# The American Political Science Review

**Articles and Essays** by Peter M. Leslie, Richard Allen Chapman, J. S. Sorzano, Jae-On Kim, John R. Petrocik and Stephen N. Enokson, N. Patrick Peritore, Claude S. Colantoni, Terrence J. Lesveque and Peter C. Ordeshook, John P. Clark, Peter G. Stillman, Meredith W. Watts, B. F. Skinner

**J. A. Laponce**
Spatial Archetypes and Political Perceptions

**Alan Marsh**
The "Silent Revolution," Value Priorities, and the Quality of Life in Britain

**Joseph A. Massey**
The Missing Leader

**Adam Przeworski**
Institutionalization of Voting Patterns, or Is Mobilization the Source of Decay?

**Avery Leiserson**
APSA Presidential Address: Charles Merriam, Max Weber, and the Search for Synthesis in Political Science

Published Quarterly by

*The American Political Science Association*

Vol. LXIX March 1975 No. 1

LIBRARY - CLEARWATER CAMPUS - SPJC

# POLITICAL SCIENCE

## PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

### Kenneth Prewitt and Sidney Verba

This text is a condensed and extensively rewritten paperback version of Prewitt and Verba's well-known text, AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. In PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, discussions from the longer text have been reworked to fulfill the needs of short courses. All the topics necessary for a well-rounded analysis of American politics are covered with a light touch.

**The compact text features**
- innovative principles
- new data
- new controversies
- absorbing material throughout on the implications of Watergate
- lively photographs
- examples from everyday life applied to American politics

**Still has a solid, objective core**
- examines the principles of democracy in American politics
- discusses the U.S. economic system and how it has shaped democracy
- considers the effects of political capitalism on American class structure
- reviews how policy is made and who makes it
- incorporates the most current research in such areas as political participation, public opinion, and elite recruitment
- covers the roles of the courts in American politics
- presents factual information on parties, elections, federalism, Congress, the Constitution, the Presidency, and the Supreme Court
- combines research in American political behavior with a thorough grounding in the basic institutions of American politics to show how citizen behavior and political structure interrelate

**Study Aids include**
- controversial debates that help students understand underlying issues and how political differences derive from them
- short "stop and think" sections on how political scientists study politics
- chapter summaries
- glossary of terms

To be published in February 1975. Tentative: 384 pages; $6.95/paper. Instructor's Manual by Pierre Wilkenson and Richard L. Cole contains chapter outlines and test questions.

1817

**FROM HARPER & ROW**

*10 East 53d Street, New York 10022*

# The American Political Science Review

Vol. LXIX March 1975 No. 1

CONTENTS

11 Spatial Archetypes and Political Perceptions J. A. Laponce

21 The "Silent Revolution," Value Priorities, and the Quality of Life in Britain Alan Marsh

31 The Missing Leader: Japanese Youths' View of Political Authority Joseph A. Massey

49 Institutionalization of Voting Patterns, or Is Mobilization the Source of Decay? Adam Przeworski

68 Interest Groups and Political Integration: The 1972 EEC Decisions in Norway and Denmark Peter M. Leslie

76 *Leviathan* Writ Small: Thomas Hobbes on the Family Richard Allen Chapman

91 David Easton and the Invisible Hand J. S. Sorzano

107 Voter Turnout Among the American States: Systemic and Individual Components Jae-On Kim, John R. Petrocik and Stephen N. Enokson

124 Comment: The American States' Impact on Voter Turnout Douglas D. Rose

132 Some Problems in Alfred Schutz's Phenomenological Methodology N. Patrick Peritore

141 Campaign Resource Allocations Under the Electoral College Claude S. Colantoni, Terrence J. Levesque, and Peter C. Ordeshook

155 Comment Steven J. Brams and Morton D. Davis

157 Rejoinder Claude S. Colantoni, Terrence J. Levesque and Peter C. Ordeshook

162 On Anarchism in an Unreal World: Kramnick's View of Godwin and the Anarchists John P. Clark

168 Comment Isaac Kramnick

169 Rejoinder John P. Clark

171 APSA Presidential Address

172 Introduction Samuel C. Patterson

175 Charles Merriam, Max Weber, and the Search for Synthesis in Political Science Avery Leiserson

186 Communications

199 Editorial Comment

202 Book Reviews and Essays

202 The Limits of Behaviorism: A Review Essay on B. F. Skinner's Social and Political Thought Peter G. Stillman

214 B. F. Skinner and the Technological Control of Social Behavior Meredith W. Watts

228 Comment B. F. Skinner

230 Rejoinder Meredith W. Watts

*Office of publication:* Curtis Reed Plaza, Menasha, Wisconsin.
*Foreign Agent:* P. S. King and Staples, Ltd., Great Smith Street, Westminster, London.
Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C., and at additional mailing offices.
Printed in the United States of America by George Banta Company, Inc., Menasha, Wisconsin.
Copyright, 1975, by The American Political Science Association

## ARTICLES

11 **Spatial Archetypes and Political Perceptions.** Assuming that the symbols demonstrated to be important to the understanding of art, literature and religion are likely to be equally useful in the study of politics leads the author to identify seven basic notations: the point, the circle, the square, the dividing line (either vertical or horizontal), and the directional line (either vertical or horizontal). The article speculates on the consequences of casting political thoughts in spatial frameworks developed out of these basic notations. Special attention is given to the Left-Right and Up-Down dimensions and to the problem of the congruence between political ideology and its underlying spatial archetype.

By J. A. Laponce, Professor of Political Science, University of British Columbia.

21 **The "Silent Revolution," Value Priorities, and the Quality of Life in Britain.** Inglehart's "Silent Revolution" thesis is examined critically through an analysis of an experimental British survey of subjective attitudes toward the "quality of life." Inglehart's techniques were replicated to identify "Acquisitive" and "Postbourgeois" types. It was found that whilst those holding to "postbourgeois" values possessed the demographic characteristics and the political dispositions predicted by Inglehart's thesis, on other highly relevant measures of values choices the postbourgeois group revealed attitudes similarly or even more "acquisitive" than the "Acquisitives." Discussion is critical of the Maslovian assumptions of Inglehart's model and proposes instead an interpretation of the postbourgeois phenomenon based upon identity and status discrepancies.

By Alan Marsh, Research Officer, SSCR Survey Unit, United Kingdom and Ford Foundation West European Visiting Fellow, Center for Political Studies, Institute of Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

31 **The Missing Leader: Japanese Youths' View of Political Authority.** Before 1945 Japan was the epitome of a nation whose political regime was based on the presence of a "benevolent leader," the Emperor. The postwar democratic regime, however, was founded in explicit repudiation of this central role of the Emperor in the political life of the nation. This study, based on two surveys of Japanese children and adolescents, investigates their images of political authority figures and the consequences of those images on support for the institutions of the present regime. The first part of the paper focuses on younger children's images of possible contenders for the role of benevolent leader. The data reveal indifference toward the emperor and strong negative affect toward the prime minister. Comparison of the images of prime minister and local leader suggests that the leader's personality and leadership style, characteristics of the institutional structure of politics, and children's conceptions of the meaning of "politics" combine to the detriment of the prime minister's image. The second part of the paper centers around the question of whether there occurs in later years a spill-over of negative affect from the prime minister's image onto the other major institutions of the regime. The data indicate that a selective political cynicism emerges in adolescence, in which negative feelings toward the authoritative, output institutions of government are coupled with support for those institutions which mediate popular participation in politics. The paper concludes with a consideration of the significance that the historical origins of a political regime have for popular images of national leaders.

By Joseph A. Massey, Assistant Professor of Government, Dartmouth College.

49 **Institutionalization of Voting Patterns, Or Is Mobilization the Source of Decay?** The effect of electoral mobilization upon the decay of political institutions is examined with reference to the stability of aggregate voting patterns in Western Europe. Historical time series are studied empirically to test predictions derived from a formal model. The conclusion is that demobilization of groups, rather than mobilization of new voters, threatens the stability of electoral institutions. It is argued that electoral mobilization is a process through which political institutions preserve stability of social relations.

By Adam Przeworski, Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago.

68 **Interest Groups and Political Integration: The 1972 EEC Decisions in Norway and Denmark.** The article examines four themes of Robert J. Lieber's article in the APSR of March 1972: "Interest Groups and Political Integration: British Entry into Europe," bringing in new evidence from the Norwegian and Danish EEC decisions of 1972. The conclusions are that:—

(a) there is conflicting evidence regarding the applicability of functionalist theories of political integration to the geographical expansion of an existing union;
(b) the attempt to link theories of interest group activity and theories of political integration is based on a premature if not unwise generalization about decision-making processes within interest organizations;
(c) politicization (as Lieber defines it) is inherently neither favorable nor unfavorable to integration; and
(d) in discussing political integration, the distinction between "high" politics (Hoffman) and welfare considerations is best abandoned, provided the observer remembers that there are more dimensions to critical decisions than the economic.

The article concludes with the suggestion that there are slim prospects for developing a theory of political integration applicable to the creation or extension of a union, and that the appropriate "vocation" for such a theory is to elucidate the workings of political systems which have two or more "levels" of political authorities.

By Peter M. Leslie, Associate Professor of Political Studies, Queen's University at Kingston.

---

76 ***Leviathan* Writ Small: Thomas Hobbes on the Family.** Though not above an occasional appeal to the "experience of fathers," Hobbes was not a patriarchalist in his view of the family. Rather, he quite deliberately represented the family as a small *Leviathan*, and he used it to illustrate the principles of Hobbesian political science. In the family, as in the state, there is a mutual relationship between protection and obedience; sovereignty is undivided, based on necessity, and justified by performance; authority is absolute and derives from consent. In the state of nature, Hobbes views the family in structure and function as a small state. In commonwealth, the family sovereign relinquishes his absolute power over wife, servant, and child, but he is still entitled to obedience and honor for having raised and educated his children. The content of family education consists of the principles of Hobbesian political science, and the children thereby are properly receptive to sovereign power as they leave the family, whether for the university or for independence.

Hobbes's conception of the family is derived from the *patria potestas* of republican Rome, and not from common law. His use of the family is fully integrated with his political theory, and it is designed to reinforce both the theory and practice of *Leviathan*.

By Richard Allen Chapman, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Montana, Missoula.

---

91 **David Easton and the Invisible Hand.** This article demonstrates that, despite David Easton's assertions to the contrary, economic conceptions play a crucial role in his version of systems theory. A comparison between Easton's model of the political system and the classical economic model of Adam Smith reveals that they share the notions of system, scarcity, allocation, competition, maximization, self-regulation, homeostatic equilibrium, goal-seeking, and feedback. This comparison of Smith and Easton not only illuminates the logical and unacknowledged historical foundations of Easton's framework, it also clarifies some common misconceptions concerning systems analysis (e.g., the idea that it is static or that it is tautological) and underscores a number of important limitations on the utility of Easton's model as a tool for political analysis (i.e., the model requires a given pattern of behavior, a particular cultural environment and a specifiable institutional complex for its operation).

By J. S. Sorzano, Assistant Professor of Government, Georgetown University.

---

107 **Voter Turnout Among the American States: Systemic and Individual Components.** Traditional studies of voter turnout in the United States have identified three factors which are presumed to explain most of the differences between the states in voter turnout: socio-demographic differences, electoral competitiveness, and differences in the rules under which elections are conducted. These studies have not, however, clearly distinguished the three factors largely because of their exclusive reliance on aggregate data to analyze the differences. The purpose of this paper is to 1) distinguish between individual and systemic components of turnout and 2) to attempt to partition the variation in turnout between the components. Unlike previous research, this study used both survey and aggregate data to decompose the variation in turnout among the states into first two components—individual and systemic, and then the latter into political (electoral competitiveness) and legal.

By Jae-On Kim, Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of Iowa and Senior Study Director, National Opinion Research Center; John Petrocik, Associate Study Director, National Opinion Research Center, and Assistant Professor of Political Science, The University of California, Los Angeles; and Stephen enockson, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science, University of Iowa.

**Comment.** By Douglas D. Rose, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Tulane University.

---

132 **Some Problems in Alfred Schutz's Phenomenological Methodology.** Alfred Schutz created a systematic methodology for the social sciences by integrating sociological concepts derived from Max Weber with the philosophical foundation provided by Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. However, much of the rigor of Schutz's analysis of social life is vitiated by his failure to come to grips with the philosophical problem of "other minds." Analysis and critique of Schutz's "general thesis of the alter ego" reveal the sterility of either pragmatic or dogmatic use of philosophic concepts in social science conceptualization, and the failure of his methodological system demonstrates the serious epistemological consequences of doing social scientific work without rigorous and radical philosophical foundation.

By N. Patrick Peritore, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Missouri, Columbia.

---

141 **Campaign Resource Allocations Under the Electoral College.** This essay addresses the question: Why does the Electoral College bias campaign resource allocations in favor of large states? Using data on candidate trips as well as estimates of the time candidates spend in states, we conclude, first, that much of the apparent empirical support for Brams and Davis's 3/2's hypothesis is an artifact of the candidates' consideration of each state's relative competitiveness and the statistical relationship between size and competitive-

ness. There is some evidence, however, for a residual bias. That is, after controlling for each state's competitiveness, campaign allocations still appear to favor larger states—at least for the two competitive elections of 1960 and 1968. We attribute that bias to corner solutions to the candidate's maximization problem and to the effects of sequential campaign planning. Thus, while we do not dispute the existence of bias over the course of the entire campaign, the data are consistent with a modified (albeit complex) proportional rule that each candidate applies sequentially during the campaign. Our conclusion is that the unit rule feature of the Electoral College, rather than weighted voting, is the predominant cause of bias.

By Claude S. Colantoni, Associate Professor of Administrative Processes and Political Economy, Carnegie-Mellon University, Terrence J. Levesque, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science, Carnegie-Mellon University, Peter C. Ordeshook, Associate Professor of Political Science, Carnegie-Mellon University.

**Comment.** By Steven J. Brams, Associate Professor of Politics, New York University, and Morton D. Davis, Associate Professor of Mathematics, City College of New York.

**Rejoinder.** By Claude S. Colantoni, Terrence J. Levesque, and Peter C. Ordeshook.

---

162 **On Anarchism In An Unreal World: Kramnick's View of Godwin and the Anarchists.** In his political theory, William Godwin, the founder of philosophical anarchism, defends a form of decentralized democracy as a transition stage toward his ideal of a stateless society. Godwin sanctioned temporary alliance with liberal political factions, and was a staunch defender of freedom of thought and expression. Contrary to Isaac Kramnick's interpretation, he bitterly opposed authoritarian measures such as Grenville's and Pitt's bills, although he also rejected violence as a valid means toward reform. Kramnick's reduction of anarchist praxis to education and theater constitutes a serious distortion of historical fact, and ignores the significance of revolutionary struggle, syndicalist organization, intentional communities, and nonviolent resistance as anarchist tactics. His assertion that anarchism is elitist involves a misunderstanding of the anarchist principles of popular participation and self-management, and his position that anarchism serves to perpetuate the status quo exhibits a failure to deal with the issues presented by the anarchist analysis of the effects of government and the nature of social change.

By John P. Clark, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Loyola University in New Orleans.

**Comment.** By Isaac Kramnick, Professor of Government, Cornell University.

**Rejoinder.** By John P. Clark.

---

171 **APSA Presidential Address**

***Introduction***

By Samuel C. Patterson, Professor of Political Science, University of Iowa.

**Charles Merriam, Max Weber, and the Search for Synthesis in Political Science.** The centenary of Merriam's birth provides the opportunity to reappraise the consequences of his prophetic advocacy of a more scientific expression and systematization of political knowledge. The vehicle for this appraisal is a comparison of Merriam's "activist" epistemology with the more self-limiting methodology of Max Weber who, perhaps among all twentieth-century social scientists, stated most explicitly and experienced most poignantly the tensions among the requirements of acquiring objective knowledge about politics and exercising responsibility in political action. Notwithstanding their many points of difference, Merriam and Weber are interpreted as sharing common grounds of disbelief that the disjunction between science and politics will be removed by the development of a unifying, paradigmatic world-view, either within political science or between the several sciences of man, nature, and society. The political context and role of scientists are visualized by the author as consisting in: (1) mastering the personal temptations and obstacles to achieving their own peculiar brand of political competence, (2) securing public recognition and respect for the factual-scientific component of controversial situations involving their sphere of expertness, and (3) acting upon the assumption of joint skills and contributions, along with other scientists, philosophers, technicians (including politicians), and participating citizens in improving the utilization of scientific research in the formulation of public policy and reform of governing institutions.

By Avery Leiserson, Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University.

---

186 COMMUNICATIONS

From Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Ole R. Holsti, Patrick Riley, Richard Kennington, Otwin Marenin, Harry Eckstein, Allan Bloom, R. E. Allen.

---

199 EDITORIAL COMMENT

---

202 BOOK REVIEWS AND ESSAYS

202 **The Limits of Behaviorism: A Review Essay on B. F. Skinner's Social and Political Thought.** After a brief review of the debate that surrounds B. F. Skinner's social and political thought, this essay argues that, even

if Skinner's behaviorism is accepted as valid, nonetheless his social and political thought is inadequate and self-contradictory. Skinner's treatment of social organization (or "sociological problems") contains two serious, perhaps insoluble, technical difficulties. His treatment of values (or "philosophical problems") is fraught with contradiction, because he cannot meld what is valued with what leads to survival, because his planners can easily misperceive the objective world, and because he cannot justify cultural survival as the ultimate value. On "political problems," Skinner is vague and incomplete; he proposes no effective means of "countercontrol"; and his behaviorism does not contain within itself the imperative to any particular type of political system. Because Skinner's social and political thought fails at crucial points, all the problems that Skinner tried to close must be kept open and—whatever may be the technical successes and failures of behaviorism—the answers to some fundamental issues of human life must be sought beyond behaviorism.

By Peter G. Stillman, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Vassar College.

---

214 **B. F. Skinner and the Technological Control of Social Behavior.** Humanist critiques of B. F. Skinner have made valuable contributions to our understanding of his thought, but more attention needs to be paid to his work as potential empirical theory. To evaluate the theoretical merits of Skinner's approach, this paper examines his methodological postulates, his implicit epistemology, and some underlying normative assumptions. It is argued that Skinnerian behaviorism commits a serious error in allowing a methodological presupposition (reduction of the subject matter to observable behavior of the organism) to become a de facto ontology that prematurely forecloses the incorporation of potentially valuable hypothetical constructs at the level of social theory. This theoretical difficulty is critical because the inherent safeguards of *science* that Skinner proposes as a humane safeguard against misuse would be unlikely to apply to an actual *technology* of behavior control as employed by political and administrative authorities.

By Meredith W. Watts, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee.

**Comment.** By B. F. Skinner, Professor of Psychology, Harvard University.

**Rejoinder.** By Meredith W. Watts.

---

238 **Political Theory, History of Political Thought and Methodology**

Henri Arvon, *Marxist Esthetics.* Trans. by Helen Lane. Alfred G. Meyer, p. 238
Guy Benveniste, *The Politics of Expertise.* Harvey M. Sapolsky, p. 238
Carl Cohen, *Democracy.* John R. Champlin, p. 239
Carl J. Friedrich, *The Pathology of Politics: Violence, Betrayal, Corruption, Secrecy and Propaganda.* Arnold J. Heidenheimer, p. 240
Morton J. Frisch and Richard G. Stevens, eds., *American Political Thought: The Philosophic Dimension of American Statesmanship.* Charles S. Hyneman, p. 241
Eugene Goodheart, *Culture and the Radical Conscience.* Stanley Rosen, p. 242
J. A. W. Gunn, *Factions No More: Attitudes to Party in Government & Opposition In Eighteenth-Century England.* Nannerl O. Keohane, p. 243
Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests.* Kenneth L. Deutsch, p. 245
Michal Kalecki, *Selected Essays in Dynamics of the Captialist Economy.* Andrew Glyn, p. 246
Maurice Mandelbaum, *History, Man, and Reason: A Study in Nineteenth Century Thought.* George Armstrong Kelly, p. 247
Thomas Mayer, *Permanent Income, Wealth, and Consumption.* Lester D. Taylor, p. 249
Ronald L. Meek, trans. and ed., *Turgot on Progress, Sociology, and Economics.* Gerald J. Cavanaugh, p. 250
Robert D. Nye, *Conflict Among Humans: Some Basic Psychological and Social-Psychological Considerations.* Stephen J. Andriole, p. 251
J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds., *Coercion. Nomos XIV, Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy.* P. H. Partridge, p. 252
J. G. A. Pocock, *Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History.* Robert Heineman, p. 254
Trent Schroyer, *The Critique of Domination.* Paul Thomas, p. 255
Peter Singer, *Democracy and Disobedience.* John Plamenatz, p. 257
Paul Sites, *Control: The Basis of Social Order.* Philip H. Melanson, p. 257
Paul Smith, *Lord Salisbury on Politics: A Selection from his articles in the Quarterly Review,* 1860–1883. William B. Gwyn, p. 258
Georges Sorel, *The Illusions of Progress.* Trans. by John and Charlotte Stanley. Donna Robinson Divine, p. 259
Thomas A. Spragens, Jr., *The Dilemma of Contemporary Political Theory: Toward a Postbehavioral Science of Politics.* Eugene J. Meehan, p. 260
Thomas A. Spragens, Jr., *The Politics of Motion: The World of Thomas Hobbes.* Herbert W. Schneider, p. 262

---

263 **American Government and Politics**

Isaac D. Balbus, *The Dialectics of Legal Repression: Black Rebels before the American Criminal Courts.* George F. Cole, p. 263

John A. Brittain, *The Payroll Tax for Social Security.* Juanita M. Kreps, p. 264
Common Cause, 1972 *Congressional Campaign Finances.* Nelson W. Polsby, p. 265
Thomas L. Connelly and Archer Jones, *The Politics of Command: Factions and Ideas in Confederate Strategy.* James E. Sefton, p. 265
Abraham L. Davis, *The United States Supreme Court and the Uses of Social Science Data.* James Eisenstein, p. 266
Donald J. Devine, *The Political Culture of the United States.* Glenn R. Parker, p. 267
C. Thomas Dienes, *Law, Politics and Birth Control.* John R. Schmidhauser, p. 268
Robert F. Durden, *The Gray and the Black: The Confederate Debate On Emancipation.* Michael Perman, p. 269
Miriam Ershowitz and Joseph Zikmund, eds., *Black Politics in Philadelphia.* Fred J. Foley, Jr., p. 270
Leon Friedman and Burt Neuborne, *Unquestioning Obedience to the President: The ACLU Case Against the Legality of the War in Vietnam.* C. Herman Pritchett, p. 271
John J. Gargan and James G. Coke, eds., *Political Behavior and Public Issues in Ohio.* Douglas Gatlin, p. 271
Brett W. Hawkins, *Politics and Urban Policies.* Martin Shefter, p. 273
Harold M. Hyman, *A More Perfect Union: The Impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction on the Constitution.* Donald L. Robinson, p. 274
Peter Kobrak, *Private Assumption of Public Responsibilities: The Role of American Business in Urban Manpower Programs.* Marshall E. Dimock, p. 275
Peter Kolchin, *First Freedom: The Responses of Alabama's Blacks to Emancipation and Reconstruction.* Richard N. Current, p. 276
Julian Martin Laub, *The College and Community Development: A Socio-economic Analysis for Urban and Regional Growth.* Harold E. Quinley, p. 277
David Lebedoff, *Ward Number Six.* Donald G. Herzberg, p. 277
S. Menshikov, *Millionaires and Managers.* Lynn Turgeon, p. 278
Oscar Newman, *Defensible Space: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design.* Vincent Ostrom, p. 279
Eric A. Nordlinger, *Decentralizing the City: A Study of Boston's Little City Halls.* Betty H. Zisk, p. 280
Richard Polenberg, *War and Society: The United States 1941–1945.* Frederick J. Dobney, p. 282
Richard C. Ratliff, *Constitutional Rights of College Students: A Study in Case Law.* Richard J. Richardson, p. 282
Harrell R. Rodgers, Jr. and Charles S. Bullock, III, *Law and Social Change: Civil Rights Laws and Their Consequences.* Alan H. Schechter, p. 283
Yonathan Shapiro, *Leadership of the American Zionist Organization, 1897–1930.* Daniel J. Elazar, p. 284
Robert Shogan, *A Question of Judgment: The Fortas Case and the Struggle for the Supreme Court.* Michael J. Malbin, p. 285
Geoffrey Smith, *To Save a Nation: American Countersubversives, The New Deal and the Coming of World War II.* Wilson Carey McWilliams, p. 286
Howard Tolley, Jr., *Children and War.* Joseph Adelson, p. 288
Wilcomb E. Washburn, ed., *The American Indian and the United States: A Documentary History.* Frances Svensson, p. 288
Washington Research Project. *The Shameful Blight: The Survival of Racial Discrimination in Voting in the South.* Hanes Walton, Jr., p. 289
Robert G. Weisbrod and Arthur Stein, *Bittersweet Encounter: The Afro-American And The American Jew.* Joyce Gelb, p. 289
Betty H. Zisk, *Local Interest Politics: A One-Way Street.* Lawrence Baum, p. 290

---

**291 Comparative Government and Politics**

Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology;* and A. F. Davies, *Essays in Political Sociology*, J. M. Power, p. 291
Gabriel A. Almond, Scott C. Flanagan, and Robert J. Mundt, eds., *Crisis, Choice, and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development.* Fred W. Riggs, p. 293
Alan Arian, ed., *The Elections in Israel—1969.* Gerald M. Pomper, p. 294
Zygmunt Bauman, *Between Class and Elite: The Evolution of the British Labour Movement;* and Allen Hutt, *The Post-War History of the British Working Class*, J. M. Winter, p. 295
Pierre Broué and Emile Témime, *The Revolution and the Civil War in Spain.* Trans. by Tony White. Carolyn P. Boyd, p. 297
Mark W. Cannon, R. Scott Fosler, and Robert Witherspoon, *Urban Government for Valencia, Venezuela.* Daniel H. Levine, p. 298
Mary C. Carras, *The Dynamics of Indian Political Factions: A Study of District Councils in the State of Maharashtra.* Marcus F. Franda, p. 299
R. S. Chauhan, *The Political Development in Nepal, 1950–70: Conflict Between Tradition and Modernity.* Pashupati Shumshere J. B. Rana, p. 300
Ronald H. Chilcote, ed., *Protest and Resistance in Angola and Brazil: Comparative Studies.* Iêda Siqueira Wiarda, p. 301
Walter D. Connor, *Deviance in Soviet Society: Crime, Delinquency, and Alcholism.* Peter Grothe, p. 302
Hilary Conroy and T. Scott Miyakawa, *East Across the Pacific: Historical and Sociological Studies of Japanese Immigration and Assimilation.* George DeVos, p. 303

Ian M. Drummond, *British Economic Policy and the Empire*, 1919–1939. Zara Steiner, p. 304
Jean Esmein, *The Chinese Cultural Revolution.* Trans. by W. J. F. Jenner. Gordon Bennett, p. 305
J. Valerie Fifer, *Bolivia: Land, Location and Politics since 1825.* James M. Malloy, p. 306
Piero Gheddo, *The Cross and the Bo-Tree: Catholics and Buddhists in Vietnam.* Trans. by Charles Underhill Quinn; and Stephen T. Hosmer, *Viet Cong Repression and its Implications for the Future.* Allan E. Goodman, p. 306
Granada Television, *The State of the Nation: Parliament.* Leon D. Epstein, p. 308
Stefan A. Halper and John R. Serling, eds., *Latin America: The Dynamics of Social Change.* John M. Baines, p. 309
Maurice Halperin, *The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro;* and Jaime Suchlicki, ed., *Cuba, Castro,* and *Revolution.* Russell H. Fitzgibbon, p. 310
Gayle Durham Hollander, *Soviet-Political Indoctrination: Development in Mass Media and Propaganda Since Stalin.* Frederick C. Barghoorn, p. 312
Mark W. Hopkins, *Mass Media in the Soviet Union.* David E. Powell, p. 314
Henry Horwitz, ed., *The Parliamentary Diary of Narcissus Luttrell, 1691–1693.* W. J. Jones, p. 314
Richard G. Hovannisian, *The Republic of Armenia, Volume I: The First Year, 1918–1919.* Robert L. Daniel, p. 315
Dale L. Johnson, ed., *The Chilean Road to Socialism;* and J. Ann Zammit, ed., *The Chilean Road to Socialism.* Paul E. Sigmund, p. 316
Morton A. Kaplan, *Dissent and the State in Peace and War: An Essai on the Grounds of Public Morality.* Geoffrey Stern, p. 318
Nina Karsov and Szymon Szechter, *In the Name of Tomorrow: Life Underground in Poland.* Joseph R. Fiszman, p. 319
Seymour P. Kaye and Arthur I. Marsh. eds., *International Manual on Collective Bargaining for Public Employees.* Harry F. Stark, p. 320
David Owen Kieft, *Belgium's Return to Neutrality: An Essay in the Frustrations of Small Power Diplomacy.* Jean Barrea, p. 321
Gilbert Kushner, *Immigrants from India in Israel: Planned Change in an Administered Community.* Stephen Oren, p. 322
Eduardo Lachica, *The Huks: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt.* Eliezer B. Ayal, p. 323
Ann K. S. Lambton, *The Persian Land Reform 1962–1966.* G. H. Razi, p. 324
Branko Lazitch and Milorad M. Drachkovitch, *Lenin and the Comintern, Volume I.* Thomas Fiddick, p. 324
Daniel H. Levine, *Conflict and Political Change in Venezuela.* John D. Martz, p. 326
Herbert S. Levine, *Hitler's Free City: A History of the Nazi Party in Danzig, 1925–30.* Kenneth R. Nelson, p. 327
Leif Lewin, Bo Jansson and Dag Sörbom, *The Swedish Electorate 1887–1968.* Robert B. Kvavik, p. 328
Martha F. Loutfi, *The Net Cost of Japanese Foreign Aid;* and Wilbur F. Monroe, *Japan: Financial Markets and the World Economy.* Martin Bronfenbrenner, p. 329
Joseph L. Love, *Rio Grande Do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism 1882–1930.* Riordan Roett, p. 329
Mahmood Mamdani, *The Myth of Population Control: Family, Caste and Class in an Indian Village.* Charles S. Brant, p. 330
David G. Mandelbaum, *Society in India, Vol. 1: Continuity and Change; Vol. 2: Change and Continuity.* T. N. Madan, p. 331
Byron G. Massialas, ed., *Political Youth, Traditional Schools: National and International Perspectives.* Frank A. Pinner, p. 333
Kenneth N. Medhurst, *Government in Spain: The Executive at Work.* Charles W. Anderson, p. 334
B. R. Nanda, ed., *Socialism in India.* Lewis P. Fickett, Jr., p. 335
Karl J. Newman, *European Democracy Between the Wars.* Trans. by Kenneth Morgan. C. B. Robson, p. 336
William E. Odom, *The Soviet Volunteers: Modernization and Bureaucracy in a Public Mass Organization.* Ellen Mickiewicz, p. 337
Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940–1944.* Henry W. Ehrmann, p. 338
Jiri Pelikan, ed., *The Secret Vysocany Congress: Proceedings and Documents of the Extraordinary Fourteenth Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 22 August 1968.* Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz, p. 339
Jaroslaw A. Piekalkiewicz, *Public Opinion Polling in Czechoslovakia, 1968–69; Results and Analysis of Surveys Conducted During the Dubcek Era.* Barbara Jancar, p. 340
Merlyn Rees, *The Public Sector in the Mixed Economy.* Leonard Tivey, p. 342
Felix Reichmann and Josephine M. Tharpe with the cooperation of Henriette Avram, Suzanne Dodson, Henry Gochman and Laura Jennings, *Bibliographic Control of Microforms.* John Brown Mason, p. 343
Bernard Schwartz and H. W. R. Wade, *Legal Control of Government: Administrative Law in Britain and the United States.* G. W. Jones, p. 343
Paul K. T. Sih, ed., *The Strenuous Decade: China's Nation-Building Efforts, 1927–1937;* Arthur N. Young, *China's Nation-Building Effort, 1927–1937: The Financial and Economic Record;* Arthur N. Young, *China and the Helping Hand, 1937–1945;* and Arthur N. Young, *China's Wartime Finance and Inflation, 1937–1945.* John H. Boyle, p. 344
Richard Sisson, *The Congress Party in Rajasthan: Political Integration and Institution Building in an Indian State.* Stanley A. Kochanek, p. 346
Harvey H. Smith and others, *Area Handbook For Israel.* Myron J. Aronoff, p. 347

William E. Steslicke, *Doctors in Politics: The Political Life of the Japan Medical Association.* Nobutaka Ike, p. 348
Joseph S. Szyliowicz, *Education and Modernization in the Middle East.* Nermin Abadan-Unat, p. 349
T. N. Tamuno, *The Evolution of the Nigerian State: The Southern Phase 1898–1914.* Ronald Cohen, p. 351
D. J. M. Tate, *The Making of Modern Southeast Asia, Volume I: The European Conquest.* Barbara N. McLennan, p. 351
Hung-mao Tien, *Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927–1937.* Allen B. Linden, p. 352
Charles Wendell, *The Evolution of the Egyptian National Image: From its Origins to Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid.* Majid Khadduri, p. 353
Richard West, *Back to Africa: A History of Sierra Leone and Liberia.* Edgar S. Efrat, p. 354
Sal Alexander Westrich, *The Ormée of Bordeaux: A Revolution during the Fronde.* Charles Tilly, p. 355
Philip M. Williams and Martin Harrison, *Politics and Society in de Gaulle's Republic.* Bernard E. Brown, p. 356
I. William Zartman, ed., *Man, State, and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib.* John Waterbury, p. 357
Sidney H. Zebel, *Balfour: A Political Biography.* Joel M. Fisher, p. 358

**359 International Politics, Law and Organization**

Benedict S. Alper and Jerry F. Boren, *Crime: International Agenda.* Richard N. Swift, p. 359
R. P. Barston, ed., *The Other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States.* Timothy M. Shaw, p. 360
Lynton K. Caldwell, *In Defense of Earth.* J. E. S. Fawcett, p. 361
Hungdah Chiu, ed., *China and the Question of Taiwan: Documents and Analysis.* Allen S. Whiting, p. 363
Jerome Alan Cohen, *China's Practice of International Law: Some Case Studies.* Arthur A. Stahnke, p. 364
Isaac Cohen Orantes, *Regional Integration in Central America.* Gail R. Sherman, p. 365
Jean-Pierre Cot, *International Conciliation.* David Brook, p. 366
Maurice Cranston, *What Are Human Rights?* Vernon Van Dyke, p. 367
Foster Rhea Dulles, *American Foreign Policy Toward Communist China, 1949–1969.* James Chieh Hsiung, p. 368
Richard A. Falk, ed., *The Vietnam War and International Law. Vol. 3: The Widening Context.* Charles H. McLaughlin, p. 369
Richard A. Falk, *This Endangered Planet: Prospects and Proposals for Human Survival.* Don C. Piper, p. 370
Werner J. Feld, *Nongovernmental Forces and World Politics: A Study of Business, Labor, and Political Groups.* Edward L. Morse, p. 372
William T. R. Fox and Warner R. Schilling, eds., *European Security and the Atlantic System.* J. I. Coffey, p. 373
F. H. Hinsley, *Nationalism and the International System.* Hedley Bull, p. 374
William Hinton, *Hundred Day War: The Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua University.* Alice Langley Hsieh, p. 374
Philip C. Jessup, *The Price of International Justice.* Anthony D'Amato, p. 375
Jung-Gun Kim and John M. Howell, *Conflict of International Obligations and State Interests.* James A. Caporaso, p. 376
Young C. Kim, ed., *Japan in World Politics.* Theodore McNelly, p. 377
William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., *SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970s.* Alton H. Quanbeck, p. 378
Manfred Knapp, *Die Stimme Amerikas: Auslandspropaganda der USA unter der Regierung John F. Kennedys.* Alan Aichinger, p. 379
W. W. Kulski, *The Soviet Union in World Affairs: A Documented Analysis, 1964–72.* Robert C. Horn, p. 380
Robert J. Lieber, *Theory and World Politics.* Dina A. Zinnes, p. 381
Evan Luard, ed., *The International Regulation of Civil Wars.* Frank Barnaby, p. 382
Ernest R. May and James C. Thomson, Jr., *American-East Asian Relations: A Survey.* Frank E. Rogers, p. 384
W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, eds., *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939. Second Series, Volume XI.* Gary B. Ostrower, p. 385
Franz Michael and Gaston J. Sigur, *The Asian Alliance: Japan and the United States Policy.* J. A. A. Stockwin, p. 386
Jaan Pennar, *The U.S.S.R. and the Arabs: The Ideological Dimension 1917–1972.* James M. McCormick, p. 387
Brian Porter, ed., *The Aberystwyth Papers International Politics 1919–1969.* Max Beloff, p. 387
Jon M. Reinhardt, *Foreign Policy and National Integration: The Case of Indonesia.* Justus M. van der Kroef, p. 389
J. David Singer and Melvin Small, *The Wages of War 1816–1965: A Statistical Handbook.* R. J. Rummel, p. 390
Michael David Wallace, *War and Rank among Nations.* Gordon Hilton, p. 391
John Yin, *Sino-Soviet Dialogue on the Problem of War.* Roy U. T. Kim, p. 392

# The American Political Science Association

1527 New Hampshire Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

*President:* Austin Ranney, University of Wisconsin, Madison; *President-Elect:* James MacGregor Burns, Williams College; *Vice Presidents:* Elinor Ostrom, Indiana University; Herbert McClosky, University of California at Berkeley; Jewel L. Prestage, Southern University; *Secretary:* Wilson Carey McWilliams, Rutgers University; *Treasurer:* Betty A. Nesvold, San Diego State University; *Program Chairman:* William J. Keefe, University of Pittsburgh; *Executive Director:* Evron M. Kirkpatrick, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036; *Managing Editor, APSR:* Nelson W. Polsby, University of California, Berkeley.

**COUNCIL:** (Above-named Officers *ex officiis*), 1974–75: Lucius Barker, Washington University, St. Louis; Martin Diamond, Northern Illinois University; Ada W. Finifter, Michigan State University; Stanley Hoffmann, Harvard University; Theodore J. Lowi, Cornell University; Francine F. Rabinovitz, University of California, Los Angeles; Sidney Verba, Harvard University; Aaron Wildavsky, University of California, Berkeley. 1975–76: Hayward R. Alker, Jr., MIT; Leonard Binder, University of Chicago; Seymour Martin Lipset, Harvard University; Dale Rogers Marshall, University of California at Davis; Samuel C. Patterson, University of Iowa; Frances Fox Piven, Boston University; Mulford Hugh Sibley, University of Minnesota; John E. Turner, University of Minnesota.

**FORMER PRESIDENTS:** Frank J. Goodnow, Albert Shaw, Frederic N. Judson, James Bryce, A. Lawrence Lowell, Woodrow Wilson, Simeon E. Baldwin, Albert Bushnell Hart, W. W. Willoughby, John Bassett Moore, Ernst Freund, Jesse Macy, Munroe Smith, Henry Jones Ford, Paul S. Reinsch, Leo S. Rowe, William A. Dunning, Harry A. Garfield, James W. Gardner, Charles E. Merriam, Charles A. Beard, William B. Munro, Jesse S. Reeves, John A. Fairlie, Benjamin F. Shambaugh, Edward S. Corwin, William F. Willoughby, Isidor Loeb, Walter J. Shepard, Francis W. Coker, Arthur N. Holcombe, Thomas Reed Powell, Clarence A. Dykstra, Charles Grove Haines, Robert C. Brooks, Frederick A. Ogg, William Anderson, Robert E. Cushman, Leonard D. White, John M. Gaus, Walter F. Dodd, Arthur W. MacMahon, Henry R. Spencer, Quincy Wright, James K. Pollock, Peter H. Odegard, Luther H. Gulick, Pendleton Herring, Ralph J. Bunche, Charles McKinley, Harold D. Lasswell, E. E. Schattschneider, V. O. Key, Jr., R. Taylor Cole, Carl B. Swisher, Emmette S. Redford, Charles S. Hyneman, Carl J. Friedrich, C. Herman Pritchett, David B. Truman, Gabriel A. Almond, Robert A. Dahl, Merle Fainsod, David Easton, Karl W. Deutsch, Robert E. Lane, Heinz Eulau, Robert E. Ward, Avery Leiserson.

# The American Political Science Review

Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley 94720

**EDITORIAL BOARD:** Nelson W. Polsby, *Managing Editor, University of California, Berkeley;* Philip Siegelman, *Book Review Editor, California State University, San Francisco;* Shlomo Avineri, *The Hebrew University of Jerusalem;* Lucius Barker, *Washington University;* Brian Barry, *Nuffield College, Oxford University;* Richard A. Brody, *Stanford University;* Samuel D. Cook, *Dillard University;* Elmer E. Cornwell, *Brown University;* S. Rufus Davis, *Monash University;* Robert J. Jackson, *Carleton University;* Robert Jervis, *University of California, Los Angeles;* Dale Rogers Marshall, *University of California, Davis;* Russell D. Murphy, *Wesleyan University;* Joan M. Nelson, *Washington, D.C.;* J. Roland Pennock, *Swarthmore College;* Samuel L. Popkin, *University of Texas, Austin;* Robert D. Putnam, *University of Michigan;* Douglas W. Rae, *Yale University;* Austin Ranney, *University of Wisconsin;* Giovanni Sartori, *University of Florence;* Michael J. Shapiro, *University of Hawaii;* Jay Starling, *Southern Methodist University;* Stephen V. Stephens, *The Johns Hopkins University;* George E. Von der Muhll, *University of California, Santa Cruz;* Richard A. Watson, *University of Missouri;* Richard Winters, *Dartmouth College.* **MANUSCRIPT EDITOR:** Ellen Y. Siegelman. **EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS:** Barbara Epstein, Betsey Cobb, Melissa Pihl. **EDITORIAL INTERNS:** Robert Arseneau, Charles Bann, Christopher R. Barr, Jonathan Bendor, Colin Campbell, Beth Capell, Peter Cowhey, Shai Feldman, Richard Gunther, John Q. Johnson, Richard G. C. Johnston, Yvonne Jones, Elaine Kamark, Harry Kreisler, David Laitin, James I. Lengle, William M. Lunch, Ian Lustick, David B. Magleby, Tom Reese, Stuart A. Ross, Christine M. Sierra, Stephen Van Evera, M. Stephen Weatherford.

# About the American Political Science Review

*The American Political Science Review,* published quarterly during the months of March, June, September, and December, is supplied to all APSA members. Membership dues are charged according to the following schedule:

| *Membership Category* | *Dues* |
|---|---|
| Regular | |
| *Annual income* | |
| Under 12,000 | $20 |
| $12,000–$15,000 | $25 |
| Over $15,000 | $30 |
| Student and Retired | $10 |
| Family | $5 |
| Life | $1000 |
| Institutional (includes *APSR* and *PS*) | $50 |

Student memberships are limited to five years per person. Foreign currency at the official exchange rate will be accepted for foreign subscriptions and foreign membership fees. The equivalent of $1 for additional postage should be added for foreign subscriptions.

*Current issues* are priced at $10.50 per copy; for *back issues prior* to 1968 address Walter J. Johnson, Inc., 355 Chestnut St., Norwood, New Jersey 07648; for issues 1968 and later send request directly to the American Political Science Association.

*Applications for membership,* orders for the *Review,* and remittances should be addressed to the Executive Director, The American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. *Notices of changes of address* should be received in the Washington office by the 25th day of the months before publication.

## INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTRIBUTORS

Address correspondence about contributions to the *Review* to Nelson W. Polsby, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California 94720. Each manuscript should be accompanied by an abstract of up to 150 words briefly describing the article's contents. All manuscripts and abstracts should be submitted IN DUPLICATE. They should be double-spaced and may be in typed, mimeographed, hectographed, or other legible form. Footnotes should appear at the end of the manuscript, not at the bottom of the page, and should also be doubled-spaced. Manuscripts that do not follow this format will be returned to the authors for retyping.

Since manuscripts are sent out anonymously for editorial evaluation, the author's name and affiliations should appear only on a separate covering page. All footnotes identifying the author should also appear on a separate page.

Address books intended for review to Philip Siegelman, *American Political Science Review,* 210 Barrows Hall, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California 94720. Information, including News and Notes, for the Association's newsjournal, *PS,* should be sent to 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036; advertising, reprint and circulation correspondence should be sent to the Executive Director at the Washington office. Domestic claims for non-receipt of issues must be made within six months of the month of publication; overseas claims, one year. Advertising information and rates are available from Nancy Edgerton, Adv. Manager, APSA, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Articles and notes appearing in the *Review* before the June, 1953 issues were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature.* Current issues are indexed by *The International Political Science Abstracts* and the *Social Sciences and Humanities Index.* Microfilm of the *Review,* beginning with Volume 1, may be obtained from University Microfilms, 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. A *Cumulative Index* of the *Review,* Volumes 1–62: 1906–1968, may also be obtained from University Microfilms. Articles appearing in the *Review* are listed regularly in *ABC Pol Sci* and *Current Contents: Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences.* Book reviews are indexed in *Book Review Index.*

# Spatial Archetypes and Political Perceptions

J. A. LAPONCE
*University of British Columbia*

In his work on language and man-made signs, Sapir distinguishes two major types of symbols: referential symbols which, like words in the Latin script, provide economical references to objects, events or ideas but do not "look like" these objects, events or ideas, and condensation symbols which, like sculptures or paintings, seek to map the shape or "essence" of the same objects, events or ideas and, by so doing, often act on our emotions.[1] The spatial archetypes I propose to study belong to the latter category.

### The Importance of Spatial Archetypes

Why study spatial symbols? Why give privileged attention to archetypes? Eliade, Bachelard, Poulet, Durand, Cassirer, Lévi-Strauss, and Jung have convinced me that identifying the spatial structures which underlie the thoughts of given individuals or cultures is essential to the understanding of their religious, mythical, philosophical, or literary perceptions and creations.[2] This conviction leads me to assume that the symbols demonstrated to be important to the understanding of arts, literatures, and religions are likely to be equally useful in the study of politics, for at least two reasons.

(a) Our perception of space in terms of up and down, left and right, close and far, front and behind has universal or near-universal characteristics related to biological and physical constants such as the pull of gravity, the concentration of the major sensory organs in the front of the upper part of the body, and the slight imbalance between the two hemispheres of the brain as well as between the two sides of the body.[3] We can then propose universal explanations of the applications of spatial symbols to social, and more specifically to political phenomena—I shall do so in a subsequent section of this paper—and we can measure the effect of the use or "misuse" of these symbols by relating cultural variables to noncultural invariants. Thus, I side with Monod and Hall: Culture is best studied from its biological and physical anchors.[4]

---

[1] See Edward Sapir, *Language: An Introduction to the Study of Speech* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1921); and his "symbolism" article in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, 1934), v. 14, 492–95. The distinction between referential and emotive terms is also made by Charles K. Ogden and I. A. Richards in *The Meaning of Meaning* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench and Trubner, 1923). For an application of this conceptual grid, see for example, W. Lloyd Warner, *The Living and the Dead, a Study of the Symbolic Life of Americans* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959).

[2] See in particular Mircea Eliade, *Traité d'histoire des religions* (Paris: Payot, 1949); Mircea Eliade, *Images et symboles, essai sur le symbolisme magico-religieux* (Paris: Gallimard, 1952); Mircea Eliade, *Mythes, rêves et mystères* (Paris: Gallimard, 1957), translated as *Myths, Dreams and Mysteries* (New York: Harper & Row, 1960). Gaston Bachelard, *L'Air et les songes* (Paris: Corti, 1943); Gaston Bachelard, *La terre et les rêveries de la volonté* (Paris: Corti, 1948); Gaston Bachelard, *La poétique de l'espace* (Paris: P.U.F., 1957); Gaston Bachelard, *La poétique de la rêverie* (Paris: P.U.F., 1960); Georges Poulet, *Les métamorphoses du cercle* (Paris: Plon, 1961); Jean-Pierre Richard, *Poésie et profoundeur* (Paris: Seuil, 1955); Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* (English trans., Ralph Manheim, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955); Carl Gustav Jung, *Psychology and Religion: West and East* (English trans., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), *Symbols of Transformation* (trans. R. F. C. Hull; New York: Harper, 1956) and the other volumes of his collected works in the Bollingen series; see also his posthumous *Man and His Symbols* (New York: Doubleday, 1964); see Claude Lévi-Strauss "Mythologiques" particularly: *L'Origine des manières de table* (Paris: Plon, 1968) and *L'Homme nu* (Paris: Plon, 1971); see Joseph Campbell, *The Masks of God Series* (New York: Viking Press Asso., 1959–68), particularly his *Creative Mythology* (New York: Viking Press, 1968), and his *The Hero with a Thousand Faces* (New York: Pantheon, 1949). A survey of the psychoanalytical literature on symbols and archetypes is given by Sydney Margolin "Psychoanalysis and Symbols" in Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, R. M. Maciver and Richard McKeon, *Symbols and Values: An Initial Study* (New York: Harper & Row, 1954), 507–521. An analysis of the notions of archetypes and primordial images in the works of Jung is in Walter Odajnyk "The Political Ideas of C. G. Jung," *The American Political Science Review*, 67 (March 73), 142–153. Excellent discussions and bibliographies on myths and archetypes are given by Gilbert Durand, *Les structures anthropologiques de l'imaginaire, introduction à l'archétypologie générale* (Paris: Bordas, 1969), and by Geoffrey S. Kirk, *Myth: Its Meaning and Function in Ancient and Other Cultures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

[3] The observations of child psychologists indicate that the up-down is the first spatial dimension to be perceived and controlled, left-right being the last. See Arnold Gesell, *The First Five Years of Life* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1940). For a recent work and guide through the abundant literature on the influence of nature and culture in left handedness, see Marian Annett, "The Distribution of Manual Asymmetry," *British Journal of Psychology*, 63 (August 1972), 343–358. For a brief summary of the findings on brain dominance, see Paul Bakan, "The Eyes Have It," *Psychology Today* (April 1971) and Doreen Kimura "The Asymmetry of the Human Brain," *Scientific American* (March 1973), 70–81.

(b) Spatial dimensions and the shapes (archetypes or specific structures) which we fit into these dimensions provide powerful systems of classification that can easily be transferred from an explanation of the physical to the understanding of the social and the cultural; easily because negative and positive values can be clearly attached to these dimensions. For example, spatially bounded forms lend themselves particularly well to the classification of in and out groups (close and far; center and periphery); and some spatial continuums call to mind the idea of social hierarchies (up and down, left and right) etc. . . . Furthermore, spatial symbols can also become time symbols; it is enough that a continuum be given a direction to express time as well as space.

### The Basic "Mapping-Cognitive Spatial Symbols": Variations on the Dot and the Line

The dot, the ultimate shape before or after nothingness, the point which evades time and almost evades space, whether focusing a nonmoving center or signifying the origin of things, has attracted the attention of an impressive number of philosophers and played an important role in the shaping of Eastern and, to a lesser extent, of Western thought.[5] In Hindu symbolism, especially in Tantric doctrines, the Bindu (point, dot) draws the mind to that ideal location where the creative and divine forces have their greatest and most potent concentration. In Western Christian culture which is on the whole dominated by a sign of tension—the sign of the cross—the reduction in size, the idea of intense concentration to the point of disappearance is used in similar ways.[6] Rome is less holy than the Vatican, which is less holy than the Chapel, which is less holy than the altar; and on the altar as one focuses toward the center, first on the tabernacle, then on the host, one reaches the most intense source of sacredness. There are obvious physical reasons for this being so. The more space taken by an object, the more difficult for that object not to come into contact with profane areas of the very space which it occupies, that space on which we or some other creatures walk, breathe, or move.

Such focusing toward a center which, at the limit, is a mere point—focusing which signifies an approach toward greater and greater sacredness—provides a structure to Dante's Divine Comedy where God is "il punto, cui tutti li tempi son presenti" (the point, the moment which encompasses all times).[7]

By contrast, the line is secular; the mere fact that it separates space makes it a symbol of division and tension, the more so as it deviates from the shape of the dot. The circle or the sphere may be seen as a dot magnified and as such it keeps some of the properties of the dot. Plato uses the perfect sphere as a symbol of androgyny, the indivisible human prototype uniting male and female elements; but perfect or not, a sphere separates inner from outer, and this unavoidable division invites internal divisions as, for example, between man and woman in Plato or between Yin and Yang in Chinese thought.

Variations on the dot and the line are infinite since we can conceive of their use and combination in boundless time and space. But one feels (as possibly Mendeleev did on the day of his most significant breakfast when he thought that surely the system of physical elements could not be as complicated as all that)—one feels, and hopes, that most of these infinite possibilities are unlikely to be used and that those in use can be reduced to a very small number of basic notations. Having looked year after year at Brahmanical cave sculptures in India, Alice Boner finally hypothesized, and later found confirmation in historical documents, that these sculptures had to have been carved as a function of an underlying model combining a circle which identified the center of the composition, together with vertical and horizontal lines representing space and time as well as with diagonal lines which by disturbing the horizontality or verticality of the pattern at selected points would introduce time and direction into the composition.[8] Could we not "look" at Plato, Vico, Hegel, Marx, or Lane's common man with the same wonder?[9] Could it be that simple spatial archetypes underlie and explain the structure of their ideologies? The idea of the circle seems to shape Vico's interpretation of history, the idea of the upward line summarizes Comte as well as Rostow, the idea of an upward spiral seems applicable to both Marx and Hegel.[10] Of course, even when the philosopher himself—by the words and metaphors he uses—helps the analyst to identify his own specific archetypes, the "map or territory" question still remains open: does the archetype generate the ideology or does it simply summarize it? Irrespective of whether this question can be answered or not, identifying the spatial structure of an ideology is an interesting and worthwhile exercise since I assume space to have cultural meaning. Identifying the basic spatial archetypes underlying political thought is more difficult than identifying those that underlie paintings or sculptures, but it is not so difficult a task as it might appear at first; the study of language, in particular of metaphors and directional verbs, corresponds to what, for a painting, would be provided by the study of the direction of light, the balance of masses, the use of color, the identification of the schematic lines indicating either movement or rest. The major problem unresolved by Bachelard, Durand, Kirk, Eliade, Cassirer, or Lévi-Strauss is to move from a descriptive to a quantitative analysis; I have not done better than they for lack of a proper *corpus.* At this stage I can only present what, intuitively, I think are the major spatial archetypes used to shape our mental landscape of politics.

---

[4] See Edward T. Hall, *The Silent Language* (New York: Doubleday, 1959), and Jacques Monod, *Le hazard et la nécessité* (Paris: Seuil, 1970).

[5] See survey in Georges Poulet, *Les métamorphoses du cercle* and René Guénon, *Le symbolisme de la croix* (Paris: Vega, 1950). For guides to the literature on specific symbols, see Juan E. Cirlot, *A Dictionary of Symbols* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1962), and Jean Chevalier, *Dictionnaire des symboles* (Paris: Laffont, 1969).

[6] See discussion in René Guénon, *Le Symbolisme de la croix,* p. 58.

[7] Dante's Paradiso, XVII, 18. See discussion in Poulet *Les métamorphoses du cercle,* p. VI.

[8] See Alice Boner, *Principles of Composition in Hindu Sculpture. Cave Temple Period* (Leiden: Brill, 1962).

[9] See Robert Lane, *Political Ideology* (New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 301–305. Lane uses spatial descriptions to obtain the community communication map of his respondents but not to get their spatial archetypes.

## The Basic Spatial Archetypes

Before listing these spatial archetypes, I must stress that I assume them to be stored in the mind not necessarily as precise shapes, but more likely as vague ideas of shapes. The painter who disposes his characters in a pyramidal order may have had the form of a triangle clearly in mind, he may even have drawn that shape on his canvas; alternatively he may have, little by little, correction after correction brought his work closer to an ideal shape of which he remained unaware.

Let us, tentatively, classify the basic spatial shapes that are used to express positions or relationships in terms of first, then second, third, and further orders of increasing complexity and specificity.

The archetypes of the first order are the point and the line, or rather the idea of a point in space and the idea of continuity in space. Symbolically, we have something which would look like this:



Developing these two basic notations leads to the idea of lines that either separate, direct, or establish a boundary. We thus obtain second-order archetypes which can be symbolically represented as follows:



From the idea of a bounding line we get the square and the circle; from the separating line we get the idea of separation on either side of a vertical line (separation between left and right, or between front and behind) as well as the idea of separation by a horizontal line (mapping of up and down); from the idea of a directional line, we get the vertical movement either upward or downward (these two movements are clearly distinct) and the horizontal movement either to the left or to the right (movements which are not as clearly distinguishable as upward and downward, but are distinguishable nevertheless). Symbolically we now have:



At subsequent orders of refinement, we get by development or combination of any of these static or dynamic shapes such symbols as the mountain or the pyramid (a development of up) the U-shaped valley (a development of down), the diagonal (a combination of up, down, left and right pulls); but the spatial shapes or directional movements I assigned to the third order are those which I prefer to consider as basic spatial archetypes, those which any mind or culture would naturally draw out of the point and the line. The fourth level of sophistication is that at which cultural specificity begins.

How could we verify that these basic shapes are indeed basic and universal? Many techniques are available, including experiments on subjects in the laboratory, content analysis of documents, depth interviews, surveys of school children. So far I have used these techniques only for the study of the landscape of left and right.[11] A pilot test on ten of my students asked to locate movable words printed on separate pieces of cardboard within a bounded rectangular space indicated that they used three major spatial models either singly or in combination: the up-down, the center-circle, and the left-right.[12]

---

[10] In Rostow, the metaphor of the takeoff leads to the metaphor of "maturity" not to that of an eventual landing or return to the ground. Rostow allows, of course, for the possibility of disruption or disintegration but only as accidents; see, for example, p. 330 in W. W. Rostow, *Politics and the Stages of Growth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971). Generally, it would be interesting to study the consequences of casting scientific theories or models in specific spatial dimensions, as for example when contrasting vertical and horizontal processes. The defining of geographical factors as horizontal leads A. Grosser to "see" history as vertical; De Bono's description of logical reasoning as vertical when compared to nonlogical "lateral thinking," leads him quite naturally—when stressing the advantages of nonlogical thinking—to "see" logical thinking as proceeding downward (digging holes) rather than going up. Are these spatial metaphors free of consequences for the models they support? Unlikely. See Alfred Grosser, *L'Explication politique* (Paris: A. Colin, 1972), p. 78; Edward de Bono, *New Think: The Use of Lateral Thinking* (New York: Basic Books, 1968).

It would be interesting to administer this kind of test in different countries, as was done by Segall and his colleagues when studying responses to visual illusions (such as whether a vertical line appears longer than a horizontal line) across cultures ranging from the primitive to the industrial.[13] Another and easier way of verifying the existence of universal underlying spatial structures is in the analysis of metaphors. Robert Frank has done this in studying the "spatial" content of the State of the Union messages from Roosevelt to Nixon; he found a positive correlation between periods of stress and the use of "horizontal" metaphors and, on the contrary, a more pronounced use of vertical rhetoric in times of prosperity.[14] Such study could easily be expanded to analyzing the speeches of politicians in other countries; it could be used for example to verify whether I am right in assuming that when the North American political culture orders its political ideas in a Left to Right Landscape, it does so according to the archetype of the mountain, while the French do it according to the archetype of the valley.[15]

## Are Spatial Archetypes Innate or Acquired?

Are the basic spatial archetypes innate? The assumptions of Plato, Humboldt, Jung, or Chomsky would lead one to either say "definitely yes" or "most likely"; Hume, Skinner and most contemporary social scientists would either say, "most unlikely" or "definitely not." It is not essential that I make a choice; but it seems obvious to me that even if one denies innate ideas, one cannot deny biological and physical constraints to perceptions. Even if the straight line or the circle are not "given" to us like the nose or the sense of touch, even if we are free to invent them, we are not completely free, once we have invented them, to give them any kind of meaning, or rather, we are not free to give them any kind of meaning at an identical intellectual and social cost. On this assumption of biological and physical constraints I base the following theoretical propositions on natural perceptions, reversals, and costs.

## The Cost of Meaning

Plato uses the circle to signify stability and perfection; the Buddha uses it to signify change and the meaninglessness of change. The Pythagoreans use the circle to signify man rather than woman, on the assumption that man is closer than woman to perfection and that the circle is a more perfect shape than any other bounded form; by way of consequence, woman is then associated with a more earthly, less perfect shape, that of the square. My own perception, shared by the students and the colleagues on whom I tested it, is that the circle is a feminine notation, the square a masculine identification.[16] Are spatial archetypes pure structures devoid of privileged associations and meanings? Do archetypes generate their own semantics, or are they given meanings that can only be explained by cultural as distinct from biological codes? Are they limited in character and number like the sounds that man can produce but as divorced from "natural" meaning as the sounds of an unknown language read from the dictionary in a monotonous voice? I do not think so. Space has meaning, space comes to us with contrasted polarities and to a greater or lesser extent, these polarities have positive or negative valences attached to them. Hence, the three following propositions.

---

[11] See J. A. Laponce "The Use of Visual Space to Measure Ideology" in *Experimentation and Simulation in Political Science,* J. A. Laponce and Paul Smoker, eds. (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1972), pp. 46–59.

[12] Ten students—asked to locate the words "communism," "myself," "doctor," and "religion" in a rectangle made to symbolize a political universe—indicated having used the idea of a circle 5 times, the up-down 10 times, and the left-right 8 times. Other tests on other groups of 5 to 10 subjects showed that the removal of political words such as "communism" or of religious words or of the concept "myself," as well as changing the identification of the rectangle from one symbolizing politics to being a plain rectangle, still resulted in up-down being the preferred and left-right the second most often used ordering. These examples taken from pretests are presented only as illustrations of the technique used; the tests remain to be administered.

[13] See Marshall H. Segall, Donald T. Campbell, and Melville H. Herskovits, *The Influence of Culture on Visual Perception* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1966).

[14] See Robert S. Frank, "Verbal Kinesics" (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, 1972).

[15] There are no American equivalents that I know of to the French political terms *"le marais"* or *"la plaine";* no French equivalent to vice-president Agnew's "vital center."

[16] The Pythagoreans, on the one hand use the circle for man, my students and colleagues, on the other, use it for woman, but the meaning of the archetype remains the same; the circle means perfection. It might also be that the symbol has become a physical rather than a moral or intellectual "map."

*Proposition 1.* Spatial archetypes have an inherent meaning which can be traced to physical and biological constraints.[17] I call that meaning "natural."

*Proposition 2.* Like all abstract constructs this natural meaning can be reversed, completely or partially.

*Proposition 3.* The reversal is obtained at a cost which can be measured in cultural and social terms.

How can we verify that the reversal of a natural meaning is costly, and how can we measure the cost? The problem is difficult—it may well prove unsolvable—but, I hope that as we gather data, the question will eventually be answered.

To pose the problem, let us illustrate it by cases of obvious reversals where the cost is not, however, equally obvious.

Three ideologies—that of the black mass, that of the alchemists, and that of the Tantrism of the left hand—represent reversals of dominant religious beliefs. In the black mass the Devil becomes God, the profane becomes sacred, prayers are recited backward. The alchemists, though less clearly than the followers of the Satanic cults, reverse some of the dominant beliefs and practices of the church; instead of seeing the spirit ruling over matter, they posit that the latter is still held captive by the former and needs to be freed from its material goal, hence the need to trick matter, to ally oneself with it, to pray to it. Such partial reversal where magic replaces religion leads, as in the black mass, to some easily identifiable reversals in both perceptions and behavior, such as the importance that the alchemists assigned to the left rather than to the right hand.[18] Tantrism of the left hand, which has some similarities with alchemy, turns a doctrine of asceticism and sexual abstinence into a doctrine and practice of wild exaggeration in the satisfaction of sensual pleasures; the orgy becomes part of the ritual, but, as in the case of alchemy, the reversal in the hierarchy of body and soul, spirit and matter, is only partial, the reversal being at the level of short-term tactics rather than ultimate goals since the objective is to free a captive spirit by returning matter to some kind of powerless chaos.[19]

Secular cases of reversals are equally interesting; for example, the exchange of roles between buffoon and king which was practiced so far as I can tell throughout Europe up to the establishment of democratic systems and translated then into the form of political jokes or cartoons in which the powerful are made to look like puppets. In 16th and 17th century Poland, at the court of Babin, a parody of the King's own court was play-acted for a whole century, each member of the court being assigned specific functions and roles corresponding in reverse to those existing at the court of the king, with ministers of injustice, disbanders rather than commanders of the armies, etc.[20]

In these various examples, the cost appears to me to lie in two main areas. First of all, the reversed system implies having to acquire additional knowledge since, to remain reversed, the system presupposes acquaintance with the normal as well as the modified ideology or behavior; second, there is likely to be an added cost because of the interference between two contradictory systems. Such costs could be quantified by measuring the amount of socialization required by the reversed as compared to the normal system and by measuring the stresses and slips in behavior caused by the interference of the dominant with the reversed ideology.

Once again, however, we meet the troublesome problem of allocating explanation to either nature or culture. Obviously, any new system of belief is likely, by the mere fact that it is new, to be acquired only at some extra cost. How can we, then, distinguish a new from a reversed ideology? Could the Satanic cults have replaced the systems they reversed to the point where the latter would have become the reversals of the new norms? If we say that any cultural or ideological system can become normal, then we can speak only of culturally dominant and culturally deviant systems of thought, with dominance or deviance determined by comparing the relative newness, the relative strength, the relative support of two different systems of thought at a given point in time rather than by comparing them to some universal standard. The examples just given, by their very ambiguity, illustrate, *a contrario*, the usefulness, should we find one, of any biological anchor. Is the orgy more "natural" than ascetic behavior? Is it more natural to conceive of matter as dominating spirit than vice versa? Maybe, maybe not. Is it more natural to recite a prayer forward rather than backward? Definitely yes.

Having illustrated what I mean by cost of a reversal, let us return to our study of space and give a spatial example, where, this time, cost can be measured in both social and biological terms. The history of handwriting offers only three major types of spatial notations according to the general direction followed by the hand and the eye (a) left to right, (b) right to left and (c) up to down. (Note the remarkably small number of systems used compared to those which could possibly have been used: hardly any down to up, no diagonal writing, practically no shell-like circular unfolding of symbols except as decorative departures from a well-established norm belonging to one of the three systems mentioned.) These three systems have often been in contact, hence in conflict; we should thus expect that the system that contradicted more "natural," biologically easier forms of notation, must have been at a biological disadvantage, in such encounters. Of course, these biological disadvantages may have been compensated by cultural advantages and, as always, it is not easy to disentangle conflicting factors; but in at least one case the record seems quite clear: when the Greeks borrowed the Phoenician alphabet, like the Semites, they started by writing from right to left, then, using the spatial metaphor of the ox plowing a field, adopted the ways of boustrophedon, writing each alternate line in a different direction. Writing was then, in Greece as elsewhere, a rare, esoteric knowledge, restricted to the priestly and ruling classes. The spread of literacy produced a revolution in writing; it destroyed an unnaturally complicated system; the common people imposed the more economical, the easier way of writing in a single direction, from left to right.[21] The greater cost of the original system was functional when it had the effect of restricting literacy and when it could be easily afforded by a privileged class that had much free time; it became dysfunctional when widespread literacy became the objective of the Greek cities. The "victory" of the more "natural" left-right direction—natural in relation to the implements used for writing—can be explained in terms of hand dominance favoring the right side of the body. Writing from left to right with the dominant right hand avoids covering with the hand what has just been written. This example suggests that a less natural system of perception or behavior survives best as a denial than as an affirmation; if it loses its negation it is less likely to survive encounters with more "natural" competitors. Alternatively, it would need, in order to survive such encounters, increased cultural expenditures in the form of training and explanations.

---

[17] These constraints are more or less severe (gravity or vision of depth is probably more constraining than the brain hemispheric imbalance) and more or less universal. The ecology is also an important intervening factor. For the role of the latter, see Segall, Campbell, and Herskovits.

[18] The Satanic cults, and the ideology of the alchemists are discussed in C. G. Jung, *Psychology and Religion.*

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] Zygmunt Gloger, *Encyklopedja Staropolska* (Warszawa: P. Laskauer i W. Babicki, 1900), v. 1, 89–93.

Similar conflicts must have often occurred between spatial metaphors, as, for example, when a religion where either the soul or the afterworld was associated with the ideas of up and ascension, came into contact with a religion in which the association was with the idea of descent to the underworld. Unfortunately we have unsystematic illustrations of such encounters which do not enable us to determine statistical outcomes. Some North American Indians believe in a soul-spirit, others in a soul-body; the "lighter" of the two, the soul-spirit, is thought to move more freely than the other, especially upward.[22] In the conflicts that must have occurred between these two systems of belief, was the first at a perceptual advantage? The experimental work of Desoille on the psychological advantages of the images of ascension would make one expect that the soul-spirit had indeed the advantage. But unfortunately most if not all of Desoille's subjects, like those of Freud, belonged, I assume, to a sky culture.[23] An interesting case, studied by Ortiz, is that of the Tewa Indians who mix their original belief in the return of the soul to the underworld after death—the belief of their native religion—with a superimposed Catholic mythology which clearly sets the course of the good "souls" toward heaven.[24] According to Ortiz, the original "back to the earth" remains the dominant mythology, but this and other such conflicts between metaphors would be worth studying in depth and over time to find out whether, as I assume to be the case, the sky has the advantage over the "down below."

## Political Thought: Up and Down, Left and Right

**Thinking politics in terms of left and right.** The Left-Right dimension, which is now so widely used to express political contrasts was not applied to politics until the end of the 18th century. The use of the terms "minister of the left" and "minister of the right" in Imperial China is hardly an exception; on the contrary, it confirms the rule since the terms were simply used to identify the position of the dominant minister, a position which varied from dynasty to dynasty following changes in the orientation of the Emperor's throne. The spatial notation was as neutral as the identifying of the left or the right bank of a river. If, from the French revolutionary Assemblies, where they first took their political meaning, Left and Right were then transmitted to other countries through the writings of French and

---

[21] See Henry Hécaen and Julian de Ajuriaguerra, *Left-Handedness,* English translation (New York: Grune & Stratton, 1969), p. 129. For a history of handwriting, see David Diringer, *The Alphabet: A Key to the History of Mankind* (London: Hutchison, 3rd ed., 1968).

[22] See Ake Hultkrantz, *Conceptions of the Soul Among North American Indians* (Stockholm: Caslon Press, 1953).

[23] Robert Desoille, *Le rêve éveillé en psychothérapie* (Paris: P.U.F., 1945).

[24] See Alfonso Ortiz, *The Tewa World. Space, Time, Being and Becoming in a Pueblo Society* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1960).

Socialist politicians and analysts, if, generally, their linguistic success coincided with the rise of Parliamentary democracy, hazard is unlikely to be the explanation. The Left-Right terminology is likely to have succeeded for two major reasons (a) in all language-cultures, the Chinese being the only major exception, the notion of left was already associated in religious and social customs with the notions of opposition, challenge, and secular ideas;[25] (b) Left-Right provided a useful "equalitarian" substitute to the more strongly hierarchical notion of up-down. The French revolutionaries expressed their beliefs by denying the vertical ordering, which is a father-child description of relationships, and by substituting for it the horizontal, brother-like, peer-like alignment. Ironically, this change from the vertical to the horizontal blurred the distinction between up and down, but did not erase it altogether. Much of the elements in the clusters of associations of ideas and symbols which had gathered around the notion of up migrated to the notion of right and a similar rotation led much of what was down to go to the left. On the right, we find the religious and the stable (the sacred is essentially stable); on the left, the secular and the changing. On the right, dominance; on the left, challenge and opposition. While symbolizing these old contrasts, however, left-right continued also to express the ideal of an absence of hierarchies. For that reason, successful left-wing political movements, even after they have become dominant or even domineering political forces, can continue to remain perceptually associated with the left by continuing to deny hierarchies and casting themselves in the role of forces preventing a return to a more vertical ordering.

Tests of associations of ideas which I administered to French-Canadian, English-Canadian, French and American students showed that the notions of left and right evoked primarily in the minds of the subjects the opposition between social classes and the opposition between the religious and the anti-religious. Interestingly, the respondents, who belonged to pre-elite groups in industrial societies, had left-right spatial perceptions similar to those of the African and South East Asian primitives studied by Hertz at the turn of the century.[26]

In his essay on the left hand, Hertz hypothesized that man had used his body as a metaphor in order to explain the cosmos, and in particular to explain the conflict between the pure and the impure, the strong and the weak. He noted that this very symbolism had notable feedback effects on the body itself, culture reinforcing nature, and thus accentuating the imbalance between the left and the right side. In some African tribes, the left hand is subjected to taboos so severe that the hand is in effect crippled; it cannot be used for cooking, nor, on many occasions, to touch other people, not even other left hands. Similarly, the forcing of the perception of politics into a single dimension, such as left and right, has both explanatory and crippling effects; crippling effects which are more likely to occur and will be more difficult to correct if there is congruence of the biological and of the cultural—if, for example, the powerful and the sacred are associated with the right, rather than with the left. This raises a fascinating question. Could not the left be as positive as the right? Indeed, is there not a clear positive bias in favor of the left in many countries, France in particular? French political parties prefer to locate themselves on the left rather than the right, as indicated by the names they give themselves and the sitting positions for which they compete in Parliamentary Assemblies. More generally, the language of contemporary politics usually associates the left with the future, with a rising historical force and links the right with a less valued past.[27] Undoubtedly, this poses a problem and would seem to endanger my theoretical assumptions about "natural" spatial metaphors and the cost of reversals. The contradiction disappears however if one defines politics—at least contemporary politics, that which makes such abundant use of the notions of left and right—as a *subsystem*, as a system of challenge, opposition, and change located on the negative side of an overall system of perception. If so, what is negative in the overall system becomes positive in the subsystem should its sign be congruent to that of the subsystem. For example, on their own, out of any specific context, the notions of "opposition" and "destruction" are negative; but in a negative context—war, for example —they become positive, inasmuch as they express the very essence of a subsystem that values destruction.

Let us suppose an ideology with such a structure that two subsystems, one positive the other negative, are hooked to an overall system assumed to have a positive valence. Symbolically we would have:

---

[25] For examples, see J. A. Laponce, "In Search of the Stable Elements of the Left-Right Landscape," *Comparative Politics* 4 (July 1972), 455–475.

[26] Robert Hertz, *La prééminence de la main droite: étude sur la polarité religieuse,"* translated by Rodney Needham as "The Pre-Eminence of the Right Hand: A Study in Religious Polarity" in *Right and Left: Essays on Dual Symbolic Classifications* ed. Rodney Needham (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973).

[27] For a study of the relationship between the location of the concept "self" and the concepts "past" and "future" in terms of political preference of the self in a Left-Right dimension, see J. A. Laponce, "Dieu: à droite ou à gauche"? *Canadian Journal of Political Science,* III (June 1970), 257–274. See also J. A. Laponce, "In Search . . . "



In this much simplified schema the first line might represent, for example, an ideal state of harmony, some paradise without negativeness, while the second line would set apart the two contrasted poles of a kind of paradise lost which knows both the good and the bad, poles around which would cluster third order subperceptual systems contained within the bracket.

In words, and still by way of illustration, we could have the following structures:



If we assume—as we just did—that politics is a subsystem that is partial, profane, or challenging, then we should expect that it would locate itself on the negative rather than on the positive side of the perceptual system.

Let us further suppose that the elements of such a political system (the $x_1 \cdots x_n$ of the theoretical structure) be the four following concepts: right, left, dominance, opposition. Out of context, that is out of politics, these concepts would, I assume, have the following valance:

| | |
|---|---|
| right | + |
| left | − |
| dominance | + |
| opposition | − |

Let us now allocate these elements, together with the signs we have just given them, to two distinct *political* ideologies, (a) and (b).

| (a) | | (b) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| *politics* | | *politics* | |
| left | − | right | + |
| opposition | − | dominance | + |

In all cases the signs were given to each concept because of its assumed valence in an overall perceptual system of thought. Let us now concentrate our attention on the relation between the subsystem and its elements, and let us use the sign (+) to describe congruence of the sign of the elements with the sign of the subsystem, and the sign (−) to describe noncongruence. If the subsystem *politics* has a negative valence (−) the negative elements of such subsystem are in congruence with it (+), while the positive elements are not congruent (−); thus we obtain:

| (a) | | (a) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| *politics* | − | *politics* | − |
| left | + | right | − |
| opposition | + | dominance | − |

The notation on the right side of the page, if we interpret it from the point of view of an adherent to a right-wing ideology, is obviously absurd. In this case, congruence is more likely to be obtained by continuing to perceive Right and Dominance as positive, while seeking to remove the negative sign of the subsystem by denying that it is a subsystem, by denying the partiality of politics in favor of some nondefined totality. By contrast, the ideology represented on the left side of the page can obtain a change from total negativeness to partial positiveness by emphasizing the specificity of the political, by casting it as a system of challenge.

I assume however, that the change of sign of Left and Opposition from negative to positive can only be partial. The sign taken in an overall perceptual system cannot be completely ignored or forgotten; it continues to live side by side with the sign taken in the subsystem. Thus, in ideology as in physics, Left cannot be a simple mirror reversal of Right. Right is not exclusive of Left to the same degree as Left is exclusive of Right. Right being positive in the absence of specific contexts tends toward totality; Left being negative tends toward partiality. Similarly, Up has a way of including and expressing Low quite contrasted to the inability of Low to comprise Up. Being at the positive end of a continuum, Right as well as Up, marks an accomplishment, like reaching the end of a journey. At the negative end of the polarity we have the mere start, unless it be the impossibility or the refusal to travel. If these speculations have any foundation in the "physics" of our perceptions, we would expect that it would be advantageous for the ideology stereotyped on the right of the page to remove the negative sign of its subsystem, that is to deny partiality. On the contrary, the ideology of the left side would find it advantageous to emphasize its political specificity.[28]

**Politics in Terms of Up and Down.** Talcott Parsons, in agreement with Pareto on this as on many other points, gives as one of the very few laws of social systems that they always develop hierarchies.[29] Agreeing still further with Pareto who wanted psychology to become the cornerstone of the social sciences, I would add that man cannot help but "see" hierarchies. The up-down dimension is so basic to our perception of the physical environment that it inevitably spills over from the physical to the social and the cultural.[30]

In his study of religious symbolism, Eliade gives considerable evidence of the positive valuing of Up and of the negative associations of Down in the myths and beliefs of Western as well as Eastern cultures. Admittedly, he proceeds by illustration rather than by statistical demonstration and does not justify the corpus from which he takes his examples; but notwithstanding these limitations, which are probably inevitable in the state of the recording of symbols, the data he presents in support of his claim for the universality of the valuing of Up rather than Down are impressive. A few examples will suffice: Rhe and Osiris in competing for dominance are battling for control of the sky; the dominant stream of Hinduism associates the idea of purification and spiritualization with the idea of ascension; in Chinese as well as in Buddhist thought, the idea of the center is associated with the idea of up, in other words, symbolically, the center of the soul or of the world is higher than the edges; in Greek mythology, the gods eventually settle on a mountain top; in the Christian tradition, heaven and hell are unequivocally located—the one up, the other down. Similar contrasts are expressed in many primitive myths by the symbols of a tree, of a world axis, of a mountain, of a rope swinging from heaven.[31]

That the divine, the spiritual, the rewarding, the liberating be located upward rather than downward is likely to be rooted in biological and physical phenomena. Supporting evidence to this assumption is given by the work of Desoille who found that he could change the mood of his patients—specifically, reduce their state of anxiety or depression—by inducing in their minds visual images of ascension.[32] The very words used to describe such states as "feeling low" or "feeling high," "breaking down" or "breaking up" record the visual archetypes of the cultures that produced them. Of course, it could again be objected that Desoille was manipulating cultural-psychological rather than biological-psychological factors. To answer this objection we would have to compare the Desoille cures to similar cures in cultures such as those of the Tewa Indians who put heaven under ground. But even if we were to find that in the latter culture depression is cured by inducing images of descent, we would still have to explain the overwhelming preference given to Up in religious thought and from cultural to cultural factors, we would at one point, be led to biological and physical explanations.

---

[28] Paradoxically, the optimistic view that politics leads to the ultimate good is often combined with the belief that until the ultimate goal of peace and harmony be reached politics must of necessity be divisive. Such politics, which seeks positiveness in the future through negativeness in the present, and seeks universalism through particularism, is obvious in Marx but more generally characterizes the optimistic utopian tradition. On this point see Karl Deutsch, "Self Referent Symbols and Self Referent Communication Patterns: A Note on Pessimistic Theories of Politics" in Bryson et al., *Symbols and Values . . .*, p. 620.

[29] See in particular his *Essays in Sociological Theory* (New York: Free Press, 1954), pp. 71–79, 329–30.

[30] The absence of the up-down polarity, which I assume to be basic to the ordering of perceptions, among the "big three" polarities identified by Osgood in his application of the semantic differential to 25 culture-languages, does not weaken this assumption. The semantic differential as used by Osgood identifies universal classificatory dimensions (evaluation, potency, activity), but does not seek to explain these dimensions in terms of underlying archetypes. The semantic differential can however be used to identify the universality of certain word-stimuli, and, indeed, Osgood is now working in that direction. See Charles E. Osgood "Exploration in Semantic Space: A Personal Diary," *Journal of Social Issues*, 27 (No. 4, 1971), 5–63.

[31] For these and many other examples, see the works listed in footnote 2, especially those of Eliade and Durand. See also the interesting thesis of Dumézil on the "natural" division of social functions into political-religious sovereignty, defense, and productivity and the symbolization of these functions by a trilogy of gods (Jupiter, Mars, Quirinus) which appear to me to line up on a vertical axis. Georges Dumézil, *L'héritage Indo-Européen à Rome* (Paris: Gallimard, 1949). Hutchison distinguishes three types of religions by their use of the metaphor of height according to whether the sacred is located (a) within the common world of nature and culture, (b) above and beyond it, (c) both above and within. See John A. Hutchison, *Language and Faith: Studies in Sign, Symbol and Meaning* (Philadelphia: Westminister Press, 1963), p. 256.

[32] Robert Desoille, *L'exploration de l'activité subconsciente par la méthode du rêve éveillé* (Paris: D'Artrey, 1938); Robert Desoille, *Le rêve éveillé en psychothérapie* (Paris: P.U.F., 1945). See also Daniel M. Ogilvie "Individual and Cultural Patterns of Fantasized Flight" in George Gerbner, Ole R. Holsti, Klaus Krippendorff, William J. Paisley, Philip J. Stone, *The Analysis of Communication Content* (New York: Wiley, 1969), pp. 243–259.

These two observations—that religious thought nearly universally values High over Low and that an ascending direction has a liberating effect while a descending move produces depression—are highly relevant to politics.

If power, and consequently the symbols and the institutions which incarnate it, is positively valued, as will normally be the case except of course in countercultures, then, power, and more specifically legitimate power, will be located Up rather than Down. Locating power and its source somewhere up will be more "natural" than the reverse, more natural in the sense of being easier on the mind. It follows that an ideology which reverses such a natural system of perception would need added cultural expenditures in the form of socialization and explanation. Aristotle says simply that the master should rule the slave as the husband rules the wife, as the father rules the child.[33] He needs no complicated explanation. When Rousseau wants to justify a power resting in the mass of the governed, he has to use and develop the notion of a social contract set in some primordial time. In typical mythical fashion, he asserts that the present is a degradation and a reversal of what had existed in purer but vanished days. It is as if, between the present and the distant past, there was, somewhere, an equal sign which, by the mere fact of being crossed, changed what was positive into negative and vice versa.

Assuming that a reversed system will always tend to return to the norm leads us to expect that a reversed system needs more than a one-time expenditure; it needs repeated expenditure over time. If this is correct, we should observe that the returns to a natural ideology would occur at those points in a political system where the pressure to keep the system reversed is least applied. In Western democracies, for example, one would expect—or at least one would have expected until the recent redefinition of meaningful communities in favor of smaller units—that at the local level, say at the municipal or city level where the ideological political pressure was least applied, legitimate power was more probably seen as coming from some vague "they-above" than from the "we-below."[34]

But paradoxically, if legitimate power is more easily located above, the idea of its rising from below and carrying the self upward has an uplifting, liberating effect. Politics, seen in static terms, favors a legitimate authority fixed above, as some kind of sun at its zenith; its dynamics favor the perception of an authority flowing upward through the self (the self being here what defines very roughly what is below and what is above).

Ferrero thought that the two major principles of government which he had identified (monarchical and democratic), together with their appropriate rules of succession (hereditary or by election) carried each the seeds of their own destruction because both were irrational in their ways of selecting rulers.[35] We note a similar kind of contradiction, resting this time in the spatial archetypes which sustain, if they did not generate, these two types of government. Legitimacy fixed above is more natural when we think of a static relationship between men and the powers that be; legitimacy rising from below, lifting the individual as on a wave that would never fall back, has a most satisfying psychological effect which finds its explanation in the very images produced in the mind of those whom it carries symbolically upward. The need for security and stability leads the mind to static archetypes which locate power above; but security, once satisfied, opens the way to dynamic archetypes, those which express an upward move. The desire for freedom favors those systems of thought which are built on the images of ascension rather than on those which use the idea of a static separation in the form of a horizontal line between the ruler and the ruled.

## Conclusion

In describing the shapes and effects of archetypes, I have assumed that they had biological and ecological anchors and that these very anchors should enable us to measure the cost of using an archetype in either a natural or a reversed way. Facts may well lead me to lift these anchors, though I hope not and I do not think it likely, but even if I had to do so, the identification of the dominant spatial archetypes of a given political culture would remain a rewarding task. It would be interesting to characterize such a culture by the number, the types, the availability, the congruence, and the rigidity of the spatial shapes it uses to generate or at least to organize its perceptions.

---

[33] See *The Politics*, Chapter 2.

[34] See J. A. Laponce, "Political Community, Legitimacy and Discrimination." *British Journal of Political Science*, 4 (June 1974), 125–126.

[35] Guglielmo Ferrero, *The Principles of Power*, trans. T. R. Jaeckel (New York: Putnam's, 1962).

# The "Silent Revolution," Value Priorities, and the Quality of Life in Britain*

ALAN MARSH
*University of Michigan*

Inglehart[1] presents a persuasive thesis to describe "a transformation" in political value priorities occurring in Western Europe. He argues that in Europe since 1945 young people have increasingly been freed of the urgency of material acquisition by sharply rising industrial affluence. Consequently these younger Europeans are held to be far more sensitive than their elders to the "higher-order" needs predicted by Maslow's[2] theory of the need-hierarchy of human motivation. They have been freed to demote safety and material needs and concentrate instead upon fulfilling their "belongingness" needs and intellectual and aesthetic drives.

According to Inglehart, among the political outcomes of this shift in value priorities has been the desertion of their traditional class loyalties by the young middle classes and especially those who have had higher education, causing them instead to embrace the ideology and goals of what may in some places be loosely called "the Left" and in others more precisely "the New Left." They will tend also to support student radicalism and supranationalism and generally hold to an articulated set of "postbourgeois" values. Correspondingly, what Lenin described as "embourgeoisification"[3] has increasingly led the older skilled workers into an unaccustomed alignment with parties of the Right who appeal more strongly to their "lower-order" needs. Their value priorities remain dominated by the need to protect and augment their material and physical security whose enjoyment is still a welcome novelty for those who lived through the Depression years and the Second World War. Theirs is an "acquisitive" view of life.

Inglehart sought out and identified his two "pure value types" by asking respondents in the five major (pre-enlargement) E.E.C. countries plus Britain to choose two out of four statements representing alternative national goals. Those choosing "maintaining order in the nation" and "fighting rising prices" were assigned to the "acquisitive" position, and those choosing instead "protecting freedom of speech" and "giving people more say in important political decisions" to the "postbourgeois" position.

Inglehart does not appear to take the position that there is anything *intrinsically* "postbourgeois" about free speech and political participation. These notions have been worn smooth by generations of "liberal" and not-so-liberal politicians, and few indeed would regard them as absolutely unimportant. It is the choice itself that is postbourgeois: the assignment of greater relative importance to freedom and participation over basic material and civil security.

The proportion of "pure" "acquisitive" choices compared to "postbourgeois" choices occurring within each age cohort from country to country across Europe gave strong support to Inglehart's hypothesis that the rise of postbourgeois values is linked fundamentally to the prevailing economic conditions experienced by the members of each national age cohort during their childhood and adolescence. Britain experienced a steady erosion of her prewar economic supremacy in Europe and, consequently, has atypically *fewer* postbourgeois types among her younger age cohorts whilst retaining an unusually *high* proportion among her older cohorts. Elsewhere in Europe industrial advance has apparently wrought a real transformation, creating profound intergenerational differences in value priorities; for example, among the under-25s in mainland Europe, postbourgeois types actually outnumber the otherwise dominant "acquisitive" group, and do so most noticeably in countries where economic advance has been most dramatic. Hence the evident signs of intergenerational stress, hence the European Student Revolution, hence the growth of the young middle-class New Left, and so on.

There is little doubt that Inglehart regards the postbourgeois phenomenon as a seminal force in modern radical politics and the postbourgeois (as we may refer to them individually) themselves as the parvenus of political change in postindustrial society. His view seems credible. Indeed, it is attractive to press the Maslovian underpinnings of the Silent Revolution thesis further than Inglehart does himself and point out that the industrial and commercial processes that are taking society toward a postindustrial situation and are facilitating the growth of postacquisitive values are at the same time unavoidably imposing a set of societal conditions least likely to satisfy the equalitarian, humanitarian, and naturalistic relations implied in Maslow's high-order needs. These inhibitors include the nuclear family as the principal consumer-unit, the growth of an alienative bureaucracy, passive media systems, standardized and automated production, and so on—all recognizably the bêtes-noires of the New Left. The more efficient becomes industrial production, therefore, the more postbourgeois types will appear *and* the more things they will find offensive in society. Opening up this paradox introduces a sense of crisis—a dynamic singularly appropriate to the theory's theme of intergenerational stress.

---

* A revised version of a paper delivered to the European Consortium for Political Research, Mannheim (Germany), April 1973. For helpful comments and criticism, I am indebted to Angus Campbell, Hugh Berrington, Bernard Blishen, John Utting, and all my colleagues in the Association for the Study of Advanced Industrial Societies but in particular to Ronald Inglehart whose singular forbearance in the face of criticism is a credit to his scholarship. Special thanks are also due to my senior colleagues in the S.S.R.C. Survey Unit—Mark Abrams and John Hall—for my free use of their materials. None of the above is in any way responsible for my errors or my opinions.

[1] Ronald Inglehart, "The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (Dec. 1971), 991–1017.

[2] Abraham H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," *Psychological Review*, 50 (1943), 370–396; see also Abraham Maslow, *Motivation and Personality* (New York: Harper & Row, 1954).

[3] V. I. Lenin, *State and Revolution* (New York: International Publishers, 1932).

Inglehart's theory casts Britain in an atavistic role. The impression is created that postbourgeois values in Britain are an eccentric response in the face of economic stagnation, the highest inflation rate in Europe, the continuous violence in Northern Ireland, and a stubborn tradition of class-based but moderate politics. The small group of still predominantly young Britons who place these problems of material and civil security aside and accord instead a higher priority to freedom and participation must surely have their reasons. Inglehart's data, resting rather starkly upon value-choices, provide few insights into those reasons but since we know also that postbourgeois priorities are associated with high social and economic status, the question then arises: Does the postbourgeois phenomenon really " . . . tap a relatively well integrated and *deep-rooted* aspect of the respondent's political orientations" and is it " . . . *integrated* into the individual's attitudinal structure—a fact which suggests attitudinal stability . . . ,"[4] or is it merely a fashionable and perhaps slightly cynical pose adopted by those (leaving aside the temporary poverty of students) who can personally afford to be less concerned about material security? That anyway is the basic question posed by this article and the attempts to answer it that follow rest upon data culled from a secondary analysis of an experimental survey, completed in November 1971,[5] which was primarily concerned with developing new measures of subjective estimates of the quality of people's lives. Inglehart's four value-items were included verbatim in the questionnaire.

A sample of 593 respondents all over 16 years of age was obtained from the seven major English urban areas and was found to conform to national parameters for age, sex, educational experience, and social class. Using a ladder-type scale on which "1" represented the respondent's *own* estimate of a least desirable state of affairs or "complete dissatisfaction," and "7" represented a kind of personal utopia of "complete satisfaction," respondents indicated the extent to which they were satisfied first with the quality of their lives overall, and their general standard of living, then with a sequence of what Bradburn (1969)[6] calls "Domain Satisfactions," in this case comprising: job, housing, education, marriage, family life, "the district you live in," leisure, health, religion, and the "quality of democracy in Britain today." Within each of these domains a series of subtopics was also rated. Thus under the rubric "District," ratings were obtained for satisfaction with "transport," "the way the local police do their job," "refuse clearance" and so on. These domain ratings were then qualified by similarly calibrated measures of the extent to which respondents felt that each major domain was *important* in its contribution to the quality of their lives. The questionnaire also probed people's personal sources of worry and anxiety, their feelings of "happiness," and self-fulfillment, together with the customary range of classification data.

The first finding was to confirm, almost exactly, that the Postbourgeois are as scarce and the Acquisitives are as numerous in Britain as Inglehart found them to be; in fact they comprise 7 per cent and 35 per cent of the population respectively. (See Table 1.)

It was also expected that the Postbourgeois compared with the Intermediates and especially with the Acquisitives would, like Inglehart's, be younger, richer, and better educated, though the all-important age effect would be a muted one. These expectations were justified. Postbourgeois are younger; 71 per cent are under 44 (44 per cent are under 29) while only 44 per cent of the Acquisitives are under 44. They are richer: 27 per

---

[4] Inglehart, pp. 997, 1001 (my emphasis).

[5] The survey, in its primary form, was designed and executed by John Hall and Mark Abrams, respectively Senior Research Fellow and Director of the S.S.R.C. Survey Unit. For details see: Mark Abrams and John Hall, "The Condition of the British People: Report on a pilot survey using self-rating scales," Paper read to Social Indicators Conference of British and American S.S.R.C., Ditchley, England, May 1971; and John Hall, "Measuring the Quality of Life Using Sample Surveys," Paper read to 4th Annual SAINT Conference, Salzburg, Austria, September 1972.

[6] Norman Bradburn, *The Structure of Psychological Well-Being* (Chicago: Aldine Press, 1969).

**Table 1. Distribution of “Acquisitive,” “Intermediate,” and “Postbourgeois” Values in Britain**

| | | “Acquisitives”<br>% | “Intermediates”<br>% | “Postbourgeois”<br>% |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Inglehart | (1970 fieldwork) | 36 | 56 | 8 (N = 1985) |
| Survey Unit | (1971 fieldwork) | 35 | 58 | 7 (N = 593) |

cent of our Postbourgeois are numbered among the professional and managerial classes but only 13 per cent of the Acquisitives are; and 49 per cent of the Postbourgeois have family incomes exceeding 2,500 pounds per annum (42 per cent of the wage-earners among them have *personal* incomes exceeding that figure) while only 19 per cent of the Acquisitives command such a high income. They are somewhat better educated: 41 per cent of our Postbourgeois received education beyond the former school-leaving age of fifteen years but only 24 per cent of the Acquisitives did so. Probably the most important feature of the Postbourgeois group was the predominance of young men the group contained.

(The Intermediate group—those choosing “mixed” value-pairs—tended to fall about halfway between the two “pure” types on the key demographic variables.)

### The Overall Sense of Satisfaction with Life

If postbourgeois values are associated with the critique that the young make of society, then Postbourgeois should manifest a generalized sense of discontent with the quality of their contemporary lives in industrial Britain. The Acquisitives too might also have cause for complaint in that, unlike some of their European neighbors, their clearly articulated material desires remain only partly fulfilled in Britain. Tables 2(a), (b) and (c) provide information relevant to these hypotheses.

The sample as a whole manifests a widespread sense of satisfaction: 26 per cent indicated a maximum level of life satisfaction at the seventh point on the scale, while fully 60 per cent indicated the sixth or fifth points, and only 14 per cent reported dissatisfaction (ratings of four points or less). But within this framework of general satisfaction, the Postbourgeois were significantly less prone to indicate high satisfaction levels. Twice as many Postbourgeois (22 per cent) as Acquisitives (11 per cent) recorded low satisfaction levels while indicating that they felt no less *entitled* to a

**Table 2A. Distribution by Value Groups of Reported Levels of “Overall Life-Satisfaction” and (in brackets) Levels of Satisfaction to Which Respondents Feel Entitled**

| | | | “Acquisitives”<br>% | “Intermediates”<br>% | “Postbourgeois”<br>% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *SATISFACTION* | High | (7) | 27 (51) | 26 (54) | 17 (50) |
| | Medium | (6, 5) | 62 (48) | 60 (45) | 61 (50) |
| | Low | (4..1) | 11 (1) | 14 (1) | 22 (0) |

**Table 2B. Combined Satisfaction Scores for All “Domains” by Value Groups**

| | | “Acquisitives”<br>% | “Intermediates”<br>% | “Postbourgeois”<br>% |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *SATISFACTION* | High | 26 | 26 | 27 |
| | Medium | 60 | 56 | 44 |
| | Low | 14 | 18 | 27 |

**Table 2C. Semantic Differential “Happiness” Scores by Value Groups**

| | | “Acquisitives”<br>% | “Intermediates”<br>% | “Postbourgeois”<br>% |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| “HAPPINESS” | High | 57 | 60 | 42 |
| | Medium | 31 | 30 | 41 |
| | Low | 12 | 10 | 17 |

very high level of satisfaction. So too with a combined estimate of satisfaction within each of the domains (job, housing, marriage, etc.) listed above, Postbourgeois are twice as likely to accumulate low satisfaction scores. (Table 2 b). The third measure of overall life satisfaction comprised a twelve-item semantic-differential battery used by respondents to indicate the extent to which they felt their lives were happy or unhappy, boring or interesting, discouraging or hopeful, etc. Again, the Postbourgeois were more likely to accumulate low scores. Thus acceptable support exists for the first hypothesis; Postbourgeois do seem to manifest a generalized sense of discontent. The second hypothesis finds no support: despite Britain's low rate of economic growth, the Acquisitives are no more and no less likely to express dissatisfaction than are the majority Intermediate group whose value priorities are less clear.

### "Domain Satisfaction"

The Survey Unit developed seven-point rating scales for ten principal satisfaction domains and these were divided into five key "Material and Security" domains (job, district, accommodation, health, and "overall standard of living"—this latter clearly defined to include "food, furniture, car, recreation, travel opportunities") and five "higher-order" domains, of which two clearly concerned "belongingness" needs (marital and family relations), two concerned intellectual and idealistic needs (education and the quality of democracy in Britain), and one concerned general creativity: the quality of leisure.

Relevant hypotheses may now be addressed directly to the Maslovian assumptions of Inglehart's thesis. Clearly, the Postbourgeois would be expected to record *higher* satisfaction scores, on the average, for the *material* domains than do the Acquisitives and the Intermediates. Conversely, the Postbourgeois should locate the sense of discontent they revealed above in a sense of *deprivation* of their *higher-order* needs. Table 3 shows the proportion of each group who recorded dissatisfaction scores (four points or less) for each of the principal domains.

There is no support at all for the first hypothesis. On the contrary, our Postbourgeois compared with the Acquisitives are actually more likely to express dissatisfaction with each of the material and security domains. This is only marginally so in the case of their accommodations and their overall standard of living, but they are very much more likely to be dissatisfied with their district's amenities and with their jobs.

The nature of job satisfaction is clearly critical for an "acquisitiveness" dimension; after all, the dissatisfaction that Postbourgeois express may simply reflect their unease in contributing to an acquisitive and competitive society—an unease which would redeem the advanced Maslovian development imputed to them, despite their concern for other materialist items. This question was tested against a list of statements describing the nature of the respondent's job (e.g., "The work is interesting," "well-paid," "the job security is good.") Each respondent indicated the extent to which he held each statement to be true or false for his present (or last) job.

The Postbourgeois, compared with the other two groups, were *more* likely to agree that their jobs were interesting (+10 per cent) and gave them opportunities to "develop my special abilities" (+15 per cent) and "to do the things I do best" (+11 per cent). They were significantly *less* likely to agree that their "job security is good" (−15 per cent), or that their jobs are well paid (−13 per cent), are conveniently located (−22 per cent), have convenient hours (−19 per cent), and are conducted in pleasant physical surroundings (−19 per cent).

These responses suggest that the Postbourgeois, despite their much higher incomes and occupational status, are significantly *more* prone to ma-

**Table 3. Distribution of Percentage Dissatisfied with each Life-Domain by Value Groups**

| | | "Acquisitives" % | "Intermediates" % | "Postbourgeois" % |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MATERIAL AND SECURITY DOMAINS | Accommodation | 17 | 20 | 24 |
| | Job | 6 | 7 | 36 |
| | District | 9 | 12 | 21 |
| | Overall standard of living | 24 | 29 | 31 |
| | Health | 17 | 17 | 12 |
| "HIGHER-ORDER" DOMAINS | Leisure | 14 | 21 | 20 |
| | Education | 14 | 17 | 26 |
| | Marriage | 4 | 3 | 0 |
| | Family Life | 8 | 7 | 12 |
| | Democracy | 13 | 17 | 36 |

terial dissatisfactions and security anxieties than are the Acquisitive group. At this stage of our analysis, the Maslovian pillars of the "Silent Revolution" appear distinctly weakened.

We find, on the other hand, some support for our second hypothesis: again compared with the Acquisitives, the Postbourgeois are somewhat *more* conscious of "higher-order" deprivations in their social surroundings. Although generally better educated, the Postbourgeois expressed greater doubts about its quality and more often felt they had learned the wrong kind of things at school rather than had insufficient time there. Similarly, they are slightly more likely to doubt the quality of their leisure opportunities and their family life.

Yet it must be emphasized that those experiencing these "higher-order" dissatisfactions are only a small minority of *both* groups; for example, only 12 per cent of the Postbourgeois are actually dissatisfied with their family life. Considering that so many of them must still reside in or have only lately left their parental homes, this figure is more suggestive of domestic tranquility than of intergenerational conflict.

The "higher-order" domain that strikingly discriminated between the three value groups was: "the quality of democracy in Britain." Overall, 36 per cent of the Postbourgeois but only 17 per cent of the Intermediates and 13 per cent of the Acquisitives thought the level of democratic expression in Britain was inadequate. In particular, the Postbourgeois focused their anxieties on a lack of tolerance toward minorities and the unresponsiveness of elected representatives toward the electorate. Yet it should again be emphasized that both at the general and the specific levels, dissatisfaction with the democratic processes was limited to a *minority* of Postbourgeois.

## The Importance of Domains: Implied Values

As Inglehart would surely agree, values are about *choices*. Our respondents were given an interesting choice: They were asked which *three* items discussed were personally the most important and the least important in determining their relative life satisfaction. A single index of the importance each value group attached to each domain was calculated by subtracting the proportion which in each group assigned the domain to the "least important" category from the proportion placing it among the three "most important" domains. Thus complete agreement that a domain is important will yield for that group a score of +100, and a similar consensus that it is unimportant will produce a score of −100.

Again, the appropriate hypotheses relating Inglehart's theory to these data are very clear: The "Material and Security" domains should receive positive scores from the Acquisitive group and negative scores (or at least lower positive scores) from the Postbourgeois. Correspondingly, the "higher-order" domains should be considered far more important by the Postbourgeois than by the Acquisitives. The results are given in Table 4.

Overall, importance is attached by all respondents to marriage, family life, health, their general standard of living, and job, in that order, and relative unimportance was attached mostly to democracy and then to leisure, education, and district, in that order. This does not mean people regarded these latter items as absolutely unimportant; they merely thought them the least important of the domains they were asked to consider.

The results are equivocal for the first hypothesis. Among the five "Material and Security" domains, the Postbourgeois do attach *less* importance to accommodation and (unsurprisingly at their age) to health and attach greater *un*importance to district than do the Acquisitives. But upon the two key "materialism" items—job and overall standard of living—the Postbourgeois place marginally *greater* importance than do the Acquisitives.

**Table 4. Index of Group-Assessed Importance for Life-Satisfaction of Life-Domains by Value Groups**

| | | "Acquisitives"<br>% | "Intermediates"<br>% | "Postbourgeois"<br>% |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MATERIAL AND SECURITY DOMAINS | Accommodation | 26 | 17 | 12 |
| | Job | 13 | 12 | 20 |
| | District | −24 | −27 | −51 |
| | Overall standard of living | 32 | 31 | 39 |
| | Health | 47 | 28 | 29 |
| "HIGHER-ORDER" DOMAINS | Leisure | −47 | −40 | −10 |
| | Education | −46 | −33 | −29 |
| | Marriage | 42 | 52 | 39 |
| | Family Life | 44 | 51 | 36 |
| | Democracy | −48 | −45 | 8 |

Table 5. Income Deficiency by Value Groups

| | "Acquisitives" % | | "Intermediates" % | | "Postbourgeois" % | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| "How much extra income do you need, per week?" | | | | | | |
| None, D.K. | 25 | | 21 | | 28 | |
| Up to £4.00 | 17 | 42 | 17 | 46 | 12 | 31 |
| £4.00—£8.00 | 25 | | 29 | | 19 | |
| £8.00—£15.00 | 20 | 32 | 19 | 32 | 28 | 43 |
| More than £15.00 | 12 | | 13 | | 15 | |

So too with our second hypothesis: Among the "higher-order" domains, we find the Postbourgeois attach less *un*importance to leisure and to education but not sufficiently to outweigh the importance they attach to the material and security domains. They attach as much importance to marriage as do the Acquisitives but slightly less to family life. Again it is the "level of democracy in this country" that successfully demonstrates a divergence of value-determined choices between the two groups. The Acquisitives and the Intermediates are equally agreed that, relative to the other domains, democracy is massively unimportant to them. The Postbourgeois are not so sure; 37 per cent of them place "the level of democracy" among their three *most* important domains, compared with only 4 per cent of each of the other two groups, yielding for them a positive importance index for democracy of 8, compared with negative values of −48 and −45 for the Acquisitives and Intermediates. So Postbourgeois do stand apart from the other two value groups, in this one predictably "idealistic" or "higher-order" value choice. Yet in their other judgments about importance, they espouse a greater concern with materialistic rewards than with such nonmaterial goals as improving their relations with others.

In order to quantify their relative concern with material needs respondents were asked to estimate just how much extra income they might need to raise their standard of living so as to have "life without money worries and in comfort." Table 5 shows that estimates were mainly modest. A quarter of those in the sample, among all three value-groups, considered their present income adequate. But among those who did need additional income, it was the *Postbourgeois* who displayed a greater tendency to ask for higher increments, evidence that British Postbourgeois are actually more acquisitive than the Acquisitives.

### Maslovian Fulfillment and Optimal Anxiety

For Maslow,[7] the path toward psychic health or "self-actualization" involves a progressive shift of anxiety-foci from basic material and security needs up through social or "belongingness" needs, until the individual confronts his innermost needs to realize his full intellectual and emotional potential, however limited or specialized this may be. A key feature of the theory is that anxiety need not be either inhibiting or destructive but that, experienced in healthy doses, it can motivate the individual to meet his felt needs. Indeed, the focus of those need-anxieties will reveal his relative position along the hierarchy. In short, if you know what a person worries about, you know how far he has come toward liberation from basic acquisitive strivings, i.e., toward what Inglehart has characterized in sociopolitical terms as the postbourgeois enlightenment.

Therefore our respondents were supplied with a list of commonplace worries and asked then to indicate the extent to which they had worried about each during recent weeks. The list was aligned as far as possible with the satisfaction domains we had probed earlier, in brief: money, debts, work (or husband's work), health, district,[8] marriage, children, relations with neighbors and friends, and the world situation—listed here in the ascending hierarchical order suggested by Maslow's theory.

It was hypothesized that our Postbourgeois should exhibit lower levels of anxiety than do the

---

[7] Maslow, 1943.

[8] Whereas our earlier questions concerning "District" were defined for our respondents in terms of material services (i.e., the kind of services chargeable to local taxes) and thus reflected "lower-order" material concerns, in the list of anxieties, "Things that go on in your district" were characterized much more by the responsiveness of local authority agencies and the social atmosphere of the area. It must be admitted, however, that this item carries greater ambiguity than the others used.

**Table 6. Distribution of Anxiety-Levels for each Life-Domain by Value Groups**

| | | “Acquisitives” % | “Intermediates” % | “Postbourgeois” % |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| “To what extent have you worried recently about . . . ” | | | | |
| *MATERIAL AND SECURITY DOMAINS* | | | | |
| a) “Not having enough money?” | High: | 32 | 33 | 32 |
| | Med: | 35 | 31 | 36 |
| | Low: | 33 | 36 | 32 |
| b) “Financial debts?” | Hi: | 10 | 13 | 17 |
| | Med: | 25 | 22 | 22 |
| | Lo: | 65 | 65 | 61 |
| c) “How things are going at your (your husband’s) work?” | Hi: | 29 | 26 | 20 |
| | Med: | 28 | 31 | 37 |
| | Lo: | 43 | 43 | 43 |
| d) “Your health?” | Hi: | 27 | 22 | 7 |
| | Med: | 25 | 30 | 22 |
| | Lo: | 49 | 49 | 68 |
| *HIGHER-ORDER DOMAINS* | | | | |
| e) “Getting along with your husband/wife?” | Hi: | 13 | 9 | 11 |
| | Med: | 10 | 18 | 17 |
| | Lo: | 77 | 73 | 72 |
| f) “Your children?” | Hi: | 24 | 23 | 26 |
| | Med: | 18 | 18 | 11 |
| | Lo: | 52 | 59 | 63 |
| g) “Relations with your neighbors?” | Hi: | 12 | 6 | 4 |
| | Med: | 14 | 13 | 18 |
| | Lo: | 74 | 81 | 78 |
| h) “Things that happen in your district?” | Hi: | 13 | 13 | 17 |
| | Med: | 26 | 31 | 42 |
| | Lo: | 61 | 56 | 42 |
| i) “The world situation?” | Hi: | 21 | 22 | 49 |
| | Med: | 39 | 39 | 27 |
| | Lo: | 40 | 39 | 24 |

Acquisitives about the earlier “Material and Security” items (money, debts and work) and greater levels of anxiety about the “higher-order” items concerned with personal relationships and the local and world situations. Table 6 shows the distribution of anxiety levels for each value-group.

It was found that on the three clearly material domains—money, debts, and work—each of our three value groups express identical levels of anxiety. A third of each group worries about “not having enough money,” about a quarter worries about employment, and a smaller proportion about debts. So the first part of the hypothesis must be dismissed: Postbourgeois are no more and no less concerned about material security than are the Acquisitives. This finding challenges directly the Maslovian assumptions of Inglehart’s theory.

In line with earlier experience with the “satisfaction” and “importance” dimensions, the value-groups’ “anxiety” responses on the “higher-order” items present an ambiguous picture. Again the three groups show identical anxiety levels on the three “belongingness” items; each group reports uniformly low levels of concern about marital and neighborly relations and a little anxiety about their children.[9] This finding, too, detracts seriously from the Maslovian assumptions of Inglehart's model.

---

[9] Put another way, we find that Acquisitives are, as we might expect, more anxious about material security than about personal relationships but only marginally so; contrary to expectations, however, precisely the same point applies to the Postbourgeois.

Once again it is left to the two "ideological" items in our worry-list to detect a divergence of opinion between the Acquisitive and Postbourgeois groups. The Postbourgeois worry rather more than the Acquisitives about "things that go on in my district" and very substantially more about "the world situation."

This information about the locus of the respondents' anxieties has confirmed the impressions built up during the examination of the "satisfaction" and "importance" data and leads toward the following generalized conclusion about the nature of postbourgeois values in Britain:

Postbourgeois groups are distinguished from Acquisitives by their relative youth, wealth, and education, *and by their concern for ideology*. The content of this ideology is likely to be biased toward a liberal and humanitarian disposition. But it seems the British Postbourgeois embraces a mode of ideological thought that is appropriate to his chronological age in *addition to*, not at the *expense of*, the materialism approximate to his times and to his social class.

Those favorable to Inglehart's thesis might shrug off these apparently fundamental inconsistencies by suggesting that the poor performance of the British economy compared with that of her European neighbors has now become so obvious and embarrassing that not even the Postbourgeois can shake themselves free of material concerns when pressed as hard as this questionnaire pressed them to consider what is really and immediately important to them. On the European mainland things may be quite different. Yet this would be tantamount to saying that Inglehart's "types" are not types at all and that the phenomenon is entirely self-contained and has no theoretical generalizability, Maslovian or otherwise. This latter is not the position taken here; after all, some encouraging confirmation as well as discontinuities with Inglehart's work were found, enough at least to keep alive the idea that some value change is going on and that it has some meaning.

But some hard questions must be asked if Inglehart's theory is to be elaborated to accommodate the implications of the findings reported above. For example: what are these young Postbourgeois doing "in the system" anyway? What business have such a relatively high proportion of a group held to be the New Left's real constituency to be working away in professional, managerial, and executive occupations and enjoying the high salaries they do? It is true that Richard Flacks[10] points to the "radicalization of educated labor" as a sequel to the student revolt of the late 'sixties and draws a convincing scenario for the future with young lawyers, doctors, and even executives pressing for radical qualitative changes in the behavior of elites and, in particular a shift in style from manipulation to participation. This interpretation too might accord with the idea of a "Silent Revolution" based on shifts in value priorities. It does not however accord very well with our data. This being Britain, not too many of our Postbourgeois attended universities (15 per cent, in fact), so what "radical" views they may hold may not be those we commonly associate with the student movement. But if they are people who favor a path of Marcusian radical change of society from within—a revolt of the intellectuals—then they could be expected to take a radical stance on some of the personal issues in the questionnaire, especially those concerning job satisfaction. The Postbourgeois should feel dissatisfied with the interpersonal aspects of their occupations and to acknowledge, albeit, grudgingly, the rewards they were receiving. On the contrary, compared with the other two groups they were much more confident that they were well suited to their higher status occupations and were fulfilling themselves, but they were distinctly less happy about their security of tenure and the amount of money they were being paid. While Inglehart also notes that his Postbourgeois tended to have higher economic expectations, he implies that they merely expect to be carried along by generally rising living standards, criticizing as they go. This is not the same thing as laying claim to an even greater share of the national cake. It simply is not very seemly for embryonic postindustrial revolutionaries to fret so much about material security. We would expect something quite different. If it were true, as claimed, that such people can actually be identified by their preference for liberal ideals at the expense of material security, trends in attitude should appear quite opposite from those observed above.

One way to break out from this near-circular confusion would be to hold that there is a crucial difference between public and private values. Inglehart's forced-choice question clearly concerns national goals—priorities which are ultimately decided by the political and administrative processes of the nation. Values that one deems to be desirable for the political community and for the conduct of national affairs need not be those one embraces for the conduct of one's own affairs. People who are shocked by untruthfulness, cynicism, or fiscal dishonesty among politicians and administrators do not necessarily condemn these traits so vehemently in private individuals and may even practice less than complete probity themselves. Similarly, we should not be too surprised if people should demand freedom and participation for the nation and cash and security for themselves.

---

[10] Richard Flacks, *Youth and Social Change* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971), pp. 114–117.

But this pleasingly simple resolution of the dilemma raised in this paper has from Inglehart's point of view a crucial deficiency: it again leads us away from Maslow. The theory of motivation proposed by Maslow is a theory of *individual* thought and behavior. His hierarchical pathway toward the desirable condition of psychological fulfillment, toward the achievement of a well-rounded and complete human condition, is to be trodden by each individual in his own way. Maslow points the way to *self*-actualization, not national actualization. Although, in an ideal state, the second might conceivably follow from the first, in Maslovian terms British Postbourgeois are "out of order." They have "higher-order" public values and "lower-order" private values to an extent that is simply not consistent with Maslow's theoretical framework nor with the use Inglehart has made of it.

The link that Inglehart provides between Maslow's theory and his own data is his assertion that the Acquisitiveness dimension is " . . . integrated into the individual's attitudinal structure." It was suggested above that this leap from the measurement of mass political (i.e., "public") values to assertions concerning highly individual factors cannot be made in the absence of detailed evidence of individual feeling states. Using data which, it must freely be admitted, are only marginally less fragile than Inglehart's original forced-choice items, and attempting to put flesh on his skeletal find, "Postbourgeois Man," we have delineated an individual whose character, among British examples, is very different from that which Inglehart has promised. Those choosing the postbourgeois value alternatives have not been lifted by postindustrial affluence into some enlightened state of nonmaterial egalitarianism; it is even possible that they choose as they do simply because, as individuals, they can *afford* to acquire a liberal or even a radical disposition. Why they *should* do so is not after all likely to be explained by an appeal to Maslow's theory of motivation; Postbourgeois are as conscious as anyone else that they have to eat. Nevertheless, the view is retained here that the phenomenon is still worth explaining. Inglehart has demonstrated that it is associated with a tendency for people to vote against their apparent class interests and we have familiar evidence that whereas in the sample as a whole there is a direct linear relationship between higher socioeconomic status and higher satisfaction of all kinds,[11] this does not hold for the Postbourgeois—which is very curious. What follows is a brief attempt to suggest a theoretical framework which may accommodate Inglehart's thesis and our own observations while preserving the essential notion that the phenomenon reflects mass value-change and has important implications for political change in the future. In the absence of further data, these suggestions remain speculative.

We would retain the notion of motivation as a theoretical construct. This may seem surprising, but the sources of motivation we should point to are much more straightforward than the subtle ramifications of Maslow's hierarchy; we believe that the Postbourgeois responses may be taken at their face value. Consider first a simple proposition concerning the importance of image-differentiation between one generation and that which precedes it. Western culture now places a high premium upon the fact of youth. This was not always so. Yet the high earning power of young people—especially the educated middle-class—early imposes an outwardly close resemblance between the consumption patterns and life-styles of this group and those of the preceding generation. Few young people feel comfortable appearing to be just like their parents. Whereas young skilled workers may be satisfied that they can achieve a successful age-differentiation through differences in taste, the better educated young middle-class people who predominate among the Postbourgeois will try to escape more profoundly from identification with their parents' generation by rejecting the very basis of that identification. So they reject their parents' easy acceptance of material priorities and stridently assert alternative basic rights like freedom and participation.

This hypothesis might then be extended to include the more important notion of intergenerational status discrepancy. The use of status discrepancy to explain the motives behind political attitudes and behavior has a long and honorable history. Bagehot[12] was puzzled about why it was the great capitalists of his time who were pressing for Parliamentary reform, and quotes Burke on the first East India Company men who were Jacobins to a man because " . . . they did not feel their present importance equal to their great wealth." In eighteenth-century France, the Jacobin cause drew support from a very similar source. Barber[13] describes how the bourgeois of *routier* origins, baulked by the entrenched power of the *noblesse de robe*, espoused egalitarian sentiments because they rightly anticipated personal advantages if social mobility in French society as a whole were increased. In a very different context, Bailey[14] describes how a caste which occupies a lowly position in the Hindu hierarchy but which has nevertheless managed to exploit its position to acquire much more wealth than higher castes (e.g., the Distillers Caste before the Indian Prohibition Acts early in this century) will elevate their ritual and hence their social status not by ostentatious disposal of wealth, but by quite the reverse; they do so by exaggerated public displays of piety and abstemiousness. In other words, discrepancies between crude material power and social status tend to be adjusted where possible in the language of the normative value system. Thus Runciman notes that the working-class men (or more likely, women) who vote Conservative and who tend to think of themselves as "middle-class" are expressing a subjectively held difference in social status between themselves and "the traditional proletarian."[15] So given the evidence that many young and especially young middle-class professional people experience status deprivation at the hands of the preceding generation, what is it about the public espousal of postbourgeois values that might adjust this discrepancy in their favor?

---

[11] See Abrams and Hall.

[12] Walter Bagehot, *The English Constitution* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1867).

[13] Elinor G. Barber, *The Bourgeoisie in 18th Century France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), pp. 141–146.

A part of the answer may be found if one accepts the assertion that Western culture also places a high premium upon worldly intellectualism. In common with youthfulness, this too was not always so. Among middle-class Europeans, this quality of applied intellectual freemindedness is popularly associated, rightly or wrongly, with an adherence to a set of nonmaterialist, liberal humanitarian, or radical reformist views. Because social interaction among humans is rarely an exercise in formal logic, a reasonably articulate utterance of radical views can attract to its adherents the desired reputation for intellectualism. Such a reputation is likely to be highly coveted by younger members of the middle classes. By appearing to speak against their class interests they may also acquire a reputation for altruism at the same time. These are powerful psychological gains and should not be underestimated. Such gains would certainly ameliorate the sense of power-frustration experienced by many young middle-class Europeans who are excluded from the exercise of real power and from positions of high social respect by what seems to them (probably rightly) to be a mere lack of seniority. This speculation is supported by the high proportion (34 per cent) of *young* men among the Postbourgeois compared with the Acquisitives (8 per cent).

More reliable support for the foregoing speculations would lead to a rather different interpretation from that put forward by Inglehart in explaining the Postbourgeois priority for "freedom and participation" and their "dissatisfaction with democracy." I am indebted to Hugh Berrington[16] for this and the earlier quotation inspired by Bagehot and Burke which suggests that the expression of such views by the Postbourgeois—given their dissatisfaction with their material rewards—may reflect little more than their urge to hasten the day when the existing elites have been ousted by themselves.

---

[14] F. G. Bailey, *Caste and the Economic Frontier* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1957), pp. 188–191.

[15] W. G. Runciman, *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 184; (also Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966).

[16] Hugh Berrington, Professor of Politics, University of Newcastle, England, written communication, 1973.

# The Missing Leader: Japanese Youths' View of Political Authority*

JOSEPH A. MASSEY
*Dartmouth College*

The apparent vitality of Japan's democratic regime seems something of an anomaly. How does a regime imposed by the force of arms of a foreign occupation, which violates tradition and history on the one hand while frustrating contemporary opposition on the other, secure its future? Among the most influential current theories of the sources of political legitimacy is the benevolent leader thesis, for which Japan provides an interesting and appropriate test.

The pioneering work of Greenstein[1] and Easton and Hess[2] on the political socialization of American children established that they develop their allegiance to the American political system through a process in which the president plays a central and vital role. From early in his political socialization the child develops his first, deepest, and most enduring political orientation—an image of the president as wise, generous, powerful, and benign. This image of the "benevolent leader" dominates the cognitive and affective dimensions of the young child's political world. Moreover, it shares much of the character of the child's relationship with his parents, and creates a link between the child and the leader which has a touch of the depth and strength of these basic human ties. This image thus serves as a major enduring source of support for the political system, onto which its affect overflows. While later research among children of an American rural subculture[3] and among black children[4] indicates that the benevolent leader syndrome is not universal, additional evidence from other nations including Britain and Holland[5] suggests that it is sufficiently common to be considered as a principal way in which contemporary political systems, including democracies, create generalized political allegiance on the part of children.

One particular variation on the benevolent leader theme is of special relevance to the question of how Japan's democratic regime secures its support. The evidence of the benevolent leader syndrome coupled with other aspects of political socialization processes including such phenomena as American children's tendencies to confuse religious and political symbols and images, has led some scholars (notably Sidney Verba) to argue that political systems may secure legitimacy by functioning in effect as religions.[6] The role of the political leader becomes endowed with a sacred or

---

* The author wishes to express his appreciation to Fred Greenstein, David Titus, Howard Erdman, James Bartholomew, Lewis Austin, Jeffrey Pressman and numerous others for their helpful comments on the manuscript, and also to the Foreign Area Fellowship Program, which supported the research for the larger study of political socialization in Japan from which this paper is drawn. Neither the Foreign Area Fellowship Program, nor any of the scholars named, bears any responsibility for the contents of the paper.

[1] See Fred I. Greenstein, "The Benevolent Leader: Children's Images of Political Authority," *American Political Science Review,* 54 (December, 1960), 934–943; and *Children and Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

[2] See Robert D. Hess and David Easton, "The Child's Changing Image of the President," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 114 (Winter, 1960), 632–644; David Easton and Jack Dennis, *Children in the Political System* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1969): and Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, *The Development of Political Attitudes in Children* (Chicago: Aldine, 1967).

[3] Dean Jaros, Herbert Hirsch, and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., "The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Subculture," *American Political Science Review,* 62 (June, 1968), 564–575.

[4] Edward S. Greenburg, "Black Children and the Political System: A Study of Socialization to Support," paper delivered at the 1969 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

[5] Fred I. Greenstein, V. M. Herman, Robert Stradling, and Elia Zurich, "Queen and Prime Minister—The Child's Eye View," *New Society,* 14 (October 23, 1969), 635–638; Fred I. Greenstein, "French, British and American Children's Images of Government and Politics," paper delivered at the meeting of the Northeastern Political Science Association, 1970; Fred I. Greenstein and Sidney Tarrow, "Political Orientations of Children: The Use of a Semi-Projective Technique in Three Nations," *Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics,* Series 01-009, 1 (Beverley Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1970), 479–588; Jack Dennis, Leon Lindberg, and Donald McCrone, "Support for Nation and Government among English Children," *British Journal of Political Science,* 1 (January, 1971), 25–48; and Paul R. Abrahamson and Ronald Inglehart, "The Development of Systemic Support in Four Western Democracies," *Comparative Political Studies,* 2 (January, 1970), 419–442.

[6] Sidney Verba, "The Kennedy Assassination and the Nature of Political Commitment," in *The Kennedy Assassination and the American Public,* ed. Bradley S. Greenberg and Edwin B. Parker (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), pp. 348–360. For a summary of many of the findings on which the argument rests as well as provocative criticism of the possible normative consequences of benevolent leadership, see Lewis Lipsitz, "If as Verba says, the State Functions as a Religion, What are We to do Then to Save Our Souls?" *American Political Science Review,* 62 (June, 1968), 527–535.

religious quality and attachments to the system become couched in symbolism which both invokes and evokes religious imagery.

That such a process might be exceedingly effective in creating support for the regime has never been demonstrated more tellingly than in Japan in the period before 1945. The emperor was explicitly a sacred leader; and in various ways, including State Shinto, the regime saw to it that political allegiance took on the character of religious commitment. In a very real sense, Japan's postwar regime was founded in explicit repudiation of that equation of religion and politics. Thus, a major question confronting a study of the socialization sources of support for the contemporary regime is to determine to what extent support is dependent upon the creation of a new Japanese version of the benevolent leader and upon the inculcation of implicit and unquestioning trust in political authority.

The first objective here, therefore, is to focus on the empirical question of whether a benevolent leader exists in the political imagery of today's Japanese children. At the outset I concentrate on a comparative analysis of younger children's images of possible contenders for the role: the emperor, the prime minister (at the time of this study, Sato Eisaku[7]), and the local leader—mayor or governor. The principal focus, however, is on the prime minister, as the most important national political figure. The analysis considers the role of children's conceptions of politics as a factor affecting the national leader's image, and shows how that image is conditioned by certain important aspects of political reality, in particular the parliamentary political structure and the leadership style and personality of the national leader himself.

The second objective is to determine whether a spill-over of affect from the national leader to other important institutions of the political system takes place in later childhood. Accordingly, I compare the attitudes of older youngsters, in their teens, toward the prime minister with their attitudes toward other political institutions, along several dimensions of political trust. The teenagers' attitudes are, in each case, compared to those of their parents to assay the continuity or discontinuity of socialization.

Finally,, some of the causes and consequences of the presence or absence of a benevolent leader in a political system are considered. Particular emphasis is placed on the historical roots of the benevolent leadership phenomenon to be found in most societies, but which are missing in Japan.

## Data and Methodology

The data on which this paper is based come mainly from two surveys of Japanese youngsters. The first was carried out in the late spring of 1969. This survey included a pencil-and-paper questionnaire with fixed choice items, which I administered to 942 eighth, tenth and twelfth-grade public school students, and to their parents, in Tokyo and in a rural prefecture. In addition to the fixed-item questionnaire, I also conducted personal interviews with some 40 students. In these interviews, I pursued in greater depth and detail the same topics dealt with in the questionnaire in order to permit a freer and more spontaneous expression of the youngsters' own images and attitudes. These interviews will be used extensively to illustrate and illuminate the points made on the basis of the questionnaire.[8]

Much of the importance of the benevolent leader thesis derives from the generalization in the study of socialization that what is learned earliest is retained longest. It becomes essential, therefore, to determine if such an image of the leader does indeed develop in early childhood. Thus, the first part of this paper draws to a large extent upon data about Japanese grade school children's images of the emperor, prime minister, and local leader, kindly made available to me by Professor Okamura Tadao of Hosei University. Professor Okamura conducted a nationwide survey of more than 5,000 children in grades three through twelve in the fall of 1968.[9]

---

[7] Sato, the first Japanese to win the Nobel Peace Prize (in 1974, for his efforts toward nuclear nonproliferation and international reconciliation in the Pacific area), held office from 1964 to 1972. His name, and all Japanese names appearing here, are given in their Japanese fashion, family name preceding surname.

[8] The schools were chosen to maximize the demographic representativeness of the sample with regard to socioeconomic status and urban-rural residence. They were located in central and suburban Tokyo, and in two small cities and two farm communities in Tochigi Prefecture, about 120 miles north of Tokyo. Each student's parents were also surveyed, with nearly identical instruments which the students took home (in sealed envelopes) and returned to the school when their parents had completed them. The student response rate was effectively 100 percent; the parental response rate was likewise high, with more than 80 percent of both parents responding.

I myself conducted most of the interviews, which lasted from forty minutes to an hour. But because Japanese have a strong consciousness of the difference between themselves and foreigners, I took several measures to reduce the impact of my foreign nationality. First I had several Japanese college students carry out a number of the interviews; upon analyzing the transcripts I was able to determine that my presence as interviewer had not produced appreciably different responses than those elicited by the native interviewers. A second tactic was to talk with two students in the same session. This not only helped the students to relax and feel less anxious, but permitted me to stimulate and record political interchanges between them. Often one student's reply or remark would lead to an interesting follow-up or counter-reply from the other. For further methodological details, see Joseph A. Massey, "Political Socialization in a New Democracy: Emerging Patterns of Political Culture in Japan" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1973), 21–30.

### The Emperor: Peripheral Monarch

A principal and obvious difference between the American and Japanese political systems is the fact that the United States, as a presidential system, has the roles of head of government and head of state united in the office of the president, while in Japan the roles are divided between the emperor as head of state and the prime minister as head of government. There are thus two nationally prominent executive offices and figures. In an earlier time there would have been little doubt about which of the two would be the more likely to inspire emotional attachment and respect on the part of Japanese, young and old alike.

Before defeat in the Pacific War so drastically changed the Japanese political system, the emperor's place was supreme, legally and constitutionally, spiritually and politically. He was very nearly the sole legitimate object of political affection and esteem. His portrayal as a father to whom all owed ultimate filial piety was part of a broader view of Japanese society as a "family-state" under his benevolent, patriarchal guidance. There is no doubt that ordinary people were profoundly attached to this father figure. American researchers studying the morale of the Japanese army found the soldiers' faith in the emperor to be so strong that any propaganda attack on him would only cause increased determination to fight and would thus risk prolonging the war. The researchers concluded that the emperor's place in the emotional and symbolic life of his subjects was so profound and central

> . . . as to constitute a non-logical, cultural type of faith strongly reinforced in any one individual by the sheer pressure of the whole society. It would be impossible for one to reject it without stepping outside almost all the ideas and value systems that are Japanese.[10]

After the war, even though the Occupation heeded the advice not to attack or destroy the throne, it did make drastic changes in its role in the new Japan. The emperor's spiritual status became that of mere mortal; his political status, under the new constitution, that of mere symbol.

What role, then, does the new emperor play in the images of government held by today's Japanese children? The significance of this question may best be understood by reference to some recent findings about English children's images of the queen. In several independent studies researchers have found that the queen dominates the political imagery and perception of youngsters over a wide range of ages. At younger age levels, many English children believe that the queen is the most important person in England (and, for almost as many, the most important person in the world).[11] Fully 72 per cent of working-class and 61 per cent of middle-class British eight and nine year olds in the same survey believed that "the queen is more important than the prime minister in running Britain."[12] Even by age twelve, one-third of the middle-class children and fully two-thirds of the working-class group continued to assert the queen's importance over the prime minister.[13] In another study, Greenstein found that 51 per cent of English ten to twelve-year-olds responding said that the queen rules or governs while only 22 per cent responded in those terms to a similar question about the prime minister, who was viewed primarily as her legislative helper.[14] Dennis and his associates obtained similar results.[15] In short, the queen dominates young British children's images of government to a remarkable degree. In a similar item, Okamura asked a nationwide sample of children, "Who is most important in running politics in today's Japan?" Table 1 summarizes the results for those in grades 3 to 8.

It is evident from the table that the lesson of

---

[9] Although our two surveys were conducted independently, Prof. Okamura and I did consult with each other, and participate in the construction and revision of each other's questionnaires. As a result of our parallel interest and of this partial collaboration, we decided to exchange data and to give one another the right to use those data in our respective countries. I would like to thank Prof. Okamura and to note that he bears no responsibility for the interpretations I have placed upon his data in this paper. Prof. Okamura has published several articles in Japanese based on these data and one in English; see "The Child's Changing Image of the Prime Minister," *The Developing Economies*, 6 (December, 1968), 566–586. In Japanese, see "Gendai nihon ni okeru seijiteki shakaika" (Political Socialization in Contemporary Japan), *Nenpo seijigaku*, 1970; "Seiji ishiki no kitei to shite no soridaijinzo" (The Prime Minister's Image as the Foundation of Political Consciousness), in Taniuchi Ken, Ari Bakuji, Ide Yoshinori, and Nishio Masaru, eds., *Gendai gyosei to kanryosei* (Contemporary Administration and Bureaucracy), (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1974); and "Seijiteki shakaika ni okeru 'minshushugi' to 'heiwa'" ("Democracy" and "Peace" in Political Socialization), *Shakai kagaku janaru*, 1969.

[10] Alexander Leighton and Morris Opler, "Psychological Warfare and the Japanese Emperor," in *Personalities and Cultures*, ed. Robert C. Hunt (Garden City: The Natural History Press, 1967), pp. 255–256.

[11] Greenstein et al., "Queen and Prime Minister."

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 639.

[13] Greenstein, "French, British and American Children's Images," Table 3 p. 40.

[14] *Ibid.* pp. 19 and 40.

[15] Dennis, Lindberg, and McCrone, "Support for Nation and Government," p. 37.

**Table 1. Perceptions of the Emperor's Importance**

"Who is most important in running politics in today's Japan?"

(Percentages selecting each response by grade)

| Grade | Emperor | Prime Minister | Diet-men | Each Citizen | Other & Don't Know | Total | (N) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | 21 | 32 | 12 | 7 | 28 | 100 | (630) |
| 4 | 21 | 32 | 19 | 13 | 15 | 100 | (626) |
| 5 | 11 | 25 | 24 | 23 | 17 | 100 | (631) |
| 6 | 4 | 20 | 11 | 55 | 10 | 100 | (631) |
| 7 | 5 | 16 | 12 | 55 | 12 | 100 | (654) |
| 8 | 3 | 15 | 22 | 50 | 10 | 100 | (732) |

Source: Okamura, 1968 Survey.

popular sovereignty has been well learned. At all age levels except the three youngest, "each citizen" has a substantial lead over the other responses. This is a most interesting finding, for it has been said by many of the critics of the new regime that only imperial sovereignty suits the Japanese: "Popular sovereignty," says Kawai Kazuo, for example, "is completely alien to Japanese thought."[16] Ardath Burkes concurs: "From the sheer historical point of view, some restoration of [imperial] theoretical authority, with popular controls . . . is almost inevitable."[17] But only among the third and fourth graders do we find a sizable proportion of children who conceive of the emperor as ruling as well as reigning, and in contrast to the British case, even among these youngest children the emperor runs second to the prime minister. By fifth grade, the emperor is picked less than any of the other responses including "each citizen." Although strict comparison between the English and Japanese data is not possible because of differences in the items, it does seem clear that the absolute level of attributions of power to the monarch is substantially lower among even the youngest Japanese respondents than among their English counterparts.

If power and rule are missing from the Japanese child's image of the emperor, neither is his role as "symbol of the State" particularly prominent. Okamura also asked the children in his survey to choose the best symbol of Japan. The emperor was chosen by fewer than 10 per cent of the children in any grade, trailing far behind the favorite choices, the flag and Mt. Fuji, which together accounted for 65 per cent or more of the responses of children in nearly every grade.[18]

It is clear that the emperor does not figure so centrally or importantly in the political life of the Japanese child as the queen does in that of the British child. This may deprive Japan of one of the leading benefits of monarchy: the promotion through the socialization process of a sense of identification with the regime that does not waver even when partisan opponents control the elected offices. Abrahamson and Inglehart, in a comparative study of the role of the monarch, point out that "The presence of a monarchy reduces the chances that an individual's first political perception is that government is in the hands of the 'bad guys'."[19] They go on to note that the perception that government is controlled by the "bad guys" is likeliest to occur where partisan cleavage and hostility run deep. But for monarchy in Japan to bridge the partisan gulf it would have to be the object of widespread affection among people of diverse political persuasions, and not itself a source of partisan division. The symbolic emperor of postwar Japan gains acceptance and support from most adults, on the average about 70 per cent as public opinion polls over the past two decades have shown.[20] But for a minority, the present status of the emperor is a source of partisan and ideological conflict. On the one hand, a small number of conservatives wish the emperor restored to his former glory and authority; on the other, a few leftists would prefer that the throne be completely abolished. On the whole, however, the majority of the Japanese support the throne as it is, but with little apparent intensity. It is doubtful, therefore, that the emperor could serve as a focal point in the cementing of the individual's allegiance to the political system in the face of control of the government by the "bad guys."

---

[16] Kawai Kazuo, *Japan's American Interlude* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 57.

[17] Ardath Burkes, *The Government of Japan* (New York: Crowell, 1961), p. 30.

[18] Okamura, 1968 Survey, unpublished data.

[19] Abrahamson and Inglehart, "The Development of Systemic Support," p. 432.

[20] See, for example: Ishida Takeshi, "Popular Attitudes toward the Japanese Emperor," *Asian Survey*, 2 (April, 1962); and David Titus, "Emperor and Public Consciousness in Postwar Japan," *Japan Interpreter* (Summer, 1970).

This lack of intense emotional investment in the throne among Japanese adults is reflected in indifference and increasing ambivalence among the youngsters. In the mid-1950s Tokyo high school students were asked to choose among several alternatives to describe their feelings when they saw or heard the word "emperor." Positive responses far outdistanced negative ones; 52 per cent chose "respect" or "affection" and only 8 per cent "a foolish or unnecessary existence." But the low affective importance of the emperor to many youngsters was illustrated by the high proportion—38 per cent—who found it hard to say what their feelings were since the emperor "is far removed from us."[21] About ten years later, in 1964, Titus and Yoshida and their associates found that feelings of emotional uninvolvement and indifference toward the emperor predominated over positive sentiments of affection, reverence, or adoration among both students at Tokyo's Meiji University (by 60 per cent to 29 per cent) and adults in their twenties in Kofu, a city near Tokyo (by 43 per cent to 31 per cent), and nearly equalled positive feelings among Kofu youngsters in their teens (34 per cent to 39 per cent).[22]

There are, of course, obvious and profound reasons why the present emperor is unable to play the role of benevolent leader. Historically, he is the very symbol of the old order that the new regime supplanted. Owing to that and to his own retiring personality and unprepossessing manner, he is much less popularly visible than other monarchs, making few public appearances. Moreover there is almost no color or pomp and ceremony remaining in the imperial institution to delight the eyes and capture the affections of the young—no horse guard, no parades, no crown and imperial regalia.[23] Those days are gone, seemingly forever. Unable to perform the kind of broad-gauge legitimation of the regime that was once his most important political function, the emperor no longer stands at the symbolic and expressive center of the national political culture; he has faded into the periphery.

But before we dismiss the throne as a contender for the role of benevolent leader, we must recognize that it may emerge from its present eclipse with the accession of a new emperor. One of the most pointed of Titus and Yoshida's findings was that Japanese of all age levels would like to see the throne "popularized," with the emperor made more a part of popular life and less a distant and aloof figure.[24] A decade ago, the marriage of the crown prince to the beautiful daughter of a commoner caused an outpouring of enthusiasm and affection from all segments of the people, especially from the young. This leads us to ask whether the feelings of today's youth toward the crown prince foreshadow any future popular affection for the throne. Once again, Okamura's 1968 survey provides data relevant to this additional aspect of the benevolent leader role in Japan. The children surveyed were asked to describe in their own words what sort of person they thought the crown prince was. Roughly 60 per cent of the youngest children chose terms of respect and goodwill, while almost none used negative or derogatory words or phrases. The positive sentiment decreased steadily with age, so that by twelfth grade only 24 per cent mentioned respect or affection while another 24 per cent used words connoting antipathy or disdain. Significantly, however, the largest proportion of the twelfth graders were noncommittal: 13 per cent made no comment, 14 per cent said they didn't know much about the crown prince, and 25 per cent made neutral or mixed comments.[25] This prevalence of high positive affect among the youngest children, turning to a noncommittal position among the high school seniors, may indicate that there are dormant resources of popular support and enthusiasm that a new and particularly a young emperor might be able to tap.

## The Prime Minister: Distant and Impersonal Leader

The change in the Japanese political regime that took place after 1945 removed the emperor from the role of benevolent leader. Does the prime minister fill the void? Let us look first at children's perceptions of his importance.

---

[21] Harada Shigeru, "Atarashii aikokushin to wa nani ka" (What is the New Patriotism?), *Seinen shinri,* 7 (February, 1956), 32.

[22] See Titus, "Emperor and Public Consciousness," 189–190; also, Yoshida Yoshiaki, David Titus, and Agata Yukio, "Shocho tennosei no ishiki kozo" (The Mentality of the Symbolic Emperor System), *Meiji daigaku hosei kenkyujo kiyo,* n.d. Note that the percentages mentioned refer to responses rather than to respondents, since multiple answers to the items were permitted.

[23] The generation gap in affect toward the emperor is pointed up dramatically by the results of a nationwide poll conducted by the *Mainichi shinbun* in 1971. Only 4 per cent of the respondents in their teens responded that what made them conscious of being Japanese was being near the emperor or the imperial palace, as compared to 50 per cent of those sixty years of age and older. That even today, one-half of the older group in the sample chose to identify the emperor so clearly with their own sense of national identity gives us some idea of the impact his benevolent leadership once had. See *Mainichi shinbun,* January 1, 1972.

[24] See Titus, "Emperor and Public Consciousness," p. 193.

[25] Okamura, 1968 Survey, unpublished data.

**Table 2. Younger Children's Attitudes toward the Prime Minister**

(Percentage of positive, neutral, and negative responses by grade)

| | Competence[a] | | | Liking[b] | | | Honesty[c] | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Grade | Pos. | Neut. | Neg. | Pos. | Neut. | Neg. | Pos. | Neut. | Neg. |
| 3 | 74 | 22 | 4 | 36 | 58 | 6 | 68 | 25 | 7 |
| 4 | 66 | 26 | 8 | 20 | 63 | 16 | 51 | 40 | 9 |
| 5 | 52 | 31 | 18 | 13 | 61 | 26 | 27 | 50 | 23 |
| 6 | 54 | 26 | 20 | 8 | 61 | 31 | 17 | 48 | 35 |
| 7 | 43 | 33 | 24 | 12 | 58 | 29 | 10 | 58 | 31 |
| 8 | 37 | 35 | 28 | 5 | 58 | 37 | 7 | 57 | 36 |

Source: Okamura, 1968 Survey; N's as in Table 1.

| Items | Positive Response | Neutral | Negative |
|---|---|---|---|
| [a] "Is the Prime Minister carrying out his responsibilities as Prime Minister?" | Very well+well | Can't say<br>Don't know | Not very well+ hardly at all |
| [b] "Do you like the Prime Minister or dislike him?" | Like very much+like | Can't say<br>Don't know | Dislike+ dislike very much |
| [c] "Is the Prime Minister honest or is he a liar?" | Very honest+honest | Can't say<br>Don't know | Sometimes lies+ always lies |

We saw above that comparison with the British case revealed the Japanese prime minister to be apparently more generally perceived by children as important in running politics than the emperor. This contrasted with the British case, where the prime minister was overshadowed by the queen. Additional data on American children's perceptions of the president's importance in politics helps to put the Japanese prime minister's image into comparative perspective. A very sizable majority of the American children surveyed by Hess and Torney, (ranging from 86 per cent of the second graders to 50 per cent of the eighth graders,) selected the president as the "one who does the most to run the country."[26] A second look at Table 1 reveals that the prime minister does not dominate Japanese children's perceptions of politics nearly so onesidedly. While the president's lead over Congress as most important drops to two-to-one only by eighth grade, the prime minister contends with the members of the Diet neck-and-neck from as early as fifth grade. In comparative terms, the Japanese prime minister seems to fall between his British counterpart and the American president in the degree of his importance and dominance in children's imagery of government.

A second and perhaps more important question has to do with young children's affect toward the prime minister. Table 2 summarizes Okamura's findings.

The most striking characteristic of these figures is the high proportion of children who chose the neutral responses, especially on the liking and competence items. The prime minister would not appear to be a highly salient figure for young children, particularly as an object of affection and trust. For those to whom he is salient, moreover, the table shows that his image is strikingly more negative than positive, from almost the earliest grade levels. On none of the items do we find an outright majority of favorable responses at all grades, and only for his competence at his job (a point discussed below) do we find such a majority at most levels.

Consistent with findings about children's affect toward political figures in other societies, the figures in Table 2 show a marked tendency across all three items for positive feelings to decrease with age and for negative feelings to increase correspondingly. What is distinctive about the Japanese case is that the drop in supportive responses appears to happen earlier and to reach a substantially lower level by eighth grade than is true, for example, in the United States. Indeed, favorable replies among eighth graders to the liking and trust items were virtually nonexistent. Cross-national comparison helps to put these data into perspective and to point up the dramatically low level of Japanese children's affection for the prime minister. For example, Easton and Dennis report that in response to an item asking American children to choose whether they liked the president "more than anyone," "more than most," "more than some," "more than a few," or "less than anyone," 60 per cent or more of the fourth through seventh graders and 56 per cent of the eighth graders chose one of the three positive replies, while about a third of the fourth through seventh graders selected one of the two most positive. Only about 17 per cent of any age level chose one of the two least favorable responses.[27]

---

[26] *The Development of Political Attitudes . . . ,* p. 35.

The contrast between the American and Japanese findings is vivid. For example, 25 per cent of the American eighth graders professed to like the president more than anyone or more than most, while only 5 per cent of the Japanese eighth graders claimed to like the prime minister or to like him very much. Though the items used differ in wording, making strict comparison impossible, independent evidence corroborates that far fewer Japanese than American children express a liking for their national political leader. Japan was one of six nations included in a study of the socialization of primary school children into "compliance" systems. With regard to liking for national leaders—in the Japanese case, the prime minister; in the American, the president—and belief that the national leader would help people who needed assistance, the proportion of youngsters giving positive responses to the identical items used was consistently lowest among the Japanese. The Japanese children were much less positive than their American, Indian, Italian, and Greek agemates. Only the Danish children approached their low levels of affect for the political authority figure.[28]

Turning to another dimension of affective evaluation—feelings about the truthfulness of the leader—we discover that here too, Japanese children are more cynical than their agemates in other lands. Easton and Dennis asked American children, while Abrahamson and Inglehart asked Dutch and French children, about how often the leader (prime minister, president, or queen) keeps his or her promises. Okamura's item asked the children to say whether they thought the prime minister was honest or told lies. Though the differences in the items are thus sufficient for us to take note of them, it seems useful nonetheless to pursue the comparison (Table 3), in view of the basic similarity in theme.

Grade-by-grade comparisons between the United States and Japanese samples make the differences found in Table 3 even sharper. Favorable responses among American children ("always keeps promises" plus "usually keeps promises") *never* fall below 94 per cent at any age level; as we saw in Table 2, favorable responses among Japanese children regarding the prime minister's honesty ("very honest" plus "honest") amounted to a majority only among the youngest children, and plummeted to merely 7 per cent of the eighth graders, where fully 10 per cent chose the most negative response ("he always lies"). In an earlier study that asked small samples of both Japanese and American children identical questions about their respective leaders' honesty, similar findings were reported. Among second graders, 90 per cent of the American children and 70 per cent of the Japanese children chose favorable replies; while among eighth graders the proportions had dropped to 50 per cent of the Americans and 5 per cent of the Japanese.[29]

One obvious possibility is that Japanese youngsters' lack of affection for the prime minister reflects a generally cooler view of him among Japanese adults than the view American adults have of the president. Okamura found that few of the children in his study believed that the prime minister was popular with many people. Table 4 presents some supporting evidence, comparing the average percentage of popular support reported in major public opinion polls received by each postwar American president (up to Richard Nixon) and the five major postwar Japanese prime ministers, up to the time of this study, as well as the highest and lowest levels of support received by each.

---

[27] *Children in the Political System,* Table 8-4, p. 179. These and all following figures on American children's affect toward the president are of pre-Watergate vintage. At this date there is very little evidence regarding the overall intensity and permanence of the impact of the Watergate revelations on American children's images of the president. In a follow-up study done in June 1973 during the period of the televised Senate hearings on Watergate, Greenstein found only a slight diminution in children's tendency to idealize the president in comparison with pre-Watergate samples of children. "Children's Images of Political Leaders in Three Democracies," paper delivered at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, Louisiana. See also Howard Tolley, Jr., *Children and War: Socialization to International Conflict* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1973) for evidence that the Vietnam War may have caused a decline in American children's perceptions of the president as an unerringly wise and infallible leader.

[28] Robert D. Hess et al., *Authority, Rules, and Aggression: A Cross-National Study of the Socialization of Children into Compliance Systems* (Chicago: University of Chicago, March, 1969, for the Bureau of Research Office of Education, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare), Part I; see "Part B, Chapter 5: Japanese Data" by Hoshino Akira, and "Part C: Cross-National Comparison and Conclusions" by Maria Tenezakis et al.

[29] See Robert D. Hess, "The Socialization of Attitudes toward Political Authority: Some Cross-National Comparisons," *International Social Science Journal,* 15 (1963), 542–559; and Okamura Tadao, "Political Socialization of Upheavals: A Case in Japan," unpublished paper, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 1962.

**Table 3. Cross-National Comparison of Children's Views of Political Leaders' Honesty**

(Percentage selecting most favorable response)

| Age | U.S.A.[1a] Pres. | Netherlands[2a] Queen | Netherlands[2a] Prem. | France[2a] Pres. | France[2a] Prem. | Japan[3b] Prime Minister |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8–11 | 42 | 65 | 36 | 48 | 36 | 15 |
| 12–14 | 23 | 71 | 33 | 30 | 16 | 1 |

Sources: 1 Easton and Dennis, *Children in the Political System*, Table 8–43, p. 180.
2 Abrahamson and Inglehart, "The Development of Systemic Support . . . ", Table 4, p. 428.
3 Okamura, 1968 Survey.
Note: a.) "Always keeps promises"; b.) "Is very honest."

While again, item wording differences must be taken into account in making any comparison, there seems little room for doubt that adult popular support for the Japanese prime minister is a significant notch lower than that for the American president. Prior to the present incumbent, Tanaka Kakuei,[30] only one prime minister, Yoshida Shigeru, who held office during much of the Occupation, had ever received more than 50 per cent popular support. In contrast, all of the American presidents have enjoyed nearly 70 per cent or more of approval at some point, while, except for Harry Truman and Richard Nixon after the Watergate scandal revelations, the average support for the American presidents far outdistances that for the Japanese leaders.[31] In short, it is clear that the cues that Japanese youngsters receive from adults about the prime minister are much less likely to be positive than those American children receive.

Yet while Japanese children do not like or trust the prime minister, they apparently think he is doing a good job. As we saw in Table 2, the belief that he is carrying out his responsibilities as prime minister remains predominant throughout the grade-school years. This mixture of respect and "dislike" is exemplified by the following comments of a tenth-grade Tokyo boy, which indicate that some children may begin with a naive, positive image of the prime minister that is soon overcome by the negative tone of adult discourse:

I. Well, what about Prime Minister Sato—is he doing a good job?

**Table 4. Adult Popular Support for Japanese and American Chief Executives**

| Prime Minister | Japanese Prime Minister (% supporting Cabinet) High | Low | Average | President | American President (% approve handling of job) High | Low | Average |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Yoshida | 54 | 31 | 41 | Truman | 87 | 23 | 46 |
| Hatoyama | 50 | 34 | 40 | Eisenhower | 79 | 49 | 66 |
| Kishi | 46 | 28 | 37 | Kennedy | 83 | 57 | 70 |
| Ikeda | 40 | 31 | 35 | Johnson | 80 | 35 | 54 |
| Sato | 46 | 19 | 32 | Nixon | 68 | 24 | 48 |

Overall average: 37 per cent
Source: Computed from *Mainichi Shinbun*, October 18, 1971 and April 4, 1972.

Overall average: 57 per cent
Source: *Gallup Opinion Index*, March, 1972, p. 2. and *The Gallup Poll Release* August 15, 1974, p. 1.

---

[30] Tanaka has been excluded from consideration because he took office after the study being reported here was conducted. He entered office on a crest of popularity, receiving the highest support ever attained by a prime minister in the Asahi poll (62 per cent in July 1972). His early support in the Mainichi poll was also very high (53 per cent in September 1972, the second highest on record after that recorded by Yoshida). But his support rapidly dwindled, reaching a low of 22 per cent in both polls at the end of 1973. To complete the comparison with the figures in the table, Tanaka's average support in the five polls taken by the Mainichi so far (up to June, 1974) is 34 per cent. See *Mainichi shinbun*, June 21, 1974 and *Asahi shinbun*, December 16, 1973.

[31] Similar polls of adult support for the French premiers of the Fourth Republic show them to have been even less popular than their Japanese counterparts. On the other hand, De Gaulle in the early years of the Fifth Republic enjoyed about as high a level of support as the American presidents. See the comparative data presented in Nishihira Shigeki, *Nihonjin no iken* (The Opinions of the Japanese), (Tokyo: Seishin Shobo, 1963), Fig. II, p. 81.

R. He stands for the whole country. . . . I think he does his best, and is right for the job.
I. Saying he's right for the job mean's he's fulfilling his responsibilities, doesn't it?
R. Yes, I think he's doing the best he can.
I. Do you like him or dislike him?

R. Like or dislike? Well, I've no real reason to dislike him, but somehow since everyone says they dislike him, I feel as if I do too.
I. Does everyone say that? Who's everyone?
R. Everyone's—well, often on television they say things like "Sato's bad." And the price of rice keeps going up.
I. They don't often say "Sato's good?"
R. I've never heard anyone say "Sato's good."

Over and above the obvious implication that the press may have a good deal to do with the prime minister's popularity, a point we shall return to, this admixture of respect and dislike may stem from the image of the prime minister's job which emphasizes its importance rather than its benevolence, one of the few distinct pictures that Japanese children seem to have of the prime minister. In that image, the kinds of qualities that would stimulate affective identification are noticeably lacking. Let us turn now to a discussion of that image.

### The Prime Minister's Image: Some Insights from a Comparison with the Local Leader

What accounts for the remarkably low overall level of affect that Japanese children show toward the prime minister? My interviews with some 40 teenagers made it apparent that underlying much of their feeling was the sense that the prime minister is a distant and remote figure. The prime minister, one fourteen-year-old Tokyo boy said, leads a "separate existence" from the ordinary people.[32] In that separate existence, other interviews made clear, the prime minister is concerned about "big" things, not ordinary matters; about policies, not people.

I. Does the prime minister try to help the people?
R. I think he tries to look after the big things rather than the little ones. Not so that people become individually better off, but so that Japan as a whole does . . . that's his responsibility.

Rural eighth-grade girl

I. What sort of person do you think the prime minister is?
R. Sort of not too kind to the common people. I feel as if he does things that are far apart from us. I feel I'd like him to be closer to us.

Tokyo tenth-grade girl

This feeling of distance and separation regarding the prime minister apparently stems, at least in part, from two sources. First, the prime minister acts on the national level, from which Japanese youngsters feel far removed. Second, he is an impersonal figure, one whose image for most Japanese youngsters does not include the personal qualities so prominent in American children's images of the president, which give the president's image much the same kind of intimacy and familiarity that their image of their fathers has. These points are best illustrated by showing the stark contrast in the images children have of the prime minister with those they have of another significant authority figure, the local leader.

In the interviews there were frequent spontaneous and enthusiastic references from the Tokyo children to Minobe Ryokichi, the governor of Tokyo. The following quote is symptomatic of his appeal to the young:

I. Is there a politician whom you like?
R. Mr. Minobe.
I. What's good about Mr. Minobe?
R. Like I said, his seeming like one of the people is good. So everyone feels friendly, and he thinks about everyone's problems—perhaps it's that. He's on television a lot. He listens to everyone's opinions and says, "If it can be done, I'll do it." I've seen that. . . .

Tokyo tenth-grade girl

Minobe has been unusually popular among adults as well; opinion polls have shown that more than two-thirds of Tokyo adults support him. His popularity also crosses party lines to an extent that is rare in Japan: not only do an overwhelming majority of Democratic Socialists, Socialists, and Communists support him; so too do a majority of Liberal Democrats.[33] Few politicians in postwar Japan have enjoyed that kind of suprapartisan support, so his relative popularity with children is no surprise. What is a surprise, however, is that children in other areas accord a similar level of support to *their* local political leaders—mayors or village heads. This is the unexpected finding that emerges from Okamura's questions about local figures which were identical to the questions asked about the prime minister. Figure 1 summarizes the comparative support for prime minister and local leader among children in grades three through eight. The numbers shown are the mean scores among children of each grade for each authority figure on each of the items, computed by scoring one point for the most negative response category up to five for the most positive.

As with the prime minister, the local leader is not highly salient to most children. But among those to whom the two figures are salient, we ob-

---

[32] This echoes a comment made by a sophisticated journalist in the *Asahi shinbun,* July 9, 1971: ". . . it is a question of whether to call the government 'us' or 'them.' In Japan the government is always 'them,' and the prime minister sounds as if he is speaking in a different dimension from that of the people."

[33] *Asahi shinbun,* July 9, 1969.



(Solid line ——— = Prime Minister; dotted line - - - = local leader; scores range from 1 = most negative to 5 = most positive.)

Source: Okamura, 1968 Survey; *N*'s as in Table 1. The items are as given in Table 2 and are identical for both Prime Minister and local leader.

**Figure 1. Mean Scores by Grade for Images of the Prime Minister and Local Leader**

serve several notable differences. First, the prime minister enjoys a clear lead in support over the local leader only among the very youngest children, the third graders. By fifth grade, and to some extent even by fourth grade, the local leader enjoys more support. Second, whereas support for the prime minister declines grade by grade, support for the local leader remains fairly constant across all grade levels. Only evaluations of the local leaders' honesty show any really marked decline and that appears to cease after fifth grade. In other words, for all practical purposes, the local leader appears to be much less susceptible to the corrosive effects of age on support that plagues the prime minister's image. Why? Though firm evidence is lacking, it seems, from a variety of sources, especially my interviews with young teenagers, that the factors they identify as negative and repulsive in the political world—remoteness, corruption, and the placing of narrow partisan interests ahead of the public interest—are widely perceived to be operative at the national level but not at the local level. And that distinction begins with the very notion of "politics," which is itself perceived as a national-level phenomenon. As one Tokyo tenth grader told me: "When you talk about local autonomy, that's something which is very close to home. Politics seems to be on a bigger scale." If politics seem remote, the notion of "politician" seems somehow "sort of wicked" and "unclean" in the words of one rural high school senior.[34] For many youngsters, however, local leaders such as Governor Minobe, or the city mayor or village head, don't really seem like "politicians":

> I. So things that are right around you don't seem like politics? If that's the case, whom do you think of when I ask about politicians?
> R. The prime minister.
> I. What about Governor Minobe?
> R. He and some others have been on television a lot recently, making a fuss. . . . In a way, he's a politician too.
> I. But he's different from the prime minister?
> R. Yes, more like the working people.

---

[34] His words reflect the feeling of many youths. One sample of college students chose to describe politicians with the adjectives dark, dirty, cold, elderly, unintellectual, empty, closed and conservative. See Nishihira Naoki, *Gendai seinen no ishiki to kodo 1* (The Attitudes and Behavior of Contemporary Youth), (Tokyo: Dai Nihon Tosho, 1970), p. 103.

I. What do you mean by that? He feels closer to you?
R. The things he does are basic, [sort of between doing] things for the country and for one's home.
I. Things like garbage collection don't seem like politics?
R. No.

Our teenager is hesitant about classifying the governor as a politician. He is a politician only "in a way," but the sorts of things he does are different from those that the prime minister does. The interviewer in this case, herself a Japanese college girl, provides us with the clue to the image of the local leader's job: not politics but "things like garbage collection." "Local autonomy" is not politics at the local level, but local officials looking after the practical, earthy needs of the common citizens. This uncynical view of local affairs and local leaders fits in with evidence suggesting that adults also feel less alienated when it comes to the local scene. In all areas of Japan, in the otherwise alienated city as well as in the country, consistently more people vote in local elections than in national ones. This may be because adults, like children, feel closer to the local leaders; Bradley Richardson, in a 1964 survey, found that both urban and rural adults were more likely to attribute concern about the people's needs to local officials and politicians than to national ones.[35]

Behind the apparently common tendency of youngsters and adults to view local level leaders as more benign than national ones, lies the fact that such leaders are expected to, and commonly do, run and serve as nonpartisans.[36] As a result, in contrast to national politics, in which party conflict and party interests occupy the limelight, at the local level the party label is widely de-emphasized. Most mayoral and gubernatorial candidates run either as independents or as suprapartisan coalition candidates. Minobe, for instance, is supported by a Socialist-Communist coalition organization, popularly known as the Tokyo Citizen's Party (*Tomin no to*). The nonpartisanship of local leaders has two important consequences for their support. First, it reflects and enhances community solidarity and harmony and thus accords well with some long-time cultural emphases that are still potent, especially in rural Japan. Second, their nonpartisanship insures that local leaders are less apt to incur critical treatment by the media, which operate, as Okamura has pointed out, on a principle of neutrality that permits the expression of positive support for nonpartisan figures only, reserving for partisan figures its negative comments.[37] Suprapartisan figures like Minobe receive generally positive treatment and of course nonpartisan local leaders often receive very little press attention at all. Meanwhile, the prime minister, as the most salient national partisan politician, is constantly criticized.

The local leader's job gets him out hobnobbing with the common people, worrying about the kinds of things they worry about, like garbage collection. How about the prime minister? What is the image youngsters have of him at his work? The chief executives of the United States, France, and Britain are all apparently perceived by the children in those lands as doing rather awe-inspiring things: "ruling" or "commanding," engaging in foreign affairs and other statesman-like enterprises.[38] No such aura of stately power and dominance characterizes Japanese teenagers' imagery of the prime minister's job. Rather, the common picture is that of one who "coordinates (*matomeru*) the government and the opinions of the people," as an eighth grader put it. The picture is neither an inspiring—nor intimidating—one like those of the Western leaders. Nor is it a familiar and ingratiating one like that of the local leader. At best, it might be seen as a rather idealistic picture of a representative leader seeking to harmonize government and people. A more negative interpretation might emphasize the power broker or bureaucratic manager, a component that may seem latent in the image. The latter interpretation would fit the personal style of Prime Minister Sato, who has been called a "model of the bureaucratic leader."[39] His personal appeal and identification with the common man were probably weaker than those of any of his predecessors, save only Kishi Nobusuke, his brother.[40] In his relatively infrequent television appearances, for example, Sato invariably seemed stiff and ill at ease. Minobe, who has made frequent television appearances, is always relaxed, full of smiles, and "folksy." The contrast is most vivid.

---

[35] Bradley M. Richardson, "Urbanization and Political Participation: The Case of Japan," *American Political Science Review,* 67 (June, 1973), Table 7, 443.

[36] Thus, among incumbents in office in January, 1973, nonpartisans (*mushozoku*) accounted for only three of the 743 members of the two houses of the national Diet, but were overwhelmingly predominant among both urban and rural mayors, and constituted the largest group of prefectural governors as well. Nonpartisans comprised 94 per cent of the 2,634 town and village mayors, and 82 per cent of the 620 city mayors, including those of eight of the nine largest cities, excluding Tokyo which, as a metropolitan prefecture, has a governor rather than a mayor. Tokyo's Minobe was among seven nonpartisan governors in office in the eight most populous prefectures. Of the total of 47 governors, nonpartisans outnumbered partisans 23 to 22, and the remaining two posts were occupied by men who had run as candidates of local groups (*shoha*) as distinct from the five major parties. Ministry of Local Autonomy figures cited in *Asahi nenkan 1974* (The Asahi Yearbook. 1974), (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1974), pp. 229 and 415–460.

[37] Okamura, "The Child's Changing Image of the Prime Minister," p. 581.

[38] Greenstein, "French, British and American Children's Images . . . ," Table 3, p. 40.

[39] Shinohara Hajime, quoted in *Yomiuri shinbun,* October 13, 1970.

But the absence of personal imagery among Japanese youngsters' reactions to the prime minister reflects not merely the former incumbent's distant personality, but also the fact that the personal image-building that American presidents undergo, with the great attention focused by the press on their personal predilections, activities, and family life has not occurred in Japan. One reason the press spotlight has been diverted from the personal life of the prime minister and his family is that to some extent the imperial family has stimulated more public curiosity and therefore more press coverage of their private lives. But perhaps more important is the aforementioned principle of neutrality under which the media operate, so that in seeking to avoid favorable treatment of partisan figures they downplay the personal ife of the prime minister.

This lack of personal imagery in Japanese youths' views of the prime minister, which appears to be true also of French children's views of their president and premier,[41] while reflective of the psychic distance existing between children and the leader, is not necessarily detrimental to his overall role. What it may imply, indeed, is that his image is less important than his performance as a means to generating support even among the young. If that is so, then the kind of support he receives may be a conditional kind that helps keep leaders responsible and responsive, rather than an uncritical support that fosters irresponsibility. The fact that many children see him as carrying out his responsibilities even while they do not like or trust him supports such an interpretation. And the probability that for many children "dislike" is no more than that—and not hostility or hatred—may help keep such a critical stance toward the prime minister from becoming bitterly cynical.

An additional basis for the distant and impersonal image of the prime minister is the way he is chosen. The absence of direct popular election in the parliamentary system almost certainly diminishes the potential support and affection that the prime minister can generate. Popular identification is less easily created with a leader selected by a vote of the legislature than with one whose election is the culmination of a series of popular campaigns and personal appeals. The parliamentary system, that is to say, depersonalizes the leadership selection process; it lacks the drama of personal combat for popular esteem by two or more personalities who actively seek to create nationwide personal followerships. In the Japanese case the process of depopularization of the leadership selection process is accentuated by the fact of one-party dominance. The head of the largest faction of the ascendant Liberal Democratic Party assumes the prime ministership almost as an automatic consequence of his selection as party president—a process in which there is no direct popular involvement and which creates little popular excitement.

The contrast with the election of the local leader is again noteworthy, here as an instance of how a structural factor may contribute to both the distance of the prime minister and his impersonal quality. The local electoral process is one in which, as we have said, nonpartisanship is the rule. Deemphasizing the party label of course results in emphasizing the personalities of the contestants.[42] Moreover, the election is in fact head-to-head combat of two candidates who must use their personal appeal to gain followers.

The young Japanese child, in summary, sees the prime minister basically as a distant and impersonal figure, who inspires neither awe nor affection but rather mild dislike and mistrust. Comparison of the image with that of the local leader makes it clear that a number of cultural, structural, and personal factors conjoin to contribute to the erosion with age of the relatively positive evaluations of the prime minister that are held by the youngest children. But the local leader's advantages with respect to most of these factors appear to shore up his image against this erosion. Thus, in an interesting twist, the local leader may serve to fulfill some of the expressive functions of leadership for Japanese children that the American president and British and Dutch queens perform for children in those lands. It is clear, however, that the local leader is hardly a complete substitute for the missing national level benevolent leader. And it becomes necessary, therefore, to inquire as to whether any national level institution is able to generate broad-gauge support capable of contributing to the legitimacy of the regime. Or, on the other hand, do the negative

---

[40] Kishi was adopted from the Sato family into the Kishi family, a common practice among traditional Japanese families who lack a male heir to carry on their lineage.

[41] Greenstein, "French, British and American Children's Images . . . ," p. 20.

[42] Research in American electoral politics has shown that candidate appeal becomes more important in nonpartisan systems. See Fred I. Greenstein, *The American Party System and the American People* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 58–59.

**Table 5. Comparison of Political Institutions' Concern for Ordinary People**

"How much does each of the following care about the problems in the daily lives of ordinary Japanese and try to help them?

(Percentage of positive, neutral, and negative responses by grades for students and for parents as a whole)

| Students | Prime Minister | | | Government | | | Diet | | | Pol. Parties | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Grade | Pos. | Neut. | Neg. | Pos. | Neut. | Neg. | Pos. | Neut. | Neg. | Pos. | Neut. | Neg. | N |
| 8 | 36 | 27 | 37 | 44 | 33 | 23 | 39 | 27 | 34 | 28 | 47 | 25 | 282 |
| 10 | 27 | 27 | 46 | 40 | 31 | 29 | 34 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 34 | 334 |
| 12 | 22 | 19 | 59 | 36 | 24 | 40 | 29 | 26 | 45 | 31 | 27 | 42 | 326 |
| Parents | 40 | 30 | 30 | 52 | 28 | 20 | 44 | 34 | 22 | 41 | 35 | 24 | 1637 |

Note: positive = very much + somewhat; neutral = can't say + don't know; negative = not much + hardly at all.

feelings toward the prime minister spill-over onto the rest of the political structure?

## The Spill-over of Affect: Support for Institutions among Teenagers and Parents

Political cynicism, we are told, is a characteristic of adults, not of children. Fred Greenstein reported that the most striking finding of his study of New Haven children was that

> . . . the prevailing adult skepticism and distrust of politics and the politicians simply did not seem to be present. . . . [There] was no evidence even of a frame of reference which would make it possible to use questionnaire items tapping the dimension of political cynicism.[43]

But of course we have seen that even young Japanese children do exhibit such skepticism and mistrust of the prime minister. Does that cynicism develop into a systematic aversion to all political institutions at the national level, as we might expect if the spill-over thesis is valid? Do older Japanese youngsters, then, develop anything approximating adult political cynicism? These are the questions that flow from what we have seen so far and to which we now turn our attention.

An essential element in the notion of the benevolent leader, and in the wider concept of political trust, is that political authorities care about the people. Table 5 summarizes how Japanese teenagers and their parents feel about the prime minister and three other national political institutions with respect to their concern for ordinary peoples' problems.

The table makes clear the lack of any intense belief in the concern of the institutions among the teenagers. It is especially noteworthy that fewer respondents believe the prime minister cares than believe that any of the other three institutions does. But no institution fares really well among the teenagers, and only the government gains consistent approval from a substantial proportion—but not a majority—of all age groups. The relationship between increasing age and increasing cynicism observed among children holds true for teenagers as well. What is more, by as early as eighth grade they are more cynical about the concern of political institutions than are their parents. Indeed, more parents responded favorably than unfavorably regarding the concern of all four institutions, while twice as many parents were favorable about each institution as were the twelfth-grade children.

Another component of the concept of political trust is belief that political authority is responsive. The will of the people plays a large role in the democratic ideology, and the widespread belief of Japanese youngsters in popular sovereignty underlines the importance of their being able to feel that the people are listened to. Table 6 shows teenagers' and parents' evaluations of the responsiveness of the four institutions compared in the preceding table, plus elections. It confirms a number of the same points seen in Table 5. Once again we observe that the students are more cynical than their parents and that insofar as the prime minister, government and Diet are concerned, cynicism prevails over trust among the students. But only the Diet fails to get more positive than negative parental responses. A new note has been added, however, in that both parents and students exhibit markedly greater support for the responsiveness of the political parties and elections than for the prime minister, Diet, and government. Moreover there is a most significant reversal of the trend among teenagers toward increasing cynicism with age, in that their belief in the responsiveness of these two institutions—that is, the institutions' ability to make the government pay attention—actually increases with age. In this finding, we have the first evidence of what I believe to be an important source of support for the regime among Japanese teenagers: the belief that

---

[43] "The Benevolent Leader," p. 935.

**Table 6. Comparison of Political Institutions' Responsiveness**

(Percentage of positive, neutral, and negative responses by grade for students and for parents as a whole)

| Students | Prime Minister | | | Government | | | Diet | | | Pol. Parties | | | Elections | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Grade | Pos. | Neut. | Neg. | Pos. | Neut. | Neg. | Pos. | Neut. | Neg. | Pos. | Neut. | Neg. | Pos. | Neut. | Neg. |
| 8 | 23 | 42 | 35 | 22 | 50 | 28 | 21 | 52 | 27 | 38 | 53 | 9 | 36 | 53 | 11 |
| 10 | 21 | 37 | 42 | 23 | 42 | 35 | 19 | 43 | 38 | 47 | 38 | 15 | 46 | 38 | 16 |
| 12 | 41 | 11 | 48 | 22 | 34 | 44 | 14 | 37 | 49 | 53 | 32 | 15 | 50 | 37 | 13 |
| Parents | 38 | 37 | 25 | 38 | 39 | 23 | 23 | 37 | 40 | 60 | 30 | 10 | 61 | 32 | 7 |

Note: N's are as in Table 5. Respondents were asked to agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly to individual items asserting that each institution either pays attention to the wishes of the people or makes the government pay attention. The items are:

| *Institution* | *Item* | *Responses scored positive* |
|---|---|---|
| Prime Minister | "When the Prime Minister decides on a policy, he gives a great deal of consideration to what the people wish." | agree+agree strongly |
| Government | "Over the long run, the government gives a good deal of consideration to what the people want, when it decides on policy." | agree+agree strongly |
| Diet | "When it comes to deciding what to do in the Diet, most Diet members pay very little attention to the wishes of the voters who elected them." | disagree+disagree strongly |
| Parties | "The political parties play an important role in making the government pay attention to what the people think." | agree+agree strongly |
| Elections | "Elections make the government pay attention to what the people want." | agree+agree strongly |

the input institutions of politics, those like parties and elections which mediate the political participation of the citizenry and convey their demands, are worthier of support than are the output institutions, like the prime minister, government, and Diet, which represent authority. Parties and elections seem to be perceived in the role of the peoples' allies against authority. If this is so, then the apparent alienation from the output institutions and particularly from the primary political authority figure, the prime minister, may represent not an undifferentiated cynicism toward the institutional structure of the regime, but rather a skepticism toward authority among a generation of Japanese brought up and socialized in a society that has repudiated but not forgotten authoritarianism.

A dimension of political trust that is particularly relevant to a society like Japan, where partisanship, cleavage, and factions often overshadow the idea of the commonweal and the common interest, is that of the inclusiveness of political institutions, that is, whether they represent all the people or are beholden to narrow interest groups. Table 7 compares the institutions on this dimension, but the items, it should be noted, all differ substantially from one another, sharing only the common theme of inclusion versus exclusion of the people.

The trends in the table are clearly like those in Tables 5 and 6. Again, parties and elections, especially the former, receive more favorable evaluations from the teenagers, on the whole, than do the other institutions. The Diet suffers most, as indeed might be expected from the kinds of remarks made by the teenagers I interviewed. A particularly common complaint against the Diet was that its members often got there by unfair means, such as having a lot of money or being the son of a Diet member. There were also a number of references to corruption in the Diet and the government.

The corruption issue, which has been a recurring thorn in the side of Japanese politics, especially since the "black mist" scandals of the mid-1960s,[44] has made its mark on Japanese youngsters as well as their parents, as Table 8 indicates.

---

[44] The "black mist" was the label attached by the press to a highly publicized series of scandals involving Liberal Democratic Party Diet members in 1966. The scandals included the indictment of a Diet committee chairman on eight charges of extortion, fraud, and tax evasion; alleged kickbacks by a sugar refining company to 11 LDP Diet mem-

**Table 7. Comparison of Political Institutions' Inclusiveness**

(Percentage of positive, neutral, and negative responses by grade for students and for parents as a whole)

| Students | Prime Minister | | | Government | | | Diet | | | Pol. Parties | | | Elections | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Grade | Pos. | Neut. | Neg. | Pos. | Neut. | Neg. | Pos. | Neut. | Neg. | Pos. | Neut. | Neg, | Pos. | Neut. | Neg. |
| 8 | 29 | 35 | 36 | 38 | 30 | 32 | 22 | 33 | 45 | 39 | 37 | 24 | 27 | 41 | 32 |
| 10 | 14 | 39 | 47 | 30 | 38 | 32 | 17 | 29 | 54 | 40 | 40 | 20 | 37 | 26 | 37 |
| 12 | 24 | 32 | 44 | 21 | 34 | 45 | 18 | 18 | 64 | 34 | 37 | 29 | 33 | 29 | 38 |
| Parents | 35 | 35 | 30 | 32 | 29 | 39 | 18 | 25 | 57 | 33 | 34 | 33 | 34 | 24 | 42 |

Note: N's are as in Table 5. Respondents were asked to agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly to individual items asserting that each institution was more or less inclusive. The items are:

| *Institution* | *Item* | *Responses scored positive* |
|---|---|---|
| Prime Minister | "The Prime Minister truly works hard for the sake of all the people not just for himself or his party." | agree+agree strongly |
| Government | "The government's policies are increasing the gap between rich and poor, and work only for the benefit of the rich." | disagree+disagree strongly |
| Diet | "In the Diet, the majority ignores the rights of the minority, and the minority impedes majority decisions, so I don't think it is carrying out its responsibility to the people." | disagree+disagree strongly |
| Parties | "The political parties are all nothing more than groups of factions and influential men who think only of their own interests. | disagree+disagree strongly |
| Elections | "Since the same one party always wins, general election results don't really represent the will of the people." | disagree+disagree strongly |

Responses scored positive were those which supported the belief that the institution works for all the people.

The interviews revealed no clear-cut pattern about where teenagers believed corruption was greatest, although some had a feeling that, as one twelfth-grade Tokyo boy expressed it, "People in the government are more in the shadows, and so I think they are more dishonest." A rural high-school senior, on the other hand, bemoaned the fact that Diet members, "no matter how often they do something wrong [i.e., break Japan's strict election laws], . . . win time and again in the elections."

What is intriguing is that though a number of youngsters made similar comments on the corrupt behavior of candidates for elective office, the

**Table 8. Corruption in the Government and Diet**

(Percentage of positive, neutral, and negative responses by grade for students and for parents as a whole)

| Students | Government | | | Diet | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Grade | Pos. | Neut. | Neg. | Pos. | Neut. | Neg. |
| 8 | 17 | 35 | 48 | 28 | 32 | 40 |
| 10 | 14 | 25 | 61 | 9 | 33 | 58 |
| 12 | 9 | 13 | 78 | 7 | 21 | 72 |
| Parents | 19 | 26 | 55 | 22 | 37 | 41 |

Note: N's as in Table 5.

| *Institution* | *Item* | *Responses scored positive* |
|---|---|---|
| Government | "A good many people in the government are dishonest and involved in corruption." | disagree+ disagree strongly |
| Diet | "Most Diet members are trustworthy, honest men, who do not get involved in things like graft." | agree+ agree strongly |

---

bers who had pressured government banking agencies to lend the firm huge sums; the forced resignation of the Speaker of the House of Representatives for alleged collusion with a stock brokerage official under indictment for fraud; the resignation under fire of the Minister of Transport, who had revised National Railway schedules so as to have express trains stop in his electoral district; and related cases involving the Ministers of Education and Agriculture and Fisheries, as well as the head of the Defense Agency. For full details see *Asahi Nenkan 1967* (The Asahi Yearbook: 1967), (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1967), pp. 251–257, and 572.

**Table 9. Willingness to Abandon Popular Input into Politics**

(Percentage of agree, neutral, and disagree responses by grade for students and for parents as a whole)

| Students | Leave everything to leaders | | | Abandon elections | | | Single party would be better | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Grade | Agree | Neut. | Disagree | Agree | Neut. | Disagree | Agree | Neut. | Disagree |
| 8 | 16 | 19 | 66 | 24 | 28 | 48 | 53 | 24 | 23 |
| 10 | 9 | 15 | 76 | 20 | 25 | 55 | 32 | 19 | 49 |
| 12 | 8 | 11 | 81 | 24 | 28 | 48 | 28 | 16 | 56 |
| Parents | 36 | 18 | 46 | 31 | 27 | 42 | 34 | 22 | 44 |

Note: N's as in Table 5.
Items:

"If we get good leaders, the best way to improve the country is for the people to leave everything to them rather than for the people to discuss things among themselves."

"Since there are always so many election law violations, it would be better if our representatives were chosen by some other means such as competitive examinations, instead of elections."

"It would be better if instead of all the present political parties there were only one political party which represented all the people and really did its best for the country."

comments showed virtually no evidence of disillusionment with the electoral process itself. And only a very few youngsters brought the political parties into their remarks on corruption. I suggested earlier that elections and parties elicit more support because of their character as input institutions and that they thus might serve as important legitimizing agents for the structure of the democratic regime. Table 9 presents some additional evidence relevant to this hypothesis.

The items in the table share the common theme of tension between diversified popular involvement in the political process and centralized authority. We note immediately that in contrast to the preceding tables, this one indicates that the parents are more negative about the institutions. Few teenagers, far fewer than parents, are willing to leave the people out of politics and leave politics to the leaders. Few would abandon elections and the multiple party system in favor of more harmonious and authoritarian modes of politics.

The other evidence available on this point is on the whole supportive. Okamura's data, for instance, included an item asking what would be the best thing for people to do to get their views reflected in politics. Among the high-school students in the sample, voting in elections led the way, followed by writing to the newspaper and supporting the party of one's choice. Appealing to the Diet or the prime minister were chosen by few of the teenagers.[45]

It would of course be blindness to deny that Japanese youth is on the whole quite cynical about politics. The opinion polls show time and again that in Japan the young are more skeptical and distrusting of politics and politicians than are older people. Nevertheless, it seems evident that much of that cynicism is grounded in idealism, in widespread belief among the young in the validity and legitimacy of the essential structural principle of democratic politics: rule by the people. But that idealism is accompanied by a skepticism about reality, a belief that government in a once anti-democratic system remains uncommitted to democracy.

The authoritative institutions of government in this regard may suffer particularly from being linked with the past. In the new regime not only are the names of the institutions the same—which is not true for the parties and is irrelevant for elections and newspapers—but so are many of the faces. Prime Minister Kishi was not only a high-ranking civil servant in Manchuria under the old regime, but was tried and convicted as a war criminal. Prime Minister Sato was also a bureaucrat in imperial Japan. (Governor Minobe, on the other hand, has a link with the past too, but a most decidedly "democratic" link. His father was the author of the famous "Organ Theory," which characterized the emperor as simply one of several organs of the state, for which he was found guilty of *lèse-majesté*. The governor thus is a personal symbol repudiating the past.)

But the fundamental impediment to the prime minister's serving as a legitimating benevolent leader lies not in such personal links to the past, but rather in the role history has played in defining the very nature and basis of national leadership in postwar Japan.

## The Missing Leader and the Missing Hero: Some Speculations on the Role of History

As in every nation the political regime of contemporary Japan is rooted, symbolically as well as institutionally, in a particular set of historical events. The events that define the contemporary Japanese polity are the defeat in World War II and the subsequent American occupation of the country from 1945 to 1952. This historical definition of the contemporary political regime is in large part responsible for the absence of a benevolent leader in Japan.

---

[45] Okamura, 1968 Survey, unpublished data.

Among the most common and effective ways in which political regimes seek to create allegiance is by sanctification of their historical roots. In the days when monarchs ruled as well as reigned, the history of the monarchy played this role, and the monarch was the benevolent leader as a matter of course. But another pattern has come to predominate in the contemporary world—the emergence of a revolutionary tradition. The broad outlines of this pattern are common to the many otherwise disparate societies in which it is found. A new regime and a new social order are created and portrayed as the result of a great popular and national victory. It may be a nationalist revolution, a victory over a colonial occupation, as in the case of the many new nations that have emerged from among the former European colonies in Africa, India, Southeast Asia, and Latin America, as well, of course, as the United States. Or the victory may be a popular defeat of the *ancien regime*, as in the cases of China, Russia, and France, among others. Whichever the case may be, the pattern is for the new regime to be the product of a revolution, in the broadest and commonest sense of the term.

The profound changes effected by the Occupation in the social, cultural, political and institutional life of Japan certainly qualify as one kind of revolution. But it was *a revolution without a victory*, not the culmination of a heroic struggle of patriots against the old order but the result of a defeat at the hands of a foreign conqueror. As a result the new political regime has lacked many of the means available to other regimes to create psychological bonds of allegiance among their members. The events of the origin of the democratic regime are not a source of national pride; there is little in them to serve as the catalyst for political emotions; no storming of the Bastille, no Long March, no Valley Forge to stimulate the patriotic urge and tie the new regime to the national identity. Thus, although Japan is a land of festivals, there is no real celebration of the democracy's founding. Constitution Memorial Day, May 3rd, is an almost entirely formal occasion with little or none of the power to kindle popular pride in the historical event and the regime it created that characterizes such days in other countries. Similarly, the flag and the national anthem are unrelated to, and therefore not directly supportive of, the new regime; they remain as holdovers from the *ancien regime*, as does that regime's foremost symbol, the emperor.

In creating a new political regime, the Occupation was inevitably limited in the means it could muster to legitimize that regime. It was able to create support for the new regime among some Japanese by reason of their belief in either its ideological or its structural legitimacy (to use David Easton's terms[46]), their conviction, that is, that the moral and political principles of the new regime were right and proper for Japan or that the new institutions and norms were inherently worthy of acceptance.

But for most people, it is not principles or institutions that catalyze political affection and create legitimacy for a new order. Rather, it is a leader. Thus we come to the second and perhaps most important characteristic of the founding of Japan's new regime: it was *a revolution without a hero*. It was perforce a profound change of political regimes; but it was accomplished without a leader to embody the new values and to personify the new institutions.[47] The mission and purpose of the Occupation was of course not to create a regime based on such personal legitimacy. It was to destroy one—the emperor-system of imperial Japan. As a result, not only did no new Japanese leader arise to serve as the personification of the new order; indeed, the popular identification of any prominent Japanese figure as the hero of the revolution and the creator of the new order was rendered impossible by the American authorship of the regime.[48] There was no Washington, Lenin, Mao or Nehru to create for his successors the mantle and aura of personal legitimacy that characterizes the institutionalized leadership roles of many contemporary political systems. Today's Japan is, in short, a nation without a pantheon of political heroes.

A comparison of pre- and postwar children's heroes will serve to underscore this important point. In 1905 and 1915, children asked to name the "greatest man in Japan" overwhelmingly chose the emperor, who was followed by a small number of national military leaders and famous warriors—Admiral Togo, General Nogi, Saigo

---

[46] David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), pp. 286 ff.

[47] In his discussion of means for creating legitimacy, David Easton points out that abstract ideologies and ideas per se are usually ineffective in eliciting mass support. Rather, he says, "Typically, this has been achieved in part by the emergence of vigorous and trusted leaders who . . . embody the ideals and stand for the promise of their fulfillment. They are the personal bridges acting as ties to the new norms and structures of authority." *Ibid.*, pp. 304–305.

[48] That authorship was symbolized in a most concrete fashion by the dominating presence of General Douglas MacArthur, head of the Occupation.

Takamori, and the 14th century warrior, Kusunoki Masashige.[49] Postwar grade-school children, in 1958 and 1960, were asked a similar question—to name those whom they thought were great men. No single figure predominated in the responses, but Noguchi Hideo, the famous bacteriologist, was chosen most often by both samples. Very few children (about 6 per cent of one sample and 4 per cent of the second) chose the emperor and even fewer (5 per cent and 0 per cent respectively) chose then Prime Minister Kishi.[50] No military figures were cited, while from history, a number of children chose the agriculturalist Ninomiya Sontoku instead of the warrior Kusunoki. But an even more telling difference was the appearance among the postwar children of foreign heroes. In the 1960 sample, it was Abraham Lincoln who was second only to Noguchi. In 1968 another sample, this time of Tokyo middle-school pupils, overwhelmingly picked John F. Kennedy as the political leader whom they most respected.[51] In the same year students at four universities—Tokyo, Nihon, Doshisha, and Kyushu—were asked the same question. Between 35 per cent and 60 per cent (the latter figure being of the students at Tokyo University, the alma mater of nearly every Japanese prime minister) replied that there was *no* political figure whom they respected. Moreover, those who did name a figure most frequently picked foreign leaders, the four figures most often named being Kennedy, Lincoln, Lenin, and Churchill. Only two Japanese prime ministers were mentioned—Yoshida Shigeru, who piloted Japan through the Occupation, was tied for fifth place with Charles de Gaulle, and Ito Hirobumi, one of the founders of the Meiji regime, was tied for twentieth place.[52] In short, for the great majority of Japanese youngsters, political heroes either do not exist or are foreign leaders.[53]

## Conclusion

Is Japan's democracy made vulnerable by having no revolutionary hero, no benevolent leader? The answer depends greatly upon the success of other means for creating legitimacy. Japan has now been a democracy for nearly a generation. As we have seen in this paper, during that time the political socialization process has inculcated among many young people a profound skepticism of government. But it has also inculcated in many of them a commitment to popular sovereignty, to the principle of popular participation in government and hence to support for an important element of the democratic ideal. Although space does not permit further discussion here, additional data from my survey make it clear that commitment to democracy as a value in itself and to democratic norms of political behavior are widespread among Japanese teenagers.[54] An important part of the evidence and the argument of this paper has been that they also share a broad commitment to those elements of the structure of the regime—elections, parties and the press—that mediate popular participation in politics. Moreover, the evidence suggests that local level support may serve as a surrogate for national level alienation, that the local leader in Japan may be an important and safe personal agent of regime legitimation.

The very success of the Japanese democracy thus far must prompt us to ask the comparative question: How do most new regimes perform? Of course, there are too many unusual characteristics in the Japanese case to permit facile comparison with the experiences of new regimes in other nations—the Occupation itself, the high level of socioeconomic development of imperial Japan, her extensive bureaucracy, and even some domestic tendencies toward democracy, among others. Still, it is obvious that all too often new regimes fail not in spite of the revolutionary hero and the benevolent leader, but in part because of him. The history of the postwar world is filled with the skeletons of young democracies and the ghosts of revolutionary heroes. Pakistan, Indonesia, Ghana, and others tell us of the sad but common tale of the revolution that is either betrayed by its own hero or unable to endure his passing.

We might also ask whether, from the perspective of democratic theory, Japan is indeed not better off because of the missing leader. If the consent of the governed is to be an effective means of democratic control, then the presence of a benevolent leader who elicits a profound emotional response from those to whom he is responsible might prove someday too high a price to pay for stability. Japan already knows how high the price of the benevolent leader can be.

---

[49] Karasawa Tomitaro, *Asu no nihonjin* (Tomorrow's Japanese), (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 1964), pp. 52–53.

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 64.

[51] Owaki Kenzo, "Chugakusei no seiji ishiki," (The Political Consciousness of Middle-School Students), *Ide*, 77 (February, 1968), 38.

[52] *Asahi shinbun*, November 24, 1968. Tanaka Kakuei, who had not yet become prime minister, was also mentioned, sharing twentieth place with Ito and two foreign leaders. The only living Japanese politician to be among the ten names most frequently cited by the students was Nakasone Yasuhiro, who shared fifth place with Yoshida and De Gaulle. Nakasone is a leading contender to succeed Tanaka as Liberal Democratic Party President.

[53] See Greenstein, *Children and Politics*, pp. 137 ff. for an interesting discussion of evidence indicating that the tendency of American children to choose political figures as heroes has shown a marked decline between the early 1900s and the present.

[54] See Chapter 3, "Symbols of Consensus: Democracy and Peace," in Joseph A. Massey, *Political Socialization in a New Democracy.*

# Institutionalization of Voting Patterns, or is Mobilization the Source of Decay?*

ADAM PRZEWORSKI
*University of Chicago*

The process of institutionalization is frequently viewed as the quintessence of "political development."[1] Perhaps no other value is as solidly entrenched within various developmental perspectives as institutionalization, stability, continuity, or their near-synonyms. "Developed" political systems are said to be characterized by the stability of patterns of behavior and expectation, whatever their content may be. Hence, conditions that promote or threaten institutionalization are of central concern to theorists of political development.

A major threat to the stability of patterns of behavior is said to result from either excessive or rapidly increasing political participation.[2] S. P. Huntington's point, revisionist vis-a-vis the dominant perspectives of the time, was one of caution against those well-intentioned writers who, having listed various developmental virtues, went on to conclude that development is a "global," "harmonious" process in the course of which industrialization, urbanization, communication, education, secularization, mobilization, and egalitarianization become a general blessing. This view, Huntington countered, disregards the fact that when political participation increases, patterns of interaction become eroded. As new people enter political institutions, patterns of interaction decay. Mobilization leads, at least in a short run, to "political decay."

This warning had some ideological implications in the context of its time and continues to have them today. The lesson to be drawn is that admission of new persons into the ranks of legitimate members of political institutions is a risky endeavor that may have disastrous consequences for the stability of these institutions. Even if in some longer run both the extension of participation and institutional stability can be achieved, political development is not an uneventful process of "the more, the merrier."[3] Indeed, if and where Huntington's theory is valid, one would expect the collapse of political institutions to be brought on by "massive waves of mobilization." Gradualness becomes the normative consequence of this warning—a prescription familiar to those who have argued that institutional stability flourished where the processes of mobilization were most gradual.[4]

Why would rapid mobilization bring the decay of institutionalized patterns of behavior? This question can be answered in three ways: (1) Since newly mobilized persons constitute a socially identifiable group, their preferences differ from those of the previous members of an institution; (2) Since newly mobilized members constitute a group with specific interests, their mobilization introduces generalized conflict and hence volatility of behavior patterns; and (3) Since newly mobilized persons are not yet socialized, i.e., taught how to behave as members, their own behavior patterns are volatile. These explanations are complementary, although their consequences for the decay are not the same. In particular, if the deinstitutionalizing effect of mobilization stems only from different preferences of the newly mobilized, then this effect will be of a very short duration. If, however, the difference in preferences is coupled with either generalized conflict or undersocialization, then the effects of mobilization will be longer in duration, since some time is

---

* This study is a byproduct of a larger project concerning the development of party systems in Western Europe and Latin America. I should like to thank the Committee on Latin America of the Social Science Research Council and the Ford Foundation for their support. I am also grateful to Joanne Fox Przeworski, John Kautsky, John Sprague, Louis Westefield, David Greenstone, and the anonymous reviewers for their comments.

[1] The emphasis on institutionalization is due primarily to Samuel P. Huntington. See "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics,* 27 (April, 1965), 386–430; *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); and "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development and Politics," *Comparative Politics,* 3 (April, 1971), 283–323. Dahl, Nordlinger and Rustow are among those who argue that "institutionalization" of governmental authority, rules of electoral competition, or political parties—crucially influenced the patterns of political development. Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); Eric Nordlinger, "Political Development: Time Sequences and Rates of Change," *World Politics,* 20 (April, 1968), 494–521; D. Rustow, *A World of Nations* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967).

[2] For the summary of arguments to this effect see Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 142–154.

[3] Thus Huntington discovers the "paradox that modernity produces stability and modernization instability," *Political Order,* p. 47.

[4] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960); William A. Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (London: Routledge, 1960); Dahl, *Polyarchy;* and many others.

necessary before either conflicts subside or socialization takes place or both.

Moreover, the first and the third of these explanations must be used simultaneously if the same theory is to explain the process of institutionalization as well as the periods of decay. The explanation of decay contains in itself an implicit theory of institutional stability. Old members behave in a stable manner; thus, as long as an institution keeps a constant membership it remains stable. The Chinese empire is Huntington's prime example. The duration of membership, even if it is inherited from generation to generation, is what explains institutionalization. Hence the implicit assumption of Huntington's argument calls for a theory of reinforcement learning as the motoric force of institutionalization.

This line of theoretical thinking holds that preferences become reinforced when they are actualized behavior. Thus a person who for some reason behaves in a particular manner at one opportunity is more likely than before to behave in the same manner when the next opportunity arises. Voters in particular become "addicted" in this fashion—once having made a choice of a party to vote for they are more likely to vote for this party in the next election, etc. This extension of learning theory to voting has brought some spectacular empirical results in the works of McPhee and Converse.[5]

Moreover, this process of reinforcement operates intergenerationally, since patterns of political partisanship are transmitted from parents to children. The intensity of political preferences varies from society to society, but the characteristics of the process of transmission should be much more invariant, at least if the results of the pioneering study of Converse and Dupeaux hold true in other societies.[6]

These common themes that seek to explain the stability of institutions in terms of the behavior of its members are not particular to the views paraphrased above. They reflect very broadly the entire Weberian-Parsonian tradition of sociological thinking that takes the goal-oriented behaving individual as the point of theoretical departure and defines institutions as normatively sanctioned, stable patterns of behavior.[7] In this view social structure is a structure of interactions among individuals, and institutions constitute simply a particular type of structure. The emphasis on "socialization" is a necessary corollary to this perspective, since intergenerational replacement of concrete individuals who perform the roles can take place if and only if the patterns of behavior specific to the roles are taught by the society. It is not this general orientation, however, but the specific thesis about the deinstitutionalizing effects of mobilization that is the subject of my investigation.[8]

### Electoral Mobilization and Electoral Decay: A Model

In summary form, the assumptions underlying the thesis that relates mobilization to the decay of patterns of behavior are the following:

(1) Variations in the membership of political institutions constitute the source of instability of patterns of behavior;

(2) This deinstitutionalizing effect of variation in membership, particularly that arising from massive waves of mobilization occurs because:

(a) The newly mobilized (demobilized) persons have preferences different from the previous participants, *and*

(b) they are not socialized to the norms of behavior that characterize a particular institution and as a consequence their behavior is much less stable;

(3) Conversely, repeated experiences within an institution lead to the reinforcement of the past behavior and, hence, increase their stability;

(4) Since patterns of behavior are transmitted intergenerationally, simple demographic replacement is at most a source of constant change, but does not lead to the "decay" of the institutionalized patterns.

This theory will be explicated and evaluated within the context of the historical experience of party systems in the developed democratic countries. A political institution—the party system—with a sharply defined membership can be observed during a period of nearly a hundred years during which the "membership"—the proportion of adults voting—grew typically from about two per cent to more than seventy per cent. Most Western European party systems have in the course of their history experienced institutionalization and decay, and what is more central to the preoccupation with "political development" than this most important institution that processes group conflicts?

---

[5] Philip E. Converse, "Of Time and Partisan Stability," *Comparative Political Studies,* 2 (July, 1969), 139–171; William M. McPhee and William A. Glaser, eds., *Public Opinion and Congressional Elections* (New York: Free Press, 1962).

[6] Philip E. Converse and George Dupeaux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 27 (Spring, 1962), 1–24.

[7] Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: Free Press, 1964), particularly pp. 87–130; Talcott Parsons, "Psychoanalysis and the Social Structure," in *Essays in Sociological Theory* (New York: Free Press, 1954).

[8] While the original formulation of this thesis comes from Samuel P. Huntington, he is certainly not responsible for the particular interpretation and reconstruction developed here. The intent of this work is not to interpret textually any particular view but to reconstruct some themes shared in various versions within the current approaches to "political development." Moreover, the analysis that follows is limited to Western Europe and to party systems and, hence, it should not be construed as a general test of Huntington's thesis, which was developed primarily with reference to contemporary developing societies.

Most competitive party systems grew originally out of loose associations among members of modern parliaments. As mechanisms of direct elections gradually developed, a two-party system became institutionalized, typically including Conservative and Liberal parties. This system decayed with the appearance of mass parties located ideologically to the left of liberals, most frequently social-democratic and labor parties. The growth of social-democratic parties resulted typically in a "realignment" from conservative-liberal dominated to bourgeois-socialist dominated systems. The latter system is today thoroughly institutionalized in nearly all developed capitalist societies, with the notable but not the sole exception of the United States.

Table 1 presents the average changes in the distribution of votes for political parties during three different periods. In very general terms, institutionalization was the lowest during the period between the wars, although in some countries the bourgeois-socialist axis had been crystalized before the end of World War I. The period of socialist-bourgeois realignment varied from country to country, both in terms of its duration and, most importantly from the viewpoint of the theory, in its relation to the date of universal male franchise. The decay of the old system and the institutionalization of the new one in some countries preceded, in some accompanied, and in others followed the introduction of universal male suffrage. The dates presented in the table, however, are only approximate. Furthermore, the introduction of universal male franchise was neither the only nor the major wave of mobilization in most of these countries. Hence, the relation of mobilization to decay of institutionalized patterns of behavior requires a more systematic investigation.

While the actual paths followed in particular countries differed sharply, a common experience of these societies was to have admitted as "citizens" practically all of the adults. From between two and five per cent when direct elections were first introduced, the proportion of adults who actually cast their votes in national elections eventually reached eighty per cent in most countries. This absorption of individuals into the network of electoral institutions constitutes one of the processes of "mobilization"—*electoral* mobilization as distinguished from their integration into the market, the educational system, the network of of social organizations, etc.[9]

**Table 1. Institutionalization of Voting Patterns**[a]

| Country | $t(0)$ | $M(0)$ | $t(0)$–1914 | 1918–1939 | 1945–$t(n)$ | Period of Bourgeois Socialist Alignment | Date of Universal Male Franchise | $t(n)$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| France | 1876 | 0.317 | 0.199 | 0.162 | 0.161 | 1893–1924 | 1971 | 1962 |
| Belgium | 1894 | 0.363 | 0.193 | 0.081 | 0.080 | 1894–1919 | 1893 | 1961 |
| Denmark | 1895 | 0.172 | 0.129 | 0.056 | 0.075 | 1895–1909 | 1915 | 1968 |
| Sweden | 1884 | 0.028 | 0.104 | 0.070 | 0.063 | 1911 | 1921 | 1960 |
| Norway | 1882 | 0.076 | 0.095 | 0.181 | 0.084 | 1903–1927 | 1898 | 1965 |
| Germany | 1871 | 0.190 | 0.084 | 0.187 | 0.118 | 1890–1919 | 1871 | 1965 |
| U. Kingdom | 1885 | 0.233 | 0.049 | 0.136 | 0.051 | 1918–1931 | 1918 | 1966 |
| Finland | 1907 | 0.533 | 0.034 | 0.082 | 0.046 | 1907 | 1906 | 1966 |
| Canada | 1896 | 0.338 | 0.032 | 0.154 | 0.099 | never | 1896 | 1965 |
| Switzerland | 1919 | 0.338 | — | 0.050 | 0.040 | — | 1902 | 1967 |

[a] The entries represent the average net change of the aggregate distribution of vote for parties. The higher the change, the less institutionalized was a system during the particular period. $M(0)$ represents the proportion of adult population voting at $t(0)$. See below for a more complete explanation.

---

[9] Different types of mobilization are discussed in Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, 55 (September, 1961), 493–514 and in Krzysztof Ostrowski and Adam Przeworski, "A Preliminary Inquiry into the Nature of Social Change: The Case of the Polish Countryside," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 8 (March, 1967), 26–43.

The concept of "political" mobilization is defined and discussed in Stein Rokkan, "Mass Suffrage, Secret Voting and Political Participation," in *Political Sociology*, Lewis A. Coser, ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 101–131. Given various types of mobilization and the multiplicity of political institutions, it is highly likely that the relations between mobilization and institutionalization are context specific.

Since mobilization is a process that takes place over time, at each election a society can be characterized by the proportion of adult population (adult being defined as 21 years old or older for convenience) that actually casts its votes in the election. If consecutive elections are numbered as $t=0, 1, 2, \cdots$, then we can define the state of the process of electoral mobilization at each moment of time as:[10]

$$(1) \quad M(t) = \frac{\text{Voters at } t}{\text{Adults at } t}; \qquad t = 0, 1, 2 \cdots$$

Since $M(t)$ varies from one election to another, one can think of the difference between two successive states of this process as:

$$(2) \qquad \Delta M(t) = M(t+1) - M(t).$$

The sign of $\Delta M(t)$ can be positive or negative, depending on whether more persons entered or left the ranks of voters.

The variations in $\Delta M(t)$ can result from various sources, most importantly from: (1) changes in electoral laws that define who has the legal right to vote; (2) the application of these laws, particularly in terms of registration procedures; (3) the intensity of efforts by the parties designed to bring the potential voters to the polls; and/or (4) individual decisions, reflecting psychological factors and general interest in a particular election.

Voters do not simply cast their ballots. In many societies they vote for parties. To characterize the institutionalization of a party system, at least with regard to voting, one can observe the extent to which the patterns of voting behavior are fixed in a given system. Institutionalization is a property of patterns of behavior. The more stable these patterns, the higher the institutionalization. In the extreme case, perfect institutionalization occurs when everybody behaves the same way all the time. Everything is stable and everything is predictable, for there is no change whatsoever. Decay occurs when people behave randomly, i.e., when it is impossible to know what the behaviors will be; when there are no patterns.[11]

Given the theoretical nature of this concept of institutionalization, one can treat the net change of aggregate voting distribution as indicative of the stability of patterns of behavior within a party system. This measure is clearly not without problems since it is a net property of an aggregate of individuals, and as such it may or may not reflect the actual extent of individual change. What matters from the point of view of the stability of the party system as an institution, however, are not only individual fluctuations but also the distribution of the aggregate vote and the changes in this distribution. Moreover, in the process of mobilization, people enter the ranks of voters in *groups*. Hence, one-for-one exchanges in the direction of voting should not be related to the movements of persons into and out of the electorate. Consequently, the error introduced by using the aggregate measure should be random with regard to the explanatory variable, namely mobilization.

With this note of caution, the concept of institutionalization of the party system with regard to voting can be defined formally. Let $V_i(t)$ be the share of the $i$-th party in the $t$-th election:

$$(3) \qquad V_i(t) = \frac{\text{voters for party } i \text{ at } t}{\text{voters at } t}; \qquad i = 1, 2, \cdots, k,$$

where $k$ is the number of parties. Since the theory concerns the impact of mobilization, defined as the ratio of voters to adults, this share of the vote is defined to the base of all those mobilized in each election, i.e., the voters.

Given this notion of shares, it is now possible to define the decay or deinstitutionalization of the party system that becomes evident at each election as:[12]

---

[10] This definition, as well as the notation, follows Adam Przeworski and John Sprague, "Concepts in Search of Explicit Formulation: A Study in Measurement," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 15 (May, 1971), 187. No detailed list of sources for the data on mobilization is given, since they consist generally of official governmental publications or reference handbooks based on such publications. In general, the $M(t)$ series was constructed by looking for official accounts of numbers of voters, finding the population over 20, and dividing the two. The errors, other than the unreliability of the original data, may stem from (1) frequent need to interpolate population data that are given either only by the 14–19 years of age split and/or by 10 year intervals, (2) an occasional need to rely on the tautology mobilization = eligibility turnout, where the dates of eligibility do not correspond exactly to the dates of elections. Perhaps the data for the United Kingdom are least reliable for the latter reason.

[11] See Przeworski and Sprague for a somewhat more extensive justification of this conception.

[12] In many countries political parties, and particularly their names, are highly ephemeral. Fortunately, errors that may have emerged from misinterpreting their fluctuations should be relatively small since they probably involve mostly small parties. In general, the rule followed was to treat the parties as they presented themselves to the electorate rather than to look for the underlying ideological tendencies. Since the results obtained here may to some extent depend upon the particular decisions involved in measuring the voting change, the list of sources which was followed in identifying the parties is provided. These are for the United Kingdom: Michael Kinnear, *The British Voter, An Atlas and Survey Since 1885* (London: Batsford, 1968); Denmark: *Statistical Yearbook* (Kobenhavn: Danmarks Statistik, various

$$(4)\quad D(t) = 1/2 \sum_{i=1}^{K} \left| V_i(t+1) - V_i(t) \right| = 1/2 \sum_{i=1}^{K} \left| \Delta V_i(t) \right|; \qquad 0 \le D(t) \le 1.00.$$

Deinstitutionalization of the party system from the $t$-th to the $(t+1)-st$ election is measured as one-half of the sum of the absolute differences between the shares of all parties at time $(t+1)$ and time $t$. This measure shows the minimal proportion of the electorate that must have shifted their vote given the observed aggregate change. Since differences between consecutive shares can be negative and positive, they are taken without their sign. Since the shifts are counted twice—once when a party gains and the second time when another party loses—one-half of the observed difference is taken as the measure. Since the number of parties may vary from one election to the next one, $k$ includes in this case all parties that obtained votes in *either* of two consecutive elections. Thus defined, $D(t)$ can vary between zero and one.

Note that $\Delta M(t)$ and $D(t)$ are measured over the same interval of time, between the $t$-th and the $(t+1)-st$ election. In other terms, $D(t)$ represents the change in the distribution of votes concurrent with the change of the proportion of adults voting, $\Delta M(t)$.

Given the assumptions (1) through (4) and the definitions (2) and (4), the theory can now be translated into a formal language. Such a translation or a "model" will be used to obtain both qualitative and empirical consequences of the theory. The most appropriate class of models for this purpose are those of systems.[13] Hence I will construct a model of a system that transforms changes in mobilization and the previous level of institutionalization into current decay.

The system under consideration yields as its output the change in the distribution of votes at a particular time, $D(t)$. It yields this output by responding to two inputs:

(1) The movements into and out of the ranks of voters, $\Delta M(t)$; [*Vide* Assumptions (1) and (2)].

(2) The effects of variations in conditions idiosyncratic to each election, primarily including intergenerational replacement of *voting* parents by their *voting* children. [*Vide* Assumption (4)].

The extent of decay of patterns of behavior at a particular time, however, does not depend solely upon the inputs, i.e., the variations of some states of the environment external to the system. Institutionalization is an auto-dependent process since each voting act reinforces the preference for voting in the same direction next time around. [*Vide* Assumption (3)]. Hence, change at a given time depends not only upon the inputs but also upon the extent of change at the previous time.

Given this verbal reconstruction of the inputs, the output, and the transformations affected by this system, its structure can be graphed as follows:



Reading this graph of structure one can see that the variations in mobilization are transformed by the parameter $Q$ as they are brought to bear on the change of voting distribution. This parameter represents the effect of the (unreplaced) movement of persons into and out of the ranks of voters upon the change of the aggregate distribution of votes. The higher the $Q$, the higher the instantaneous impact of mobilization upon deinstitutionalization. In other words, $Q$ is high when the newly mobilized voters differ distinctly

---

years); Sweden: L. Lewin, B. Janssen, and D. Sorbom, *The Swedish Electorate, 1887–1968* (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell, 1972) for the pre-1911 period; *Statistisk Årsbok för Sverige* (Stockholm: Statistiska Centralbyrån, various years); Norway: *Statistisk Årbok for Norge* (Oslo: Statistisk Sentralbyra, various years); Switzerland: *Statistisches Jahrbuch* (Basel: Statistisches Amt, 1969); Finland: *Statistical Yearbook* (Helsinki: Statistical Office, various years); Belgium: *Annuaire Statistique de la Belgique* (Bruxelles, various years); France: Peter Campbell, *French Electoral Systems and Elections, 1789–1957* (London: Faber and Faber, 1958), and *Annuaire Statistique* for the 1958 and 1962 elections; Canada: M. C. Urquhart, ed., *Historical Statistics of Canada* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1965); Germany: *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich* (Berlin: Statistisches Reichsamt, 1933).

[13] The entire logic of analysis underlying this investigation is based on Fernando Cortés, Adam Przeworski, and John Sprague, *Systems Analysis for Social Scientists* (New York: Wiley, 1974).

in their voting preferences from those voting previously. When all newly mobilized voters vote differently than the previous participants did, the value of $Q$ will be exactly one. Actually, it could be shown that the values of $Q$ between zero and one can be interpreted as the proportion of the newly mobilized who vote differently from the previous participants, *assuming the latter did not change their aggregate vote.* Hence, when $Q$ equals zero, the newly mobilized persons vote in the same manner as the voters participating in the previous election.

The parameter $P$ transforms past change of voting distribution into current change. While $Q$ represents the "decay effect" of mobilization taking place during a particular election, $P$ represents the "institutionalization effect" resulting from repeated voting experiences. If $P$ is high—when it approaches the value of one—no one learns to vote in a fixed way. There is no reinforcement. When $P$ approaches zero, "learning" is instantaneous or, conversely, the newly mobilized persons enter the system with preferences that are already fixed, and no learning takes place within the system. Once a voter chooses a party, he continues repeating this choice. As a result changes at each time period are not auto-dependent. Hence, if newly mobilized persons are less socialized than the older participants, then $P$ should be relatively high, i.e., learning should take place only slowly. Moderately high values of $P$ should be expected if institutionalization is indeed a gradual process based on repeated experiences *within* the system.

As the graph indicates, however, mobilization is not the only source of change. Total decay is a sum of three components: past change transformed by $P$ and two "disturbances," namely, mobilization transformed by $Q$, and the input $S$, treated as a constant. The role of $S$ is somewhat residual, but this input still has an interesting theoretical interpretation. It represents the average of that part of change in voting distribution that is contributed by factors specific to each election, including the replacement of voting parents by voting children. Since both the vulnerability of partisan choices to the variations of conditions idiosyncratic to each election and the extent of change introduced by intergenerational replacement indicate the strength of political socialization in a given society, the magnitude of $S$ can be thought to provide a rough measure of socialization. The lower the $S$, the more effective the socialization.

## Some Analytical Consequences

Given the graph of structure of this system, it is now possible to deduce the equation that describes the response of the system, namely the extent of decay, over time.[14] Summing the three components where the lines come together yields:

$$D(t) = Q\Delta M(t) + S + P(\text{DELAY})\,D(t).$$

Solving for $D(t)$ yields:

$$(5)\qquad D(t) = PD(t-1) + Q\Delta M(t) + S.$$

This equation asserts that the change of voting distribution between the $t$-th and the $(t+1)-st$ election depends upon the change in this distribution during the period from the $(t-1)-st$ to the $t$-th election, the change in mobilization from $t$-th to the $(t+1)-st$ election, and the (constant) effect of idiosyncratic conditions.

At this point the deductive rules of mathematics can be used to study the consequences of the theory under various conditions, actual as well as hypothetical or even counterfactual.

Suppose we study a system that is the most Chinese of all empires. There is no mobilization whatsoever, so that $\Delta M(t)=0$ for all $t$, and the socialization is so perfect that $S$ is equal to zero. This system is autonomous from its external environment in the sense that it constitutes a closed institution completely isolated from its environment. The reasons to study this kind of counterfactual situation are twofold: (1) as a logical test of the formalization, since, if the formal model renders accurately the intuitions of the verbal theory, then such an autonomous system should be perfectly stable; (2) as a part of total response of the system since, from the mathematical point of view, the response of the system considered in isolation from its environment constitutes a part of the total response.

Given constant membership and perfect socialization, the equation describing the dynamics of total response, namely (5), reduces to:

$$(6)\qquad D(t) = PD(t-1).$$

The solution of this equation is given by:

$$(7)\qquad D(t) = P^t D(0),$$

where $t$ stands for any period of time, $t=0, 1, 2, \cdots$, and $D(0)$ represents the amount of change observed during the first election from which we begin systematic observation, i.e., at $t=0$.

If $0<P<1$, as the theory requires, the amount of change converges over time monotonically to zero. The initial change, $D(0)$, gradually disappears as reinforcement leads voters to fix their preferences. Hence, when considered in isolation the system behaves as it should: it becomes perfectly institutionalized.

---

[14] Given the rules of graph algebra. See Cortés, *et al., Systems Analysis,* Chapters 4 and 5.

Since the circumstances of each election vary, since parents die and are replaced by children, and since socialization is never perfect, the above is clearly a counterfactual case. Therefore, let us now examine a system in which the effects of socialization operate while membership still remains constant. This case is no longer counterfactual, since during relatively long periods of time the level of mobilization remained constant in several countries, most notably in France from 1876 until 1945, in Belgium from 1899 until 1948, and in Switzerland from 1922 until today.

Given the assumptions of constant $S$ and constant $M(t)$, equation (5) becomes reduced to:

$$D(t) = PD(t-1) + S, \tag{8}$$

and the solution for any $t$ is:

$$D(t) = P^t D(0) + \frac{S(1-P^t)}{1-P}\cdot \tag{9}$$

A particularly interesting value that can be defined at this point is:

$$D^* = \frac{S}{1-P}\cdot \tag{10}$$

When $0<P<1$, then $D^*$ is the limit of $D(t)$ as time tends to infinity.[15] Hence, $D^*$ demonstrates the extent of change that would exist after a long period of time in a system in which the effectiveness of socialization is $S$ and the effectiveness of learning is $P$. An examination of (10) will show that the less effective the socialization (the higher the values of $S$) and the slower the learning ($P$ approaches 1.00), the higher will be the amount of change permanently present in the system. Thus, $D^*$ shows the limit to institutionalization in a society with a given effectiveness of socialization and learning.

In order to see that $D^*$ is indeed the limit of $D(t)$ when $0<P<1$, it is convenient to substitute (10) into (9), obtaining

$$D(t) = P^t[D(0) - D^*] + D^*. \tag{11}$$

If the initial change is higher than the limit, the amount of change will gradually decrease; if the initial change is lower than the limit, it will gradually increase.

Finally, we can view the world more realistically, even if still under idealized conditions, to see whether this formal representation of the theory leads to conclusions consistent with the intuitions of the theoreticians. What is the effect of mobilization upon institutionalization within the terms of the formal model?

The process of electoral mobilization followed sharply different paths in various societies; the waves of mobilization were much more "massive" in some countries than in others. We can approximate the general pattern of the time path of the process of mobilization, however, by using a logistic, $S$-shaped function. Given this function for $M(t)$, the differences in the level of mobilization can be written as:

$$\Delta M(t) = aM(t)[L - M(t)], \tag{12}$$

where $L$ is the maximal proportion of the population that becomes mobilized (around 90 per cent), and the parameter $a$ indicates how abrupt is the process. The higher the value of $a$, the more rapid is the process of mobilization.

Given the function $\Delta M(t)$ in (12), we can now determine the predicted response of party systems to the waves of mobilization and to the effects of socialization. In other words, we can now solve the equation (5) in its full form. We will do it only graphically, adding the effects of mobilization to the previously examined effects of the initial conditions and of socialization. Figure 1 shows the time path of deinstitutionalization in fictitious countries differing only with regard to the pace of the process of mobilization. Figures 2A and 2B show the values of deinstitutionalization in Germany and Canada predicted by the model when the actually observed time path of mobilization is used in (5).

In general terms, the formal model seems to represent well the intuitions of the theory that relates mobilization to decay. It does lead to the deductive conclusion that massive waves of mobilization have a short-term destabilizing effect upon the patterns of behavior; and when membership ceases to change, institutionalization increases to reach a constant level.

### Empirical Validity of the Theory

Since we now know what the world would look like *if* the theory of mobilization and decay is true, we can evaluate the empirical validity of this theory. *Is* the theory true—true in the sense of accounting for the observed variance of deinstitutionalization?[16]

In order to assess the empirical validity of the theory, we can treat (5) as a regression equation

---

[15] Readers not familiar with difference equations may want to consult Samuel P. Goldberg, *Introduction to Difference Equations* (New York: Wiley, 1958).

[16] The choice of countries in which the theory was tested was dictated by availability of data or by the length of time series. Austria, Italy, and Spain were not included because their time series were too short. The United States was not included deliberately.



**Figure 1. Predicted Paths of Deinstitutionalization**

of the form:

$$(13)\quad D(t) = PD(t-1) + Q\,|\Delta M(t)| + S + e,$$

where *e* represents random error.

As the reader can note in (13), changes in mobilization are taken in their absolute value. It is assumed that movements into and out of the electorate have the same destabilizing effect upon the distribution of votes. This is not an unreasonable assumption, since those who move out are known to be least socialized in terms of the norms of electoral institutions and hence not unlike those who move in. Actually, when the secular trend is excluded, it is probably true that the same people move in and out. This assumption will be subsequently relaxed to yield some of the more interesting results of the study.

An evaluation of the empirical results must be based not only on the overall measure of fit but also on the values of parameters, for these must remain reasonable in terms of the theory.[17] Since no magic numbers are available to assess these results, any evaluation must be treated as relative to the adopted criteria.

When this regression equation is fitted in ten countries, the theory defends itself quite badly.

---

[17] Least-squares estimation of this model presents a number of problems stemming from the fact that the dependent variable occurs with a lag as a regressor. To analyze the behavior of error terms, I have computed the Durbin-Watson statistic in those cases where the graphs of errors gave the impression that they may be autocorrelated. This test brought the conclusion that errors are not autocorrelated. However, I discovered subsequently that the Durbin-Watson statistic should not be used when some of the regressors were lagged dependent variables and the tests developed for this kind of a situation are valid only asymptotically for large samples. See M. Nerlove and K. F. Wallis, "Use of the Durbin-Watson Statistic in Inappropriate Situations," *Econometrica,* 34 (January, 1966), 235–238; J. Durbin, "Testing for Serial Correlation in Least-Squares Regression When Some of the Regressors are Lagged Dependent Variables," *Econometrica,* 38 (May, 1970), 410–421.

Without knowing whether and how the error terms may be autocorrelated all we know is that: (1) the sample estimates of parameters are biased, and (2) they are inconsistent estimators of true parameter values. Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr. ("Problems of Statisti-

A. *Germany*



B. *Canada*



**Figure 2. Predicted Paths of Deinstitutionalization**

Only in two countries does the model account for more than fifty per cent of the variance and in one of the two, Switzerland, practically no mobilization took place. At least in the case when the movements into and out of the electorate are treated in the same manner, the theory of mobilization and decay explains little variance of institutionalization of Western European party systems. The results for Scandinavian countries of Den-

---

cal Estimation and Causal Inference in Time-Series Regression Models," *Sociological Methodology 1973*, Herbert L. Costner, ed. [San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973]) demonstrates that values of our parameter *P* will generally be overestimated while the values of *Q* will be underestimated. Hence even the low values of *P* which we obtained are most likely higher than the true values. I am grateful to Douglas Hibbs for his comments and for letting me see a prepublication copy of his article.

mark, Sweden, and Norway border on the disastrous, the per cent of variance explained being respectively 1.8, 9.5, and 12.9. Belgium fares no better with 5.5 per cent of variance explained. France does not surpass 19 per cent. The fit improves to pass one-third of variance in Finland, where the proportion is exactly 33.3, Canada with 36.3, and the United Kingdom with 37.8 per cent. Only in one country is the fit truly impressive for a model that accounts with two independent variables for 20 elections over 62 years. This country occupies a special position in European history—a fact that makes the fit even more fascinating. The country is Germany, and the period is 1871 to 1933.

The table below presents the results of regression analysis and the mean decay in order of ascending proportion of explained variance.

When the values of parameters are examined, it again becomes clear that the analysis yields at least one value that does not make theoretical sense in each of the five countries where the proportion of variance is lower than one-third. In the remaining five countries the values of parameters are all between zero and one.

The values of $Q$, the parameter representing the effect of mobilization upon simultaneous change of voting distribution, are relatively high. The persons who move into and out of the electorate seem to have preferences different from those who stay within the electoral system. The Finnish system is most sensitive to these movements, while in the United Kingdom, where the value of $Q$ is the lowest, still one-half of the new voters (or nonvoters) differ in their aggregate preferences from those who remained within the electorate (assuming that previous voters did not change their preferences, see above).

These numerical results overstate, however, the impact of mobilization and hence the values of $Q$. Franchise was frequently extended under unusual circumstances, and these circumstances, rather than mobilization itself, can account for much of the change. In nearly all cases those large increases in mobilization that had a profoundly deinstitutionalizing effect occurred after the end of either of the two World Wars.[18] In Norway in 1921 a major realignment was accompanied by a moderate increase of mobilization but also by the introduction of proportional representation. In Germany, the major redistribution of votes in 1919 was not only an effect of the war but also of the introduction of proportional representation. Hence, even the observed relationships between mobilization and deinstitutionalization may be "spurious" in the sense that both processes are a consequence of the same underlying conditions.

Perhaps most surprising are the relatively low values of the parameter of institutionalization, $P$. Several values of $P$ are close to zero. Some learning seems to operate in Canada and Switzerland; and in Germany nearly half of those who change once shift during the next election. The German voters were the ones who kept switching their preferences, while in most other countries those who changed once did not differ in their likelihood of changing from those who adhered to the same choices in the past.

The general implication of these results is that *newly mobilized voters are not any less socialized than are previous participants.* They enter with clear and already somewhat fixed preferences. Once having entered they adhere to these preferences. This assertion, and the intercountry differences, can be best understood when one realizes that the persons who have for the first time obtained the legal right to vote generally turn out to vote at a rate much lower than those who had the

**Table 2. Regression Analysis of Deinstitutionalization in Ten Countries**

| Country | $P$ | $Q$ | $S$ | Proportion of Variance Explained | Mean of $D(t)$ | Period | No. of Observations |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Denmark | −0.0763 | −0.1410 | 0.1015 | 0.0179 | 0.0895 | 1895–1943 | 17 |
| Belgium | 0.2395 | −0.0889 | 0.1008 | 0.0546 | 0.1280 | 1894–1961 | 14 |
| Sweden | −0.3030 | −0.0784 | 0.1138 | 0.0950 | 0.0844 | 1884–1960 | 24 |
| Norway | −0.2710 | 0.6342 | 0.1337 | 0.1291 | 0.1302 | 1882–1945 | 18 |
| France | −0.0817 | 0.6464 | 0.1941 | 0.1900 | 0.2028 | 1876–1962 | 21 |
| Finland | 0.0653 | 0.8219 | 0.0243 | 0.3333 | 0.0679 | 1907–1966 | 22 |
| Canada | 0.2930 | 0.6333 | 0.0464 | 0.3630 | 0.1069 | 1896–1958 | 15 |
| U. Kingdom | 0.0116 | 0.5052 | 0.0665 | 0.3775 | 0.0820 | 1892–1966 | 18 |
| Switzerland | 0.2556 | 0.5412 | 0.0209 | 0.5583 | 0.0511 | 1919–1963 | 11 |
| Germany | 0.4541 | 0.6161 | 0.0340 | 0.6587 | 0.1327 | 1871–1933 | 20 |

---

[18] I take into account the fact that the Canadian military personnel did not vote in the first election following World War I. It is significant that in Belgium, where female universal franchise was introduced in 1948, the mobilization of women had much less impact on the voting distribution than the war.

Table 3. System Memory in Four Countries

| Country | $t(0)$ | $M(0)$ | $QM(0)$ | $D(1/0)$ | $D(2/0)$ | $D(3/0)$ | $D(4/0)$ | $D(5/0)$ | $t(n)$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| U. Kingdom | 1918 | 0.185 | 0.093 | 0.0010 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 1931 |
| Finland | 1906 | 0.477 | 0.392 | 0.0255 | 0.0016 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 1911 |
| Canada | 1921 | 0.267 | 0.145 | 0.0495 | 0.0145 | 0.0043 | 0.0012 | 0.0004 | 1941 |
| Germany | 1919 | 0.496 | 0.305 | 0.1383 | 0.0628 | 0.0285 | 0.0129 | 0.0059 | 1930 |

Explanation: $t(0)$ represents the date of the election during which the largest wave of mobilization occurred in a given country;
$M(0)$ represents the proportion of adults mobilized at this time;
$QM(0)$ represents the change that resulted immediately from this mobilization;
$D(1/0)$ $D(2/0)$, etc., represents that part of the change at time 1, 2, etc. that is due exclusively to the increase in mobilization at $t(0)$;
$t(n)$ represents the date of the fifth election since the massive wave of mobilization occurred.

right in the past. Extensions of franchise generally depress turnout—the rate at which eligible persons actually vote.[19] Hence, it is likely that those newly franchised voters who do turn out at the polls are already organized by political parties and have a clear and stable preference. This interpretation finds confirmation in the fact that perhaps the only major extension of franchise which resulted in the increase in turnout was precisely the German extension of 1918. Thus, it seems that in most cases, socialization into the patterns of voting behavior occurred *before* persons actually voted, not as a consequence of repeated voting experiences.

Since the newly mobilized entered the electorate with preferences already fixed, the deinstitutionalizing effects of waves of mobilization were of short duration. To the extent that preferences of new voters differed at the moment of their mobilization from those of the previous participants, a change in voting distribution occurred *at this moment*. Since little learning took place within the electoral system, however, the effects of mobilization were quickly "forgotten." Table 3 presents the "memory" of different systems: the manner in which these systems weigh at any time the importance of events that occurred at some time in the past.[20] The largest wave of mobilization which occurred in each four countries is considered, and the effects of these waves upon changes during subsequent elections are examined. Hence, for example, the largest wave of mobilization in Canada occurred in 1921, when the proportion of adults who voted increased by 26.7 per cent. Given that about 63 per cent of these new voters had partisan preferences different from those of the previous participants, these new voters changed the distribution of vote in the 1921 election by 14.5 per cent. Given that 29.3 per cent of those who introduced the change in the distribution of vote in 1921 continued to change in the next election, the mobilization of women in 1921 resulted in the change of 4.95 per cent between the 1921 and 1925 election, 1.45 per cent between 1925 and 1926 election, 0.43 per cent between 1926 and 1930, and was "forgotten" nearly completely by 1935. The role of the parameter of institutionalization, $P$, can best be seen comparing Finland and Germany. Waves of mobilization of similar magnitude resulted in similar instantaneous changes in voting distribution. In Finland, however, this wave was forgotten nearly immediately, while in Germany the effects of the wave of mobilization that followed World War I were felt throughout the 'twenties.

In summary, the empirical investigation shows that the theory accounts for little variance in at least five of the ten countries studied. Learning of fixed patterns of voting generally precedes rather than follows mobilization. In turn, while mobilization has some deinstitutionalizing effects, these effects may be exaggerated by the particular circumstances under which waves of mobilization occurred in several countries.

## Mobilization or Demobilization?

Having discovered these variations in the validity of the theory in particular countries, we can now shift the level of analysis to inquire into the reasons for these differences. Why does the model fit, at least to some extent, in Germany, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Canada, and Finland, while it falls flat on its face in Denmark, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, and France?

One interpretation, suggested immediately by the theory, is that the model would not fit where there were no "massive waves" of mobilization, i.e., where the admission of new voters proceeded slowly and smoothly. Since the theory assumes rapid increases in mobilization, anything may follow where this assumption is false. This interpretation implies that the fit should be better where mobilization was more rapid. In other words, some values of parameters of the process of mobilization should be related to the validity of the theory.

---

[19] See Stein Rokkan and Henry Valen, "The Mobilization of the Periphery: Data On Turnout, Party Membership and Candidate Recruitment in Norway," *Acta Sociologica* (January, 1962), 111-158.

[20] For a discussion of this concept of memory see Cortés *et al.*, *Systems Analysis*, Chapter 10.

This interpretation can be tested in a number of ways. If the means of the changes in mobilization are taken as the parameter of the time path of this process, then the higher the means the better should be the fit of the model. Since in the long run, however, mobilization took place in most countries, the mean of mobilization has little variance across countries and hence is not a very useful way of characterizing the process. Mean change in mobilization shows no relationship to mean change in voting distribution.

A better way to characterize the speed of the processes of mobilization in different countries is to estimate the parameter $a$ of the function given by (12). The higher the value of $a$, the more rapid was the process of mobilization. This test, however, is again negative.[21]

Since we are interested in the effects of single waves of mobilization, we may also want to examine the relationship between the fit of the model in each country and the size of the single largest increase in mobilization. These increases are again independent of the fit of the model.

Finally, for those who object to compressing the history of nearly a hundred years into a single number, whatever it might be, in Figure 3, I reproduce the time paths of mobilization during periods studied in each country. It is sufficient to look at these graphs to see that the form of the processes of mobilization in different countries is not related to the validity of the theory.

Hence, the interpretation that may be derived from the theory itself leads us to a blind alley. This result is significant when we consider that the paths of the process of mobilization fail to predict not only the fit of the model in each country but *also the mean amount of change in the voting distribution.*[22] Denmark, Sweden, Norway, the United Kingdom, and Germany all mobilized new persons more or less at the same rate and more or less at the same time. Moreover, not only are there differences in the fit of the model and the mean amount of voting change but also in the stability of electoral institutions. Italy is included among the graphs of the paths of mobilization to show that before 1922 the process of mobilization in this country was not strikingly different from, say, Sweden or Norway. Whether one thinks of the amount of behavioral change within an institution or the continuity of the institution itself, the pace of the process of electoral mobilization explains little of the intercountry difference.

How, then, can one explain the differences in the validity of the theory? It is necessary to observe that the process of mobilization was not without reversals. Even though legal restrictions of franchise were extremely rare, for various reasons mobilization declined during certain periods in most countries. Hence, it is possible that net movements of persons *out* of the ranks of voters—"demobilization"—has a different effect upon the change of voting patterns than their mobilization.

This hypothesis proves, indeed, to be fruitful since, as Figure 4 shows, *the fit of the model is closely related to the mean decrease in mobilization* during the period studied.

What Germany and Switzerland, Finland, Canada, and the United Kingdom have in common is that the proportion of adults voting decreased relatively frequently and significantly during their electoral history. In Switzerland, a higher proportion of adults voted in national elections in 1919 than in 1963. In Germany, the level of mobilization fell slightly between 1878 and 1884, then fell again from 1887 to 1898; it reached a peak in the first election with the franchise of women, in 1919, fell by seven per cent in 1920, and only in the last election of the Weimar Republic did it surpass the level reached during the 1919 election. In Finland a long drop in the level of mobilization followed the first election under universal franchise; the level of mobilization increased after the Civil War of 1918 but remained at a low level until 1930; it increased sharply when voting age was lowered to 21 in 1944 and the Communist Party became legal again; and it has oscillated by as much as five per cent since then.

---

[21] Actually, I estimated the parameter of the continuous function

$$Y(t) = \frac{L}{1 + Ce^{-at}}$$

where $C$ is a constant. Since only three points, 1890, 1920, and 1950, were used for the estimation, the results should be treated as very rough.

[22] Whatever way one tries to find a relationship between the pace and/or the timing of mobilization and the mean institutionalization, the attempts fail. These results cannot be presented in detail for lack of space, but they are highly significant in the light of the quantity of literature that posits such a relation. The thesis that relates the pace of electoral mobilization to the institutionalization, stability, or continuity of political institutions requires detailed examination within the full comparative spectrum. The analysis of selected cases, upon which this thesis has been built, relies excessively on Anglo-centrism and comparisons of the United Kingdom, Germany and France.



Figure 3. Electoral Mobilization, $M(t)$, in Various Countries

In the United Kingdom, oscillations with a period of about every third election accompanied the secular increase in the level of mobilization; the sharpest drop of nearly ten per cent occurred from 1931 to 1935. In contrast to these countries, mobilization was nearly monotonic in Denmark, where its level dropped only twice and by negligible amounts, as well as in Belgium, Sweden, and Norway where decreases in mobilization were more frequent but very small.

Within the original motivation of the theory, this finding is a striking one. It turns out that the theory is clearly invalid in five of the ten countries studied, that its validity is not related to the intensity of the "massive waves of mobilization," but that, strangely, it is valid where there was relatively more demobilization.

### Demobilization of Groups and Political Decay

Given that the theory is valid in those societies which have experienced periods of relatively intense demobilization, it is necessary to examine separately the effects of increases and decreases in mobilization in producing the decay of voting patterns. For this purpose, the negative and positive values of $\Delta M(t)$ can be treated as distinct variables which will be denoted as $\Delta M(t)^+$ and $\Delta M(t)^-$. These variables will be defined as follows:

$$\Delta M(t)^+ = \begin{matrix} \Delta M(t), & \text{if } \Delta M(t) > 0, \\ 0, & \text{otherwise;} \end{matrix}$$

$$\Delta M(t)^- = \begin{matrix} 0, & \text{if } \Delta M(t) > 0, \\ |\Delta M(t)|, & \text{otherwise.} \end{matrix}$$

The regression equation to be fitted is then:[23]

$$(14) \quad D(t) = PD(t-1) + Q_1\Delta M(t)^+ + Q_2\Delta M(t)^- + S + e,$$

Table 4 presents the fit of the equation (13) and the equation (14), the difference of the propor-

---

[23] See footnote 17 for the discussion of problems in fitting this model. The introduction of the "partially dummy" variables should not complicate matters excessively since they are linearly independent. This model, however, does contain nearly the entire bag of econometric worms, since the same variable appears on both sides, dummy-like variables are utilized, and the error may be serially dependent. Hence, the stability of the estimates of $P$ and $S$ should be considered as a rough criterion of the magnitude of problems introduced additionally by the separate treatment of mobilization and demobilization.



**Figure 4. Demobilization and the Fit of the Theory**

tions of variance explained by the two equations, the differences in the values of $P$ and $S$, and the ratio of the number of decreases in mobilization to the total number of observations.

In general, when decreases in mobilization are distinguished from the increases, the model fits slightly better. It continues to account for little variance, however, in Denmark, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, and France. The most spectacular increase in variance explained occurs in Canada,

**Table 4. The Fit of Two Models**

| Country | Variance Explained by | | Differences in | | | Demobilizations/ No. of Observations |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Equation 13 | Equation 14 | Variance Explained[a] | $P$[b] | $S$[b] | |
| Denmark | 0.0179 | n.a.[c] | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 2/17 |
| Belgium | 0.0546 | 0.0786 | 0.0240 | 0.0555 | 0.0197 | 6/14 |
| Sweden | 0.1340 | 0.0950 | 0.0391 | 0.0020 | 0.0069 | 8/24 |
| Norway | 0.1291 | 0.1255 | −0.0036 | 0.0039 | 0.0060 | 5/18 |
| France | 0.1900 | 0.1907 | 0.0007 | 0.0051 | 0.0025 | 11/21 |
| Finland | 0.3333 | 0.3469 | 0.0136 | 0.0113 | 0.0133 | 9/22 |
| U. Kingdom | 0.3775 | 0.3955 | 0.0180 | 0.0708 | 0.0033 | 8/18 |
| Canada | 0.3630 | 0.5188 | 0.1558 | 0.1636 | 0.0003 | 6/15 |
| Switzerland | 0.5583 | 0.5874 | 0.0291 | 0.0664 | 0.0022 | 7/11 |
| Germany | 0.6587 | 0.7101 | 0.0514 | 0.0552 | 0.0003 | 7/20 |

[a] Variance explained by equation (13) minus that explained by equation (14).
[b] Absolute values of the differences.
[c] n.a.—not applicable.

and the second largest occurs in the country where the undifferentiated model already fit best, namely Germany. The differences in the values of $P$ and $S$ are generally small; particularly the intercept, $S$, seems unaffected by the modification of the fitted equation.

The most startling finding of this analysis, however, emerges from the examination of values of the parameters $Q_1$ and $Q_2$ in different countries. The parameter $Q_1$ represents the impact of the *increases* in mobilization upon the change of voting distribution. It shows to what extent voters who entered the electorate differed in their aggregate partisan preferences from those already in the electorate, i.e., the extent to which voters entered the electoral systems as groups. The parameter $Q_2$ represents the impact of *demobilization* upon the decay of voting patterns. It shows to what extent persons who left the ranks of voters differed in their aggregate partisan preferences from those who voted previously. *This parameter indicates to what extent persons left the electorate in groups.* When $Q_2$ is large, demobilization is group-specific, i.e., persons who leave the electorate constitute a particular type of voter. When $Q_2$ approaches zero, demobilization is random with regard to the previous composition of the electorate—any voter is equally likely to leave the electorate. Finally, when $Q_2$ is negative, voters again leave the electorate in groups—groups defined not with regard to the direction of their voting preference but solely with regard to the stability of that preference. In other words, when $Q_2$ is high and positive, voters for particular *parties* become demobilized; when $Q_2$ is close to zero, all voters are equally likely to become demobilized; when $Q_2$ is high and negative, voters who are likely to change their vote become demobilized.

Given this interpretation, we can now examine the empirical results. The values of the parameters $Q$ for those countries in which the model accounts at least for one-third of the variance are presented in Table 5.

At this point the relation between mobilization and deinstitutionalization is starkly revealed. The German results are perhaps most telling. The decay of the German patterns of voting was clearly a result of demobilization of certain *groups* of voters. While influx of voters into the party system has a coefficient of 0.64, the effects upon change of voting patterns when voters leave are nearly twice as large, 1.24. Finland is the other country where voters become demobilized in groups. Although their influx has a higher destabilizing effect than in Germany, demobilization has again a clearly higher effect upon decay. In Canada, the mobilization of new voters has some destabilizing effect upon the voting patterns while demobilization sharply decreases the change of voting distribution—the marginal voters in Canada are the floating voters. The sharpest contrast to the German-Finnish case is provided by the United Kingdom, where the influx of voters has some destabilizing effect but their demobilization has no effect whatsoever. In the United Kingdom, voters leave the electorate randomly with regard to those voting previously; neither the voters for particular parties nor the floating voters, who change their preferences from one election to another, are more likely to leave than to stay.

This impact of the movements of voters into and out of the electorate must be viewed within the broader terms of the electoral history of each country. In interpreting the German results, it is perhaps most important to realize that free competition among parties, unrestricted organization of followers, and responsible acceptance of the outcomes of the electoral game were never accepted unconditionally between 1871 and 1933.[24] The laws restricting the activity of the Social Democratic Party were proposed several times

**Table 5. Regression Analysis of Effects of Mobilization and Demobilization***

| Country | $Q_2$ | $Q_1$ | $P$ | $S$ | Proportion of Variance Explained |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Germany | 1.2404 | 0.6383 | 0.3999 | 0.0343 | 0.7101 |
| Finland | 1.0962 | 0.8181 | 0.0766 | 0.0110 | 0.3469 |
| Switzerland | 0.5284 | 0.7458 | 0.1892 | 0.0231 | 0.5874 |
| U. Kingdom | −0.0164 | 0.5749 | −0.0592 | 0.0632 | 0.3955 |
| Canada | −0.9451 | 0.6374 | 0.4566 | 0.0467 | 0.5188 |

* Only the countries where the proportion of variance exceeds 0.33.

---

[24] German dominant ideology considered the mystical will of the "volk," rather than outcomes of partisan intrigues, to constitute the source of political legitimacy. The notion of representation mediated by parties never gained ideological primacy over the concept of unmediated relation between the "community" and a leader. See the essays by Ernst Fraenkel and particularly by Kurt Sontheimer in Fritz Stern, ed., *The Path of Dictatorship, 1918–1933* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966).

before they finally went into effect in 1878, and they had a precedent in the anti-*Zentrum* campaign of the *Kulturkampf* period. The anti-Socialist laws were not revoked; they were only allowed to expire after Bismarck made an unsuccessful attempt to make them permanent in 1889. In 1894, a "subversion bill" was submitted to the Reichstag; in 1897, the Prussian minister of the interior was forced to resign on account of his "softness" toward Socialism; in 1899, the Reichstag was asked to pass laws directed against union organizing. A modification of electoral laws in Saxony in 1896 effectively eliminated Socialists from the *Landtag;* in 1897 the Prussian *Landtag* was asked to give the police power to dissolve all societies threatening law and order or the security of the state. When the Emperor William II became furious at parliamentary resistance against naval appropriations, he threatened to restrict the franchise. Neither was the climate of the Weimar Republic free from open repression against left-wing parties (and for a short time the NSDAP). Between 1919 and 1922 there were 376 political murders in Germany, of which, according to William Carr, 356 were committed by right-wing extremists.[25] In 1923 when two provincial governments included Communist ministers, Chancellor Stresemann ordered the Reichswehr to depose these governments by force.

In the light of this political repression in Germany, it is noteworthy that Finland is the other country in which demobilization has had a sharp effect upon electoral change. In Finland, as in Germany, one of the parties participating in elections was legally discriminated against or simply outlawed for 21 years.

In the United Kingdom and Switzerland, the effect of demobilization is lower than that of the increases in the proportion of voters. In both countries demobilizations have generally been a result of party decisions not to contest particular constituencies. In Switzerland the greatest drop in mobilization occurred in 1939 and was accompanied by a sharp change in voting distribution. This demobilization resulted from the fact that *élection tacite* took place in nine cantons. In general, the rates of mobilization in Switzerland follow quite closely the decision of the parties to contest elections in particular cantons. The same seems to be true in the United Kingdom in the elections of 1895, 1900, and 1910. Minor decreases of mobilization which occurred during these elections follow again the decisions of the parties to contest particular constituencies. It is important to note, however, that the turnout (ratio of actual voters to eligible voters) in the contested constituencies covaried from 1885 to 1910 with the number of constituencies that were contested—indicating that the decisions of the parties to contest a particular number of constituencies reflected their general competitive posture and hence organizing efforts.[26] The sharp drop in turnout from 1931 to 1935 (80 per cent to 70.1 per cent) is probably due not to any explicit decision of the parties but to the dissatisfaction of the Labor voters with the general inefficacy of party government and, specifically, with McDonald's betrayal. Hence, the British situation in 1935 may have been a crisis of party government similar to the German disaffection with "*das System*" in 1928.

When one compares Germany and Finland, on the one hand, with the United Kingdom and Switzerland, on the other hand, it becomes clear that *demobilization has a strong effect upon institutionalization where it is based on repression.* Electoral systems experience decays of patterns of behavior when groups of voters are excluded from the ranks of participants, whether it is because of legal prohibitions, physical coercion, or blatant fraud.

### Implications and Departures

At this point, a summary of the findings is needed to draw consequences from the empirical tests of the theory. The theory asserted that patterns of voting behavior are destabilized by the mobilization of new persons since these new voters share neither the preferences of the previous participants nor their extent of socialization. When subjected to empirical analysis, this theory has experienced a strange fate:

(1) Of the ten countries studied, only in five did the theory explain more than one-third of variance, and only in one, Germany, two-thirds.

(2) The persons who entered the ranks of voters were already socialized in most countries; they were not more likely than the previous voters to change their preferences.

(3) The influx of new voters introduced some change into the distribution of votes in most countries, but this change was probably an effect of general circumstances (wars, new electoral laws) rather than mobilization alone.

---

[25] This entire list follows nearly *verbatim* various passages in William Carr, *A History of Germany, 1815–1945* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969).

[26] The numbers of uncontested constituencies were 64 in 1892, 185 in 1895, 241 in 1900, 114 in 1906, 75 in the first election of 1910, 163 in the second election of 1910. The turnout dropped in 1895, 1900, and the second election of 1910. See Michael Kinnear, *The British Voter, An Atlas and Survey Since 1885;* and James Cornford, "Aggregate Election Data and British Party Alignments, 1885–1910," in *Mass Politics,* ed. Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan (New York: The Free Press, 1970), p. 114.

(4) At the aggregate level, there was no relationship between the pace of mobilization and the general level of change of voting distribution.

(5) The validity of the theory is independent of the pace of mobilization, but it increases in those countries which experienced relatively significant decreases in mobilization.

(6) *Demobilization* of groups has a much sharper destabilizing effect upon patterns of voting than incorporation of new voters.

These results of empirical analysis of voting patterns in ten countries are at variance with the general theory that asserts that political mobilization constitutes a major threat to the stability of political institutions. Are we thus to conclude, à la Popper, that the theory is false since it has led to a prediction that turned out to be false when tested against a set of observations?

Several arguments can be made to the effect that the empirical analysis reported above does not constitute a proper test of the general theory. It might be questioned whether the concrete countries and periods under examination are appropriate for testing the theory, whether stability and change of voting patterns represent institutionalization of party systems, and even whether this theory is meant to apply to party systems at all. Perhaps most importantly, Huntington's thesis concerns primarily the contemporary underdeveloped societies, not the history of political development in Western Europe. Hence this thesis may not lend itself to any abstract, ahistorical treatment. It may be false with regard to Western Europe and still retain its validity with reference to societies which until now did not attain the level of economic development comparable to that achieved by most Western European countries at the eve of World War I.

In the societies in which most economic activities are independent from one region to another (and from one sector to another where production is oriented primarily toward exporting), any integrated political rule must be based on consensus among elites. In the absence of economic interdependence that emerges with division of labor, consolidated political rule depends upon agreements among political notables of the economically self-sufficient regions. When exposed to political mobilization such regimes are likely to crumble, and either remain in the state of endemic warfare or to be gradually replaced by a "modernizing" rule based on force, typically embodying domination of one region over another. Hence, mobilization may indeed signify the decay of elite consensus politics in economically undeveloped countries.

Our concern, however, is not with a process of "political development" in general but only with the functions of political participation in democratic developed societies. When Huntington's thesis was extended to these societies we found not only that electoral mobilization did not have the expected disruptive effect upon the electoral institutions but that, to the contrary, it was group demobilization that constituted the threat to the stability of these institutions. But the issues that arise from this analysis extend beyond this interpretation of Huntington's thesis and of any particular set of data. My disagreement is not just with the specific empirical predictions but with some basic assumptions shared by many theories of political participation.

We can neither analyze here these theories nor provide evidence for an alternative viewpoint. But the results of empirical analysis illustrate two issues that reach deeply into the basic assumptions of those theories that take the acting individual as the point of departure and attribute to the individual the responsibility for the institutional, structural, or social conditions under which he or she lives. Hence the following argument should not be treated as a conclusion but rather as a departure toward an alternative theoretical viewpoint of political participation in advanced democratic societies. Specifically, let us ask whether individual voters are indeed those who cause the decay of voting patterns and whether electoral mobilization is a threat to the stability of capitalist political institutions.

When one examines the three largest changes of voting distribution in each of the ten countries, of the total number of thirty, none is due to mobilization alone. Six are due to combinations of mobilization, war, and/or introduction of proportional representation; two are due to effects of war alone; three are due to demobilization alone. The remaining nineteen were a result of fusions or splits of parties. But mergers of parties and their divisions, prohibitions of party activity, and changes of electoral laws all constitute events that happen to the voter, independently of his or her will. When a party merges with another party, a "preference" must be changed. When a party is forcibly removed from the ballot, or when voting for it jeopardizes one's life and limb, voters must "decide" to change their vote. When proportional representation is introduced, the nature of individual choices is again altered.

These are just the most striking situations in which choices offered to the voter change, or the manner in which he can or cannot exercise them is altered, or new conditions under which he votes are imposed. What the above result demonstrates is that changes of voting distribution did not occur because new individuals entered the electorate, nor because old voters "decided" to shift their preferences, but because the manner in which they could vote and the conditions under which they did vote were altered independently of their will. Party systems experienced decay not because voters decided en masse to change their vote; but on the contrary, distribution of votes changed because the institution of elections changed. Distribution of votes changes when party leaders, opinion leaders, economic elites, or those in control of the apparatus of coercion become successful in changing the formal rules under which voting takes place, the alternatives opened to the voters, or the very preferences that voters are alleged to express at the polls. Distributions of votes reflect strategies of party leaderships, strengths of political ideologies, distribution of access to means of propaganda and repression, formal rules of electioneering and voting. They are not sums of individual decisions but only observable outcomes of underlying political struggles. Voters have little to decide; what they decide and how they decide is determined by conditions given to each individual independently of his choosing. Votes are not expressions of freely made decisions. Their numbers do not measure preferences of autonomous individuals.

> What votes do measure is precisely the effectiveness and the capacity of active minorities, elites, leadership, etc. to expand their own views, to persuade others. . . . Ideas and convictions are not born spontaneously in the brain of each individual; they have had a center of formation, radiation, diffusion, and persuasion; a group of people or even a single personage who has elaborated these views and presented them in their actual political form. *The counting of votes is the final manifestation of a long process* in which the central role belongs precisely to those who "devote all that is best in them to the State and the nation."[27]
>
> [italics supplied]

Are electoral institutions threatened by the influx of new voters? Is electoral mobilization a source of decay of electoral institutions? The notion underlying many views of political development is that political institutions are threatened at various times by people who under the impact of urbanization, education, modernization, etc. demand to participate in politics and to share the benefits distributed through politics. Dangerous situations are then created since the ultimate of virtues—stability—is jeopardized, and even violence may ensue. But if mobilization constitutes such an imposing threat to the stability of electoral institutions, why would these institutions repeatedly expose themselves to this danger?

An alternative view of the relationship between mobilization and institutional stability would hold that new people are recruited into political institutions when the stability of these institutions is already threatened; that incorporation into the existing institutions is a strategy that serves to keep things as they are; in short, that electoral mobilization is a process through which electoral institutions preserve their stability. But this argument would lead us too far afield from the results of the empirical analysis, and these results are sufficient to sketch the role of electoral mobilization in the development of capitalist political systems.

The analysis of patterns of voting has shown that under some circumstances, *decreases* in the proportion of adults who vote have a strong impact upon change of these patterns. When voters leave electoral systems in groups, patterns of voting become sharply altered. This conclusion is nearly tautological and it could have been reached without all the tedious empirical analysis. But what this analysis has shown is that the logical possibility of group demobilization is not historically vacuous, that it did occur, and that it occurred in countries that share a history of prolonged repression of political parties.

As we all know, the decay of the German electoral system was not limited to changes in the distribution of votes. However one defines decay or instability this is what occurred in Germany between 1928 and 1933. Not only did the patterns of voting or, more precisely, the relations between classes and parties change radically, but eventually the entire edifice of capitalist democracy fell into decay.[28] The withdrawal of voters was in no sense a "cause" of this decay, since the German ruling classes had never accepted the rule that groups may participate in the electoral process regardless of what they are and what consequences their participation might bring. Yet in Germany voters moved out of the electorate in groups, and the electoral system proved highly vulnerable.

The German result becomes ominous when considered alongside the experience of Italy and Spain. Time series are too short in these countries to permit the use of regression analysis to assess the extent to which voters left the electorate in groups. But what we know about the history of these countries supports the conclusion based on the German case.

---

[27] This is a loose translation from Antonio Gramsci's *Note sul Machiavelli, sulla politica e sullo stato moderno* (Torino: Einaudi, 1966), p. 81. The original reads as follows:

> Si misura proprio l'efficacia e la capacita di espansione e di persuasione delle opinioni di pochi, delle minoranze attive, delle elites, delle avanguardie, ecc. . . . Le idee e le opinioni non "nascono" spontaneamente nel cervello di ogni singolo; hanno avuto un centro di formazione, di irradazione, di diffusione, di persuasione, un gruppo di uomini o anche una singola individualita che le ha elaborate e presentate nella forma politica di attualita. La numerazione dei "voti" e la manifestazione terminale di un longo processo in cui l'influsso massimo appartiene proprio a quelli che "dedicano allo Stato e alla nazione le loro migliori forze."

[28] The importance of the sharp change in the relations between classes and parties is emphasized by Nicos Poulantzas, *Fascisme et dictature* (Paris: Francois Maspero, 1970).

In Italy several groups were kept out of the electoral process. Catholics were barred from participating in national elections by papal edict. The laws against anarchy, passed in 1894, served to repress the socialist movement and electoral lists were revised to exclude nearly 28 per cent of the eligible voters. Southern peasants lived under a nearly permanent stage of siege, forcibly prevented from any kind of political expression. But more important than these instances of group exclusion is the fact that electoral mobilization never became sufficiently broad and intense to outweigh the insurrectionary pressures born from misery and injustice. Giolitti well understood that mobilization into existing institutions is necessary if they are to survive. But his policy could not have been effective since workers already knew that their political rights depended on their good conduct in the factories and the Southern peasants did not acquire the right to vote until 1913 and did not vote en masse until 1919.[29]

In Spain, as in Italy, some groups were barred from participating in electoral politics, some were persuaded that this participation had nothing to offer, while others were not persuaded that it did. Juan Linz once asked why was the Spanish electoral system "unable to slowly integrate, if not the masses, at least the business and professional bourgeoisie, use the talents of the intellectuals, and continue the peaceful process of mobilization of increasingly larger segments of the population and particularly those with serious grievances against the social order?"[30] In fact although universal male suffrage was extended relatively early, electoral participation fell systematically from 1907 to 1920 and only in 1936 surpassed the 1907 level. The electoral law of 1907 contained a curious article on the basis of which elections could be declared noncompetitive in particular districts and the nominated candidate would be proclaimed without voting. In this manner between half a million and one and a half million voters were effectively disenfranchised between 1907 and 1923.[31] In the meantime both working class and regional movements were systematically repressed while the peasant found little reason to become involved in party politics. Abstention and apathy, as Linz emphasizes, were the factors that made possible the coup of Primo de Rivera.

In Germany, Italy, Spain, and to some extent Finland, significant groups were left outside of the electoral system. In some situations they were actually expelled, in others they were not admitted; under still different circumstances they refused to participate. But whether they were not allowed or not persuaded, they remained outside the electoral system. This is not to argue that group withdrawals or abstentions are an immediate and direct cause of the downfall of electoral institutions, but merely that in those societies in which groups remain for one reason or another outside of electoral politics these institutions are particularly vulnerable.

This brings us to the general thesis. Group abstention from the electoral process, whether it results from repression or other circumstances, constitutes a major threat to the stability not only of party systems but the general system of political, economic, and social relations. The developed capitalist countries owe their stability to institutionalization of intergroup conflict. The belief in the instrumental effectiveness of particular mechanisms for processing such conflicts, accompanied by varying amounts of repression of political activities defined as "subversive," channels intergroup conflicts into the institutionalized framework. Party systems, collective bargaining arrangements, and in some countries mass media constitute the major social mechanisms through which intergroup conflicts are processed in a peaceful, orderly, and predictable manner. Party systems absorb potentially explosive political activities and transform them into political participation. Hence, when groups cease to play according to the institutionalized rules, alternative forms of political mobilization may emerge: "parties" become replaced by "movements."

The threat to the stability of democratic capitalist systems comes not from political participation, which for most people involves little more than voting at regular intervals. Rather, the real threat is posed by withdrawals of groups from the electoral process and a loss of legitimacy of the institutionalized forms of conflict processing.

---

[29] For a short history of Italy during this period see Salvatore Saladino, *Italy from Unification to 1919* (New York: Crowell, 1970). Controversies concerning the Giolitti era are collected in *Italy from the Risorgimento to Fascism*. A. W. Salomone, ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1970). See in particular the essay by Gaetano Salvemini, "Was Prefascist Italy a Democracy?" reprinted in this volume under the title "The Historian as Polemicist. 'Giolitti, No—Democracy, Yes'," pp. 474–490, for a description of the electoral system under Giolitti's rule. For the attitude of the working class movement toward elections see Angelo Tasca, *La Naissance du Fascisme* (Paris: Galimard, 1938), Chapter II.

[30] Juan Linz, "The Party System of Spain: Past and Future," in Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 202.

[31] Miguel Martinez Cuadrado, *Elecciones y Partidos Politicos de España, 1868–1931,* 2 vol. (Madrid: Taurus, 1969), p. 760 and Table 28.

# Interest Groups and Political Integration: the 1972 EEC Decisions in Norway and Denmark*

PETER M. LESLIE
*Queen's University at Kingston*

This article extends the discussion of issues raised by Robert J. Lieber in this *Review:* "Interest Groups and Political Integration: British Entry into Europe."[1] Evidence from Denmark and Norway, it is argued below, require us to reject some of Lieber's conclusions regarding the process of political integration, without however enabling us to rehabilitate the functionalist theories which he criticizes. The article then explores some implications of this double rejection, concluding with a comment on the current status of integration theory.

### Lieber's Findings

Lieber's findings include the following (my summary):

(1) Functionalist theories of political integration (Mitrany, Haas)[2] cannot explain how the process of "enlarging a geographical area of integration" (p. 67) occurs, i.e., they cannot explain the accession of new members to an existing union. According to functionalist theories, nonpoliticized interest group activity operates to promote political integration. The opposite, however, was the case in Britain, where pressure group opposition to entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) was overcome only by effective politicization of the issue. Nonetheless, functionalist theories are probably applicable to the process of "expanding [i.e., intensifying] . . . integration once a [supranational] grouping already exists" (p. 67).

(2) "Interest group theorizing," as exemplified by Beer and by Eckstein for Britain and by Bauer, Pool, and Dexter for the United States,[3] is partially confirmed. Organizational needs will cause interest groups to oppose new schemes for political integration even when on balance integration will confer economic benefits on the majority of their members. On the basis of this supposition, the anti-EEC stance of British interest groups and their early success in keeping Britain out of the EEC may be taken as confirmation of "the group politics approach" (p. 53).

(3) Interest group theorizing, however, is no longer applicable once the integration issue becomes *politicized.*[4] Groups demonstrate their power by their ability to veto decisions to which they are hostile. An interest group veto may be overridden if political leaders mobilize public opinion to support a decision of "major national importance." In this case political parties supplant pressure groups as the dominant or leading representative institution (p. 56).

(4) The enlargement of a geographical area of integration requires a conscious, "high"[5] political decision, (p. 67) overriding objections from "sectional" (i.e., occupational) groups. This is a specific instance of a general rule: "[P]rofound new ventures . . . cannot be made so long as pressure groups provide the main constituency for policy makers" (p. 57).

In the following four sections, each of these issues will be discussed in turn.

### The Functionalist Hypothesis

The first issue is whether functionalist theories of political integration apply to the enlargement of the geographical area within which integration takes place. Since Mitrany is concerned with a modest degree of integration on a global scale rather than a more intensive form of integration on a regional scale, Haas's work must be taken as the main object of our attention.

Haas argues that there exists an "expansive logic of sector integration"—or a "spill-over" process consisting in

---

* Data for the article were collected from government reports, publications of interest organizations, newspapers and 20 interviews with spokesmen for interest organizations in Denmark and Norway. I am grateful to Queen's University for grant of sabbatical leave in 1972–73, and to the Canada Council for a Leave Fellowship.

[1] *American Political Science Review,* 66 (March 1972), 53–67. Page references in the present article, unless otherwise indicated, are to the Lieber article.

[2] David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System: An Argument for Functional Development of International Organization* (London: Oxford University Press, For the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943); Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950–57* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958).

[3] Samuel H. Beer, *British Politics in the Collectivist Age* (New York: Knopf, 1965); Harry Eckstein, *Pressure Group Politics: The Case of the British Medical Association* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960); Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis A. Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade* (New York: Atherton, 1963).

[4] Lieber's usage of the term "politicization" is discussed below, section entitled Politicization and Integration.

[5] "High," in the sense used by Stanley Hoffman. See below, section entitled High Politics and Integration.

> . . . the accretion of new powers and tasks to a central institutional structure, based on changing demands and expectations on the part of such political actors as interest groups, political parties, and bureaucracies. [Spill-over] refers to the specific process which originates in one functional context, initially separate from other political concerns, and then expands into related activities as it becomes clear to the chief political actors that the achievement of the initial aims cannot take place without such expansion.[6]

"[P]erhaps the chief finding," Haas wrote in the preface to *The Uniting of Europe*, "is that group pressure will spill over into the federal [i.e., supranational] sphere and thereby add to the integrative impulse."[7] Although his main emphasis is on the integrative process within an area for which there are already functionally-specific supranational institutions, he has further suggested that the "expansive logic" may also result in the accession of new members to an emerging economic-political union:

> A geographical spill-over is [1958] clearly taking place. In its unique British form it rigorously rejects any federal trimmings and continues to rely on intergovernmental "association." But it grants not only the need for more and more intimate economic contacts in areas of activity until recently considered the sacrosanct preserve of national governments, but even the necessity for decision by majority vote among ministerial delegates. All other things being equal, it is as inconceivable that this form of co-operation should not result in new patterns of profound interdependence as it is unlikely that the General Common Market [i.e., the European Economic Community] can avoid a species of political federalism in order to function as an economic organ.[8]

Is evidence from Norway and Denmark consistent with Haas's thesis? Fundamental to an understanding of the Scandinavian situation is the fact that neither Denmark nor Norway could consider membership in the EEC until Britain was clearly going in. Conversely, once British entry was assured, even a negative decision (i.e., rejection of membership) would entail an important change in the *status quo*, involving the partial disruption of trading patterns built up under the EFTA.[9] In short, the timing of a momentous decision was thrust upon the Scandinavian countries. There could be no question of a gradual growth of interdependence and the piecemeal creation of a nongovernmental institutional network, inducing in the fullness of time political commitment to a union with supranational institutions. One could not write a functionalist scenario for Denmark and Norway.

Nevertheless the functionalist view that interest group activity promotes integration finds substantial support in the Norwegian and Danish cases. The views of occupational associations, which in all cases represent a very high proportion of their potential membership, were as follows:[10]

**Industrial and Commercial Associations.** In both countries these organizations publicly expressed full support for membership. This is hardly surprising in the case of commercial associations,[11] whose members, as importers and exporters, would increase their turnover as the volume of trade rose. It is perhaps more noteworthy in the case of manufacturers' organizations (the Federation of Danish Industries and the Federation of Norwegian Industries) since at the time of the creation of the EFTA (1958–9) and during the first EEC application in 1961–2 they had adopted ambivalent but negative-toned positions, dwelling more on the dangers to which domestic industries would be exposed than on the opportunities for moving into export markets. During the 'sixties, however, the industrial structure of both countries adapted to external competition, and by the end of the decade the entrepreneurial groups were far more confident of their ability to prosper in a broader European market. In any case, extensive protection for domestic industry was not an option, as the only realistic alternative to membership was a trade agreement which would still provide for free entry of industrial products. Thus the issues of direct significance to industry were relatively peripheral ones such as the length of the transition period for "sensitive" products, access to raw materials and the related issue of "rules of origin" (classification of goods using imported raw materials), regional policy, and access to capital. These matters affected different industries in different ways, but on balance the advantages of membership (for example, in terms of security) appeared far to outweigh the drawbacks, and the industrial organizations conducted a campaign in favor of membership. This position was echoed by the powerful employers' federations.[12]

---

[6] "International Integration: Regional Integration," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* 7, 523.

[7] Haas, *The Uniting of Europe,* p. xiii.

[8] *Ibid.,* p. 317.

[9] In both cases the alternative to membership was taken to be the negotiation of a trade agreement which by 1980 would eliminate tariffs on industrial products. The probable terms of any such agreement were known with fair precision, in view of the extant agreements between the EEC and other EFTA countries such as Switzerland and Sweden. In Denmark such an agreement would occasion serious difficulties for the export of farm products to the important British market. In Norway disruption of EFTA trade patterns would not be as great, although fears were expressed regarding paper and fish and also for the shipping industry (the last-mentioned accounting for forty per cent of Norway's foreign exchange earnings in 1970).

[10] The position taken by interest organizations was not difficult to identify, as in both countries the EEC decision was the subject of a referendum. In the campaigns, most organizations publicly identified themselves with one side or the other. In subsequent references to interest organizations, those with an official English version of their names are referred to in English; others in the original (Danish or Norwegian).

[11] In Denmark, the wholesalers' association (*Grosserer Societet*); in Norway, the Federation of Norwegian Commercial Associations. The latter is a composite organization, representing the political interests of wholesale and retail traders as well as commercial agents and forwarding agents. The absence of any parallel organization in Denmark meant that the representation of commercial interests devolved upon more specialized organizations, with the wholesalers (as the most-concerned group) playing the leading role.

**Trade Unions.** The pattern of union support and dissent was similar in the two countries. There was active opposition to EEC membership from some unions, but this did not prevent the two national Federations of Trade Unions from adopting a pro-EEC stance. First the executive committees endorsed membership, though not unanimously, and subsequently special congresses were held to adopt the definitive union position. Many unions had already held their own conventions to determine the stand they would take. In Norway the executive committee's pro-membership resolution was endorsed in the congress by 74 per cent of the votes, and in Denmark by 63 per cent. The arguments used by the opponents of entry were partly *ideological* (portraying the EEC as undemocratic and remote and bureaucratized, as an emerging superpower with cold-war attitudes, or as the institutionalization of rapacious capitalism); partly *national* (expressing fears of loss of sovereignty); and partly *economic* (raising the specter of an influx of cheap foreign labor, of a decline in the quality of welfare services, and of a widened differential between the wages of skilled and unskilled workers.) There was no discernible relationship between the economic vulnerability of a union's members and its tendency to oppose entry into the EEC.

**Farmers and Fishermen.** Here there was a strong contrast between Norway and Denmark, clearly attributable to differences in economic interest. Danish agriculture is efficient, and Danish farmers expected (and obtained) large and immediate economic benefits from membership in the EEC. Its fisheries (which in any case occupy only one per cent of the labor force) are primarily deep-sea, and membership would guarantee a market for its catches at favorable prices. By contrast, Norwegian agriculture is inefficient, and its fishermen ply the banks within its twelve-mile coastal waters. In both cases the prospect of membership in the EEC threatened the livelihood of people who would find it particularly difficult to move into other occupations, and at the same time threatened the depopulation of the north and west. In the case of agriculture, the danger came from the opening of Norwegian markets to foreign produce and from the prohibition on long-term government subsidies which alone could (if sufficiently large) have made Norwegian agriculture artificially competitive. In the case of fisheries, the threat was the common fisheries policy adopted by The Six in 1971, according to which member countries' territorial waters beyond the three-mile zone would be open to fishermen from all Community countries. Norwegian fishermen saw the danger of the depletion of their stocks by trawlers from other member-countries; and the attractions of favorable marketing conditions paled by comparison. Hence farmers' and fishermen's organizations in Norway conducted a vigorous campaign against membership, while the Danish farm organizations were its warmest advocates.[13]

In summary, it may be said that *all* major occupational associations in Denmark supported entry into the EEC, while in Norway a preponderant number—though there were significant exceptions—also adopted a positive position. The pro-membership arguments were overwhelmingly economic. On the other hand, opposition arose from a combination of economic fears, nationalistic sentiment, and ideological hostility, which was generally associated with neutralistic inclinations in foreign policy.[14] These latter themes found expression in what Lieber calls promotional pressure groups (i.e., those organized on the basis of shared attitudes rather than on economic or occupational groupings). In Denmark such organizations found no allies amongst the occupational interest organizations, and the EEC referendum (October 1972) went in favor of membership by the unexpectedly large majority of almost two to one. In Norway the ideological-nationalistic-neutralist opposition to the EEC combined with hostility toward membership by farmers and fishermen on economic grounds to defeat the negotiated (but unratified) treaty (September 1972). Had the Labor government in Norway been able or inclined to follow its own judgment and the weight of interest organization opinion, without calling a referendum, Norway would now be a full member of the EEC.[15]

---

[12] Norwegian Employers' Confederation and Danish Employers' Confederation. The function of these organizations is the conduct of negotiations with trade unions for a countrywide collective wage agreement covering most sectors of the economy. Although their activities also include political representation of employers' interests, the task of representing industry in issues not relating to the labor market is primarily in the hands of the respective federations of industries.

[13] In Norway, the marketing cooperatives (*Landbrukets Sentralforbund*), The Norwegian Farmers' Union, and the fishermen's union (*Norges Fiskarlag*); in Denmark, the agricultural council (*Landbrugsrådet*, an organization which undertakes the political representation of a large variety of agricultural producer groups and farmers' unions).

[14] I have argued this thesis in "Norway Out, Denmark In: Scandinavia and the European Economic Community," *Queen's Quarterly*, 80 (Summer 1973), 194–209.

The degree of interest group support for EEC membership in both Norway and Denmark contrasts sharply with Lieber's findings in the British case. His rejection of the functionalist thesis, at least as it may apply to the accession of new members to an existing union, rested primarily on his observation that the major interest organizations were opposed to membership,[16] or demanded so many safeguards for themselves that, so long as the government pledged itself to obtain them, the British negotiating position was unrealistically rigid. Evidence from Denmark and Norway, on the other hand, is much more favorable to the functionalist thesis, though not conclusively so, as the opposition of farmers' and fishermen's organizations in Norway contributed decisively to the negative result of the referendum.

Taking the British, Danish, and Norwegian evidence together, one observes a mixture of confirmatory and nonconfirmatory evidence for the functionalist hypothesis. In this situation we are forced either to modify the theory in order to explain the exceptions, or to abandon it altogether. If the latter, then an alternative theory may also be advanced, but it must not predict situations which are uniformly inconsistent with the predictions of the original, rejected, theory.

Lieber's course, when he has discovered the nonconfirmatory British evidence, is first to declare the functionalist hypothesis incapable of explaining the accession of new members to an existing union, and then to propose the employment of an alternative theory for this phenomenon, namely, the "group politics hypothesis."

## The Group Politics Hypothesis

Our second topic is the partial confirmation of "the group politics hypothesis" which Lieber professes to see in the attitude and early successes of British interest groups. He formulates the hypothesis as follows: "If interest groups influence policy formation, then progress toward integration is likely to be impeded" (p. 57). With such a formulation, evidence confirming functionalist theories of integration would constitute refutation of the group politics hypothesis, and vice-versa. Such a stark presentation of the theoretical alternatives, I have just argued, is inadmissible when the evidence does not *consistently* favor either one hypothesis or the other. In my opinion the trouble arises from the fact that Lieber bases the "group politics hypothesis" on a questionable inference from the works he cites as examples of "interest group theorizing."

The proposition which Lieber, improperly in my opinion, inserts into group theories of governmental decision making is that interest organizations "will tailor their positions so as not to outrage important sectors of their membership" (p. 57) and in so doing may oppose policies which are not only in the national interest (on grounds which include but are not necessarily limited to economic advantage) but which would also be of economic benefit to their membership as a whole (p. 66). This supposition is complemented by a further one: that when a country embarks upon a scheme for economic-political integration, the move will entail, for any large or "composite" interest organization, economic losses for a part of the membership.

If both these suppositions are conceded, then it is true that interest group influence will impede integration. But Lieber is elevating instances of a type of behavior into a general rule. The literature which he cites as illustrative of interest group theorizing does not propose the generalization, as Lieber does, that within interest organizations, " . . . policies tend to be developed on the basis of a lowest common denominator. The groups'

[15] In Norway, as in Denmark, the EEC negotiations had been initiated by a center-right coalition government, and concluded by labor or socialist governments. But whereas in Denmark the change of government (1971) resulted from electoral losses and was apparently unrelated to the EEC issue, in Norway it was the common market controversy which caused the government's collapse. The declared policy of the coalition government was to seek entry provided it could obtain certain concessions in agricultural and fisheries policy. As it became evident that not all these concessions could be obtained, the coalition became increasingly strained. When the prime minister, whose position as leader of the Center (agrarian) Party was particularly delicate, was discovered to have leaked a secret document on the Brussels negotiations to a prominent opponent of membership, his coalition partners forced his resignation and the break-up of the government.

[16] Lieber's portrayal of interest group attitudes is more negative than Michael J. Brenner's in his *Technocratic Politics and the Functionalist Theory of European Integration* (Ithaca: Center for International Studies, Cornell University, 1969), pp. 45–63. Brenner, covering the 1961–2 application only, suggests that the Federation of British Industries and the trade unions were publicly hesitant or ambivalent while several of their most influential leaders privately urged the government to opt for membership. The National Farmers' Union was described as neutral during the prenegotiations stage.

political muscle is consistently employed to protect sectors which could be sacrificed as uneconomic, even though the resultant balance of gain and loss might leave businessmen or farmers or trade unionists, on the whole, much better off" (p. 66). This proposition is accompanied by a reference to Bauer, Pool, and Dexter, who state that it is difficult to get multipurpose business associations to take stands on controversial issues.[17] The same authors, however, also refer to the readiness of CIO leaders to adopt positions on trade policy which were opposed by some of its affiliated unions; they allude, too, to the multiplication of associations when controversial issues could not be avoided.[18] This is a far cry from suggesting that in the absence of quasi-unanimity amongst the membership of an organization, the leaders will formulate stands which defend a vested minority interest by sacrificing a prospective gain for the majority. Such an hypothesis is not only absent from the literature, but is also contrary to empirical evidence. For example, it was noted that in the Danish and Norwegian cases, the trade unions endorsed their countries' membership in the EEC in spite of strong opposition (in part economically motivated) within their ranks. A conceivable response to the mixed empirical evidence would be to suggest that organizations which cannot offer their members *selective incentives* to maintain their membership, must accordingly avoid controversial issues, whereas those organizations that provide essential services to a clientele (and are therefore surer of retaining their members) may then promote, in the field of public policy, causes to which most members are indifferent or to which some members are vocally opposed or both.[19] This proposition, however, is mentioned only as an illustration of how some subtlety could be given to Lieber's indefensibly broad supposition about interest organization behavior, when such an organization has to take a stand on an economic-political integration issue.

At present it is essential to note that the suppositions necessary to establish a connection between interest group theorizing and integration theory are neither suggested in the literature nor borne out by observation. If there is any such connection, its formulation will have to await the collection and analysis of a great deal of data on policy formation within interest organizations. In the present state of knowledge, any attempt to build links between these two subject-areas is an heroic one: doomed to failure, but nonetheless attractive for its bravery.

### Politicization and Integration

The third question which concerns us is whether politicization of the integration issue is likely to facilitate integration or to impede progress toward it.

In Lieber's usage, "politicization" is not necessarily equivalent to the generation of political controversy. Rather, an issue is said to be politicized when it is handled by a "political" ministry (such as the British Foreign Office) rather than by an economic one (e.g., the Board of Trade), when it receives general public attention, and—most importantly—when political parties become involved in its resolution. As issues become politicized, interest groups are supplanted by political parties as the leading representative institution. Lieber also suggests, revealing his affinities with Stanley Hoffman,[20] that one consequence of politicization is that "judgments may be rendered more often on the basis of an interpretation of broad national interest than on some kind of cost-benefit calculations important mainly to sectional [occupational] interests" (p. 57).

Lieber argues that in expanding the membership of a political-economic union (and presumably also in creating such a union in the first place) *politicization is favorable to integration*. The bulk of functionalist writing suggests the contrary, although Haas, chastened by de Gaulle's success in keeping supranationalism at bay during the middle 'sixties, has become more equivocal.[21]

On the basis of Lieber's criteria for politicization, the EEC issue was highly politicized in both Norway and Denmark. One may confidently say that had it been otherwise (though this is difficult to imagine) there would have been virtually no opposition to EEC membership in Denmark, while in Norway the decision would have swung in favor of membership. It is the Norwegian case which is the more interesting in this context.

I have argued (above) that in both countries there was a substantial measure of opposition to common-market entry on the basis of nationalistic sentiment, anticapitalistic ideological leanings, and neutralist foreign policy orientations; and that in Norway this source of opposition was complemented by strong hostility from farmers and fishermen who felt that the basis of their livelihood was being threatened. The latter source of opposition was expressed by occupational associations which in Norway have relatively close links

---

[17] Bauer et al., *American Business and Public Policy,* p. 339.

[18] *Ibid.,* p. 338.

[19] On the subject of selective incentives, see Mancur Olson, Jr., *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 51, 132ff.

[20] See below, section entitled "High Politics and Integration."

[21] "The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America," *Journal of Common Market Studies,* 5 (June 1967), 328.

—in some cases formal links—with political parties. It was natural that conflicts among interest groups would be quickly reflected in controversy between political parties. Indeed, the party controversy was strong enough to destroy a government.[22] In this situation, politicization did not and could not *override* interest group attitudes; on the contrary, interest group involvement contributed to the politicization of the EEC issue. In other words, politicization (specifically, public attention to the issue and party involvement in the decision) was in part *the product of* interest group involvement rather than an obliterator of their significance in the decision-making process.

I am inclined to think that such an observation does not merely point to a difference between decision-making processes in Norway and Britain, but that Lieber's view of politicization and its consequences needs revision. The root of the difficulty is the attempt to make a distinction between economic issues (where cost-benefit calculations are relevant) and political issues (where a broad national interest *may be* decisive but is not invariably so). The problem with Lieber's formulation is that public attention to an issue, and party involvement in its resolution, can arise as easily out of economic disputes which are cast into the political arena by interest group demands and counter-demands, as from ideological, foreign policy, or cultural issues. In fact, this point is illustrated by recent developments in the British case. (Lieber's account concludes with the events of 1967.) When the terms of the EEC treaty became known, Labour Party leader Harold Wilson opposed its ratification *on the grounds that the Conservatives had sacrificed interests which a Labour government would have safeguarded.* Public attention and party involvement were both magnified by this attack. In other words, Wilson increased the politicization of the issue by stressing the effects of the proposed treaty on diverse occupational groupings.

We must conclude that politicization, like interest group activity, is *inherently* neither favorable nor unfavorable to the progress of integration. If interest groups are hostile, politicization *may* overcome their hostility, though it may also reinforce and generalize opposition; if interest groups are favorable, politicization may defeat a move toward integration, though it may also generate public support where before there was only ignorance or indifference.

### High Politics and Integration

The final issue is whether the accession of new members to a supranational grouping requires a conscious, "high," political decision, overriding objections from interest groups. The latter part of the question has already been disposed of, but the character of the decisions involved—those of the applicant state(s) and those of the union or its members—deserves a little further attention.

Stanley Hoffman, with Lieber and others in train, argues that modern states have a political function which is distinct from that of promoting economic welfare, and that, (in the words of Michael J. Brenner), "[T]he political function has attitudes, compulsions, and ways of approaching public issues all its own that cannot be understood strictly in terms of group politics or patterns of economic activity."[23] "[W]hen the functions," writes Hoffman, "are concerned with the ineffable and intangible issues of *Grosspolitik*, when grandeur and prestige, rank and security, domination and dependence are at stake, we are fully within the realm of traditional interstate politics. There are no actors, no constituents, other than the governments."[24] Hoffman and his followers are most explicitly demarcated from the functionalist school in proclaiming the autonomy of the realm of "high" politics from the "low" politics of welfare, and in asserting that political integration occurs (if at all) by discrete steps each of which involves a *high* political decision. Thus at successive critical points in the integration process, economic considerations are subordinated to those of national prestige, rank, and security.

Was this so in Denmark and Norway? Once again, these cases provide us with ambivalent rather than solely confirmatory evidence. It could scarcely be argued that the government of either of the two countries was primarily seeking, through its EEC decision, to augment the nation's status or power in the international political system, but in both countries foreign policy and defense issues figured prominently in the referenda campaigns. This was especially true on the anti-membership side. Nationalist sentiment and neutralist inclinations were important features of the arguments of some (but by no means all) of the opponents of entry. Some of these, in their jubilation over Norway's "No," were not slow to attribute the government's defeat to its neglect of noneconomic aspects of the decision. It is nonetheless incontrovertible that in both countries the decision—both the initial governmental option, and the definitive choice made in the referenda—reflected a constellation of economic and other factors. This much said, any further argument is verbal rather than substantive. A conscious decision of high import was taken by the political authorities (and ultimately by the final political authority, the electorate); whether or not it was a "*conscious, high political decision*" the reader may well determine.

---

[22] See above, note 15.

[23] Brenner, *Technocratic Politics and the Functionalist Theory of European Integration*, p. 14. The concept that there exists a distinctly political function, and a "high" politics concerned with the exercise of that function, is adumbrated by Hoffman in various articles, including, "Discord in Community: The North Atlantic Area as a Partial International System," *International Organization*, 17, (Summer 1963), 521–549; "The European Process at Altantic Crosspurposes," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 3 (February 1965), 85–101; and "Obstinate or Obsolete, The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe," *Daedalus*, 95 (Summer 1966), 862–915.

[24] Hoffman, "Discord in Community," p. 531.

### Integration Theory: A Comment

The following points have emerged so far: (a) There is conflicting evidence regarding the applicability of functionalist theories of political integration to the geographical expansion of an existing union; (b) the attempt to link theories of interest group activity and theories of political integration is based on a premature if not unwise generalization about decision-making processes within interest organizations; (c) politicization (as Lieber defines it) is inherently neither favorable nor unfavorable to integration; and (d) in discussing political integration, the distinction between "high" politics (Hoffman) and welfare considerations is best abandoned, provided the observer remembers that there are more dimensions to critical decisions than the economic.

When the evidence before us so discourages generalization about the processes of regional integration, it is appropriate to conclude with some reflections on the status of political integration theory.

It must be acknowledged that at present we have no reliable or useful theory. We cannot argue, as Lieber (with some exaggeration) says the functionalists have done, that there exists a "benign invisible hand [which] will operate to bring about supranational integration in a nonideological, depoliticized economic setting" (p. 58); nor can we treat integration theory as a special case of interest group theory, or an application of it. And the perspective of Hoffman and his followers, who regard decisions on integration as partaking of a distinctive and higher order of "*the political*," casts a mystical air over what should be a commonplace observation, namely, that important political decisions (whether in domestic or foreign policy) often involve more factors than the economic.

Nevertheless I think we can achieve greater clarity in our thinking about processes of political integration. Any headway made must follow from a distinction employed by Lieber and also (more fuzzily) by functionalists between (a) the establishment or geographical extension of a supranational political community, and (b) the intensification of integration within an existing grouping.

In the case of the establishment or geographical extension of a supranational political community, the relevant decisions are those of national governments. There seem to be no special grounds for treating decisions involving supranational integration any differently from other important decisions: questions of ideology, economic advantage, cultural or psychological make-up, and defense are likely to be involved (though in differing degrees according to the case); external pressures will have to be taken into account; cleavages may be those of class, occupation, region, religious or ethnic group; and political parties as well as interest groups will presumably strike attitudes appropriate to the demands of their clientele, their own organizational needs, or the inclinations and aspirations of their leaders. In short, the range of relevant considerations is comprehensive. A commitment must be made by the political authorities, and the relevant literature is that dealing with governmental decision making by individual countries or grouping of countries. There seem to be no prospects for the development of a special theory of political integration applicable to the creation, or extension, of a supranational grouping of states.

Once that step has been taken, however, I believe it is worthwhile to think in terms of a theory of political integration. Where a supranational grouping has been formed, however weak its central institutions, one may usefully conceive of a general political system (interactions defined as political) operating within a political community which encompasses a grouping of states. What is characteristic of such a political system, and distinguishes it from simpler ones, is the *interaction of two (or more) levels of political authorities.* An account of the political process then involves not only the relationship between those constitutionally endowed with political authority and role-occupants in other political institutions (parties, pressure groups, etc.) but *also* the interaction between (a) the general political authority and (b) other political authorities, each of which operates over a geographical section of the larger political community. Such a description covers the political process not only within a grouping of states which have formed some supranational institutions, *but within federal states.* Intensification or dilution of political integration is the product of a multitude of decisions taken by both levels of political authorities independently as well as jointly.

It has been the error of the functionalists, in their more optimistic moments, to suppose that integration once embarked upon would grow from strength to strength. When Haas wrote *The Uniting of Europe* in 1958 he seems to have regarded the progress of European political integration as inexorable.[25] What he neglected was not only that a de Gaulle could thrust a stick in the spokes of the European bicycle, but that the logic of sector integration is inherently no more powerful a centralizing force than a decentralizing one. It is true, as Haas has argued, that once certain powers are conceded to a central political authority, their effective exercise will require the grant of additional and probably unforeseen powers; but it is equally true that as long as the national states (or states within a federation) retain constitutional competence in certain policy areas, the successful pursuit of their policy objectives will require that they retain competence in related areas. In short, there is no logical and conflict-free division of powers but always a zone where effective policy-making involves the coordination of both levels of authorities. The result is inevitably a series of contests of will or strength between governments ("high" political wrangles, if you like) involving interest groups, political parties, and bureaucracies.

It is the task of a theory of political integration to provide an account of how the interactions within this complex network of institutional forces affect the decision-making process in such "composite" political systems, and how integrative—or disintegrative—consequences flow from successive triumphs and defeats of the central authorities.

---

[25] Haas seems to have changed his mind; see his article entitled "International Integration: Regional Integration," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* 7, 522–528.

# *Leviathan* Writ Small: Thomas Hobbes on the Family*

RICHARD ALLEN CHAPMAN
*University of Montana*

Recent scholarship on seventeenth century English political thought has begun to recognize the "patriarchal" context in which it occurred. In his introduction to the modern edition of Filmer's political writings, Peter Laslett observed that

> patriarchalism . . . was a condition of all political thinking [in the seventeenth century]; a limitation on the ideas which might come into any thinker's head, as much as a source of specific social conceptions . . . all writers whatever their attitude to this problem, shared this preoccupation with the family as the fundamental unit of social relationships.[1]

Locke was bound to deal with the family because of its prominence in the political debate of his day,[2] particularly in Filmer's argument, and Filmer himself no more than reflected patriarchal institutions.[3] Filmer's main argument was to justify absolute monarchical authority by tracing its historical origins to the family, and the family figured for others, too, "both as the model of political society and also as its actual, if remote, origin."[4]

The rediscovery of the family as an important ingredient in seventeenth century English political thought is significant for both historical and theoretical understanding, but it is doubtful that the rather loosely used term "patriarchal" reinforces that understanding. The case of Hobbes is instructive. For Laslett,

> Hobbes could do nothing with the patriarchal attitude. To him patriarchal societies were those 'the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust,' and that was all. He was unwilling to distinguish the authority of a father from the naked exercise of force.[5]

At the other extreme, Professor Hinton argues that Hobbes provided the "ablest exposition" of the "normal tradition of patriarchalism," a tradition of which Bodin was the archetype.[6] Bodin's family was characterized by the absolute mastery of the father; wives, children and servants obeyed "more like slaves than free human beings."[7] Hinton goes on to say that Hobbes took such patriarchalism "for granted" and inserted the act of consent as a means of appealing to English voluntarism and to the prejudices of fathers.[8] Between these extremes, one reads that Hobbes's patriarchalism is "ironic,"[9] or that it is the product of the society in which he lived;[10] both imply that Hobbes was not fully conscious of what he was doing with the family. One commentator finds himself puzzled at Hobbes's attempt to base paternal authority on the child's consent;[11] another sees the same attempt as "anxiety to forestall at their inception, contemporary paternalistic theories of sovereign authority,"[12] while a third concludes from this that Hobbes "avoided thoroughgoing patriarchalism."[13] And the older commentary by Strauss holds that the "patriarchal theory" used in particular by Maine to refute Hobbes "is not only no refutation of Hobbes's theory, but is itself defended by Hobbes."[14]

The view that Hobbes was a patriarchalist seems plausible, at least with respect to the importance of fathers and their power over family members. He does say, for example, that dominion originated in the family, and his model for the family was the *patria potestas* of republican

---

* I wish to thank David C. Rapoport and Howard E. Schwartz for their comments on earlier drafts. Part of the research was funded by the University of Montana Foundation.,

[1] Peter Laslett, *Patriarcha and Other Political Works of Sir Robert Filmer* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 26.

[2] R. W. K. Hinton, "Husbands, Fathers and Conquerors II," *Political Studies* 16 (February 1968), 59–61.

[3] Laslett, p. 27.

[4] R. W. K. Hinton, "Husbands, Fathers, and Conquerors I," *Political Studies* 15 (October 1967), 292; Gordon Schochet, "Thomas Hobbes on the Family and the State of Nature," *Political Science Quarterly*, 82 (September 1967), 429; W. H. Greenleaf, "Filmer's Patriarchal History," *The Historical Journal*, 9 (1966), 159.

[5] Peter Laslett, "Introduction" to John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 70.

[6] Hinton I, p. 300.

[7] Hinton I, p. 293.

[8] Hinton II, p. 57.

[9] Quentin Skinner, "Hobbes on Sovereignty: An Unknown Discussion," *Political Studies* 13 (June 1965), 217.

[10] Keith Thomas, "The Social Origins of Hobbes's Political Thought," in *Hobbes Studies*, ed. K. C. Brown (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), pp. 188–189.

[11] F. C. Hood, *The Divine Politics of Thomas Hobbes: An Interpretation of Leviathan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 174.

[12] Howard Warrender, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of Obligation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 124.

[13] Schochet, "Thomas Hobbes on the Family," p. 444; also, Richard Peters, *Hobbes* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1956), p. 198.

[14] Leo Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis*, trans. Elsa M. Sinclair (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1952), p. 103.

Rome, as it was explicitly for Bodin and—through him—for Filmer. Fathers in Hobbes's state of nature had absolute power and could put their own children to death. Although he mentions the legendary Amazons more than once, most of Hobbes's examples from the distant past involve fathers. Attacks on "other mens [sic] persons, wives, children, and cattell" are regarded as just human nature—and masculine.[15] Further, Hobbes seems to appeal quite openly to a patriarchal tradition when he says that children "are to be taught, that originally the Father of every man was also his Soveraign Lord, . . . " and that fathers of families *instituted* commonwealths.[16] At the end of Chapter 30 of *Leviathan* Hobbes offers a patriarchal shortcut to sovereign (i.e., monarchical) popularity with the following advice: "To have a known Right to Soveraign Power, is so popular a quality, as he that has it needs no more, for his own part, to turn the hearts of his Subjects to him, but that they see him able absolutely to govern his own Family: . . . "[17] And, in perhaps the most striking passage of all, Hobbes appears to rest *Leviathan* itself on the patriarchal experience:

> For I ground the Civill Right of Soveraigns, and both the Duty and Liberty of Subjects, upon the known naturall Inclinations of Mankind, and upon the Articles of the Law of Nature; of which no man, that pretends but reason enough to govern his private family, ought to be ignorant.[18]

These appeals to patriarchal attitudes, however, are ambiguous. The experience of governing a family is enough to afford men the reason necessary to understand human nature and the laws of nature—but what kind of reason is "enough" to govern a family? Does one govern a family according to standards implicit in a patriarchal, traditional order, and if so, what do they have to do with the sort of "reason" Hobbes has in mind? Or, does Hobbes refer to the father who governs his family according to the principles of Hobbesian political science? If a father understands the "mutuall Relation between Protection and Obedience,"[19] then clearly he can understand *Leviathan;* it is not clear, however, that he does so as one immersed in patriarchal attitudes. The point of the "patriarchal shortcut" is not so much that subjects should see the monarch govern absolutely; rather, they should see him govern without favoritism to family-members. The price of favoritism might be public indignation and possibly rebellion—a few pages earlier, Hobbes reminds the sovereign that Tarquin was driven from Rome for the "insolence" of one of his sons, and the monarchy itself dissolved as a result.[20] Finally, children may be taught anything about historical fathers useful to public order; but it does not follow from any of this that Hobbes was a patriarchalist, i.e., one who believed in a traditional system of authority in which the unlimited powers of the father are based on the fact of paternity. To the contrary, I shall argue that Hobbes's view of the family subverts patriarchal attitudes.

In general, Hobbes's comments on the family do not attract much serious attention. Although the twentieth chapter of *Leviathan* bases the rights of "Paternall Dominion" on the child's consent, some scholars are more impressed with the idea expressed in the better-known thirteenth chapter that small families in America are held together by natural lust.[21] There are scattered comments throughout Hobbes's works about the family—its size in commonwealth, its functions, structure, its activities in the state of nature, in ancient Germany, in early Rome, in scripture, and in "savage" America. But early readers of *De Cive* missed the significance of Hobbes's remarks in that work, for he had to add several notes explaining that the family of course still existed in the state of nature,[22] and many critics from Hobbes's day to this have persisted in overlooking those notes and the brief though formal considerations of the family.[23]

A close analysis of all that Hobbes says about the family, however, shows a most unusual conception, both in the history of political thought and in seventeenth century England: Hobbes saw the family as a diminutive state, as *Leviathan* writ small. He uses the family constantly as an analogy for the state, as justification, as historical example, as a heuristic device to explain political structures and functions, and as exhortation; further, the strength of the analogy makes it easy for Hobbes to put the family in commonwealth into the business of primary education. Note the order of things, for it is not that the state is an extension of the family; it was Filmer, not Hobbes, who saw the state as the family writ large. Hobbes almost never finds the family in the state; the family is the model only in questions of intestate succession. In all other cases the state is the model for the family. Kinship, love, affection, civil marriage, divorce, bastardy, have little to do with the state and consequently hardly exist in Hobbes's conception of the family. For all of the fact that Hobbes's principal discussions of the family are found in the context of the acquisition of sovereign power by *natural* means, little in the family as Hobbes describes it seems natural, at least in the biological or psychological sense.[24] Even the one natural element Hobbes discusses—force—ends up being rationalized by consent. Indeed, the point about Hobbes's unique view of the family is that he saw it strictly in rational terms, as an artificial institution rather than a natural one. His elaboration of this view seems systematic enough to suggest that he was deliberately using the family in various ways to reinforce his political theory and, therefore, to reinforce the first state built on principles sound enough to make it "everlasting."[25] To list the main points of Hobbes's political theory is to elicit the conclusions to which one is led by his view of the family: all government rests on consent, or—to put it another way—there is a necessary relationship between protection and obedience; political authority is indivisible, it is absolute, and it is justified by necessity and performance. One wonders if there is anything natural about the family at all, so thoroughly rational was Hobbes.

---

[15] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme, & Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civill* [1651], with an Essay by W. G. Pogson Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1909), Ch. 13, p. 96.

[16] *Leviathan* 30, p. 263.

[17] *Leviathan* 30, p. 273.

[18] *Leviathan,* Review and Conclusion, p. 554.

[19] *Leviathan,* Review and Conclusion, p. 556.

[20] *Leviathan* 30, p. 269.

[21] *Leviathan* 13, p. 97. See Laslett's introduction to Locke, *Two Treatises,* p. 70, and Hood, *Divine Politics,* p. 81.

[22] Thomas Hobbes, *De Cive or The Citizen* [1651], ed. Sterling Lamprecht (New York: Appleton, 1949), pp. 21n–22n, 28n, 80n. Hobbes apparently added these notes in 1642 after friends reacted to a private printing of the work in Latin; see p. 17. I follow Lamprecht in referring to the Latin title, though Hobbes's English title in his 1651 translation is *Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society.*

[23] For Hobbes's contemporary critics, see Schochet, pp. 428–429.

### The Family in the State of Nature

Gordon Schochet suggests that the dominant interpretations of Hobbes's state of nature as merely a "logical and reductionist device" need revision in view of the fact that Hobbes saw families in conflict, rather than unaffiliated individuals. He suggests that Hobbes ascribed a real, historical dimension to the state of nature, and that the family not the individual is the basic social unit.[26] Both revisions are, I think, correct, but it must be observed that the family has much more significance for Hobbes as the basic social unit in commonwealth where it performs a vital service in political education, than in the state of nature, where conflict is the problem, rather than numbers. The central point Hobbes makes in his comments on the "historical" family is that political authority is the most effective means of providing protection and security, regardless of the size of the group involved; it is true whether one talks about a state or a family in the state of nature. The problem with the family in matters of security is not that it is a family, but that it is small: "And as for very little Common-wealths, . . . there is no humane wisdom can uphold them, longer than the Jealousy lasteth of their potent Neighbours."[27] The institution of large commonwealth does not solve the security problem, it merely institutionalizes it for some families, one might say, against other families. At least each family no longer need face every other family, sovereignty against sovereignty. Hobbes's description of the earliest family reads like the prelude to a problem in international relations, which in effect, it is.

In his *Dialogue of the Common Laws*, Hobbes argues that dominion, government and law are older than history:

> . . . or any other writing, and that the beginning of all dominion amongst men was in families. In which, first, the father of the family by the law of nature was absolute lord of his wife and children: secondly, made what laws amongst them he pleased: thirdly, was judge of all their controversies: fourthly, was not obliged by any law of man to follow any counsel but his own: fifthly, what land soever the lord sat down upon and made use of for his own and his family's benefit, was his propriety by the law of first possession, in case it was void of inhabitants before, or by the law of war, in case they conquered it. In this conquest what enemies they took and saved, were their servants. . . . And all this is consonant not only to the law of nature, but also to the practice of mankind set forth in history, sacred and profane.[28]

The family sovereign[29] has absolute power over members, makes laws for them and judges their disputes; he is independent of all men, and is aggressive with respect to land whether vacant or occupied. The lawyer in the *Dialogue* asks the philosopher if it is lawful for a family sovereign to make war on another "like sovereign lord, and dispossess him of his lands?" The philosopher replies that it is lawful, if one's intentions are (in effect) pre-emptive, preventative, or defensive. "Necessity and security are the principal justifications before God, of beginning war,"[30] and it appeared to Hobbes that the need for security was always great. In *Leviathan* he observes that originally Germany "as all other countries" amounted to nothing more than "an infinite number of little Lords, or Masters of Families, . . . " Their main preoccupation seems to have been with increasing their strength, for they "continually had wars one with another; . . . "[31] In the "historic" state of nature, families lived by trying to weaken or subdue their neighbors; they attempted to "enlarge their Dominions, upon all pretences of danger, and fear of Invasion, . . . "[32] And, prior to commonwealth, "the militia, was . . . reckoned in the number of the gaining arts, under the notion of booting [sic] or taking prey" by families.[33] Hobbes claims men abstained from cruelty, "leaving to men their lives, and instruments of husbandry,"[34] nevertheless "rapine . . . was warranted in the law of nature."[35]

---

[24] On the interesting idea that the family as "value, a theme of expression, an occasion of emotion" is recent, and a product of liberal individualism, rather than a casualty, see Phillipe Ariès, *Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life,* trans. Robert Baldick (New York: Vintage, 1962), pp. 9–11, 365–407.

[25] *Leviathan* 30, p. 260.

[26] Schochet, pp. 428, 442–445. Cf. Harvey Mansfield Jr., "Hobbes and the Science of Indirect Government," *American Political Science Review* 65 (March, 1971), 103n; David P. Gauthier, *The Logic of Leviathan: The Moral and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 118–119. Evidence that "Everyman" is the family sovereign and that the family is therefore the basic social unit may be found in *Leviathan* 13, pp. 96–97; 22, p. 180; 25, pp. 197–198; 30, pp. 263, 273; 42, p. 438; 43, p. 457; *De Cive* x, p. 115.

[27] *Leviathan* 25, p. 202.

[28] Thomas Hobbes, *A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England* [1666], in *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes,* ed. William Molesworth, VI (London: John Bohn, 1839–1845), 147. *The English Works* will be cited as *E. W.*

[29] I use the term "family sovereign" to mean the head of the family; "father" is misleading, since the mother may govern as well. *Leviathan* 20, p. 154.

The logic of the situation, as it emerges from these comments, suggests that for Hobbes *all* pre-commonwealth families will be concerned with security all the time, either trying to defend themselves or trying to expand. The family can grow by natural means (procreation or conquest), or by allowing outsiders with certain skills to become members of the family: "such men as wanting possessions of lands, but furnished with arts necessary for man's life,. came to dwell in the family for protection, became their subjects, and submitted themselves to the laws of the family."[36] Hobbes implies in *Leviathan* that growth by conquest is best; the growth of a small family must be both rapid and numerically great enough clearly to preclude an attack by another family, for "in small numbers, small additions on the one side or the other, make the advantage of strength so great, as is sufficient to carry the Victory; and therefore gives encouragement to an Invasion."[37]

Hobbes finds that the great monarchies developed out of small families "by war, wherein the victor not only enlarged his territory, but also the number and riches of his subjects." The ancient Egyptian, Assyrian, Persian and Macedonian monarchies, as well as the modern kingdoms of England, France and Spain—all the "greatest kingdoms in the world"—are his examples of commonwealth by acquisition. The Venetian aristocracy, on the other hand, was created by "a voluntary conjunction of many lords of families."[38] In other words, the need to survive requires larger defense organizations and families must grow in size. Thus, almost all commonwealths originated in conquests of families. Though it is true that " . . . there is scarce a Commonwealth in the world, whose beginnings can in conscience be justified,"[39] survival is a matter of necessity, not conscience. Whether the state of nature is populated by states, individuals, or families, the dynamic is the same. Fathers who lose or fathers who institute commonwealth by "voluntary conjunction" end up in the same position, having "resigned that absolute Power" they once had because they can no longer protect themselves and their families. Hobbes's view of the family in the "historical" state of nature, then, shows that political authority is justified by necessity, and its locus is contingent upon performance.

Beyond this, Hobbes does not go. For example, he does not try to make a case for monarchy from the historical family. The argument that "paternal government . . . was instituted in the beginning from the creation,"[40] Hobbes rejects as inadequately based on "examples and testimonies," not on "solid reason."[41] History is an example, but it proves nothing. He rebuffs Bishop Bramhall because "he saw there was paternal government in Adam; which he might do easily, as being no deep consideration."[42] But in the hands of Hobbes, rather than Bramhall (or Filmer), scripture, though not solid reason either, proved more than history. The Kingdom of God is real and not metaphorical, says Hobbes, because of covenant and not by the right of God's power.[43] The first covenant with God was Abraham's; he alone was sovereign of his family, and only the sovereign can take note of the word of God. Abraham's whole family was part of the kingdom of God, not by its own covenant with God, but because Abraham the father and husband had covenanted with God. The kingdom was maintained through inheritance by Isaac, then Jacob, but ended with the capture of the Israelites in Egypt. It was renewed by Moses, who (not being descended from Abraham) governed only by opinion, until the people consented at Mount Sinai, promising obedience by saying to Moses, "speak thou with us, and we will hear, but let not God speak with us, lest we die."[44] Hobbes would have it that this is sovereignty by institution, and it follows his characteristic formula: protect us and we will obey. The point of Hobbes's discussion about the kingdom of God is to show that next to the civil sovereign, priests have no power; but a good part of his argument rests on a demonstration that binding relationships are established by covenants. And since Abraham could by right punish those whose private visions were interposed against his law, "it is lawfull now for the Soveraign to punish any man that shall oppose his Private Spirit against the Laws: For hee hath the same place in the Commonwealth, that Abraham had in his own Family."[45] Abraham, the paradigmatic patriarch was also the paradigmatic civil sovereign—and his lawful power was based on consent.

---

[30] *Dialogue, E. W.* VI, p. 148.

[31] *Leviathan* 10, p. 72.

[32] *Leviathan* 17, p. 129.

[33] *De Cive* xiii, 14, p. 150.

[34] *Leviathan* 17, p. 129.

[35] Thomas Hobbes, *De Corpore Politico: or The Elements of Law* [1640], I, 6, 2, *E. W.* IV, p. 118.

[36] *Dialogue, E. W.* VI, 147. On the historical context of these passages, see J. G. A. Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and The Feudal Law* (New York: Norton, 1967), pp. 162–170.

[37] *Leviathan* 17, p. 129.

[38] *Dialogue, E. W.* VI, pp. 150–151.

[39] *Leviathan*, Review and Conclusion, p. 551.

[40] *De Corpore Politico* II, 5, 3, *E. W.* IV, p. 166.

[41] *De Cive* x, 3, p. 116.

[42] *Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance, E. W.*, V, p. 180.

[43] *Leviathan* 35, p. 319.

## Hobbes's Political Conception of the Family

**Definition of the Family.** The Hobbesian family consists of all persons who are under the jurisdiction of the family sovereign. It is a "civil person" by virtue of jurisdiction, not by virtue of marriage or biological parenthood. In his definitions of the family, Hobbes is concerned with relationships between one of the parents and the children and the servants. Jurisdiction is exercised by the family sovereign over persons who are not his (or her) equals in wit or strength. A man and a woman are equals, according to Hobbes's view, and it is a matter of indifference to him which of them rules. In general he sees that fathers have erected commonwealths, and thinks men more apt, having "greater parts of wisdom and courage . . . than women . . . "[46] Hobbes does talk about matrimonial relationships, but he is never concerned with saying "a man and a woman united are a family." His definition? A family "consist[s] of a man and his children; or of a man and his servants; or of a man, and his children, and servants together . . . "[47] By extension, the family can include the children's children and the servants' children.[48]

Jurisdiction is not established by force, nor is it the consequence of responding to biological urges. Jurisdiction is a political relationship, and it is the bond between any two people or more, whether one calls them family or state. Hobbes's more active term to describe that relationship is "dominion." Dominion is produced by a covenant between two persons, obedience being exchanged for protection; by virtue of the covenant "there is presently constituted a little body politic, which consisteth of two persons, the one sovereign, which is called the *master*, or lord; the other subject, which is called the *servant*."[49] According to Hobbes's definition, a master–servant relationship is a family, and as the master in a family is sovereign, so is the father. He is a "civil person by virtue of his paternal jurisdiction,"[50] but how this comes to be is less obvious for the father than for the master.

In the state of nature the original right of dominion over the child is with the mother, who may exercise the right-giving option of preservation of life or not, as she chooses.[51] Since "among men no less than other creatures, the birth follows the belly,"[52] the title "father" is meaningless to Hobbes until his jurisdiction or dominion is established. But in the state of nature, where there are no civil marriages, there is no theoretical reason why a "free" woman should confine herself to one man; consequently, it is impossible for any woman to know who the father of her child is.[53] The mother can "name" as father any male who has had access, or even one who has not, if he wishes to care for the child. Hobbes's point is that the title of "father" in the state of nature rightly belongs to whoever preserves the child. If no man is willing to exercise dominion over the child, then the mother is the "lord" of the child. In all cases what matters is the capacity to preserve and protect, and the exercise of that capacity. The maintenance of life rather than its creation, is crucial. Hobbes's discussions therefore center on dominion rather than on parenthood as such; on the power to preserve rather than to generate.

### Consent

The context of Hobbes's discussions of the family (including master–servant relationships) is that of dominion or commonwealth which is acquired by natural force. Strictly speaking, dominion over children and servants is a function of force or physical superiority. That infants are physically inferior to their parents is obvious, but since mature men and women are by nature equal, it is less obvious how one can apply continuous force over an equal such that Hobbes can speak of dominion, rather than continual war. But is war continual? The master–servant relationship is used by Hobbes to illustrate the acquisition of dominion by conquest; the servant is presented originally as a captive and is no different from a slave. The power a man may exercise over slaves, servants, and children is absolute, in the state of nature, but servants and children are obliged by covenants to obey, while slaves are under no obligation, and are not members of the family. The main question presented by these facts, as by Hobbes's political theory itself, is: What is the necessary connection between protection and obedience? The simple answer of course is that without obedience, there can be no protection. But the demonstration of the necessity of this relationship is more complex and may be shown by considering the relationship between consent and dominion over children, servants and slaves.

---

[44] *Leviathan* 40, p. 366 (emphasis omitted); 20, p. 157; 26, p. 221; 35, p. 319; Review and Conclusion, p. 551.

[45] Abraham's "right" for Hobbes comes from his position: he was "Father, and Lord, and Civill Soveraign," and not just the father. *Leviathan* 40, pp. 364–365.

[46] *De Corpore Politico* II, 4, 14, *E. W.* IV, p. 160; *Leviathan* 20, p. 154.

[47] *Leviathan* 20, p. 157.

[48] *De Corpore Politico* II, 4, 4, *E. W.* IV, p. 156.

[49] *De Corpore Politico* II, 3, 2, *E. W.* IV, pp. 149–150.

[50] *De Cive* ix, 10, p. 110.

[51] *De Corpore Politico* II, 4, 3, *E. W.* IV, p. 155.

[52] *De Cive* ix, 3, p. 107.

[53] *Leviathan* 20, p. 154. The father is known if—in the state of nature—she has covenanted with a man for "copulation," "society of bed" or for "society of all things." *De Corpore Politico* II, 4, 4–7, *E. W.* IV, pp. 156–157.

Again, dominion is a function of force or physical superiority. But force or physical superiority is an insufficient basis for lasting relationships. It is insufficient among adults because, as Hobbes puts it, "the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others . . . "[54] It is insufficient between an adult and a child because the latter "might both get strength by his years, and at once become an enemy."[55] In the first instance the captive may be prevented from harming the captor by being put in chains or other physical bonds, and in the second, a child may be abandoned. Should the slave break his bonds, however, he may kill his captor with perfect right, and should an exposed child be found and preserved by someone else, he will still be an enemy to his parent. In no case is a slave or an exposed infant of much benefit to the master or parent. Thus, dominion as a function of force, obviously is not very relevant to Hobbes's purposes. What is important is the *right* of dominion.

A right of dominion is made "effectual" (Hobbes's word) by "a covenant from him that is overcome, 'not to resist him that overcometh."[56] Thus Hobbes shows how a right to dominion over a slave comes into being when the slave becomes a servant by exchanging his "natural bonds" for "verbal bonds" (a covenant), and in *Leviathan* he says the parent's right of dominion over the child is derived "from the Childs Consent, either expresse, or by other sufficient arguments declared."[57] It may be observed that in all three political works Hobbes rejects the notion that paternal dominion is based on generation, but that only in the two early works does he base the right of dominion on preservation alone. In *Leviathan* Hobbes's discussion of the matter is much shorter than before, but it is an improvement in that the right of dominion stems not from preservation alone but from consent. It is no longer necessary to discuss master-servant dominion in one chapter and paternal dominion in another, as he does in the *Corpore Politico* and in *De Cive*, for the discrepancy between the two "titles" to dominion is resolved.

The problem in *De Corpore Politico* and in *De Cive* was that preservation of the child's life by a parent sufficed to give the parent a right of dominion; but preservation of life by a master (or conqueror) was not the distinguishing characteristic between a slave and a servant. Both were "preserved," but the master had a right to dominion over the servant, while his dominion over the slave was merely physical. The servant was under an obligation to obey the master, but was physically at liberty; the slave had no obligations to his enslaver but he had no freedom of movement, either. A slave became a servant by covenant; the master trusted the slave with physical liberty (freedom of movement) in exchange for the promise of obedience. In consideration of an immediate benefit conferred (release from physical bonds), the slave becomes a servant by agreeing "either in expresse words, or by other sufficient signes of the Will, that so long as his life, and the liberty of his body is allowed him, the Victor shall have the use thereof, at his pleasure."[58] In all three discussions of master–servant dominion, Hobbes is very clear about the connection between trust and covenant (or contract); where there is no trust of the servant by the master, there can be no covenant between them. Note that Hobbes is not talking about "covenants of mutual trust," which are invalid in the state of nature because of "equal strength"; the covenant between a servant and the master is "the promise of him that is trusted"[59] by the master in consideration of "the Liberty" of the servant's body. The right of dominion is based on the consent of the servant, who is then bound to obey as long as he is protected and at liberty, i.e., physically unbound.

In the first two works, Hobbes mentions that the parent is to presume he "hath received a promise of obedience . . . "[60] but the legitimacy of paternal dominion is not explicitly a function of consent, while in *Leviathan*, it is. To enunciate this is not to change its character as a fiction; Hobbes of course knows children "had never power to make any covenant . . . "[61] It is perfectly reasonable for Hobbes to base paternal dominion on the child's consent in *Leviathan*, however, because in *Leviathan* he says for the first time that the family must play an essential role in the commonwealth; the family is responsible for the primary civic education of children. By direction of the sovereign, the connection between protection and obedience is to be made quite clear:

---

[54] *Leviathan* 13, p. 94.

[55] *De Cive* ix, 3, p. 106.

[56] *De Corpore Politico* II, 3, 2, *E. W.* IV, p. 149.

[57] *Leviathan* 20, p. 153.

[58] *Leviathan* 20, p. 155.

[59] *De Corpore Politico* I, 2, 9, *E. W.* IV, p. 90.

[60] *De Corpore Politico* II, 4, 3, *E. W.* IV, p. 156; *De Cive* ix, 3, p. 106.

> And because the first instruction of Children, dependeth on the care of their Parents; it is necessary that they should be obedient to them, whilest they are under their tuition; and not onely so, but that also afterwards (as gratitude requireth,) they acknowledge the benefit of their education, by externall signes of honour. To which end *they are to be taught*, that originally the Father of every man was also his Soveraign Lord, with power over him of life and death; and that the Fathers of families, when by instituting a Common-wealth, they resigned that absolute Power, yet it was never intended they should lose the honour due unto them for their education.[62]

Dominion is legitimized by a covenant given in exchange for benefits received. The slave becomes a servant by promising to obey, in exchange for the master's trust in him (manifest by releasing the slave from his physical bonds). The duty of the servant is obedience, and his right is to be preserved. The duty of the master is the preservation of the servant, and his right is in the service of the servant. The child is preserved by the parent on the assumption the child will be of future benefit to the parent. The parental presupposition of the child's consent has the effect of legitimizing the parental right of dominion, although in fact his right is legitimized when the child is of sufficient age to consent.

Hobbes is quite aware of the gap between his premise that men are not "born fit for society" and the fact that infants are utterly helpless, "for infants have need of others to help them to live." He does not wish to deny the physiological need to associate with others, but the point is that society ("civil society") is not simply *any* associating or coming together of men. Civil society is a certain kind of association which requires "bonds, to the making whereof, faith and compacts are necessary." Obviously the kind of needs children have least of all involve faith and compacts, or things civil and political, and therefore by definition, "all men, because they are born in infancy, are born unapt for society."[63] This does not mean that Hobbes looks upon infants as suddenly "sprung out of the earth"[64] into a state of nature. He is quite clear about this: "a son cannot be understood to be at any time in the state of nature, as being under the *power* and *command* of them to whom he owes his protection as soon as ever he is born, . . . "[65] The dominion of the parent is in fact based on natural force, but any parent who claimed natural force as the basis of his dominion could be confronted with a grown child who was his enemy. To benefit from a child without fearing his mature strength, the parental assumption of consent means the child is taught that his consent is the basis of paternal right, and therefore that consent is the basis of all dominion.

### Power

It is of course characteristic of Hobbes that consent does not limit the power of the father—or mother, if she is the family sovereign. In the state of nature, the powers of the family sovereign are absolute, from the birth of the child or the covenant of the servant until their release from the jurisdiction of the family. A "free" mother in the state of nature can elect to raise her child, or she may "adventure him to fortune."[66] At all times (prior to the institution of commonwealth), children and servants are in the absolute power of the family-sovereign, who may

> alienate them, that is, assign his or her dominion, by selling, or giving them, in adoption or servitude to others; or may pawn them for hostages, kill them for rebellion, or sacrifice them for peace, by the law of nature, when he or she, in his or her conscience, think it to be necessary.[67]

Although Hobbes cites the law of nature in part of this passage, his source for this conception of the family sovereign's power is the early Roman family—an institution whose main feature was the father's absolute power over all members of the family. The early Roman family, known generically as the *patria potestas*, like the Hobbesian family, is defined in terms of jurisdiction (as a function of power). Strictly speaking, the Roman *familia* was a group consisting of a father (*paterfamilias*), his children (natural or adoptive), the wife, and slaves (under certain circumstances the wife was not a member of the family),[68] plus all male descendants born in lawful wedlock to his children.[69] Its principal characteristic was the supremacy of the father over all members of the family. By the time of the Twelve Tables (B.C. 449), his power was differentiated as to the persons over whom it was exercised; over the wife it was known as "*manus*," over children it was "*patria potestas*," and over slaves, "*dominica potestas*."[70] The structure of the Roman family was purely agnatic; the basis of membership in the family was not kinship *per se*, but the *potestas* of the father.[71] The word for father (*pater*) connoted authority and protection, rather than generation.[72] The *paterfamilias* alone had rights in private law,[73] and he alone had *locus standi* in the tribunals of the state.[74] In short, the father, or *paterfamilias*, was the family; even a male infant, newly born, outside a *potestas*, was himself a *paterfamilias*.[75]

---

[61] *Leviathan* 26, p. 208.

[62] *Leviathan* 30, p. 263. Emphasis added.

[63] *De Cive* i, 1, p. 21n–22n.

[64] *De Cive* viii, 1, p. 100.

[65] *De Cive* i, 10, pp. 27n–28n. Emphasis added.

[66] *De Cive* ix, 2, p. 106.

[67] *De Corpore Politico* II, 4, 8, *E. W.* IV, p. 157.

[68] W. W. Buckland, *A Textbook of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921), p. 102.

[69] H. F. Jolowicz, *Roman Foundations of Modern Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 181.

The Hobbesian family does not include slaves, as did the Roman, but it does include servants. Recognizing that the Romans did not distinguish between servants and slaves (they "comprehended all under the name of '*servus*' "),[76] Hobbes makes a distinction which is central to his use of the family, and draws part of it from civil law. As the Romans included slaves in the family by "a supposed agreement between the victor and the vanquished, in which the first stipulated for the perpetual services of his foe, and the other gained in consideration the life which he had legitimately forfeited,"[77] so did Hobbes include the servant. The importance of jurisdiction in determining the family suggests that Hobbes drew on the *patria potestas* because jurisdiction meant absolute power—something as necessary in his conception of the family as in his conception of the state. The fact that Hobbes distinguished between the slave and the servant, as the Roman had not, does not suggest that Hobbes turned to another source, but that he had another purpose, namely to show that absolute power, even in the family, must be understood to rest on consent.

A Roman marriage was based solely on the consent of the parties;[78] but the consent of the parties did not suffice to place the woman in her husband's family, and under his power. For that, it was necessary that the marriage be with *manus*, that is, accompanied by a ceremony in which the woman was transferred from the domestic cult of her father's family to that of her husband's.[79] This placed the wife in the position of a daughter and, in effect, made her the sister of her own children.[80] That this was the case suggests that the Romans were less concerned with the institution of marriage than with the issue of marriage; they seemed to look upon marriage "not as a separate institution but as a step in the most important way of acquiring *patria potestas*."[81] Hobbes is similar: a "marriage" in the state of nature is described by him as follows: "And therefore the man, to whom for the most part the woman yieldeth the government, hath for the most part, also, the sole right and dominion over the children."[82]

The power of the *paterfamilias* was supreme in early Rome, and was little interfered with by the state. Hobbes's description of the absolute power of the family sovereign (quoted at the beginning of this section), though compact, covers much of the *patria potestas*. The Roman father had the power of life and death over sons and daughters under his jurisdiction, regardless of their age. He could sell them into slavery or civil bondage, he could veto marriage and control divorce; he could hand the child over instead of paying the penalty for a wrong done by him (called "noxal surrender"); he had the power to appoint guardians and heirs.[83] A child abandoned by the *paterfamilias*, subsequently preserved and raised by someone else, somehow would remain legally in his father's *potestas*;[84] Hobbes's system, more functionally precise than the Roman, required that the dominion of the Hobbesian family sovereign over his exposed child be *de facto* rather than *de jure*, and consequently may be regained only if the parent is in a position to "save" the child again, and elects to do so.[85] Power for Hobbes is always in the present tense.

---

[70] H. F. Jolowicz, *Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), p. 112.

[71] Jolowicz, *Roman Foundations*, p. 178. As Maine puts it, "Where the Potestas begins, Kinship begins; . . . Where the Potestas ends, Kinship ends; . . ." Henry Sumner Maine, *Ancient Law* 14th ed. (London: John Murray, 1891), p. 149.

[72] Robert A. Nisbet, "Kinship and Political Power in First Century Rome," *Sociology and History: Theory and Research*, ed. Werner J. Cahnman and Alvin Boskoff (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 259.

[73] Jolowicz, *Historical Introduction*, p. 118.

[74] Nisbet, "Kinship and Political Power . . ." p. 260.

[75] Jolowicz, *Historical Introduction*, p. 119n.

[76] *De Corpore Politico* II, 3, 3, *E. W.* IV, p. 150.

[77] Henry Sumner Maine, *Ancient Law*, p. 163. He adds that the theory was unsound.

[78] James Bryce, "Marriage and Divorce Under Roman and English Law," in *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*, II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1901), p. 786.

[79] Jolowicz, *Historical Introduction*, p. 118.

[80] Buckland, p. 113. Although Hobbes is not describing the Roman family in his constructs, his failure to discuss the position of the wife in the family is consistent with his source. Hinton is too sweeping when he says "the pages on *husbands*, fathers and conquerors" play a vital part in Hobbes's argument. Hinton II, p. 55. Emphasis added.

[81] Buckland, p. 106. The quotation refers specifically to Gaius. A modern author observes that in practice the Roman woman acquired relative freedom of behavior and action in marriage, compared with Greek women of the classical age, and that "in every age" the Roman's wife "shared in his authority over the children and slaves." Ugo Enrico Paoli, *Rome: Its People, Life and Customs*, trans., R. D. Macnaghten (New York: David McKay, 1963), pp. 113–114.

[82] *De Corpore Politico* II, 4, 7, *E. W.* IV, p. 157. The language "for the most part' is not characteristic of Hobbes's later writings.

[83] Buckland, pp. 103–104.

[84] Jolowicz, *Roman Foundations*, p. 184.

Those subject to the *patria potestas* could not escape from its power during the lifetime of the *paterfamilias* unless he released them by emancipation, gave them in adoption, or permitted daughters to marry with *manus*. Independence did not occur at the age of majority. On the death of the *pater*, the *potestas* ended; all descendents in the first degree (that is, sons, but not their children) became independent.[86] Sons could be voluntarily released by emancipation, but they lost all right of maintenance, and all rights of succession to the father. Hobbes says that sons may be emancipated (and servants similarly may be released from the subjection of their master by *manumission*), and he generally implies that sons will be emancipated automatically when they reach the age of majority.[87]

The *patria potestas* was of enormous importance in the early Roman Republic; it stood "for the unity of the family, its continuity in time, and as the irreducible atom of the society as a whole." While its function was originally religious in nature, politically it represented stability and authority in a society which lacked centralized political power over individuals.[88] Hobbes borrows freely from the *patria potestas* partly because it provides him with credible[89] familial relationships which better serve the purposes of his political theory than do those of the English common law family.[90] This is not to say that Hobbes builds a state on the model of the Roman family; no more than any Roman writer attempted to trace "the power exercised by the state authorities . . . out of those exercised by the head of the family."[91] The point that Hobbes wishes to make about the family is that it can illustrate, resemble and help stabilize the perfect commonwealth, and the *patria potestas* provides him with a convenient and familiar model which rested on absolute power. This may be seen in examining his one explicit reference to *patria potestas*. He points out that freedom in commonwealths does not mean that one is exempt from subjection and obedience to power, and in support of this he observes that the Latin word for children (*liberi*) also signifies "freeman." "And yet in Rome," he continues,

> . . . nothing at that time was so obnoxious to the the power of others, as children in the family of their fathers. For both the state had power over their life without consent of their fathers, and the father might kill his son by his own authority, without any warrant from the state.[92]

Freedom does not mean one is released from subjection; indeed, the power to which one owes obedience as a freeman can be absolute, without in any way diminishing one's status. In drawing on the *patria potestas*, Hobbes is trying to show that the authority to which men owe obedience is absolute in character—and it is convenient for Hobbes's theory that he can carry that point right into the heart of the one universal institution experienced by Everyman—the family.

### The Family in Commonwealth

**The Family and Education.** If Hobbes sees the family in the state of nature as analogous to a small state in its concern with self-preservation as a function of absolute power and obedience, one might expect a reversal of that analogy in commonwealth. Indeed, for Hobbes the essence of commonwealth is its capacity to protect, and where "in Nations not thoroughly civilized, severall numerous Families have lived in continuall hostility, and invaded one another with private force; yet it is evident enough, that they have done unjustly; or else that they had no Commonwealth."[93] Family sovereigns lay down their arms, transfer all questions relating to protection to the commonwealth, and give up absolute power over family members. The analogy is not reversed, however; though the family sovereign is tamed, the family still remains *Leviathan* writ small. The head of the family retains primacy in the household; there is no change in family structure; the integrity of the family as the irreducible element of the commonwealth continues; and the family sovereign gives up only such power as commonwealth requires. And, Hobbes continues to view the family in political terms. Subjects in a body politic may do whatever has not been expressly forbidden; they are at liberty, for example, "to buy, and sell, and otherwise contract with one another; to choose their own aboad, their own diet, their own trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves think fit; . . . "[94] And, the sovereign may directly legislate over members of the family, (that is, fathers cannot command actions contrary to law) but in "all other actions, during the time they are under domestique government, they are subject to their Fathers, and Masters, as to their immediate Soveraigns."[95] Should the commonwealth collapse suddenly, for example by the death of a monarch who had not named a successor,[96] the family would "return" to the state of nature and the family sovereign would recover once more "the absolute dominion" he had over his children and servants originally.[97]

---

[85] *De Cive* ix, 4, p. 107

[86] Jolowicz, *Roman Foundations*, p. 181.

[87] *De Corpore Politico* II, 3, 7, *E. W.* IV, pp. 151–152; *De Cive* viii, 9, p. 103; *Leviathan* 24, p. 194.

[88] Nisbet, pp. 259–260.

[89] A contemporary (though satirical) critic pointed out that Hobbes said little on the family that was new. John Eachard, *Mr. Hobbs's State of Nature Considered In a Dialogue between Philautus and Timothy*, London, 1672; ed., Peter Ure (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1958), p. 16.

[90] In common law, the family was characterized as a matrimonial relationship between husband and wife determined by contract. Paternal power was "much more moderate" than in Rome. The most striking feature of the common law family is the liabilities attached to the man, particularly regarding the acts of his wife and his servants. William Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England I* Chap. 15 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1765).

[91] James L. Strachan-Davidson, *Problems of the Roman Criminal Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1912), 2, 38, cited in Nisbet, p. 259.

[92] *De Corpore Politico* II, 4, 9, *E. W.* IV, p. 158.

[93] *Leviathan* 22, p. 182.

In commonwealth, emphasis in the family shifts from defense to education. Both functions were performed in the family prior to commonwealth, of course, but the peace afforded by the existence of commonwealth makes it possible for the family to contribute reciprocally to stability by teaching the principles of Hobbes's political science. Hobbes does not systematically articulate the role of the family in what I referred to earlier as primary civic education, but the direction of his thought is clearly implied by his comments on the process and content of education. And, the importance of both education and the family for Hobbes is suggested by the paragraph in *Leviathan* which begins with this observation:

> And because the first instruction of Children dependeth on the care of their Parents; it is necessary that they should be obedient to them, whilest they are under their tuition; and not onely so, but that also afterwards (as gratitude requireth,) they acknowledge the benefit of their education, by externall signes of honour.[98]

In commonwealth, education replaces protection as the occasion for the child's obedience, but the point of education is not to raise children in whatever way the parent thinks best, as Hobbes implies in saying men are at liberty to "institute their children as they themselves think fit." Rather, the point is that commonwealth does not weaken obligations in the family; children "are to be taught, that originally the Father of every man was also his Soveraign Lord, with power over him of life and death; and that the Fathers of families, when by instituting a Common-wealth, they resigned that absolute Power, yet it was never intended, they should lose the honour due unto them for their education."[99] And, by focusing the content of education on questions of power and gratitude (honor), Hobbes implies the political character of education. Properly understood and practiced, education can serve to bind people together.

The education of children, Hobbes says, is "a *Culture* of their mindes" in the same sense that culture is "the labour bestowed on the Earth:" both represent "that labour which a man bestowes on anything, with a purpose to make benefit by it."[100] Whether in the state of nature or in commonwealth, every man who has children seeks his own benefit from them. "[E]very man after death receives honour and glory from his children, sooner than from the power of any other men: . . . "[101] And, while alive, a man is honored by his children when they are diligent in serving him, when they obey, when (in short) in "all words and actions [they] betoken Fear to Offend, or Desire to Please."[102] When children are grown and independent, they are expected to "promise all those external signs at least, whereby superiors used to be honoured by their inferiors," namely honor and friendship.[103] Promising is not simply a matter of filial piety, but of agreement. How this comes about will be seen in a moment; for Hobbes, it seems easy.

Children are incapable of reasoning until they acquire "the use of Speech; but they are called Reasonable Creatures, for the possibility apparent of having the use of Reason in time to come."[104] But initially, learning for Hobbes is more a matter of simple behavior modification than of speech and reason.

> A child may be so young as to do what it does without all deliberation, but that is but till it have the chance to be hurt by doing of somewhat, or till it be of age to understand the rod: for the actions, wherein he hath once had a check, shall be deliberated on the second time.[105]

Any parent today can imagine a child "testing" the rules time and again, calculating how far he might go without being punished. Hobbes seems confident that negative reinforcement is an effective teacher; a hand burned by the cooking fire, or a seat warmed because of defiance causes a child to think twice before repeating such acts. The only standard of good and bad manners children have, Hobbes says, is the correction they receive from their parents, and as compared to adults who follow either reason or custom, according to their immediate self-interest, children are consistent in following their parents' rule.[106] It is no surprise to discover that Hobbes believes in the effectiveness of "checks," "punishments," and "corrections"; fear of adverse consequences is always a valid motive for action, and a valid teacher. To be sure, when Hobbes says "man is made fit for society not by nature, but by education," he has more in mind than simple conditioning. Children cannot "desire" civil society because they do not know what it is; the virtues of "bonds" which depend on "faith and compacts" and the "profit" of society are not self-evident;[107] education in these matters is more a question of instruction, for example, by reading *Leviathan*[108] or by assembling with others periodically to be reminded of duties and positive laws.[109] But the point of both conditioning and later instruction is to develop the child's rationality to the point where he may acknowledge the primacy of his parents, first, and, subsequently, of the sovereign.

---

[94] *Leviathan* 21, p. 163.
[95] *Leviathan* 22, p. 180.
[96] *Leviathan* 22, p. 170.
[97] *De Corpore Politico* II, 3, 8, *E. W.* IV, p. 152.
[98] *Leviathan* 30, p. 263.
[99] *Leviathan* 30, p. 263.
[100] *Leviathan* 31, p. 278.
[101] *De Cive* ix, 15, p. 112.
[102] *Leviathan* 45, p. 505.
[103] *De Cive* ix, 8, p. 109.
[104] *Leviathan* 5, p. 37.
[105] Thomas Hobbes, *Of Liberty and Necessity*, *E. W.* IV, p. 244. Emphasis omitted.

As Hobbes sees it, the parent is almost obliged to educate a child by his decision to nurture it in the first place, for (in the state of nature) a dependent but physically strong child presents a serious problem to a parent: the parent's natural force is inadequate in the face of a matured "child," ungoverned by any sense of restraint, obligation, gratitude, or honor. Hobbes insisted that "it would be wisdom in men, rather to let their children perish, while they are infants, than to live in their danger of subjection, when they are grown." Thus, the "gift" of strength made by the parent is supposed to carry with it a "promise of obedience in consideration thereof"[110] from the child. The question is, when can the child make that promise?

According to Hobbes, two preconditions must be met. First, the child must have grown enough physically to have the capacity "to do mischief." Second, he must also have enough judgment to understand that he is protected from the potential "mischief" of others by the latter's fear of his parents. The mature child can openly renounce his parents' protection; if he does not, he becomes obliged, Hobbes says, by consent.[111] When Hobbes says in *Leviathan* that paternal dominion is based on "the Childs Consent, either expresse, or by other sufficient arguments declared,"[112] he logically rules out natural force, even though in fact the child's consent is *assumed* until consent may be given or protection rejected. The growing child recognizes by his own observation no doubt that his immediate protection is due to his parents' efforts, but more importantly he is to be explicitly taught about his parents' role in his preservation and his education, and about the basis in consent of his own obedience. It does not seem likely that he would "withhold" his consent, since obedience has been taught and exacted from an early age. In teaching a child the nature of obedience in the family, a parent is teaching the nature of obedience in the state. A child well instructed in his duty toward his parents is a child well prepared to be a "good citizen" (i.e., an obedient subject) upon reaching his majority or independence.

From the maturing child's point of view, gratitude (or the honoring of one's parents) requires that he acknowledge the superior power of his parent, or rather the originally superior power. There is to be no assumption of equality on the part of the matured child which would detract from the honor due to a parent. It is a part of the child's education that he should recognize this explicitly, for if he does *not* recognize it, the presumption is that the parent may exercise his naturally superior power (while the child is still young) to punish; and the child is to be reminded that parents once had the power to kill their children. "[I]t follows, that the precept of honouring our parents, belongs to the law of nature, not only under the title of gratitude, but also of agreement."[113] Why does it follow? Without a promise of gratitude by the son or servant, Hobbes implies, there will be no independence from the family.

The kind of education Hobbes has in mind is designed to stabilize the power of the civil sovereign. As an "inducement" to parents, Hobbes not only emphasizes the duty of children to honor their parents, but also stresses the point that children are to be taught that originally the power of parents was absolute; and that only as much has been surrendered by parents as the commonwealth requires. To suggest that the right of paternal dominion rests on the child's consent not only points out to children that the power of fathers (or mothers) is like that of the sovereign; it also reminds parents that the power of the sovereign is based on their consent. Properly educated, children, for their part, learn that their preservation and education are the consequence of the "sovereign" power of one parent; that such power is based on their consent; and that the power of the sovereign is likewise based on their consent. Hobbes's failure to say anything in *Leviathan* about how children in fact become subjected to the laws of the commonwealth suggests that he expected the child already to feel obliged by paternal conditioning and instruction. The task of the sovereign is made easier if the parent correctly “nurtures and educates” the child. To be sure, the education of the child is not ended when the parents have raised him, but subsequent education outside the family (in universities in particular) is likely to be more consistent with political stability if education in the family has been effective.

---

[106] *Leviathan* 11, p. 79.

[107] *De Cive,* i, 2, pp. 21n–22n.

[108] *Leviathan* 31, pp. 284–285.

[109] *Leviathan* 30, p. 262.

[110] *De Corpore Politico* II, 4, 3, *E. W.* IV, p. 156. See also *Leviathan* 20, pp. 154–155.

[111] *The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance, E. W.* V, p. 180. Hobbes uses the word "assent." Cf. Gauthier, p. 117.

[112] *Leviathan* 20, p. 153.

[113] *De Cive* ix, 8, p. 109.

### Family Education and University Education

Hobbes expresses Platonic disillusionment with his work at the end of Part II of *Leviathan* on the grounds first that it differs too widely from contemporary practice, and, second, because sovereigns are not philosophers. But on reconsideration he decides that his work is superior to Plato's *Republic* because it shows men both how to govern and how to obey, and he recovers hope that it can be read by a ruler who will “convert this Truth of Speculation, into the Utility of Practice” by having it taught publicly.[114] The public teaching of the true philosophy is of the utmost importance: in *Behemoth* Hobbes doubts there can be any “lasting peace” until the universities teach absolute obedience to the laws of the king.[115] But young persons are not exposed to the doctrine of absolute obedience for the first time in universities, for as I have shown, the inculcation of this doctrine is central to the family. Obviously, however, it would do little good for the absolute obedience taught in the family to be undone by universities. While Hobbes considers the reform of universities to be of immediate importance, the effectiveness of university reform is ultimately contingent on the effectiveness of family education.

Of the twelve powers of sovereignty enumerated by Hobbes in Chapter 18 of *Leviathan*, the central one is the power to judge what is necessary for the peace and defense of his subjects. The main discussion of this power concerns the opinions and doctrines with which men are to be trusted, when speaking to multitudes of people. In particular, the sovereign is charged with the duty of determining whether and which doctrines are conducive to peace: “For Doctrine repugnant to Peace, can no more be True, than Peace and Concord can be against the Law of Nature.”[116] Thus the sovereign is to take care that the universities become and remain pure, for they are the “Fountains of Civill, and Morall Doctrine, . . . ”[117] Hobbes of course is not suggesting that the universities are encountered by large numbers of people or by ordinary (“common”) people, either. But men's actions are governed by their opinions,[118] and “common people” are amenable to opinion from any source, whether it be the “Potent,” or “Doctors,”[119] “Preachers” or the “Gentry.”[120] Thus one of the duties of the sovereign is to appoint regular times in which people will be taught their duties and the rights of sovereign power, as the Jews assigned every seventh day for reading and expounding the Law.[121]

This is not simply a matter of theoretical purity for Hobbes, but it is a practical necessity. There are many persons who cannot read for themselves, and of those who can read, some lack sufficient leisure time in which to read and others use their leisure time for private business. This means “it is impossible that the multitude should ever learn their duty, but from the pulpit and upon holidays. . . . ”[122] If bad doctrine proceeds now from the pulpit, it is because bad doctrine is taught in the universities. “[I]f any man would introduce sound doctrine, he must begin from the academies.” There, the young minds which are properly shaped will “cheerfully and powerfully” teach the “vulgar” in public as well as in private.[123] Like the public at large, the minds of the young who attend the university are quite impressionable (“as white paper”) provided they “come thither void of prejudice.”[124] Given this important qualification of openmindedness, the critical question becomes that of the soundness of the subject matter itself. If the true philosophy (Hobbes's work) is correctly taught, it will provide for the everlasting peace that hitherto proved elusive;[125] if not correctly taught, men may anticipate the continuation of political disorder and civil war.

Because Hobbes looks upon the universities as an immediate source of discord and instability, he looks to their reform as a crucial step toward peace and stability. But, he does not believe one can realistically expect immediate results “because opinions which are gotten by education, and in length of time, are made habitual, cannot be taken away by force, and upon the sudden; they must therefore be taken away also by time and education.”[126] Although he recognizes that most people are already influenced by the clergy, or by teachers, or other visible (“Potent”) persons,[127] Hobbes seems to miss the question which proved so troublesome to Plato, namely, how does one satisfactorily educate the young when the environment in which they grow up is corruptive? To put the question to Hobbes in his own terms, what is to guarantee that the young will be "void of prejudice" by the time they reach the university?

---

[114] *Leviathan*, 31, pp. 284–285.

[115] *Behemoth* I, *E. W.* VI, p. 233.

[116] *Leviathan* 18, pp. 136–137.

[117] *Leviathan*, Review and Conclusion, p. 556.

[118] *Leviathan* 18, pp. 136–137.

[119] *Leviathan* 30, p. 260.

[120] *Leviathan*, Review and Conclusion, p. 556.

[121] *Leviathan* 30, p. 262.

[122] *Behemoth* I, *E. W.* VI, p. 213.

[123] *De Cive* xiii, 9, pp. 146–147.

[124] *De Corpore Politico* II, 9, 8, *E. W.* IV, p. 219.

[125] Cf. Watkins: “Hobbes's *Leviathan* . . . prescribes a universal cure for all revolution and civil war.” J. W. N. Watkins, *Hobbes's System of Ideas: A Study in the Political Significance of Philosophical Themes* (London: Hutchinson, 1965), p. 14.

[126] *De Corpore Politico* II, p. 9, *E. W.* IV, p. 219.

[127] *Leviathan* 30, p. 260.

While Hobbes fails to consider the question directly, he does provide for it nonetheless in his theory. I have already suggested that by the time he is of sufficient age to be a reasoning being, the child is ideally to have recognized the relationship between protection and obedience. By his own experiences and by virtue of the education received from his parents, the child is made into a social being who is accustomed to and understands political relationships of authority and obedience. The child's mind is to be kept free by the parents from influences prejudicial to the true philosophy's teaching of duty and obedience. Keeping the child's mind free is not simply a question of discipline or conditioning, however; it is possible to talk about family education because in providing a rational justification for the child's obedience, Hobbes indicates that the content of education in the family is nothing less than the basics of Hobbesian political science. To teach one's children that their obedience is due when protection is given is to learn the same lesson for one's self. What binds a child to the family also binds the family sovereign to the state. Of course this lesson could work both ways; fathers could be reminded to be vigilant of their own sovereign.[128] But Hobbes, never one to doubt his own rightness, does not worry about creating a highly active citizenry. It is obvious that he sought to cool men off, to pacify them, to drive them into the waiting arms of whoever might be ruling with the frightening imagery of a state of nature in which there is "continuall feare, and danger of violent death."[129] In the teaching of one's children Hobbes has the fathers greet the new sovereign and bid themselves farewell.

Thus Hobbes's metaphor of young minds as "white paper" is not quite descriptive of his meaning; what he intends (to continue the metaphor) is clean white paper which is untainted by rebellious doctrines and at least *lined*, if not already watermarked with the imprimatur of obedience, duty and honor, first (as children) to fathers, then (as reasoning or maturing beings) to the sovereign.[130] When Hobbes implies openmindedness, he means simply, willing receptivity to the kind of political teaching found in *Leviathan*, rather than open and inquiring minds which can come to the kinds of conclusions about "liberty" and sovereign power which are destructive of political order. Thus when he says that it "is therefore manifest, that the Instruction of the people, dependeth wholly, on the right teaching of Youth in the Universities,"[131] he does not mean that the whole process of education begins there. "Right teaching" depends not only on true philosophy but also on "right Youth," that is, on minds well-disciplined and correctly taught by the family. Thus, family education contributes to the stability and maintenance of the commonwealth.

The most remarkable feature of the system, apart from its rationalistic simplemindedness, is that it is put into effect by private rather than public agencies. To be sure Hobbes does say that men are at liberty to raise children as they see fit, but that obviously does not mean they may teach anything seditious, and it is an observation that Hobbes makes only once. In opposition to this stands the more characteristic Hobbesian notion that nothing may be taught which is contrary to doctrines approved by the sovereign, whether by universities, pastors, or fathers. Private education in the family is sanctioned by the sovereign, who does not, however, "legislate" the content, and Hobbes seems perfectly confident that fathers are capable of educating their children. If they have not done so in the past, one assumes it is because they have not read Hobbes.

This may be contrasted with Aristotle's insistence that education be conducted by the state: "[i]t cannot be left, as it is at present, to private enterprise, with each parent making provision privately for his own children, and having them privately instructed as he himself thinks fit."[132] In the *Ethics* Aristotle suggests that a man should educate his children if the state makes no provision for public education, and he claims that the father is capable of doing it,[133] but no such concession to private education appears in the *Politics*;[134] here, Aristotle discovers that "education is therefore *the* means of making [a polis] a community and giving it unity."[135] Educating citizens in the spirit of their constitution is the best way of securing political stability,[136] and in the ideal polis the family brings children into the world so that the polis may perpetuate itself (Aristotle implies) by educating the young.[137] In the name of providing "a stock of the healthiest possible bodies in the nurseries of our state," Aristotle recommends a variety of laws to regulate ages of marriage, as well as the age appropriate for and the "season" suitable to, procreation.[138] Such regulations may be understood, in part, as signs that Aristotle thought the family had the potential to destroy the polis both in theory and in practice unless men recognized the true priorities. It is essential for Aristotelian political science then that the family and the state be clearly distinguished, and that the primacy of the state over the family be understood.

---

[128] Christian moralists assumed Hobbes "intended to teach that when a citizen is not adequately protected, then his obligations cease"—and were horrified by such a teaching. Quentin Skinner, "Hobbes's Theory of Political Obligation," in *Hobbes and Rousseau: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Maurice Cranston and Richard S. Peters (Garden City: Anchor, 1972), p. 140.

[129] *Leviathan* 13, p. 97.

[130] *Leviathan* 30, p. 263.

[131] *Leviathan* 30, p. 265.

[132] Aristotle, *Politics*, trans. E. Barker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), VIII, 1337a, pp. 332–333.

[133] Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics*, trans. Martin Ostwald (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), X, 1180a, 30–33, pp. 297–298.

[134] John Burnet, trans. and ed., *Aristotle on Education* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1936), pp. 97, 106.

[135] *Politics* II, 1236b. Emphasis by translator.

For Hobbes it is a different matter altogether; the family and the state are to be understood in the same terms so that the state can be reinforced by the family. In a sense, Hobbes's conclusion is the same as Aristotle's; by thinking of the family in political terms exclusively, Hobbes makes it a servant of his political science in the same way that laws in Aristotle's ideal polis make the procreation and education of children matters of concern to the polis. But Hobbes's political science does not presuppose tensions between the family and the state arising from their different functions and capacities, as is the case with Aristotle, and since Hobbes's teaching is that both family and state rest on the same political principles, it follows that family education properly conducted is education about the state.

## Conclusion

Sheldon Wolin's dictum about the epic theorist seems to apply with particular vigor to Hobbes's view of the family: "His aim has been to make the world reflect a theory."[139] There is certainly very little in Hobbes's view of the family which does not emanate from his theory of the state, and if my reading is correct, it seems clear that Hobbes intended to use the family as a heuristic device to teach the basic principles of Hobbesian political science. No one is born into the state of nature. All children have at least one parent, and if they survive at all it is due to the protection of that parent. There may be two parents, of course, but preservation is a function (in part) of undivided sovereignty, and only one parent rules. In preserving a child, a parent performs a sovereign function; the uncertainties of independence are nearly always fatal for an infant, just as Hobbes would have us believe that independence from political authority is nearly always fatal for grown men. Authority is justified by necessity, and the justification continues according to performance; and neither has anything to do with origins. If a mother accepts a man's protection, the child follows, and if a father accepts the protection of a sovereign larger than himself, the child follows once again. The logic of the situation makes consent mandatory; if consent is not forthcoming, then preservation is not required, and the child finds himself outdoors, just as the adult finds himself at the whim of a stronger force, with no liberty of limbs and possibly with loss of life. The powers of a family sovereign were absolute, in the state of nature, and they will be again should sovereignty fail. Children must remember that the family sovereign once had that power, and they must continue to show gratitude to their parents in commonwealth for the education they receive in the family. Family education is political education; children will be amenable to sovereignty in the state because they were taught the principles on which it rests in the home. Hobbes makes much use of these points in his discussions of the family, and the direction of his thinking seems clear enough: if *Leviathan* comes into being, then the family in its daily reflections on politics can contribute much to stability in the state.

It is clear that Hobbes is deliberate in his use of the family, and he is consistent throughout his work. He is also characteristically one-sided and narrow in his view of the family. If family life is to consist almost exclusively of lessons in Hobbesian political science, then what can one reasonably expect beyond a kind of paranoia from a constant preoccupation with security questions? Sovereign power in the state, and "historically" in the family, rests on a necessity-justification which must be continual if absolute power is to endure unquestioned. One can imagine that that justification could continue at the state level, as a function of real or manufactured interstate crises, but it is hard to see how the Hobbesian family sovereign can get much mileage from a similar justification, once the commonwealth is well established. However, if family sovereigns were in fact so successful that all children were made into persons predisposed to obedience, then it would follow that Hobbes had in fact provided for a thoroughgoing transformation of human nature. If such a transformation implies that men's passions be curbed, that their atomistic individualism be replaced by a political ethic, and that they accede voluntarily to an order of living which is civilized and peaceful, rather than barbarian and violent, then Hobbes is confident; at the end of *Leviathan* he argues that education and discipline can dispose men to all sorts of "Civill Duty," by reconciling judgment and fancy, reason and eloquence.[140] It is difficult, he says, but not impossible. The kind of obligation men come to experience may be rational, or moral, or both,[141] but Hobbes's political theory at one level is a discussion of several stages by which the "natural man turns into a just citizen."[142] Hobbes expects the family sovereign to be successful, in the same way that he expects a sovereign to be successful: both teach Hobbesian political science. Perhaps, as Minogue puts it, "the end product of this evolution resembles Spinoza's rational man who has released himself from the bondage of the passions, and is distinguished by the fact that he is active, not passive."[143] I am more inclined to the view expressed by Wolin that Hobbes has created a society "of formal equality, where all subjects have been humbled and made dependent upon the sovereign for the security of their lives, goods, rights, and status."[144] If Hobbes has managed to link paranoia with pacification in his conception of education in the family—and I suggest that he did—then he has certainly prepared people to choose wisely between obedience to sovereign power and the terrors of a state of nature.[145] But neither sustained paranoia nor sustained pacification seem very elevating styles of human existence, whether in the family or in the state.

---

[136] *Politics* V, 1310a.

[137] *Politics* VII, 1335b.

[138] *Politics* VII, 1334b–1335b.

[139] Sheldon S. Wolin, *Hobbes and the Epic Tradition of Political Theory* (Los Angeles: William Andrews Clark Memorial Library, 1970), p. 8.

For all of its flaws, however, Hobbes's view of the family has as its virtue the premise that the family can be viewed in political terms. If one can model the family on political values, then one can equally well criticize it according to political values. If one objects to the unjustifiable use of force and the exercise of unlimited power, then surely such objections apply in the family as well as in the state. Sexism institutionalized in the family should be no less criticized than sexism institutionalized in society, and children who learn violence in the home are not likely to be easily converted to the use of words in their later years. But it was Aristotle and not Hobbes who first saw the family in political terms.[146] What is unique about Hobbes is that he sees the family logically as a small version of the state. If Hobbes can reinforce *Leviathan* by having the relationship between protection and obedience taught in the family, he makes it possible for others to humanize families—and states—by teaching fairness, consent, respect for human dignity and equality in the family.[147] For this reason, Hobbes's viewing of the family in political terms seems theoretically sound.

In Hobbes, children who are taught that fathers once had power of life or death over them are not being instructed in patriarchalism, but in sovereignty. Though Hobbes teaches that the power of the sovereign and the father is the same (at different times), the child possibly learns to be grateful for the rather more remote and abstract sovereign. In that the sovereign is a good deal less personally involved in one's daily life than the father, the two phenomena seem far apart; but in truth the patriarch's power has simply moved upstairs into the generalized consciousness of society—a point feminists understand very well. Politically, if total domination by the parent is the evil in a patriarchal family, does total domination by a sovereign matter any less? The question Hobbes raises is not that of an anachronistic tradition of household authority; it is the problem of the modern state.

---

[140] *Leviathan,* Review and Conclusion, pp. 547–548.

[141] K. R. Minogue, "Hobbes and the Just Man," in *Hobbes and Rousseau,* ed. Cranston and Peters, p. 82.

[142] Minogue, p. 73.

[143] Minogue, p. 74.

[144] Wolin, p. 50.

[145] For a discussion of contemporaries who agreed with Hobbes's statement of choices, see Quentin Skinner, "Hobbes's Theory of Political Obligation," in *Hobbes and Rousseau,* pp. 126–135.

[146] Aristotle, *Ethics,* VIII.

[147] No doubt the quality of our own public life would improve proportionally, though only eventually.

# David Easton and the Invisible Hand

J. S. SORZANO
*Georgetown University*

For a science of Politics,
let us turn back to Adam Smith.
G. E. Catlin

It is widely recognized that the functionalist approach to the social sciences as a whole is heavily imbued with organic or physiological assumptions. This conviction may help explain the increasing popularity—it has almost achieved the status of conventional wisdom—of the view that David Easton's systems model is also fashioned after the physiological one.[1] What is less widely recognized, indeed, even explicitly denied, and what will be my main contention in this essay, is that Easton's systems model can profitably be shown to have a striking number of resemblances to typically economic conceptions.

While some commentators have previously discerned an economic element in Easton's thought,[2] Easton himself has more than once disclaimed any such influence. In *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* he explicitly asserts that "there is neither an historical nor a logical connection"[3] between his model and the economic one. Another and more detailed disclaimer is to be found in *A Framework for Political Analysis*:

> Although the concept "system" is prominent in both sociology and economics in particular, it would represent a profound misconstruction of these disciplines if we were to identify their theoretical perspectives with those that will be developed here . . . The mere fact that I shall be speaking of inputs and outputs, for example, ought not to be misconstrued for the adoption of the input-output analysis familiar to students of economics. Any similarities, the reader will quickly discover, are indeed largely coincidental.[4]

Though it is always prudent to accept an author's statement of the intellectual influences which have converged in his thought,[5] I wish to suggest that the Eastonian model and the traditional economic approach share not only the notions of system and input-output but those of scarcity, allocation, competition, maximization, homeostatic equilibrium, functional interdependence, self-regulation, goal-seeking, and feedback as well. The number and importance of these shared notions suggest that the "similarities" may possibly be more than just "largely coincidental."

One may trace the influence of economic conceptions upon Easton's systems model in any number of ways.[6] Perhaps the most direct, and I believe fruitful approach consists in showing that several of the fundamental assumptions, concepts and propositions of Easton's model are also present in, and for a long time have been recognized as the identifying characteristics of, the classical economic model of Adam Smith.

The attempt to establish analogies between the respective models of Smith and Easton provides several benefits besides its obvious, if restricted, antiquarian interest.[7] It seems to me, for instance, that if these analogies are taken into consideration they can effectively be used to dispel various commonly held misconceptions about Easton's model while at the same time revealing certain of its inherent limitations which have so far escaped attention. At least two other advantages to be derived by the comparison also come to mind.

---

[1] See, for example, John D. Astin, "Easton I and Easton II," *Western Political Quarterly*, 25, No. 4 (Dec. 1972), 734; Colin Campbell, S. J. "Current Models of the Political System: An Intellective-Purposive View," *Comparative Political Studies*, 4, No. 1 (April 1971), 25–27 and D. H. Everson and J. P. Paine, *An Introduction to Systematic Political Science* (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey, 1973), p. 194.

[2] Peter Leslie, "General Theory in Political Science: A Critique of Easton's Systems Analysis," *British Journal of Political Science*, 2 (April 1972), 172. The most explicit allegation of the existence of economic elements in Easton's thought is provided by William C. Mitchell's "Politics as the Allocation of Values: A Critique," *Ethics*, 71 (Jan. 1961), 79–89. Because of its publication date Mitchell's article could only deal with Easton's *The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science* (New York: Knopf, 1953). Despite this Mitchell accurately foresaw many of the central features of Easton's subsequent work by noting that "the allocative framework is in many ways the analogue of the theories of income distribution and the allocation of resources in economics, and particularly neoclassical theory since there, too, the emphasis is upon the economy as a distributive process or system." (page 79).

[3] *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965), p. 477, footnote 6. (Hereinafter referred to as *Sytems Analysis.*)

[4] *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. xi-xii. (Hereinafter referred to as *Framework.*) Easton acknowledges the existence of some overlap with economics but insists that his main inspiration is drawn from other sources (p. xi).

[5] These influences are cited by Easton in *Framework* (pp. xiiff.). To most readers, however, they may prove uninstructive since they presume some acquaintance with the personalities involved. James G. Miller who was associated with Easton in the Committee on Behavioral Science has been characterized as "an unabashed vitalist" thus lending at least indirect support to the physiological interpretation of Easton's approach. See John D. Astin, "Easton I and Easton II," p. 727.

[6] An indirect manner of achieving this result would be to assess the influence upon Easton's thought of Harold Lasswell and Talcott Parsons both of whom include characteristically economic notions in their overall approaches to the study of society.

Partly because of its comparatively recent development Easton's systems model is not yet completely articulated. For example, many of its relevant interrelationships are still being specified. Easton himself has recognized the pressing need for the further refinement of his model and has indicated that one of the areas needing special attention is what he calls the "theoretical imperatives" of systems analysis.[8] Even under the best of conditions this is not an easy task since one of the vexing problems of complex model-construction lies precisely in the difficulty of clearly identifying the model's variables as well as stipulating the kinds of relationships which obtain among them. In an attempt to make this arduous task somewhat easier we can turn to some fully articulated model already in use in another discipline and utilize it as an expedient guideline for our model-building efforts.

We could, for instance, adopt the organic or physiological model as our principal theoretical guideline. And, indeed, from the point of view of some critics of Easton's model, this selection would be ideal since, it is maintained, his model is fashioned after the physiological one.[9] It is true that the physiological model could provide a series of useful, if limited, insights into the meaning and interrelationships of such concepts as system, function, boundary and homeostatic equilibrium. Yet an increasing number of commentators have concluded that the physiological model is an inadequate guideline for the construction of a model which seeks to represent certain aspects of social reality.[10]

The inadequacy of the physiological model as a theoretical guideline becomes even greater when our task is to elucidate the meaning and interrelationships of some of the components of Easton's model. As is well known, Easton's model proceeds from the initial assumption that actors are in conflict over the allocation of scarce values. It is clear that a physiological model such as that developed in Walter B. Cannon's *The Wisdom of the Body*[11] cannot be very useful as a guideline for the elucidation of the meaning and the theoretical implications of such notions as conflict, maximization, value scarcity, and allocation. But, unfortunately, neither do we find much discussion on some of these topics in the relevant literature of political science. Within this field, as William C. Mitchell has noted, the meaning and implications of such concepts as scarcity, allocation and maximization are seldom made explicit and less frequently discussed than in the sister discipline of economics.[12] And this should point out a second benefit to be derived from the comparison between Adam Smith and David Easton. For not only does Smith's model include most of the central concepts and propositions to be found in Easton's model, but more importantly, in the two centuries since its articulation, a large body of knowledge has accumulated concerning the precise meaning and theoretical implications of these notions. Indeed, Smith's model has been so intensively studied that present-day economists are in the enviable position of being able to enumerate accurately its component parts, properties, and conditions of operation. This wealth of knowledge can, and should, be utilized in the elucidation of some of the conceptual ambiguities, imprecise formulations, and implicit premises contained in the relatively less articulated model of David Easton.

---

[7] It is interesting to note that Adam Smith's work has never been fully discussed from the point of view of systems theory. One partial exception is Louis Schneider's "Introduction" to a collection of readings from the works of the "Scottish Moralists" of the 18th century (i.e., Hume, Smith, Ferguson, Hutcheson, *et al.*). Schneider devotes several pages to a discussion of the "anticipations of functionalism" to be found in the works of these theorists. *The Scottish Moralists On Human Nature and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. xlvii–lvi. This neglect of Smith's work from the point of view of systems theory is especially surprising since as Parsons has noted "classical economics was the first instance in which a system of human activity was successfully analyzed as a dynamic system of inter-related variable elements." "The Rise and Decline of Economic Man," *Journal of General Education,* 4 (1948–50), 49. The prevailing opinion, however, seems to be that Smith's is not a systems model. For instance, Karl W. Deutsch in *The Nerves of Government* (New York: Free Press, 1963) seems to exclude Smith from what he refers to as the "cybernetic" school of thought. The cybernetic model contains several elements which are characteristic of systems analysis, e.g., "self-monitoring, self-controlling, self-steering automatic processes" (p. 75), all of which are to be found in Smith's model. Deutsch classifies Smith as a "mechanist" (p. 29) a category which excludes such notions as "irreversible change, of growth, of evolution, of novelty and of purpose" (p. 27) most, if not all of which are also present in Smith's model.

[8] David Easton, ed., *Varieties of Political Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 147.

[9] See above, footnote 1. It must be admitted that Easton's phraseology sometimes lends itself to physiological interpretations. For some of these see the particular instances cited by Astin, "Easton I and Easton II," p. 734.

[10] For a good discussion of these inadequacies see A. James Gregor, "Political Science and the Uses of Functional Analysis," *American Political Science Review,* 62 (June, 1968), 427–429.

[11] (New York: Norton, 1939).

[12] "Politics as the Allocations of Values: A Critique," p. 82.

Finally, as intimated before, in comparing the two models we will have the opportunity to discuss some of the most common misconceptions about Easton's systems approach. Thus, we shall be dealing with such questions as: Is Easton's conception of the political system tautological? Is it correct to conclude that Easton's notion of "system persistence" means that his model is essentially static? Can we assume, as Easton seems to suggest, that the model has universal relevance, or does it have specific conditions of operation which demand a much more restricted range of applicability? These are important questions in their own right and even slight progress in answering them may affect the political scientist's choice among the alternative methodological approaches available to him.

What follows is obviously not a complete exposition of either Easton's or Smith's models.[13] Rather, the discussion will be restricted to examining several significant similarities between the two models and noting what insights they may contribute towards a fuller understanding of Easton's model.

### Similarities and Correspondences

**Definition of System.** A social system, be it political or economic cannot be directly perceived by the senses. As Hayek notes, " . . . the social sciences, thus, do not deal with the 'given' wholes, but their task is to constitute those wholes by constructing models from the familiar elements. . . . "[14] By and large, systems theorists, concerned as they are with macro-phenomena, have followed this so-called "constructivist"[15] approach in elaborating their respective models. In constructing these models it is, of course, necessary to abstract from experience utilizing some criterion of relevance. Both Adam Smith and David Easton make use of a two-step procedure for isolating their respective areas of inquiry and for defining the particular social system with which they are concerned. As a first approximation they begin by identifying the relevant system by the function it performs (i.e., by what it does).

We need not search far to discover Smith's principle of abstraction. The very title of his best known work—*An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*[16]—already suggests what he considers to be the relevant universe of inquiry. It clearly establishes Smith's concern with the "causes" or production of wealth.[17] His general area of inquiry therefore, is what we know as the economy, that is, the set of behaviors the function of which is to produce economic goods by allocating scarce resources.

The identification of Easton's principle of abstraction also presents little difficulty. Two decades ago Easton published his influential *The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science.* In that seminal work Easton examined and rejected various reference points for the study of politics. Instead of the concepts of the state or power Easton proposed an alternative principle of abstraction which perhaps may be regarded as his most distinctive contribution to contemporary political science. Easton held that political science should focus on those processes that have a significant impact upon "the authoritative allocation of values for a society."[18] In his view, political action occurs "when individuals or groups dispute about the distribution of things considered valuable, whether they be spiritual or material."[19] When such a dispute is not solved through private negotiations, then an "authoritative allocation" is sought. It is this authoritative character which distinguishes the political act from other social acts. As in the case of Smith, Easton defines the political system by the function it performs: "A political system, therefore, will be identified as a set of interactions, abstracted from the totality of social behavior, through which values are authoritatively allocated for a society."[20] The two functions of production of wealth and authoritative allocation of values perform, therefore, the analytical task of broadly identifying the aspects of social reality with which Smith and Easton are respectively concerned. In each case the system's function provides the initial principle of abstraction which allows the investigator to circumscribe his universe of inquiry and to differentiate it from its environment.

---

[13] I am using Everett Hagen's conception of models as ". . . mental constructs consisting of a set of elements in interrelation, the elements and their interrelations being precisely defined." "Analytical models in the Study of Social Systems," *The American Journal of Sociology,* 67 (Sept. 1961), 144. Of course, whether the specified relations among variables actually obtain (i.e., have an empirical referent) is a distinct and separate question, which will remain outside the scope of this essay. On this point, however, we may note a difference between Easton and Smith. While Easton is primarily interested in articulating a framework for political analysis, Smith, on the other hand, advanced more than a framework for the analysis of economic systems and tried to explain why economic behavior occurs in the patterns that we observe.

[14] F. A. Hayek, *The Counter-Revolution of Science; Studies on the Abuse of Reason* (New York: Free Press, 1955), p. 56.

[15] Oran Young, *Systems of Political Science* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 16; and Alvin W. Gouldner, "Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functional Theory," in *Symposium on Sociological Theory,* ed. L. Gross (Evanston, Ill.: Peterson and Co., 1959), p. 252.

[16] Adam Smith, *An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,* Edwin Cannan edition (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1965). (Two volumes. Hereinafter referred to as *Wealth*).

[17] Wesley Mitchell argues that Adam Smith's basic concern is in the process of production. *Lecture Notes on Types of Economic Theory* (New York: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1967), Volume I, p. 37.

[18] *Political System,* pp. 128–129. See also *Framework,* p. 50.

[19] *Political System,* p. 137.

In and of itself, this first approximation to the definition of the system is clearly inadequate. Commentators on Easton's systems approach have been quick to point out that defining a system solely in terms of what it does removes the notion of system from the realm of testability.[21] They quite correctly note that there is no way of testing whether the political system allocates values because this is true by definition. They conclude that if Easton's approach aspires to meet the minimal requirement of scientific status (i.e., testability) it must include some additional element in its conception of system.

Yet neither Easton nor Smith conceives of a system merely from the point of view of what it does. What some of the critics seem to have overlooked is that in a manner reminiscent of functionalism[22] both Easton and Smith assert that the system will actually seek to perform its identifying function in a determinate and specifiable manner. That is, if the system is subjected to a disturbance it will react in a self-adjusting fashion and it will tend to return to its original path. Thus, the system behaves as if it were striving to achieve some specific end, state, or goal out of all possible end results. This "equifinality"[23] led Gregor to denominate systems of this type as "teleological systems."[24] It is therefore, misleading to refer to this kind of system as merely a set of interdependent variables. What identifies a set of variables as a system, and what constitutes the core of systems analysis is the process of self-adjustment.

The existence of this systemic self-regulating tendency is clearly visible in Smith's notion of the economic process as a whole. While Smith is clearly concerned with production, he is not concerned with all manners of production. He cannot deny that all societies, even mercantilist societies, do produce wealth. But Smith's main objection against mercantilist economic policies is that they create and, what is even worse, they perpetuate inefficient conditions of production which hamper the production of wealth. Smith's desire is, therefore, to remove these mercantilist restraints and to allow what he regarded as the self-regulating "natural tendencies" of the economic system to work themselves out and to produce "the full complement of riches"[25] that the society can attain. In other words, Smith conceived the economic system as being automatically and efficiently regulated by the forces of the market. The institutions of the market are conducive to the maximization of the "annual produce" because of their built-in bias in favor of efficiency of allocation. They reward the efficient agent while penalizing the inefficient ones. In this light Gregor Sebba has stated:

> [Adam Smith's] model is fundamentally a general mechanical equilibrium model—a complex servo-mechanism. . . . The model asserts that if the particles are left undisturbed in their movement along cost-minimization paths, then the system as a whole will automatically attain equilibrium at maximal production and optimal distribution.[26]

Easton's notion of system is also commonly understood to include the element of self-regulation. In *The Political System*, Easton broadly identified the area of political life. In subsequent publications he proceeded to elaborate additional components of his political model. Thus, in his *A Framework for Political Analysis* and in *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, Easton laid the essential groundwork for conceiving the political system as a "self-regulating, self-directing set of behaviors."[27] In these two works Easton raised one fundamental question: How is it that a political system can maintain its capacity to allocate values? Or, in its alternative formulation, How and in what manner do political systems manage to "persist?"[28]

---

[20] Easton, *Framework*, p. 57.

[21] This is a common criticism of Easton's work. It is advanced by, among others, Michael Evans, "Notes on David Easton's Model of the Political System," *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, 8 (July, 1970), 124; John D. Astin, "Easton I and Easton II," p. 735; Everson & Paine, *An Introduction to Systematic Political Science*, p. 195; and Thomas L. Thorson, *Biopolitics* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970). Thorson states: "Notice that a political system is a political system because of what it does—it authoritatively allocates values for a society. A scientific theory, of course, is more than a definition." (p. 62).

[22] Thus, Sherman Roy Krupp states: "Functionalist theory assumes a system to have a basic organizing principle of goals and self-regulating mechanisms." "Equilibrium Theory in Economics and in Functional Analysis as Types of Explanation," in *Functionalism in the Social Sciences; the Strengths and Limits of Functionalism in Anthropology, Economics, Political Science and Sociology,* Monograph 5 in a Series ed. Don Martindale (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1965), 65.

[23] Ludwig von Bertalanffy's term. I am using it rather loosely to denote the fact that the system appears to have "a goal of its own." For this usage see Anatol Rapoport's "Foreword" in W. Buckley, ed., *Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientist* (Chicago: Aldine, 1968), p. xviii.

[24] A. James Gregor, "Political Science and the Uses of Functional Analysis." "A teleological system, as distinct from a nonteleological system, is one which displays a tendency to move toward some one state or some one class of states out of all its possible states . . ." (p. 433).

[25] *Wealth*, I, pp. 78, 105, 106, 107.

[26] Gregor Sebba, "The Development of the Concepts of Mechanism and Model in Physical Sciences and Economic Thought," *American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings*, 43 (May, 1953), 262.

Easton holds that a political system has a tendency to persist—i.e., to allocate values in such a manner that "these allocations are accepted as authoritative by most persons in the society most of the time."[29] Because this acceptance of allocations as authoritative is a contingent event, Easton claims that every existing political system must have a series of self-regulatory devices to help it cope with those disturbances (i.e., "stresses") which threaten to displace the acceptance level beyond its critical limits. The system, therefore, not only performs the function of authoritatively allocating values but also manifests a self-regulating tendency to perform this function in such a manner that the level of acceptance is kept within its critical parameters. This second characteristic of Easton's notion of system is, although difficult, testable in principle.[30] This, of course, undermines the often repeated charges of tautology which have been directed against Easton's framework.

The preceding comparison of Smith's and Easton's systems highlights the central importance of the self-regulatory process for their respective models. Accordingly, the rest of this essay will be focused on an analysis of some of the concepts, propositions, and behavioral patterns implied by the notion of self-regulation which are frequently overlooked in discussions of Easton's model.

## Homeostatic Equilibrium

The self-regulating aspect of the respective models of Adam Smith and David Easton leads to a discussion of another of their resemblances, namely, the concept of homeostatic equilibrium. This is probably one of the most important and least understood elements within the conceptual inventory of the systems approach. This particular form of equilibrium implies that when a system is subjected to a disturbance which materially affects the performance of its identifying function, some of its variables will be momentarily displaced but each eventually tends to return to its respective *status quo ante*.[31] In other words, implicit in systems analysis is the proposition that some of the system's variables must be maintained within specified boundaries or the system will not be able to continue to perform its identifying function. This proposition is a frequent source of misunderstanding. It is mistakenly assumed, for instance, that homeostatic equilibrium implies that if disturbed, the system as a whole (i.e., *all* its variables) seeks to return to the *status quo ante*. But seldom, if ever, do we encounter a system in which *all* the variables manifest homeostatic properties.[32] Typically, in the face of persistent disturbances the system can only maintain some variable(s) in homeostatic equilibrium if some of its other variables are progressively displaced from their original position. We may, therefore, identify two distinct yet interdependent tendencies of a system: (1) It manifests a tendency towards homeostatic equilibrium in seeking to maintain certain variables within narrow boundaries. But if the disturbance persists, the system must respond by progressively displacing other variables. Hence, (2) the system can also be thought of as seeking to achieve a new and different position with respect to this second set of variables. This second tendency provides the system with a long-range future state or "goal," the nature of which can be inferred from the system's past and present performance. Since this second and often neglected tendency is what enables systems theory to deal with the process of change, we must be aware of, and discriminate between the two forms of systemic tendencies.

---

[27] Easton, *Framework,* p. 128.

[28] Easton defines "persistence" as "the perpetuation of any means through which values may be authoritatively allocated." *Framework,* p. 78.

[29] *Ibid.,* p. 96.

[30] Gregor has noted that the proposition that systems display specific tendencies is a testable one since "the truth or falsity of such a construction can be established by determining whether in fact the objects in the universe of inquiry do in fact display those properties." "Political Science and the Uses of Functional Analysis," (p. 435). Critics of Easton, however, have insisted that unless some numerical value can be given to the minimum level of support, the proposition that the system seeks to maintain support above a critical threshold is untestable. (Evans, "Notes on David Easton's Model of the Political System," pp. 120–121; Leslie, "General Theory in Political Science: A Critique of Easton's Systems Analysis," p. 157. Astin, "Easton I and Easton II," p. 732.) The critics' contention is incontestable, but I see no reason why the variables in Easton's model cannot be quantified. For an effort in that direction see Richard J. Trilling, "Easton's Concept of Effective Support: Two Formal Models," *Comparative Political Studies,* 4 (January, 1972), 491–507.

[31] Renate Mayntz, "On the Use of the Equilibrium Concept in Social System Analysis," *Transactions of the Fifth World Congress of Sociology,* 4 (Louvain, Belgium: International Sociological Association, 1964), 135–136.

[32] Renate Mayntz would exclude such a system from the homeostatic class. Mayntz argues that the "constancy in the values of all system variables . . . should be excluded from the definition of homeostatic equilibrium, since it is its distinguishing mark that no overall constancy is presupposed." (p. 134.) Similarly, H. M. Blalock and A. M. Blalock, "Toward a Clarification of Systems Analysis in the Social Sciences," *Philosophy of Science,* 26 (April, 1959), 90, state. ". . . the notion of equilibrium always seems to imply that *something* is remaining unchanged or is assumed to remain unchanged over some period of time (however short) . . . These "*somethings*" (remaining unchanged) are always clearly specified by the physicist. It is seldom if ever implied that *all* variables under consideration are necessarily fixed. It is misleading to say that a given system is 'in equilibrium' . . . It would be preferable to say that a system is in equilibrium *with respect to* specific variables. The implication is clear: social scientists who use the concept of equilibrium need to make efforts to specify precisely what it is about the system they are assuming to remain unchanged."

One of the clearest features of Smith's model is the particular kind of homeostatic relationships which it incorporates, making relatively easy the task of identifying the variables that remain within specific parameters and those that are progressively displaced from their original position. Suppose, for example, that the economic system is disturbed by an increase in demand for a given commodity. Smith's model predicts that the exchange price of that commodity will temporarily increase but that after the adjusting mechanisms of the market have acted the price will tend to return to its original level. Note, however, the curious fact that while prices seek to return to their predisturbance level, the system as a whole does not return to its *status quo ante*, the reason being that the market mechanism meets the rise in demand not by attempting to reduce it to its previous level but by increasing production.[33] In the face of increasing demand, the effective maintenance of the price level within given parameters must be accomplished by the cumulative displacement of the production variable from its original position. And thus, even though Smith's model contains a variable which seeks to maintain its homeostatic equilibrium, the model can, nevertheless, accommodate the notion of economic development.[34]

In Easton's model the identification of the variables involved in the homeostatic process is not as fully or as clearly spelled out as in Smith's case, but if we follow the guide provided by the economic model, a reasonably accurate picture emerges.[35] Easton considers that one of the most important among the self-adjusting mechanisms possessed by a political system is that which regulates the system's level of support. Support and acceptance of allocations are intimately related because without support the regime could not authoritatively allocate values.[36] If the system is to persist, therefore, support must be maintained within a critical range, and it must consequently be regarded as one of the model's homeostatic variables which oscillate within limits. Given this necessity of maintaining support above its critical threshold in the face of increasing and persistent demands from the members of the system, Easton indicates that the "first, easiest, and most direct" manner of maintaining support at an acceptable level is to increase the level of outputs.[37] Comparing this process of self-regulation in Easton's model with the one which obtains in Smith's model reveals a startling resemblance: Not only do both models have at least one variable being maintained within homeostatic parameters at the expense of the progressive displacement of another variable, but most significantly, both respond to an increase in demand in an identical fashion; not by curbing demand but by increasing outputs.

This analogy suggests that critics' charges that Easton's model presupposes a "persisting" *status quo* system incapable of coping with social change may have been due to their exclusive focusing upon the behavior of the homeostatic variable of support.[38] By keeping their eyes on the wrong ball, so to speak, and missing the progressive displacement of the nonhomeostatic variable of output, observers could well conclude that the model has a built-in tendency to favor the *status quo*, since if the system is disturbed, the homeostatic variable tends to return to its original level.

---

[33] Adolph Lowe, *On Economic Knowledge; Towards a Science of Political Economics* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 108–109.

[34] For Smith's theory of economic development see Joseph Spengler, "Adam Smith's Theory of Economic Growth," *The Southern Economic Journal*, 25 (April, 1959), 397–415, and 26 (July, 1959), 1–12; H. Myint, "The Welfare Significance of Productive Labor," *The Review of Economic Studies*, 11, No. 1 (1943), 20–30; Adolph Lowe, "The Classical Theory of Economic Growth," *Social Research* 21 (Summer 1954), 127–158; and W. Theatt, "A Diagramatic Presentation of Adam Smith's Growth Model," *Social Research* 24 (Summer 1957), 227–230.

[35] It is clear, however, that Easton regards certain variables as homeostatic ones. For example, he states "The persistence of a given type of political system requires more than the presence of essential variables. They need to operate above a certain level. In other words, there is a critical range and if disturbances displace the system [sic] beyond it, the entire system will change its character." *Framework*, p. 93.

[36] *Systems Analysis*, p. 157. For Easton's elaborate discussion of the concept of support see Part Three of the same work. By just referring to "support" I am greatly simplifying Easton's rich conception of support.

[37] *Systems Analysis*, p. 275. Easton is here primarily referring to the *quid pro quo* form of support ("specific support"). Easton is emphatic in his insistence that just specific support is insufficient to allow a system to persist. It needs to be supplemented by a "cushion" of diffuse support upon which the system may draw from time to time. Still, outputs are related to the level of diffuse support in at least two ways. First because in the long-run lack of desired outputs diminish the level of diffuse support (p. 273). Secondly, because the longer outputs satisfy demands the more likely it is that diffuse support will be generated (p. 275).

[38] For the view that Easton's system is a static one see Roger Scott, "Systems Analysis Without Tears: Easton and Almond," *Politics* 7, No. 1 (May, 1972), 76.

### Maximization

The similarity between the two models is also reflected in the element which supplies the energy of the system and allows it to perform its various self-regulating tasks. In both instances this dynamic element is provided by a variation of what Harold Lasswell has called the "maximization postulate."[39] Both models are based on the premise that an actor's desire for a given value or values is almost insatiable. A good illustration of this form of maximization is Hobbes's conception of man's *libido dominandi* according to which man is endowed with a "perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death."

A very similar form of maximization is, of course, involved in Adam Smith's *homo œconomicus*.[40] This wealth-maximizing element clearly furnishes the energy of the economic system.[41] Smith himself is explicit in attributing to it the capacity of impelling the "natural progress of things."

> The uniform, constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his condition, the principle from which public and national, as well as private opulence is originally derived, is frequently powerful enough to maintain the natural progress of things toward improvement, in spite both of the extravagance of government, and of the greatest errors of administration.[42]

Not only is the maximizing drive of economic man the reason behind the motion of the economic model, but it also creates the problem of economic scarcity, the existence of economic conflict (competition), and the necessity of allocation. Moreover, since the concept of economic scarcity involves the "proposition that what was somewhere gotten was somewhere lost . . . "[43] it sets the stage for conflict among maximizing economic units which are seeking to enlarge their share of the proverbial "limited pie." Smith's main contention in the *Wealth of Nations* is that conflict, when channeled through the institutions of the market place, brings about the most efficient allocation of economic resources.

While the existence of maximizing drives in Smith's *homo œconomicus* is clear, the same cannot be said about the actors within Easton's system. Although Easton's model is sometimes held to be predicated on an unstated yet specifiable view of human nature,[44] I believe that Easton's model depends not so much on a view of human nature as on a *determinate form of behavior* (i.e., maximization). The reason for this distinction is that while most people would agree that Hobbes's view of human nature (constant, universal) is considerably different from that of Marx (developmental, malleable), nevertheless both of their theories can accommodate maximizing patterns of behavior.[45] In this sense then, Easton's model is compatible with at least two different views of man. But it appears that neither its self-correcting behavior nor Easton's conception of the allocative function of the political system can be built upon behavioral foundations fundamentally different from the maximization principle.

Unfortunately, given its importance to his systems approach, Easton is not as explicit in dealing with the form of behavior assumed by his system as he usually is when dealing with other elements of his model. His vagueness on this topic has been previously noted by Thomas L. Thorson who stated: "Suppose we ask what makes the system authoritatively allocate values? Why does it convert inputs into outputs? Easton never really faces this kind of question."[46] Although Thorson's objection is well taken, it best applies to Easton's earlier works.[47] Neither in *The Political System* nor in *A Framework* did Easton directly discuss what Thorson calls "the motive force, the energy of the system."[48] In fairness to Easton, however, a good case can be made that the so-called "energy of the system" was implicit from the very beginning in the peculiarly Eastonian conception of politics as the authoritative allocation of values.

---

[39] Harold Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, eds., *World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1965), p. 7.

[40] See William Grampp, "Adam Smith and the Economic Man," *The Journal of Political Economy* 56 (1948) for a useful corrective to the simplistic conceptions about Smith's maximizing man.

[41] Eduard Heimann, *History of Economic Doctrines; An Introduction to Economic Theory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 74 and R. L. Meek, "Adam Smith and the Classical Concept of Profit," *Scottish Journal of Political Economy*, 1 (June, 1954), 139.

[42] *Wealth* I, p. 367.

[43] Karl Pribram, "Patterns of Economic Reasoning," *American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings*, 43 (May, 1953), 246.

[44] Michael A. Weinstein suggests that systems analysis is based upon a Hobbesian view of man. *Systematic Political Theory* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1971), pp. 7–11.

[45] Karl Pribram has noted that "the maximization principle—as the rationale of the employer's behavior—appears to be the real source of the disruptive tendencies attributed by Marx to the operation of the economic forces." "Patterns of Economic Reasoning," p. 251.

[46] *Biopolitics*, p. 62.

[47] In *Systems Analysis* he explicitly acknowledges maximization. (pp. 363–364).

[48] *Biopolitics*, p. 62.

According to Easton's often repeated view, all societies inevitably develop a struggle over the allocation of scarce values: "The fundamental fact confronting all societies is that scarcity of some valued things prevails. It leads *inevitably* to disputes over allocations."[49] The inclusion within this quotation of the traditionally economic concepts of scarcity, conflict, and allocation suggests that Easton's model may also include the concept of maximization. This suspicion is confirmed once we investigate the presuppositions underlying Easton's belief in the inevitability of sociopolitical conflict.[50]

Suppose for the sake of argument that the valued things are not scarce. In that case there would be no disputes over them, and, consequently, no allocation would be necessary. Next imagine that the valued things are scarce but not all actors desire them simultaneously. Again there would be no necessity for disputes or allocations. Finally, suppose that the values are both scarce and deemed desirable but the actors are not maximizers. Again, there would be no necessary reason for a dispute, since if we assume nonmaximizing guidelines, then the actors may rest satisfied with their present holdings. In other words, if the actors are not maximizers, if they do not constantly attempt to increase their share of the "limited pie," there is no reason for Easton to maintain that disputes are inevitable. Disputes arise because increasing one actor's holding must decrease the amount available for distribution among the other actors who, being maximizers themselves, redouble their strivings in order to obtain a more favorable distribution. I see no way of escaping the conclusion, therefore, that an essential presupposition of Easton's model is that the actors have maximizing behavioral patterns very similar to those of the *homo œconomicus* of classical economics.[51] As we shall see now, this conclusion is strengthened by an analysis of the behavioral patterns required for the effective operation of the self-regulating process.

### The Self-Regulating Process

Systems analysis not only regards the actors as behaving in a maximizing fashion but it also characteristically distinguishes between the actor's intentions and the objective consequences of his behavior for the system as a whole.[52] At the outset, therefore, systems theory distinguishes between two levels—the actors' or micro level, and the systemic or macro level. These two levels must somehow be linked if the dynamic element at the micro level—the actor— is to be instrumental in propelling the system toward its preferred state. Indeed, it may be argued that the very core of systems analysis consists of the self-adjusting mechanism which links the two levels and automatically regulates the behavior of the actors within the system.[53]

---

[49] *Framework*, p. 53 (my emphasis) and p. 80. See also *Political System*, p. 137 and *Systems Analysis*, p. 247.

[50] For an overlapping analysis of the assumptions underlying Easton's conception of politics see William C. Mitchell's, "Politics as the Allocation of Values: A Critique," pp. 79-90. He states. "Allocation theories in political science also make certain assumptions about the actors in a polity. These assumptions vary, but the dominant ones appear to conceive of political man as both essentially rational and motivated to maximize his returns, just as economic theory postulates an economic man." (p. 81).

[51] Yet, in a footnote, Easton seemingly denies that he is assuming maximizing behavior. He writes: "It may indeed appear from discussion of the ratio of demands to outputs that the member who is putting in support must, in some neo-Benthamite fashion, calculate the advantage to himself in the light of how the authorities act. If he fails to get the expected benefits, then he must conclude it is wiser to withhold support from these authorities. With the continuation of this process, he might take stock of his feelings toward the whole way of ordering political relationships and decide to withdraw support from the regime. Such a rational model of behavior might be useful if one wished to adopt the utilitarian assumptions that man knows his own interest and will pursue it. But for purposes of our analysis I have assumed no specific and dominant kind of motivation in political behavior." (*Systems Analysis*, p. 409.) Easton thus distinguishes between the motivation and the behavior. He writes: "We do not need to make any monolithic or inflexible assumptions about the motivations of the authorities in the production of outputs. They may act to satisfy a need or desire for power, to fulfill a detached principle of right and wrong, to express a socialized sense of responsibility to the community at large, or to gain calculated advantage over their adversaries." (*Systems Analysis*, p. 432.)

[52] In Robert Merton's terminology this amounts to the distinction between "manifest" and "latent" functions. The former are consciously intended by the actors while the latter are the unintended consequences of the actors' behavior. Robert K. Merton, "Manifest and Latent Functions," in *System, Change and Conflict*, ed. N. Demerath and R. Peterson (New York: The Free Press, 1967). Similarly, Wsevolod W. Isajiw remarks that ". . . the question of finality, i.e., goals in functionalism is not one of ends or motives of the individuals but one of the ends of the system of action itself, regardless of the motives of the individuals participating in it." *Causation and Functionalism in Sociology* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), pp. 53–54.

[53] Ernest Nagel insists that to be considered a teleological system any set of interdependent variables must not only obey the principle of equifinality but *must* include a compensating mechanism or negative feedback: "For example, I would not say that a simple pendulum which moves in such a way that it strives to achieve the lowest potential energy is a teleological system. There are no compensating effects on the pendulum." "Types of Causal Explanations in Science" in *Cause and Effect*, ed. Daniel Lerner (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 27.

The operation of this mechanism needs to be both automatic and self-adjusting. The former requirement derives from the overall self-regulating character of the system, which does not depend upon the conscious decision of any one actor or group of actors to bring it about. Rather, the system's self-correcting behavior is the unintended consequence of the interplay of the actors' maximizing behavior. It manifests regularity in spite of, indeed, probably because of, no one's deliberately seeking it. And this underscores the fact that one important aim of systems theory is to account for regularities in social processes which are not the result of deliberate human design.

Moreover, the mechanism also needs to be of an equilibrating nature because, as we have seen, the system is a teleological one which displays a preference for a given future state. This tendency towards equifinality can only be a property of the system if some mechanism automatically intercedes in a compensating fashion when the system is subjected to some form of stress or disturbance. It is for this reason that systems theory includes within its conceptual inventory the notion of "negative feedback," i.e., "the ability to generate forces which restore the displaced equilibrium."[54] For the present, however, I wish to set aside the notion of feedback, reserving it for later treatment. I would like to emphasize, however, the fundamental importance of the self-correcting mechanism. Without a tendency toward a preferred state, there is no system, and this preference is dependent upon the functioning of a self-correcting mechanism.

One of the most famous aspects of the classical economic model of Adam Smith is that it conceived of the economic system as being controlled by an automatic, self-regulating mechanism, the so-called "Invisible Hand."[55] This famous "Hand" is not a metaphysical entity like, say, Providence or Fate, intervening in the historical process in a mysterious and unfathomable way. The Invisible Hand is a rather suggestive metaphor used by Smith to denote the fact that, within the institutional environment of the market place, the interaction between maximizing producers and consumers results in macro-consequences which were intended by neither group.

As the following illustration shows, there is nothing mysterious about this phenomenon. Under conditions of perfect competition, for instance, if in an attempt to increase his wealth the maximizing producer raises the price of his commodity beyond its "natural price,"[56] the maximizing consumers, who are seeking to pay the least for the most, will modify their buying patterns and go elsewhere. The producer in turn realizes that by increasing the price he has diminished rather than increased his revenue, and, consequently, acting as a maximizer he reduces the price of his goods to its previous level.[57] If, on the other hand, the producer initially raised the price not out of greed but because his own inefficiency required it, the forces of the market would compel him either to become efficient and lower the price or to go out of business altogether. "It is thus that the private interests and passions of individuals naturally dispose them to turn their stock towards the employment which in ordinary cases are most advantageous to the society."[58] In this fashion the "Invisible Hand" (i.e., the operation of the market mechanism) automatically intervenes and adjusts the maximizing behavior of both consumers and producers to a pattern which is conducive to the system's preferred state—optimum production.

As the title of my essay suggests and in spite of Easton's explicit denial,[59] his model, if it is to be a self-regulating one, must also incorporate its own analogous version of the "Invisible Hand." The existence of a political Invisible Hand is implied by the following similarities between the respective models of Smith and Easton. As in Smith's case, Easton's model postulates the existence of self-correcting mechanisms.[60] Moreover, as in Smith's model, the functioning of this self-correcting mechanism is inextricably connected with the actors' maximizing tendencies. And, finally, Easton's self-correcting process is also not necessarily the result of anyone's deliberate intention.[61] In order to show how this political Invisible Hand may theoretically operate within the Eastonian framework I wish to refer to Easton's conception of the operation of the self-correcting mechanism under what he terms "optimal conditions."[62] This very simple version is introduced by Easton to provide a point of departure for his analysis of the "feedback" process and is then further modified by subsequent approximations to reality. I am not concerned here with these approximations but, rather with what we may refer to as the bare skeleton or the simple model of the self-adjusting process. The basic components of this mechanism can be found in the following two assumptions postulated by Easton:

---

[54] W. W. Isajiw, *Causation and Functionalism in Sociology,* p. 68. He states "Self-regulation means negative feedback. . . ."

[55] Mark Blaug notes: "The price system is a mechanism that imposes orderly rules of behavior on economic agents and imposes them automatically, without central direction or collective design." *Economic Theory in Retrospect* (London: Heinemann, 1968), p. 61.

[56] "When the price of any commodity is neither more nor less than what is sufficient to pay the rent of the land, the wages of the labour, and the profits of the stock employed in raising, preparing, and bringing it to the market, according to their natural rates, the commodity is then sold for what may be called its natural price." *Wealth* I, p. 60.

[57] *Wealth* I, pp. 61–62.

[58] *Wealth* II, pp. 225–226.

[59] Easton, *Framework,* p. 100. Easton implies that a political Invisible Hand would seek to reestablish the *status quo ante* for the whole system once it is disturbed. As we have seen this is not necessarily the case.

[60] Scattered through the text of his various works are references to the political system as "a self-regulating, self-directing set of behaviors" (*Framework,* p. 128) or as "an open, self-regulating, and goal-setting system" (*Systems Analysis,* p. 479). Similarly, he explicitly includes the self-regulating mechanisms as part of his conception of system. "Every persisting system has homeostatic devices to help it cope with stress." (*Framework,* p. 95.)

(1) The interrelationships of outputs, demands, and support: to the extent that a member perceives his demand as being satisfied we may make the very plausible assumption that he will be more rather than less inclined to support the various political objects.

(2) Responsiveness of the Authorities: the authorities are always responsive to the information they receive about the degree of support being offered by the politically relevant members and they desire to increase that support by every means at their disposal.[63]

It should be noted that both the "demand makers and the support givers" (i.e., actors) as well as the "producers of outputs" (i.e., authorities) are operating under maximizing guidelines. The former seek to maximize scarce values, while the latter seek to maximize support. As with the economic model, the Eastonian self-adjusting process is dependent upon the interaction of maximizing individuals. Easton speaks of the actors as "demand-makers and support-givers." They are conceived as seeking to maximize values by demanding outputs from the authorities. If these demands are satisfied, they are more inclined to extend their support. Since, however, the values being allocated are by definition scarce, it follows that the increasing satisfaction of some actors must be accompanied by dissatisfaction on the part of other members. These disgruntled members begin to weaken in their support of the various political objects. But under the conditions stipulated by Easton's second assumption the authorities are seeking to maximize their support. Accordingly they respond by modifying the allocation of values in order to revive the flagging support of the dissatisfied members. In this fashion, therefore, the interplay of the maximizing behavior of the authorities and the political actors ensures that, in principle, support does not fall below the critical level. Given maximization on the part of the members of the system the mechanism behaves as an automatic and self-correcting Invisible Hand in that it maintains without anybody deliberately designing it the amount of support at such a level that the authoritative allocations of values can be performed.

Quite clearly the preceding refers to the operation of a heuristic model under ideal or optimal circumstances. As in the case of the "frictionless" world of physics there are no indications that such ideal political circumstances exist in the "real" world. Nor do they need to exist for the model to be useful. As Easton himself has noted in discussing the equilibrium concept[64] the economic model is useful not in providing "a substantive description of the empirical world"[65] but in providing the observer with a hypothetical condition to be used as a baseline in determining the factors which account for the divergence between the model and the empirical phenomena under consideration.

---

[61] The distinction between the goals of individuals and the goals of the system is one which Easton makes but often forgets. He frequently speaks of the goals of the individual members within the system as if they were the same as the system's goal. (For an illustration see *Systems Analysis*, p. 20. For a discussion of this topic see Peter Leslie, "General Theory in Political Science: A Critique of Easton's Systems Analysis," pp. 158–159 and Michael Evans, "Notes on David Easton's Model of the Political System," p. 131.) This conflation of the two types of goals is, however, inconsistent with the following essential propositions of Easton's approach. Thus, Easton constantly (and literally) refers to the system's self-regulating, self-directing and goal-setting capacities. He emphasizes the existence of automatic regulative homeostatic devices. He insists that "Here as in other areas of our analysis, the subjective or rational intentions of the actors do not necessarily dictate the consequences of their behavior for the system." (*Systems Analysis*, p. 433.) And, finally, he argues that the notion of "regulation" can be used meaningfully despite the absence of conscious and deliberate effort on the part of the actor(s) (*Ibid.*, pp. 115–116). One possible solution to this inconsistency is provided by Easton when he notes that individuals can deliberately and rationally create regulative devices which will help keep the variables of a system within their respective critical ranges (*Ibid.*, p. 116). In this sense there is no necessary contradiction. As we shall see, self-regulation does not occur within an institutional vacuum but requires a specific complex of institutions which may, of course, be deliberately created. Indeed, Adam Smith's market society had to be consciously fashioned after the mercantilist order was dismantled. But once the institutional framework of the market was created it automatically regulated the economic processes.

[62] *Systems Analysis*, p. 364.

[63] *Systems Analysis*, pp. 363–364. Easton lists two other assumptions which parallel those of classical economics: a) the authorities are competent to achieve whatever goal they select, b) they have the resources to do so. These two assumptions parallel the conception of the economic actor as having the information, rationality and resources to select and implement his decisions.

[64] *Political System*, pp. 266ff. For another useful discussion of the concept of equilibrium see Cynthia E. Russett, *The Concept of Equilibrium in American Social Thought* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

[65] *Political System*, p. 279.

### Some Implications and Consequences

Very early in *A Framework for Political Analysis* Easton wondered about "what kinds of commitments might be inadvertently undertaken if political life is characterized as a system of behavior and the implications of the description are pursued diligently."[66] The analogies which we have uncovered between Easton's and Smith's models help us in partially answering Easton's query by pointing to some of the consequences of conceiving political life as a self-correcting system of behavior. In this section, as in the previous ones, I will continue to take my bearings from the relatively better understood model of Adam Smith and see what insights, if any, they contribute to a deeper comprehension of Easton's model.

It should be clear from the previous discussion that Smith's self-correcting model cannot operate within a social vacuum. On the contrary, its optimal functioning requires fairly narrow and specifiable behavioral, cultural, and institutional conditions of operation. I propose to sketch briefly these conditions of operation and to investigate whether similar requirements can be specified for the optimal functioning of Easton's model.

### Cultural Prerequisites

We have seen that the self-correcting mechanism of Smith's model is inextricably linked to the maximizing behavior of producers and consumers. Yet, an unanswered question remains: What factors account for the individuals' maximizing drives? While the late Joseph Schumpeter admonished economists to shun this question and to take maximization as a given,[67] Talcott Parsons, on the other hand, appears to have shifted his intellectual interests from economics to sociology so as to deal better with the source of economic motivations. Parsons rejected the then prevalent view that economic motivation is a basic human drive. In his early work[68] and most notably in *The Structure of Social Action*,[69] Parsons followed the lead of Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim, and Weber in discerning a relationship between economic motivations and such factors as cultural norms and ethico-religious values. Parsons concluded that certain motivations had psychological origins but that the particular form of activity into which these motivations are translated by an individual depend upon the normative order inherent in the society's culture and institutions and upon the internalization of this order by the individual.[70]

This view that economic maximizing behavior is restricted to specific cultural milieus and is not an inborn and universal human trait has become widely accepted. Simon Kuznets, for instance, has noted that "the maximization principles are not truly a description of innate and inescapable characteristics of human 'nature' to be found regardless of the kind of society in which individuals operate."[71] This relationship of maximization and specific cultural norms suggests that as a mode of analysis Smith's model is only useful when applied to those historical periods and societies in which individuals behave in a maximizing fashion. That is to say, that while the model may be a valuable tool in studying the economic processes of those societies in which individuals are imbued with Max Weber's "Protestant ethic" it would be misleading if not totally inappropriate when applied to, say, the economic processes of the Bolivian Altiplano. In *The Political System* Easton noted this cultural requirement of economic theory:

> Economists . . . have consistently felt that their conclusions applied to all peoples everywhere. But increasingly economists are realizing that their laws of supply and demand are valid only in our contemporary culture and that it is possible to find cultures in which, under conditions of otherwise perfect competition, constant prices will be maintained even when supply falls off sharply. A people more bound to customary modes of living than we are in the West, will look askance at a society that permits its prices to fluctuate with the supply and demand. In economics the assumptions with regard to the motivations of human activity reflect not a general psychological theory of the way human beings behave but largely the way in which Western people were thought to behave. Economic theory is culturally conditioned at least to this extent.[72]

The inclusion of the principle of maximization within the conceptual framework of Easton's model raises essentially the same kind of question which we have seen in relation to Smith's model. Thus, for instance, although Easton could conceive of maximizing activities as an innate form of human behavior there is strong evidence that he has preferred the alternative route of conceiving it as a form of behavior which is determined by cultural factors.[73] That Easton takes this view is suggested by his intense interest in the process of socialization. This interest is not an accidental one, for his model forcefully draws our attention to value-maximizing behavior and to the means and processes responsible for the individual's acquisition of such patterns of behavior.

---

[66] *Framework,* p. 23.

[67] Joseph A. Schumpeter, *History of Economic Analysis* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 889. He succinctly states "A housewife's behavior on the market may be analyzed without going into the factors that formed it." See also Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), Vol. II, Chapter 14.

[68] "Economics and Sociology: Marshall in Relation to the Thought of His Time" and "Wants and Activities in Marshall" both in *The Quarterly Journal of Economics,* 66 (1931–32), 316–347 and 101–140.

[69] *The Structure of Social Action* (New York: The Free Press, 1968), 2 Vols.

[70] For a concise description of how an individual comes to regard the maximization of profits as desirable see "The Present Position and Prospects of Systematic Theory in Sociology" (p. 38) and "The Motivation of Economic Activities," (pp. 200–217) both in *Essays in Sociological Theory Pure and Applied* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949).

[71] Simon Kuznets, "Parts and Wholes in Economics" in *Parts and Wholes,* ed. Daniel Lerner (New York: The Free Press, 1963), pp. 52–53.

[72] *The Political System,* p. 33.

While the principle of maximization focuses our research attention on political socialization, a subject which has been receiving increasing attention within the profession, nevertheless, the principle simultaneously restricts the applicability of Easton's model to those societies in which the prevailing cultural context produces maximizing behavior. More specifically, the applicability of the model seems to be restricted to those societies in which the political actors are capable of conceiving political activity as a form of exchange of support for outputs. If, for the sake of argument, we accept Almond and Verba's classification of actor's outlooks (Parochial, Subject, and Participant)[74] it is clear that Easton's model would be maximally useful in analyzing a society in which most of the actors are imbued with the participant outlook. Conversely, the model's usefulness is severely limited in those instances where either Parochial or Subject outlooks predominate.[75] This not only restricts the range of applicability of Easton's model but also strongly suggests that it can best be applied to a specific type of society of which Western Democracies are probably the best examples.

## Institutional Requirements

If the maximization element in both models presupposes specific kinds of cultural environments, the same is true of the operation of the self-correcting mechanism which also requires a determinate type of institutional framework. Here I will be concerned with the following two questions: What are some of the institutional prerequisites of such a process? and Do we have reasonable grounds for presuming that some institutional frameworks are more conducive to self-adjustment than others?

One of the most studied and best understood aspects of the self-regulating model of Adam Smith is precisely that it requires a definite and specifiable institutional framework.[76] This is so well known that it does not seem to merit separate treatment. Suffice it to say that among the institutions which are required for the effective operation of the economic system as a self-regulating process we must include private property, division of labor, contracts, money, free market place, mobility of resources, atomistic competition, and a minimum amount of governmental intervention.[77]

---

[73] "We do not inherit our political behavior, attitudes, values, and knowledge through our genes. They must be learned in some way." David Easton and Jack Dennis, *Children in the Political System* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1969), p. 13.

[74] These three types of outlooks can be briefly described as follows: the parochial actor "expects nothing from the political system." The subject actor is predominantly oriented towards the "outputs, administrative, or 'down-ward flow' side of the political system." He still does not conceive of himself as an active participant. This is, in fact, the essential characteristic of the third type—the participant actor—who is oriented in an "activist" fashion towards "both the input and output aspects of the political system." Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), pp. 16–19. Since the authors are explicit in noting that the three types can exist simultaneously in a society the question of what percentage of actors has to be "participant" for Easton's model to function optimally has to be left to empirical investigation.

[75] Easton observes that peasant societies display "a kind of political impermeability, a long-suffering patience on the part of the general membership that leads to the acceptance of one's fate and either a complete absence of any thought of politicizing one's wants or an unquestioned stifling of any urge to do so." *Systems Analysis,* p. 109.

[76] Nathan Rosenberg states "Atomistic competition, absence of collusion, and mobility of resources are not nearly sufficient to establish the linkage between unhampered pursuit of self-interest and social well-being. Smith himself clearly realized this. Indeed large portions of his *Wealth of Nations* are specifically devoted to analyzing the nature of the appropriate institutional framework." "Some Institutional Aspects of the Wealth of Nations," *The Journal of Political Economy,* 68 (Dec., 1960), 558–559. Mark Blaug concurs: "What distinguishes Smith's theory of economic development . . . from later and even from more recent efforts in the subject is a continuous harking back to the framework of social institutions that harness and channel pecuniary motives. So frequently accused of *Harmonielehre,* the vulgar doctrine of the spontaneous harmony of interests, Smith instead seems to be forever emphasizing that the powerful motive of self-interest is only enlisted in the cause of the general welfare under definite institutional arrangements." *Economic Theory in Retrospect,* p. 63.

[77] The literature on this point is voluminous. The following are some of the general accounts of the institutional requirements of the classical model. Joseph Schumpeter, *The Theory of Economic Development; An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle,* trans. by R. Opie (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 59, footnote 1; George Stigler, "Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated," *Essays in the History of Economics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 234–238; Chandler Morse, "Becoming versus Being Modern: An Essay on Institutional and

The case is different, however, with the relatively unknown role played by "feedback" in Adam Smith's model and, therefore, it deserves a more detailed analysis. Although most commentators usually do not associate the concept of feedback with anything historically prior to the invention of the Watt's steam engine regulator it is, nevertheless, a central element in Adam Smith's model.[78]

Easton has noted that "strictly speaking and customarily, the concept 'feedback' applies only to information. It is on the basis of the information returning to decision-makers that they are able to regulate or 'correct' their behavior."[79] Regardless of the medium through which the messages are transmitted, the necessity of feedback seems to be implied by the notions of maximization and self-regulation. That is to say, somehow the actor must be made aware "of the extent of deviation from the desired course of action"[80] so that he may modify his behavior. The very fact that there is alteration of behavior among the actors in Smith's model already points to the existence of some peculiarly economic medium of communication. Talcott Parsons, who has made a detailed analysis of how information is transmitted in the economic model, suggests that money not only serves the traditional functions (i.e., medium of exchange, measure of value) but it also serves as a "specialized language, i.e., a generalized medium of communication through the use of symbols given meaning within a code."[81] When seen in this light, Adam Smith's maximizing actor can be regarded as correcting his behavior on the basis of information feedback conveyed to him either by his revenue (if he is a seller) or by the prices of the commodities (if he is a buyer), both of which are symbolized or "coded" in monetary terms.[82] The evidence suggests, therefore, that the optimal functioning of a self-regulating economic system presupposes a specific set of institutions (e.g., market place, money economy, perfect competition, etc.) and that, consequently, as a mode of analysis Adam Smith's model is best suited to those societies possessing the required institutional factors.

The need for feedback can be regarded as one of the identifying characteristics of Easton's approach. Easton indicates that under present circumstances the transmission of information through a wide variety of mediums is a "central condition" for self-regulating political systems.[83] Without such information the authorities would lack knowledge about the level of support existing within the system and the effect their outputs are having upon it. Without that kind of information "each output would be a purely random shot in the dark."[84]

The question of which institutional arrangements, if any, are more conducive to the performance of the essential feedback function is less explicitly settled, but a reasonably accurate estimate can be made. Easton's model seems to be better suited for an analysis of what he calls "modern mass societies." Within this broad range of mass societies a reading of Easton's works leaves the distinct impression that, all things considered, he believes that a democratic institutional framework can handle the feedback process in the best possible manner. I will now discuss some of the evidence from which this inference is drawn.[85]

Easton hypothesizes, for instance, that both the number and the differentiation of feedback channels are important variables in considering how well any given system is likely to handle feedback information.[86] Too few and/or relatively undifferentiated channels might lead to what Easton suggestively calls "information overload." In such cases the " . . . queuing up of information about the condition of supportive sentiments, complete neglect of part of it, confusion or disorganization with their attendant delays, could not be

---

Economic Development," in *Modernization by Design; Social Change in the Twentieth Century* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), p. 304. On a more specific level we have: Warren Samuels, "The Classical Theory of Economic Policy: Non-legal Social Control," *The Southern Economic Journal,* 31 (July, 1964), 1-20, and (Oct., 1966) 87-100; Nathan Rosenberg, "Some Institutional Aspects of the *Wealth of Nations,"*; Joseph Cropsey, *Polity and Economy. An Interpretation of the Principles of Adam Smith* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1957); Sidney Pollard, *The Idea of Progress, History and Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1968), Chapter II, 119-195, and Mark Blaug *Economic Theory in Retrospect,* p. 63.

[78] See, for instance, F. K. Berrien, *General and Social Systems* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1968), p. 117, and Karl W. Deutsch, "Mechanism, Organism and Society: Some Models in Natural and Social Science," *Philosophy of Science* 18 (July, 1951), 230-252.

[79] *Systems Analysis,* p. 366.

[80] *Systems Analysis,* p. 379.

[81] Talcott Parsons, "On the Concept of Influence," pp. 357 ff; "On the Concept of Political Power," pp. 306 ff., and "Some Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Process," pp. 272 ff.; all in *Sociological Theory and Modern Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1967).

[82] For a description of negative feedback in economic analysis see Paul A. Samuelson, "Some Notions on Causality and Teleology in Economics," in *Cause and Effect* ed. Daniel Lerner (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 99-143.

[83] *Systems Analysis,* p. 371.

[84] *Systems Analysis,* p. 365.

[85] Thomas Thorson has previously suggested that Easton's model seems to be a generalized version of the American political process. *Biopolitics,* p. 61.

[86] *Systems Analysis,* p. 418.

avoided."[87] The solution, of course, is to provide an increased number of communication channels which would be directed at "a greater variety of targets among the authorities."[88] When these necessarily abstract considerations are translated into concrete structures they suggest that a pluralistic and structurally differentiated set of political institutions is in a better position to handle information overload problems than, say, a traditional dictatorship or even a totalitarian one-party system. And, when the levels of pluralism and structural differentiation are used as criteria of measurement, few political systems can approximate the levels attained by democratic regimes.

If a high level of structural differentiation already points in the direction of democratic institutional frameworks as being the best equipped to deal with feedback processes then this suggestion is considerably strengthened by several other considerations. Thus, for example, Easton argues that the norms of a democratic system tremendously facilitate the operation of a feedback process:

> These norms permit greater freedom of entry into the political market place for new organizations that seek to collect and transmit supportive sentiments. They also encourage a greater diffusion and competition among the collecting points and a greater decentralization of control over and timing of discharge of discontent. Hence the number of storage facilities for gathering and synthesizing supportive sentiments is limited only by what is practical and possible. Furthermore, the norms of democratic regimes encourage easy discharge of sentiments. On the one hand, the members themselves are encouraged to communicate freely and frequently with the authorities. On the other, the authorities operate within assiduously cultivated norms that all of them,—representative, administrators, even judges—ought to keep their ear to the ground for expression of popular sentiments. The channels of communications are to be kept open between members and the authorities as well as among the members themselves, so that they may join forces in seeking to obtain attention for their feedback response.[89]

Finally, in the output phase of the feedback loop the evidence for the thesis that democratic institutions facilitate the operation of the feedback processes becomes somewhat more conclusive. Easton indicates the closing of the feedback loop depends on the likelihood that the authorities are willing to respond to the incoming information. That is to say, the successful completion of the feedback process must be based upon the "responsiveness" of the authorities. This means that

> . . . the authorities are willing to take the information into account and give it consideration in their outputs and second, that they do so positively in the sense that they seek to use it to help avert discontent or to satisfy grievances over the initial outputs or some unfulfilled demand.[90]

That is a reasonably accurate description of the operational code of democratic representatives. Easton goes further to dispel most of the remaining doubts when he identifies the two factors which are likely to influence the responsiveness of the authorities. The first is what Easton calls "the social and political distance of the authorities." This factor, which includes "the sympathies of the authorities, their capacity to understand and appreciate sensitively the problems and demands of others, their intuitive ability to foresee emerging wants of members, and their general attunement to the perspectives and ambitions of various parts of the politically relevant members in a system will help to establish the kind of attention they pay to feedback response from such members."[91] While this kind of sympathetic outlook among those in power is not the exclusive property of any particular type of political system, nevertheless, the institutional arrangements of democratic regimes are so designed as to encourage it among the authorities. The prime reason for this is, of course, the second factor mentioned by Easton[92]—the existence of formal sanctions—which can be applied in cases of nonresponsiveness. While such sanctions may or may not exist in nondemocratic regimes, the crucial difference is that in democratic regimes they are institutionalized. Indeed, the provision of institutional mechanisms for the implementation of sanctions against nonresponsive authorities seems to be one of the defining characteristics of democratic systems.

In brief, our preceding discussion suggests that the effective operation of the feedback loop, and thus of the whole self-adjusting process, requires very definite institutional arrangements that in broad terms have been associated historically with democratic regimes. This conclusion should not come as a surprise if we accept the basic conceptual correspondence between the logical structures of the two self-adjusting, self-regulating models which we have been discussing. Moreover, it would be difficult to conceive of a process of self-regulation which would function regardless of the environmental conditions in which it was placed.[93] While some form of economic activity is present in all societies, nevertheless, self-adjusting economic processes only exist, if at all, within specifiable societal conditions. Similarly, Easton's notion that all societies must have political activities to allocate scarce values may or may not be true. But the preceding analysis suggests that a self-adjusting, self-directing system for the authoritative allocation of values only occurs, if at all, within specific societal conditions. Since not all institutional contexts are equally conducive to the performance of the feedback and self-adjusting tasks, the model of a self-regulating political system is most applicable to those historical societies possessing the appropriate set of institutions. We need to be cautious, therefore, and avoid the mechanical application of the systems model to societies lacking the necessary institutional characteristics.[94]

---

[87] *Systems Analysis,* p. 420.

[88] *Systems Analysis,* p. 420.

[89] *Systems Analysis,* p. 428.

[90] *Systems Analysis,* p. 434.

[91] *Systems Analysis,* p. 437.

[92] *Systems Analysis,* p. 435.

[93] This seems to be true of all self-regulating mechanisms whether they be physiological, cybernetic or economic in nature.

### Predictive Conditions

One might concede the preceding arguments concerning the conditions of operation of Easton's model yet wonder whether they unnecessarily restrict its range of applicability with no visible compensating gain. I believe, however, that there is an advantageous trade-off involved. It is true that in restricting its range of applicability we may have to abandon the claim of the model's universal relevancy. But it is also true that the model achieves its maximum predictive potential only in the limited number of instances where the specified conditions of operation are present.

It seems, in fact, that from the point of view of the observer, it is precisely the system's self-adjusting capacity which allows for a measure of predictability. In other words, the significant property of a system, and that which makes it highly attractive to the scientific interests of the observer is that out of all possible future states, the system seeks to attain a particular one. As we know, this equifinality is essentially the result of the self-regulatory process operating within the specified sociocultural context. It is this context, this "Logic of the situation"[95] which creates what Spiro J. Latsis has recently called "Situational Determinism."[96] That is, the motions of the system, and the behavior of the actors within it are predictable precisely because they are operating not in a vacuum but in a highly structured situation. Thus, for instance, "the inexorable logic of a competitive situation"[97] in which maximizing agents are placed, allowed classical economists to predict the behavior of buyers and sellers and to delineate the motions of the system. Likewise, to achieve its maximum predictive potential, Easton's model requires its own version of "situational determinism." As I have attempted to show in my previous discussion, this logic of the situation seems to be provided by a framework of democratic institutions.

It would be inaccurate to conclude, however, that the preceding implies some kind of determinism, a vision of robotlike actors mindlessly behaving without any reference to their own wishes, goals, or intentions. To be sure, this equifinality involved in the system's behavior does indeed suggest some form of determinism. But it is a determinism of a peculiar sort. It applies at the macro level but not at the micro level. In fact, if the "determinism" implied in the system's equifinality is to exist, "freedom" must be operative at the micro level.[98] That is to say, the postulated equifinality of the system directly and necessarily depends upon the effective capacity of the actors to choose among various alternative courses of action. The self-correcting mechanism cannot operate if men constantly behave in an unchanging fashion. On the contrary, the system's self-correcting behavior is partly the result of the actors' capacity to modify their activities on the basis of information feedback.

This can be illustrated by referring once again to the respective models of Adam Smith and David Easton. In the former, if the economic system is to reach its maximum feasible level of production, both producers and consumers must be capable of choosing among different courses of action. In the latter, the maintenance of a level of support above the critical threshold presupposes the ability of the authorities to select among various policy alternatives. Neither model assumes mindless, passive actors. In both instances the actors are able to choose among alternative courses of action but are influenced in their decision by the "logic of the situation" created by the institutional framework in which they are placed.[99]

---

[94] For a similar conclusion concerning the limitations of Easton's model in the international arena see M. B. Nicholson and P. A. Reynolds, "General Systems, The International System and The Eastonian Analysis," *Political Studies,* 15, No. 1 (1967), 12–31.

[95] Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies,* Vol. II, page 97.

[96] Spiro J. Latsis, "Situational Determinism in Economics," *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,* 23 (1972), 207–245.

[97] *Ibid.,* p. 223.

[98] This formulation of free will within a context of apparent systemic necessity has a long and outstanding pedigree. For instance, Kant long ago noted that the study of history "if it examines the free exercise of the human will *on a large scale,* it will be able to discover a regular progression among freely willed actions." He continues, "individual men and even entire nations little imagine that, while they are pursuing their own ends, each in his own way and often in opposition to others, they are unwittingly guided in their advance along a course intended by nature. They are unconsciously promoting an end which, even if they knew what it was would scarcely arouse their interests." "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose" in *Kant's Political Writings,* ed. Hans Reiss, trans. by H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 41 (Emphasis in the original.)

[99] This "logic of the situation" is one possible manner to deal effectively with the vexing problem of

## Conclusion

I have tried to show that the areas of similarities and analogies between the respective models of Adam Smith and David Easton are numerous as well as revealing. These analogies have provided a means to dispel various misconceptions concerning Easton's model while allowing us to indicate several areas in need of further clarification. If my analysis is reasonably accurate, then some of the pressing tasks facing Easton's approach are the careful determination of the precise behavioral, cultural, and institutional conditions of operation required for a self-regulating, self-directing political system.

Finally, the similarities between the two models suggest another interesting avenue of inquiry related to the history of ideas. Contrary to conventional wisdom, systems analysis seems part of a longer intellectual tradition than might be suspected. Rather than being intimately connected to the modern invention of the servomechanism, the systems model can plausibly be traced back at least to the model of classical economics and perhaps even to some of the teleological conceptions of Aristotle.

---

self-fulfilling and self-defeating predictions in the social sciences. (Easton, *Political System*, pp. 24–31). On this topic see the recent exchange in the *British Journal of Political Science* starting with Claude Ake's, "The Scientific Status of Political Science," 2 (January, 1972), 109–115 and especially the comments of Ian Budge, "A Comment on Self-fulfilling and Self-defeating Predictions," 3 (April, 1973), 249–250, and my reply "The Scientific Status of Political Science. A Note on the Oedipus Effect," 4 (April, 1974), 254–256.

# Voter Turnout Among the American States: Systemic and Individual Components*

JAE-ON KIM
*National Opinion Research Center* and *The University of Iowa*,

JOHN R. PETROCIK
*National Opinion Research Center* and *University of California, Los Angeles*

STEPHEN N. ENOKSON
*The University of Iowa*

## Introduction

Almost all modern states subscribe to the principle of universal adult suffrage, but in no state is the actual voter participation universal. As individuals differ from one another in their likelihood of voting at a particular election, so do groups in their rate of voting. For example, in the 1960 presidential election, which had the highest overall voter turnout in recent history (64 per cent), less than 26 per cent of the adult population in the state of Mississippi cast their ballots. The persistence of inequality of such a magnitude calls for an explanation.[1]

The main objective of this study is to examine the sources of variation in the voter turnout among the American states. More specifically, its goal is to evaluate the relative importance of socioeconomic, legal and political factors for turnout variation among the states in the 1960 presidential election by combining information about individual behavior obtained from survey data, with information about the state obtained from the 1960 census, from aggregate election statistics, and from published election rules.

## Existing Studies and Their Findings

Several studies have noted the importance of: (1) variation in the rules governing registration and voting; (2) variation in the competitiveness of elections and parties; and (3) variation in the socioeconomic or "demographic" composition of the electorate in explaining variation in voter turnout among such aggregate units as states and cities.

In studying the importance of legal factors in voter turnout among the American states, Milbrath presents an inventory of items that are associated with turnout rate: (1) registration requirements, which includes existence or absence of permanent registration, general civilian absentee registration, precinct registration and closing time for registration; (2) residency requirements; (3) literacy test requirements; (4) absentee ballots, and (5) polling hours.[2] In a study of differences in registration rate among *cities*, Kelley, Ayres, and Bowen corroborate Milbrath's general findings by concluding that "differences in the turnout for elections are to a large extent related to local differences in rates of registration, and these in turn reflect to a considerable degree local differences in the rules governing . . . and . . . handling . . . the registering of voters."[3] Similarly, in their classic study of the electorate, Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes find that individuals in states with restrictive registration and voting requirements are less likely to vote than citizens in more liberal states, although better educated and highly motivated individuals tend to overcome these barriers.[4] Finally, the President's Commission on Registration and Voting Participation concluded that one of the major reasons for the

---

* We are grateful to David Payne, Hallowell Pope, James P. Smith, and Allen Bluedorn for their critical reading of the earlier draft, and to Susan M. Muse for her editorial assistance. For the research reported in this paper, the authors were supported in part by an Old Gold Faculty Research Fellowship from The University of Iowa, and by the Cross-National Project on Social and Political Change.

[1] Variation in the amount of voter turnout among the American states has been diminishing in recent elections. But substantial differences still exist, especially between the South and non-South as has been the case for the last century. See Walter Dean Burnham, "The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe," *The American Political Science Review*, 59 (March, 1965), 7–28; William H. Flanigan, *Political Behavior of the American Electorate* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968), p. 16; Lester W. Milbrath, "Political Participation in the States," in *Politics in the American States*, ed. Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), pp. 25–60.

[2] Milbrath, "Political Participation in the States," pp. 45–50.

[3] Stanley Kelley, Jr., Richard Ayres and William G. Bowen, "Registration and Voting: Putting First Things First," *American Political Science Review*, 61 (June, 1967), 359–377.

[4] Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley, 1960), Chapter 11, esp. pp. 276–286.

nonvoting of some 35 million age-eligible citizens in 1960 was the restrictive voting laws under which they lived.[5]

The importance of interparty competition and electoral competitiveness for voter turnout is equally well documented.[6] Anthony Downs argues that if the expected outcome of voting is clearly onesided, there are no rational grounds for an individual to vote given the effort voting requires from the individual and the low probability that he can have a visible effect on the outcome.[7] Kelley et al., following the same logic, argue that a high degree of electoral competitiveness would increase the value of an individual's vote, and therefore would increase, first, the incentive for people to vote and, second, the incentive for parties and politicians to get them to vote.[8] V. O. Key, Jr., in his *Southern Politics* pointed out that although voter turnout was very low in the general election in most areas of the South, turnout for primaries was considerably higher, often approaching the norm for general elections in the rest of the country. The reason for this, he argued, was that the effective election was the primary, where competition was strong, while the general elections amounted to little more than a publicly required ratification of a previous decision.[9] Burnham has used the competition turnout hypothesis to explain extensive historical changes in voter turnout in the United States.[10] According to Burnham the major reason for the decline of voter participation in this country around the turn of the century can be traced to the dominance of the Republican party following the election of 1896. After displacing the Democratic party in that election, the Republicans were the effective government of the country until the realignment of 1928–1936. Had it not been for splits in the Republican party in 1912 and 1916 there probably would not have been a Democratic president during that period. Under these conditions, Burnham argues, there developed a general apathy regarding elections; an apathy that could be measured in a number of different ways but was clearly seen in the sharp decline in turnout beginning about 1896–1898.[11]

The importance of the third factor, of "socioeconomic," "demographic," or "background" variables, is noted in a series of classic survey studies on voting.[12] For instance, Lipset notes that, throughout Western democracies, "Men vote more than women; the better educated more than the less educated; urban residents, more than rural; those between 35 and 55, more than younger or older voters; married persons, more than unmarried; higher-status persons, more than lower; members of organizations, more than nonmembers."[13] One may add to this list, differences between whites and blacks, long-time residents and newcomers, etc.

There is no doubt that these three factors all affect voter turnout among the states. But the traditional analyses of turnout suffer, in our opinion, from one or more of the following three weaknesses: (1) they are generally anecdotal and examine only one factor at a time, thus ignoring the multivariate character of the problem; (2) they use ecological correlations to adjust for the relationships at the individual level; or (3) they do not clearly delineate the theoretical meaning of "socioeconomic" factors. These points are illustrated in the following discussion.

(1) Milbrath in an otherwise very comprehensive account of voter turnout among the states provides an example of the first weakness. He first establishes that probability of an individual's voting is affected by his socioeconomic status. Yet in his later analysis of the impact of legal setting on voter turnout, he fails to control for the confounding effects of the "socioeconomic" factors.[14]

---

[5] Report of the President's Commission on Registration and Voting Participation (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1963).

[6] Among others whose studies we do not specifically comment on are Campbell et al., *American Voter*, Chapter 11; Milbrath, "Political Participation in the States"; Richard E. Dawson, "Social Development, Party Composition and Policy," in *The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development*, ed. William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 203–237.

[7] Anthony Downs, *Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1957). See Chapter 14 in particular.

[8] Kelley et al., "Registration and Voting . . .", p. 360.

[9] V. O. Key, *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: Knopf, 1951), Chapter 29.

[10] Burnham, "Changing Shape of the American Political Universe," and his "End of Party Politics," *Transaction*, 7 (December, 1969), 12–22.

[11] Gerald F. Rusk, "The Effect of the Australian Ballot Reform on Voting: 1876–1908," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (December, 1970), 1220–1238, for a counter argument; and, for further elaboration on this counter argument, see Phillip E. Converse, "Change in the American Electorate" in *The Human Meaning of Social Change*, ed. Angus Campbell and Phillip Converse (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1972).

[12] We will cite only a few: Campbell et al., *The American Voter;* Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), Chapters 11 and 12; Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964); Seymour Lipset, *Political Man*, Garden City, N.Y.: (Doubleday, Anchor Books Edition 1963), Chapter 3; Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality* (New York: Harper, 1972).

[13] Lipset, *Political Man*, p. 187.

[14] Milbrath, "Participation in the American States."

Therefore, when he concludes that the states with the least facilitating legal systems have the lowest turnout, it is not clear whether this is due to their restrictive rules or to the socioeconomic disadvantages of its voters, because states with more restrictive legal structures tend to be states with a disproportionate number of individuals of low socioeconomic status. An examination of the relationship between party competition and voter turnout, without adjusting for the confounding effects of socioeconomic and legalistic factors, faces the same problem.

(2) The second weakness is found in studies that, while recognizing the multivariate nature of the problem, fail to account adequately for the confounding effects of socioeconomic factors because of an exclusive reliance on aggregate data. Matthews and Prothro's study of black registration in the South, and Kelley, Ayres, and Bowen's[15] research on voter registration would fall into this category. In both cases the researchers controlled for the effects of the socioeconomic factors by adjusting for the correlation of turnout with such aggregate statistics as median income and the percentage of blacks in a city or county. In doing so, they assumed that the correlations at the aggregate level correctly reflect correlations at the individual level.[16] (The inadequacy of this assumption will be commented on later.)

(3) The third weakness of traditional analyses originates from the exclusive use of aggregate statistics. This weakness is widely found in the interpretation of so-called "socioeconomic" factors in studies using aggregate data.[17] Whether or not a state has a competitive party structure or an election management system that is conducive to voting is a variable that has no direct counterpart among individual characteristics. Such systemic differences represent more than a simple aggregation of individual characteristics; they represent the characteristics of the political system itself. On the other hand, such correlates of voting as education, income, age, sex, race, and urban-rural residence have a clearer meaning as characteristics of individuals than they do as characteristics of the political system.[18] Of course, these variables can be aggregated and treated as system level variables. For instance, the level of community wealth may have some impact on voter turnout above and beyond the relationship shown at the individual level. What is analytically crucial is the implied, if not explicit, inference about the relationship between the explanatory variables and the phenomenon to be explained.

When a researcher aggregates these individual characteristics at the system level into variables such as median income or proportion of blacks in the population, and introduces them as explanatory variables, he has basically three options for making inferences: systemic, individual or noncommittal. If he introduces these variables because it is known that individuals with higher incomes, for instance, are more likely to participate in voting than individuals with lower incomes, his reasoning is *individual*, and the variables should be treated as such. If, however, he introduces them as measures of system characteristics—indicators of the wealth of the community, or of black-white cleavage—his inference is *systemic*. Most studies cite survey research as the basis of their reasoning behind the inclusion of "socioeconomic" or "demographic" factors in their analysis of voter turnout, but in the process of aggregate data analysis the conceptual distinction between socioeconomic factors as *individual* components and socioeconomic factors as *systemic* variables is either ignored or obliterated.[19]

## Hierarchical Decomposition of Individual and Systemic Effects

Our approach differs from those traditionally employed in recognizing the duality of aggregate voting rates. On the one hand, states can differ in their voting rates solely because they differ in the social composition of their electorates. For instance, if better-educated individuals are more likely to vote than less-educated, a state that has proportionately more well-educated individuals will have a higher voting rate than a state with proportionately fewer well-educated, other things being equal. On the other hand, if facilitative election rules and party structure increase voter turnout, states with more facilitative systemic characteristics will have higher turnout than states with similar social composition but less facilitative systemic characteristics. The first component (socioeconomic) is no more than the simple aggregation of effects that are operating at the individual level, while the second (facilitative legal and electoral structures) is clearly a system level effect.

---

[15] Kelley et al., "Registration and Voting," and Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, "Political Factors and Negro Voter Registration in the South," *American Political Science Review,* 57 (June, 1963), 355–367.

[16] For a discussion of ecological fallacies, see W. S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlation and the Behavior of Individuals," *American Sociological Review,* 15 (June, 1950), 351–357; also Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "A Typology of Ecological Fallacies," in *Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences,* ed. Mattei Dogan and Stein Rokkan (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1969), pp. 69–86.

[17] Most studies based on aggregate data analysis have a tendency to mix the two meanings of socioeconomic factors. For example, see Kelley et al., "Registration and Voting," and Matthew and Prothro, "Political Factors and Negro Voter Registration."

[18] For a discussion of several types of variables, see Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Herbert Menzel, "On the Relation between Individual and Collective Properties," in *Complex Organizations,* ed. Amitai Etzioni (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), pp. 422–440.

[19] We are not saying that socioeconomic factors can only be used at the individual level. In studies of the policy output of states or the stability of the system as a whole, the level of economic development may be a significant variable apart from the relationships at the individual level.

Recognizing this duality, the first task of this analysis is to estimate the individualistic component by combining (a) information about the relationship between voting and socioeconomic characteristics at the individual level with (b) the socioeconomic composition of the electorate of each state. Having estimated the individualistic component of turnout, the second task is to examine the impacts of system level variables on the residual variations not accounted for by the individualistic component. (The specific techniques and data used for each task will be discussed in greater detail in separate sections.)

A few general methodological issues which must be mentioned at this point include: (1) the relevance of the 1960 presidential election; (2) the relevance of the state as a unit of analysis; and (3) the appropriateness of the hierarchy implied in the analysis. First, the 1960 election was used because it was the most recent election for which a complete socio-demographic profile of each state from the 1960 census, a national survey of the presidential election, and a compilation of legal restrictions on voting for every state was readily available.[20]

Second, although the state is frequently too big an ecological unit for many analyses, its relevance for the current study can be readily justified. Prior to recent Supreme Court rulings, control of the franchise was an exclusive prerogative of the states. The "Time, Places and Manner" Clause of the First Article of the Constitution, the reserve power in the Tenth Amendment, and tradition have left to the states almost complete jurisdiction for the regulation of elections. Specific reference to the powers of the national government on this matter are few. Even with the passage of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment regarding the 18-year-old vote and recent Court rulings against state restrictions that work specifically against blacks, the preeminent authority for election management in the United States is still the individual state. In studying electoral competitiveness, it is true one cannot always use the state as a relevant unit because congressional elections and most local elections are dependent upon party organizations that are active at the county or municipal levels.[21] With respect to presidential elections, however, the electoral college—which is a state institution—legally elects the president, and because of its "unit rule" a state is either won or lost. Therefore, whether presidential elections are competitive at the state level is meaningful.

The third issue is the acceptability of the hierarchical controls utilized in this study. The analysis gives implicit priority to individual as against systemic variables, but this does not necessarily reflect the conviction that one set of variables is more fundamental than any other. If both system level information and survey data existed for each state, it would not be necessary to follow the sequential data analysis employed here. The simultaneous examination of inter- and intrasystem variation would allow the detection, not only of the additive impacts of individual and systemic factors, but also their possible interaction. Unfortunately, such a data set is not available and is not likely to be available in the near future; therefore, a heuristic hierarchical assumption that individual characteristics are more important than systemic characteristics has been made.[22]

---

[20] The ideal design would replicate this analysis for several elections. Longitudinal design would permit a more complete test of these components. Changes instituted by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the 1970 amendments to it and the 26th Amendment along with the Republican effort to mobilize the South will be a pertinent subject of analysis and may provide some keys to the controversy over the relative importance of party competitiveness and legal structures for voter turnout and electoral systems in general. See Burnham, "Changing Shape of the American Political Universe" on the one side, and Converse, "Change in the American Electorate" and Rusk, "The Effect of the Australian Ballot" on the other side.

[21] V. O. Key, *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups* (New York: Crowell, 1956, Third Ed.), p. 305.

[22] Such a hierarchical assumption is often made in analyzing the effects of correlated factors even if the full data set is available. See the section on the decomposition of two systemic factors in Table 5. One of the readers suggested the possibility of coding systemic factors on the survey data. The resultant analysis at the individual level would eliminate the problems of committing the ecological fallacy and allow the examination of interaction effect between the systemic (contextual) variables and other individual characteristics. Furthermore, it would eliminate the problems of weighting (see footnote 34). For our analyses, the liabilities of such a procedure seem to outweigh its advantages. First, the SRC sample does not contain every state; second, even for the states that are included, the sample for any particular state is too small to be a reliable representation of the state; third, the SRC sample design is not meant to be representative samples of each state, but rather of the U.S. as a whole; fourth, different sample sizes for different states, coupled with an overall small sample size, would make variance decomposition very unreliable; finally, the focus of this study is not the probability of voting of the individuals, but rather the variation in voter turnout among the states.

### Individual Effects and Their Aggregation

The analysis of individual components in turn involves two specific steps. In the first, national survey data (collected by the Survey Research Center in 1960) are used to estimate the effects of socio-demographic variables on voting at the individual level. As previously mentioned, a comparative analysis of voting participation across the states would require survey data for each state in addition to system level data.[23] If such data sets were available, it would be possible to examine whether the effect of individualistic variables and systemic variables is interactive rather than additive—for example, whether the relationship between the educational attainment of an individual and his likelihood of voting varies from state to state. In using a national sample, which does not allow an examination of each state it was assumed that the relationship among such variables as education and voting are uniform across the states.[24] There are many variables known to be associated with the individual's voting—education, age, race, income, occupation, length of residency, size of place of residence, sex, and religion being some of them. Among these we considered only four—race, age, education, and income—ignoring such variables as occupational status, community size (urban-rural), sex, and religious affiliation. Occupational status is not considered, partly because the detailed coding categories are not transferable between survey data and census publications.[25] Sex was excluded because there is little interstate variation in sex composition. But the most relevant justification for excluding any of these latter variables can be made on the basis of redundancy. Given the four variables—income, education, age, and race—the addition of these other variables does not appreciably increase the predictability of individual voting.[26]

The figures in Table 1 represent the per cent

**Table 1. Expected Voter Turnout by the Social Characteristics of the Individual**

(Percentage voting expressed as deviations from the national turnout)

| Social Characteristics | Not Controlling for Other Characteristics | Controlling for All Characteristics |
|---|---|---|
| Education Level | | |
| Less than 5 years | −20.2 | −12.1 |
| 5 to 7 years | −12.4 | − 6.4 |
| 8 years | − 5.0 | − 5.6 |
| 1 to 3 years high school | − 9.4 | − 5.2 |
| 4 years high school | 7.7 | 8.3 |
| 1 to 3 years college | 8.9 | 10.0 |
| College graduate or more | 14.6 | 12.8 |
| Family Income | | |
| Less than $2,000 | −15.5 | −13.1 |
| $2,000–2,999 | −15.4 | − 9.7 |
| $3,000–3,999 | − 2.1 | − 1.5 |
| $4,000–4,999 | − 4.3 | − 4.4 |
| $5,000–5,999 | 5.8 | 6.0 |
| $6,000–7,499 | 5.9 | 5.0 |
| $7,500–9,999 | 10.4 | 8.1 |
| $10,000 or more | 9.1 | 1.3 |
| Age | | |
| Under 24 | −35.1 | −30.0 |
| 25–34 | − 3.4 | − 5.1 |
| 35–44 | 0.6 | − 2.1 |
| 45–54 | 4.7 | 4.0 |
| 55–64 | 3.7 | 10.4 |
| 65 and over | − 1.7 | 11.3 |
| Race | | |
| Black | −29.0 | −18.6 |
| White | 2.9 | 2.1 |
| National Turnout | 64.2 | 64.2 |

---

[23] For an excellent discussion of comparative studies, see Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* (New York: Wiley, 1970).

[24] Examples of such relationships are found in Campbell et al., *American Voter,* and Verba and Nie, *Participation in American Political Life.* Also, see Walter Dean Burnham and John Sprague, "Additive and Multiplicative Models of the Voting Universe: The Case of Pennsylvania: 1960–1968," *American Political Science Review,* 64 (June, 1970), 471–490. For an interesting discussion of comparability and hidden uniformities in the relationships among variables across the nations, see also Sidney Verba, "Cross National Survey Research: The Problem of Credibility," in *Comparative Methodologies: Changes and Continuities,* ed. Ivan Vallier (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972). More important, lack of additivity does not automatically invalidate the current procedure, however. The examination of residuals would indicate any gross deviations from the additive model, and such indirect information may be of some value.

[25] Gross categorization—professionals, white collar, skilled worker, farmer, etc.—can be made transferrable between the two different data sets. Such categorizations of occupation, however, do not add much to the predictability of individual voting when education and income of the individual are already known. See footnote 26.

[26] The multiple correlation between voting and the four variables—education, income, age and race—is .350. The addition of religion, residency, occupation, and sex increases the multiple $r$ to .369. It may also be noted that most survey reports do not employ truly multivariate analysis. In particular, many comments in Lipset's *Political Man* with respect to factors affecting voting are based on serial examination of each rather than on multivariate control (Chapter 6). For a multivariate analysis of

voting expressed as deviations from the national mean. Numbers in the first column represent the expected turnout deviation for each category of each variable. The meaning of these numbers is straightforward. For example, people with less than five years of formal schooling had a voting rate 20.2 per cent below the national average, while people with a college education or better had a voting rate 14.6 per cent above the national average. These numbers are no more than the mean voting rates of each category, expressed as deviations from the national mean. As a point of reference the average turnout of age-eligible voters in the 1960 presidential election is presented at the bottom row of the table.[27]

The numbers in the second column have the same meaning as the numbers in the first except that they are the residual deviations; they are the difference from the mean having controlled for the effects of the other variables. For example, −12.1 associated with educational level "less than 5 years" means that if an adjustment is made for the fact that people with lower education are likely to have less income, to be blacks rather than whites, and to be old rather than young, their expected turnout would be 12.1 per cent less than the national average. One possible interpretation of these numbers is to consider them indications of the *net* "effect" of each characteristic.

The actual procedure used in obtaining these numbers was multiple regression with dummy variables. The same result can be obtained either by multiple classification analysis or by Guttman-Hayashi techniques. For those not familiar with the technique, we note that the expected turnout of any group (representing any combination of the categories of these four variables) can be obtained by the formula:

$$y = 64.2 + E_i + F_j + A_k + R_1,$$

where $E$, $F$, $A$, $R$ and their subscripts represent particular numbers in the second column of Table 1. $E_i$ stands for one category in Educational Level, $F_j$, $A_k$ and $R_1$, likewise stand for categories in Family Income, Age and Race, respectively. For example, the expected voter turnout for people with four years of high school, with family incomes ranging between $2,000 and $3,000, who are white and are over 65 would be:

$$64.2 + (7.7) + (-15.4) + (-1.7) + (2.9) = 57.7(\%).$$[28]

The second step calculates the expected turnout variation of each state, given that individuals with particular characteristics are more (or less) likely to vote than others, and given the compositional profile of the state's electorate. The information about the socio-demographic composition of each state is extracted from publications based on the 1960 census.[29]

Given these two types of information, the calculation of the *expected* voter turnout for the state is simple: multiply the coefficients of Table 1 (which stand for the expected voter turnout for a particular category) by the respective proportion of the population of the state falling into that category, and sum the resultant number over all categories of the four variables. This final sum is the expected voter turnout given the social composition.[30]

---

the effect of urban residency, for example, see Norman H. Nie, G. Bingham Powell, and Kenneth Prewitt, "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, Part I, II," *American Political Science Review*, 63 (June and September, 1969), 361–378 and 808–832.

[27] The national average in the last row is the turnout for the voting age population of the U.S. in 1960 and it is not the population who reported voting in the 1960 survey, which is about 74 per cent. It has been consistently higher than voting rates based on election statistics. The discrepancy runs between 5 and 10 per cent. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 143, "Voter Participation in the National Election: November, 1964," U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1965. Also Hugh J. Parry and Helen M. Crossley, "Validity of Responses to Survey Questions," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 14 (Spring, 1960), 61–80.

[28] J. Johnson, *Econometric Methods* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1972, 2nd Ed.), Chapter 6. For discussion of dummy regression, see Daniel B. Suits, "The Uses of Dummy Variables in Regression Equations," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 52 (December, 1957), 548–551; Emmanuel Melichar, "Least Squares Analysis of Economic Survey Data," *Proceedings of the Business and Economic Statistics Section, American Statistical Association* (1965), pp. 373–375. For approaches based on the quantification perspective, see Chikio Hayashi, "On the Quantification of Qualitative Data from the Mathematical-Statistical Point of View," *Annals of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics* (Japan) 2 (1950); and "On the Prediction of Phenomena from Qualitative Data and the Quantification of Qualitative Data from the Mathematical-Statistical Point of View, *Ibid.*, Vol. 3 (1951–1952). For a discussion of the MCA technique, see Frank Andrews, James Morgan, and John Sonquist, *Multiple Classification Analysis: A Report on a Computer Program for Multiple Regression Using Categorical Predictors* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1967).

[29] Mostly from the *Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1962*, 83rd Ed., U.S. Bureau of the Census, Washington, D.C. We have used exactly corresponding categories in age, education and race—both in survey and census data—but there was a slight discrepancy between the categories of income in survey data and the categories of income in census data. Since, however, the discrepancy was slight, we proceeded as if there were no discrepancies.

[30] If the population distribution pattern found in the sample survey is exactly the same as that of

Table 2. Social Composition and Its Aggregative Effects: An Illustration of Their Calculation

| Variables | Social Composition<br>*A*<br>U.S. | <br>*B*<br>Mississippi | Coefficients, Adjusted[a]<br>*C* | Aggregative Effects |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Educational Level | | | | |
| Less than 5 years | .084 | .189 | −12.1037 | |
| 5 to 7 years | .139 | .190 | − 6.4037 | sum $(A \times C)$ = 0.0 |
| 8 years | .176 | .137 | − 5.6037 | |
| 1 to 3 years high school | .192 | .187 | − 5.2037 | sum $(B \times C)$ = −2.42 |
| 4 years high school | .245 | .173 | 8.2963 | |
| 1 to 3 years college | .088 | .069 | 9.9963 | |
| College graduate or more | .076 | .055 | 12.7963 | |
| Family Income | | | | |
| less than $2000 | .130 | .377 | −13.0641 | |
| $2–2999 | .083 | .139 | − 9.6641 | |
| $3–3999 | .095 | .112 | − 1.4641 | sum $(A \times C)$ = 0.0 |
| $4–4999 | .110 | .093 | − 4.3641 | |
| $5–5999 | .123 | .079 | 6.0359 | sum $(B \times C)$ = −5.27 |
| $6–7499 | .107 | .058 | 5.0359 | |
| $7.5–9999 | .201 | .090 | 8.1359 | |
| $10,000 or more | .152 | .052 | 1.3359 | |
| Age | | | | |
| under 24 | .082 | .089 | −29.9853 | |
| 25–34 | .210 | .201 | − 5.0853 | sum $(A \times C)$ = 0.0 |
| 35–44 | .222 | .204 | − 2.0853 | |
| 45–54 | .189 | .196 | 4.0147 | sum $(B \times C)$ = 0.0 |
| 55–64 | .144 | .147 | 10.4147 | |
| 65 and over | .153 | .163 | 11.3147 | |
| Race | | | | |
| Black | .102 | .420 | −18.5417 | sum $(A \times C)$ = 0.0 |
| White | .898 | .580 | 2.1583 | sum $(B \times C)$ = −6.59 |
| | | | | Grand sum $(A \times C)$ = 0.0 |
| | | | | Grand sum $(B \times C)$ = −14.28 |

[a] The coefficients in this table are slightly readjusted. See footnote 30.

In Table 2, we illustrate the procedure, using the state of Mississippi. First note, by comparing the first two columns of Table 2, that the voting age population of Mississippi is less educated, less well paid, and has a higher proportion of black residents than the nation as a whole. Therefore, given the relationships established at the individual level, Mississippi would be expected to have lower turnout than the nation because of these differences in composition.

More specifically, Mississippi is expected to have lower turnout than the nation by 2.4 per cent because of the relatively lower educational attainments of its citizens; by 5.3 per cent because of its disadvantages in income distribution; and by 6.6 per cent because of its racial composition. (The impact of age composition is negligible—.002 per cent.) As a whole, its socio-demographic composition is responsible for a 14.3 per cent downward deviation from the national mean. Since Mississippi had 38.5 per cent lower turnout than the nation, there still remains a 24.2 per cent deviation (38.5−14.3) not explained by these individual components.

Applying the same technique to every state pro-

---

the entire voting age population of the U.S., the expected voter turnout calculated in this manner for the nation should be 0.0. Because of the slight discrepancies between the distribution of the sample data and the population distribution, the actual calculation does not exactly turn out that way. Since, however, the discrepancy is minor (at most, to the magnitude of 0.06 per cent), we do not think it necessary to reestimate the coefficients using some iterative procedure. We simply adjusted the coefficients in such a way that the national mean based on the population became zero. The final coefficients used are given in Column *C* of Table 2.

duced the results shown in Table 3. One of the most prominent features in the table is the pattern among the states of the South. Southern states in general have a lower rate of voter turnout than the rest of the country. A substantial portion of that deviation can be explained by the socio-demographic characteristics of their electorate, but a great deal remains to be explained. Within the South, North Carolina is the only state where expected voter turnout equals the observed turnout given the social composition of its electorate. All of the others lag behind the U.S. norm.

Further examination reveals an interesting pattern: the two largest states, California and New York, had only slightly higher turnouts than the national average, and those deviations are fully explained by the relative advantage of their social composition. Some states are helped by their social composition, namely those in New England, the West, and the Mountain regions of the country, while some states, namely in the South and Border regions of the country, are handicapped by their social composition.

Particularly noteworthy are three states: West Virginia, Arizona, and Nevada. In these states, the deviation from the national mean becomes slightly more pronounced if one controls for socioeconomic factors. Were it not for the slight disadvantage of its socio-demographic composition, West Virginia would have deviated even further upward from the national mean. In contrast, were it not for the relative advantages of their socioeconomic compositions, Nevada and Arizona would have deviated further downward from the national mean.

In the language of analysis of variance, the background characteristics (or individual components) explain 52.5 per cent of the total variation in voter turnout among the American states. This figure should be interpreted with caution since the individual effects may be confounded by the effects of systemic variables; and it cannot be claimed that all of the important individual characteristics that affect voter turnout at the state level have been included.[31]

### Systemic Effects and Their Decomposition

As the size of the residual variation in Table 3 indicated, differences in turnout among the states cannot be fully explained by variation in the socio-demographic composition of each state. We must now look for systemic factors contributing to this residual variation. In this study we will focus on the effects of the two most frequently mentioned systemic characteristics—electoral competitiveness and legal structures pertaining to elections: We use the term "electoral competitiveness" rather than "party structure" or "competitiveness of party systems" because people do not agree upon either the meaning or the measurement of "competitive party structure."[32]

To avoid introducing unnecessary discontinuities in the flow of the general analysis, the overall results are presented first and detailed discussions of each of these components has been postponed to a later section. For now it should simply be noted that electoral competitiveness was measured by averaging vote differentials between Democratic and Republican presidential candidates from 1932 to 1960 and that the degree of legal hindrance or facilitation of voting was measured by quantifying twelve legal items presented by Milbrath.[33]

The final results are presented in Table 4. Column *A* represents the unexplained variation taken from the last column of Table 3, slightly adjusted to account for the discrepancy between the national turnout rate obtained when the state is used as a unit of analysis without regard to the population of the state and the turnout rate obtained when the state is weighted by its population.[34] This residual variation is treated as the

---

[31] Our estimate of individual components contain some of the effects of legal and political systems, since there is likely to be some interaction effect.

[32] To cite only a few examples: Billy J. Franklin, "Urbanization and Party Competition: A Note on Shifting Conceptualization and a Report of Further Data," *Social Forces,* 49 (June, 1971), 544–549; Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American State," *Journal of Politics,* 25 (May, 1963), 265–289; Robert T. Golembiewski, "A Taxonomic Approach to State Political Party Strength," *Western Political Quarterly,* 11 (September 1958), 494–513; David F. Pfeiffer, "The Measurement of Inter-Party Competition and Systemic Stability," *American Political Science Review,* 61 (June, 1967), 457–467; Austin Ranney, "Parties in State Politics," in *Politics in the American States,* ed. Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines (Boston, 1965); Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, "The American Party System," *American Political Science Review,* 48 (June, 1954), 477–485; Dennis D. Riley, "Party Competition and State Policy Making: The Need for a Re-examination," *The Western Political Quarterly,* 24 (September, 1971), 510–513; Joseph A. Schlesinger, "A Two-Dimensional Scheme for Classifying the States According to Degree of Inter-Party Competition," *American Political Science Review,* 49 (December, 1955), 1120–1128.

[33] Milbrath, "Participation in the American States"; for quantification techniques, see footnote 28.

[34] The readjustment amounted to adding .9 per cent to each value. It would have been neater statistically to weight each state by its voting age population so that the resulting mean turnout for the nation would remain the same whether one uses survey data or aggregate statistics. But it is neater conceptually to treat each state as an equal unit. For instance, to examine the impact of a regulation in effect, say, both in Texas and North Dakota, there is no reason to give more weight to the results of Texas than that of North Dakota.

**Table 3. Voter Turnout Deviation: Individual Effects and Their Decomposition**

| State | Vote in 1960 | Deviation Explained By<br>Education *A* | Income *B* | Age *C* | Race *D* | Sum of *A, B, C, D* | Residuals |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama | −33.0 | −2.2 | −3.2 | −0.4 | −4.1 | −9.9 | −23.1 |
| Arizona | −10.4 | 0.7 | −0.1 | −1.0 | 1.4 | 1.0 | −11.4 |
| Arkansas | −23.1 | −2.4 | −4.7 | 1.0 | −2.4 | −8.5 | −14.6 |
| California | 3.7 | 1.9 | 1.4 | −0.3 | 1.0 | 4.0 | −0.3 |
| Colorado | 7.5 | 2.0 | 0.5 | −0.4 | 1.6 | 3.8 | 3.7 |
| Connecticut | 12.9 | 0.6 | 2.2 | 0.4 | 1.2 | 4.5 | 8.4 |
| Delaware | 10.3 | 0.5 | 0.8 | −0.6 | −0.7 | 0.0 | 10.2 |
| Florida | −14.2 | 0.2 | −1.5 | 0.5 | −1.6 | −2.3 | −11.9 |
| Georgia | −33.0 | −2.0 | −2.6 | −3.1 | −3.8 | −11.5 | −21.5 |
| Idaho | 16.4 | 1.4 | −0.2 | −0.1 | 2.1 | 3.2 | 13.2 |
| Illinois | 12.3 | 0.1 | 1.3 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 1.7 | 10.5 |
| Indiana | 12.7 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 0.9 | 1.8 | 10.8 |
| Iowa | 12.6 | 1.1 | −0.9 | 1.0 | 1.9 | 3.1 | 9.4 |
| Kansas | 7.6 | 1.4 | −0.4 | 0.4 | 1.2 | 2.7 | 4.8 |
| Kentucky | −3.7 | −2.4 | −3.1 | −2.1 | 0.6 | −7.0 | 3.2 |
| Louisiana | −19.1 | −2.2 | −2.6 | −0.6 | −4.5 | −9.8 | −9.3 |
| Maine | 9.8 | 0.5 | −0.7 | 0.6 | 2.1 | 2.5 | 7.3 |
| Maryland | −5.9 | −0.1 | 1.0 | −0.6 | −1.3 | −1.1 | −4.9 |
| Massachusetts | 12.7 | 1.1 | 1.6 | 0.8 | 1.7 | 5.1 | 7.6 |
| Michigan | 8.5 | 0.1 | 1.2 | −0.2 | 0.2 | 1.3 | 7.1 |
| Minnesota | 12.9 | 0.7 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 2.0 | 3.2 | 9.6 |
| Mississippi | −38.5 | −2.4 | −5.3 | 0.0 | −6.6 | −14.3 | −24.2 |
| Missouri | 8.4 | −0.6 | −1.0 | 0.9 | 0.3 | −0.5 | 8.9 |
| Montana | 7.5 | 1.3 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 2.1 | 3.5 | 4.0 |
| Nebraska | 7.9 | 1.3 | −1.1 | 0.8 | 1.7 | 2.6 | 5.2 |
| Nevada | −3.2 | 2.1 | 1.6 | −1.0 | 1.1 | 3.9 | −7.2 |
| New Hampshire | 16.0 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 2.1 | 4.2 | 11.7 |
| New Jersey | 7.6 | 0.1 | 1.9 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 2.7 | 4.9 |
| New Mexico | 0.3 | 0.5 | −0.6 | −2.1 | 1.7 | −0.5 | 0.8 |
| New York | 2.7 | 0.1 | 1.3 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 2.4 | 0.2 |
| North Carolina | −10.1 | −1.9 | −3.0 | −1.1 | −3.0 | −9.1 | −1.1 |
| North Dakota | 14.9 | −0.2 | −1.8 | 0.2 | 2.1 | 0.3 | 14.5 |
| Ohio | 7.1 | 0.3 | 1.1 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 1.9 | 5.2 |
| Oklahoma | 0.1 | −0.1 | −1.9 | 0.5 | 0.8 | −0.7 | 0.8 |
| Oregon | 8.2 | 1.5 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 1.9 | 4.9 | 3.2 |
| Pennsylvania | 6.5 | −0.4 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 1.3 | 5.1 |
| Rhode Island | 13.1 | −0.8 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 11.1 |
| South Carolina | −32.8 | −2.4 | −3.3 | −1.4 | −5.1 | −12.2 | −20.6 |
| South Dakota | 14.6 | 0.4 | −2.5 | 0.6 | 2.1 | 0.6 | 13.9 |
| Tennessee | −13.8 | −2.1 | −3.1 | −0.2 | −1.3 | −6.7 | −7.1 |
| Texas | −21.8 | −0.5 | −1.4 | −0.7 | −0.5 | −3.1 | −18.8 |
| Utah | 14.7 | 2.8 | 1.1 | −1.3 | 2.0 | 4.6 | 10.1 |
| Vermont | 8.7 | 0.6 | −0.8 | 0.8 | 2.1 | 2.7 | 6.0 |
| Virginia | −29.8 | −0.8 | −1.3 | −1.1 | −2.2 | −5.4 | −24.5 |
| Washington | 9.9 | 2.0 | 2.7 | 0.1 | 1.8 | 6.5 | 3.3 |
| West Virginia | 13.7 | −1.8 | −2.1 | 0.4 | 1.1 | −2.4 | 16.0 |
| Wisconsin | 9.3 | 0.2 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 1.7 | 3.3 | 5.9 |
| Wyoming | 9.7 | 1.9 | 0.8 | −0.4 | 2.0 | 4.3 | 5.3 |

**Table 4. Aggregate Turnout Deviations: Decomposition of Systemic Effects**

| State | *A*<br>Residual | *B*<br>Legal Factors | *C*<br>Electoral Factors | *D*<br>*B*, adjusting for *C* | *E*<br>*C*, adjusting for *B* | *F*<br>(*D*+*E*) | *G*<br>(*A*−*F*) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama | −24.0 | − 8.4 | −18.2 | − 0.5 | −17.6 | −18.0 | − 5.9 |
| Arizona | −12.3 | 2.4 | 1.7 | 0.1 | 1.7 | 1.8 | −14.1 |
| Arkansas | −15.5 | − 8.5 | −12.5 | − 0.5 | −12.0 | −12.5 | − 3.0 |
| California | − 1.2 | − 2.8 | 3.3 | − 0.2 | 3.2 | 3.0 | − 4.2 |
| Colorado | 2.8 | 5.5 | 6.1 | 0.3 | 5.9 | 6.2 | − 3.4 |
| Connecticut | 7.5 | 2.2 | 6.9 | 0.1 | 6.6 | 6.8 | 0.8 |
| Delaware | 9.4 | 2.0 | 6.5 | 0.1 | 6.3 | 6.4 | 2.9 |
| Florida | −12.8 | − 1.8 | − 4.4 | − 0.1 | − 4.2 | − 4.3 | − 8.5 |
| Georgia | −22.4 | − 6.9 | −21.0 | − 0.4 | −20.3 | −20.7 | − 1.7 |
| Idaho | 12.3 | 11.1 | 7.0 | 0.6 | 6.8 | 7.4 | 4.9 |
| Illinois | 9.7 | 5.6 | 6.7 | 0.3 | 6.5 | 6.8 | 2.9 |
| Indiana | 10.0 | 6.6 | 5.4 | 0.4 | 5.2 | 5.6 | 4.4 |
| Iowa | 8.6 | 7.9 | 4.9 | 0.5 | 4.7 | 5.2 | 3.4 |
| Kansas | 4.0 | 7.7 | − 0.4 | 0.4 | − 0.4 | 0.0 | 3.9 |
| Kentucky | 2.4 | − 8.7 | 3.3 | − 0.5 | 3.2 | 2.7 | − 0.4 |
| Louisiana | −10.2 | −14.6 | −15.9 | − 0.8 | −15.4 | −16.2 | 6.1 |
| Maine | 6.4 | 2.2 | − 1.6 | 0.1 | − 1.6 | − 1.4 | 7.9 |
| Maryland | − 5.8 | − 4.4 | 3.9 | − 0.3 | 3.7 | 3.5 | − 9.3 |
| Massachusetts | 6.7 | − 2.1 | 5.3 | − 0.1 | 5.1 | 5.0 | 1.7 |
| Michigan | 6.2 | 7.0 | 7.1 | 0.4 | 6.8 | 7.2 | − 1.0 |
| Minnesota | 8.8 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 0.2 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 5.5 |
| Mississippi | −25.1 | −18.6 | −31.1 | − 1.1 | −30.0 | −31.1 | 6.0 |
| Missouri | 8.0 | 1.6 | 2.4 | 0.1 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 5.6 |
| Montana | 3.1 | 2.7 | 3.0 | 0.2 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 0.1 |
| Nebraska | 4.4 | 7.1 | 1.5 | 0.4 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 2.5 |
| Nevada | − 8.0 | 7.7 | 2.0 | 0.4 | 2.0 | 2.4 | −10.4 |
| New Hampshire | 10.9 | − 0.9 | 3.7 | − 0.1 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 7.4 |
| New Jersey | 4.0 | 2.8 | 5.9 | 0.2 | 5.7 | 5.8 | − 1.8 |
| New Mexico | − 0.1 | − 5.6 | 3.3 | − 0.3 | 3.2 | 2.9 | − 3.0 |
| New York | − 0.6 | − 0.6 | 6.6 | − 0.0 | 6.4 | 6.3 | − 7.0 |
| North Carolina | − 1.9 | − 2.2 | − 6.3 | − 0.1 | − 6.1 | − 6.2 | 4.2 |
| North Dakota | 13.7 | − 3.3 | 5.3 | − 0.2 | 5.1 | 5.0 | 8.7 |
| Ohio | 4.3 | 5.9 | 6.3 | 0.3 | 6.1 | 6.4 | − 2.1 |
| Oklahoma | − 0.1 | − 1.5 | 1.1 | − 0.1 | 1.0 | 0.9 | − 1.0 |
| Oregon | 2.3 | 7.1 | 5.5 | 0.4 | 5.3 | 5.7 | − 3.4 |
| Pennsylvania | 4.2 | 1.7 | 7.3 | 0.1 | 7.0 | 7.1 | − 2.9 |
| Rhode Island | 10.2 | − 1.9 | 2.1 | − 0.1 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 8.3 |
| South Carolina | −21.5 | −22.5 | −22.0 | − 1.3 | −21.3 | −22.6 | 1.1 |
| South Dakota | 13.0 | − 0.0 | 2.9 | − 0.0 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 10.2 |
| Tennessee | − 8.0 | − 0.0 | − 1.4 | − 0.0 | − 1.3 | − 1.3 | − 6.7 |
| Texas | −19.7 | − 2.7 | −12.0 | − 0.2 | −11.6 | −11.7 | − 7.9 |
| Utah | 9.2 | 6.5 | 3.8 | 0.4 | 3.7 | 4.1 | 5.1 |
| Vermont | 5.1 | − 0.9 | − 4.7 | − 0.1 | − 4.6 | − 4.6 | 9.7 |
| Virginia | −25.3 | 1.9 | − 0.0 | 0.1 | − 0.0 | 0.1 | −25.4 |
| Washington | 2.4 | − 2.1 | 2.1 | − 0.1 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 0.5 |
| West Virginia | 15.2 | 6.2 | 2.6 | 0.4 | 2.5 | 2.9 | 12.3 |
| Wisconsin | 5.1 | 7.8 | 6.0 | 0.4 | 5.8 | 6.2 | − 1.2 |
| Wyoming | 4.5 | − 1.8 | 6.7 | − 0.1 | 6.5 | 6.4 | − 1.9 |

dependent variable in assessing the impact of systemic factors. Column *F* of Table 4 represents the expected (residual) deviation for each state, given both its electoral competitiveness and the degree of legal facilitation. Column *G* represents the final residual variation unexplained by both individual and systemic components. The Columns *B* and *C* stand for the effect of each systemic factor when the impact of the other factor is ignored. Columns *D* and *E* represent the effects of each systemic factor with adjustments having been made for the other factor.

Before examining the relative contributions of legal and competitive factors, it is noteworthy that these two factors are highly correlated as may be readily seen by comparing Columns *B* and *C* of Table 4 (the correlation is .762). The states that are high in *B* tend to be high also in *C*, and vice versa. Given such highly correlated factors there is no simple way to decompose the total effects of two factors into the independent effects of each one.[35]

The effects of each systemic component ignoring those of the other component are examined first. As can be seen from Column *B* of Table 4, states in the South have, in general, a less facilitative legal structure. For illustration both the states with the least and the most facilitative structures are listed below.

| Legal Structures Are Least Facilitative | | Legal Structures Are Most Facilitative | |
|---|---|---|---|
| *State* | *Effect* | *State* | *Effect* |
| So. Carolina | −22.5 | Idaho | 11.1 |
| Mississippi | −18.6 | Iowa | 7.9 |
| Louisiana | −14.6 | Wisconsin | 7.8 |
| Kentucky | − 8.7 | Kansas | 7.7 |
| Arkansas | − 8.5 | Nevada | 7.7 |
| Alabama | − 8.4 | Nebraska | 7.1 |
| Georgia | − 6.9 | Oregon | 7.1 |

The effects of electoral competitiveness ignoring the effects of legal facilitation are obtained by reading Column *C* of Table 4. The following are particularly notable.

| Political Parties Are Least Facilitative | | Political Parties Are Most Facilitative | |
|---|---|---|---|
| *State* | *Effect* | *State* | *Effect* |
| Mississippi | −31.1 | Pennsylvania | 7.3 |
| So. Carolina | −22.0 | Michigan | 7.1 |
| Georgia | −21.0 | Idaho | 7.0 |
| Alabama | −18.2 | Connecticut | 6.9 |
| Louisiana | −15.9 | Illinois | 6.7 |
| Arkansas | −12.5 | Wyoming | 6.7 |
| Texas | −12.0 | New York | 6.6 |

To examine the effects of each factor by controlling for the other, the following multiple regression equation was used:

$$\text{Expected (Residual) Deviation}$$
$$\text{(Due to Systemic Factors)}$$
$$= .057 \times A + .966 \times B,$$

where *A* and *B*, respectively, stand for the legal and electoral effects as expressed in terms of deviations from the national mean. That is, to predict the residual deviation in turnout with the least amount of error, each systemic factor must be weighted according to the regression weights given in the preceding formula. The final results of such predictions are given in Columns *D* and *E* of Table 4. It should be noted that the figures in *D* are proportional to the figures in *B* and the figures in *E* are proportional to the figures in *C*.

As noted earlier, the decomposition of the effects of correlated independent variables is not simple. There are at least four different approaches suggested in the literature. These approaches and their results are presented in Table 5.

One possible approach indicated by the first column in Table 5 is to assign a causal priority to legalistic factors and assume that electoral competitiveness is affected by the legal structure of the state. To follow such reasoning leads to the conclusion that 37.5 per cent of the systemic variation among states is explained by legal factor and 24.2 per cent by electoral competitiveness. The second possibility is to argue for the opposite position. That is, to assume that competitiveness leads to a particular type of legal structure. Given such an assumption the data indicate that electoral competitiveness explains almost all of the variation accounted for by systemic factors. A third approach is to combine the strategies of the preceding two approaches (using the flip-flop step-down procedure) and assign only those positions that are additionally accounted for by each factor to that factor, and the remaining portion jointly to both factors. The final approach is to use multiple regression (or path analysis) equations to decompose the explained variation into variations that are explained by each regressor and variations that are explained jointly.[36]

---

[35] This difficulty stems from the fact that the variation of $Y$ explained by, for example, two independent variables $X_1$, $X_2$, when the relationship is $Y = b_1X_1 + b_2X_2$ is given by $b_1^2$ times (the variance of $X_1$) + $b_2^2$ times (the variance of $X_2$) + $2b_1b_2$ times (the covariance between $X_1$ and $Y_2$). The last term is often interpreted as the amount of variance explained jointly by $X_1$ and $X_2$. Note, however, that these components can be negative if one of the $b$'s *or* the covariance between $X_1$ and $X_2$ is negative.

[36] The last strategy is plausible if one is not willing to assign causal priority to either factor. See footnote 35.

**Table 5. Variance Decomposition into Legal and Electoral Components**

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Variance Explained | 61.7% | 61.7% | 61.7% | 61.7% |
| Per Cent of Variance Explained: | | | | |
| Legal Factors | 37.5 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Electoral Factors | 24.2 | 61.6 | 24.2 | 57.5 |
| Jointly | — | — | 37.4 | 4.1 |
| Unexplained | 38.3 | 38.3 | 38.3 | 38.3 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Approaches:

(1) Stepdown procedure, introducing A first and assigning to B only the portion it explains additionally.

(2) Stepdown procedure, introducing B first and assigning to A only the portion it explains additionally.

(3) Combination of 1 and 2, the last number representing overlap.

(4) Using path analytic procedure, in which, if the regression equation is $Y=a+b_1x_1+b_2x_2$, the variance in $Y(V_y)$ is: $V_y=b_1^2v_1+b_2^2v_2+2b_1b_2v_{12}$; effect of $X_1=b_1^2v_1$, effect of $X_2=b_2^2v_2$, joint effect$=2b_1b_2v_{12}$. This type of decomposition into 100 per cent is not always possible because the joint term can be negative.

Unless one has a willingness to assign a causal priority to legal factors—which we are not—one must conclude on the basis of this evidence that the effects of electoral components appear to be greater than those of legal factors. Such a conclusion is at best tentative, however. Given the high correlation between legal and electoral factors, a slight change in measurement error or coding can easily change the relative importance of each variable drastically. Note that it was assumed in measuring the effects of legal factors that the impact of one regulation is additive to others. A slight deviation from such additivity may affect the correlation between voting and legal factors, and a slight change in that correlation can in turn affect the relative contribution of each factor substantially. (The correlation between *A* and *B*—as noted earlier—is .762; between *A* and residual voting .613; between *B* and voting .785.)[37]

Assuming for now that both systemic factors have some effect on voter turnout, the combined effects of both electoral competitiveness and legal factors are shown in Column *F*. Several states with the most and least facilitative components are listed below.

| Most Handicapped by Systemic Variables | | Least Handicapped by Systemic Variables | |
|---|---|---|---|
| *State* | *Effect* | *State* | *Effect* |
| Mississippi | −31.1 | Idaho | 7.4 |
| So. Carolina | −22.6 | Michigan | 7.2 |
| Georgia | −20.7 | Pennsylvania | 7.1 |
| Alabama | −18.2 | Illinois | 6.8 |
| Louisiana | −16.2 | Connecticut | 6.8 |
| Arkansas | −12.5 | Delaware | 6.4 |
| Texas | −11.7 | Ohio | 6.4 |
| | | Wyoming | 6.4 |

After examining the last column of Table 4, it should be noted that, for most states, deviations of voter turnout from the national mean are adequately accounted for by the three factors—individual effects, electoral competitiveness, and legal facilitation. Only five states deviate from the national mean by more than 10 per cent when these three factors are controlled. In contrast, when only individual components are controlled, 15 states deviate by more than 10 per cent and when nothing is controlled, 25 states deviate by that amount. Expressed in analysis of variance language, the hierarchical decomposition as a whole explains 81.8 per cent of the total variance: the individual component accounts for 52.5 per cent of the original variance in the first stage of analysis; the two systemic components explain 61.7 per cent of the residual variation and an additional 29.3 per cent of the original variation.

It is informative, however, to examine deviant cases. The five states having more than 10 per cent unexplained deviation are:

| *State* | *Residual* | *State* | *Residual* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Virginia | −25.4 | West Virginia | 12.3 |
| Arizona | −14.1 | South Dakota | 10.2 |
| Nevada | −10.4 | | |

After adjusting for both individual and systemic components, Virginia, Arizona, and Nevada have substantially lower rates of voter turnout than the national average, while West Virginia and South Dakota have substantially higher voting rates. The existence of these substantial deviations for a few cases can either mean that (1) these states have some additional unique sources of variations which have not been considered in the model, or that (2) the relationships among the variables included in the model do not exhibit the same form in these states that they do in the nation as a whole. Although it is tempting to suggest some plausible *ad hoc* explanations, the more prudent response is to leave the results as a challenge for specialists with a more detailed knowledge of the politics of these states.[38]

---

[37] For discussion of multicollinearity, see Hubert H. Blalock, "Correlated Independent Variables. The Problems of Multicollinearity," *Social Forces*, 41 (December, 1963) 233–237.

### Further Comments

A few comments are in order: first, on the two systemic components and their measurements and meaning: second, on the inadequacy of aggregate statistics; third, on some alternative interpretations; and finally, on the possible uses of the method for future studies.

### Legal Factors

Although it is possible to deduce from examination of the rules that certain regulations are more conducive to voting than others, their actual impact is hard to determine. There are several reasons for this. First, the procedural arrangements alone do not tell anything about their actual execution.[39] For instance, a literacy test may be used less discriminatively in some states than others. Second, since there are so many regulations pertaining to elections and they are usually intercorrelated, it is difficult to determine the impact of one item as distinguished from that of another. Third, as noted earlier, legal factors are closely related to electoral competitiveness. Finally, some effects of regulations are likely to be interactive. Multivariate statistical controls cannot be used as easily here to sort out these problems as they were in assessing the impact of race, education, income, and age of voting at the individual level because there is only a limited number of units (48 states are used in this analysis) and the degrees of freedom diminish quickly as the number of variables increases.

With this caveat in mind, the results of a limited multivariate analysis will be presented. Table 6 lists all of the regulations considered in this paper.[40] In Column *A* the number of states with a particular regulation are presented. For instance, 12 states in 1960 required less than 12 months residency for voting, while 36 states required at least one year's residency. In Column *B* the mean turnout (residual deviation) of the states with the particular regulation is shown—ignoring other regulations altogether. For example, states having a residency requirement of less than one year averaged a 5.8 per cent higher turnout than the national mean while states with longer residency requirements had a rate of 1.9 per cent below the national average. In Column *C*, multiple correlations (multiple *r* with dummy independent variables) between each legal factor (numbered 1 through 13) and voter turnout is presented. Those correlation coefficients may be used as indicators of importance, with the understanding that these coefficients measure a bivariate relationship and are not adjusted for the confounding effects of other regulations. In Column *D*, the mean turnout of the states with particular regulations are presented with adjustments having been made for the other regulations.[41]

In general, the effects of legal restrictions as shown in Column *B* are in the expected direction. The states which have registration rules that are generally supposed to facilitate turnout do, in fact, tend to have higher rates of voter participation than those which do not. There are however, some noteworthy exceptions. Contrary to our general expectations, states without registration systems show lower turnout than states with such systems, and states that allow precinct registration show lower turnouts than states that do not. In both instances, the correlations are relatively low, indicating great internal variation.

Examination of Column *D* shows that when the intercorrelation of legal rules is controlled, the pattern does not substantially change. There are two major instances of a change from the zero-order effects. After controlling for effects of other legal items, the effect of precinct registration is in the expected direction; and states that accept a mere absence as grounds for absentee voting show lower turnout than states that do not, contrary to our expectations. On the whole, however, Columns *B* and *D* are similar. To develop a summary estimate of the effects of legal regulations on turnout, the relevant numbers in Column *D* of Table 6 for each state were summed. The correlation between the residual voter turnout and this index was .613.

Table 7 lists the states in the order in which their legal arrangements facilitate voter turnout. The value of the index of legal facilitation for the specific state is presented in Column *A*. Columns 1 through 13 present a summary of the legal items and their presence or absence in the state in question.

### Electoral Competitiveness

The measure of electoral competitiveness used here is not presumed to be a measure of the com-

---

[38] For an example of this kind of deviant case analysis, see Gerald W. Johnson, "Research Note on Political Correlates of Voter Participation: A Deviant Case Analysis," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (September, 1971), 768–776.

[39] In examining the relationship between voting and legal factors, Campbell et al., *American Voter*, p. 152, pointed out that it is the informal and extralegal barriers, not state legislation, that accounts for much of the variability in the turnout of the Southern Negro.

[40] Out of Milbrath's 12 items, we created one additional one: Existence or lack of registration system.

[41] The statistical procedure used here is the same as the one used in estimating coefficients in Table 3. See footnote 28 for reference.

**Table 6. Regulations for Voting and Expected Voter Turnout**

| | *A* | *B* | *C* | *D* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Residency Requirement: | | | | |
| 1a. Required residency in state less than one year | 12 | 5.82 | .302 | 0.72 |
| 1b. Required residency in state more than or equal to one year | 36 | −1.94 | | −0.24 |
| 2a. Presidential voting by new residents allowed | 15 | 4.27 | .259 | 2.62 |
| 2b. Presidential voting by new residents not allowed | 33 | −1.94 | | −1.06 |
| 3a. Presidential voting by former residents allowed | 7 | 1.16 | .043 | 0.87 |
| 3b. Presidential voting by former residents not allowed | 41 | −0.20 | | −0.15 |
| Registration Procedures: | | | | |
| 4a. Registration not required | 3 | −2.09 | −.056 | −7.27 |
| 4b. Registration required | 45 | 0.13 | | 0.48 |
| 5a. Permanent registration throughout the state | 31 | 0.63 | .235 | 1.77 |
| 5b. Permanent registration in some areas of the state | 12 | 1.52 | | −1.88 |
| 5c. No permanent registration (or no registration in the state) | 5 | −7.57 | | −6.48 |
| 6a. Absentee registration allowed | 16 | 4.68 | .298 | 3.03 |
| 6b. Absentee registration not allowed | 32 | −2.34 | | −1.51 |
| 7a. Precinct registration throughout the state | 22 | −1.42 | −.131 | 0.17 |
| 7b. Precinct registration in some areas of the state | 6 | −0.40 | | 0.10 |
| 7c. No precinct registration or no registration in the state | 20 | 1.68 | | −0.22 |
| 8a. Registration closes within one month of the election in all areas of the state | 31 | 1.25 | .153 | 1.53 |
| 8b. Registration closes within one month of the election in some areas of the state | 1 | −0.63 | | −1.98 |
| 8c. Registration closes earlier than one month before the election or no registration in the state | 16 | −2.38 | | −2.84 |
| Absentee Balloting: | | | | |
| 9a. General civilian absentee ballot allowed | 45 | 1.04 | .361 | 0.36 |
| 9b. General civilian absentee ballot not allowed | 3 | −15.55 | | −5.43 |
| 10a. Mere absence grounds for absentee voting | 33 | 1.08 | .144 | −1.29 |
| 10b. Mere absence not accepted as grounds for absentee voting | 15 | −2.38 | | 2.85 |
| 11a. Absentee ballot application accepted by mail | 42 | 1.87 | .444 | 1.11 |
| 11b. Absentee ballot application not accepted by mail | 6 | −13.07 | | −7.75 |
| Literacy Test: | | | | |
| 12a. Literacy test not required | 30 | 2.30 | .267 | 2.52 |
| 12b. Literacy test required | 18 | −3.84 | | −1.51 |
| Voting Hours: | | | | |
| 13a. Polls open twelve hours or longer throughout the state | 28 | 2.24 | | 0.15 |
| 13b. Polls open twelve hours or longer in some areas of the state | 11 | 1.05 | .359 | 0.79 |
| 13c. Polls open less than twelve hours in all areas of the state | 9 | −8.25 | | −1.44 |

Legend: *A* = Number of states, *B* = Expected voter turnout expressed as deviation from grand mean, *D* = Expected voter turnout after controlling for election management factors. (Voter turnout here refers to residual deviations after individualistic components are taken out.) *C* = Correlation between voter turnout and a voting regulation. (This is done through multiple regression with dummy variables. Minus sign is assigned to note that the relationship is opposite to our expectation.)

petitiveness of party structure. The controversy surrounding the meaning of party structures is fully recognized and the variable used here is not necessarily meant to measure that concept, although it is highly correlated with one typology of party structure.[42] Our measure of electoral competitiveness is based on the eight presidential elections conducted between the years 1932 to 1960, inclusive.[43] Operationally,

$$\text{The Index of Competitiveness} = abs(1/N \textstyle\sum (\%\text{Democratic} - \%\text{Republican}))$$

where *abs* stands for absolute value and $N_0$ is the number of relevant elections. The examination of this index showed that the Southern states had extremely high values, indicating lack of competitiveness. Since these are the states with extremely low election turnouts, it was suspected that nonlinear relationships might exist between electoral competitiveness and voter turnout, i.e., that voter turnout was affected only at the extreme lack of electoral competitiveness.

The suspected nonlinearity, however, proved insignificant, and the following linear equation turned out to be adequate as a representation of the relationship between voter turnout and the index of electoral competitiveness:

$$\hat{y} = -.548\,(\text{Index of Competitiveness}) + 7.324$$

where $\hat{y}$ represents the expected (residual) turnout deviation. This expected value ($\hat{y}$) is used as a measure of the effect of electoral competitiveness and presented in Column *C* of Table 4. The correlation between the residual voter turnout and the index of electoral competitiveness was .785. (The mean of the index of competitiveness is 11, and its standard deviation is 16.8.)

One possible weakness of this index is that it is possible for a state to have a smaller score (highly competitive) either by voting closely in every election or by giving landslides to each party an equal number of times. In other words, it does not differentiate between a lack of consistency from one election to another and the closeness of elections throughout the period.

### Aggregate or Ecological Controls

The possible outcome of an analysis based solely on aggregate statistics can be briefly examined. If aggregate statistics such as median income, mean education level, the percentage of blacks, the percentage of the population in urban areas, and median age were used as variables representing "socioeconomic" factors, the following estimates are produced:

| Variables | Standardized b |
|---|---|
| (1) Per cent Black | −.85 |
| (2) Median Income | .38 |
| (3) Mean Education Level | −.16 |
| (4) Per cent Urban | −.16 |
| (5) Median Age | .01 |
| Multiple *r* | .9145 |

The multiple *r* and the variance explained by this set of variables was .91 and 84 per cent respectively. Note first that the percentage explained by aggregate data is much higher than the estimate based on an aggregation of individual effects (52.5 per cent). In fact, this is more than the variance explained by all three of the factors used in this analysis. More importantly note the signs of each coefficient. Education and urban residency are usually positively associated with voting at the individual level, but in this multiple regression on aggregate data, the educational and urbanization levels of the state are negatively associated with voter turnout. Such reversals in the direction of the coefficients are statistically possible but contrary to the known effects found in the survey data above. As cited earlier, aggregate correlations can be substantially different from individual level correlations and the results of this aggregate regression clearly shows this to be the case.

**"Region" as an Alternative Interpretation:** Finally, it must be noted that the most salient pattern of all is that Southern states tend to have the lowest turnout, the least competitive elections, and relatively more restrictive legal structures. Although the examination of the meaning of regionalism is beyond the scope of this paper, it is pertinent to ask at least the following two questions: First, do the regional differences in sociodemographic composition, electoral regulations, and party structure represent adequately the "regional differences" with respect to voter turn-

---

[42] The correlation (multiple correlation with dummy variables) between our measure of electoral competitiveness and Golembiewski's typology—with categories such as one-party, weak minority party, two-party states, and others—is .778. See Golembiewski, "A Taxonomic Approach . . ."

[43] These eight elections are used on the ground that party alignment during this period has been relatively stable. For such rationale, see V. O. Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics*, 17 (February, 1955), 3–18. However, the years in which a particular state had a substantial third-party vote were eliminated from consideration. Consequently, only seven elections were used for Alabama, Louisiana, and South Carolina, and only six for Mississippi.

**Table 7. Election Regulations by State**

Key: * = statewide = *A* in Table 6; + = some areas only = *B* in Table 6; blank = *C* in Table 6

| State | *A* | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Idaho | 11.1 | * | * | | | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| Iowa | 7.9 | * | | | | + | * | * | * | * | | * | * | * |
| Wisconsin | 7.8 | | * | * | | + | * | | * | * | * | * | * | + |
| Kansas | 7.7 | * | * | | | + | * | | * | * | * | * | * | + |
| Nevada | 7.7 | * | | | | * | | * | * | * | | * | * | + |
| Nebraska | 7.1 | * | * | | | + | * | | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| Oregon | 7.1 | * | * | | | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | | * |
| Michigan | 7.0 | * | | | | * | * | | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| Indiana | 6.6 | * | | | | * | | | * | * | | * | * | * |
| Utah | 6.5 | | | | | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| West Virginia | 6.2 | | | | | * | * | * | | * | | * | * | * |
| Ohio | 5.9 | | * | | | + | * | | | * | | * | * | * |
| Illinois | 5.6 | | * | | | * | | * | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| Colorado | 5.5 | | * | | | * | | + | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| Vermont | 5.1 | | | * | | | | | * | * | | * | * | + |
| Minnesota | 3.4 | * | | | | + | * | | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| New Jersey | 2.8 | * | * | * | | * | | | | * | * | * | * | * |
| Montana | 2.7 | | | | | * | * | * | | * | * | * | * | + |
| Arizona | 2.4 | | * | * | | * | * | | | * | * | * | | * |
| Maine | 2.2 | * | * | | | * | | | * | * | * | * | | * |
| Connecticut | 2.2 | | * | * | | * | | | * | * | * | * | | * |
| Delaware | 2.0 | | | | | * | | * | * | * | | * | | * |
| Virginia | 1.9 | | | | | * | | * | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| Pennsylvania | 1.7 | | | | | * | | * | | * | | * | * | * |
| Missouri | 1.6 | | * | | | + | | | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| South Dakota | 0.0 | | | | | * | | | * | * | * | * | * | |
| Tennessee | 0.0 | | | | | * | | | * | * | * | * | * | |
| New York | −0.6 | | | | | + | * | + | + | * | | * | | * |
| New Hampshire | −0.9 | * | | | | * | | | * | * | * | * | | + |
| Oklahoma | −1.5 | | | | | * | | + | * | * | * | * | | + |
| Florida | −1.8 | | | | | + | | + | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| Wyoming | −1.8 | | | * | | + | * | * | * | * | * | * | | |
| Rhode Island | −1.9 | | | | | * | | + | | * | * | * | * | + |
| Massachusetts | −2.1 | | * | | | * | | * | | * | * | * | | + |
| Washington | −2.1 | | | | | * | | * | * | * | * | * | | * |
| North Carolina | −2.2 | | | | | * | | + | * | * | * | * | | * |
| Texas | −2.7 | | | | * | NO REGIST. | | | | * | * | * | * | + |
| California | −2.8 | | * | | | * | | * | | * | * | * | | * |
| North Dakota | −3.3 | | | | * | NO REGIST. | | | | * | * | * | * | * |
| Maryland | −4.4 | | | * | | + | | * | | * | * | * | * | + |
| New Mexico | −5.6 | | | | | * | * | * | * | | | | * | |
| Georgia | −6.9 | | | | | * | | | | * | * | * | | * |
| Alabama | −8.4 | | | | | * | | * | * | * | | | | |
| Arkansas | −8.5 | | | | * | NO REGIST. | | | | * | | * | * | |
| Kentucky | − 8.7 | | | | | * | | * | | * | | | * | |
| Louisiana | −14.6 | | | | | + | | * | * | * | * | | | * |
| Mississippi | −18.6 | | | | | * | | * | | | | | | |
| South Carolina | −22.5 | | | | | | | * | * | | | | | |

Table 8. South, Non-South Differences in Voter Turnout
(Percentage Deviations)

| | Original Vote *A* | Indiv. Compont. *B* | First Residual *C* (*B*−*A*) | Legal Factors *D* | Elect. Factors *E* | Syst. Factors *F* | Final Residual *G* (*C*−*F*) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| South | −25.06 | −8.13 | −16.93 | −7.65 | −13.15 | −13.14 | −3.79 |
| Non-South | 7.45 | 2.42 | 5.03 | 2.27 | 3.91 | 3.91 | 1.13 |

$D$ and $E$ are without controlling for the other; $F$=joint effect $= .0572\times D + .9660\times E$.

out, or is there still a great deal of difference between the South and the North that is not explained by these factors? Second, turning the first question around, are not the apparent effects of electoral competitiveness and legal structure spurious, merely reflecting the association between voting and *other* regional differences?

This study cannot supply satisfactory answers to these questions. As a note of caution, a few observations are presented. In Table 8, South and North are compared on various aspects. The South as a whole had a 25.1 per cent lower turnout than the nation while the non-South as a whole had a 7.5 per cent higher turnout than the national average.[44] The final column shows that differences between the South and the non-South diminish as the differences in socio-demographic composition, legal structure, and electoral competitiveness are controlled. Viewed in this perspective, the first question is apparently answered affirmatively. (The numbers in Table 8 have the same meaning as those in Tables 3 and 4.)

On the other hand, differences between the South and the non-South alone account for just as much variation in the (residual) voter turnout as both electoral competitiveness and legal structure do. The correlation between region and residual turnout is −.83. However, this relationship does not imply that the relationship between the legal and electoral factors, on one hand, and the voter turnout, on the other, is spurious. Given the strong intercorrelations between "region" and other factors— −.762 between the two systemic factors, −.582 between region and legal factor, and −.821 between region and electoral competitiveness—any attempt to separate one from the other is confounded by the problem of extreme multicollinearity.

**Concluding Remarks.** The substantive conclusion of this analysis on the relative importance of the three factors for variation in state voting rates is quite tentative. The conceptual and empirical separation of the individual component of variation in state turnout from the systemic component represents an improvement over other studies. On the other hand, the decomposition of the two systemic factors is less firm, partly because these factors are closely related and partly because "South" as an alternative interpretation cannot be ruled out. The method of multi-level analysis presented in this paper should permit a more detailed analysis of issues of the sort analyzed here. Replicating this analysis on units such as cities, congressional districts, and counties should permit more definitive judgments about the impact of individual and systemic factors on a variety of political and nonpolitical phenomena.

---

[44] These figures are based on unweighted average. See footnote 34.

Table 7 (Cont.)

*A* Index of legal facilitation
1 Residence in state under 1 year
2 Presidential voting by new residents
3 Presidential voting by former residents
4 No registration
5 Permanent registration
6 General civilian absentee registration permitted
7 Precinct registration
8 Registration closes within 1 month of election
9 Civilian absentee vote
10 Mere absence a ground for absentee vote
11 Absentee ballot application by mail
12 No literacy test
13 Polls open 12 hours or longer

Source: Reproduced in part from Milbrath, "Participation in the American States," Table 6, p. 46, which is in turn based on the Report of Presidential Commission on Voting and Registration, 1963.

# Comment on Kim, Petrocik, and Enokson: The American States' Impact on Voter Turnout

DOUGLAS D. ROSE
*Tulane University*

In the Spring of 1974, Herbert Jacob of Northwestern University suggested to me that the main source of state impact might not be found in average state differences but might instead occur as an internal redistribution of value among citizens. That is, while states might all treat their "average" citizen about the same, some states might favor the poor over the rich or whites over blacks while other states did not. If Professor Jacob was correct, a good deal of previous work, including my own, was missing the main state impact. While I thought this unlikely, given a limited exploration of the problem earlier, the question was worth addressing directly. Edward Tufte of Princeton University pointed out that if individual-level data could be found for a variety of states, state discrimination would be evident as an interaction effect following a consistent pattern. For example, turnout among Mississippi black people and poor people which was lower than would be expected from the average national turnout of black and poor people and from the average Mississippi turnout would be interaction showing that Mississippi differed from other states in racial and economic discrimination. I wanted to address the interaction question and also, because I believed that we had been actually overestimating rather than underestimating the impact of states, I wanted data which could test whether the measured state "impact" actually traveled along the theoretical causal paths or was spurious. For reasons outlined below, the best data to address these questions were those from the Census Bureau's 1972 national election survey.

By the beginning of the summer, computer printout in hand, I had the answers and was writing them up when I found Professors Kim, Petrocik, and Enokson's article on a similar topic listed for publication. Pleasantly surprised by what they had done, I asked the authors and the Editor if I could postscript their findings with mine in a comment. They graciously consented.

My remarks are in two distinct parts. First, I comment on the authors' approach, pointing out its contribution in three areas and illustrating what remains to be done in those areas. Second, I present the results of my own investigation into the interaction impact of states and into the causal paths of state influence on turnout. The link between the two parts lies in the use by Professors Kim, Petrocik, Enokson and myself of individual-level data to understand the role of states in voting.

### Individual and Systemic Influences in State Voting Turnout

The authors have moved the study of voting turnout ahead by using a more comprehensive model, producing a more complete explanation, and discovering more reliable estimates of relationships than previous work has yielded. Because of the limited purposes and data of Professors Kim, Petrocik, and Enokson, however, much work remains to be done in these same three areas of model, explanation, and estimation.

The authors' model is the first research effort that I know of to look at state differences within the context of individual differences springing from American national society. As they point out, most state differences in voting turnout trace to the operation of social variables having the same individual relations in all states. The article rather decisively demonstrates that if these characteristics of individuals are misrepresented as characteristics of state political units, their impact on turnout and state voting differences is misestimated and exaggerated. The authors' corrections for turnout estimates can usefully be duplicated in other areas of state politics to improve our understanding of how states operate.

The authors' model remains incomplete, however. Intentionally and necessarily with their data, the authors have omitted the large block of political psychology variables, such as strength of party identification, election involvement, sense of citizen duty, sense of political efficacy, etc. These individual-level political variables are already known to be important proximate causes of turnout and to have effects beyond serving as conduits for social and state-level influences. Some of the article's estimates of relationship might change considerably if individual-level political variables were included in the model. The authors' systemic competition variable directly depends on individual-level behavior which flows from individual-level psychology variables. If, as seems likely, these individual-level variables cause both systemic competition differences and turnout differences, then much of the measured impact of state competition may be spurious, resolving to nationwide relationships at the individual level.

Some previous work suggests just such a pattern. For instance, in a study of the 1968 presidential election the voting of Texas partisans followed closely the national pattern: regression coefficients of vote for various candidates on partisans of three age groups averaged 98 per cent of the national coefficients. At the individual level, the relationships were the same in Texas as elsewhere. The differences in election results and competition arose from the greater number of Democrats in Texas than in the nation as a whole, so that for standardized coefficients, Texas averaged only 89 per cent of the national coefficients.[1] Just as Kentucky differs from the nation less in the voting behavior of its rich and poor than in the number of its rich and poor, so that it is individual-level variables, not systemic variables, which produce state differences, so it may be individual-level political variables, not systemic competition, which produce much of the remaining variance in state voting turnout.

The increase in completeness of explanation given us by the authors comes from their bringing together data on individual and on systemic levels. Because variables at both levels influence behavior, a more complete explanation of variance requires that both sets of data be used. Unfortunately, we are not usually in a position to have complete individual-level information for each system; as a result, the authors' extrapolation of national survey results to each system seems the logical path to take. If, as suggested above, we bring individual-level political variables into the voting model to provide a more complete explanation, it makes sense to follow the authors' lead and to assume that, for instance, liberal Democrats tend to vote for liberal Democratic candidates everywhere, or that involved, efficacious citizens turn out in above average numbers in every state. We can then examine the impact of systemic candidate selection variables or election scheduling variables to provide an even more complete explanation.

A more complete explanation is needed, not only because we wish to know more but also because we cannot be confident in existing estimates based on such a partial explanation. Again, the authors have not aimed at a complete explanation and their data do not permit an explanation of more than about one-sixth of the individual-level turnout variance. Their explanation of more than five-sixths of the interstate variance would seem to virtually close the business of explaining state differences, but in fact their findings remain tentative until substantially more of the individual-level variance is explained. As the authors demonstrate, much of the state variance traces to individual-level influences; what remains unclear is whether additional amounts of the state differences trace to further, possibly political, individual-level influences which have not been included in the authors' analysis. Because only one-sixth of the individual-level turnout variance is accounted for, we know that important variables have been omitted; because interstate differences account for only about one-twelfth of the individual-level variance, we know that the omitted variables must be mostly individual level; because the included individual-level variables account for only one-eighth of individual-level variance but over one-half of interstate differences, we know that state differences are highly sensitive to individual-level turnout influences; I conclude that the analysis of systemic causes is open to considerable revision as our explanation of individual-level turnout is made more complete.[2]

The authors' most basic contribution to our understanding of state turnout differences lies in providing much more reliable estimates of the relations between variables than we have ever had. The literature on state politics has been plagued by nominally complete explanations which depend on lamentably incorrect estimates of actual influences. The difficulty in finding reliable estimates has arisen from a situation of high multicollinearity among variables.

With few political units (48 states in this case) which differ on a great number of characteristics, the problems of sorting out which variables have how much impact are multiplied by multicollinearity. That is, everything is so related to everything else that sorting out "true" from "spurious" relations hinges on small and error-prone differences. Because our standard multivariate statistical methods are likely to give incorrect estimates, the authors have chosen the better course of finding ways to isolate the various factors so that impact can be measured more directly and with less error. Thus, though their estimates of social variables' impacts on turnout are highly correlated with other impacts on turnout ($r = .965$), the authors' confidence in these estimates can be high because they derive from individual-level data where multicollinearity is not a major problem.

---

[1] Roderick Bell, "The State of the Texas Electorate: A Description and Interpretation of Who Texas Is," prepared for the 68th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (1972), provides the coefficients for the text's percentages.

[2] The Kim, Petrocik, and Enokson study accounts for individual-level turnout variance as well as or better than other well-known studies do. For instance, William R. Shaffer, in *Computer Simulation of Voting Behavior* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), reports that the original Downsian model and the SRC six-components model perform fairly poorly in the 1964 election, accounting for only .1 per cent and 1.6 per cent, respectively, of the turnout variance. William Riker and Peter Ordeshook, in their "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting," *American Political Science Review*, 62 (March, 1968), 25–42, achieve a prediction of 11.6 per cent of individual turnout variance using four political variables (perceived closeness, care about outcome, duty, and specific election). Philip Converse, with the assistance of Richard Niemi, accounts for 19.7 per cent of the turnout variance using four background social variables (education, age, sex, and region) in "Non-Voting Among Young Adults in the United States," in *Political Parties and Political Behavior*, ed. William Crotty, Donald Freeman and Douglas Gatlin (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2nd ed., 1971).

The single greatest multicollinearity complex for the American states has centered on the differences between the South and the North on a whole range of social and political variables. The authors remove the multicollinearity influence from the estimates of the impact of social variables on turnout, but the systemic political variables' estimated impacts remain affected by the regional multicollinearity complex. Because of the limits of their data, the authors can do no more than indicate that the problem exists.

With more recent data, misestimates due to region and multicollinearity can be pinpointed for the absentee voting laws. The article's tentative estimates of the effects of voting laws appears in their Table 6. The three absentee balloting laws, assumed to affect turnout among registered citizens, account for more than one-third of the estimated total impact of all laws on turnout. On the face of it, this seems exaggerated, as the number of absent registrants is small and relatively similar in all states, so the effects of the laws should be small. The source of the exaggeration appears to be region: because region is related to turnout, and because region is related to absentee voting laws, the laws spuriously "account for" regional turnout differences. According to the estimates, the average northern state increases its turnout by more than 2 per cent over the national mean simply because of absentee voting laws, and, conversely, the average southern state drops more than 4 per cent below the mean because of its absentee voting laws. The estimates thus trace about 42 per cent of North-South turnout differences to absentee voting laws. These results would appear to be spurious, but without individual-level data on absentee voting, they cannot be proven spurious.

Individual-level data on absentee voting is available in the Census Bureau's 1972 election survey of voting and registration,[3] and these data indicate a considerably lower estimate of the possible impact of absentee voting laws. In 1972, 2.3 per cent of the voting-age population reported voting by absentee ballot. While, as in 1960, the South had turnout well below the national average and absentee votes in the South were a smaller share of the population than were absentee votes in the North, these continuing associations do not provide a good guide to the actual, highly limited effects of the laws. In 1972 in the North, absentee voting increases individual turnout slightly more than one-quarter of one per cent above the national average, while the lack of absentee voting drops the South's turnout about one-half of one per cent below the national mean; thus, the maximum effect of absentee voting laws accounts for no more than 7½ per cent of the regional differences in individuals' behaviors, not 42 per cent, as the article estimates for 1960. While comparisons between 1960 and 1972 results can be no more than suggestive, given changes in law and social composition and electoral competition, the 1972 data indicate a maximum impact of absentee voting laws which is only one-eighth the size of the effect estimated in the aggregate data for 1960. Because absentee laws are correlated with region and competition at the state level, it appears that multicollinearity has produced exaggerated estimates for 1960. More correct estimates could be found by extending the authors' use of individual-level estimators to the legal and competition variables.

To summarize, the authors' inclusion of individual-level variables provides considerable improvements in model, explanation, and estimation. While the authors' purposes and data did not allow them to go further, we need to extend their work to broader models to be confident in our understanding of individual and systemic causes in state politics. The extensions should add more individual-level variables.

### Registration and Interaction in State Voting Turnout

In measuring the impact of individual-level social variables and systemic factors on voter turnout, the authors take the effects to be simple, direct, and independent. In this second part of my remarks, two additional, more complex, relationships between the individual and the systemic levels are examined for their impact on turnout. Briefly, my research uses additional individual-level data—not available to the authors for the 1960 election—to focus on the interdependence of individual-level and systemic influences on turnout; thus I am concerned with possible extensions of their model and am continuing the authors' use of both individual-level and aggregate data.

The first more complex relationship which might be added to the voting model is for the impact of individual-level social variables to be contingent on systemic factors for their turnout impact. States can moderate or increase the effects of social factors on turnout. For instance, in 1960, as earlier, the individual social characteristic of race affected individual turnout almost everywhere, but the size of that impact varied considerably from state to state with the major differences occurring between northern and southern states: though among adult white males the proportions who had never voted were much the same in both regions, among adult black males nonvoting was three times as high in the South as in the North.[4] The impact of an individual social variable was contingent on the state system.

---

[3] "Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1972," *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 253 (October, 1973), Social and Economic Statistics Administration, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, table 15.

The interaction of the two levels, as in the disenfranchisement of blacks through registration procedures, has long been seen as a major impact of states on turnout. Actually measuring the interaction effects has been very difficult, however. The state-to-state differences do not show up in the overall individual-level data, and the individual differences do not show up in the aggregate state-level data, so that inferring state impact from available data plunged scholars into severe methodological problems. Indeed, it was precisely this area which Robinson picked as his famous illustration of the ecological fallacy, and the problem has been more avoided than solved since then. While times have changed since 1960 and race does not play as important a role in turnout, the general problem of state impact through interaction remains. States can still affect turnout by discouraging voting by particular social groups.

In 1972, the likely candidates for such discrimination are younger, newly enfranchised voters. The states were, in effect, coerced into granting the franchise; the vast new electorate threatened much of the political status quo with its size and its relatively liberal, independent Democratic leanings; some national party politicking did occur over registration by college students; a handy, legitimate tool of influencing turnout, registration procedures, was already available to states and known to be discriminatively effective in influencing turnout by younger groups. In brief, all the ingredients for state differences in discrimination against age groups were present in 1972. The question of turnout discrimination is additionally informative about states' impacts on citizens because interaction as a whole is a little explored area of systemic influence, thus turnout results give strong clues to other areas of politics. Because voting and electoral areas show the strongest direct state impact, it seems likely that if states have a major impact via interaction, it will show up in turnout statistics.

While the first complex relationship has states intervening between individual-level variables and turnout, the second complex relationship examined has individual-level variables intervening between systemic factors and turnout. For the most part, states do not directly cause individual voting behavior. Rather, they have their impact on pre-voting, individual-level variables which in turn lead individuals to vote or not vote. Systemic impact should correspondingly be contingent on states' affecting intervening individual-level variables. For example, we expect that turnout will be affected by an individual's interest in an election, that interest in turn is partly a function of stimulation, and that states can impact the amount of stimulation by manipulating election rules, such as the banning of partisan competition. The turnout consequences of such state actions, however, are dependent on the intervening individual-level variables. If, as in the case of the absentee voting laws, the state actions do not have much impact, then the systemic factor does not explain turnout, and correlations between state actions and turnout are spurious.

The use of intervening individual-level variables between systemic factors and voting turnout makes the voting model stronger and subjects estimates of systemic influence to more stringent tests. Traditionally, the requirements for proving systemic impact on behavior have been lax. Proof has merely involved correlations among aggregate variables which could be plausibly linked to individual behavior. The authors have devastatingly illustrated the incorrect conclusions which emerge under the lax requirements. Finding better estimates involves relying more on a strong model and reliable data and relying less on multivariate regression routines. If states have merely a generalized and diffuse association with voting, rather than following the routes specified in a strong model, we must suspect that the association of states and turnout is spurious and arises because some individual-level variables are not included in the analysis. For presidential voting, the prime route through which states affect voting should be the registration procedures. Registration is the main gateway to voting in America, and it is largely under the control of state governing groups. While states have a number of other tools available, these are for the most part minimized in a presidential election: both parties have candidates on the ballot, media exposure and candidate expenditures vary nationally rather than by state, the individual-level forces leading to turnout receive high and fairly equal stimulation across states, local elites have little stake in the impact of turnout, the electoral organizations are largely independent of state organizations, etc. Registration, however, remains a state variable (though it, too, is somewhat diminished in impact). For the present study, registration is even more likely to be an impact route, because the interaction of state and age groups is highly likely to operate through registration procedures. In sum, the intervening role of registration provides a good indicator of whether state influence is truly systemic or is spuriously associated with individual-level variables.

---

[4] William Flanigan, *Political Behavior of the American Electorate* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2nd ed., 1972), Table 1.1, p. 23.

### Research Design

The data on the 1972 election published by the Census Bureau include four major variables.[5] For each of nine age groups, in each of the fifteen largest states, the study reports registration and voting data for individuals. Additionally, because regional groups are broken down similarly, I have constructed two additional "states" as aggregates of the remaining southern states and the remaining northern states, so that any common "small state" or regional or combination effects can be discovered. Because the Census Bureau takes very large samples, their accuracy for each included state compares well with that of the SRC for the entire nation. It is thus possible to push the analysis down to much lower levels than the authors found possible in their 1960 SRC data.[6]

The actual estimation of causal impact involves four considerations. First, age groups, states, registration, and voting are treated as dichotomous variables as in the authors' analysis. Second, interaction is specified as in analysis of variance by treating each combination of groups as a variable. Interaction impact is then regarded as the impact of combinations minus the impact attributable to the variables separately. Third, interactions with registrations are included as part of the age and state impact, because interactions with registration merely reflect that unregistered voters do not vote and that all variance involves registered voters. Fourth, path analysis techniques are employed on the model presented in Figure 1 to recover standardized path coefficients for the independent variables.[7] While this last procedure is unusual with ordinal and interaction data, in the present format it is perfectly proper, basically because all calculations can be traced to the common statistic of the proportion of the dependent variable's variance explained.

### Results

The standardized path coefficients recovered in the analysis are presented in Table 2. The largest and most striking coefficient represents the unknown sources of registration. Age and state help relatively little in explaining why individuals do or do not register. The inability to explain registration is particularly important because of the next two largest coefficients: registration is regularly translated into voting turnout, and, aside from this relation, most of the causes of turnout are unknown. Explaining registration is thus the single most important task of turnout research.

Age, state, and their interaction are only minor explanations of registration differences. Most age groups and state populations register in similar proportions, with at most a 20 per cent difference between categories. Age, with fewer groups yet larger differences between groups, is a more important source of registration differences than are the variables associated with state differences.

As we expect from the studies cited in the article, the age differences produce curvilinear registration effects, with the youngest group (18- to 20-year-olds) registering least frequently (58 per cent), the middle-aged (55- to 64-year-olds) showing peak registration (80 per cent), and older groups

---

[5] "Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1972," *Current Population Reports*, Tables 1, 3, 15.

[6] Comparing survey and official tabulations always reveals discrepancies in turnout, and so it is here. A higher percentage of persons report voting than are reported voting in official tabulations. This does not appear to be a problem for the present study, as the between-state variance in turnout is close in both survey (variance is .00533) and official (variance is .00534) data. Additionally, state differences in the survey and the official reports are highly correlated ($r = .958$), so the differences in national average merely have the effect of reducing national variance, hence exaggerating the role of our variables in explaining turnout. Registration differences between survey and official data are more serious, as the public not only reports less registration than do state officials, but also the state publics report fewer state differences in registration (variance is .00306) than do the state officials' versions (variance is .00415). Moreover, the state differences from the two data sets are not close to perfect correlation ($r = .816$). I believe that the survey data provides the better index of registration of potential voters. The over-report of official data probably traces to the lag in striking the dead, institutionalized, and relocated citizens from the rolls; since states are believed to vary noticeably in the speed with which they correct their registration lists, the relation between the two sets of data is what would be expected if the survey were accurate. The combination of higher reported voting and lower reported registration in the survey as compared to official tabulations leads to considerable differences between the two in the proportion of registered voters going to the polls. Again, from the above it seems likely that the survey is more accurate.

[7] Before starting estimation, one further operation was performed: state and age were made independent by setting the same age structure in each state. The authors have already pointed out the impact age has on state data, so it seemed wise to simplify analysis. The adjustment has little effect on the relevant correlations. (Data available on request.)

**Table 1. 1972 Registration and Turnout, by State and Age**

| | Registration | Turnout Among Registrants | Total Turnout |
|---|---|---|---|
| State: | | | |
| Illinois | + 6.4[a] | + 3.3 | + 8.2 |
| Indiana | + 8.6 | − 1.9 | + 5.9 |
| Massachusetts | + 5.5 | + 1.3 | + 5.8 |
| North, residual | + 4.6 | + 1.5 | + 5.2 |
| New Jersey | + .9 | + 4.0 | + 3.7 |
| California | − 1.3 | + 5.9 | + 3.0 |
| Ohio | + 1.0 | + 2.5 | + 2.6 |
| Missouri | + 3.9 | − 1.2 | + 2.4 |
| Michigan | + .9 | + 1.8 | + 2.1 |
| New York | − 3.2 | + 5.4 | + .9 |
| Pennsylvania | − 3.4 | + 1.3 | − 2.1 |
| Florida | − 3.6 | − 1.3 | − 4.0 |
| South, residual | − 1.2 | − 6.2 | − 5.5 |
| Texas | − 3.4 | − 7.3 | − 8.0 |
| Virginia | −10.8 | − 7.1 | −13.7 |
| Georgia | − 8.1 | −10.6 | −13.9 |
| North Carolina | − 8.9 | − 9.8 | −14.0 |
| Age: | | | |
| 45–54 | + 7.0 | + 2.3 | + 7.9 |
| 55–64 | + 7.9 | + 1.1 | + 7.7 |
| 65–74 | + 6.2 | − .3 | + 5.1 |
| 35–44 | + 2.5 | + 1.5 | + 3.3 |
| 30–34 | − 1.1 | − .1 | − 1.1 |
| 25–29 | − 6.2 | + .4 | − 5.2 |
| 75 and over | − 1.6 | − 8.5 | − 7.4 |
| 21–24 | −12.8 | − 1.8 | −12.2 |
| 18–20 | −14.2 | − 4.0 | −14.7 |
| National Total, percentage | 72.3 | 87.1 | 63.0 |

[a] Entries are deviation from the national total percentage.

**Table 2. Voting Model Standardized Path Coefficients for 1972, Simple and Compound Paths**

| | Independent Variable | Path Coefficient |
|---|---|---|
| Simple Paths | | |
| To Registration: | Age | .1716[a] |
| | State | .0956 |
| | Age-State Interaction | .0624 |
| | Error | .9785 |
| To Voting: | Age | .0468 |
| | State | .0841 |
| | Age-State Interaction | .0400 |
| | Registration | .7888 |
| | Error | .5811 |
| Compound Paths | | |
| To Voting Through Registration: | Age | .1354 |
| | State | .0754 |
| | Age-State Interaction | .0493 |

[a] Entries are standardized regression coefficients.

registering with declining frequency (71 per cent for the group 75 years of age and older). For each group, however, most persons are registered and there is a large minority of unregistered citizens, so that age and its associated factors are at best a moderate influence on registration. States are even less illuminating as areas of registration differences. Most of the states cluster in the high 60s to low 70s of registration percentage. The interaction between states and age groups produces even less impact. As is statistically expected, the lowest registration cells are young citizens in low registration southern states, and the highest registration cells are established citizens in the high registration midwestern states. Many of the interactions which do occur are obviously sampling errors, since states do not show consistent patterns of registration across the several young, several middle-aged, or several older age groups.

Age-state interaction impact on registration takes three forms. In Florida, high registration among older citizens suggests that retirees settling in Florida bring their northern individual-level registration habits with them. A young-old, linear age type of interaction suggests that the impact of residence laws and permanent registration systems occurs in two sets of states, with Illinois, Missouri, and the residual South being harder on young residents and easier on the more settled age



Figure 1. Model of the Influences on Voting Turnout

groups, while Indiana, Texas, Michigan, and Ohio show an opposite tendency. The third pattern is for states to increase or decrease the age variance, which might be expected if states had generally accessible or inaccessible registration arrangements and thus had changed the age-related level of motivation required to register. Pennsylvania and Virginia show larger-than-expected age differentials, implying restrictive registration. Although plausible system-level explanations can be constructed for the latter pattern of interaction, individual-level social and political explanations can be constructed as well. The interactions are simply too small and unreliable to allow any further testing with the data. What is clear is that the interaction is small and that no single systemic factor produces it.

The registration route is the prime hypothesized path for age, state, and interaction to affect voting turnout. Direct impact on voting is suspect, and since the impact through registration is not very large, we should be cautious about any causal interpretation of a moderate association between the exogenous variable and turnout which is independent of registration. The coefficient for the impact of age on voting confirms our expectation by being small. On examination, even this impact is related to our understanding of registration. Generally, turnout differences among the registered follow in highly modified form the registration differences among the age groups, reflecting some age-related differences in motivation. Additionally, because registration works a special and often one-time hardship on the young while being relatively easy for the old, there is more symmetry in the turnout than in the registration curves across age groups. Both these patterns, while of limited magnitude, reflect the pattern of age impact which we expect from our understanding of age and registration.

The state coefficient is much larger than the age coefficient and indeed is nearly the size of the state impact on registration. As indicated, this should make us suspicious about the validity of the association. On examination, it is apparent that the largest part of state association with voting turnout among the registered can be traced to region: the northern states have from 85 to 93 per cent turnout among registered voters, while the southern states range from 76 to 86 per cent. Since southern states are below northern states in registration as well as turnout among the registered, the regional background directly contributes to the estimated state impact on voting directly, rather than through registration. When we control for region, however, it is only within the South that the pattern of a general factor—low registration–low turnout among the registered—occurs. In the North more registration of course means more votes, but as the registration increases, turnout among the registered declines, indicating that more lenient registration procedures or registration drives tend to register citizens less motivated and less likely to turn out. The interaction in the North again follows a well-known characteristic of registration, so that state impact on turnout among registered voters by raising or lowering registration standards is quite understandable and apparently legitimate. No such conclusion holds for the South and thus for most of the estimated state impact on voting; the system-level variables most likely to have an impact on both registration and turnout are controlled in the 1972 national election: electoral competition, type of election, media exposure, etc. do not vary noticeably overall, much less in the South alone. I believe we should suspect the estimated impact of states on turnout because the impact cannot be plausibly tied to known characteristics of registration.

The estimated coefficient for direct state-age interaction impact on voting is very small. Both the size of this coefficient and the largely random pattern of age-state deviations which give rise to it are grounds for considering this estimate almost entirely the result of sampling error.[8] Considering the measured size of the state impact, this is perhaps surprising, unless the state impact is, as suggested, largely due to spurious association which does not directly involve how states affect their citizens.

## Conclusions

The analysis added in this comment indicates that interaction does not appear to be a major route of impact on voting. For the most part, the individual-level social variable of age has a direct impact on turnout which is uncomplicated by systemic differences in registration procedures. While registration is a crucial variable and produces most of the turnout differences among age groups, and while states differ in turnout in large part because of registration differences, the state registration differences do not produce large differences in the registration and voting of the various age groups. This lack of state impact through interaction in the area of voting, where we would most expect such an impact, implies that interaction may not be an important factor in other areas of state politics. Additionally, the sizeable part of the association of state and turnout which does not travel through registration, the main gateway to turnout, implies that much of that association is spurious. Most of the unexplained turnout variance occurs at the individual level, and it appears that excluded individual-level factors are associated with both region and turnout, producing a spurious association between state systemic variables and turnout. Correspondingly, our voting model should be extended to include more postregistration individual-level variables to explain turnout before we attempt to reliably estimate systemic impact on voting turnout.

---

[8] The only nonrandom patterns—and they are small—involve a slight inverse relation between registration rates and turnout among the registered: in Indiana, Missouri, and Texas, stiff registration procedures mean lower registration but higher turnout among the registered in the extreme age groups, while lax registration laws mean higher registration but lower turnout among the registered for susceptible age groups. Aside from this minor plausible pattern, interaction does not appear to have a real impact on voting.

The supplemental analysis presented here supports the article's basic assumptions and procedures and suggests that the authors' methods should be extended to provide a more complete model, more powerful explanations, and more reliable estimates by continuing and augmenting their use of individual-level and systemic variables jointly. The lack of a sizeable interaction factor suggests that we do not need to measure each individual-level variable for each system, and that their procedures for extrapolating individual-level results from one data set to another does provide a useful and reliable tool. The possibilities that Professors Kim, Petrocik, and Enokson have opened up can considerably increase our understanding of individual behavior and of state politics.

# Some Problems in Alfred Schutz's Phenomenological Methodology

N. PATRICK PERITORE
*University of Missouri, Columbia*

Alfred Schutz's phenomenological sociology represents the most consistent and consequential attempt to give authentic philosophical grounding to the social sciences. Standing as it does at the boundary between phenomenological philosophy and empirical social science, Schutz's work raises crucial questions for both disciplines. The social sciences, having no philosophical unity, fluctuate between the extremes of idiosyncratic systematization and fragmented empirical specificity. To a philosophical mind the social sciences, far from being "positive," remain merely speculative. Phenomenological philosophy on the other hand, though it claims to be able to provide a foundation for social science, has made few fruitful endeavors to complete its program and, indeed, appears to be little better than a magnificent philosophical fragment. Thus an attempt such as Schutz's represents an important development for both disciplines and deserves careful critical examination both in its own right and as a test of the phenomenological program. This paper will analyze Schutz's "general thesis of the alter ego," his notion of social science and, finally, some specific problems in his theory of social action. Its purpose will be to explicate the consequences flowing from Schutzian sociology's lack of rigorous foundation in a phenomenological theory of intersubjectivity.

## Problems of Intersubjective Knowledge—The "General Thesis of the Alter Ego"

It must first be noted that the *Phenomenology of the Social World* is really two works; the first two chapters contain a phenomenological analysis of the temporal structures of projective action under the *epochē* (ἐποχή); the second half, beginning with Chapter 3, is an application of these phenomenologically derived insights to the structures of social action in the world of everyday life.[1] The second half, containing Schutz's systematic sociology, is executed within the natural attitude. That is, Schutz divests himself of the discipline of the *epochē* in order to examine social interaction from the standpoint of the actor's self-comprehension. His stated reason is that:

---

[1] Regarding the program and terminology of Husserl's phenomenology: The philosopher removes himself from the naive, mundane, or natural attitude, the unreflective realism of the man on the street who takes the world and his knowledge of it as merely given, by means of the *epochē,* a conscious "bracketing" or abstention from utilization of received philosophical judgments about cognition. Under the discipline of the *epochē,* the philosopher returns to the raw phenomena presented to perceptive consciousness. The phenomena are the substance of knowledge, and the philosopher researches the manner in which such knowledge is constituted or given form in the stream of conscious experience; hence "phenomenology"—discovery of the structure of phenomenal experience. Husserl's philosophic researches revealed that consciousness is intentional, that is, all consciousness is consciousness *of* something. For analytic purposes, Husserl differentiates the intentional stream of consciousness into the *noesis* (νόησις), mode of judging or attitude toward the "object of consciousness," and a correlative *noema* (νόημα), the intended meaning immanent in the noetic judgment, the pure intended form of experience. Consciousness here "sees" through ideation (*Wesensschau*) the essence (eidos, εἶδος) of the pure object of consciousness by abstracting a common core from all its various modes of appearance.

Thus Husserl, a mathematician and philosopher of science by training, intends to create an eidetic science (science of essences) in order thereby to provide a logical and epistemological foundation for the empirical sciences. From noetic analyses can be generated an essential science of the possible modes of judging, correlative to which is regional ontology or a theory of the possible kinds of noematic "objects of consciousness" given in the various modes of judging. For example, by varying Euclid's 23rd definition regarding parallel lines, it is possible to generate an infinity of different geometries, i.e., noetic modes of judging spatiality (Euclidean, Lobichevskian, Riemannian, etc.). Correlative to these different geometries is a multiplicity of different noematic types of space (plane, spherical, negative, etc.). An eidetic science would range all possible types of judging (noeses) with all of their possible correlative noemata, becoming thereby an analytic tool for the generation of systematic theoretical sciences concerning the various relevant fields of being (regional ontologies). These eidetic or theoretical sciences give both form and epistemological validity to the inductive propositions of empirical science, just as mathematics structures and grounds the propositions of observational physics. The system of eidetic sciences finds its foundation, in turn, in the apodicticity (absolute self-evidence) of the transcendental ego which is a sort of Cartesian *cogito ergo sum.*

See Edmund Husserl, *Ideas I,* trans. W. B. Gibson (New York: Collier, 1967), the best systematic statement. For the philosophy of science see Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology,* trans. D. Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), and Edmund Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic,* trans. D. Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969). For the problem of ego, body and other minds see Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations,* trans. D. Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960). For an overview of the program see Edmund Husserl, *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy,* trans. Q. Lauer (New York: Harper, 1965).

For Schutz's phenomenology see Alfred Schutz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World,* trans. F. Walsh and F. Lehnert (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967). *Collected Papers,* Vol. 1, *The Problem of Social Reality,* ed. M. Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), *Collected Papers,* Vol. 2, *Studies in Social Theory,* ed. A. Broderson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), *Collected Papers,* Vol. 3, *Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966).

> The purpose of this work, which is to analyze the phenomenon of meaning in ordinary [*mundanen*] social life, does not require the achievement of a transcendental knowledge that goes beyond that sphere or a further sojourn within the area of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction. In ordinary social life we are no longer concerned with the constituting phenomena as these are studied within the sphere of the phenomenological reduction. We are concerned only with the phenomena corresponding to them within the natural attitude.[2]

There is a major philosophical justification for what might appear to be merely the exercise of an author's prerogative to delimit his own task. The reason for the turn to the natural attitude is that Schutz divides the problem of intersubjective understanding into three different levels. At the first level, the problem of intersubjectivity is concerned with the epistemology of the nature and existence of "other minds." Because this problem has not been clearly stated, let alone solved, Schutz calls it a "scandal of philosophy," and indeed devotes three subsequent critical essays to Husserl's, Sartre's, and Scheler's attempts to constitute alterity.[3] At the second level, intersubjective understanding is a culturally transmitted set of practical usages, an experiential common sense knowing of others in the natural attitude. On the third level, intersubjective understanding is a method of social science utilizing ideal-typification to explicate mundane actors' pre-interpretation of their own culture as a matrix of social intercourse.[4]

In the light of this division of the problem, Schutz adopts a working assumption designed to avoid the epistemological (first-level) problem. This assumption, the "general thesis of the alter ego," claims that " . . . this stream of thought which is not mine shows the same fundamental structure as my own consciousness."[5] Basically, the "general thesis" states that all the structures of projected action, motivation, etc., revealed under the *epochē* in the first two chapters, are directly applicable to the other ego in the natural attitude without benefit of the type of transcendental reduction and pairing appresentational synthesis of the other utilized in Husserl's fifth Cartesian Meditation which Schutz rejects in his later essay.[6] Thus the general thesis is held to be a "sufficient frame of reference for the foundation of empirical psychology and social science."[7]

However, the problem of intersubjective constitution, which Schutz seems to avoid by means of a shift from the thematic attitude of the *epochē* to the natural attitude, is not so easily disposed of and indeed keeps returning to spoil his otherwise elegant analyses of social life. It could not be otherwise insofar as the "general thesis of the alter ego" violates a basic intent of the phenomenological program. As Husserl so carefully demonstrates, the natural sciences, unclear as to their own foundation in the Galilean idealization and mathematization of the lifeworld, can hardly serve as the basis for social science. Against the naturalistic and empiricist position, phenomenology demonstrates the need for basing empirical inquiry on a "theoretical science" derived from essential ideation of the "region" of discourse to be studied. Scientific thinking has coherence, according to Husserl,

> . . . by virtue of the unity of a theoretical interest and the correlative unity of the scientific province that is to be systematically explored and cognized. Whatever accrues in the process of scientific thinking, as judgement-results or cognitional results pertaining to that province, makes up an openly endless *thematic field by itself*, the expanding unity of the *science as theory*, a multiplicity of themes belonging together and thematically combined.[8]

The consequences are clear. The social sciences, if they are to be truly "scientific," must found themselves once and for all by rendering thematic their own field of discourse through ideation of the essence of "the social," the most basic level of which is pure (intermonadic) intersubjectivity. Richard M. Zaner stated this point clearly in an article on Schutz without developing the critical implications. He said:

> Hence, all empirical social sciences, beginning with the socio-cultural world as already given, presuppose as their ground "the constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude"—that inquiry which has as its fundamental theme the problem of intersubjectivity. For the same reason, inquiry into intersubjectivity cannot avail itself of either the methods or the theories belonging to the empirical social sciences, but must be developed as an autonomous discipline, one taking its clues and methods from the phenomenon itself.[9]

---

[2] Schutz, *Phenomenology of the Social World,* p. 44.

[3] Schutz, *Collected Papers,* Vol. 1, pp. 150–179 and pp. 180–203, and Vol. 3, pp. 51–91.

[4] Schutz, *Collected Papers,* Vol. 1, pp. 56–59.

[5] Schutz, *Collected Papers,* Vol. 1, p. 174, *Phenomenology of the Social World,* p. 98.

[6] Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations.* Schutz, *Collected Papers,* Vol. 3, pp. 51–91.

[7] Schutz, *Collected Papers,* Vol. 1, p. 175. *Phenomenology of the Social World,* p. 98, p. 44 (my emphasis).

[8] Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic,* p. 36.

[9] Richard M. Zaner, "Theory of Intersubjectivity: Alfred Schutz" in *Social Research,* 28 (Spring 1961), 72.

A theory of intersubjectivity (and embodiment) forms the necessary foundational precondition for a true "science" of man. Intersubjective constitution is the "Archimedean point" on which turns the possibility of a "philosophical anthropology," the a priori "theoretical science" that frames and unifies the method, questions, and derived propositions of the empirical sciences associated with its theme. It is only with this grounding that the social "sciences" can become truly "positive." As Husserl states,

> The positive sciences operate exclusively on the plane of the theory that can be fashioned straightforwardly, when the theorizer directs himself to the province of cognition as his theme—fashioned, that is, by the continuous categorical forming of experiential objectivities belonging to the province, as they come within the scope of determining processes of thinking, and by the systematic connecting of the formations thus acquired, to make cognitional formations at higher and higher levels: the openly endless, and yet systematically unitary, edifice of the scientific theory of the province.[10]

Within a founded philosophical anthropology, concept and theory formation occurs according to a rigorous "paradigm" which is not merely conventional (accepted by the scientific community) but purely objective because derived from logical transformations of the essence of the subject matter itself. Given a mode of theory formation freed from cultural and personal biases, empirical techniques will yield propositions that are rigorously relevant to the confirmation or denial of derived theoretical wholes. Also, the epistemological limitations and application of the various empirical methods will be rendered clear because of the corresponding philosophical clarity of their guiding theoretical problems.

It is against this extension of the phenomenological ideal of science that Schutz's theory must be measured. Criticism according to this standard is fruitful only because his systematic sociology, one of the most rigorous and clear to date, provides a persuasive example of the problems involved in begging the question of foundation.

The "general thesis" forms the only bridge between phenomenological revelation of structures of action and motivation under the *epochē*, and imputation of these same structures to other egos in the concrete social world. The "missing link" in this argument is a phenomenological analysis of the way in which another ego and his life-expressions are constituted under the *epochē* as meaningful phenomena. In whatever manner this theory is developed, whatever its position for instance on the problem of the transcendental ego, it is in itself the only basis on which phenomenologically developed structures of consciousness, action, and motive can logically be applied to other egos. Without this middle term the analysis of the structures of sociality in the second half of Schutz's book rests on a dogmatically applied (i.e., unfounded, unreflexive) analogy; an analogy which states without philosophical justification that the other (primordially experienced in the natural attitude) bears all the characteristic types of motivation, temporal projection of action, etc., that have been revealed within the observer's consciousness under the discipline of the *epochē*. It must be noted that Schutz frequently makes this question-begging leap between the naive and philosophic levels of discourse in his social analysis. Thus, he speaks in the natural attitude of the other's "stream of consciousness," a philosophical "entity" which in fact is revealed and legitimately utilized only under the *epochē*.

This procedure of dogmatic analogizing is tempting because of the difficulties involved in Husserl's theories of temporality, embodiment, and intersubjective constitution. It is easier to apply Husserl's developed analyses dogmatically to each philosophical sphere of discourse rather than to do what the spirit of the phenomenological program demands, i.e., going directly "to the things themselves," bracketing all scientific and even phenomenological prejudices about what is to be found among them. Husserl left not the fragments of a system to be completed by lesser hands but rather a method to be applied in each instance in a presuppositionless manner. Part of the danger of the "general thesis of the alter ego" is that it provides a methodological precedent which, if followed, turns phenomenology into another "scholastic" philosophy.

Further, the "general thesis of the alter ego" cannot be defended as a type of phenomenological psychology which can transfer the "invariant, unique, a priori structure of the mind," discovered under the *epochē*, into the natural attitude's realm of psychological introspection.[11] Again, this approach skirts not only the basic question regarding the way in which others are "constituted in multiplicities belonging to my intentional life," but also the crucial questions involved in positing the ego's intentionality as a "world-performing life" "holding sway" in its own body and giving itself a world.[12] In other words, the psychologist must make thematic his own capability to constitute not only the other but also himself, before there can be clarity as to the limits involved in his cognition of the other in the natural attitude. Whatever Schutz's ultimate position might have been on the issue of Husserl's egology, phenomenology ultimately requires revelation of the transcendental ego as a hypostatized locus of intentional activity when the *epochē* brackets mere psychophysical introspection. As Husserl said,

---

[10] Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. p. 37.

[11] Schutz, *Phenomenology of the Social World*, p. 37.

[12] Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, p. 238.

> . . . I, the constituting Ego, am not identical with the Ego who is already worldly, not identical with myself as a psychophysical reality; and my psychic life, the psychophysical and worldly life of consciousness, is not identical with my transcendental ego, in which the world, with everything physical and psychic that belongs to it, is constituted for me.[13]

Only clarity at the transcendental as well as at the psychophysical levels can guarantee that psychological cognition of the other, controlled at the superior philosophical level, can be objective and rigorous. The "phenomenological-psychological *epochē*" rendering the observer an *ego cogito* and the observed other the *cogitatum,* is a valid method only because insights derived under its discipline can ultimately be grounded in the transcendental realm.

> In fact, for a genuine psychology, and for the exactness which belongs essentially to it, transcendental philosophy plays the role of the a priori science to which it must have recourse in all its actually psychological knowledge, the science whose a priori structural concepts it must utilize in its mundane inquiry.[14]

In sum, the "general thesis of the alter ego" is not an adequate basis for social science, either as working hypothesis or as a type of "phenomenological psychology." Before examining the specific ways in which lack of foundation tends to vitiate many of Schutz's social analyses, it is necessary to examine his theory of the nature of social science.

### The Postulates of Social Science Methodology

Schutz defines the task of social science as the construction of "objective meaning-contexts" (ideal types) out of the general or specific "subjective meaning-contexts" which actors use as the basis of comprehension and action within the social world. "Thus, the exploration of the general principles according to which man in daily life organizes his experiences, and especially those of the social world, is the first task of the methodology of the social sciences."[15] In "constructs of the second degree," objectifications of those understandings of the world which inform individual social action, the social scientist creates models of behavior or, quoting Schutz, "theoretical systems embodying testable hypotheses." In his papers, Schutz develops six norms for the scientific validity of these ideal types or "constructs of the second degree." These are:

> (1) The "postulate of logical consistency" states that second order constructs must be clear, distinct, and in accord with the principles of logic.
>
> (2) The "postulate of compatibility" requires that ideal types contain assumptions "scientifically verifiable" and compatible with the body of "accepted scientific knowledge" about man.
>
> (3) The "postulate of relevance" insists that the scheme of reference chosen by the scientist on the basis of a problem at hand, be used to delimit the scope of ideal-type formation, in the form of an imperative independent of the mere subjective desires of the scientist. This is a demand for "objectivity" and consistency in the operation of the initial frame of reference (relevance) in accord with his problem.
>
> (4) The "postulate of subjective interpretation" stipulates that "The scientist has to ask what type of individual mind can be constructed and what typical thoughts must be attributed to it to explain the fact in question as the result of its activity within an understandable relation."
>
> (5) The "postulate of adequacy" states that every term in the model of human behavior must be so constructed that an action performed on its basis by a concrete individual would be construed by himself and others as meaning the same thing intended by the social scientist.
>
> (6) The "postulate of rationality" holds that course-of-action and personal ideal types be constructed so that an actor, following such protocols, would behave as if he had clear and distinct knowledge of all the elements relevant to the performance of the act, that is, he would behave in a "goal-rational manner."[16]

Adherence to these postulates should produce scientific models of behavior which are: (a) logically rigorous and in line with standing "scientific knowledge" regarding man, (b) adequate at the level of meaning and empirically testable, and finally (c), objectively applicable by an observer. The social scientist chooses his problem and mode of approach, his criteria of "relevance," according to the problem at hand. These "relevances" (really values) become the basis for the creation of personal and course-of-action types out of the stuff of social observation. Such typifications of social action in rational "models" provide hypotheses and behavioral protocols which can be tested by reinsertion into concrete lifeworld situations.

Although this is in many ways an admirable statement of intellectually honest social scientific procedure, it falls far short of the conditions of the possibility of a true "science" of man sketched in the first part of this paper. Postulates (1) and (6) flow from the very nature of the ideal type and so are not problematical. But postulate (3) raises serious issues. The notion of "objectivity" arises from the realization that the choice of problem—the framing of the question—largely determines the method and therefore the type, range, and level of answer received. This reciprocity of question and answer only becomes clear when the process of knowing is itself made thematic, i.e., only when the *epochē* is used to reveal the structures of consciousness wherein cognition occurs. Without such "transcendental" thematization there is no self-conscious clarity about which sorts of empirical propositions are licit and which illicit, which are clear, dubious, false, etc. Without truly internal criteria of evidence—criteria flowing from the same foundation as the judgmental forms themselves—empirical statements remain at the level of uncorrected inductive generalization. Without epistemological foundation, even the call for scientific "objectivity" is a mere prejudice flowing from the contemporary scientistic *Weltanschauung* so aptly criticized by Husserl. Indeed, this prejudice offers little in the way of self-justification or definitional criteria beyond the merely pragmatic.

---

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] Husserl, *The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology,* p. 260.

[15] Schutz, *Collected Papers,* Vol. 1, p. 59. *Phenomenology of the Social World,* p. 223.

[16] Schutz, *Collected Papers,* Vol. 2, pp. 83–86. See also, Vol. 1, pp. 43–44, and Vol. 2, pp. 18–19.

The observer, like his subjects, is engaged in a species of historically conditioned social action. Therefore, without the discipline of the *epochē* rendering thematic and hence problematic on the transcendental level his own involvement in the *Lebenswelt*, or culturally structured world of lived experience, he can never comprehend his own "world-performing life" let alone that of others. The very quest for a "social science" demonstrates that operational and mundane knowledge of social action is not intellectually sufficient. As Richard M. Zaner said, "The mere fact that we are all actors on the social scene, concretely engaged in a variety of intersubjective relations, by no means guarantees that we can forthwith grasp the significance and structures of these relationships, any more than we can all become shoemakers because we all have feet."[17] Husserl touched the same point when he said, "The life which effects world-validity in natural world-life does not permit of being studied from within the attitude of natural world-life. What is required, then, is a *total* transformation of attitude, a *completely unique*, *universal epochē*."[18]

It is the thematizing discipline of the *epochē* which can give access to a truly objective theoretical science of man whose intersubjective validity is guaranteed by its apodictic foundation. In this "philosophical anthropology," notions of intersubjectivity, embodiment, lived-temporality, meaningful action, etc., provide a rigorously derived and interconnected system of hypotheses guiding research on the empirical level. It is this very promise of foundation that the "postulate of relevance" subverts by elevating common social scientific usage, necessitated by the undeveloped state of the art, into a norm. Further, that postulate belies even the most minimal definition of science as "organized knowledge" by offering instead to generate a motley collection of propositions based on personally chosen problems and methods, disparate canons of method and evidence, and diverse levels of discourse. The limitations of such a procedure are revealed in the necessary question: Must the second-degree constructs derived from different canons of "relevance" then be concatenated in "constructs of the third degree," i.e., constructs of the constructive activity utilized by observers to typify social action in the lifeworld? Clearly this possibility opens the way to an infinite regress of conceptualizations akin to the hierarchy of perspectives called into play by a relativistic historicism. Nor is it possible to give order to such idiosyncratic second-degree constructs by reference back to the structures of mundane sociality because these comprise the very "reality" to be explained.

Though the "postulate of adequacy" requires that an actor recognize the role he creates by basing his action on the second-degree construct as a behavioral recipe, this recognition is no guarantee of the compatibility of such a construct with other typifications of the same action drawn from different observational perspectives. The woodcutter as athlete, worker, spy, pyromaniac, or what have you, is a "type-transcendent" human actor whose concrete existence overflows his role interpretations so that his verification carries only minor evidenciary weight in ultimately validating an ideal typification.

The fourth postulate, that of "subjective interpretation," commits social science to a thoroughgoing methodological individualism. Without theoretical clarity about the ways in which individuals combine to act in history, methodological individualism, at very best, can eventuate only in extensive *Weltanschauung* analysis. That is, careful typification could probably reveal the "general principles" by which men organize their "experiences," as stated in Schutz's definition of the task of social science. But first it may be objected that analysis of *Weltanschauungen* can rely exclusively on contextual interpretation of cultural products (*Lebensausdrücke*) disregarding ideal typification of individual action altogether. Second, such "hermeneutics" are admitted to be acts of personal artistic virtuosity (requiring aesthetic sensitivity, insight, etc.) rather than a controlled and rigorous method by which a scientific community develops knowledge.[19] This is not to deny validity to *Weltanschauung* analysis, but rather systematically to prefer, with Husserl, " . . . a scientific critique and . . . a radical science, rising from below, based on sure foundations, and progressing according to the most rigorous methods—the philosophical science for which we speak . . . "[20] as the foundation for the empirical science of man.

---

[17] Zaner, "Theory of Intersubjectivity," p. 72.

[18] Husserl, *The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology,* p. 148.

Moreover, Schutz's methodological individualism, because not grounded in an eidetic or essential science of "the social," fails to cut through mere synchronic empirical regularities to the subtle and dark forces underlying social interaction. Relying solely on observational empiricism, it fails to ask questions which might lead to knowledge of those cultural and historical forces that twist rationally projected action into unintended forms. An elaborate Schutzian analysis of a woodcutter's acts reveals the structure of a role and its necessary ideal motivation, but ignores what could well be historically crucial circumstances, for instance, the alienation and reification of wage labor at a certain stage of capitalism. Schutz's method can treat such historical forces only by reducing them to biographical-situational "because-motivation." History would then be studied only as reflected in individual consciousness, in order to save its "subjective meaning" and assert "the unity of the social world."

> . . . the stream of history can be reduced to the genuine experiences of other men, experiences which occur within the immediacy of individual streams of consciousness, experiences which refer to consociates and contemporaries, experiences which take place within both We- and They-relationships.
>
> In a sense, history itself can be regarded as one continuous We-relationship from the earliest days of mankind to the present . . . [21]

Whatever the prospects for the development of a phenomenological theory of historical cognition, this being one of the crucial tasks Husserl bequeathed to his followers, it is clear that Schutzian methodological individualism merely addresses the subjective level of analysis and therefore requires supplemental analyses of those historical and cultural forces which predefine the individual's situation and, to a large extent, the outcome of his action.

In sum, examination of Schutz's theory of science reveals a codification of current research procedure rather than an attempt at epistemological and methodological foundation. In this theory the empiricist prejudice seems to be operative, i.e., that social science is built by massive data collection with only ad-hoc theory construction. But this procedure implies a naive empiricism which flies in the face of Husserl's careful demonstration that empirical, scientific "data" collection was *originally given meaning only through prior theoretical mathematization of geometrical essences* (*Limesgestalten*) by Galileo.[22] Naive empiricism, however is all that can be expected from a methodology that does most of its work in the natural attitude, utilizing in dogmatic fashion only those phenomenological insights which conveniently dispose of basic problems such as the temporal structure of projective action, and motivation in alter egos. The fault of such procedure is that it leads to nominalist and empiricist "science," not to the philosophically grounded and unitary science of man and nature which was Husserl's goal. But even within the framework of Schutz's assumptions regarding science, lack of foundation on a consequential theory of intersubjectivity tends to vitiate the rigor and finality of many of his specific analyses of social life. These internal problems are the proper concern of the next part of this paper.

## Schutz's Theory of Social Action

The "general thesis of the alter ego," warranting transference of insights gained in the transcendental sphere directly into the natural attitude without real foundation in a theory of intersubjectivity, leads Schutz in his social analyses continually to leap between the philosophical and mundane spheres. The reader can follow him in these leaps only by presupposing a phenomenology of intersubjectivity which Schutz does not claim to provide.

For example, Schutz maintains that within the natural attitude the body, actions, and products of the other stand as a "field of expression" referring back to the "consciousness of the other." As he said, " . . . what is involved is a certain intentional Act which utilizes an already established code of interpretation directing us through the bodily movement to the underlying lived experience."[23] But, of course, it is the ground of this very "intentional Act" and "Code of interpretation" which is properly at issue in a social science claiming epistemological and not merely pragmatic validity for its statements. This "Code of interpretation" must be constituted under the *epochē* before the natural attitude can benefit from its insights.

---

[19] Karl Mannheim, "On the Interpretation of Weltanschauung" in *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 33–83.

[20] Husserl, *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, p. 142, *passim*.

[21] Schutz, *Phenomenology of the Social World*, pp. 213–214.

[22] Husserl, *The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology*, Part 2, Nos. 8–10.

[23] Schutz, *Phenomenology of the Social World*, p. 101.

Further, without a theory of embodiment, a notion of the way in which the ego "holds sway" in its body, there is no ground for ascription of self-experience to the other and indeed no essential clarity about the structure of one's own bodily experience. Phenomenological explication of the process whereby corporeal intentionality synthesizes acts into a "harmonious expressive whole" is necessary. Without this explication, the dubious and naive self-comprehension of the natural attitude becomes the sole basis for "analogizing apperception" of the life experiences underlying another individual's expressive activity. The "general thesis" represents a provisional analysis, restricting the naive observer to those "normal" cases within his own cultural framework where the conventional "Code of interpretation" remains valid. The phenomenologically interesting problem, cross-cultural *Verstehen*, whose clarification is essential to a founded "philosophical anthropology," is virtually eliminated. But this problem demands attention as a possible test of scientific universality of *verstehende Soziologie*. Anthropological field work indicates that members of different cultures live their bodies as expressive-fields in broadly divergent modes.[24] Goldstein shows similar findings in his studies of aphasia, the gestural types of brain-damaged patients varying according to the concretion or abstraction of their fundamental "attitude" toward the world.[25] Phenomenological analysis of the possible range of expressive behaviors and their relation to differing linguistic definitions of time and space, might be a salutary first step in the direction of an eidetics of expression. Such a project should yield a set of appresentational typifications predefining the range of possible meaningful behaviors prior to comparative empirical study of social action.

Schutz's case for a mundane sociology is further weakened by his admission of a realm of "intimate personal experiences" in the observer, which cannot be reproduced with clarity and are given merely as "there." He includes pain, movement, sexual sensation, mood, feeling, and affect in this category of lived but unthinkable experience.[26] Obviously, this range of intimate experience is not available to the observer for his analysis of the other if it cannot be made choate or thematic within himself. Now, phenomenology should be able precisely to thematize such experiences and extract their essence under the discipline of the *epochē*. Herein lies its prime *raison d'être* as opposed to that of ordinary introspection.

Another problem with Schutz's system is the phenomenological error on which is grounded his analysis of meaning as temporal lived experience. His terms are drawn both from Husserl's notions of time-consciousness (*Zeitbewusstsein*) and Bergson's lived time (*durée*), an uncomfortable marriage in phenomenological terms. He speaks rightly of a stream of consciousness made thematic through retention and recollection, or primary and secondary remembrance. The "Act of attention" constitutes experiences as phases within the flow of duration under the *epochē*. But then he maintains, "*For the Act of attention*—and this is of major importance for the study of meaning—presupposes an elapsed, passed-away experience—in short, one that is already in the past, regardless of whether the attention in question is reflective or reproductive."[27] And next,

> Because the concept of meaningful experience always presupposes that the experience of which meaning is predicated is a discrete one, it now becomes quite clear that only a past experience can be called meaningful, that is, one that is present to the retrospective glance as already finished and done with.

> Only from this point of view of the retrospective glance do there exist discrete experiences. Only the already experienced is meaningful, not that which is being experienced. For meaning is merely an operation of intentionality, which however, only becomes visible to the reflective glance.[28]

To maintain the proposition that only past experience is meaningful, Schutz must reject the noematic element in the intentional stream of consciousness, which gives the "object-of-consciousness" meaning "as such" during the time it is being revealed in intentional perspectival variation within an Act of attention. As expected, Schutz rejects the *noema* on Bergsonian grounds.

> It is, then, incorrect to say that my lived experiences are meaningful merely in virtue of their being experienced or lived through. Such a view would eliminate the tension . . . between life and thought. But this is the very tension that is presupposed in all talk about meaning. Let us, then, reject the position that meaningfulness pertains either to the noematic structure (i.e. . . . lived experience itself) or to the mere fact of belonging to the stream of duration.[29]

This is an arguable position. Without a noematic meaning-core correlative to noetic modes of judging, the stream of experience would consist of mere unstructured "phenomena" devoid of overall sense as unitary experience of an "object as such." Without the protended noematic "object" to unify the perspectival flow of phenomena, no relations of figure/ground, part/whole, same/different would be discerned; no harmoniously appearing "thing" would be held in attention and therefore reflection could constitute "no-thing." Clearly the intended meaning-core, or *noema*, must pre-exist reflection on the experience which it serves to unify. Husserl said,

---

[24] See Victor Barnouw, *Culture and Personality* (Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1963), chapter 12.

[25] Kurt Goldstein, *Human Nature in the Light of Psychopathology* (New York: Schocken, 1966) especially chapter 2.

[26] Schutz, *Phenomenology of the Social World*, pp. 52–53.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 51.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 52.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 70.

> In memory, after reduction, we find the remembered as such; in expectation, the expected as such; in imaginative fancy, the fancied as such. "In" each of these experiences there "dwells" a noematic meaning . . .[30]

> Like perception, *every* intentional experience—and this is indeed the fundamental mark of all intentionality—has its "intentional object," i.e., its objective meaning [noema]. . . . To have a meaning, or to have something "in mind" is the cardinal feature of all consciousness, that on account of which it is not only experience generally but meaningful, "noetic."[31]

Of course, Schutz is free to follow his own philosophical lights, but in this case an unclear merger of phenomenological language and Bergsonian content vitiates his pivotal concept of meaning. This very concept of meaning serves as the mainstay of the "general thesis of the alter ego." The argument, curiously sophistical, states that since I bestow meaning on my experience reflectively, as do others, I observe and give meaning to another's experiences (in reflection) as they occur in the expressive field of his body. Thus, the ego and *alter's* "streams of consciousness" exist in "simultaneity," i.e., they "grow older together": " . . . by merely 'looking' I can grasp even those of your lived experiences which you have not yet noticed and which are for you still prephenomenal and undifferentiated. This means that, whereas I can observe my own lived experiences only after they are over and done with, I can observe yours as they actually take place."[32] This notion of the interlocking of "streams of consciousness" in the natural attitude is the justification of the "general thesis of the alter ego:" "For us the term "simultaneity" is rather an expression for the basic and necessary assumption which I make that your stream of consciousness has a structure analogous to mine."[33] But this is poor support indeed for the "general thesis of the alter ego" insofar as it relies on what it should be proving. That is, no warrant exists for speaking within the "objective time" of the natural attitude of a "stream of consciousness" which is given only in the "subjective" thematic sphere under the *epochē*. This confusion of levels of discourse is attended by the question-begging procedure of imputing a "stream of consciousness" to another ego on the basis of the very "general thesis" to be proved. Further, it might legitimately be maintained that the "stream of consciousness" given under the *epochē* finds its true mundane counterpart not in time but rather in "mood." That is, fear, anxiety, interest, boredom, etc., are moods in the natural attitude bearing different lived experiences of subjective time as their ground. It would be a shame if phenomenological analyses of mood and time, perhaps as related to bodily "comportment," were precluded by a dogmatic assumption of simultaneity.

These considerations lead to the final problem involved in the "general thesis of the alter ego," that of its analytic fruitlessness. Being a mere assertion of structural parallelism between one ego and another, the "general thesis" is incapable of offering insight into the structures of projective action, embodiment, etc., in either self or alter. It contains its entire explanatory potential within itself. As Schutz said, "In fact, however, when we are dealing with actions having no communicative intent, all that we can assert about their meaning is already contained in the general thesis of the alter ego."[34] The "general thesis" provides no standpoint from which the deeper meaning of social action can be grasped. It offers only a new and unfounded terminology for the schematization of motive, action, and social interaction, which, however original, appears to a working observer to be a Procrustean bed. In many ways, Schutzian sociology as developed in the second half of his book parallels the explanatory style of functionalism. For example, in direct social observation, interpretation of the subject's action and motivation must rely on: first, the "reading of one's own hypothetical motives into another's behavior"; second, "knowledge of the customary behavior of the person observed"; third, inferring "the in-order-to motive from the act by asking whether such and such a motive would be furthered by the act in question."[35] The range of questions asked by functional analysts differ little from this formulation. Further, this framework is of little use in cross-cultural research. The only addition to functional role description (course-of-action) is the postulation of a "sociological homunculus" (personal ideal type) with necessary and sufficient typical motivations to fulfill the behavior protocols of the role.

---

[30] Husserl, *Ideas I*, p. 245.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 241.

[32] Schutz, *Phenomenology of the Social World*, p. 102.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 103.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 115.

[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 174–175.

> Ideal-typical understanding . . . characteristically deduces the in-order-to and because-motives of a manifest act by identifying the constantly achieved goal of that act. . . . The next step is to postulate an agent behind the action. . . .
>
> The conscious processes of the personal ideal types are, therefore, logical constructions. They are deduced from the manifest act and are pictured as temporally prior to that act . . .[36]

This addition to standard observational functionalism, the ascription of structures of meaningful action to an ideal type actor, rests solely on the basis of the "general thesis." Indeed, Schutz's entire social analysis, from the intimacy of the We-relationship to progressively more abstract typifications of contemporaries and predecessors, is based only on a mere unfolding of the implications contained in the "general thesis of the alter ego," itself a dogmatic and ungrounded assertion.

### Conclusion

However original and lucid Schutz's systematic sociology is, it fails to satisfy the persistent need of the social sciences for rigorous philosophical foundation in an eidetic science of the social. It is Schutz's merit to have brought social science to a point where the problem of its "scientific" nature becomes compelling. Although his solution to the problem turns out to be no solution at all, he has indicated some ways in which transcendental phenomenology can justify itself by works and not by faith alone.

---

[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 188–189.

# Campaign Resource Allocations Under the Electoral College*

CLAUDE S. COLANTONI, TERRENCE J. LEVESQUE, AND PETER C. ORDESHOOK
*Carnegie-Mellon University*

In a recent essay Steven Brams and Morton Davis offer a game-theoretic analysis of campaign resource allocations under the Electoral College that yields the nonobvious prediction that: "The Electoral College . . . induces candidates to allocate campaign resources roughly in proportion to the 3/2's power of the electoral votes of each state."[1] They argue, moreover, that the 3/2's rule predicts the candidates' allocations (measured by campaign appearance data) as well as if not better than a simple proportional rule. Hence, they offer both a theoretical and an empirical justification for believing that the Electoral College establishes a bias that favors larger states. We argue, however, that the apparent empirical support for the 3/2's rule is an artifact of: (1) the empirical relationship between size and the competitiveness of states, (2) the existence of corner solutions to the candidate's maximization problem, and (3) the campaign's sequential nature. Looking at the frequency of campaign appearances as well as Stanley Kelley, Jr.'s estimates of the time candidates spend in states, we conclude that a modified proportional rule predicts allocations better generally than the 3/2's rule. We do not dispute the fact that resource allocations under the Electoral College typically favor larger states, but our theoretical rationale for this bias differs markedly from Brams and Davis's argument.

Section One reviews briefly the theoretical problem Brams and Davis address as well as their solution to it. Section Two presents an analysis of the data so as to make the strongest case for the validity of the 3/2's hypothesis. Section Three, however, examines both theoretically and empirically the strategic effects of competitiveness. Section Four considers the effects of "corner solutions" and sequential campaign planning. Briefly, we conclude that while no simple allocation rule is likely to account adequately for observed allocations, the validity of the 3/2's hypothesis is at best highly suspect.

### Resource Allocations and the 3/2's Rule

Turning first to a theoretical definition of election competition, if candidates seek to maximize their respective probabilities of winning, then two-candidate elections can be modeled as two-person zero-sum games. To construct such a model, we introduce some essential notation:

$E_j$ : the electoral vote of state $j$, $j = 1, \cdots, 51$;
$\theta_i$ : candidate $i$'s strategy, $i = 1, 2$;
$\phi_{ij}(\theta_1, \theta_2)$ : candidate $i$'s popular vote plurality in state $j$;
$P_{ij}(\theta_1, \theta_2)$ : the probability that candidate $i$ receives all of state $j$'s electoral vote, which, under the unit rule system equals $\Pr[\phi_{ij} > 0]$;
$\overline{E}_i(\theta_1, \theta_2)$ : the total electoral vote realized by candidate $i$.

Candidate 1's decision task, then, is to find an equilibrium solution to the following problem:

$$(1)\quad \max_{\theta_1} \min_{\theta_2} \Pr\left[\overline{E}_1(\theta_1, \theta_2) - \overline{E}_2(\theta_1, \theta_2) > 0\right],$$

subject to appropriate constraints on $\theta_1$ and $\theta_2$. If $\theta_1$ and $\theta_2$ are alternative allocations of some scarce resource (e.g., time) across states, and if we denote the resources candidate $i$ allocates to state $j$ by $\theta_{ij}$, the logical constraint is,

$$(2)\quad \sum_{j=1}^{51} \theta_{ij} \leq B_i, \qquad i = 1, 2 \quad \text{and}$$
$$\theta_{ij} \geq 0 \qquad \text{for all } i, j$$

where $B_i$ is candidate $i$'s budget.[2] It is straightforward to show, moreover, that if the variance of the random variable $\overline{E}_1 - \overline{E}_2$ is constant for all $\theta_1$ and $\theta_2$, maximizing probability of winning is equivalent to maximizing expected electoral vote.[3] That is, expression (1) is equivalent to

---

* This research was supported by a National Science Foundation Grant to Carnegie-Mellon University. We also wish to thank Steven Brams and Morton Davis for the availability of their data, Stanley Kelley, Jr. who gave us his data on the estimated time candidates spent in each state, and Timothy McGuire and Melvin J. Hinich for their helpful suggestions.

[1] Steven J. Brams and Morton D. Davis, "The 3/2's Rule in Presidential Campaigning," *American Political Science Review*, 68 (March 1974), 113.

[2] In spatial models of party competition, however, strategies are not resource allocations but positions on "issues," and the constraint should be $\theta_{i1} = \theta_{i2} = \cdots = \theta_{i51}$. For a discussion of this distinction and its implications see Melvin J. Hinich and Peter C. Ordeshook, "The Electoral College: A Spatial Analysis," *Political Methodology* (forthcoming).

[3] See Peter H. Aranson, Melvin J. Hinich, and Peter C. Ordeshook, "Election Goals and Strategies. Equivalent and Nonequivalent Candidate Objectives," *American Political Science Review*, 68 (March, 1974), 135–152.

$$\max_{\theta_1} \min_{\theta_2} \sum_{j=1}^{51} E_j P_{1j}(\theta_1, \theta_2) \tag{3}$$

For most general assumptions about $P_{1j}$, however, an equilibrium solution in pure strategies does not exist for the zero-sum game described by expressions (2) and (3). If, for example,

$$P_{1j} = \begin{Bmatrix} +1 \\ \frac{1}{2} \\ 0 \end{Bmatrix} \text{ if and only if } \theta_{1j} \begin{Bmatrix} > \\ = \\ < \end{Bmatrix} \theta_{2j}, \tag{4}$$

the election model is a Colonel Blotto game. The unfortunate feature of such games is that they possess only complicated mixed strategy solutions that are not subject to any substantively meaningful interpretation.[4]

Brams and Davis's resolution of this problem is this: First, they assume that the candidates match strategies in each state, i.e., $\theta_{1j} = \theta_{2j}$ for all $j$. Second, they derive the probability that candidate $i$ carries state $j$, $P_{ij}(\theta_1, \theta_2)$, from the assumption that citizens do not abstain and that

$$p_{1j} = \frac{\theta_{1j}}{\theta_{1j} + \theta_{2j}} \tag{5}$$

where $p_{ij}$ is the probability that a citizen in state $j$ votes for candidate $i$ (hence, $p_{2j} = \theta_{2j}/[\theta_{1j} + \theta_{2j}]$). The probability $P_{ij}(\theta_1, \theta_2)$, then, is (for an even number, $n_j$, of citizens in state $j$),

$$\begin{aligned} &(6) \quad P_{1j}(\theta_1, \theta_2) \\ &= \sum_{k=n_j/2+1}^{n_j} \binom{n_j}{k} p_{1j}^{k} (1 - p_{1^j})^{n_j - k} \end{aligned}$$

Owing to the law of large numbers (and certainly even Alaska's population is a large number statistically), $P_{1j}$ is essentially described by expression (4). However, $P_{1j}$ remains a differentiable function of $\theta_{ij}$ since only in the limit, $n_j \to \infty$, is $P_{1j}$ restricted to the values 1, 1/2, 0. Hence, the calculus can still be applied to solve for minimax strategies.

With these assumptions Brams and Davis show that

$$\theta_{ij} \approx c E_j^{3/2}, \qquad j = 1, \cdots, 51 \tag{7}$$

is a local pure strategy equilibrium to the election game (where $c$ is a positive constant determined by the actual size of the candidate's budget). That is, if both candidates allocate their resources across states in proportion to each state's electoral vote, raised to the 3/2's power, neither candidate possesses any incentive to shift his strategy unilaterally, provided that candidates can make only very small shifts.[5]

Given that the 3/2's rule is but a local equilibrium strategy, it is of course tenuous to argue that candidates should adopt such strategies. Nevertheless, Brams and Davis offer empirical evidence to suggest that candidates actually conform to this rule, and it is that evidence to which we now turn.

### Empirical Evidence

The data Brams and Davis use to test their model consist of the number of times a major party's presidential and vice-presidential slate visited each state during the 1960–1972 presidential campaigns.[6] While they present these data in several forms, they assert that the "most convincing case can be made for the general applicability of the 3/2's rule" from the simple correlations between actual campaign appearances and the allocations predicted by their model. In Table 1 we present those correlations as well as the correlations between appearances and the proportional rule.

Certainly, as Brams and Davis note, the correlations for the 3/2's rule are generally higher than the correlations for the proportional rule—excepting the Democratic Party's campaign in 1964. But, none of these differences appears to be significant. We cannot yet rule out the possibility that candidates allocate proportionally and that the Electoral College engenders no bias. Stated simply, we cannot discriminate between the two hypotheses with simple correlation coefficients. If we present this data differently, however, it appears strongly to support the 3/2 rule as against the proportional rule (see Brams and Davis's Tables 3 and 4). Aggregating states into "large," "medium" and "small" categories, candidates do allocate proportionately more resources in the

---

[4] O. Gross and R. Wagner, "A Continuous Colonel Blotto Game" (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Memo. #408, June 17, 1950); O. Gross, "The Symmetric Blotto Game" (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Memo. #424, July 19, 1950); Lawrence Friedman, "Game-Theory Models in the Allocation of Advertising Expenditures," *Operations Research*, 6 (Sept.-Oct. 1958), 699–709. See also David Sankoff and Koula Mellos, "The Swing Ratio and Game Theory," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (June, 1972), 551–554.

[5] It is important to note, however, that the 3/2's rule is vulnerable to strategies that deviate from it by *very* small amounts. That is, 3/2's is truly a local optimum in the most extreme sense. The magnitude of deviations from 3/2's that can upset it is on the order of the sensitivity of $P_{ij}$ in expression (6) to variations in $P_{ij}$. Note that if $n_j$ is large (e.g., $n_j$ equals the population of Alaska), $P_{ij}$ is essentially a point mass at 1 or 0 if $P_{ij} = 1/2 + \varepsilon$ where $\varepsilon$ is a *very* small number.

[6] Throughout this analysis we omit Alaska and Hawaii because of the discontinuity in campaign costs associated with visits to them.

**Table 1. Correlation Coefficients Between Campaign Appearances and the 3/2's and the Proportional Allocation Rules**

| Year | Republican Slate | | Democratic Slate | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 3/2 | Proportion | 3/2 | Proportion |
| 1964 | .95 | .91 | .96 | .94 |
| 1964 | .87 | .86 | .83 | .84 |
| 1968 | .94 | .94 | .93 | .90 |
| 1972 | .79 | .79 | .86 | .85 |

form of trips to large states than to medium and small states (excepting 1964).

One problem with this procedure, however, is that it does not permit us to test other more complex hypotheses. Hence, let us restate the evidence by estimating the coefficient $\beta$ for the following model:

$$T_j = \alpha E_j^{\beta} \tag{8}$$

where $T_j$ denotes the number of trips a candidate or a slate takes to state $j$. Assuming a multiplicative log-normal error structure, expression (8) suggests the following regression[7]

$$\log T_j = \log \alpha + \beta \log E_j + \epsilon_j$$

Presumably, the proportional rule predicts that $\hat{\beta} \approx 1.0$, whereas the 3/2's rule predicts that $\hat{\beta} \approx 1.5$.

Unfortunately, estimating $\beta$ is difficult because the candidates do not visit all the states. Specifically, for $T_j = 0$, $\log T_j = -\infty$, and if only one $T_j = 0$, $\hat{\beta} = \infty$. The question, then, is how to treat these observations. Clearly, neither the simple proportional or 3/2's rules predicts $T_j = 0$. The problem lies, apparently, in the lumpiness of the dependent variable. That is, trips are not infinitely divisible, and a candidate cannot take, say, .25 trips to a state. We may observe $T_j = 0$, rather than .25, then, because the candidate rounds the optimal solution off to the nearest integer. Later we examine this lumpiness in greater detail theoretically and empirically. Presently, however, we assume that if we observe $T_j = 0$, the true value of $T_j$ is $\delta_j$, where $0 \leq \delta_j < .5$. Taking a median value for $\delta_j$, .25 we set $T_j = .25$ if and only if the candidate (or slate) fails to visit state $j$.[8] Thus, we estimate the coefficients of the following model:

$$\log [T_j + \delta_j] = \log \alpha + \beta \log E_j + \epsilon_j, \tag{9}$$

where

$$\delta_j = \begin{Bmatrix} .25 \\ 0 \end{Bmatrix} \quad \text{if } T_j \begin{Bmatrix} = \\ \neq \end{Bmatrix} 0 \tag{10}$$

Naturally, we must check the sensitivity of $\hat{\beta}$ to variations in $\delta$.

We set forth in Table 2 the estimates of $\beta$ as well as the standard errors of these estimates.[9] Clearly, all coefficients are significantly greater than zero. More important, however, strong support for the 3/2's rule is exhibited by both slates in 1960 and 1968—the two competitive elections in our study—while the proportional rule is supported "conclusively" in only three instances.[10] And, even the one "indeterminate" coefficient is nearer 1.5 than 1.0. Overall $\hat{\beta}$ averages 1.25, while for 1960 and 1968 it averages, remarkably, 1.55. Since it is reasonable, moreover, to place greater emphasis on data from 1960 and 1968—because Brams and Davis assume, essentially, that the election is competitive—Table 2 must be interpreted as strongly supporting the 3/2's rule against a simple proportional rule.

These data, of course, need to be qualified.

**Table 2. Value of $\hat{\beta}$ for Expression (9)**

| Year | Democratic Slate | Republican Slate |
|---|---|---|
| 1960 | 1.37 (.13)* | 1.56 (.19)* |
| 1964 | .83 (.16)** | .81 (.20)** |
| 1968 | 1.56 (.20)* | 1.73 (.16)* |
| 1972 | 1.45 (.25)*** | .79 (.17)** |

* Significantly greater than 1.0 but not significantly different from 1.5.

** Significantly less than 1.5 but not significantly different from 1.0.

*** Indeterminate.

---

[7] If we assume that the observed total number of trips taken by a candidate is not a random variable, the parameters of this model are overidentified. That is, $\alpha = \Sigma T_j / \Sigma E_j^{\beta}$ and $\Sigma \epsilon_j = 1$. We do not, however, make this assumption. Rather, we let $\Sigma T_j$ be a random variable and assume that the $\epsilon_j$'s are independently distributed.

[8] An alternative procedure is to let $\delta_j = .25$ for all $T_j$. This, however, decreases $\hat{\beta}$ and renders it easier to secure estimates that support the proportionate hypothesis. For example, $\hat{\beta}$ in 1960 decreases from 1.37 to 1.32 for the Democratic slate and from 1.56 to 1.48 for the Republican slate.

[9] Throughout this paper, all statements concerning significance refer to the .01 confidence level. Also, the figures in parentheses denote standard errors.

[10] Several of these estimates are sensitive to $\delta_j$ while others are not. Letting $\delta_j$ vary between .1 and .5, we find that four coefficients vary by more than 5 per cent—those for both parties for the 1968 and 1972 elections (which is to be expected, of course, since in these elections the candidates bypass a great many states whereas almost all states are visited in 1960 and 1964). The coefficient for the 1972 Democratic slate is the most sensitive: $\hat{\beta} = 1.72$ for $\delta = .1$ and $\hat{\beta} = 1.24$ for $\delta = .5$. Thus, while there is some justification for letting $\delta = .25$ rather than .1 or .5, this sensitivity should be kept in mind as a qualification of our conclusions.

First, many trips are taken for reasons other than soliciting votes. Commenting on John Kennedy's last-minute tour of Connecticut, for example, Theodore H. White writes that "[Bailey] and Ribicoff had assured Kennedy that their state, Connecticut, was going to be safe—but they wanted their one day to show, too."[11] Second, a candidate's trip to a state may be designed to influence the voters of other states as well. Visits to New York City, for example, may activate party regulars in New Jersey, or it may yield funds from wealthy contributors destined to be spent in Kansas. Third, because collection of these data relies heavily on *The New York Times*, it is not unreasonable to suppose that trips to New York are better reported than trips to other states. Finally, we should not weight all trips equally. A full day's visit is hardly equivalent to a half-hour whistle stop.

With these last two qualifications in mind, then, we consider another source of data—Stanley Kelley's estimates of the time candidates spend in states. We set forth in Table 3 a comparison between estimates of $\hat{\beta}$ for the two data sets.[12] As this table reveals, Brams and Davis's data for 1960 yield slightly higher estimates than Kelley's data, whereas the converse is true for 1964. Any inferences derived from a comparison of these two sets of estimates are, of course, tenuous, owing to $\delta_j$. Nevertheless, this table does suggest that if we use the number of trips as an indicator of the amount of time the candidates allocate to states, Table 2 overestimates $\beta$ in 1960 but underestimates $\beta$ in 1964. If this is true, then 3/2's is a less valid description of strategies than Table 2 indicates. In fact, with only one possible exception, Kelley's data offers little convincing support for the 3/2's hypothesis.

As always, however, these estimates are subject to numerous qualifications, including, in 1964, Johnson's incumbent status and the landslide proportions of his victory and, in 1960, Nixon's admittedly nonoptimal pledge to visit every state. We proceed, then, using both sets of data and, in particular, we assume that the coefficients obtained from Brams and Davis's data warrant further study.

### Competitiveness

Much of the descriptive and normative literature on presidential elections offers a simple rule for candidates: identify the states that you and your opponent are certain to carry, and focus your attention on the remaining (competitive) states. That is, candidates should be concerned not only with size but also with the likelihood that resources can swing a state from one candidate to another.

Simple as this rule might seem, no consideration is given *in the derivation of the 3/2's rule* to the relative competitiveness of states. Brams and Davis assume that a state's citizen's probability of voting for a candidate, $p_{ij}$, is an unbiased function of the resources the candidates allocate to the state (see expression 5). Thus, if both candidates allocate the same amount of resources to a state, the state is as likely to go for one candidate as the other. Suppose, however, that competitiveness is systematically related to size. It is reasonable to conjecture, then, that some rule other than 3/2's is a local equilibrium (if in fact a local pure strategy equilibrium exists). It also follows that the 3/2's rule should not be tested against a proportional rule that is unadjusted for competitiveness.

That some adjustment is necessary is apparent if we measure the competitiveness for each candidate by the absolute value of his plurality in percentage terms. Plurality, obviously, is not a wholly satisfactory measure, but it is sufficient to indicate the direction of effects. Thus, denoting this difference by $|Pl_j|$, consider

$$(11) \quad \log |Pl_j| = a + b \log E_j + u_j$$

We present the results of this regression in Table 4.[13]

Table 4 reveals the relationship that exists between competitiveness and size in 1960 and 1968. While $R^2$ is not high for these two elections, $\hat{b}$ is significant.[14] More importantly, however, in 1960 and 1968, larger states are more competitive on the average than smaller states. Thus, if candidates allocate according to a proportional rule that is adjusted as the literature and common sense suggest, we should find in 1960 and 1968, allocations to large states in excess of proportion and allocations to small states that are less than proportional. Conversely, we should anticipate little adjustment in 1964 and 1972. If any adjustment is warranted in 1964 (on the basis of a coefficient that is not significantly different from 0), it is in favor of the smaller states.

---

[11] *The Making of the President*, 1960 (New York: Atheneum, 1960), p. 338.

[12] As with Brams and Davis's data, we add a $\delta_j$ to those $T_j$'s we observe as zero. We again choose $\delta_j = .25$ since a quarter of an hour seems a sufficiently small rounding error. None of the coefficients, however, are especially sensitive to $\delta_j$.

[13] Because of third parties that received more votes in a state than one or both of the two major parties, we calculate two sets of coefficients in 1960 and 1968. For these elections we set $Pl_j$ equal to the relevant slate's plurality over its strongest opponent in state $j$.

[14] The approximate adjusted $R^2$'s for 1960 and 1968 are .10 and .22 respectively, while the adjusted $R^2$'s for 1964 and 1972 are essentially zero.

Table 3. Comparison of $\hat{\beta}$ for Brams-Davis and Kelley Data

| | Democrat | | Republican | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | $B-D$ | Kelley | $B-D$ | Kelley |
| 1960 President | 1.49 (.21) | 1.47 (.17) | 1.32 (.17) | 1.06 (.17) |
| 1964 President | .75 (.17) | .89 (.17) | .97 (.19) | 1.18 (.15) |
| 1964 Slate | .83 (.16) | 1.13 (.14) | .81 (.20) | .93 (.15) |

The implication of Table 4, then, is that it is not reasonable to assume that the estimates of $\hat{\beta}$ in Tables 2 and 3 properly reflect the influence solely of a state's size on campaign strategies. Rather, those estimates as well as any support they lend to Brams and Davis's model might simply reflect the empirical relationship between size and competitiveness. To test this possibility more carefully we must first formulate an appropriate model of campaign allocation. This is essential because we seek some theoretical justification for the statistical models we estimate as well as additional testable propositions. In formulating a model, however, we are confronted with at least two problems. First, we are uncertain about the best conceptualization of a candidate's strategic environment—is it, for example, decision making under risk or is a game-theoretic analysis more appropriate? The second problem is that to derive explicit allocation rules (e.g., 3/2's), we must posit explicit functional forms for the relationships among the model's variables (e.g., expression (5)). But, any such form is necessarily *ad hoc*, and available data do not always permit us to reject one assumption in favor of another.

Our solution to the first problem is to proceed with a decision making under risk model. This assumption eases exposition and permits us to explore more readily the possible explanations for observed campaign strategies. Our solution to the second problem is not to seek explicit allocation rules but rather to use our model as a guide to an analysis of the data. In this way, we seek to ascertain allocation rules that are theoretically meaningful and that conform as closely as possible to the observed allocations of candidates.

Table 4. Estimates of *a* and *b* for
log $|PI_j| = a + b \log E_j$

| Year | Slate | $\hat{a}$ | $\hat{b}$ |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1960 | Democrat | 2.85 (.51) | −.56 (.22) |
| | Republican | 2.90 (.52) | −.56 (.23) |
| 1964 | Democrat<br>Republican | 2.61 (.40) | +.14 (.18) |
| 1968 | Democrat | 3.54 (.38) | −.63 (.17) |
| | Republican | 3.55 (.39) | −.65 (.17) |
| 1972 | Democrat<br>Republican | 3.39 (.26) | −.08 (.11) |

Turning then to the model, we begin with the assumption that candidates maximize their expected Electoral College vote, the objective represented by expression (3).[15] To reduce (3) to an objective function for decision making under risk, suppose that each candidate acts as if he possesses a set of prior probabilities over his opponent's strategies. When these probabilities are absorbed into the $P_{ij}$'s, expression (3) becomes,[16]

$$\max_{\theta_1} \sum E_j q_{1j}(\theta_1) \tag{12}$$

where $q_{1j}(\theta_1)$ is candidate 1's derived estimate of the probability that he carries state $j$ with strategy $\theta_1$.

The assumption that a candidate places prior probabilities on his opponent's strategies and acts as if he is a decision maker under risk must seem strange, since most formal analyses of elections offer a game-theoretic conceptualization of competition. However, unlike spatial models that typi-

---

[15] Alternatively, we can assume that candidates maximize their probabilities of winning but that the variance of the random variable $E_j(\theta_1, \theta_2)$ is approximately a constant for all $\theta_1$ and $\theta_2$, in which case expression (1) is equivalent to expression (3). One justification for this reduction, other than the obvious way in which it facilitates analysis, is the assumption that neither candidate can manipulate his strategies so as to change appreciably (from .5 say to .25) the $P_{ij}$'s of a great many states. Such manipulations are plausible if candidates can advocate policies that alienate large portions of the electorate. But we are considering here a different sort of strategy—resources in general and trips to states in particular. And in the absence of any strong empirical evidence that resources such as trips affect state outcomes in an overwhelming way, the assumption of a constant standard deviation is a reasonable initial approximation.

[16] Letting $s(\theta_2)$ denote candidate 1's prior probabilities over $\theta_2$.

$$q_{1j}(\theta_1) = \int_{P_{ij}} (\theta_1, \theta_2) s(\theta_2) d\theta_2.$$

cally yield readily identifiable solutions such as "adopt the median preference," resource allocation games are exceedingly complex and difficult to analyze. Simple solutions do not exist generally, and global equilibrium strategies are difficult or impossible to interpret substantively. Thus, even a static game-model is an heroic abstraction from theoretical possibilities; namely, it eliminates the dynamic feature of campaigns. This abstraction is less important if a global pure strategy equilibrium exists, since we can conjecture that during the campaign, the candidates converge to the equilibrium. But if such equilibria do not exist, it is not unreasonable to suppose that candidates adopt heuristics that simplify their decisions. Brams and Davis use one such heuristic: candidates act as if they believe that opponents will allocate resources as they do (hence, $\theta_{1j}=\theta_{2j}$ for all $j$). Our assumption is another, although less specific, heuristic.

We now denote the solution to (12), subject to the candidate's budget constraint, by $\theta_1^*=(\theta_{11}^*, \theta_{12}^* \cdots)$. If we assume that a candidate's probability of carrying a state is not a function of how he allocates resources among other states (i.e., $\partial q_{ij}/\partial\theta_{1k}=0$, $k\neq j$) and if we assume also (and temporarily) that no $\theta_{1j}^*$ is a corner solution, then $\theta_1^*$ satisfies

$$(13) \qquad E_j\frac{\partial q_{ij}}{\partial\theta_{1j}} = \lambda, \qquad \lambda \neq 0$$

Next, we decompose $\partial q_{1j}/\partial\theta_{1j}$ thus,

$$\frac{\partial q_{1j}}{\partial\theta_{1j}} = \frac{\partial q_{1j}}{\partial\mu_{1j}}\cdot\frac{\partial\mu_{1j}}{\partial\theta_{1j}}$$

(where $\mu_{1j}(\theta_{1j})$ is candidate 1's expected plurality in state $j$), and we rewrite condition (13) as,

$$(14) \qquad \lambda^{-1}E_j\frac{\partial q_{1j}}{\partial\mu_{1j}} = \left[\frac{\partial\mu_{1j}}{\partial\theta_{1j}}\right]^{-1} \qquad \text{for all } j.$$

Thus, a model of how candidates allocate resources among states consists essentially of assumptions about the derivatives $\partial q/\partial\mu$ and $\partial\mu/\partial\theta$. As we note earlier, however, a model that seeks to specify a particular allocation rule must substitute into (14) explicit functional forms for these derivatives. Unfortunately, we are not certain what those forms should be or what they are in the minds of the candidates. Nevertheless, we can conjecture about their general properties. Turning first to $\partial q/\partial\mu$, we see that $q_{ij}=\Pr[x_{ij}>0]$, where $x_{ij}$ is candidate 1's realized plurality in state $j$. Assuming that $x_{ij}$ is a random variable with expected value $\mu_{ij}$, the probability $q_{1j}$, then, is a cumulative density that increases as $\mu_{1j}$ increases and thus possesses a functional form like the curve in Figure 1. If, for example, $x_{1j}$ is approximately normally distributed, $\partial q_{1j}/\partial\mu_{1j}$ decreases as the absolute value of $\mu_{1j}$, written $|\mu_{1j}|$, increases. This, of course, is simply a restatement of the intuitively reasonable proposition that if the candidate anticipates a very large or very small plurality, small changes in this plurality do not affect greatly his chances of carrying a state; but if the election is close, these small changes affect $q_{1j}$ significantly.



**Figure 1: General Functional Form for $q(\mu)$**

It is not so easy to specify the properties of $\partial\mu/\partial\theta$. First, it is entirely possible that this derivative is negative for some candidates in some states. John Kennedy, after entering the 1960 Democratic primary in West Virginia, for example, experienced an initial decline in that state's polls as Protestant citizens became aware of Kennedy's religion. Equivalently, a candidate might succeed only in increasing turnout across the board, and if registration or citizen sentiment favors his opponent, his campaign yields a net decrease in $\mu_{1j}$.[17] Conversely, $\partial\mu_{1j}/\partial\theta_{1j}$ might be rendered positive if the candidate conducts a more sophisticated campaign designed to activate only his party's leadership which, in turn, activates only citizens who are likely to vote for him. A candidate might visit only the regions of a state that favor him. Or the candidate might use his resources to improve his image or to increase the salience of issues on which he possesses some strategic advantage.

Whatever the form of this derivative, it must be the case that $\theta_{1j}^*>0$ only if $\partial\mu_{1j}/\partial\theta_{1j}\geq 0$ at $\theta^*$; otherwise the candidate could withdraw resources from the state and increase his expected plurality. But even if the derivative is non-negative for all $\theta$, its form can vary considerably. The function $\mu_{1j}(\theta_{1j})$ might, for example, look like curve $B$ in Figure 2, which is to say that the initial rate of return on $\theta_{1j}$ increases up to some point and thereafter is subject to the law of diminishing marginal

---

[17] For a more complete discussion of such possibilities see Gerald H. Kramer, "A Decision-Theoretic Analysis of a Problem in Political Campaigning," in *Mathematical Applications in Political Science, II*, Joseph L. Bernd, ed. (Dallas, SMU Press, 1966), 137–160.



**Figure 2: Alternative Functional Forms for $\mu(\theta)$**

returns. Alternatively, $\mu_{1j}(\theta_{1j})$ might exhibit diminishing marginal returns for all $\theta_{1j}$ (see curve $A$). Curves $D$ and $C$ in Figure 2 illustrate two additional forms that $\mu_{1j}(\theta_{1j})$ might assume. Doubtlessly, others can be imagined and rationalized.

All of these possibilities render tenuous the exercise of deriving a simple general allocation rule for candidates. Our objective, however, is not to derive a particular rule but rather to test whether the proportional hypothesis or the 3/2's hypothesis best fits the data on candidate trips. With a few additional assumptions we can apply expression (14) to that end. (Parenthetically, however, we must warn the reader that our subsequent assumptions are not designed to yield a mathematically rigorous theory that explores all possibilities as generally as possible. Rather, they facilitate formulation of a simple and estimatable statistical model. In this way we hope to render our empirical analysis less ad hoc and its implicit assumptions more evident.)

Consider first $\partial\mu/\partial\theta$. If form $C$ in Figure 2 applies, then $\theta_{1j}^{*}=0$. Since we are assuming that $\theta_{1j}^{*}>0$, we eliminate functions of this sort from consideration. Functions such as $B$ and $D$, on the other hand, in general do not yield tractable statistical models. Consequently, we assume that $\mu_{1j}(\theta_{1j})$ looks like curve $A$—that is, the return from allocations is subject to the law of diminishing marginal returns. The simplest and most tractable representation of this assumption is that

$$(15) \qquad \frac{\partial \mu_{1j}}{\partial \theta_{1j}} = K/(\theta_{1j}+\xi)^{A},$$

where $K$, $A$, and $\xi$ are unknown positive constants.

Turning now to $\partial q_{1j}/\partial \mu_{1j}$, we know that, theoretically, this derivative is a function of $\theta_{1j}$ since, from Figure 1, it is a function of $\mu_{1j}$ and since $\mu_{1j}$ is a function of $\theta_{1j}$. Suppose, however, that we approximate $\partial q_{1j}/\partial \mu_{1j}$ by its value at $Pl_j$—candidate 1's realized plurality in state $j$. In particular, suppose that:

$$(16) \qquad \frac{\partial q_{1j}}{\partial \mu_{1j}} = \frac{k}{|Pl_j|^{d}},$$

where $k$ and $d$ are non-negative constants. This expression represents, of course, a heroic assumption. First, $Pl_j$ is the realized value of a random variable: thus, it can be a poor estimate of that variable's expected value, $\mu_{1j}$. Second, $\mu_{1j}$ might vary considerably as the election campaign proceeds, owing, for example, to campaign blunders or to a new international crisis.[18] Thus, a candidate's estimate of his expected plurality when he initially invests resources in a state can differ substantially from his estimate when he invests the last units of his resources.

With all the necessary qualifications in mind, we substitute expressions (15) and (16) into (14) and obtain a necessary condition for a maximum. This condition, in turn, yields the following modification of expression (8):

$$(17) \qquad T_j + \delta_j = CE_j^{\beta}\,|Pl_j|^{-\gamma}$$

Again assuming a log-normal multiplicative error structure and letting $\delta_j$ satisfy condition (10), we present the estimates of $\hat{\beta}$ and $\hat{\gamma}$ in Table 5.

**Table 5. Estimates of $\hat{\beta}$ and $\hat{\gamma}$ for Expression (17)**

| | Democratic Slate | | Republican Slate | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year | $\hat{\beta}$ | $\hat{\gamma}$ | $\hat{\beta}$ | $\hat{\gamma}$ |
| 1960 | 1.23 (.13)** | .25 (.07) | 1.40 (.19)* | .30 (.11) |
| 1964 | .87 (.15)** | .30 (.12) | .87 (.19)** | .41 (.15) |
| 1968 | 1.15 (.25)*** | .64 (.19) | 1.54 (.17)* | .30 (.13) |
| 1972 | 1.36 (.21)*** | 1.16 (.26) | .78 (.17)** | .12 (.22) |

* Significantly greater than 1.00 but not significantly different from 1.50.
** Significantly less than 1.50 but not significantly different from 1.00.
*** Indeterminate.

---

[18] Clearly, though, if $Pl_j$ is a function of $\theta_{ij}$ in any statistically appreciable way, the appropriate methodology is simultaneous equations estimation. Our data, however, seems far too crude to apply this method and it is reasonable to asume a priori that the relationship from $Pl_j$ to $\theta_{ij}$ is the stronger.

Note that with one exception, $\hat{\gamma}$ is significantly greater than zero at the .01 confidence level; and even the one insignificant coefficient possesses the proper sign.[19] With Table 2 in mind, note also that the inclusion of $|Pl_j|$ affects our estimates of $\beta$ in the anticipated way: If $|Pl_j|$ and $E_j$ are negatively related as in 1960, 1968, and 1972 (see Table 3), $\hat{\beta}$ declines, but if a positive relationship exists as in 1964, $\hat{\beta}$ increases. These are highly gratifying results, and they strongly support common sense arguments about the role competitiveness plays in campaigns.

A comparison between estimates of $\hat{\beta}$ in Tables 2 and 5, however, is more interesting for our purposes. In particular, note that four coefficients in Table 2 support 3/2's, but only two do so unambiguously in Table 5. And while only three coefficients support the proportional rule in Table 2 and one coefficient is indeterminate, four coefficients in Table 5 support the (modified) proportional rule and two are indeterminate. Thus, while $\hat{\beta}$ averages 1.55 in Table 2 for 1960 and 1968, it averages 1.33 in Table 5 for these two elections. Overall, $\hat{\beta}$'s average is reduced from 1.25 to 1.15, while the standard deviation of this average declines from .36 to .26. Hence, the inclusion of $|Pl_j|$ collapses the distribution of our estimates about a value that is closer to 1.0 than to 1.5.

For completeness, we conclude this section with a comparison of the Brams-Davis and Kelley data in Table 6.

Even though only one $\hat{\gamma}$ is significantly greater than zero with Kelley's data, all estimates of $\hat{\gamma}$ possess the proper sign. Thus a simple nonparametric signs test supports the proposition that candidates allocate proportionately more resources to competitive states. With Table 3 in mind, we note also that the inclusion of $|Pl_j|$ affects our estimates of $\hat{\beta}$ in the anticipated way for both data sets: In 1964, $|Pl_j|$ increases $\hat{\beta}$, whereas in 1960, $|Pl_j|$ decreases $\hat{\beta}$. And while the standard errors of these estimates preclude rejection of the 3/2's hypothesis in two cases, these coefficients vary convincingly about 1.0. Again, then, we find substantially less support for the 3/2's hypothesis with data on the amount of time candidates spend in states than we find with the data on trips.

Given Tables 5 and 6, it is reasonable to reject the 3/2's hypothesis in favor of a modified proportional rule. Of the fourteen estimates for $\hat{\beta}$, only one exceeds 1.50, which clearly indicates that $\hat{\beta}<1.5$. Nevertheless, there are several bothersome details. First, the analysis does not account presently for the failure of candidates to visit states. Second, many coefficients in Tables 5 and 6 exceed 1.0, some significantly. The inclusion of $|Pl_j|$ reduces $\hat{\beta}$, but perhaps not sufficiently to accept, without suspicion, the modified proportional hypothesis. We turn then to two additional theoretical considerations—"corner solutions" and sequential planning.

## Corner Solutions and Sequential Planning

Consider the following simple constrained maximization problem: maximize the differentiable function $f(x_1, x_2)$, subject to $x_1+x_2\leq B$, where $x_1$ and $x_2$ are nonnegative. Forming the Lagrangian

**Table 6. A Comparison of $\hat{\beta}$ and $\hat{\gamma}$ for the Brams-Davis and Kelley Data Using Expression (16)**

| | Brams-Davis | | Kelley | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | $\hat{\beta}$ | $\hat{\gamma}$ | $\hat{\beta}$ | $\hat{\gamma}$ |
| 1960 Democratic Presidential Candidate | 1.38 (.22) | .19 (.14) | 1.39 (.18) | .16 (.11) |
| 1960 Republican Presidential Candidate | 1.15 (.16) | .29 (.10) | .91 (.17) | .28 (.10) |
| 1964 Democratic Presidential Candidate | .80 (.16) | .33 (.13) | .92 (.16) | .20 (.14) |
| 1964 Democratic Slate | .87 (.15) | .30 (.12) | 1.15 (.14) | .13 (.12) |
| 1964 Republican Presidential Candidate | 1.03 (.19) | .43 (.15) | 1.20 (.15) | .16 (.13) |
| 1964 Republican Slate | .87 (.19) | .41 (.15) | .96 (.15) | .17 (.12) |

---

[19] The adjusted $R^2$'s with and without $|Pl_j|$ are as follows:

| Year | Slate | Expression (9) | Expression (17) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1960 | Democrat | .70 | .75 |
| | Republican | .60 | .64 |
| 1964 | Democrat | .36 | .42 |
| | Republican | .25 | .34 |
| 1968 | Democrat | .47 | .57 |
| | Republican | .71 | .74 |
| 1972 | Democrat | .41 | .58 |
| | Republican | .30 | .29 |
| | Average | .475 | .54 |

Note, however, that these numbers are defined in terms of log $T_j$. To ascertain the variance accounted for in terms of $T_j$, it is necessary to retransform the variables and, given our estimates of $\hat{\beta}$, $\hat{\alpha}$ and $\hat{\gamma}$, recalculate $R^2$. These new values for $R^2$ will be higher than those we report above but the change in $R^2$ owing to the inclusion of $|Pl_j|$ will diminish.

expression $f(x_1, x_2)-\lambda[x_1+x_2-B]$ and differentiating with respect to $x_1$, we obtain,

$$\partial f/\partial x_i \leq \lambda, \qquad i = 1, 2$$

as the necessary condition a solution, say $(x_1^*, x_2^*)$, must satisfy. With respect to this condition, if "=" holds, then $x_i^* \geq 0$, but if "<" holds, then the "corner solution" $x_j^*=0$ prevails.

Several possibilities yield corner solutions. First, if $\partial f/\partial x_1$ is smaller than $\partial f/x_2$ everywhere in the feasible region, the entire budget should be allocated to $x_2$. If, for example, $\partial f/\partial x_1=0$ for all $x_1$ but $\partial f/\partial x_2>0$ for all $x_2$, then $x_1^*=0$ and $x_2^*=B$ maximizes $f$. A second possibility is that differentiability of either $f$ or $x_i$ may be only an approximate assumption. Suppose, for $B=1.0$, that $x_1^*=.01$ and $x_2^*=.99$, but that in actuality the budget can be divided between $x_1$ and $x_2$ only in units of .1. Then the solution might best be approximated by letting $x_1=0$ and $x_2=1$.

For a more relevant illustration of this latter possibility, suppose that a candidate can devote fifty days to whistle-stopping, etc., and that each day consists of sixteen useful hours (including travel, speeches, etc.). If the candidate adopts the proportional rule, he should allocate approximately 4.8 hours to a state with three electoral votes and 6.4 hours to a state with four electoral votes. Suppose, however, that, given his campaign style and the technological constraints of transportation, the candidate believes he must budget at least eight hours to any state he wishes to visit. He might approximate the proportional solution, then, by avoiding states with three and four electoral votes.[20]

Since trips, or for that matter even time, are not infinitely divisible commodities, we see from expression (13) that corner solutions are possible if $E_j q_{ij}/\partial\theta_{ij}$ is sufficiently small, or, from subsequent assumptions, if $E_j^\beta |Pl_j|^{-\gamma}$ is small. Consider the effects of such solutions on estimates of $\hat{\beta}$. Ignoring plurality for the present, suppose that a candidate allocates no resources to state $j$ if $E_j \leq E_0$ and that he allocates resources proportionately among states with more than $E_0$ electoral votes. We illustrate this rule by the dark solid line in Figure 3, where we also graph with a thin solid curve an approximate best fit line that conforms to expression (9). Clearly, this curve corresponds to an estimate of $\beta$ that exceeds 1.0 (hence its curvature).



**Figure 3: Effect of Corner Solutions on $\hat{\beta}$**

Figure 3, then, illustrates an important possibility: corner solutions can bias our estimates of $\hat{\beta}$ upwards. An estimate of $\hat{\beta}$ that exceeds 1.0, then, can indicate simply that the candidate is allocating resources proportionately over some subset of states. The remaining states are ignored, or, if the candidate does visit them, his objective is something other than increasing his probability of carrying them (e.g., he seeks campaign funds from a wealthy potential contributor, or he is helping the party win a Senate or gubernatorial race).

The supposition that the model illustrated by Figure 1 accounts for estimates of $\hat{\beta}$ greater than 1.0 is readily rejected—or at least rendered highly suspect. Specifically, we can reestimate the coefficients of expression (17) after dropping from the sample states that the candidate fails to visit, acknowledging that $\beta$ will be thereby underestimated.[21] If this estimate exceeds 1.0, then we can conclude that the concept of a corner solution by

---

[20] The following caveat must necessarily precede this "rounding-off" argument. Although rounding off the optimal solution of the noninteger (i.e., continuous) problem to obtain integer value solutions is often adequate, there are pitfalls in this approach. First, after it has been rounded, the optimal noninteger solution need not be feasible. Second, there is no guarantee that a feasible rounded solution is optimal to the original integer programming problem. See, F. S. Hillier and G. J. Lieberman, *Introduction to Operations Research* (San Francisco: Holden-Day, Inc.), 1967, pp. 553–570.

[21] There is, however, a condition under which these estimates are not biased. Specifically, assume that a candidate confronts two decisions—the first being whether or not to visit a state—and let $Q_j$ denote the probability that he visits state $j$. The candidate's second decision, now, is to properly allocate his trips among those he plans to visit. From all subsequent assumptions, including that error structures are multiplicative log-normal, the distribution of $T_j$ becomes

$$f(T_j > 0 \,|\, \alpha, \beta, \gamma) = rQ_j e^{-S_j^2/2}$$
$$f(T_j = 0 \,|\, \alpha, \beta, \gamma) = 1 - Q_j$$

where

$$S = [\log T_j - \log \alpha - \beta \log E_j - \gamma \log |Pl_j|]/\sigma$$

and

$$r = (2\pi\sigma^2)^{-\frac{1}{2}}.$$

Letting

$$X_j = \begin{Bmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{Bmatrix} \quad \text{if and only if} \quad T_j \begin{Bmatrix} > \\ = \end{Bmatrix} 0,$$

**Table 7. Unvisited States Deleted from Sample**

| | Democratic Slate | | | Republican Slate | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | $\hat{\beta}$ | $\hat{\gamma}$ | $n^+$ | $\hat{\beta}$ | $\hat{\gamma}$ | $n$ |
| 1960 | 1.23 (.13)** | .25 (.08) | 48 | 1.47 (.14)* | .18 (.09) | 45 |
| 1964 | .84 (.12)** | .07 (.10) | 46 | .89 (.14)** | .20 (.12) | 45 |
| 1968 | 1.14 (.17)** | .26 (.14) | 37 | 1.36 (.11)* | .04 (.08) | 36 |
| 1972 | 1.16 (.18)*** | .43 (.23) | 28 | .61 (.09) | .08 (.12) | 29 |

+ $n$ denotes the number of states in the sample.
* Significantly greater than 1.0 but not significantly different from 1.50.
** Significantly less than 1.50 but not significantly different from 1.0.
*** Indeterminate.

itself does not account for estimates that deviate from the proportional allocation hypothesis.[22] We report the results of this procedure in Table 7.

Observe that these estimates for $\hat{\beta}$ differ only modestly from the estimates in Table 5—the exceptions being a slightly higher estimate for the Republican slate in 1960 and a lower estimate for the Democratic slate in 1972. Since the standard errors also change, we note a slight shifting of the number of coefficients that are different from 1.5 and 1.0. Overall, $\hat{\beta}$ averages 1.07 in Table 7 as against 1.15 in Table 5; but 25 per cent of this reduction can be attributed to a substantially smaller estimate of $\hat{\beta}$ for the 1972 Republican slate. This same, apparently inconsequential, pattern emerges also if we also estimate $\hat{\beta}$ and $\hat{\gamma}$ for Kelley's data (see Table 8).

Clearly, then, the concept of a corner solution fails to account for the values of $\hat{\beta}$ that exceed unity in Table 5. But if we employ this concept in conjunction with a particular hypothesis about how candidates plan and execute their campaigns over time, we can offer an intuitively plausible explanation about why proportional allocation rules yield $\hat{\beta} > 1.0$.

First, Kelley observes that in 1960, both Kennedy and Nixon spent 74 per cent of their time in twenty-four doubtful states during the campaign but about 88 per cent of their time in these same states during the final three weeks. Correspondingly, Kennedy spent "57 per cent of

---

then the likelihood function for our parameters becomes

$$L = \prod_j f(T_j > 0 \mid \alpha, \beta, \gamma)^{X_j} f(T_j = 0 \mid \alpha, \beta, \gamma)^{1-X_j}$$

and the log of the likelihood function is,

$$\log L = \sum_j X_j[\log K + \log Q_j - S_j^2/2] + \sum_j (1 - X_j) \log (1 - Q_j).$$

To derive the maximum likelihood estimates of $\alpha$, $\beta$, and $\gamma$, we substitute the observed values of $X_j$ into this expression, and set the derivatives of log $L$ with respect to $\alpha$, $\beta$, and $\gamma$ equal to zero. Note, however, that if $Q_j$ is functionally independent of $\alpha$, $\beta$, and $\gamma$, the maximum likelihood estimates of these parameters are exactly what we obtain if we re-estimate expression (17) as before after deleting from the sample those states the candidates fail to visit. The assumption that $Q_j$ is functionally independent of $\alpha$, $\beta$, and $j$, however, is inconsistent with our previous analysis, since in that analysis the decision about whether or not to visit a state depends on the magnitude of $\alpha E_j{}^\beta |Pl_j|^{-\gamma}$. Nevertheless, if one is willing to accept the assumption that candidates adopt simplifying heuristics such as letting their decision rest on $E_j$ or $|Pl_j|$ alone, the preceding analysis proves that the estimates in Tables 7 and 8 are unbiased.

[22] We note, however, that the derivation of the 3/2's rule also admits the possibility of corner solutions, but Brams and Davis implicitly assume that such solutions do not occur. Of course, if they are admitted into their analysis then their theory would predict estimates of $\beta$ in excess of 3/2's.

**Table 8. Comparison of $\hat{\beta}$ and $\hat{\gamma}$ for Brams-Davis and Kelley Data, with Unvisited States Deleted from Sample**

| | Brams-Davis | | | Kelley | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | $\hat{\beta}$ | $\hat{\gamma}$ | $n$ | $\hat{\beta}$ | $\hat{\gamma}$ | $n$ |
| 1960 Democratic Presidential Candidate | 1.39 (.15) | .07 (.09) | 43 | 1.45 (.17) | .10 (.11) | 44 |
| 1960 Republican Presidential Candidate | 1.19 (.12) | .17 (.07) | 44 | .98 (.15) | .15 (.09) | 43 |
| 1964 Democratic Presidential Candidate | .58 (.11) | .16 (.10) | 40 | .85 (.12) | .12 (.10) | 41 |
| 1964 Democratic Slate | .84 (.12) | .07 (.10) | 46 | 1.15 (.06) | .11 (.10) | 44 |
| 1964 Republican Presidential Candidate | .99 (.13) | .28 (.17) | 42 | 1.18 (.13) | .12 (.11) | 43 |
| 1964 Republican Slate | .89 (.14) | .20 (.12) | 45 | .96 (.13) | .19 (.11) | 45 |

his time in the seven largest of the doubtful states, and about 71 per cent of his time in these states in the final three weeks," while for Nixon, "the proportion of total campaign time spent in the seven largest doubtful states [was] 51 per cent [and the] proportion of campaign time spent [in these states] in the final three weeks [was] 67 per cent."[23]

Consistent with these observations is the general tendency for candidates to visit fewer states in the second half of their campaigns than in the first half. As Table 9 reveals, only Lyndon Johnson deviates from this pattern.[24]

**Table 9. Number of States Visited by Presidential Candidates in First and Second Halves of Campaign**

| | 1st Half | 2nd Half |
|---|---|---|
| 1960 Democrat | 33 | 24 |
| 1960 Republican | 36 | 21 |
| 1964 Democrat | 20 | 30 |
| 1964 Republican | 33 | 23 |
| 1968 Democrat | 22 | 13 |
| 1968 Republican | 28 | 14 |

The implication one draws from these observations and patterns is that the candidates' strategies change as the campaign proceeds, which is only reasonable since their information is changing also. They know more about their opponents' strategies, and they have better estimates about which states are close and which are foregone conclusions. Moreover, their budget constraints are changing. A constraint that might cause little concern in September grows to paramount importance in October.

Let us consider how this shrinking budget might affect campaign strategies. In particular, suppose that a candidate plans his entire campaign in September and proceeds to allocate his resources according to a proportional formula. In October, however, he decides to reassess his campaigning, make suitable adjustments to new information, and proceed from then on into November with a recalculated proportional allocation. Observe now that, aside from information effects, the principal difference between planning in the two months is that corner solutions are likely to be more prevalent in October because time is a scarcer commodity. If, for example, he reassesses his campaign two days before the election, the candidate would be wise to ignore all states except, say, California and New York.

What we wish to show now is that by thus readjusting his campaign, the least squares estimate of $\beta$ in expression (8) exceeds 1.0. That is, even though the candidate makes proportional allocations in both periods, he appears overall to use a greater than proportional rule. Our proof here focuses on the case of a single replanning point although the method can be extended to show that $\hat{\beta}>1.0$ for any number of points.[25] To simplify analysis and exposition still further, we ignore competitiveness and assume that as the campaign commences the candidate plans to visit all states. For the case of a single replanning point, then, the inequality we seek to establish is,

$$\beta=\frac{\sum_j\,[\log E_j-\sum_j\log E_j][\log\theta_j-\sum_j\log\theta_j]}{\sum_j\,[\log E_j-\sum_j\log E_j]^2}$$

$$>1$$

where $\theta_j$ is the overall proportion of trips or time a candidate allocates to state $j$. Straightforward algebraic manipulation reduces this expression to,

$$\text{(18)}\quad \sum_j \log E_j\left\{\left(n\log\frac{\theta_j}{E_j}-\sum_j\log\frac{\theta_j}{E_j}\right)\right\}$$

$$>0.$$

Assuming now that the candidate allocates $\xi$ per cent of his total resources in period 1, then,

$$\theta_j=\xi\overset{1}{\theta}_j+(1-\xi)\overset{2}{\theta}_j,$$

where $\theta_j^k$ is the proportion of resources allocated in period $k$ to state $j$. From the assumption that the candidate visits all states at least once in period 1 and allocates proportionally,

$$\overset{1}{\theta}_j=E_j/\sum_j E_j=E_j/E'.$$

(Note that to simplify the analysis further, we let

---

[23] Stanley Kelley, Jr., "The Presidential Campaign," in *The Presidential Election and Transition: 1960–1961*, Paul T. David, ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1961), p. 71.

[24] The data in Table 9 is taken from John H. Runyon, Jennefer Verdini, and Sally S. Runyon, eds., *Source Book of American Presidential Campaign and Election Statistics: 1948–1968* (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1971), pp. 156–173. On Johnson's exception to the general pattern see Karl A. Lamb and Paul A. Smith, *Campaign Decision-Making: The Presidential Election of 1964* (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1968), pp. 202, 205–207.

[25] To forestall someone from traversing several blind alleys that we entered, we note that the conjecture that $\hat{\beta}$ increases monotonically with the number of replanning periods is true, but only under some severely restrictive conditions—conditions that seem impossible to express in any simple, substantively meaningful way.

$\theta_j^1$ be a nonstochastic variable.) For time period 2, however,

$$\theta_j^2 = l_jE_j/\sum_j l_jE_j = l_jE_j/E'',$$

where $l_j=0$ if $E_j<E_0$ and $l_j=1$ if $E_j \geq E_0$. That is, if the state is "small," he does not visit it, but if it is sufficiently large, he allocates his resources to it proportionately—in proportion, that is, to its size with respect to the states he plans to visit. Substituting these expressions for $\theta_j^k$ into (18) yields, with some additional algebraic manipulation and cancellation,

$$\sum_j \log E_j \Big\{ n \log [\xi E'' + (1-\xi)l_jE'] - \sum_j \log [\xi E'' + (1-\xi)l_jE'] \Big\} > 0.$$

We now divide this summation into two parts—over those states for which $l_j=0$ and over those for which $l_j=1$. Letting $v$ denote the total number of states for which $l_j=1$, we get

$$v\sum_{E_j<E_0} \log E_j\{\log \xi E'' - \log [\xi E'' + (1-\xi)E']\} + (n-v)\sum_{E_j\geq E_0} \log E_j\{\log [\xi E'' + (1-\xi)E'] - \log \xi E''\} > 0$$

or, alternatively,

$$\{\log [\xi E'' + (1-\xi)E'] - \log \xi E''\} \cdot \Big[ (n-v)\sum_{E_j\geq E_0} \log E_j - v\sum_{E_j<E_0} \log E_j \Big] > 0.$$

Since the term contained by { } is positive we can ignore it. To prove that the expression in brackets is also positive, note that if we set all $E_j=E_0$, we minimize its first term but maximize the second (subtracted) term. Thus, we obtain $(n-v)v \log E_0 - v(n-v) \log E_0 = 0$. Hence, the bracketed term is positive, which completes our proof that $\hat{\beta} > 1.0$.

Following a proof of this sort it is perhaps useful to illustrate the general idea with a simple example. In Figure 4 we graph proportion of time spent in a state against $E_j$, where $E_j$ assumes the values 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. The dashed line denotes the candidate's decision rule in September and indicates that he begins his campaign by allocating time proportionately among all six states. The dotted line denotes the candidate's decision rule in October and indicates that he allocates his time proportionately among only the three largest states. The dark solid line represents the overall average proportion of time a candidate allocates to each state. The thin solid line, in turn, represents an approximate best-fit curve for expression (8) to the *overall* data. Clearly, $\hat{\beta} > 1.0$. Thus, while candidates are allocating according to a proportional rule, we estimate $\hat{\beta}$'s in excess of one because they are applying this rule to a smaller subset (of larger states) as the campaign progresses.

Can we assert, then, that corner solutions in conjunction with sequential replanning constitute a valid explanation for the apparent biases of the Electoral College? Unfortunately, we cannot. First, subjecting the explanation to a statistical test is a difficult task even with the best of data—and the data currently available hardly qualify as such.[26] Second, and perhaps more important, we cannot also reject the proposition that the candidates do not adjust their campaigns and that they plan *from the very beginning* to abide by a greater than proportional rule by allocating proportionally to many states initially but proportionally to only a few later. Doubtless, the truth lies somewhere between this proposition and our explanation. We cannot believe that momentum has no effect, or that candidates do not foresee the utility of concentrating their resources in big competitive states as the campaign nears its conclusion. But it is reasonable also to assume that candidates make some adjustments over time. Undoubtedly, adjustments to plans are not made in the starkly simple way we portray them. We hope only that our model captures the essential feature of these adjustments and explains why, after controlling for competitiveness, we might observe greater than proportional allocations over the course of the entire campaign.

## Conclusions

Clearly, we can answer affirmatively the question "Does the Electoral College bias campaign allocations in favor of big states?"—at least for

---

[26] For a discussion of the relevant statistical methodology and data requirements see John U. Farley, Melvin J. Hinich, and Timothy W. McGuire, "Testing for a Shift in the Slopes of a Multivariate Linear Time Series Model," *Journal of the American Statistical Association* (forthcoming). If, however, we accept the assumptions of the statistical model outlines in footnote 21, then we can conduct a comparison of estimates of $\hat{\beta}$ for the first five weeks of the campaign as against the last three weeks (using Kelley's data). Briefly, such a comparison reveals that, as the theory predicts, $\hat{\beta}$ for either period is always less than our estimate for the overall campaign and that only one estimate of $\hat{\beta}$ is significantly different from 1.0 (.39 for Lyndon Johnson in 1964—all other coefficients vary between .76 and 1.22). We repeat, though, that the assumption that $Q$ is functionally independent of $\alpha$, $\beta$, and $\gamma$ is at best tenuous and is not consistent with our central analysis.



**Figure 4: Effect of One Replanning Point**

competitive elections in which neither candidate is an incumbent. For purposes of reform, however, we must also ask: What is the extent and source of this bias? Without an adequate answer to this question we cannot speculate meaningfully about the consequences of alternative election procedures.

First, however, we can reject the 3/2's hypothesis as an adequate explanation of bias on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, the derivation of 3/2's rests heavily on an unreasonably limiting assumption about the relationship between voter choice and resource allocation (expression 5) and the failure to consider corner solutions to the candidates' constrained maximization problem. Justification for its use, moreover, rests on the tenuous principle that candidates adopt a local equilibrium that is readily upset by very small changes in strategy. The apparent empirical support for the 3/2's hypothesis, on the other hand, can be attributed, first, to the correlation between the size and competitiveness of states and to the failure of candidates to visit states.

The derivation of the 3/2's rule addresses the wrong issue. The issue is not whether the Electoral College induces the candidates to abide by a greater than proportional formula, but rather ascertaining the effects of the Electoral College's two principal characteristics—the unit rule and weighted voting. Together and separately these two characteristics affect strategies, and the process of isolating these effects moves us closer to an understanding of the consequences of alternative election procedures in general.

Briefly, we conclude that even without weighted voting we should anticipate some variation in resource allocations. To the extent that equally weighted states differ in competitiveness, the unit rule will admit the effects of corner solutions, sequential campaign adjustments, and differences in marginal productivity across units. Hence, reform proposals such as the district plan will not eliminate biases—and if competitiveness correlates with the distribution of policy preferences within a district, these biases may be as consequential as we presume them to be under the Electoral College.

Weighted voting, on the other hand, accentuates the effects of the unit rule: it acts in much the same way as competitiveness in that it contributes to variations in the states' marginal productivities. We cannot say whether its influence on strategies in conjunction with the unit rule follows a proportional formula, however, since our analysis in the previous section suggests that it can affect strategies in rather complex ways.

The principal conclusion of this essay is that while the consequences of the Electoral College can be studied rigorously, there is no reason to suppose that these consequences are describable by a single simple formula that is applicable to all campaigns. These consequences are very much a function of each candidate's information, his assumptions about his opponent, and his ability or willingness to reevaluate his strategy as the campaign proceeds. Doubtless, it is a function of other considerations as well—including his demand for financial support, his ability to recruit this support without visiting states, and his willingness to campaign also for candidates of lesser office. Within the context of the variables we consider, moreover, one needs only to peruse the literature on portfolio selection and sequential decision processes to recognize the primitiveness of our analysis and the opportunities for further study. For example, we disregard the candidates' attitudes towards risk and hypotheses such as: candidates who believe they are behind are risk-acceptant, while candidates who believe they hold the advantage are risk-averse. These attitudes can affect strategies since campaigning in one large state rather than several smaller states with an equivalent total of electoral votes entails less risk, *ceteris paribus*.

These facts, in conjunction with our failure to address other important issues surrounding the debate over Electoral College reform—including the viability of third parties, the probability of indeterminate outcomes and reversals, and the incentives for fraud—necessitate our resisting the temptation to render a verdict on that debate.[27]

---

[27] For an analysis of reversals and indeterminate outcomes see Melvin J. Hinich, Richard Mickelsen, and Peter C. Ordeshook, "The Electoral College vs. A Direct Vote: Policy Bias, Indeterminate Outcomes, and Reversals" in *Journal of Mathematical Sociology,* forthcoming and Mickelsen and Ordeshook, "The Electoral College and the Probability of Reversals" in *Modeling and Simulation,* 5 (Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, forthcoming).

# Comment on "Campaign Resource Allocations under the Electoral College"

STEVEN J. BRAMS
*New York University*

MORTON D. DAVIS
*City College of New York*

Colantoni, Levesque, and Ordeshook provide further confirmation of the large-state bias of the Electoral College, but we do not find the mathematical model (or more accurately, class of models) that they offer to explain this effect of the Electoral College particularly persuasive. Before discussing their alternative approach, however, we wish to consider their criticisms of the "3/2's rule," some of which seem to us to be based on a confusion of assumptions in our model.

We think it useful first to repeat our own qualifications of the 3/2's result:

> We wish to emphasize that while the 3/2's rule fits the [campaign] appearance data somewhat better overall than the proportionate rule does, we do not promulgate it as an immutable law. Like any theoretical consequence of a set of assumptions, its applicability will be limited to those situations that can be reasonably well characterized by these assumptions—particularly the postulated goal of maximizing one's expected electoral vote and the assumption that candidates match each other's campaign expenditures in each state—which are not easy to verify. Further, the instability of the 3/2's rule as an equilibrium point, which makes it vulnerable to only small deviations, may also limit its applicability, especially when candidates resort to adaptive strategies in response to each other's allocations. Finally, another potential source of slippage between the theoretical allocations and the actual campaign behavior of candidates occurs in the reconstruction of campaign itineraries, which is a task fraught with difficulties that certainly contributes to unreliability in the data.[1]

Beyond these limitations, the main criticism offered by Colantoni, Levesque, and Ordeshook is that the 3/2's rule is an "artifact" of the "empirical relationship" between the size and competitiveness of states—that is, large states tend to be more competitive (the winning margins of candidates in these states are proportionally smaller) than small states.

Historically this is true, but it is emphatically *not* true that the 3/2's rule is an artifact of any empirical relationship—it is a strictly theoretical result that is implicit in the assumptions of our model (which we shall make explicit below). Nor is it true that "no consideration is given *in the derivation of the 3/2's rule* to the relative competitiveness of states" (italics those of authors). On the contrary, a consequence of assuming that the voters committed to each candidate before the start of a campaign are split fifty-fifty in each state (or some subset of states), and that the uncommitted voters will therefore be decisive to the outcome in each state, is to make states *unequally* competitive—and hence unequally attractive campaign targets for the candidates.[2] The reason is a direct implication of the central limit theorem applied to the $n_i$ uncommitted voters in each state $i$: for large $n_i$, the total Republican [Democratic] share of the uncommitted popular vote of state $i$ is a normal variate with mean $n_ip_i[n_i(1-p_i)]$ and standard deviation $\sqrt{n_ip_i(1-p_i)}$, where $p_i$ is the probability that an individual uncommitted voter in state $i$ votes Republican. This means that a candidate's margin of victory does not increase (proportionally) according to $n_i$ but rather (less than proportionally) according to $\sqrt{n_i}$.

(It increases proportionally only if $p_i$ is defined to be the probability that a *majority* of uncommitted voters in state $i$, and not the individual uncommitted voters the state comprises, votes Republican. It is this latter definition that makes states equally competitive in our electoral-vote model, which Colantoni, Levesque, and Ordeshook seem to have confused with the individualistic definition of $p_i$ given above underlying our derivation of the 3/2's rule. Thus, their critique is misdirected at the 3/2's rule—it should be directed at the equal-competitiveness assumption underlying the proportional rule.)[3]

---

[1] Steven J. Brams and Morton D. Davis, "The 3/2's Rule in Presidential Campaigning," *American Political Science Review*, 68 (March 1974), p. 126.

[2] To be sure, if one defines "competitiveness" in terms only of the way that the committed voters divide in each state, we do assume all states are equally competitive. But if one measures competitiveness by absolute plurality or relative plurality (taking into account not only the winning margin but its proportion of the total vote, as we suggest below), as do Colantoni, Levesque, and Ordeshook, then even when the committed voters split fifty-fifty in all states, different-size states will be unequally competitive. In our original article, we indicated how states whose committed voters do not split fifty-fifty could be taken account of, but this complication did not yield simple results. At least at this stage in the development of resource-allocation models of presidential campaigning, the intuitive appeal, and empirical support for, the 3/2's rule were for us compelling, and Colantoni, Levesque, and Ordeshook have not shaken us in this belief.

If, as we assumed in our article, $n_i$ is proportional to the size of a state, then large states will be more competitive on a proportional basis (i.e., the margin of victory of the winning candidate will tend to be smaller in percentage terms), even though the absolute value of the winning candidate's plurality will tend to be larger. In fact, the regression results that Colantoni, Levesque, and Ordeshook report in Table 4 of their article provide empirical support for this theoretical consequence of our model and the assumptions about uncommitted voters from which it is derived. (We wish all critics were so charitable with the ammunition they provide their adversaries!)

On the question of competitiveness, then, it is simply false to assert that the derivation of the 3/2's rule does not take into account the relative competitiveness of states. Quite the contrary: It is precisely the relative competitiveness of different-size states under unit-rule voting that causes the attractiveness of states to increase disproportionally (by the "extra" $\sqrt{n_i}$ factor) with size; this is no artifact of any "empirical relationship" between size and competitiveness but rather a theoretical consequence confirmed (unwittingly, it seems) by Colantoni, Levesque, and Ordeshook's own statistical analysis.

With respect to unit rule, the claim by Colantoni, Levesque, and Ordeshook that this feature of the Electoral College is the "predominant cause of bias" (this characterization is used in their abstract) seems to us unjustified: With states of equal size under unit rule, all states would be equally attractive and so, therefore, would their uncommitted voters (by assumption, the same number for all equal-size states); similarly, without unit rule but with states of different size, uncommitted voters would be equally attractive campaign targets in all states, as we showed in our popular-vote model. Since both unit rule and unequal size are necessary, and only together sufficient, to produce the large-state bias, we find no basis for singling out one of these features as the predominant cause of the bias.

We turn now to an assessment of the approach taken by Colantoni, Levesque, and Ordeshook. We think a parsimonious model, and a simple consequence derived from it, is a virtue and not a vice if one is cognizant of the simplifications it entails. We were certainly aware that our model was a static one, as implied in the quotation above where we said that the 3/2's rule was vulnerable "especially when candidates resort to adaptive strategies in response to each other's allocations." To try to meet this deficiency, we outlined a dynamic, sequential-strategy model in a separate technical article giving mathematical details not given in our *APSR* article.[4]

In our dynamic model, which is hardly more than suggestive, we tried to show how candidates would be motivated to respond to the previous campaign allocations of an opponent. In the Colantoni-Levesque-Ordeshook model, on the other hand, what motivates the candidates to concentrate their spending in the largest states during the final weeks of a campaign is far from clear. They suggest that candidates will view these states to be more productive, but it is not apparent why. If they are so at the end of the campaign, why wouldn't they be so earlier, given that one's basis for evaluation does not change abruptly in midstream? (Of course it may, but why would only large states be favored, especially if one's opponent is ignoring small states?) And why wouldn't a candidate anticipate, in a game-theoretic sense, the greater productivity of large states and make appropriate adjustments before the last weeks of the campaign? Models based on decision making under risk, beyond suggesting the possibility of corner solutions, seem inadequate for answering such questions.

It is one thing to postulate a large-state bias by assuming that the candidates will allocate resources exclusively to large states in the latter half of a campaign, but it is quite another thing to develop a model that motivates such candidate behavior as a response to an opponent's behavior (and not just constraints in the environment). We believe that game-theoretic models are necessary for this task, but, as we tried to show in our article, standard solutions (e.g., based on the concept of mixed strategies) may not always have a clear substantive interpretation, and additional assumptions may be required to derive tractable and testable consequences.

---

[3] In fairness to our critics, they seem to recognize this to be the problem when they say (p. 144) that "the 3/2's rule should not be tested against a proportional rule unadjusted for competitiveness"—and then proceed to test an adjusted rule—but this statement is difficult to reconcile with the statements quoted above implying that the 3/2's rule also ignores the relative competitiveness of states. In any event, we believe that the simplest and most natural "adjustment" for competitiveness is the definition of $p_i$ we gave above, which, given the assumptions of our model, yields the 3/2's result. By way of comparison, we shudder at the complexity and ad hoc quality of the statistical model used to derive estimates of competitiveness in Table 5 of Colantoni, Levesque and Ordeshook.

[4] Steven J. Brams and Morton D. Davis, "Models of Resource Allocation in Presidential Campaigning: Implications for Democratic Representation," in *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Democratic Representation and Apportionment: Quantitative Methods, Measures and Criteria*, ed. L. Papayanopoulos, 219 (New York: New York Academy of Sciences, 1973), 105–123, esp. 118–121

# Rejoinder to "Comment" by S. J. Brams and M. D. Davis

CLAUDE S. COLANTONI, TERRENCE J. LEVESQUE, AND PETER C. ORDESHOOK
*Carnegie-Mellon University*

Brams and Davis begin their comment with the assertion that our "main criticism" of their research is that the 3/2's rule is an artifact of an empirical relationship rather than a theoretically derived proposition. This statement reverses our argument, however, which is that the apparent empirical support for their hypothesis is the artifact. Their remaining comments warrant more attention. Briefly, they assert that (1) their model, contrary to our statements, incorporates considerations of the relative competitiveness of states and that our empirical analysis "unwittingly" confirms this fact; (2) the parsimony of their model (as, presumably, against ours) is a virtue and not a vice, and; (3) the logic of our hypothesis as to why we observe greater than proportional allocations (even after controlling for competitiveness) is, at best, unintelligible to them while, at worst, the hypothesis is our initial assumption rather than a derived conclusion.

First, Brams and Davis properly note that in their model, if $n_j$ is proportional to state $j$'s size, the proportionate margin of victory (in absolute terms) should on the average be smaller in larger states. To see this, let $N_j$ denote state $j$'s voting population and $x_j$ denote the realized number of uncommitted voters voting for, say, the Republican candidate. Given their assumptions (including that, in each state, candidates match allocations and committed voters are evenly divided), a candidate's plurality in proportionate terms, $(2x_j-n_j)/N_j$, is normally distributed with zero mean and standard deviation $\sigma=\sqrt{n_j}/N_j$. Clearly, if $n_j=CN_j$, $\sigma=\sqrt{C/N_j}$, which decreases as $N_j$ increases and thus $E|(2x_j-n_j)/N_j|=\sigma\sqrt{2/\pi}$ decreases as well. Brams and Davis then state that the regression results we report in Table 4 confirm this consequence of their model and that they wished "all critics were so charitable with the ammunition they provide their adversaries." Indeed, a superficial examination of the data and of their model's implications supports their argument. In Table 1 we report, for the two competitive elections in our study, the average value of $|Pl_j|$ and the standard deviation of $Pl_j$. For both elections, $|Pl_j|$ and $\sigma$ are greater in smaller states (defining "small" to be those states with fewer than nine electoral votes, which approximately divides the sample). Furthermore, as we show in our essay, $|Pl_j|$ does tend to decrease with the square root of electoral vote.

Their model, however, not only predicts that $\sigma$ decreases with $N_j$ but, given $n_j$, it also renders a prediction about the magnitude of $\sigma$. This consequence should also be tested lest we accept their model when the true cause of variations derive from a different stochastic process.[1] Using the data in Table 1 to estimate $n_j$ for small states, we obtain:

$$\hat{n}_j^{1/2}/N_j=\hat{\sigma}>.1$$

or

$$\hat{n}_j>.01N_j^2.$$

For even the small state of Nevada, however, $N_j>100{,}000$, so that $\hat{n}_j$ must be at least as great as .01 times $(10^5)^2$ or 100,000,000. (Alternatively, if we use $|Pl_j|$ to estimate $n_j$, we get

**Table 1. Average $|Pl_j|$ and $\sigma$ for Large vs. Small States**

| | Large States | | Small States | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Average $|Pl_j|$ | $\sigma_{Pl_j}$ | Average $|Pl_j|$ | $\sigma_{Pl_j}$ |
| 1960 | .06 | .09 | .10 | .11 |
| 1968 | .07 | .10 | .14 | .12 |

---

[1] It is not difficult, in fact, to imagine a plethora of stochastic models that give rise to this relationship (and that also promise to be more consistent with the data). For example, suppose state $j$ consists of $R_j$ perfectly homogeneous *regions* of equal size that are populated wholly by Democrats, Republicans, or uncommitted voters. Let the character of each region be determined by a random draw from an infinite population, where $p_d$ $(p_r)$ denotes the probability that the region is Democratic (Republican). If uncommitted voters are as likely to vote for one candidate as the other, it follows that the Democrat's proportionate expected plurality equals $E(Pl_j^d)=(p_d-p_r)$ while the standard deviation of $Pl_j^d$ equals $\sigma=[1+p_d-p_r)(1+p_r-p_d)]^{1/2}/R_j^{1/2}$. Thus, if $R_j$ is proportional to the state's size, $\sigma$ again decreases with the square root of $N_j$. We are not, of course, proposing this model to explain observed variations in $|Pl_j|$—we require a more sophisticated probability model dealing, perhaps, with mobility patterns and socialization. What we seek to show, however, is that an inverse relationship between $|Pl_j|$ and $N_j$ is a likely consequence of most simple (and perhaps more complex) probability models, and, hence, its confirmation should not be particularly exciting. An adequate model of campaigning must account, additionally, for the magnitudes of $|Pl_j|$ and $\sigma$.

$\hat{n}_j > 225{,}000{,}000$.) Thus, *to accommodate the observed variance of plurality with Brams and Davis's model, it must be assumed that there are more undecided voters in a small state than there are voters.*

Clearly, it is more reasonable to attribute the variations in plurality to violations of the assumption that committed voters are evenly divided. If, however, we seek to accommodate the data in Table 1, this explanation renders Brams and Davis's analysis incomplete or empirically irrelevant. To see this, let us compare the variance in plurality that we can attribute to their model to the variance we must attribute to the violation of their assumption. If uncommitted voters constitute, for example, ten per cent of the state's voters (i.e., $n_j = .1N_j$), then $\sigma = \sqrt{.1N_j}/N_j = 1/\sqrt{10N_j}$. Even for states as small as Nevada (i.e., $N_j \cong 100{,}000$), however, $\sigma = .001$, which is about one hundred times smaller than the observed standard deviation. Thus, given their other assumptions, we must attribute virtually all observed variations in plurality to violations of their assumption.[2]

But, if we do so, Brams and Davis's analysis provides us, at best, with either a null or an incomplete model. As a null model, though, it possesses a critical approximation that we now see diverges significantly from reality. Thus, there is little justification for their empirical analysis and their argument that the correlational data on trips provide "a rather convincing case . . . for the general applicability of the 3/2's rule . . . ."[3] Alternatively, if the model is intended to account for observed allocation patterns (which clearly is their intention), it is an incomplete formulation. As Brams and Davis themselves note in their general discussion, if candidates believe that committed voters are not evenly divided in every state "the most attractive targets by far for campaign allocations . . . will be those states in which committed voters are split roughly 50–50."[4] We do not know what solution to the election game Brams and Davis might derive should they attempt to modify their assumption about committed voters. They recognize, nevertheless, that the modification suggested by Table 1 will affect allocations thus: "Insofar as polls indicate the largest states to be toss-up states, candidates who act on this information . . . will magnify even the large state bias of the 3/2's rule."[5] That this magnification does not appear in their analysis of the data (see their Table 3) should suggest to them that their model provides a less than satisfactory account of reality.

The essence of the argument over competitiveness should now be evident. In their comment, Brams and Davis define competitiveness in *ex post* terms—a *consequence* of a particular stochastic structure and the "$\sqrt{n_j}$ factor." Our analysis, however, focuses *explicitly* on an *ex ante* notion of competitiveness vis our stated intention of incorporating the logic of such advice as: when planning a campaign, "identify the states you and your opponent are certain to carry and focus your attention on the remaining (competitive) states."[6] And the fact is, no consideration is given in the derivation of the 3/2's rule to such *ex ante* notions of competitiveness. Since they clearly note (in their essay) the failure of the 3/2's model to accommodate the initial biases of states and since the explicit intent of our essay is, in part, to estimate the extent to which these biases account for greater than proportional allocations, we must conclude that Brams and Davis either misunderstand the consequences of their assumptions or that they prefer to ignore the empirical world.

Turning to their second assertion, we agree that the 3/2's model is parsimonious and that parsimony is no vice. But we must ask: At what price is parsimony achieved? Aside from the assumption that uncommitted voters are evenly divided, three additional assumptions and their consequences reveal that price and why we chose in our essay to examine the data more closely and regard the 3/2's rule as suspect.

The particular assumptions that concern us are: (1) the candidates possess equal budgets, $R = D$; (2) the candidates match allocations in each state, $r_j = d_j$ for all $j$, and; (3) the probability that an uncommitted voter votes for, say, the Republican candidate equals the resources allocated by the candidate to that state divided by the resources allocated to that state by both candidates, $p_j = r_j/(r_j + d_j)$.

---

[2] Alternatively, suppose that we attribute $y$ per cent of the variation in $Pl_j$ to violations of the matching hypothesis. Then even if $n_j = N_j/2$, a value for $y$ as low as 10 (per cent) presupposes that the candidates shifted their resources out of the local equilibrium region of the 3/2's rule in those states with $|Pl_j| \geq .05$ (a majority). That is, to accommodate ten per cent of .05 or more, it must be the case that $|2p_j - 1|/2 > .05(.1)$, i.e., either $p_j < .495$ or $p_j > .505$. It is straightforward to show, however, that the small deviations from matching that raise $p_j$ to .505 in general lie outside the local equilibrium region.

[3] Steven J. Brams and Morton D. Davis, "The 3/2's Rule in Presidential Campaigning," *American Political Science Review*, 68 (March, 1974), 126.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 132.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 131.

[6] Admittedly, our measure of competitiveness is *ex post*, owing to the unavailability of *ex ante* data. We do not regard this as serious, however, since it seems reasonable to assume that resources such as trips affect the biases of states less than those biases affect trips (see our note #18). Ideally, of course, we would prefer an *ex ante* measure such as the opinions of the candidates themselves as their campaigns commence.

The first assumption is, admittedly, a reasonable and convenient starting point for modeling election competition, and it is, after all, a simple consequence of assumption (2). We note it here, however, to reveal the devastating sensitivity of Brams and Davis's analysis to it. Specifically, *not only is $R = D$ sufficient for the existence of a local equilibrium, but the approximate equality of budgets, given their other assumptions, is necessary for such equilibria.*[7] For example, if each $n_j$ is on the order of 100 and $.98 > R/D$ or $R/D > 1.02$, even local equilibria cannot exist (and for larger $n_j$, $R/D$ must more closely approximate 1). This renders their model almost wholly useless empirically. Since theoretical assumptions are never

---

[7] To see this we use Brams and Davis's original method of proof: Steven J. Brams and Morton D. Davis, “Resource-Allocation Models in Presidential Campaigning: Implications for Democratic Representation” *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, 219 (November, 1973), 105–123. Evaluating, as they do, the rate of change in the Republican's expected electoral vote with respect to $r_i$ $(dW_r/dr_i)$ at the point.

$$r_i = a + \epsilon; \qquad r_j = b - \epsilon$$
$$d_i = \alpha_i a; \qquad d_j = \alpha_j b,$$

and letting

$$(1) \qquad K_i = \frac{v_i\sqrt{n_i}}{(1+\alpha_i)a\sqrt{2\pi}}\left[\frac{2\sqrt{\alpha_i}}{1+\alpha_i}\right]^{n_i};$$

$$K_j = \frac{v_j\sqrt{n_j}}{(1+\alpha_j)b\sqrt{2\pi}}\left[\frac{2\sqrt{\alpha_j}}{1+\alpha_j}\right]^{n_j},$$

we obtain (ignoring all higher order terms in $\varepsilon$),

$$(2) \qquad \frac{dW_r}{dr_i} = [K_i - K_j] - \epsilon\left\{K_i\left[\frac{n_i+1}{(1+\alpha_i)a} - \frac{n_i}{2a}\right] + K_j\left[\frac{n_j+1}{(1+\alpha_j)b} - \frac{n_j}{2b}\right]\right\}.$$

Thus, $(a, b)$ is a local maximum for the Republican only if $K_i$ equals $K_j$, i.e., only if $dW_r/dr_i = 0$ for $\varepsilon = 0$ (note that if $\alpha_i = \alpha_j = 1$, expressions (1) and (2) reduce to those seen in the original derivation of the 3/2's rule). The second condition for a local maximum at $(a, b)$ is that $dW_r/dr_i < 0$ for $\varepsilon > 0$ and $dW_r/dr_i > 0$ for $\varepsilon < 0$. Setting $K_i = K_j$, this condition is satisfied (after some rearranging of terms) if and only if

$$(3) \qquad \frac{n_i + 2 - n_i\alpha_i}{(1+\alpha_i)a} + \frac{n_j + 2 - n_j\alpha_j}{(1+\alpha_j)b} \geq 0.$$

Repeating the analysis for the Democrat by letting

$$d_i = \alpha_i a + \eta; \qquad d_j = \alpha_j b - \eta$$
$$r_i = a; \qquad r_j = b,$$

we find that $(\alpha_i a, \alpha_j b)$ is a local maximum for him if and only if $K_i = K_j$, and

$$(4) \qquad \frac{(n_i+2)\alpha_i - n_i}{(1+\alpha_i)a\alpha_i} + \frac{(n_j+2)\alpha_j - n_j}{(1+\alpha_j)b\alpha_j} \geq 0.$$

Thus, a sufficient condition for $[d = (\alpha_i a, \alpha_j b), r = (a, b)]$, to be a local equilibrium in the game-theoretic sense is,

$$(5) \qquad 1 + \frac{2}{n_i} \geq \alpha_i \geq \frac{n_i}{n_i + 2} \qquad \text{for all } i.$$

To show now that this is, for all practical purposes, a necessary condition, note that if $1 + 2/n_i < \alpha_i$ or $\alpha_i < n_i/(n_i + 2)$ for two or more states, a local equilibrium cannot exist. There remains, then, two possibilities. First, condition (5) is satisfied for all states but one; second, condition (5) is satisfied for all but two states, with $\alpha > 1 + 2/n$ in one state and $\alpha < n/(n+1)$ in the other. Suppose state $j$ satisfies the condition and, in particular (to avoid excessive algebra) let $\alpha_j = n_j/(n_j + 2)$ so that, from condition (4), $\alpha_i$ must satisfy $\alpha_i \geq n_i/(n_i + 2)$. Using the fact that $K_i = K_j$, expression (3) now requires that

$$\frac{n_i+2}{n_i}\left\{1 + \frac{4n_i^{3/2}\left[\dfrac{2\sqrt{\alpha_i}}{1+\alpha_i}\right]^{n_i}}{n_i n_j^{3/2}\left[\dfrac{2\sqrt{\alpha_j}}{1+\alpha_j}\right]^{n_j}}\right\} > \alpha_i$$

This expression is readily reduced by noting that the maximum value of

$$[2\sqrt{\alpha_i}/(1+\alpha_i)]^{n_i}$$

is one and that

$$[2\sqrt{\alpha_j}/(1+\alpha_j)]^{n_j},$$

equal in this instance to

$$[\sqrt{n_j(n_j+2)}/(n_j+1)]^{n_j},$$

increases as $n_j$ increases and closely approximates 1 for relatively small values of $n_j$ (e.g., for $n_j = 12$, it equals .968). Adding without proof the condition for $\alpha_j = 1 + 2/n_j$, we conclude that in the one or two remaining states, the maximum admissable bounds on $\alpha_i$ are,

$$(9) \qquad \left[\frac{n_i+2}{n_i}\right]\Gamma > \alpha_i > \left[\frac{n_i}{n_i+2}\right]\Gamma^{-1} \quad \text{for all } j \neq$$

where $\Gamma = [1 + 4(n_i/n_j)^{3/2}/n_i]$. Note, however, that the bounds on $\alpha_i$ must hold for all $j \neq i$, in which case the maximum value presently for $[n_i/n_j]^{3/2}$ is about 2. Clearly, then, the second term in the expression for $\Gamma$ is, for reasonable values of $n_i$, several orders of magnitude smaller than one. Thus, we can set $\Gamma = 1$ and approximate condition (6) simply by condition (5). To ascertain, then, the maximum admissable discrepancy between $R$ and $D$, assume that $D > R$ and $\alpha_i = 1 + 2/n_i$ for all $i$. Since $D = \Sigma r_i[1 + 2/n_i] = R + 2\Sigma(r_i/n_i)$ and $r_i \approx Rn_i^{3/2}/\Sigma n_i^{3/2}$, the necessary and sufficient condition for a local equilibrium is,

$$\frac{D}{R} \leq 1 + \frac{2\sum n_i^{1/2}}{\sum n^{3/2}}$$

For example, then, if all $n_i$'s are on the order of 10,000, a local equilibrium exists if and only if $0.9998 \leq D/R \leq 1.0002$!

satisfied perfectly in reality, in testing our models or in using them for the design of systems we assume that they provide approximate answers if assumptions are only satisfied approximately. We ask, in fact, that this be demonstrably true. In Brams and Davis's model, however, it is demonstrably false. That is, their model does not imply that if $R=D+\Delta$, allocations should abide approximately by the 3/2's rule; rather, it implies complete disequilibrium, i.e., there are no "reference points" for candidates and hence no predictions about strategies. Unless we accept the assumption, then, that the candidates believed they possessed identical budgets in terms of time or trips, Brams and Davis's empirical analysis is invalid. Since in 1960, '64, '68, or '72, the candidates did not take the same total number of trips or spend the same amount of time on total trips, their model as presently constituted provides no explanation for observed allocation patterns.

Let us return, nevertheless, to the special case of $R=D$ and to the assumption that $r_j=d_j$. Brams and Davis argue strongly in their essay and in their comment for a game-theoretic analysis of campaigning. By imposing such an assumption and by hypothesizing that local equilibria serve as "reference points," however, they depart significantly from that theory. *Even in a static analysis there is no reason to suppose, given the explicit structure of their model, that candidates abide by $r_j=d_j$ or that local equilibria serve any special strategic function.* If a candidate believes that his opponent's strategy is based on such an assumption, then a rational candidate acts on his belief and abides by some other rule. If Brams and Davis possess some psychological model demonstrating that local equilibria are "reference points," we wish they would make that model explicit.

We might not object so strongly to assumption 2 and to the hypothesis that local equilibria are "solutions" to the election game, however, were it not for the implications of assumption 3. If the local equilibrium is unique (which 3/2's appears to be) and if reasonable deviations from it do not advantage a candidate considerably, we cannot exclude the possibility that some plausible set of behavioral heuristics justify Brams and Davis's approach. The problem is that the 3/2's rule seems too sensitive to small deviations for any such justification. To see this, suppose that $d_j=1$ and that the candidate sets $r_j=d_j+\delta$. His probability of carrying state $j$, $\pi_j$, depends now on $n_j$ and the sign and magnitude of $\delta$. Specifically, $\pi_j=\Pr[x_j/n_j>.5]$, where $x_j/n_j$ is (for sufficiently large $n_j$) normally distributed with mean $p_j=(1+\delta)/(2+\delta)$ and standard deviation $[p_j(1-p_j)/n_j]^{1/2}$. By way of example, assume that the candidate increases his allocation over his opponent by one per cent (i.e., $\delta=.01$), so that the mean of $x_j/n_j$ increases from .50 to .5024. Suppose further that the state possesses 12 electoral votes and, say, 200,000 uncommitted voters (i.e., $n_j\approx.1N_i$). The standard deviation of $x_j/n_j$, then, is approximately .0011. Thus, $\pi_j$ equals the probability that the realization of a normal random variable is less than its mean by about 2.2 standard deviations, or $\pi_j\cong.99$. In state $j$, then, the candidate realizes a net gain of 5.9 expected electoral votes (12 times .99 less the original expectation of 6). Of course, this 1 per cent increase in resources must come from somewhere. Clearly, the candidate can extract those resources from a state with, say, 5 electoral votes, lose that state with near certainty (i.e., decrease his expectation from 2.5 to 0 votes), and thereby realize an overall net expected gain of 3.4 electoral votes, Hence, if the candidate possesses a budget of $10,000,000, he can upset the "equilibrium" of the 3/2's rule simply by shifting $1,900 (since, under the 3/2's rule he should allocate approximately 1.9 per cent of his budget to states with twelve electoral votes) from Nebraska to Missouri. Should this gain seem small, we note that by increasing his California allocation by 1 per cent—about $15,000—and by reducing, say, his Vermont allocation to zero, the candidate can realize a net expected gain of 21 electoral votes.[8] Such are the stability properties of the 3/2's rule.

Turning to Brams and Davis's final critique of our essay, let us state at the outset that we also prefer a game-theoretic analysis of election competition—provided that the analysis possesses at least a few reasonable properties. We felt at the outset—for the reasons we detail here—that their model did not satisfy this criterion. Admittedly, though, we are unaware of a more reasonable and sufficiently interesting yet tractable model (which, of course, doesn't mean that such a model cannot exist, but only that we have not found or formulated one ourselves). Thus, we chose instead to focus on the data and search for some partial hypotheses about the patterns we observe there while admitting the possibility that candidates abide by a 3/2's rule. Our hope is that these hypotheses might serve as a guide to the formulation of a more complete and empirically plausible

[8] One objection to this example, perhaps, is that we choose $n_j$ too large and that if we let $n_j\simeq.01N_j$ or $.001N_j$, the 3/2's allocation rule is less unstable (although a 1 per cent increase in Missouri's budget at the expense of Vermont remains advantageous even if there are as few as 4,000 uncommitted voters in Missouri). To repeat our earlier argument, however, the problem is that for smaller values of $n_j$, the model is less able to accommodate the apparent biases of states. Thus, the model is either irrelevant or incomplete from a practical perspective or the instability of a 3/2's rule vitiates its function as a "reference point."

model. Our formal analysis, on the other hand, does not seek to justify "explicit allocation rules but rather [is intended] as a guide to the analysis of the data." Specifically, that analysis proposes only to reveal the kinds of assumptions one might need to justify a particular but straightforward specification of an estimatable statistical model. In this way we intend "to render our empirical analysis less ad hoc and its implicit assumptions more evident."

Brams and Davis, nevertheless, seem seriously to misinterpret our analysis. It is not our hypothesis that candidates act as if the productivity of larger states increases as the campaign proceeds (although that may be true for particular states), but that the candidates perceive different budget constraints at various stages of the campaign. Thus, while the concept of a corner solution might partially explain greater than proportional allocations, this concept coupled with the hypothesis that candidates modify their campaigns in midstream without fully anticipating the necessity for doing so initially, provides an additional reason for anticipating disproportionate allocations to larger or more competitive states. We offer, then, a modest conclusion: A reasonable factor to consider when formulating models of campaign resource allocation is the interactive effect of budget and replanning.[9]

Clearly, we cannot offer this as even an approximately complete explanation for observed allocations patterns and, thus, we are not prepared to pontificate on the issue of Electoral College reform. We feel, of course, that our essay contributes to that debate, but we see the necessity for more complete analyses. We hope, however, that an analysis intended to guide or justify a constitutional amendment contains assumptions that have some basis in fact.

---

[9] Brams and Davis's objection to the statement (in our *abstract*) that "the unit rule . . . is the predominant cause of bias" is legitimate. We perhaps overstated the case there, however, in satisfying the restrictions on an abstract's length. We suggest that they read the conclusion to our *essay* for a more complete account of our argument, which is simply that "even without weighted voting we should anticipate some variation in resource allocations" across units.

# On Anarchism In An Unreal World: Kramnick's View of Godwin and the Anarchists

JOHN P. CLARK
*Loyola University, New Orleans*

In the past few years, interest in anarchism as both a political movement and as a philosophical position has grown considerably. In connection with this increased interest in anarchism, there has been renewed study of the important theorists in the history of libertarian thought. This trend is continued by Isaac Kramnick's article in the *American Political Science Review* entitled "On Anarchism and the Real World: William Godwin and Radical England."[1] In that article he attempts to deal with the ideas of Godwin, one of the most important though neglected of these anarchist thinkers, and to relate both his thought, and anarchist thought in general, to social and political realities. Kramnick's article should be of interest to students of anarchist theory, since although it involves a quite serious misinterpretation of both Godwin and anarchism, it differs considerably from the standard arguments against the libertarian position.

### Kramnick's View of Godwin

Kramnick clearly makes a correct analysis of a number of aspects of Godwin's thought. He does, as Kramnick claims, have a great faith in reason and the power of education as a means toward social change. He is, in a sense, an elitist, in that he believes that the enlightened segment of society, the intelligentsia, must bear the major responsibility for spreading truth to the great majority who are still under the spell of society's authoritarian institutions. He is also an extreme gradualist, and rejects the use of force as an effective tool for social progress. And his description of the ideal society toward which we must move is, indeed, utopian, although he admits that this ideal is not one which can be achieved either easily or quickly.

Although he points out these important elements in Godwin's thought, Kramnick also makes a number of additional claims which are indefensible (and some of which are, in fact, hardly defended in the article). An instance is his interpretation of Godwin's views toward politics. In Kramnick's opinion, Godwin's reliance on education leads him to a complete rejection of political activity. According to Kramnick, Godwin "despised politics and the pursuit of change through political activity" (p. 114). It is true that Godwin did not see political action as the ultimate answer to society's ills. Yet, as is made quite clear in *Political Justice*, Godwin does see a political system for the present as a necessary evil, and he defends a type of decentralized democracy as the least evil form of government.[2] This qualified acceptance of democracy would imply that Godwin fell somewhat short of "despising" political activity. Nor was this limited sanction of political action purely theoretical for Godwin. If Kramnick's interpretation were correct, we would expect Godwin to rely wholly on the gradual diffusion of knowledge, and to shun political involvement. But this is not what happened in "the real world." Godwin was aware of the existence of political power, and he believed that the libertarian can legitimately seek to defend freedom through an alliance with the less authoritarian political alternative. As Burton Pollin notes in *Education and Enlightenment in the Works of William Godwin*, this meant for Godwin support for the Whig Party, with which he consistently sided "from about 1780 on. . . . "[3] Several avowals of support for that party by Godwin have been recorded, as for example his statement that the Whigs were "of the highest value to the public welfare, and constituted the party to which a liberal-minded and enlightened man would adhere."[4] In view of such evidence, Kramnick's description of Godwin's attitude toward political activity proves hopelessly inadequate.

---

[1] Isaac Kramnick, "On Anarchism and the Real World: William Godwin and Radical England," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (March 1972), 114–128. All successive references to that article will be given in the text of this paper.

[2] William Godwin, *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice*, F. E. L. Priestley, ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1946), Vol. II, Book V, chaps. XIV, XXII, XXIII, XXIV. Godwin discusses democracy as a necessary stage toward a noncoercive society, in view of the "institutions by which [man] has been corrupted," p. 210.

[3] Burton Pollin, *Education and Enlightenment in the Works of William Godwin* (New York: Las Americas, 1962), p. 172. Pollin notes that Godwin was able to support the Whigs both during his more radical period in the 1790s, and also as he became more conservative in his later career. This was possible because of the moderation of the Whigs' own position in the early nineteenth century.

[4] Quoted from a letter to H. B. Rosser in Charles Kegan Paul, *William Godwin: His Friends and Contemporaries* (London: Henry S. King and Co., 1876), Vol. II, p. 263.

One of Kramnick's major criticisms is that Godwin's philosophical position leads to what Kramnick pictures as a betrayal of the forces of reform. What the argument purports to show is that Godwin, and presumably all anarchists, though radical in theory, turn out to be conservative in practice. It must be pointed out, first, that if Kramnick could demonstrate that Godwin was, in fact, a traitor to the cause of reform, this would not present much evidence that such a betrayal is typical of anarchists in general, who, for the most part, differ considerably from Godwin in both theory and practical proposals. A careful study of the evidence, however, shows that Kramnick's contention is not true even of Godwin, and that his allegations that Godwin "was by no means a friend of reform," and that he "sided with Pitt in the repression of the English Jacobins" (p. 115), are entirely without basis. His evidence is presented through a highly selective use of quotations from Godwin's *Considerations on Lord Grenville's and Mr. Pitt's Bills.*[5] The passages chosen and the interpretation given to them indicate that Kramnick misunderstood Godwin's position on the issues of freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and that he failed miserably to grasp Godwin's strategy in the pamphlet.

Godwin begins the *Considerations* with a discussion of government. He notes that a more localized system of government would require little use of force, but that governments having power over great numbers of people and large areas necessarily tend to become more complex and coercive.[6] This point should be interpreted within the context of Godwin's thought as a whole. He is not advocating such a complex and coercive form of government, but rather explaining that if society does not choose the more desirable alternative of decentralized government, problems will result which call for greater governmental action. To Godwin, the most important task for government in a complex society is the maintenance of order. Beyond this, as he states in the pamphlet, people can provide for themselves.[7] When government expands beyond this function, it quickly becomes a tool for creating and perpetuating injustices and exploitation.

Godwin saw, at the time of his writing the *Considerations*, two threats to the preservation of that order which he felt necessary for social progress. On the one hand, he had some degree of apprehension that if the political innovators should succeed in overturning the established order, excesses similar to those of the recent French Revolution might result. On the other hand (and this was his greater fear), he saw a threat that if the innovators should fail in their attempts, a period of repressive reaction might follow. Because of these apprehensions, Godwin sought in the pamphlet to convince radicals to become more moderate in their methods of seeking reform, to convince the public that repressive legislation is undesirable, and to convince the government that repression is unnecessary. The first of his purposes involved an attack on the actions of the London Corresponding Society. This attack may suffer from some of the faults which Kramnick cites. Godwin's elitism is evident, for instance, in his warning of the danger of large assemblies in which "persons of eminence, distinction, and importance"[8] are not present. His gradualism seems to go to excessive lengths when he requires that for reform "public sentiment must become . . . unequivocal" with "a grand and magnificent harmony expanding itself through the whole community."[9] Furthermore, Godwin probably overstates his case against the possibility that truth can be communicated "to a mixed and crowded audience."[10] Finally, he may well have exaggerated the chances that the activities of the London Corresponding Society might have led to results similar to conditions in France.[11]

Yet none of this means, as Kramnick claims, that Godwin was opting for the side of Pitt, Grenville, and repression. If one reads only the first fourth of the pamphlet, which consists largely of Godwin's criticism of the London Corresponding Society, one might get this impression. And oddly enough, it is only this portion of the text to which Kramnick refers. But shortly after the last passage quoted by Kramnick, Godwin begins a wholehearted attack on Grenville's and Pitt's bills.[12] While Kramnick claims that Godwin supported Pitt in his attack on "freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of the press" (p. 125), Godwin in fact proclaims in the pamphlet that freedom of assembly is "one of the grand characteristics of English liberty,"[13] and that freedom of the press is "the most important of all human affairs,"[14] and "the most sacred of all human functions."[15] He sees Grenville's bill as a grave threat to these freedoms. He fears that the vagueness of the alleged crimes referred to in the bill will permit it to be used for political persecution at the whim of the government.[16] He judges such a bill as "a remedy ten times larger than the evil in question."[17] Far from becoming a party to the proposed despotism, Godwin attacks the bill as "the consecrated engine of tyranny; . . . the open and avowed enaction of an arbitrary power,"[18] and he spends twenty-eight pages in his detailed attack on the provisions of the bill.

---

[5] William Godwin, *Considerations on Lord Grenville's and Mr. Pitt's Bills Concerning Treasonable and Seditious Practices and Unlawful Assemblies* (London: J. Johnson, 1795). For the sake of accuracy, it should be noted that Kramnick incorrectly dates the pamphlet as 1796, and fails to mention the publisher. Godwin notes in his diary that it was published November 21, 1795, and Burton Pollin's exhaustive work (with 3379 entries) *Godwin Criticism: A Synoptic Bibliography* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967) lists no other editions. It might also be remarked that of Kramnick's four footnotes concerning the *Considerations,* three involve incorrect page citations, and one omits reference to the page cited.

[6] *Considerations,* pp. 2–3.

[7] *Ibid.,* p. 7.

[8] *Ibid.,* p. 14.

[9] *Ibid.,* p. 17.

[10] *Ibid.* However, Godwin's argument that political oratory usually deteriorates into *ad hominem* argument seems well taken.

[11] But then again, Godwin may have been aware of more violent intentions on the part of the Society than Kramnick seems willing to admit. F. E. L. Priestley, in his introduction to *Political Justice,* cites evidence presented by W. P. Hall indicating that members of the Society had plans for violent rebellion and had engaged in "the actual manufacture of weapons." *Political Justice,* Vol. III, p. 51.

Godwin's criticism of Pitt's bill is almost as vehement as his criticism of Grenville's. He calls the measure "a direct attack upon the most essential provision of the Bill of Rights, the provision, that authorizes the inhabitants of Great Britain, to consult respecting their grievances, and to demand redress."[19] He willingly concedes that some such assemblies might lead to violence, but cautions that "to prohibit them from assembling, may lead to the same thing in a worse form."[20] His animadversion is most strongly directed against the requirement that a government official with power to silence discussion must be present at all political meetings. He contends of such a stipulation that "it is improbable that a greater insult was ever put upon any thing appearing in human form. . . ."[21] He calls the exercise of such power a "mockery"[22] which puts people in the most "slavish" condition imaginable.[23] Godwin feels that this particular provision of Pitt's bill sufficiently exhibits its dangerousness, and he declines to discuss additional aspects which would only further "detect Pitt's sterility, and uncover his nakedness."[24]

Godwin concludes the pamphlet with an argument which shows that repression, rather than too hasty innovation, was the major cause of his apprehension. He states that there is, indeed, no reason for the government to propose harsh laws to deal with the London Corresponding Society. Either the Society would act rashly and prematurely, without convincing the great majority of the correctness of its views, or it would ultimately bring a large proportion of the society over to its side. In the former case, the Society would have no hope of success, and could easily be put down like any other "mere tumult of sedition."[25] In the latter situation, it would have to progress in an orderly fashion and take years to accomplish its purpose. The possibility of the use of force in the distant future would also not require repressive legislation.[26] Godwin hoped, in fact, that the Society's members would moderate their position, since he believed that reform could and would be accomplished, without violence, through the further growth of those "more liberal principles of freedom" which "deeply . . . struck their root into the soil of Britain" and "widely . . . diffused themselves."[27] The government, he says, cannot successfully contain change, for "reform must come. It is a restless tide; and, if we endeavor to keep it out too long, it will overwhelm us."[28]

It must be concluded that, although Kramnick can quite legitimately dispute the validity of Godwin's gradualism, his claims that Godwin "was by no means a friend of reform," and that he "sided with Pitt in the repression of the English Jacobins" (p. 115) are found to be entirely unsupportable.[29]

### Kramnick's View of Anarchism

Kramnick attempts in his article to show that many of the characteristics which he attributes, often falsely, to Godwin, are also typical of anarchists in general. An example is his contention that "what replaces politics for the anarchist is either education or theater" (p. 114). Godwin is taken as an exemplar of the former anarchist approach, and Jerry Rubin and Abbie Hoffman, as cases of the latter. In view of the variety of methods used by anarchists, and particularly because of the relative insignificance of "theater" as an anarchist tactic, the dilemma proposed by Kramnick constitutes a clear misrepresentation of the historical practice of anarchism. No discussion of anarchist practice can ignore the part played by anarchists in the Russian revolution and the Spanish Civil War. The former has been extensively documented by Paul Avrich,[30] while the latter has been described by numerous sympathetic observers from George Orwell to Noam Chomsky.[31] Daniel Guerin devotes half of his well-known book on anarchism to a discussion of anarchist methods of revolutionary struggle and agrarian and industrial organization in Russia, Spain, and Italy.[32] Nor can anarchist participation in the international syndicalist movement, and its support of the tactic of the general strike be overlooked.[33] Particularly in the United States, anarchists have also pursued their goals by means of participation in intentional communities, from the 19th century utopian settlements to the 20th century communes.[34] Finally, the strategy of nonviolent resistance has formed the core of numerous anarchist efforts, from that of Tolstoy and his followers in Russia,[35] to the Catholic Worker movement in the United States,[36] to the Sarvodaya movement in India.[37] An almost endless list of examples could be given. But the point is obvious: Kramnick's assertion that anarchist praxis has been limited to education and theater is simply false and betrays an unpardonable ignorance of anarchism for one who ventures to write critically on the subject.

---

[12] Kramnick's apparent obliviousness to the bulk of Godwin's discussion makes one wonder if he somehow got hold of a defective copy of the text, in which somewhat over 60 of its 89 pages were omitted. He cites nothing past page 22.

[13] *Considerations,* p. 23.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] *Ibid.,* p. 25.

[16] *Ibid.,* p. 27.

[17] *Ibid.,* p. 28.

[18] *Ibid.,* p. 30.

[19] *Ibid.,* p. 52.

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] *Ibid.,* p. 55.

[22] *Ibid.,* p. 56.

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] *Ibid.,* p. 58.

[25] *Ibid.,* p. 72.

[26] *Ibid.,* p. 73.

[27] *Ibid.,* p. 86.

[28] *Ibid.,* p. 80.

[29] Kramnick's article is not the first case of such a glaring distortion of Godwin's position on this issue, although it has the distinction of being the most detailed misinterpretation. As Pollin notes, M. Beer, in his *History of British Socialism,* makes the same error. Pollin, p. 211.

Kramnick's neglect of the history of anarchism leads him even further into error, as exemplified by his statement that the anarchist holds that freedom "cannot be realized through political methods and certainly not through popular or mass action" (p. 114). Most anarchists, it is true, think that political action is not a productive means of expanding freedom, although many, like Godwin, condone a temporary alliance with the more libertarian political faction. An obvious example is the coalition between anarchists and other leftist groups during the Spanish Civil War in which some anarchists went so far as to accept positions in the government.[38] But the glaring fallacy on Kramnick's part is his belief that anarchists oppose "popular or mass action." If he had been aware of the elements of anarchist practice which have been mentioned, or if he had investigated anarchist theory more carefully, he surely would have seen that most anarchists have considered large-scale voluntary organization of the people the foundation of social progress. Bakunin, for example, writes that the function of libertarian activists is to "foster the self-organization of the masses into autonomous bodies federated from the bottom upward."[39] According to Kropotkin, through anarchism "socialism must become *more popular*, more communalistic."[40] Anarcho-syndicalism, which has used as its main tactic the organization of large masses of workers and peasants, is the most obvious example of anarchist reliance on popular movements.[41] Kramnick thus ignores most of the history of the anarchist movement in formulating his generalities.

Another error in Kramnick's interpretation of anarchism is his allegation that it is elitist. After correctly noting that Godwin is, in a sense, an elitist, he hastily concludes that this characteristic is typical of anarchism as a whole. He contends that for "legions of future anarchists," as for Godwin, "the literary and intellectual elite" were "the only social group capable of the noble mission of moving society to its blissful future" (p. 127). There have, indeed, been anarchists since Godwin who have been elitists (though to describe them as "legions" is quite an exaggeration). But two important distinctions concerning this elitism must be made. First, the elitism of Godwin and those anarchists who have followed his example is an elitism of a peculiar sort. It consists primarily in a distinction between those members of society who are more enlightened concerning justice and political truth, and those who are less so. This distinction is, in itself, hardly worthy of criticism by anyone who accepts the existence of any sort of truth of which people can be aware to a greater or lesser degree. The charge of elitism seems to arise mainly because of the pessimism of these anarchists concerning the ability of the less enlightened to reach awareness of truth without the help of those who are fortunate enough to have perceived truth more adequately. This elitism, if it can be so called, may be invalid. And, in fact, it conflicts with the inclination of most anarchists, who have had great faith in the spontaneous growth of awareness on the part of the masses, without the help of the intellectual elite which Godwin valued so highly. But, in any case, this elitism should be distinguished from that which is commonly so designated. Elitism usually connotes the belief in social or political privilege for some group in society, and often implies the advocacy of coercion to maintain this privilege. Neither Godwin nor any other anarchist has ever been an elitist in this sense. Godwin's entire philosophy is, in fact, a plea for the creation of a social structure in which the barriers to the enlightenment and liberation of the masses will be removed, so that the equality which he firmly believed to be the natural condition of humanity could be realized.[42]

---

[30] Paul Avrich, *The Russian Anarchists* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967) and *The Anarchists in the Russian Revolution* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1973). It should also be noted that Peter Arshinov's work on Ukrainian anarchism, the *History of the Makhnovist Movement (1918–1921)*, which has been out of print since 1923, is again available (Detroit: Black and Red; and Chicago: Solidarity, 1974).

[31] See George Orwell, *Homage to Catalonia* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), and Noam Chomsky, *American Power and the New Mandarins* (New York: Pantheon, 1969), pp. 72–124. The latest addition to the literature on the Spanish Revolution is Sam Dolgoff's *The Anarchist Collectives: Workers' Self-management in the Spanish Revolution 1936–1939* (New York: Free Life Editions, 1974). Murray Bookchin's forthcoming two-volume history, *The Spanish Anarchists,* promises to be the definitive work on the subject.

[32] Daniel Guerin, *Anarchism: From Theory to Practice* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970).

[33] See Rudolf Rocker, *Anarcho-Syndicalism* (Indore, India: Modern Publishers, N.D.).

[34] For a good brief description of a 19th century community see "The Pattern of Life in an Individualist Anarchist Community" in Leonard Krimerman and Lewis Perry, *Patterns of Anarchy* (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, 1966), pp. 312–323. For the anarchist elements in the counter-cultural milieu of which today's communes are a part, see Michael Lerner's "Anarchism and the American Counter-Culture" in *Anarchism Today,* David Apter and James Joll, eds. (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor, 1972), pp. 41–69, and Richard Fairfield's *Communes USA* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1971).

[35] See, for example, Tolstoy's writings *On Civil Disobedience And Non-Violence* (New York: Signet, 1968).

[36] See Ammon Hennacy, "The One-Man Revolution," and Dorothy Day, "The Green Revolution," in Krimerman and Perry, pp. 364–378.

[37] See Geoffrey Ostergaard, "Indian Anarchism: The Sarvodaya Movement" in Apter and Joll, pp. 169–190, and Geoffrey Ostergaard and Melville Currell, *The Gentle Anarchists: A Study of The Leaders of The Sarvodaya Movement for Non-Violent Revolution in India* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972).

[38] See George Woodcock, *Anarchism* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1963), especially pp. 368–370. Woodcock, however, considers this an unacceptable deviation from anarchist principles. It must be admitted that attempts by anarchists to form coalitions with authoritarian Marxists have usually ended in disaster—at least for the anarchists and the cause of human freedom.

[39] Sam Dolgoff, ed., *Bakunin On Anarchy* (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), p. 196.

[40] Roger Baldwin, ed., *Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets* (New York: Dover, 1970), p. 185. The italics are Kropotkin's.

[41] See Rocker, especially chap. 5, "The Methods of Anarcho-Syndicalism."

Misleading as Kramnick's discussion of the Godwinian form of elitism may be, his treatment of the subject leads to an even more serious problem. His exclusive attention to the type of elitism which forms part of the political theory of Godwin and a minority of anarchists obscures the very important fact that anarchists have, on the whole, consciously and specifically attempted to avoid the elitism which they found to be inherent in all other political positions. This is, in fact, the great point of dispute between anarchists and the followers of Marx. Whereas the authoritarian socialists would centralize authority, and establish an elite "vanguard" group to guide the people, anarchists settle for nothing less than participatory self-management by the communal and productive groups within society. Anarchist programs have, on the whole, been aimed at enabling people to learn to be free, not by following an elite, but by organizing and making decisions themselves.[43] It is this interest on the part of anarchists which has led them to participate so actively in the contemporary worker-control movement and free-school movement. It therefore seems paradoxical that Kramnick can characterize as elitist this most anti-elitist of all political theories. The solution to the enigma, however, lies in his rather equivocal use of the word *elite*, and in his tendency to attribute to anarchism as a whole qualities which apply to only part of the movement.

Although it is not necessary to discuss all the numerous inadequacies in Kramnick's interpretation of anarchism, one final difficulty merits attention, since it involves a particularly serious charge. Kramnick maintains, at the conclusion of his article, that anarchism has inherited from Godwin "its ultimate service to the status quo. . . . To the extent that change in political systems—either incremental or revolutionary—has and must come from political activity, there is little to fear from those who seek change but who eschew politics, be it for philosophic enlightenment or for theater" (p. 128).

First, it should be noted that Kramnick has stated his argument in the form of a tautology. He is making the unquestionable but uninformative statement that those changes which are caused by political activity cannot be caused by those who do not engage in political activity. But, of course, the real question is whether significant changes in society are caused primarily by political action. Anarchists hold that political activity, far from having a monopoly on effecting change in society, serves most often as a barrier to significant change. For Godwin, and for all anarchists, government, from its very nature as a supreme coercive authority, interferes with human autonomy. It conditions people to accept passively the determination of the conditions under which they live by externally constituted authority, and teaches them that they are incapable of providing for their needs through the exercise of reason and voluntary choice. At best, they say, government offers only a belated recognition of accomplished social change. But it continually acts to perpetuate values which are obsolete, and it results in a diversion of people's efforts from effective means toward change. Some anarchists, as has been noted, do not dogmatically abstain from participation in politics. Yet their participation is always reluctant, involves the recognition of the evils entailed by government, and includes little expectation of positive gains. Anarchists assert that the status quo can only be changed by a change in people's consciousness, a change in their behavior, and a change in social institutions. Since this change implies an end to authoritarianism, it therefore requires a continual contraction of the sphere of influence of government. Anarchism seeks to liberate society through reshaping individual personality characteristics, family structure, moral values, and economic, social, and political organization. It holds that predominant reliance on political activity as the means toward such change involves the hopeless contradiction of pursuing social reform through an institution, the existence of which is, to a large extent, the cause of the very problems which necessitate that reform.

---

[42] See *Political Justice,* Book I, chap. IV, "The Characters of Men Originate in their External Circumstances," in which Godwin establishes an epistemological basis for human equality.

[43] A good statement of the anarchist anti-elitist criticism of Marxism, taken from Bakunin's *Statism and Anarchy,* can be found in *Bakunin On Anarchy,* pp. 326–333.

Anarchists may, of course, be wrong in all these contentions. What is necessary, in order to find out if they are wrong, is an investigation of the evidence upon which they base their assertions concerning the effects of government and the causes of social change. Unfortunately, nothing of this sort is to be found in Kramnick's article. Instead there is only the assumption, which he makes not the slightest effort to support, that political activity is the proper mechanism through which to achieve reform.

# Comment on Clark's "On Anarchism in an Unreal World"

ISAAC KRAMNICK
*Cornell University*

Professor Clark has written an interesting, and certainly spirited, critique of my article of several years ago. My inclination is to let it stand for the broadside it is. I merely note three small caveats:

(1) Re: The disputed tract, *Considerations:* I chose to read the pamphlet with one emphasis, Professor Clark with another. I think both views are legitimate. Godwin is critical of both Pitt and Thelwall and Professor Clark is quite right in insisting that both sides should be reported. Godwin did criticize the government's legislation as a fundamental threat to the freedom of speech and assembly. This assault on the treason and sedition acts notwithstanding, what strikes one most in reading the pamphlet today is its outspoken condemnation of Thelwall. Defense of a free press and the right of assembly is, after all, by no means an unexpected position for a man to take who had in *Political Justice* opposed libel laws as unnecessary restrictions on speech and print, or who had just a few months earlier in his pamphlet *Censory Strictures* turned opinion against Chief Justice Eyre's charges to the jury in the English State Treason Trial. What was shocking to Thelwall (and is still, I think, to the modern reader) was that Godwin saw fit in addition to the rebuke of Pitt's repressive legislation to lash out at Thelwall and the L.C.S. What Thelwall didn't know and indeed what few have known until very recently is that two years earlier Godwin had already spoken out, albeit anonymously, against what he considered the disruptive radical associations. Only in the 1960s have the letters been attributed to him that Godwin wrote in January 1793 to *The Morning Chronicle.* Written at the very time he was finishing *Political Justice*, these earlier letters expressed the same position he would take in *The Considerations*—a plague on both your houses! He condemned the repressive excesses of Reeves and the Anti-Jacobins, but was equally critical of the radical associations, "the intemperate advocates of reform," whose methods of appealing to public opinion he characterized as "such instruments disgraceful to a civilized community."[1]

(2) Re: My thumbnail characterization of anarchists as fundamentally apolitical: I did not attempt to survey the history of anarchism as thought and movement. I am, however, quite aware of its rich and diverse history. My very brief asides on this subject were intended as speculative generalizations. Professor Clark disagrees with these views; so be it. I stand by my interpretation. That, I take it, is what we are all about in the world of scholarship.

(3) Re: The elitism of Godwin and of anarchists in general: Here, too, we simply disagree. Godwin and most anarchists do believe, I still contend, that certain individuals more adequately perceive truth than others. This is what I meant by elitism in my paper, not that anarchists seek the rule of a privileged group. Despite their numerous critiques of Marxists as authoritarian and despite the anti-intellectualism of Bakunin, Kropotkin, and others, anarchist sympathy for the masses often coexists, I think, with a basic disdain for ordinary mankind, often bordering on disgust.

This elitism is of course by no means the exclusive property of anarchists. They share it with many others. But they are not free of it. Emma Goldman, a not atypical anarchist, illustrates this sentiment well. The masses, she writes, have "suppressed the human voice, subdued the human spirit, chained the human body. As a mass its aim has always been to make life uniform, gray and monotonous as the desert."[2] On the other hand, "men towering high above such political pygmies, men of refinement, of culture, of ability are jeered into silence as mollycoddles."[3] That's what I had in mind.

---

[1] William Godwin, *Uncollected Writings 1785–1822,* edited by Marken and Pollin (Gainesville, Florida: Scholar's Facsimiles & Reprints, 1968), p. 115.

[2] Emma Goldman, *Anarchism and Other Essays* (New York: Dover Publications, 1969), p. 78.

[3] *Ibid.,* p. 74.

# Rejoinder to "Comment" by Isaac Kramnick

JOHN P. CLARK

(1) I agree entirely with Professor Kramnick on his point that Godwin's rejection of the methods of the London Corresponding Society seems strange to the modern reader. There seems to be a contradiction between his utopian social goals and his rejection (based on a concern for autonomy and individuality) of what most people, including most anarchists, would see as effective means of reaching these ends. This is, in fact, what makes Godwin so atypical an anarchist. His theory of social change gives little, if any, foundation for those activities which have historically constituted anarchist praxis.

My point was, however, that the ineffectiveness of Godwin's proposals for change does not point to the conclusion that he could in any case support governmental suppression of freedom of expression. In fact, his writings on the subject rank with those of Milton and Mill as among the most eloquent defenses of liberty of thought and expression in the history of English political thought. I note that Professor Kramnick now recognizes that Godwin's libertarianism on this issue was more than merely theoretical. Yet, the only meaning which could be attributed to his original claim that Godwin "sided with Pitt in the suppression of the English Jacobins"[1] is that Godwin supported the authoritarian measures proposed by the government.

Nor can I agree that Godwin's contemporaries could have been surprised by his opposition to the L.C.S. in 1795. Although many of his letters were written anonymously or under the pseudonym "Mucius," there was abundant evidence in the 1793 edition of *Political Justice* that he was an opponent of any hasty reform which was not preceded by a growth of enlightenment among the populace. This is noted by Professor Kramnick himself in his analysis of Godwin's position in *Political Justice*.[2]

(2) Professor Kramnick's claim in his original article that Godwin's position is representative of anarchism is a very important contention. As the title of that article implies, he was assessing Godwin's political position and using this assessment as evidence for the inadequacy of the anarchist viewpoint as a whole. Since anarchism is perhaps the most widely misunderstood of all social or political theories, I believe that such significant generalizations about its nature require some supporting evidence if they are to be helpful.

(3) Emma Goldman is an excellent example of the sort of individualism (leading to a kind of "elitism") which can be found in some (but certainly by no means all) varieties of anarchism. She is one of the most interesting and unusual figures in the history of anarchism, in large measure because of her synthesis of diverse traditions in libertarian thought. While she accepts the activism, egalitarianism, and theory of social organization of Kropotkin and the communist anarchists, she also inherits from thinkers like Stirner, Nietzsche, Thoreau, and Emerson a firm commitment to individuality and personal uniqueness. To note only one element in this synthesis is to distort her position. In the preface to *Anarchism and Other Essays* (the work cited by Kramnick), she comments that "the most disheartening tendency common among readers is to tear one sentence from a work, as a criterion of the writer's ideas or personality."[3] Thus, she suggests that some of her statements in "Minorities Versus Majorities" (the precise essay he quotes) will lead her to "be excommunicated as an enemy of the people," because she rejects "the mass as a creative factor."[4]

The quotations used in Professor Kramnick's "Comment" are somewhat misleading because they separate Goldman's individualism from the context of her egalitarianism. She attacks the submissiveness, inauthenticity, and conformity prevalent in mass society, and, more particularly, characteristic of bourgeois society of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. If this leads to a form of "elitism," it is important to note that it is not based on a belief in any inherent inequality of human beings. She asserts that the average person is quite capable of self-directed, rational action, when liberated from the dependence, subservience, and repression of self which are encouraged by certain social institutions. Her faith in the creative capacities of all is vividly expressed in her essay on "Francisco Ferrer and the Modern School."[5] She therefore sees her function as encouraging people to secede from the mass, and to form groups of autonomous, voluntarily cooperating individuals. It is true that she believes that some will come along in this process of liberation more quickly than others.

---

[1] Isaac Kramnick, "On Anarchism and the Real World: William Godwin and Radical England," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (March 1972), 115.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] Emma Goldman, *Anarchism and Other Essays* (New York: Dover, 1969), p. 44.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 49.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 149–150.

Finally, I will note that a brief but balanced treatment of the coexistence within anarchism of this sort of "elitism" on the one hand, and its populism and egalitarianism on the other, can be found in Guerin's book, in the sections entitled "Sources of Inspiration: The Individual" and "Sources of Inspiration: The Masses."[6]

---

[6] Daniel Guerin, *Anarchism: From Theory to Practice* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), pp. 27–38.

# APSA PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, 1975

# Charles Merriam, Max Weber, and the Search for Synthesis in Political Science

AVERY LEISERSON

# Introduction

SAMUEL C. PATTERSON
*University of Iowa*

We meet here today to hear the presidential address of a distinguished member of our Association, Professor Avery Leiserson. His professional life has spanned the era from the Depression and early New Deal through World War II and the "behavioral revolution," and now he is basking in the sunshine of the "postbehavioral era." Professor Leiserson was, in the days of the Great Depression, an undergraduate student at the University of Illinois, and then a graduate student at the University of Chicago, where he got his Ph.D. in 1941. At the University of Chicago, Leiserson came under the very profound influence of Charles E. Merriam, and along with his contemporaries—Harold Lasswell, Harold Gosnell, V. O. Key, Jr., Quincy Wright, Gabriel Almond, Herbert Simon, David Truman and others—carried the influence of Merriam, the founder of modern, behavioral political science, to universities and colleges across the land.

Just as other political scientists did, Leiserson worked for the government in the early days of the New Deal—for the National Recovery Administration, the National Labor Relations Board, and the National Defense Mediation Board. And, with many others, Avery Leiserson "went to Washington" during World War II, working with the Bureau of the Budget during the years 1942 to 1945. These years undoubtedly gave him a sense of the urgency of Merriam's teachings about the importance to political science of political reality. Through these years of the late 1930s and 1940s, he wrote about executive reorganization, administrative policy, and especially about the role of political interest groups in the administrative process.[1] His first book, *Administrative Regulation*, was published in 1942 by the University of Chicago Press.[2] In this study, Leiserson documented the importance of the group process in administration and illustrated the larger theme of greater realism in the portrayal of administrative behavior.

Although it was not his first academic appointment—since he served briefly before the war at Princeton University—in 1946 Professor Leiserson went back to the University of Chicago as a faculty member, and during the late 1940s and early 1950s he worked primarily upon supporting efforts to enrich research on public opinion and political opinion formation.[3] In 1952, he moved to his present academic location, Vanderbilt University, and during his years at Vanderbilt he served as departmental chairman, he was a Brookings Senior Scholar in 1962–63, and he was named Harvie Branscomb Distinguished Service Professor in 1966. While at Vanderbilt he wrote *Parties and Politics* (1958), coauthored *Government and Politics* (1966), and edited *The American South in the 1960s* (1965).[4]

Avery Leiserson has accumulated an impressive record of distinguished service to the profession of political science. In the 1950s, he was concerned to find ways to provide adequate support for research for a new generation of political scientists who carried on Merriam's commitment to systematic inquiry into political realities. He devoted great effort to the work of the Social Science Research Council. He was one of the early recipients of an SSRC grant while he was a graduate student. In 1950, he began fourteen years of service on the SSRC Committee on Political Behavior, and for three of those years he served on the SSRC Board of Directors. As a professor in a southern university, he served actively in the Southern Political Science Association, editing the *Journal of Politics* in the mid-1950s and serving as President of the Southern Association in the mid-1960s. His professional service to the American Political Science Association is long-standing. I first got briefly acquainted with Avery Leiserson when I went to a pre-convention, week-long conference in 1957 at Princeton University designed to launch young political scientists into productive careers. Leiserson was a conference leader, along with Austin Ranney and Earl Latham. He had just taken over the tasks of Book Review Editor for the *Review*. The subsequent high points of his service to the Association have, of course, been his election as Vice-President in 1966, as President-Elect in 1972, and his current year as President of the American Political Science Association.

---

[1] See his "Political Limitations on Executive Reorganization," *American Political Science Review*, 41 (February 1947), 68–74; and his chapters on "The Study of Public Administration," "Interest Groups in Administration," and "The Formulation of Administrative Policy," in *Elements of Public Administration*, ed. Fritz Morstein Marx (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1946), pp. 27–50, 314–338, 365–380.

[2] *Administrative Regulation: A Study in Representation of Interests* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942). Leiserson also contributed to the interest in the 1950s in the internal politics of private groups. See "Problems of Representation in the Government of Private Groups," *Journal of Politics*, 11 (August 1949), 566–577.

[3] See "Opinion Research and the Political Process," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 13 (Spring 1949), 31–38; and "Notes on the Theory of Political Opinion Formation," *American Political Science Review*, 47 (March 1953), 171–177.

[4] See *Parties and Politics: An Institutional and Behavioral Approach* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958); John C. Wahlke, Alex N. Dragnich, et al., *Government and Politics: An Introduction to Political Science*, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1971); and, *The American South in the 1960's* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964). Leiserson's opus on political parties was previewed by an article "The Place of Parties in the Study of Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 51 (December 1957), 943–954.

As I read the scholarly work of Avery Leiserson, I find four themes to be of greatest interest: (1) his interest in research methodology; (2) his concern about values; (3) his devotion to scientific inquiry; and (4) his emphasis on realism. This is not the place to recount President Leiserson's scholarly achievements in all of their subtlety. But his early and continuous interest in research methodology has influenced many of our contemporaries. I was especially influenced as a graduate student at the University of Wisconsin by Leiserson's seminal paper on "Problems of Methodology in Political Research."[5] In that paper, and in his subsequent writings, he emphasized the compatibility of so-called behavioral and institutional approaches to political analysis, arguing that "there is no necessary reason for excluding studies of organized structure and process from the scope of political behavior research."[6] If we had been able to listen more closely to Professor Leiserson, the trivialities of the less-than-cosmic confrontation of behavioral versus institutional political science might have been avoided. Avery Leiserson's professional life has been guided by a clear sense of values, and especially a sense of the value of democracy. Like Merriam, Leiserson has always maintained the relevancy of political inquiry to the development and perfection of a democratic polity.[7] At the same time, his teaching always has stressed the importance of scientific inquiry—of formal theory, hypotheses, systematic gathering of appropriate data, statistical analysis, and deductive logic. And his interests have focused upon both a science of politics and a political science of science.[8]

His views on values and scientific inquiry are illustrated in his conviction that "political scientists who do not pretend to omniscience or aspire to political responsibility, but who nonetheless have a keen sense of knowledge-as-power, to be acquired and exercised in trusteeship for the public good, should answer that on the level of values and purposes their function is to clarify, articulate, and criticize the goal values and institutional effects of popular beliefs and preferences, the acts of political representatives and leaders, and the issues and proposals of influential groups and policy-makers who collectively compose the decision-making process of society."[9]

Finally, Avery Leiserson has been a realist. He sought to understand and explain the role of private interest groups in the administrative process, to construct a comparative analysis of political parties, and to analyze partisan behavior in congressional districts with an eye to patterns of conflict among contending forces, sources of opposition, tension, and hostility among leaders, parties and groups, and the bases of a politics of conflict in public opinion and behavior.[10] In his keynote address on the opening of the Duke University Center for Southern Studies in the Social Sciences and Humanities in 1966, he spoke about

> the desirability of orienting analytical inquiries to the *dynamic interaction of conditioning or determining variables in behavior*, to the end that objective evidence may be produced for our fellow citizens and policy-makers willing to use their senses and intelligence. In colloquial terms, our function may be described as that of society's *non-secret* CIA, showing to all who will listen that: (a) things that were thought to be necessary and inevitable aren't necessarily so, and (b) things that were thought to be impossible may, under certain conditions, be brought about. The job of the social scientist is less to predict how things will happen, than to reveal how things do happen, to delineate trends, to specify probable effects, and to indicate the conditions under which alternative goals may be achieved."[11]

More recently, in an essay on "Realism and Commitment in Political Theory," Leiserson said that the first mark of the realist is his acceptance of conflict and opposition as a "given of human existence. . . . " The realist lives with, is known by, the contradictions of experience he maintains in his own life. . . . Nothing infuriates him more than the assertion that reality is nothing but sheer personal selfishness or will to power. For the realist, conflicts and contradictions are part of an objective order of events that exists independently of his approval or disapproval. . . . [12]

---

[5] Reprinted in *Political Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research*, ed. Heinz Eulau, Samuel J. Eldersveld, and Morris Janowitz (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), pp. 53–64 [from *Political Science Quarterly*, 68 (December 1953), 558–584].

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 56.

[7] See "Empirical Approaches to Democratic Theory," in *Political Research and Political Theory*, ed. Oliver Garceau (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 13–38.

[8] Leiserson concerned himself with political analysis of the scientific establishment and science policy in "Scientists and the Policy Process," *American Political Science Review*, 59 (June 1965), 408–416. His presidential address to the Southern Political Science Association was devoted to "Science and the Public Life," *Journal of Politics*, 29 (May 1967), 241–260.

[9] *Parties and Politics*, p. 355.

[10] In addition to writings already mentioned, see "National Party Organization and Congressional Districts," *Western Political Quarterly*, 16 (September 1963), 633–649.

[11] "The Changing South: Some Social Science Applications," in *Perspectives on the South: Agenda for Research*, ed. Edgar T. Thompson (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1967), pp. 3–16; quoted at p. 14.

It has been a great pleasure to work together with President Leiserson during the past year. He made an indelible and immeasurable contribution to the work of the Program Committee, and has provided distinguished leadership to this Association during the year of his term as its President. I am, therefore, very pleased to introduce President Avery Leiserson.

---

[12] See "Realism and Commitment in Political Theory," in *The Post-Behavioral Era: Perspectives on Political Science,* ed. George J. Graham, Jr. and George W. Carey (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1972), pp. 144–170; quoted at pp. 144–145.

# Charles Merriam, Max Weber, and the Search for Synthesis in Political Science

AVERY LEISERSON
*Vanderbilt University*

## Merriam and The Disjunction of Science and Politics[1]

This year we commemorate the centennial of Charles Edward Merriam's birth. Year after next we look forward to celebrating the bicentennial of the United States. The central link between these events, perhaps best reflected in his prophetic presidential address to this Association in 1925, lies in Merriam's 18th-century, rationalist-enlightenment faith that science and democratic government are mutually supportive and reinforcing.

Nowadays such a statement of belief has an old-fashioned, even naive, ring. Yet no one was more aware than Merriam of the biological, material, and nonrational components of human personality and society. For him, however, these constituted not ineluctable, immutable causes, but the materials, the tools, with which the competent politician, political scientist, and citizen must work in acquiring the arts and understanding of government. We do not know how early Merriam acquired the "passion for politics," but he certainly exhibited it from the time he took his doctorate at Columbia in 1900 to the retirement years when he campaigned for his son Robert's election to the Chicago City Council. Throughout fifty years of active participation in university, municipal, foundation, and national public service, politics and governance never lost their fascination for him as the primary and natural, if not the most efficient, aspect of man's social relationship.

Analytically, Merriam viewed the exercise of personal leadership, group processes of influence and power, and institutions of public order as the central, determining, "phylogenetic core" of those conceptual structures we call Society, Economy, and Culture. In the personalities of political actors, in the internal struggles of political groups, in the intergroup strategies and settlements of formal and informal public decision, Merriam saw the weaving and devising of those functional patterns of adaptation in our personal and collective control systems that constitute instrument and phase of human evolution from lower to higher, simpler to more complex, levels of societal achievement.

In the preface to his last major work, Merriam wrote:[2]

> It was a long step forward from politics as custom, symbolism, violence, and superstition . . . to the formulation of theories of government, however crude or obviously rationalizations of power. It was a still longer step from politics as speculation and intuition to systematic investigation of political intelligence in the context of the total physical, economic and social scene.

Even in his own day, many of Merriam's students questioned what they felt to be his overconfident optimism with respect to the relation between science and politics. Some colleagues, inside and outside the profession, rejected his assumption that the data and structure of politics are comprehensible in terms of scientific concepts and methods. Others, young and old, challenged on empirical grounds the results of his efforts to demonstrate that social science research can be significant, indicative, or determinative of the direction and formulation of political events and choices. From another direction, the definitional guns of logical positivism were brought to bear upon Merriam's refusal to accept "the unbridgeable gulf" between scientific political analysis and worthy goals of political action. Then, as today, critics were not lacking to assert that the concept of "politics as science" leads its devotees not only to active rebellion against or conservative acceptance of the established social order and power structure, but also to personal self-deception, moral and material corruption, and to an intolerable pretence to godlike, devilish, superhuman powers of comprehension and manipulation.

Admittedly, Merriam supplied his critics with ammunition. As a political theorist, he sought truth in action more than in contemplation. One of his favorite pedagogical devices was to emphasize the confusion between the use of theory to clarify conceptual points of departure (credenda), and its use as myth and justification (miranda) for initiatives in interpersonal behavior. With respect to a third function of theory—the rigorous definition of observational categories, and specification of binding methodological rules for assessing reality—Merriam was typically enigmatic, and far too pragmatic for a logician's taste. He cavalierly transposed from necessary conditions of thought to problematic data of observation the famous epistemological issues of idealism versus materialism, rationalism versus empiricism, free will versus determinism, realism versus nominalism, monism versus pluralism. He located his organizing categories in the great historic and contemporary tensions of political life, the contradictions of continuity and change between the public and the private, the civil and the military, the religious and the secular, formal law and substantial justice, individual interest and group solidarity, partisan strife and the common weal. He was fond of quoting Goethe's "gray are all theories, green the shining tree of life" to express his conviction that politics should be studied as it is, rather than prejudged on the basis of a unified World Hypothesis, an explicit ideological position, or even a carefully defined scientific paradigm. Merriam tended to be impatient with legitimate epistemological questions and a priori disputes over preferred methodological technique, regarding them as getting in the way of doing research or of whatever needed to be done. He was inclined to throw both overboard in favor of inquiry into the "actual workings of politics, not from the viewpoint of the particular moment of struggle but from that of broader observation and analysis."

---

[1] See Merriam's autobiographical sketch in L. D. White, ed., *The Future Government in the United States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942). Also, Barry D. Karl, "The Power of Intellect and the Politics of Ideas," pp. 431–461, in D. A. Rustow, *Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership* (New York: Braziller, 1970); *Charles E. Merriam and the Study of Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974); *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* vol. 10, pp. 254–259.

[2] *Systematic Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945), p. x.

While Merriam made important substantive contributions to several subfields of political science, his most lasting impact was as protagonist for a scientific approach to politics, as advocate of statistical and social-psychological concepts in political analysis, as entrepreneur of interdisciplinary effort to support social science research and research training, and as active participant in multi-disciplinary applications of scientific knowledge to governmental and social problems. He was enormously challenging and exciting to his students, although he deeply disturbed many who saw him as a 20th-century combination of Niccolo Machiavelli and Francis Bacon. "Hard" social scientists regarded him as a philosopher; moral philosophers and logicians viewed him as unsound and tricky; practicing politicos called him "professor." As we listen to contemporary calls for a new political science, it is ironic to reflect on how little is known of his agenda for political research, and how much he had in common with today's rebels against the behavioral political science he did so much to establish.

In contemporary terms, Merriam was a pragmatic holist who saw politics and the political system as the strategically critical, conditional factor responsible for "putting it all together"—form and substance, theory and practice, values and skills, knowledge and power. He assumed the interdependence of formal structure and informal function in human personality and organization. He postulated the interaction and convertibility of individual, social, economic, governmental control systems. He asserted the importance and necessity of analyzing long-range trends and short-run factors affecting the stability and survival of social and political institutions. He was materialistic in his perception of individual and group interests, power drives, value-loaded demands, negotiable *and* nonnegotiable, as the basic data of politics. At the same time, he had the rationalist's passionate faith that reason and intelligence could penetrate the fogs and cruelties of social myth, coercion and propaganda, to overcome individual ignorance, apathy, impatience and self-delusion. He was idealistic in believing that knowledge based on research could improve not only the quality of public policy but the entire process of governmental decision making, including popular participation and understanding of what it takes to realize public goals through political conflicts and political settlements.

In later years, watching the upsurge of polarizing ideologies, each claiming to possess the banner of "true" democracy, Merriam came very close to identifying the bases and agenda of democracy with the root-assumptions of the scientific creed. We should not accuse him of oversimplification. He knew as well as anyone the irreverent, analytical, corrosive cutting edge of science, as well as its synthetic, symbolically creative, constructive function. He thoroughly understood the antagonisms of role and skill between scientists and politicians. But he did say that science *is* intelligence in human affairs, and he was capable of asserting that "we know" the scientific foundation for such concepts and propositions as (1) the dignity of individual personality, (2) the perfectibility of mankind, (3) the equitable diffusion of the material gains of commonwealth throughout the community, (4) the desirability of arriving at governing decisions in the context of widest possible popular participation, and (5) processes of agreement and consent are preferable to physical coercion and violence in making authoritative adjustments of conflicts of interest, opinion, and power.

If Merriam had been willing or able to commit himself to a postulate concerning the conditions under which various types of scientific inquiry could be applied or related to the several modes of political action, or to specify the requisite procedures for settling scientific disputes over factual truth by political decisions, he might have reconciled the two worlds of science and democracy.

But Merriam either would not or could not identify the making of authoritative decisions about what constitutes scientific knowledge with the democratic decision process. He left us his redoubtable faith rather than a satisfactory demonstration of the unity or the correct ordering of priorities between the two worlds. Yet it is exactly our contemporary uncertainty as to what the relationship between scientific truth and democratic decision making means, or requires, that underlies so many of our present professional discontents.

### Weber and the Multiplicity of "Political Models"[3]

In juxtaposing Charles Merriam and Max Weber, my intention is to clarify certain problems raised by the disjunction of science and politics, not to appraise their merits as political and social theorists. Merriam, from his entry into Chicago politics in 1905 to his death in 1953, bespoke the buoyant, optimistic faith of progressive America in increased popular political participation, mediated by the prospects of a beneficent, productive adaptation of scientific knowledge to improvement of the public life. Weber, the German-European, was prophetic analyst and tragic protagonist of 20th-century Western society at war with itself. He was obsessed with the pessimistic suspicion that the closer we come to scientific understanding of the forces at work, the more we doubt the adequacy or relevance of science to provide an acceptable map and guide for the course of human events. He indicated clearly the uses and limits of scientific judgment in dealing with the ambiguities of social choice and political value-conflicts, but despaired of widespread popular or governmental application of such methods. Perhaps more than any other social scientist, not excepting Freud, Weber articulated and forecast the existential contradictions with which the 20th century has been struggling: the anarchic disenchantment and alienation that accompany secularization and rationalization of authority, the idealistic distrust and contempt for the positivistic aspects of science triumphant; the paradoxical linkages and tensions between economic calculation and religious motivation, bureaucratic domination and charismatic leadership, Marxism and nationalism, and, perhaps above all, personal commitment and analytical detachment.

Although their paths seem to have crossed when Weber visited the United States in 1904, apparently there was little continuing communication or dialogue between them. This is not surprising when we consider, besides their respective ages and statuses at that time, the range and sophistication of Weber's interests in the evolution of capitalism, legal and religious sociology, scientific methodology, and comparative bureaucratic systems. Weber might well have regarded Merriam's revolt against idealism and formalism in political theory, and reforming the American party system through the direct primary and civil service as conceptually particularistic, professionally parochial, smacking too much of applied gadgetry to be intellectually important. Weber did take advantage of his American visit to gather useful comparative data about religious and political organization in a non-European, non-Asiatic social system. The reverse analogy fifty years later, when American social scientists ransacked Europe and the third world for data to flesh out the categories of behavioral science and comparative political development, may not be too far off the mark in illustrating the context of their professional communication, or lack of it.

From Merriam's side, our information is mostly limited to what he communicated to his students about Weber's work. In later years he often referred to *Politik al Beruf* and *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. His lectures and persuasive writings are full of applications of Weber's distinction between values as ultimate, personal convictions (*urteil*) and values as standards of reference (*beziehung*). Merriam had no quarrel with Weber's political sociology, particularly his model of the relation between individual interests, ideals, and the bases of legitimate public order; indeed, he considered Weber's analysis superior to that of A. F. Bentley, who was accepted by so many American pressure-group theorists as their patron saint. Like Weber, he repeatedly stripped from Hegelian, Marxian and Spenglerian-type historical constructions their pretenses to scientific certainty and inevitability.

Merriam's differences with Weber for the most part are matters of emphasis to be inferred rather than corroborated by documentary quotation. In one sense, both men used *power* as a residual category. Weber, however, was interested in the classification and normative grounding of authority-patterns in individual behavior, of which the most "modern" type was *Herrschaft*, or rational-legal domination (as opposed to the authority of personal charisma, custom and tradition). Merriam identified power and politics with the activity of governing in both organized states and "stateless" societies, combining the functions of direction and control with the aggregation-mobilization of consent. This led him to classify power not as a derivative of social systems, but as legitimized means of establishing and maintaining authoritative systems of public order, through physical coercion, moral persuasion, and economic sanctions (calculation, allocation, bargaining, withholding resources).

---

[3] For Max Weber, I have relied primarily on R. Bendix, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait* (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1962); *International Social Science Journal*, vol. XVII (1965), pp. 9–70, and literature there cited; R. Aron, *Main Currents of Sociological Thought* (New York: Basic Books, 1967), vol. II, pp. 177–264; H. S. Hughes, *Consciousness and Society* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1956); G. Lichtheim, *The Concept of Ideology* (New York: Vintage Books, 1967); T. Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937), vol. II, and translator's introduction to M. Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947).

Next, Merriam was radically skeptical of the cognitive status and reliability of *ideal types* as starting points for empirical observation, although he had no objection to the construction of organizing categories for purposes of data analysis, inference and generalization.

Third, for Merriam the scope of politics and the political system could not be confined or delimited to forms of association or collective activities characterized by the criterion of "a claim to a monopoly of legitimate physical force." He granted the empirical and normative ground for Weber's criterion, but he spent most of his life denying its sufficiency.

In more personal terms, Merriam exhibited the rather contemptuous tolerance of the experienced politico for intellectuals and others who forget the discrepancy between their conceptual constructions and reality, who fail to allow for the possibility of error, and who then agonize excessively over the failure of reality to fit the logic of their definitions. Since politics to him was so much a matter of controversial situations, Merriam found little practical use for Weber's distinction between an ethic of ultimate ends and an ethic of responsibility. The former cannot be expunged from political reality simply by definition. Persons who seek ideal goals do not always act without regard to consequences. The distinction does not adequately take into account the political problems raised by moral insensitivity, cynicism, amorality and absurdity, which by implication are relegated to the realm of abnormal psychology. Finally, Merriam rejected both the definitional and empirical bases of Weber's pessimism about scientists playing an effective or constructive role in politics and policy formation.

Far more instructive than their technical differences, was the way the two men conceived the relation between politics and society, which both saw as the proper context of "the political." This goes far beyond the simple idea that politics is important or unimportant, prior or derivative. Both assumed the necessity of politics, and that the truths of politics are accessible to human comprehension. Weber's question was perhaps more basic: What presuppositions of thought necessarily govern human access to political truth? Merriam's was more direct, action-oriented: What are the conditions, resources, methods and limitations of political thought in maintaining, modifying, and transforming social processes and institutions?

Neither man thought of eliminating or escaping from the conditions that make politics natural and necessary in social life; indeed, both came close to identifying the concept of power in human relations with the idea of action, i.e., the relation of initiating or yielding to others in communicating and choosing among standards and patterns of expected conduct. But whereas Weber sought to explain social action from the standpoint of individual motives and perceptions which justify and sustain authority, Merriam looked at interpersonal behavior in society from the standpoint of the interdependence and mix of the means (physically coercive, normatively persuasive, and rationally calculative) implied in the concept of a mutually-dependent, asymmetric, leader-follower relation between individuals, groups, or nations. At the societal level of integration, Merriam saw politics in terms of a problematic, variable, functional capacity of political systems to adapt to the conditions imposed by their changing internal and external environments. Political legitimacy was thus more than the sum or product of individual perceptions and beliefs politicized by society. It needed to be visualized in terms of the active formative process of public decision, starting from educational strategies of collective action employed by public officials, political leaders and group representatives, proceeding through the limitations imposed by resources, events, intelligence, and the requirements for securing acceptance and support from group members and the public at large.

Our natural science brothers are fond of pointing out that social and behavioral scientists are not quite sure of our conceptual points of departure. It is tempting to speculate how Merriam and Weber would have reacted to the modern plethora of models seeking to "explain" politics. There is the ancient view of politics as a simple battle or fight between forces of might. There is the classic-medieval conception of politics as the effort of the political society, or religious commonwealth, to realize its ideals of justice, and the good life. The search for ideal justice and harmony generates the conflict between the cities of God and Man, which gives us the secular image of a moral crusade, uniting or polarizing society by a holy war of ideologies. From Machiavelli, his precursors and successors, we inherit the idea of politics as *Staatswissenschaft*, statecraft, the arts of organizing and coordinating people, resources and public officials, through acceptable rules of collective decision. This view turns politics into a rather special kind of social engineering. Then we have the Greek-dramatic-Shakesperian, and modern advertising, public-relations, view of politics as a form of mass entertainment, a theatrical production, with a playwright, financial and productive organization, openly or behind-the-scenes, staging the plot, scenes and roles for political *dramatis personae* to act out for the pleasure and approval of the mass audience. There is the social contract, Mayflower Compact, town-meeting conception of politics as a sort of mass-participatory, discussion process culminating in an agreement, a vote, or some other method of establishing and renewing popular consent. Finally may be mentioned the utilitarian, free-market paradigm of politics as a transactional game, or series of games, strategies and outcomes for which can be logically calculated according to assigned rules of decision and varying assumptions of resources, costs and benefits on the part of the players.

Merriam and Weber were quite aware of these varying conceptions of politics. In addition, they were concerned (Weber much more than Merriam) with such difficult theoretical problems as whether conceptual thought is determinative of or determined by language, culture, psycho-physical and external, material conditions, and the appropriate relation between concepts, methodological rules, and evidence in communicating and testing theories. I may be wrong, but my hunch is that neither of the two would have felt it necessary to argue that we require advance normative consensus upon a unified, paradigmatic point of departure before we can have an ultimately satisfactory, scientifically productive, or empirically realistic theory of politics.

Like most of us, Merriam and Weber differed about the epistemological context in which scientific propositions about politics ought to be stated, but they were largely in agreement in specifying the substantive data and requirements for analyzing the structure of political life. These consist in the authoritative relations of direction and control among men, the modes of exercising authority by leadership, and the influencing of that leadership by the participating units of society and community that constitute a political system. Political and social scientists select and emphasize different aspects of political structure and process for purposes of simplifying theoretical explanation, interpretation, and action. The central task of scientific political analysis is to explain the conditions and effects under which the continuing, changing relationships of downward direction and upward control between leaders and led, governors and citizens, occur. More generally, and normatively, explanations of the control relations of decision makers and members of the political community need to be stated in terms of variables affecting the interactions between people acting through units of social and political structure—not only at the given moment or in the short run, but also dynamically, historically, so that action can be more creatively and intelligently directed toward or away from projected trends and contingencies.

No matter how ingeniously expressed in scientific terms of winning fights, games, coalition building, rational calculation of costs and benefits, or transposed into the skills of theater, decision making, large-scale organization and opinion management, no single, simplifying, analytical, metaphoric picture-image of politics is ever wholly satisfactory. We want more than the ideal utopia, the limited-aspect, reality-testing approach of science, or the intellectual-rationalist effort to arrive at political truth by formal reasoning from premises and definitions, empirically based or not. We require cognitive maps of individual perception and learning processes in political situations; we need to know how these affect and are affected by social structure, cultural beliefs and values. We require analytical categories which make the structural conditions and effects of the inclusive authority-system, in which individuals, their groups and values are implicated, explicitly part of the explanation. The difficulty is to find ways of interpreting the whole without attributing qualities to it that are only potential, problematic, or in process of realization. Both Merriam and Weber challenged the idealistic assumption that the presumed inclusiveness, power, or goodness of the group, society, state, or world political system controls everything, and thereby "explains" the molecular actions of individuals and group aggregates. At the same time, neither wholly accepted the lower-order assumptions of biological, economic, or cultural determinism.

With respect to our human desire for an adequate, comprehensive model-assumption clarifying political reality in human societies, Weber's great contribution consisted in his demonstration of how much, but also the limits to which, human aggregate or system behavior can be explained in terms of a "voluntaristic," individual theory of action. Merriam's legacy consisted in the fascination with which he clothed and transmitted the conviction that politics and political-system behavior, while empirically rooted in individuals and groups, cannot wholly be explained as simple, additive relations between individual actors, nor by rational deductions of probable choices from assumptions about individual motives and interests under varying conditions. He anticipated the modern statement of the task of political and social science as that of discovering ways of conceptualizing and verifying the *systemic properties* whereby the relations between the parts constituting the more inclusive unit-level of integration we call the political system are coordinated and controlled. He rejected the twin assumptions that a science of politics is impossible (a) because human collectivities do not behave or vary according to unalterable, necessary laws derived from history, human nature, or economic conditions, or (b) because a science of political *praxis* based on such laws would be humanly intolerable. Merriam saw the problem of a scientific politics to be that of identifying the strategic system-attributes, qualities, variables; improving our instruments of measurement, and incorporating them explicitly into the explanatory model, along with indices of behavior, belief, and material conditions. While his personal interests in improving the policy process far outstripped his scientific energies, his awareness of the far-from-completed theoretical requirements led him constantly to forecast and welcome many efforts at "resynthesis."

## The Problem of Interlevel Integration Among the Sciences[4]

Merriam and Weber's work suggests another obstacle impeding re-integration of theory around an agreed-upon, paradigmatic starting-point. That is the interdisciplinary relation among the sciences of human knowledge bearing upon politics, of which the so-called micro-macro problem is a special case. In the 19th century, the distinction between the natural and the cultural (human) sciences seemed to set the limits of discussion, with the natural sciences having nothing to do with society or politics, and the social sciences relegated to speculative hermeneutics, debatable doctrines of interpretation. Again we may point to Weber as anticipating our present-day realization that, in the context of man's collective search for knowledge about the natural world and his place and destiny in it, the choice lies not between a natural-scientific approach and a human-oriented, social-science approach, but between science and nonscience. Weber worked with economic, legal, historical and sociological materials, but Merriam explicitly visualized and welcomed the contribution of physicists and biologists, psychologists, anthropologists, and statisticians to the quest for political understanding. It seems clear that both men considered, but found little hope in the ideas and methods of those who reject scientific modes of assessing reality, in favor of wholly subjective insight, consciousness, and determination. Merriam in particular had no use for the either-or quality of the unity-of-science assumption versus the anthropomorphic-subjective view. His work on civic education and training suggested that the empirically-important question is to identify the institutional, as well as social-psychological, processes of political socialization, in order that the dialogue between the respective believers, and the conflicts as to correct modes of assessing reality and dealing with change, can be carried on constructively instead of destructively.

Within the "scientific" camp, the micro-macro, or level-of-analysis, problem starts from the investigator's decision as to which unit-level of integration (inorganic, biological, individual, economic, or social-collective) to adopt for purposes of interpreting the complex structure of interacting variables affecting human development. Many social scientists still think of this orientation problem in nominalistic terms of the language we employ to describe the relations between persons acting as individuals, without differentiating such behavior in small and large-scale aggregates and organizations, and without explicit and adequate recognition of the problematic political variables affecting the resolution of conflicts and controversies.

Weber tended to treat the complex level of sociopolitical integration as a residual category of nonrational behavior that either escapes or results from inter-individual efforts toward partial, rational, bureaucratic control. Merriam was characteristically ambiguous as to the logically necessary level of integration from which to understand politics. Scattered throughout his writings, however, are expressions of the conviction that it is theoretically appropriate to analyze human behavior functionally from the standpoint of any observable level or unit of system, or subsystem, organization, provided that the different analytic levels are not confused (consistently differentiated), and relationships between simpler (sub) or more complex (supra) levels of integration are treated as explicit attributes or variables of the system. He knew very well, if he did not emphasize, the practical difficulties in political research of finding or creating varying conditions under which interlevel variables can be treated reversibly as causal, dependent, or held constant.

Another way of stating the "level-of-analysis" problem in scientific research is that we are still uncertain about the appropriate level of integration from which to describe the functional linkages or uniformities controlling the behavior of inter-unit variables. If we fail to discriminate, or oscillate between genetic, physiological, individual, and collective levels of integration and control, our estimates will vary as to the predicted consequences of altering or changing the conditions which induce the respective unit-levels possessing autonomous organs of direction and adaptation to act. When we are thinking about the intra- and interlevel relations of the atom, molecule, enzyme, gene, brain, nervous system, personality, economy, or political society, we can perhaps appreciate better why, insofar as possible, we try to explain higher-level units of integration in terms of simpler, more basic units, but also why it is necessary to question the assumption that lower unit-level concepts exclusively or a priori provide adequate premises for explaining behavior at more complex, higher-unit levels. Needless to add, the reverse premise is equally suspect.

---

[4] K. Deutsch, "Recent Trends in Research Methods in Political and Social Science," *A Design for Political Science* (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1966); A. Etzioni, *The Active Society* (New York: Free Press, 1968), Part I; H. D. Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935); C. Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966); K. Lorenz, *Civilized Man's Eight Deadly Sins* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), chs. 1, 8, esp. pp. 91–98; W. J. M. Mackenzie, *Politics and Social Science* (London: Penguin Books, 1967); J. Piaget, *Structuralism* (New York: Basc Books, 1970).

Much more could be said on the question of whether political science has, needs, or can achieve a single, unifying, intersubjective, observational standpoint at the political-societal level of integration. If Merriam and Weber are reliable teachers, however, the primary problem is not the dichotomy, but the *interdependence* of fact and value, scientific method and normative theory, knowledge and power. The more proximate, inhibiting factor is the number and Babel of knowledge-models (quantitative-behavioral, bio-psychic, material-cultural, cybernetic-communications, organization-decision, logico-mathematical, and linguistic-metaphorical) competing for attention as the productive guide for research programming and knowledge-based policy. In recent years, some have professed to find in systems theory, others in the history and philosophy of science, an emergent basis for synthesis in political science. Without disparaging the competition of theories as indicative of the absence or failure of science in our discipline (clearly we are more scientific than we were fifty or a hundred years ago), a decent respect for objectivity compels us to admit the prospects for an early resolution of our paradigmatic perplexities are not bright.

Although most of them reject its validity, our philosophers have discovered the survival-and-use value of the curricular distinction between value and behavioral theory in our institutions for producing and training political scientists. From their side, our scientific researchers have been able to make perhaps too much of a good thing, financially and organizationally, out of the proliferation of specialized methodologies, jobs and facilities for cross-disciplinary communication with segments of our sister sciences. Perhaps an even greater number in our association do not even worry about research and the theoretical state of our discipline; their primary concerns are their impact on students, teaching materials, and their own political involvements.

If current epistemological and paradigmatic controversy holds out little immediate prospect for conceptual synthesis, at least in one sense we are better able than in Weber's and Merriam's day to recognize the consequences of our behavioral preferences for the principle of analytical autonomy and interdependence within and between the sciences. At least the specialists who investigate factors affecting individual belief, perception, and behavior patterns nowadays seem to be more able to tolerate, find justification for, and even on occasion make use of the activities of specialists who elaborate and apply evaluative criteria to political attitudes, processes and institutions. Both groups apparently see some functional justification for characters who insist upon trying to develop comparative indices for the institutional variables involved in applying knowledge to the resolution of inter-individual, intergroup and cross-national conflicts.

Empirical evidence for autonomy and interdependence between analytical levels and planes of understanding may be found in expanding areas of agreement among all sciences of nature, man, and society:

(1) value-objectivity in science does not mean value-neutrality; we can all accept, if not take for granted, the insight that the public realm, the political commonwealth, has a stake in maintaining existence of men and institutions passionately engaged in the study and interpretation of social fact whose findings are not contingent upon immediate pressures of partisan interest, opinion and power;[5]

(2) the scientific outlook is no longer interpreted, by its most distinguished practitioners and exponents, to assume the identity, opposition, or one-to-one relation, between scientific models for acquiring knowledge and practical paradigms for exercising political power and administrative judgment. In other words, "to know the truth" in either sphere does not provide an automatic or necessary premise from which to deduce the necessary and sufficient course of action in the other, whether in the case of conflicting value or conflicting scientific judgments;[6]

---

[5] H. Arendt, "Truth and Politics," pp. 3–39, in *Political Theory and Social Change,* ed. D. Spitz (New York: Atherton Books, 1967); J. Bronowski, *Science and Human Values* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1959); R. Dubos, *The Dreams of Reason* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961); M. Landau, *Political Theory and Political Science* (New York: Macmillan, 1972), ch. 2; W. G. Runciman, "Sociological Evidence and Political Theory," ch. 2, in *Philosophy, Politics and Society,* 2d series, ed. P. Laslett and W. Runciman (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962).

[6] American Academy of Arts and Sciences, "Science and Culture," *Daedalus* (Winter, 1965); V.

(3) there is steady and increasing recognition of the central importance of the relation between science and politics, not in the sense of imposing the distinctive value criteria associated with either sphere of activity upon the other, but in the "policy science" sense that science has a contributory responsibility to improve the controversial process of discovering the appropriate means and mix of intellectual, technical, bureaucratic, political and popular judgment in the search for public truth.[7]

### The Politics of Public Truth[8]

Regardless of whether we decide with Weber, in relating science to politics, that man and society are prior and politics and people merely technical instruments, or with Merriam, that politics is "the name of the game" and man and society are variable and conditionally controlling, many if not most political and other scientists have yet to learn what is involved in reconciling the scientist's duty of clarifying the necessary conditions attached to realizing the truth of things, with the political actor's duty to make decisions according to one or more criteria of public good. In a way, the problem resembles that of the child's discovery of what society does to him when he learns to face the unpleasant options required in the process of discovering that his cognitive reality-map is not only incongruent, but often abhorrent to his "others." Naturally, some individuals prefer not to make the choice, deny the distinction, and refuse to make the effort at reconciling differences.

In the context of political action and choice, the value-relativism issue boils down to the question: at what level of existence are we willing to "settle" in resolving the tension between trying to make our personal cognitive models come true by political means, on the one hand, and accepting the "truth" imposed by the requirement of adjusting our own to the cognitive maps of others, and deriving such satisfaction as we are able "from being good" with others on mutually tolerable terms? When we discover that "adjusting the wind to the sails is not the same thing as adjusting the sails to the wind," some of us prefer to become critics, part of the permanent opposition, finding pleasure in a self-sacrificial struggle against the wind, validating our preferred cognitive maps at least in our own eyes. Others adjust to the map, either by changing the point and time of destination, by modifying the map itself to take into account factors it overlooked or could not control, or by devising strategies of adjustment to the conditions to which the model applies. To complete the metaphor, some of us stop struggling, throw away all maps, and relinquish the effort to strive, to understand, to control and guide through knowledge.

To put it mildly, political scientists have a problem in relating our self-images to the requirements imposed by the public images held of us by our fellow-politicians and citizens. We can do something to modify those stereotypes, besides acting violently, argumentatively, or by deliberately cultivating a counter-cultural contempt. Again the comparison of Weber and Merriam is instructive, largely because both have been so extraordinarily misinterpreted.

Max Weber did *not* stand for value-neutrality in either scientific or political action. On the contrary, he showed as clearly as anyone ever has why scientists cannot be value-neutral, and that while in politics values in one sense have to be treated as data in order to analyze and deal with them as objectively as possible; that does not mean that values can be regarded only or merely as instrumental means to one's own purposes. Weber warned that the practice of science was all-consuming. To him, the "calling" of science requires the scientist to practice science consistently all the way through from the selection and conceptualization of problems through data observation, analysis, conclusions and generalizations of fact, and specifying the implications of findings for personal behavior and public policy. He taught that the image political scientists should try to act upon and present to the public was their self-image as scientists, not as hardcase professional politicians, nor as amateurs who act on the premise that politics consists in openly arguing one's personal political opinions as often,

---

Bush, *Modern Arms and Free Men* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1949); J. B. Conant, *Modern Science and Modern Man* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952); S. Lakoff, *Knowledge and Power* (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp. 1–58; A. Leiserson, "The Politics of Science," *Polity*, VI (1973), 122–134; M. Polanyi, *Science, Faith and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946); E. Shils, *Criteria for Scientific Development* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1968).

[7] J. Ben-David, *The Scientist's Role in Society* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1971); H. Brooks, *The Government of Science* (Boston: M.I.T. Press, 1967); Y. Dror, *Public Policymaking Re-examined* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1968); C. E. Lindblom, *The Intelligence of Democracy* (New York: Free Press, 1965); R. M. Merton, *The Sociology of Science* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973); H. Orlans, *Contracting for Knowledge* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973); D. K. Price, *The Scientific Estate* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); E. Shils, *The Intellectuals and the Powers* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973); N. W. Storer, *The Social System of Science* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966).

[8] "Only he has the calling for politics who is sure he shall not crumble when the world from his point of view is too stupid or too base for what he wants to offer." Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," p. 128, in H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, *From Max Weber* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946). See also, *ibid.*, "Science as a Vocation," pp. 129–156.

as passionately, and attracting as much attention as one can.

Merriam was not as rigorous and self-limiting as Weber on the problem of relating his personal and public images. Like many political scientists, he wanted to do both. I trust I do not do him injustice in saying the impact of his teaching was that scientists in their public life should maintain a distinction between their concepts and methods of observation and inference, on the one hand, and the motives, criteria, and ends by which they apply that knowledge on the other. He felt that by participating in politics one could maintain his private self-image as scientist and still advance his public image as politician. He was only partly successful, but there is no doubt that he regarded himself and achieved considerable stature as a member of several of America's elite groupings. We do not have to charge him with self-deception and corruption in order to concede the validity of his point that scientists need to acquire political *competence* if they wish to see their knowledge put to appropriate public purposes. The lesson of Charles Merriam's life is that if one fails to acquire the public image necessary to remain in elective or governing politics, he can find other active roles in which to satisfy his personal image of being an effective protagonist in using his scientific knowledge for public good.

This is not the argument that a good scientist cannot be a good politician. The point lies in the question of whether the individual can surmount the intrapersonal strains of sacrificing his self-image as scientist in order to act successfully in meeting the public expectations and requirements of the politician. At the same time, it suggests that the scientist should not throw over his scientific attitudes and become as completely value-absolute, value-relative, or anti-scientist as any professional politician or fanatic reformer. The task is far more complex than the McLuhan-Goffman, Nixon-Haldeman thesis that the political test of public truth is what other people do or can be persuaded to believe. As a public figure, a man must not only act in such a way as to be true to himself; he must also be comfortable with the truth he arrives at after adjusting his original compulsions to act in the light of the conflicting expectations and obligations of the several publics to whom his public image is important. In our public lives, the conflict of gods is within us as well as in our interpersonal relations. In the human world, the test of truth lies in the balance we establish between our private and our public images.

The history of politics, as well as that of science, suggests that factual truth is not identical with what people believe it to be, and cannot be arrived at by bringing it to a vote of all the members of the political community. When we organize into scientific societies, we do not submit the question of the best, most productive, or most socially acceptable theory of energy and matter, organic life, human personality, economics, or politics to a majority vote of our memberships. We investigate, publish, and exchange results of our research, much of which as individuals we regard as obnoxious, uninteresting, irrelevant, or just plain wrong. We confine our official, collective activities as scientists to such mundane purposes as exchanging information, improving our teaching, increasing opportunities for creative and productive research. We try to raise standards of practice and performance, to make the job market more efficient, and conditions of employment more just and equitable. In general, scientific societies as such do not tell citizens and public decision-making bodies what the discipline regards as the correct view of truth and public policy. Such societies seek to reconcile their internal and external images by protecting the right of the individual member to join others in voluntary groups to act on such matters in their own name and status, not in the name of the educational or research institution, the scientific or professional society.

How the whole body of scientific associates decides on what is truth, or the correct way of ascertaining it, is a debatable, empirical question; I do not here attempt to describe or evaluate it. However in fact it is decided, it is not done by the explicit democratic method of ascertaining majority opinion on the appropriate research design, conceptual approach, or findings of fact. We assume there is such a thing as scientific knowledge, but except in extraordinary situations, we do not find it necessary by a political act to declare what that truth is, or what it requires us to do in political cases and controversies. That is why it is disturbing, and perhaps damaging to our public image, when sizeable minorities among us are openly contemptuous and disparaging of science, deny that scientific knowledge of politics is possible, and argue that the proper public image of science is one in which the members behave publicly like nonscientists, organizing into a number of minorities, each asserting the priority of their personally-satisfying cognitive maps, and trying to make the discipline behave publicly as divided along partisan or ideological lines like any other political group. If we hold and act upon such a public image, we may indeed confirm the self-image of those who regard subversive and destructive effects on public attitudes toward science as desirable. Whether the public good is advanced by persuading nonscientists that such a public image is accurate is quite another question, one that is also highly debatable.

Does this private-public image problem, then, add up to nothing more than a basic postulate of scientific or professional competence, with the corollary that individual political scientists must specialize, limit themselves to some aspect or segment of political knowledge and behavior they can be "good at," be willing to take jobs as teachers, budget, personnel, public relations or management experts in government, industry, and education; become reporter-writer-commentators for the mass media; prepare for the practice of law, or go into the political process itself as opinion surveyors, analysts, consultants, party and elective office workers, or do research and write for interest group and mass "causes"? In part, the answer is yes, but that alone is not nearly enough.

Two attributes of professional competence are needed, beyond the basic level of skill required to be a "pro" at one of the wide variety of jobs for which political science is good preparation. One goes to the professional's orientation toward "class collaboration"—an old socialist term referring partly to the individual's self-image as a member of one of the influential groups participating in the value-consensus that holds society together, partly to his sense of responsibility for the intellectual training of future citizens and leaders of his society. Alienated intellectuals often seem to assume that the only legitimate function of a self-respecting professional is the critical, corrosive, destructive role, and that scientific societies and organized professions of medicine and nursing, law, engineering, divinity, psychiatry and administration (including the military) are necessarily allies and corrupt tools of the "establishment." Not only is the relation more complex than this, but it is not always realized that the professional's experience with his "social service" function often makes him more critical and aware of what is wrong with existing social institutions than the intellectual who has given up hope and knows the system is wrong in its entirety. At any rate, one quality of the professional, however he places himself on the ideological spectrum, is his usefulness in knowing how to proceed in helping laymen to cope with the system's malfunctioning, including efforts to reform and improve it at strategic, critical points. It is impossible to overemphasize the political significance of research and evaluation of the reproductive, educational and standards-improvement functions of scientific and professional associations.

One other attribute of the scientific calling's political involvement goes beyond the demand for qualifications to perform jobs perceived as socially useful, and the requirement that the intellectual-academic-professional classes face up to responsibilities of educating their students and successors for political participation. Political scientists do both these things, and in my opinion we are getting better at them, but not because our research methodology is more sophisticated or we know better what the political good requires than our intellectual forefathers. Our progress as a scientific discipline and professional calling is significantly related to our ability in example to convince our fellow citizens and scientific brethren that there is a body of knowledge and analytical skills for dealing with the political aspect of social living. This is not the same as mastery of the *law*, knowledge of *psycho-cultural-social conditions* of stability and peace in voluntary group association, or the rational balancing of *costs and benefits* in choosing alternative ways to allocate material resources for the national or world benefit.

The political aspect of social life concerns the institutional (stable and dynamic) conditions under which authoritative rule is carried on subject to consent and opposition from the influential segments of opinion, interest, and power in society. What everybody needs and wants to know about politics is how better to associate the several powerful, conflicting elements of supportive *and* dissenting opinion in a civil-adversary process with the officially responsible centers of public authority and rule. This may take many forms, of which the separation of powers, free press, consultation of group interests, commissions of inquiry, staff planning and advisory arrangements, are but a few. Underlying them all is the problem of organizing consent out of controversy, coordinating the several modes of exercising power, improving and remaking society's procedures of representing and adjusting conflict. These are the continuing tasks and skills of the professional political calling—not to hold out the impossible dream of eliminating conflict and controversy, but how to make it possible for conflict and controversy between powers to be carried on by political means.

In that task we are not required to accept the premise that either the scientist's facts must be made controlling over the politician's values, or vice versa. We cannot wait upon realization of the philosopher-scientist's insight that the unity of knowledge and action requires prior agreement upon some internally consistent, objectively operational, subjectively-satisfying, Archimedean standpoint. Max Weber warned that from the standpoint of either the individual or society, there is no guarantee that the public good will follow if we resolve the opposition-tension between the scientist and politician within each of us by the comforting assumption that everyone wills the good and must do what he thinks is right. We may well *believe* in that assumption, but in political situations where private and public values conflict, the will to realize private truth alone is not a sufficient condition. We need, in addition, the presumption of Charles Merriam: "The poisoned world calls for us all to become politists in the true sense of that term—philosophers, scientists, technologists (politicians), and politically-sophisticated peoples."[9] In particular, as we political scientists improve our professional habits and skills of analysis and communication with our fellow-politists, we help to increase the factual-scientific component in public value-controversies, and thereby the public's understanding of and reliance upon it. Upon that foundation may be built the road leading to that "politicizing the masses"[10] of our fellow-citizens, upon which our collective capacity to clarify and exercise some choice over our common, human destiny, depends.

---

[9] C. E. Merriam, *Prologue to Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), p. 91.

[10] J. Habermas calls this condition "depoliticization." *Toward A Rational Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 103–104.

# COMMUNICATIONS

To the Editor:

I have read with interest the article by Ole R. Holsti entitled "International Politics Makes Strange Bedfellows" in the *American Political Science Review*, March 1974. While Professor Holsti's article contains some useful observations concerning contrasting approaches to American foreign policy, his article is unfortunately flawed both by conceptual problems and by factual errors.

Professor Holsti's article lacks a clear definition of either the "radical right" or the "radical left." At no point in his analysis does he provide any firm criteria for including or excluding authors of either category in these two groups. By his own admission, as he suggests in footnote 7 (p. 218), "The term 'radical' presents serious difficulties as it means different things to different people." The same can obviously be said about the terms "right" and "left." The closest Professor Holsti comes to an approximation of a definition of "radical right," for example, is to suggest that such writers "have warned since the early 1950s that accommodation with communism is too high a price to pay for what would, at best, be the temporary comfort of detente in the cold war" (p. 218). Many writers other than those included by Professor Holsti in the category the "radical right" have held to such a view of communism—Soviet communism in particular. They have also shared many of the ideas contained in the writings of the so-called "protracted conflict" school which Professor Holsti equates with the "radical right." To illustrate this point, may I call Professor Holsti's attention to the fact that, in 1959, Dr. Henry Kissinger wrote: "*Protracted Conflict* is an important book dealing with one of the most crucial problems of our time. It should be read by everyone who wishes to understand the nature of our danger." The book was also reviewed favorably by other students of international affairs, including C. L. Sulzberger, General James M. Gavin, and Bertram D. Wolfe, none of whom would identify himself as a member of Holsti's "radical right."

An unfortunately large number of inaccuracies mar this article. Several examples drawn from Professor Holsti's comments on the "radical right" will suffice to illustrate this point. Holsti alleges that analysts of the "radical right" believe that "war, conflict and injustice, wherever they occur, can ultimately be traced to a single source" (p. 224). However, it is clear from a reading of the works of individuals Holsti identifies as part of the "radical right" that they do not believe that "international communism" is the only cause of world conflict. For example, Robert Strausz-Hupé and Stefan T. Possony (two Holsti-labeled members of the "radical right") in their 1954 textbook *International Relations* reviewed ten major sources of conflict between states—of which ideology was but one (p. 28). Others included conflicts which arise over territorial issues, economic competition, population pressures and ethnocultural differences, to mention just a few.

Another of Professor Holsti's allegations is questionable, namely, that foreign policymakers in the Soviet Union and China are free from external constraints that "shape the main contours of foreign policies and restrict policy choices on critical issues" (p. 226). The authors of *Protracted Conflict* do not maintain, in Holsti's words, that Communist states—or any other states—"pursue policies of aggression and repression—by deliberate and calculated choice, not in response to international pressures or domestic constraints that lie beyond their control" (p. 226). Professor Holsti's suggestion that such writers hold to the view that "nothing important happens by accident and that every foreign policy undertaking is part of a carefully developed master plan" represents a deceptively simplistic and somewhat facile understanding of the writings of those authors. In *Protracted Conflict* (p. 41), the authors write that they are "not prepared to argue that the Communist leaders always adhere consciously to these principles or scrupulously strive to observe them in every instance."

Professor Holsti's article betrays a considerable degree of conceptual unevenness in its treatment of the writings of the two groups whose thoughts he juxtaposes. His attempt to describe certain methodological and conceptual similarities between the "radical right" and the "radical left" is apparently designed to provide evidence of a symmetry in the errors of these two schools. In effect he argues that the analysis of both of these schools is incorrect for similar reasons. But this attempt to impose symmetry, though it makes for an attractively organized article, is inconsistent with the literature he analyzes. Moreover, for reasons that are not evident, Professor Holsti focuses almost exclusively upon the writings of his "radical right" category of the mid-1960s and before, while the great majority of "radical left" sources are from the late sixties and the early seventies. This naturally causes some difficulties in Holsti's attempts to show symmetry because there are no political analyses which are isolated cognitive events; they are inevitably shaped by contemporary thinking. The writings of authors whom he terms "radical right" were undertaken in the context of a tense "bipolar" confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union; "radical left" writings were largely written during the period of U.S. participation in the increasingly unpopular Vietnam War.

Aside from its numerous analytical flaws, Professor Holsti's article contains several unfortunate factual errors. The Foreign Policy Research Institute is not affiliated with the University of Pennsylvania, contrary to Professor Holsti's statement in footnote 5. Moreover, *Orbis* is not a journal of the "radical right" which in recent years has "opened its pages to a more representative group of scholars." This assertion does a grave disservice to the diversity of both *Orbis* subscribers and authors. Men such as Dean Acheson (1959), Lincoln P. Bloomfield (1968, 1973), Habib Bourguiba (1958), Alastair Buchan (1969), Herbert Butterfield (1967), Joseph Clark (1966), Karl W. Deutsch (1967), Carl J. Friedrich (1967), Denis Healey (1969), Hubert Humphrey (1971), Hans Kohn (1962), Lawrence Krause (1969), Salvador de Madariaga (1961), Pierre Messmer (1962), Lester Pearson (1958), James N. Rosenau (1970, 1972), James Schlesinger (1962), Robert Shuman (1958), and Paul Henri Spaak (1958) would have been surprised if not shocked to learn that they were contributors to a journal of "the radical right." And this is only a small sample of the "moderates" and "liberals" who have published articles in *Orbis*. In his article Professor Holsti identifies fourteen scholars as members of the so-called "radical right." A review of the authors of articles published during the seventeen-year history of *Orbis* shows that these fourteen scholars authored or co-authored a very small percentage—under nine per cent—of the total number of articles published. Even using Holsti's own list of authors, one has difficulty in categorizing *Orbis* as a journal of the "radical right."

The article contains other such inaccuracies of which only a few examples can be cited in this letter. On page 219 Professor Holsti alleges that, according to his "radical right" school, "the liberal is especially guilty of looking at each conflict in isolation, rather than as an 'organic whole'." He furthermore suggests that, for those authors of the "radical right," "liberals are linked with pacifists, socialists, and neutralists in a single category." As evidence of this assertion Professor Holsti cites *Protracted Conflict*, pp. 19–20. In order to correct this distortion may I quote the passage from *Protracted Conflict* to which Professor Holsti refers:

> A considerable segment of European opinion—liberal, pacifist, socialist, neutralist—was alienated by the continuation of U.S. nuclear experiments, the decision to rearm Germany, the cost of NATO defenses and the construction of U.S. air bases on European soil.

Holsti implies that these groups are linked together as a consequence of a judgment about their views. Instead, as the full quotation shows, these groups are linked only by their common reaction to certain events, which is a statement of fact, not of judgment.

Professor Holsti contends (p. 217) that the structure of the theories of his "radical right" and his "radical left" are similar. There are indeed "points of similarity" among works to which Professor Holsti refers. To the extent that there are similarities among works representing a wide spectrum of thought on American foreign policy, Professor Holsti has provided a useful service in illuminating them for the reader. However, it would have been of greater utility for Professor Holsti to have included in his analysis other writers besides his so-called "radical" groups. Had he done so, he might have found that some of the views that he imputes to the groups under examination in his article are held to varying degrees by many other writers or groups. For example, the idea that there is a relationship, or "linkage," between domestic policy and foreign policy is by no means unique to groups considered in this article. Most analysts of American foreign policy, traditional and contemporary, have been aware of the importance of the impact of domestic policy and the structure of domestic political systems upon the foreign policy of a country.

Given Professor Holsti's failure to develop a clear differentiation of the so-called "radical right" and "radical left" from other groups in the broad spectrum of thought in American foreign policy, together with his effort to compare alleged "bedfellows" whose writings are separated by a decade or more in time, the result is a strained and often inaccurate comparison. Professor Holsti's inability to define adequately the schools of thought which he discusses, together with the inaccuracies contained in his article restricts greatly its value in providing an understanding either of the debate within the United States on postwar foreign policy or the complex issues facing us as a nation over the past generation and in the 1970s.

Sincerely,
ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, JR.
*Foreign Policy Research Institute*

TO THE EDITOR:

Although I have admired much of Dr. Pfaltzgraff's work, I find that his critique of my essay is not persuasive.

(1) He asserts that I do not have a precise

definition of the two groups of authors under review. In Footnote 7 I discuss some of the problems. As anyone who has tried to deal with such terms as radical, right, left, liberal, or conservative is aware, no definition will satisfy everyone. In his penetrating new book, *In Search of American Foreign Policy*, Professor Lincoln Bloomfield refers to Strausz-Hupé, Kintner, et al., as the "militant right" (p. 34). I have a slight preference for "radical," but I would happily give in on this point because the essay does not stand or fall on it. I would continue to maintain, however, that the radical right authors are intensely critical of American liberalism, and they seek fundamental rather than incremental changes in American institutions and public policy. In foreign policy this has meant, among other things, advocacy of a "forward strategy" rather than "containment," willingness to take higher military risks, and heavier defense spending, usually at the expense of domestic health, welfare, or other humanitarian programs.

(2) I was aware of Dr. Kissinger's review of *Protracted Conflict*, from which Dr. Pfaltzgraff quotes a sentence. Many other reviewers were highly critical. I thought it would be better to read the book for myself, however. In my view, the book is simplistic and misguided, both as analysis and prescription. That the book was published in 1959 rather than 1974 does not, in my opinion, salvage it. Because appeals to the reputation of reviewers will not settle the issue, each reader will have to decide the merits of *Protracted Conflict* for himself.

(3) I am charged with "An unfortunately large number of inaccuracies." I would invite interested readers, as I did on page 218 of my essay, to follow up the numerous references to determine whether in fact I have maligned the authors under review. The quotation from page 41 of *Protracted Conflict* does appear to leave a small loophole to the observation that the authors in question believe that Communist foreign policy undertakings are always the result of planning and calculation. But the preceding paragraphs, as well as the thrust of the entire book, make it clear that the loophole is roughly equivalent to the statement that "I am not prepared to argue that all persons who leap from the Golden Gate Bridge will always be killed."

(4) Dr. Pfaltzgraff asserts that some of the beliefs discussed in my essay—specifically the linkages between domestic and foreign policies—are also shared by other analysts. On p. 236 I wrote, "The premise of linkages between domestic and external policies is a reasonable working hypothesis, although it can hardly claim the status of an empirically-based 'iron law' with which it is endowed by the writers under review." In various other places on pp. 235 and 236 I stated explicitly that the radical right and radical left are not unique in all respects.

(5) Some of the literature from the radical right was written slightly earlier than that of the radical left. However, 62 per cent of the items cited from the right were published after 1965, compared to 75 per cent from the left. Thus, there is substantial overlap not only in date of publication, but also in the events to which they address themselves. Prominent among these is the Vietnam War, discussed on pp. 232–233. In any case, most if not all of the authors in both groups claim to have discovered important generalizations about foreign policy that will survive beyond tomorrow's headlines. Certainly I have found no suggestions from their proponents that the theories of "international communism" and "capitalist imperialism" are of merely fleeting validity. Finally, given this criticism, I am puzzled by the charge that I failed to look all the way back to the Strausz-Hupé and Possony textbook of 1950, written a good decade too soon to cover many of the events dealt with by most of the other authors. Aside from date of publication, the main reason for the omission was simply a decision not to consider introductory-level textbooks. Also omitted was a book I thought was atypical: Stefan Possony's venture into racism, *Geography of Intellect*, written with Nathaniel Weyl.

(6) Dr. Pfaltzgraff chides me for linking the FPRI with the University of Pennsylvania. The first issue of *Orbis* (April, 1957) states: "*Orbis* is published four times a year, January, April, July and October, for the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania." The two institutions are linked in every issue of *Orbis* until the Autumn, 1970, issue. Presumably a divorce took place at that time. The complaint is therefore technically valid, if a bit disingenuous.

(7) I did not claim that *Orbis* was a "radical right" journal. I wrote (p. 218) that, "These writers publish prolifically, not only in their own journal, but also in several books on contemporary international affairs." The initial issue of *Orbis* states: "Not all of the Institute's [FPRI] studies lend themselves to publication in book form. Hence, *Orbis*, a quarterly, will supply a much needed outlet for the Institute's materials." It is also true that the authorship and tone of *Orbis* have changed in recent years. Messers. Strausz-Hupé, Possony, Kintner, Daugherty, and Cottrell have appeared some forty times as authors or co-authors in the journal, but much less frequently during the 1970s.

(8) The quotation linking liberals, pacifists, socialists and neutralists is not a distortion: it is merely a repetition of a device used repeatedly by the radical right in its effort to discredit liberals

and liberalism. Many other examples could be cited. Consider the following: "Liberal and leftist intellectuals throughout the world take it for granted that imperialism is a peculiar vice of the west" (*Protracted Conflict*, p. 101).

(9) Early drafts of my essay were sent to about a dozen authors whose works were most often cited. I receive four responses: A gracious and helpful letter from Dr. Gar Alperovitz; a note from Professor Gabriel Kolko asserting that he does not discuss his work with unknown critics; a rather garbled defense of his views from Mr. Philip Resnick; and a letter and package of materials from Dr. Kintner. Dr. Kintner's letter asserted without specific elaboration that his recent views had changed. The accompanying material was a curious mélange of rough notes, unpublished mimeographed materials, and assorted minor items. Little of it addressed the points in my essay, none of it explicitly repudiated works such as *Protracted Conflict*, and at best it was of rough draft quality. Footnote 1 of my essay thanks Dr. Kintner for his letter. Footnote 8, taking his letter at face value, acknowledges that he has possibly changed some of his views, even though this is not evident in the materials he made available to me.

I sincerely appreciate both Dr. Pfaltzgraff's interest in my essay and the opportunity to respond to his letter. Although exchanges of this type are useful, they are inherently too brief to provide definitive answers to all issues. Therefore, I would again invite readers interested in judging the validity of my essay to trace my footnotes back to the original literature.

Ole R. Holsti

*Duke University*

To the Editor:

Since Leibniz is usually, and with good reason, taken to be the greatest German philosopher before Kant; and since my *Political Writings of Leibniz* (Cambridge University Press, 1972) is the first edition to make a considerable number of his political pieces available in English; and since Richard Kennington in reviewing the book (*APSR*, March 1974) concentrated his attention on three or four "errors" in the Introduction to the book (to the exclusion of four-fifths of the text); and since these "errors" are either demonstrably not errors or are alternative ways of looking at problematical aspects of Leibniz's practical philosophy—alternative ways suggested by Leibniz's own words—it is my view that R.K.'s review is, at best, onesided. It would have been one thing for the reviewer to show that a given line of interpretation in my Introduction lacks inevitability or irresistibility, though it might have plausibility and be backed up by an important Leibnizian text; instead of this, R.K. speaks of "notable error," of "defective" reporting of Leibnizian arguments, and of insufficient "awareness." The claims being what they are, I feel entitled to defend my work.

In his first paragraph R.K. taxes me with being "far from sufficiently aware" that Leibniz's political thought involves "an extraordinary fusion of old politics and new natural science." Even if one accepts this characterization of Leibniz's politics—which is tolerably right when stated in so general a way—my book cannot fairly be charged with lack of "awareness" on this point, since one of the longest Leibniz pieces which I translated (*Memoir for Enlightened Persons of Good Intention*, not mentioned by the reviewer), presents precisely Leibniz's argument in favor of princes' supporting the new sciences with a view to diminishing human misery. And one of Leibniz's letters to Thomas Burnett, which I took care to include, but which R.K. again does not mention, is decisive on this point: "In my opinion an Archimedes, a Galileo, a Kepler, a Descartes, a Huygens, a Newton are . . . at least on a par with those esteemed legislators whose aim has been to lead men to what is truly good." I think that "sufficient awareness" was shown in choosing to translate such pieces in preference to others.

But R.K.'s more important point seems to be that I am not "aware" that Leibniz "made use of" certain "old" ideas of Plato, Aristotle, and the scholastics "in order to oppose modern egalitarian doctrines of natural law and natural rights." Now I certainly pointed out repeatedly that Leibniz did not accept egalitarianism, at least in politics, and partly for Platonic and Aristotelian reasons; what I must not be "aware" of, then, is that Leibniz "made use of"—as distinguished, perhaps, from "believed in"—certain "old" political ideas in order to be able to oppose egalitarianism. The notion that Leibniz "made use of" certain old political doctrines means (or at least seems to say) that what Leibniz may have accepted as true in the "old" ideas is not what matters; that what matters is his having "made use of" these old ideas "in order" to "oppose" modern egalitarianism. To be "sufficiently aware" that this was in fact Leibniz's "unique" achievement, I would have to grant that Leibniz merely used old ideas "in order to oppose" modern moral novelties, but I could not hold that he opposed novelties *because* he believed that (some of) the old ideas were right or true. I could not, that is, treat belief in "old" ideas as the *reason* for rejecting (say) egalitarianism. This, then, is not a question of "awareness" at all; in R.K.'s review lack of agreement is converted into lack of awareness. And since one who is unaware might well fall into the "errors" which he goes on to point out, this is doubtless a convenient charge.

Moreover—to mention it only in passing—R.K. is not sufficiently careful when he urges that Leibniz's "conservative and apparently derivative political thought" is "placed upon" a novel philosophical foundation. The relation of his political thought to his philosophy is not one of mere juxtaposition, of "placing upon," but one of systematic connection and even attempted derivation—as in Leibniz's constant claim that since all truths are essentially of one kind, one can no more imagine a true concept of justice as the arbitrary creation of God than one can imagine that "the reason that a triangle has three sides, or that two contrary propositions are incompatible, or that God himself exists, is that God has willed it so" (*Political Writings of Leibniz*, p. 72). This notion of the nature of all true propositions Leibniz used not just to defeat the Cartesian view that the reason that it is true that $A=A$ or that $2+2=4$ is that God has willed it so, but also to defeat the Hobbesian notion that "irresistibly" powerful beings can create true justice by fiat (*Leviathan* Ch. 31), and to uphold the Platonic notion (*Euthyphro* 10 d–e) that moral truths are the motive, not the effect, of even a divine will. To speak, then, of "placing" a "derivative" (rather than derived) political thought "upon" a novel foundation gives little sense of the real relation of Leibniz's political theory to his philosophy.

I turn now from "insufficient awareness" to "notable error." And the notable error into which I have been "led" by using a procedure "modeled on Leibnizian writings that begin with God" is that of "attributing to Leibniz the view that evil is an eternal uncreated essence in the divine mind, the source of evil in the world." "Despite certain appearances to the contrary," R.K. adds, "this procedure was recognized as impossible by Leibniz." Now the main "appearance to the contrary," in which Leibniz in fact argued repeatedly that evil in the world is ultimately traceable to evil as an uncreated essence in the mind of God ("when a wicked man exists, God must have found in the region of possibles the idea of such a man forming part of that sequence of things, the choice of which was demanded by the greatest perfection of the universe") is nothing less than Leibniz' *Theodicy*, which (1) is the only large philosophical work that he himself ever published, which (2) constitutes Leibniz's main effort to establish a "universal jurisprudence" in which "universal right is the same for God and for men" (given his notion that all "truths" are the same for all intelligent "substances"), and which (3) R.K. does not mention *at all*—though it is, clearly enough, a "Leibnizian writing" which "begins with God." It is true, of course, as I pointed out at some length, that Leibniz attempted to draw a distinction (in the *Theodicy* and elsewhere) between "metaphysical evil" (limitation or imperfection or "privation," which characterizes the essences of all things other than God, since only God is perfect) and "moral evil" (sin or wrongdoing). But in the end the distinction between metaphysical and moral evil tends to collapse in his system: "[Human] free will is the proximate cause of the evil of punishment, although it is true that the original imperfection of creatures, which is already presented in the eternal ideas, is the first and most remote cause." Since R.K. does not mention the fact that Leibniz's chief objective in practical philosophy was the construction of a "universal jurisprudence," he does not tell one why Leibniz might have fallen into so awkward a position—namely that he wanted to defend God against the charge of unjustly creating evil by urging that God simply "translated" evil essences into existence as elements of a world which is "best" rather than perfectly good. And it was in this connection that I said that "assigning evil to the status of an essence not created by God saves him from the charge of voluntarily manufacturing evil; but it not only virtually destroys moral responsibility in human beings . . . , it also raises the question: Why, if an actual universe could not be perfect throughout (a multiplication of God), and if the admission of evil was the *conditio sine qua non* of the best [possible world], did God create existence?" What I was asking was whether men and God can operate under the same principle of "universal right," if Leibniz holds that all beings less perfect than God are necessarily "metaphysically evil," that metaphysical evil is the "first and most remote cause" of moral evil in the world, and that this merely "best" world, which (Leibniz grants) *need* not have been translated into existence, is still *justifiable*. What I said about Leibniz's concept of evil, then, far from being a "notable error," is founded squarely on Leibniz's most extended (and only published) effort to reconcile divine justice, human moral responsibility, and the nature of evil, the *Theodicy*—a work devoted to proving, *inter alia*, that "evil springs from the forms themselves in their detached state, that is, from the ideas which God has not produced by an act of his will."

Having treated of insufficient awareness and of notable error, I turn finally to "defective" reporting of Leibniz's theory of substance. What I said in my book (pp. 12–13) was that for Leibniz a substance is a psychic being which is characterized by "perception" (or "intelligence" in the higher monads) when "passive" and by "force" when active; that while substances are not themselves material, they are always conjoined with bodies in actual existence; that the reason that a substance is not material or corporeal is that matter can be subdivided *ad infinitum* but that to account for perception or intelligence and for action there must be a point of "unity"—a "mind," in higher monads—which is not subdivisible. Now according to R.K. my "reports" about Leibnizian substances are "defective" because I say that while substances are not themselves material, I cite on the same page Leibniz's notion that a "complete corporeal substance" involves a conjoining of mind or soul or "primitive force" *with* matter, solidity and resistance. But there is no "discrepancy" here, as R.K. insists, unless "substance" is equivalent to "complete corporeal substance." Who cannot see that the notions of "completeness" and of "corporeality" *add* something to the simple notion of "substance"? For Leibniz one cannot derive the concept of substance from the properties of matter; nonetheless substances are conjoined with matter—hence the distinction between a "substance" and a "complete corporeal substance." And this matters for Leibniz's politics, since only an "intelligence" could understand an idea such as justice, and only a being endowed with "force" could *act* justly.

I shall not take up in detail the lesser criticisms made in R.K.'s review, though most of them seem to me as little justified as the ones I have treated. I could "wish" (to borrow R.K.'s term) that he had not suggested that Leibniz offers a "material" account of justice derived from Aristotle's *Ethics* when in fact Leibniz uses Aristotelian notions of justice only secondarily (and inconsistently) and ordinarily defines justice, for God or men, as "the charity of the wise" ("neither Moses, nor Christ, nor the Apostles nor the ancient Christians regulated justice otherwise than according to charity . . . [and] I, too, after having tried countless definitions of justice, finally felt myself satisfied only by this one"); and that he had not argued that Leibniz's "ultimate" harmonizing achievement was to "reinterpret ancient virtue hedonistically," since this is true only of the *Nouveaux Essais* (among major works) and leaves the idea of a "universal jurisprudence" based on charity out of account. I could wish that instead of dwelling on errors and defects which turn out to be neither, the reviewer had pointed out which Leibniz pieces actually appear in this edition—among them long writings on justice and natural law, attacks on Hobbes's concept of sovereignty, an extensive defense of Hapsburg rights in Spain, several commentaries on the Abbé de St. Pierre's *Project for Perpetual Peace*, letters to Bossuet on the reunification of Christendom, an evaluation of Shaftesbury's *Characteristics*, etc. Not one of these pieces was mentioned.

In view of the reviewer's doubts about the accuracy of my work, it was charitable of him to say, at the end, that it does have one "great merit." For it was one of Leibniz's favorite notions that "charity must prevail over all other considerations in the world."

PATRICK RILEY

*University of Wisconsin*

TO THE EDITOR:

Professor Riley believes that I underestimated the importance of Leibniz's political writings. Otherwise I would have concentrated my review less on (erroneous) criticism of his Introduction, and more on Leibniz. Everybody knows the platitude that Leibniz is "the greatest German philosopher before Kant," but when is Riley going to tell us in what the importance of his political writings consists? The political thought of "great philosophers" is often of small importance; we do not find Berkeley or Husserl in the histories of Sabine or Strauss-Cropsey. Riley's failure to give us any grounds to become interested in these political writings derives from his conclusion that Leibniz's philosophy is essentially a "rationalized medieval system" (p. 2). Riley's Leibniz is a peculiarly tedious, belated medieval, since "the central question in Leibniz" (p. 16) is the divine responsibility for evil, to which he allegedly gives a peculiarly unsatisfactory answer. As in his Introduction, so again in his response, Riley devotes more space to this problem than any other.

(1) *Leibniz's uniqueness.* All the objections I raised, and all those he now raises, point to this medieval bias. It subordinates the ancients as well as the moderns, whose great quarrel Leibniz sought to compose. Its first major consequence is Riley's neglect of Leibniz the philosopher and pioneer of modern natural science. For example, in his account of the metaphysics of substance (pp. 12–17) we find not a word about the dependence of metaphysics on dynamics. This dependence is not buried in recondite scientific writings. It is stated forcefully in the first paragraphs of Leibniz's first published systematic account of his system, the *New System*, and often elsewhere. The substance doctrine is meant to reconcile the teleology of the ancients with the mechanism of the moderns—as Leibniz says many times. Accordingly, I characterized the distinctiveness of Leibniz's political thought as lying not in its political content which is traditional, but in its metaphysical foundation which is modern in so far as dependent on modern science. Rather amazingly, Riley believes that he accepted this formulation, or its simplified equivalent—"an extraordinary fusion of old politics and new natural science." Had he not included two selections that stress the importance of science or scientists? But both selections are as devoid of the connec-

tion of metaphysics and natural science as was Riley's Introduction. It was of this connection that I said Riley lacked "sufficient awareness,"—and not of Leibniz's use of "old ideas" of the pre-modern tradition to oppose modern egalitarianism. (A rereading should surely convince Riley that he misread me.) It is not opposition as such to modern egalitarianism "that matters" but the strict dependence of Leibniz's inegalitarianism on modern natural science. The implications of modern natural science have been understood in opposed manners by egalitarians (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau) and inegalitarians (Bacon, Descartes, Shaftesbury, Nietzsche). Among the latter Leibniz is at once the greatest scientist and the one clear exponent of pre-modern natural right. Riley's neglect of natural science renders invisible Leibniz's place in this part of the history of political philosophy.

(2) *Systematic connection.* Riley is therefore badly situated to charge that I ignored the "systematic connection" in Leibniz's thought, since he still makes no connection between the science of nature and the nature of man. Riley cannot exhibit systematic connection because he views Leibniz's system as a one-way deduction from God's nature to the nature and existence of worldly substances. He wrote that "it is perfection which holds the Leibnizian system together" (p. 17). I objected that he had failed "to explain, specify, or derive the Leibnizian meaning of 'perfection'." He does not even mention this important objection; it is in part the same as his failure to explain the natural basis of human inequality (see below). In general, Riley neglects the critical distinction in the philosophic and scientific tradition between what is "first to us" (the world as immediately experienced), and what is first "in itself" (first causes and principles). A two-way procedure is needed; an ascent from the former must precede the attempted deduction from the latter. Only divine revelation of the nature of God, or medieval revealed theology, would permit the descent without the ascent. From the nature of God Leibniz did not and could not deduce the worldly substances in their specific character—as "real unities," "substantial forms," "first entelechies" or "more intelligibly . . . primitive forces." It was this "systematic" descent from deity alone which I said "was recognized as impossible by Leibniz"—not the absurdities Riley's misreading attributes to me. The *Theodicy* indeed "begins with God," but who would say this great Christian apologia is "a systematic account of Leibniz' philosophy" (my phrase)? (Not Leibniz—Loemker II, 1067.)

(3) *Essence of evil.* In line with this medievalized metaphysics as exclusively deduction from diety, Riley still attributes to Leibniz "the view that evil is an eternal uncreated essence in the divine mind, the source of evil in the world." But he mistakenly equates the essence of evil in the divine mind, of which Leibniz does not speak, with the essence of (this or that) evil man. Or does Riley think that in the divine mind there are no universals and only essences of particular substances? The evil of a particular evil man is traceable to the same type of cause as the imperfection of any good man. The essence of each is that of a particular being, therefore a limited being, in which there is greater or less privation of perfection, a difference of degree only. Hence no eternal essence of evil in the divine mind is required, and the texts Riley cites do not assert or imply one.

(4) *Substance.* Neglect of the prior ascent from experience and science underlies Riley's difficulties about substance. He combined the assertion that substances are immaterial with the reference to "complete corporeal substance." He could have removed this contradiction by noting Leibniz's distinction between simple (immaterial) substance and compound substance (unified organisms or animals and nonunified *aggregata—minerals, mountains*), which we find in many texts. "A true substance, such as an animal, is composed of an immaterial soul, and an organized body" (Erdmann, p. 736). Hence it remains incorrect to say that substances are immaterial. Riley's silence on the simple/compound distinction amounts to the equation of substance with simple substance (mind or soul). He thinks Leibniz "conjoins" or "adds on" body and its properties to the simple to make a compound, which he does not acknowledge is compound substance. But the simples are rather "forms constitutive of substances," i.e., compound substances (*New System*, #4). Riley relies on those Leibnizian statements in which the substance doctrine is stated apart from the dependence on the dynamics of force, and neglects those in which that dependence is clear: "forms" are, in one sense, "primitive forces."

Since man is not a soul but a compound animal substance, Riley's neglect of natural science deprives Leibniz's political thought of its proper metaphysical foundation. In fact, the simple substance on the lowest level is not strictly a mind or soul, as Riley thinks, but an entelechy of force "conceived in imitation of the ideas we have of soul." It possesses merely "something analogous to feeling and appetite" (*New System*, #3). From these low-grade organisms the *scala naturae* ascends by infinitely small gradations of form or perfection up to the human animal with self-consciousness, and continues its gradations within the human species. This *scala naturae*, governed by the Law of Continuity, is meant to overcome the dualisms of mind/body and life/nonlife. Only in this region can we find the natural basis of Leibniz's political inegalitarianism. As regards a theological explanation, it is ultimately nugatory. "The question why God has given to one mind more perfection than to another, is among senseless questions. . . . " (Erdmann, p. 670). The form or entelechy, borrowed in part from Aristotle, is conceived partly in opposition to him: each individual is unique, not accidentally, but in its entelechy or essence. Otherwise no two individuals would be genuinely distinguishable. To approach Leibniz's political thought, we must recognize that "ontological" basis which combines ancient natural aristocracy with the modern dignity of the individual.

(5) *Justice and hedonism.* Riley thinks that Leibniz's "brush with hedonism" (p. 19) did not modify seriously his acceptance of Christian and ancient doctrines of virtue. This modification is "true only of the *Nouveaux Essais* (among major works). . . . " With what right does Riley dismiss the conflicting evidence of minor works and a "major work"—the longest and most complete philosophic statement Leibniz ever composed, twice rewritten and only left unpublished owing to Locke's untimely death? Still more marvelous, the main propositions that connect justice and hedonism are supplied by Riley's own volume. Justice is the "charity of the wise" (p. 54); "wisdom is the science of felicity" (p. 83); "felicity is a lasting state of pleasure" (p. 83); "wisdom is the knowledge of our own good" (p. 57). This hedonist strand of Leibniz' thought—according to which the goal of human activity is referred to pleasure—is as clearly represented here as in the *New Essays* ("happiness is a lasting state of pleasure"—Langley ed. p. 83).

Riley might reply that "charity is the essence of justice" (p. 4); he seems to believe that "the ancient Christians" were charitable, therefore just. But wisdom is the precondition of charity: "wisdom ought to guide charity" (p. 171). At least once Riley grants that the Leibnizian wise man finds a model in the Platonic philosopher (p. 22). Is the wisdom of Socrates the same as that of "the ancient Christians"? The wise man, far from being "no respecter of persons," practices "distributive justice" (see pp. 172, 174, 63). "Wisdom ordains that benevolence have degrees" (p. 198). Even if this Aristotelian element were "inconsistent" as Riley holds, it should only lead us to reflect on the amazing inconsistencies in Leibniz's "harmonizations."

(6) *Harmonization and prudence.* Riley makes no direct response to my question, "Is not the harmonization of apparently inconsistent elements, ancient and modern, pagan and Christian, often more prudential than real?" Instead he bravely jettisons doctrines (hedonism, distributive justice), minor works, and the *Nouveaux Essais* that do not fit his "rationalized medieval system." The question of Leibniz's prudence has surely subsided since Bertrand Russell trumpeted his "insincerity." But Riley is the only Leibnizian scholar known to me who does not at least mention the problem. This neglect might have been rectified by reflection on "German philosophy before Kant." Riley says that Leibniz "admitted (rather uncritically) the idea of eternal damnation" (p. 10). Lessing and Eberhard agreed that Leibniz did not accept the literal, orthodox meaning of the doctrine of eternal damnation. They disagreed as to whether Leibniz's endorsement of that doctrine was "prudent" or "insincere." Lessing opposed "the rather prevalent conception that Leibniz 'believed nothing of what he tried to persuade the world to believe' " (H. Allison, *Lessing and the Enlightenment*, p. 91). Lessing said "[Leibniz] did nothing more nor less than the ancient philosophers were wont to do with their exoteric lectures" (*Werke*, ed. Rilla VII, p. 466). Leibniz advocated "the distinction of the ancients between the *exoteric*, i.e., popular, and the *acroamatic* mode of writing" (*New Essays*, Langley ed. p. 272; see the same distinction in the young Leibniz of 1670, Erdmann, p. 63). The rhetorical problem sometimes lies in determining whether Leibniz's concern is primarily religious or political, as in his great prophecy about the future of Europe. Those who believe themselves "released from the troublesome fear of an overseeing providence and of a menacing future . . . dispose all things to the general revolution with which Europe is threatened, and accomplish the destruction of what still remains in the world of the generous sentiments of the Greeks and Romans" (*New Essays*, Langley ed. pp. 535–536).

Richard Kennington
*Pennsylvania State University*

To the Editor:

Harry Eckstein's recent article on the delimitation of politics in terms of authority patterns (*APSR*, December 1973), though it is a welcome argument about a difficult and critical topic, fails to find the optimum stance between homogeneity and extensiveness he seeks and succeeds merely in defining his own ambiguities. Yet his problem could have been avoided by the use of a different "branching" criterion and by basing his definition of politics on a less restrictive theoretical construct.

The central difficulty is that his proposed definition does not fit the requirements of a classification scheme he himself posits. A classification scheme, he argues, should have the characteristic that "all instances of the subject matter fall into one subset or the other, so that all cases in a subset share one characteristic which is not found in any case in the other subset." Done correctly, this will "preclude ambivalence (i.e., having equally good reasons for classifying a case under two or more sets) and also preclude ambiguity (difficulty in deciding to what set a case belongs)" (pp. 1148–49). He divides social relationships into symmetrical and asymmetrical relationships. Yet his discussion of symmetrical relationships (super-super and sub-sub) which are either a traditional concern of political scientists—a fact he can blame on the misguided development of the discipline—or an important aspect of his own conceptualization—a problem he cannot push aside since it deals with the definition of politics regardless of disciplinary interests—reveals his own ambivalence and weakens the validity of his initial distinction between political and nonpolitical actions. His statement that the resulting "conceptual dissonance can be tolerated" (p. 1159) does little except give a semantic gloss to his classification's fatal flaw, its inconsistency. Dissonance can be tolerated for practical purposes, but not for logical classification.

Eckstein fails to give sufficient weight to the distinction between the logic and the utility of a classification scheme. Logically, a scheme must be exclusive and exhaustive, a matter of all or nothing. The utility of the scheme, on the other hand, depends on the real world, where data and events are neither exclusive nor total. A classification scheme, if its logical requirements lead to a distortion of empirical cases, so that commonly grouped and objectively similar data end up in uncommon classes, lacks utility. Eckstein's schema does exactly that, and he can include much of the common concerns and the disciplinary foci of political scientists only by extending his definition, muddling his categories, and undermining his classification. Nor can the proposed conception be defended by the argument that just because symmetrical relationships are common concerns of political scientists, nevertheless they should be outside the pale of the discipline. The new way of looking at things should be theoretically consistent; it must be convincing as well. Eckstein's new way does neither.

The second reason for the ambiguity in his schema is more critical than its lack of utility. It is the result of an unnecessary addition to his initial and correct focus, an addition which undermines the logical consistency of the scheme. Two of the three differentiating criteria between political and nonpolitical relationships seem valid: the limitation of a boundary—a social unit; and the pursuit of a social goal for the unit—its direction. The third proposed criterion, relations which occur "among hierarchically ordered segments, or manifestly affect their relations" (p. 1151) is unclear (what is "manifestly"?) as well as superfluous. The requirement that asymmetrical relations are political only when they are institutionalized leads directly to the ambivalence in placing symmetrical relations which "manifestly" affect politics.

The main cause of the difficulty is Eckstein's conception of politics by both structural (role, hierarchy) and behavioral (actions, perceptions of legitimacy) criteria. As Ralf Dahrendorf pointed out long ago, discussing Parsons, there is no logical step from individual action to systemic structure and function. Incorporating both into one definition of politics is an act of will which sacrifices either individual action to systemic necessity or reduces systemic necessities to mere probabilities of action. Eckstein, in chosing neither one or the other as his theoretical base, lands in ambivalence, and remarkably close to Easton's position (despite his critique of it)—which may be a reasonable position for a practising political scientist but is fatal to the theorist. His defense of the theoretical weaknesses reveals this. They are pragmatic excuses, not logical supports.

Yet Eckstein's notion of authority patterns, his central focus and a reasonable one, need not be tied to role-institutionalized hierarchy. Another criterion exists and can be utilized. Authority is subjective ranking in an interpersonal relationship, a point Eckstein makes and a definition he uses himself (authority is a "label for a structure in which activities, roles and instruments evoke legitimacy sentiments, positive and negative," (p. 1153). The perception of legitimacy is, for Eckstein, the dividing line between authoritative and nonauthoritative structure, between authority and power or control. The differentiating criterion is not hierarchy. Asymmetrical directives are political when their source evokes legitimacy sentiments, or is perceived as authoritative.

Authority is not necessarily based on hierarchy. It also need not be based on perceptions of legitimacy. Legitimacy, the perception of moral right to rule, may be a source of authority; it is not the only one. If we define authority as the acceptance of direction by evaluating the source without regard for the content of the directive, then the question how such authority comes about is another matter, yet it is clear that other factors—power, interests, tradition, etc.—can have a place in such a process.

Eckstein's central point can be restated and affirmed once the invalidating qualifications he adds are removed. The essential element of his definition is individual compliance with directives in a social unit because they are perceived as authoritative. The focus is on individual action.

The direction of the unit can be discussed in terms of the motivations for compliance and noncompliance individual actors have. A differentiating scheme based on individual action in authoritative, asymmetrical relationships could be this:

Leader–Led Linkages

| Type of Linkage | Differentiating Characteristic |
|---|---|
| Social Influence | Modification of another's action |
| Mere influence | |
| Power | Intention to modify |
| Manipulation | |
| Overt power | Awareness of intention by influenced |
| Persuasion | |
| Influence | Immediacy of compliance motivation |
| Expediency: interest | |
| Emotion: affect | |
| Habit: tradition | |
| Fear: force | Motive for compliance: standard of justification |
| Legitimacy: morality | |
| Other: other | |

This typology follows Easton's influence typology fairly closely, with the exception that the branching under "overt power" is different. To Easton all "overt power" is authority, with the exception of physical force (no choice) and rational argument (persuasion). In the typology shown here, authority can be any of the influence relations. If the source of direction has gained the status of authority, the influence relation is authoritative. If compliance occurs because of the immediate recognition of the expediency, rightness or force of the content of the directive then influence exists. (There is a distinction made between immediate motive for action and justification for action or motive in this typology which is not elaborated.)

This typology eliminates the problem Eckstein's has. Politics is any influence relation which is authoritative. But its political character is defined by the perceptions and motivations of the participants, and not by the observer or the institutionalized structure of the social unit. Political systems exist only as the coming together of political acts at a particular point in time. As M. Edelman argues, "there is no real political system. To people in diverse situations one or another facet is real for the time being and for the issues that concern them" (*The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, p. 21). There are only people acting. Individual action, and institutions aggregated on them, is political action when the perception of authority is the motive for action.

If this definition of politics advocated here against Eckstein's strikes one as too removed from the subjective interests of the discipline or as too heterogeneous, so be it. Yet it has two virtues. One, a definition of politics which does not do violence to reality can be based on it. Second, it allows for theoretical consistency. The political system, its institutions, the way politics is done has as its basic, irreducible element individual action in a subjectively asymmetrical relationship. If professional sensibilities are offended they are outweighed by the gain in consistency, and this dissonance can be tolerated.

Otwin Marenin

*Ahmadu Bello University, Nigeria*

To the Editor:

I take the essence of Marenin's argument to be this:

> (a) My proposed delimitation of "politics" is inconsistent in that I consider political relationships to be a species of between-level, asymmetrical social relationships, but nevertheless admit certain within-level, symmetrical relationships to political inquiry. The (acknowledged) logical felony is supposedly covered up by two cosmetic phrases.
>
> (b) One alleged cause of this inconsistency is my use of procrustean means to keep some subjects conventionally studied by political scientists within the boundaries of politics. A second is my use of a "behavioral" trait (the evoking of perceptions of legitimacy) to characterize political phenomena, alongside "structural" ones (asymmetrical relations in social units, between hierarchically ordered segments of them).
>
> (c) The inconsistency can be avoided by conceiving politics as a certain kind of influence relationship. This also allows one to continue grouping as political, things "commonly" so grouped and "objectively similar," including activities I can admit to the field only via logical chicanery.

(1) I will consider (c) first, for if Marenin's alternative delimitation makes sense the other points are moot. But I do not think it will wash.

Marenin certainly does not supply much in the way of reasoning to support his proposal, other than that it avoids difficulties he discerns in mine. Perhaps this is due to the necessary brevity of these communications. However, there are problems with his proposal which lengthy discussion is unlikely to dispel. (I must, of course, be brief about these too.)

"Political" acts, Marenin argues, are any "authoritative" acts of influence in a social unit. Acts of influence are those that intentionally seek to modify others' behavior, where the others are aware of the intention, and compliance motivations are evoked. I do not want to quarrel with this conception of influence; a lot of such conceptions are extant, and though not everyone would want to use the term in Marenin's sense, his meaning at least is clear. In any case, I too consider "influence"—by superordinates on subordinates, and by subs on supers—a critical dimension (actually a set of dimensions) of politics, and so treat it, at considerable length, in a forthcoming book on authority patterns, co-authored with Ted Robert Gurr. The really tricky proviso in Marenin's proposal is that acts of influence, to be political, must be authoritative. What makes them authoritative? One can forgive the circularity in saying that acts are authoritative if their sources have the status of authority, for we are told what confers such status. Influencers have authority if they succeed for reasons other than fearful, expedient, or moral compliance; or, put positively, if they gain compliance through "emotion," "habit," or "other" (a category that should be banned, and for which Weber long ago provided an alternative with substance).

Thus defining political acts entails great costs; indeed one may wonder whether it would be possible to identify political acts on that basis at all. You have to know why people "comply" (allow themselves to be influenced), which is extraordinarily difficult. It is difficult partly because the matter is wholly subjective, partly because motives are usually complex composites. Who does not find it, in some measure, expedient to comply with authorities also accepted on other grounds, or frightening not to do so? And whose moral sentiments are not touched by compliance and noncompliance with leaders' directives or subs' demands? The difficulty is compounded by many orders of magnitude because all actions in social units must be studied to discover those that qualify for "political" status in the first place, for motives of compliance are rarely obvious or safe to assume, not least because they are generally compounds of dispositions. This defeats the whole purpose of delimitation, and is subject to the same objections that I raised against the "functionalist" conception of politics (p. 1145) and earlier attempts to equate politics with all social power, control, or influence (pp. 1146–1147).

What gain might justify the cost? Chiefly, of course, that Marenin's conception allows one to avoid the alleged contradiction in mind. (I leave aside the argument that, proceeding *à la* Marenin, one can avoid joining "behavioral" and "structural" characteristics to define political phenomena; I consider it obvious that people behave in structures.) The gain, however, is zero if there is no contradiction to avoid—and I do not think there is.

(2) It is true that I made the distinction between symmetrical and asymmetrical relations the first branch-point in distinguishing political from other social relationships, and used between-level versus within-level relations as another. I also stated that some within-level, generally symmetrical relationships so impinge on "political" ones that they cannot be ignored, and that this introduces an element of dissonance into my proposed delimitation of politics which "can be tolerated." This is one of the supposedly cosmetic phrases to which Marenin objects. He is not the first to do so; the phrase has been hopped on repeatedly by hunters for contradictions. But I did not just mean "psychologically tolerated"; I meant that there is no real logical problem. The immediately following sentences, which surely require equal attention, should make that clear. They state (to paraphrase) that symmetrical relations will require distinct theories of their own—the ultimate hallmark of typologically distinct categories; that, in the "real world," symmetrical and asymmetrical relations, within-level and between-level relations, will often be "intertwined"; and that, in consequence, full explanations will usually require at least two different sets of theories. This is nearly always so, whether one's subject is social, biological, or physical. It is not illogical to argue thus, but simply recognition of the ineluctable fact that in concrete reality quite different phenomena may impinge on one another. Furthermore, the needed *different* theories are unlikely to be developed in the first place if the different categories of experience to which they pertain are not distinguished. (Marenin, incidentally, also does not mention my argument that different categories of experience can still be theorized about at a level of generality higher than that at which they are distinguished—but, of course, at costs to the informativeness of theories.)

(3) The problem Marenin claims to have uncovered would be serious, indeed fatal, if I admitted any and all symmetrical and within-level social relations into the universe of politics. But I do not—only those that manifestly affect between-level, asymmetrical relationships concerned with the direction of social units. This brings up

the second supposedly cosmetic phrase that bothers Marenin. He seems puzzled by the term manifest, and obviously considers it an artful dodge. Why? The term has a familiar, precise meaning in social science: it refers to actions "intended and recognized" to have some specified effect, and which, for that reason, have an import readily apparent to observers. An example is Marenin's own conception of influence; another, more germane here, is any decision-making process among superordinates of a social unit. Such processes are "manifestly" concerned with the unit's direction and between-level relations in it. It is true that one might make mistakes about what is intended and recognized in the exercise of authority, but that matter is nowhere near as arcane as motives for compliance.

The same, I would argue, holds for the one "subjective" matter to be known to put my conception of politics to work: that perceptions of legitimacy are evoked. In fact, I posit in my article that all acts of direction in social units—anything to do with "rule" and "rules"—do evoke such perceptions, and treat them as intrinsic to direction, no less than directives issued and directors who issue them. There will no doubt, in some cases, be a fuzzy line between actions that evoke sentiments of legitimacy or simply moral judgments, like judgments of honesty or decorum; but it is likely to be thin. Anyway, Marenin also requires us to distinguish between moral and other kinds of perceptions.

Two points in conclusion. I do not want to seem mulish about my piece. No doubt it contains flaws, and still unfinished business. But I can think of objections more serious than Marenin's (e.g., how to distinguish symmetrical and asymmetrical relations with precision in the first place; how exactly to delimit "polity-authority," so to speak, from other subspecies). Since such other objections have not been raised I do not deal with them here, but rather hope that they will be raised, in this or some other forum.

There are, however, two things about which I am disposed to be inflexible. I am persuaded that studying and theorizing about patterns of authority, in any and all kinds of social units, is profoundly fascinating and consequential—and worthy of being an academic subject, whether or not the case for equating that subject with "political science" is ultimately convincing, and whether or not it is logical to study some symmetrical, within-level relations together with others in order to make sense of such patterns. I am just as persuaded that confining political study to "public" governance, as conventionally thought of, makes no sense. That is, most basically, why I wrote my article, and why I have taken the trouble, with Gurr, to write an extensive book about authority patterns. In that book many issues—descriptive, typological, methodological, and theoretical—not treated in my article are confronted; they include elaborate discussion of the within-level relationships relevant to the study of authority.

HARRY ECKSTEIN

*Princeton University*

TO THE EDITOR:

In October 1973 Leo Strauss died. In the December 1973 issue of the *APSR* (pp. 1372–1373) there was a review of his latest published book *Xenophon's Socrates*. An examination of that review tells a tale to which many morals could be attached.

It is short, consisting of two paragraphs. The burden of the first is that Mr. Strauss ignores the secondary literature and this is asserted to be a serious flaw. The second paragraph reads:

> Nor is the flaw redeemed by Professor Strauss's analysis, which is generally hard to follow, and often insensitive. A sample will do. At *Memorabilia IV*, iv 19, the sophist Hippias is made to agree with Socrates that there are unwritten laws made by the gods for men, for example, honoring gods and parents; but Hippias denies that the prohibition against incest is among those laws, on the ground that some nations transgress it. Professor Strauss infers that "He obviously implies that the unwritten laws are never transgressed by anyone, whether he thinks so from innocence or from the lack of it, we are in no position to tell" (p. 113). The obviousness is unobvious. Hippias is proceeding on an assumption common to his time, that divine law is, not untransgressible by individuals, but universal among peoples—an anticipation of the later association of *jus gentium* with *jus naturale*.

This is intended to show that Leo Strauss forces interpretations and is ignorant of what scholars like the reviewer know about the assumptions common to Hippias' time and the history of natural right. Now if one looks at the text on which the reviewer bases his flight of intellectual history, *Memorabilia* IV, iv 20, it can be seen that minimum precision would have required that he say " . . . Hippias denies that the prohibition against children having intercourse with parents is among those laws on the ground that some transgress it." *Nations* is the reviewer's addition, which makes Xenophon easier for him to follow and allows him his construction. But there is no reason to read *nations*. As a matter of fact the text as it is makes it impossible to do so, for Hippias could point to no nation which transgressed the prohibition against children having intercourse with parents. But believing is seeing, and the reviewer made his case by using the much weaker word *incest*. Xenophon's text is difficult to understand, and Leo Strauss tries to understand it as it is. This was always his only claim. How much more fitting it would have been if the reviewer had left it at his admission that he found "Professor Strauss' analysis . . . hard to follow."

I wrote the reviewer, R. E. Allen, asking him what the basis for his rendition was. He did not choose to respond.

I should like to suggest that there is a deep inner relation between the first and second paragraphs of the review. Immersed in the secondary literature, the reviewer cannot see ancient thought as it is but only as it is reflected in what is commonly said about it today.

And this second paragraph, as a sample of the work of *some* scholars, shows why Leo Strauss, a man who ignored nothing relevant to his studies, thought it sometimes more delicate to pass over such products in silence.

ALLAN BLOOM

*University of Toronto*

TO THE EDITORS:

If Professor Strauss were right about *Memorabilia* IV. iv. 19–20, then Hippias (or was it Xenophon?), though he was aware that some parents commit incest with their children, was not aware that some children fail to honor their parents, or that some people do not fear the gods.

This is, of course, absurd. It is an absurdity we may attribute either to the text of Xenophon, or to Professor Strauss' interpretation of that text. There is no adequate reason to attribute it to the text. Hippias denies that incest is a law of God on the ground that "some transgress it" (*τινας παραβαίνοντας αὐτόν*, 174.17, Hude). 'Some,' the indefinite relative, raises the question 'some *what*?,' and the answer, working back in our context, is some *men* (*ἀνθρώποις*, 174.11, *bis*). 'Men,' in turn, may be used collectively or distributively. Professor Strauss assumed the latter. The former is correct (*ἐν πάσῃ . . . χώρᾳ*, 174.5, cf. *οἱ ἄνθρωποι*, 174.6 and *πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις*, 174.11). The translation offered by J. S. Watson, "some nations transgress it," is thus accurate. This is not to say that E. C. Marchant's translation, "some transgress it," is incorrect; it only becomes so when taken out of context and misunderstood.

Professor Bloom objects that Hippias could have known no nation which countenanced incest between parents and children. How this anthropological theory is to be verified for the 4th and 5th centuries B.C., I do not know; nor do I care, since what is at issue is the proper construction of a Greek sentence in its context, a sentence which, properly construed, is evidence against the theory. And if I were permitted a *tu quoque* argument, I would suggest that it is not more absurd to deny that theory than it is to deny that some people, in the 5th and 4th centuries, did not fear the gods and did not honor their parents: literary sources aside, Athenian law dealt with both offenses.

I am surprised that Professor Bloom should complain that my review of *Xenophon's Socrates* was brief, given that it was also unfavorable—though indeed, it seemed to me sufficiently restrained not to merit an abusive response from a colleague. A longer review by Professor Terence Irwin will be found in the *Philosophical Review* for July, 1974 (pp. 409–413). It has the virtue of being both philologically and philosophically competent. The implied question with which it ends is one I must leave for Professor Bloom to answer.

R. E. ALLEN

*The Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton*

# EDITORIAL COMMENT

**Help wanted.** As it must to all editors, ex-editorship will overtake the current inhabitants of the *Review's* masthead with the issue of June 1977. Five issues before then, if the size of our current backlog holds, a new managing editor elect must be in place and ready to evaluate manuscripts for the June 1977 issue, and those following. That means by the end of 1975 the Council must hear the advice of the President, and select a new managing editor in accordance with the constitution and bylaws of the Association. A search committee has been appointed by President Austin Ranney, to advise him as he ponders the possibilities. This committee consists of six members. Two sit as ex-officio members: the current managing editor and the President-elect of the Association. In addition, three members are drawn from the Council and one other member from the editorial board of the *Review*.

Since members of the Association having an opinion about the future management of the *Review* should feel free to communicate with any or all of the members of this committee, we will list herewith their names and addresses:

1. Austin Ranney, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, 202 Junipero Serra Boulevard, Stanford, California (on leave from the University of Wisconsin); 2. James MacGregor Burns, Department of Political Science, Williams College, Williamstown, Massachusetts; 3. Martin Diamond, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C. (on leave from Northern Illinois University), 4. Dale Rogers Marshall, Department of Political Science, University of California, Davis, California; 5, John E. Turner, Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota; 6. Stephen V. Stephens, Department of Political Science, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland. In addition the managing editor can be reached at the usual place.

What qualifications for the job should we be bearing in mind as we go about our search? The last editor of the *Review* once stated within earshot that the private standard against which he measured potential candidates for the managing editor's job was John L. Lewis's famous description of John Nance Garner: "a poker-playing, whiskey-drinking, evil old man." It seemed to my illustrious predecessor that only persons approximating to these qualities would have the necessary consciousness of their own limitations and consequently the requisite compassion to discharge wisely responsibilities that affect the course of so many careers and the shape of intellectual discourse in our discipline. At the same time these nicely chosen epithets convey a certain joyfulness of spirit, a sustaining capacity to have a little fun in the most unpromising of circumstances.

All things considered, it is a wonder that the last managing editor ended up with a non-gambling teetotaler nearly fifteen years his junior for a successor. Perhaps this shows his flexibility, perhaps his capacity to be undeterred by superficialities. The tacit criteria he foreshadowed, in any event, if not the overt ones, are not bad guidelines.

What they suggest, among other things, is that certain human qualities come first, and that a number of other considerations will be of little or no help in screening candidates. For example, all purely demographic characteristics of political scientists—characteristics which commonly weigh heavily in determining job eligibility throughout most societies—are utterly irrelevant to the selection of a managing editor: sex, age, race, religion, height, weight. It is well known, for example, that tall people are far more likely to be selected for executive positions in most American enterprises, and fat people far less likely. On at least one of these counts, previous APSA search committees can claim very clear consciences.

Certain other characteristics of possible candidates are bound to count for something. It is important in order to tap the most competent advice available that managing editors have reasonably good access to informal networks of communication within the discipline. This would suggest at first blush that the Association would be better served if the managing editor were to come from a large department than a small one. Plenty of large departments, on the other hand, are collections of lonely prima donnas, and some small ones provide nearly ideal conditions of collegial access, so it is important to state this criterion as a property of an individual rather than of his environment. What the search committee should be looking for are candidates who make an effort, and who succeed, in informing themselves about currents of thought in political science.

Field of specialty within the discipline should count only a little. There is certainly no one mainstream in political science, so the notion of selecting a "mainstream" political scientist, while no doubt more appropriate for the central journal of the profession than the deliberate selection of an intellectual maverick, is in fact a will-o-the-wisp. The methodological, theoretical, and substantive range of present-day political science is very great. The metaphor of an intellectual center surrounded by a periphery has limited usefulness when "mainstream" voting behavior specialists rarely if ever cite "mainstream" international relations theorists in their work and vice-versa. Either specialty might perfectly well be the area of major interest for the next managing editor.

Since scholars are notorious for their erratic work habits, it is well to state one criterion that should matter a great deal. All serious candidates for the managing editorship must be capable of regular routines and especially must be prompt about answering their mail. This indispensable quality undoubtedly knocks off some otherwise attractive candidates, but it is a clear sine qua non for actually doing the job.

It is not quite self-evident that the managing editor should be a scholar of some accomplishment. In principle, of course, and in practice as well, being a skilled and tasteful appreciator of other peoples' scholarship does not entail also being a scholar. The reason managing editors must meet a test of scholarship is to confer legitimacy upon their letters of rejection. A letter of rejection from editors who have not personally subjected their work to the same rigorous scrutiny that the *Review* routinely accords its submissions, is a document of questionable persuasiveness.

At the same time, competence within one of the vineyards of our discipline is certainly not enough. Successful managing editors must also have a well-developed curiosity about what is going on in other parts of the discipline, a sense of where the emerging interests are, a sensitivity to cliques and schools of thought, and something more hospitable than tolerance toward work in modes and traditions different from their own.

If such a paragon exists, no doubt the search committee will want to hear of it. And readers are invited to send their suggestions along.

**On Being Calm.** In a recent journal article, a political scientist disparages the appearance in the *Review* of the 1930s of "calm analyses" of fascism. The implication is clearly that there is something morally defective in scholars who confront evil in a nonhysterical, even an analytical, fashion. Is it possible that the composure of scholars sent to premature destruction people whose lives would have been spared by scholarly hysteria? We doubt it. The moral example of emotionally distraught men of knowledge is not the strongest material out of which to build policy of any sort, and it seems to us the record is now thick with examples of all kinds—and on all sides—that bear this proposition out. Moreover people are sure to ask on what grounds a scholar's lack of calm should be weighed more heavily than the urgent promptings of the conscience of a construction worker, or a housewife.

What entitles scholars to be listened to, it seems to us, is not the intensity of our convictions, but the quality of our arguments. When these are grounded upon an honest marshalling of evidence, upon a fair-minded canvass of alternatives, a capacious understanding of social and political contexts, they have a chance at larger influence. In part, the capacity of political scientists to play a role in making a better world is dependent upon our capacity to render assurance to those whom we address that our work is warranted by a climate of free and open inquiry, tested by the rigorous canons of rational discourse, and arises in short from an atmosphere of what for a better word one might call "calm."

We believe that the preservation of this atmosphere is an imperative duty that rests (in part) upon the management of the *Review*. The pursuit of this obligation does not entail suppressing conflicts of opinion, but rather ventilating them. It does mean making a strenuous effort to keep discourse civil, focused, and substantive. We believe that although we are far from perfection, the *Review* does show the effects of the diligent pursuit of this goal, at a time when, no less than the '30s, the calm voices of political scientists are needed in public discourse.

**Articles Accepted for Future Publication**

Paul R. Abramson, Michigan State University, "Generational Change and the Decline of Party Identification"

Christopher H. Achen, Yale University, "Political Belief Systems in Mass Publics: The Problem of Inconsistent Opinion Survey Responses"

C. Arnold Anderson, University of Chicago, "Conceptual Framework for Political Socialization in Developing Societies"

Neal Andrews, Wayne State University, "Integration and Community in Communist Theory"

Francisco Arcelus and Allan H. Meltzer, Carnegie-Mellon University, "The Effect of Aggregate Economic Variables on Congressional Elections"

John A. Armstrong, University of Wisconsin, "Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas"

Robert L. Ayres, University of California, Berkeley, "Development Policy and the Possibility of a 'Liveable' Future for Latin America"

Jonathan D. Casper, Stanford University, "The Supreme Court and National Policy Making"

Roger Cobb, Brown University, Jennie-Keith Ross, Swarthmore College, and Marc Howard Ross, Bryn Mawr College, "Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process"

David Collier, Indiana University, and Richard E. Messick, Office of U.S. Senate, "Functional

Prerequisites Versus Diffusion: Testing Alternative Explanations of Social Security Adoption"

Andrew T. Cowart, University of Iowa, Tore Hansen and Karl-Erik Brofoss, University of Oslo, "Budgetary Strategies and Success at Multiple Decision Levels in the Norwegian Urban Setting"

Fred R. Dallmayr, Purdue University, "Beyond Dogma and Despair: Toward a Critical Theory of Politics"

Geoffrey Debnam, University of Otago, "Nondecisions and Power: The Two Faces of Bachrach and Baratz"

John P. Diggins, University of California, Irvine, "Four Theories in Search of a Reality: James Burnham, Soviet Communism, and the Cold War"

Douglas Dobson, Northern Illinois University, and Douglas St. Angelo, Florida State University, "Party Identification and the Floating Vote: Some Dynamics"

George Edwards, Tulane University, "Presidential Influence in the House: Presidential Prestige as a Source of Presidential Power"

Claude S. Fischer, University of California, Berkeley, "The City and Political Psychology"

Robert C. Fried, University of California, Los Angeles, "Party and Policy in West German Cities"

Norman Frohlich, University of Texas, "The Instability of Minimum Winning Coalitions"

Richard Funston, San Diego State University, "The Supreme Court and Critical Elections"

Benjamin Ginsberg, Cornell University, "Elections and Public Policy"

Sheldon Goldman, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, "Voting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals Revisited"

Fred I. Greenstein, Princeton University, "The Benevolent Leader Revisited: Children's Images of Political Leaders in Three Democracies"

Fred W. Grupp, Jr., University of Connecticut, and Allan R. Richards, Louisiana State University, "Variations in Elite Perceptions of American States as Referents for Public Policy Making"

Susan Blackall Hansen, University of Illinois, Urbana, "Participation, Political Structure, and Concurrence"

Fred M. Hayward, University of Wisconsin, "A Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom About the Informed Public: National Political Information in Ghana"

David K. Hildebrand, University of Pennsylvania, James D. Laing and Howard Rosenthal, Carnegie-Mellon University, "Prediction Analysis in Political Research"

K. J. Holsti, University of British Columbia, "Underdevelopment and the 'Gap' Theory of International Conflict"

Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, University of Minnesota, "Crises and Sequences in Collective Theory Development"

M. Kent Jennings, University of Michigan, and Richard G. Niemi, University of Rochester, "Continuity and Change in Political Orientations: A Longitudinal Study of Two Generations"

David Koehler, American University, "Vote Trading and the Voting Paradox: A Proof of Logical Equivalence"

Patrick J. McGowan, University of Southern California, and Robert M. Rood, University of South Carolina, "Alliance Behavior in Balance of Power Systems: Applying a Poisson Model to 19th-Century Europe"

Kenneth John Meier, Syracuse University, "Representative Bureaucracy: An Empirical Analysis"

Arthur H. Miller, Warren E. Miller, Alden S. Raine, and Thad A. Brown, University of Michigan, "A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election"

Fritz Nova, Villanova University, "Political Innovation of the West German Federal Constitutional Court: The State Discussion on Judicial Review"

Guillermo Owen, Rice University, "Evaluation of a Presidential Election Game"

Douglas Rae, Yale University, "The Limits of Consensual Decision"

Michael J. Robinson, The Catholic University of America, "Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise: The Case of *The Selling of the Pentagon*"

Austin Sarat, Yale Law School, and Joel B. Grossman, University of Wisconsin, Madison, "Courts and Conflict Resolution: Problems in the Mobilization of Adjudication"

Joseph A. Schlesinger, Michigan State University, "The Primary Goals of Political Parties: A Clarification of Positive Theory"

Paul R. Schulman, University of Tennessee, "Non-Incremental Policy Making: Notes Toward an Alternate Paradigm"

Gerald S. Strom, University of Illinois, Chicago, "On the Apparent Paradox of Participation"

Edward R. Tufte, Princeton University, "Determinants of the Outcome of Midterm Congressional Elections"

Eric M. Uslaner and J. Ronnie Davis, University of Florida, "The Paradox of Vote Trading: Effects of Decision Rules and Voting Strategies on Externalities"

J. Weinberger, Michigan State University, "Hobbes's Doctrine of Method"

Mary B. Welfling, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, "Models, Measurement and Sources of Error: Civil Conflict in Black Africa"

# The Limits of Behaviorism: A Review Essay on B. F. Skinner's Social and Political Thought*†

PETER G. STILLMAN

*Assistant Professor, Vassar College*

B. F. Skinner has devoted most of his life to developing a behaviorist science of psychology and propounding what he sees as the social and political benefits of the implementation of his science. His psychology interprets individual behavior as the fully determined result of the individual's history of reinforcement; the individual's past environments (or "contingencies of reinforcement") completely shape his current behavior. Starting from this deterministic psychology, Skinner concludes that contemporary advocates of "freedom and dignity" are scientifically wrong and thus that their political and social prescriptions are likely to produce unfortunate consequences. Furthermore, Skinner thinks, if current cultures are to improve, it is necessary that they institute cultural planning by Skinnerian technicians of behavior, who must be allowed full scope to manipulate the environment (and thus the reinforcers) of the culture's members.

Skinner expounded the social and political implications of his behaviorist science at length first in the novel *Walden Two*, and then in the treatises, *Science and Human Behavior* and *Beyond Freedom and Dignity;* in response to criticisms, he defended his views in *About Behaviorism.*[1] *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* met immediate popular success; it soared to the heights of the best-seller lists, and Skinner himself was soon rewarded with the perquisites and publicity, the cover stories and talk shows, that now attend such quantitative status. Although he gained popular acclaim, most reviewers were critical.[2] Their criticisms were numerous and diverse, covering almost all aspects of Skinner's thought. Most critics, nevertheless, did agree on one point: they doubted the possibility or validity of a science of behavior in Skinner's sense.

---

* *About Behaviorism.* By B. F. Skinner. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974. Pp. 256. $6.95, cloth; $3.95, paper.)
*Beyond Freedom and Dignity.* By B. F. Skinner. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971. Pp. 225. $6.95, cloth. New York: Bantam Books, 1972. Pp. 215. $1.95, paper.)
*Science and Human Behavior.* By B. F. Skinner. (New York: The Free Press, Macmillan, 1953. Pp. 461. $6.95; paperback edition, 1965, $3.45.)
*Walden Two.* By B. F. Skinner. (New York: Macmillan, 1948; paperback edition, 1962. Pp. 320. $2.25.)

† This review essay owes much to others, especially faculty and students at Vassar College, where many of the points were first presented in a class. An earlier version was delivered as a lecture at Philosophers' Holiday, and copies of the lecture were freely distributed. As a result of the many comments and criticisms that ensued, arguments were modified and errors removed. I would like to thank the many at Vassar who were helpful, and especially Jesse Kalin, Michael Murray, Suzanne Vromen, Nancy Downing, Ed Jacobs, and Kim Landsman. In addition, I would like to thank Emily Gill and P. Gordon B. Stillman, who read and commented on this essay at various stages. None of them, of course, is responsible for the problems and infelicities that remain.

[1] B. F. Skinner's social and political thought is presented primarily in his *Walden Two* (1948; paperback ed., New York: Macmillan, 1960), *Science and Human Behavior* (1953; paperback ed., New York: Free Press, 1965), and *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* (New York: Knopf, 1971); it is defended in *About Behaviorism* (New York: Knopf, 1974). All citations to these books are in the text; the titles are abbreviated to W2, SHB, BFD, and AB, respectively. (Only with BFD is there a disparity in pagination between the paper and cloth editions; a rough way to reconcile this disparity is to subtract 5 per cent from the cloth edition's page number in order to obtain the paperback's page number.) These sources can be supplemented by numerous articles (e.g., B. F. Skinner, "Freedom and the Control of Men," *The American Scholar,* 25 [Winter 1955–56], 47–65) and by many published interviews: Richard I. Evans, *B. F. Skinner: The Man and His Ideas* (New York: Dutton, 1968); "An Interview with B. F. Skinner," *The Center Magazine,* 5 (Mar./Apr. 1972), 63–65; Elizabeth Hall, "Will Success Spoil B. F. Skinner?" *Psychology Today,* 6 (Nov. 1972), 65–72 and 130. In addition to *About Behaviorism,* Skinner "responds" to his critics both in parts of the interviews and in a chapter, "Answers for My Critics," in *Beyond the Punitive Society,* ed. Harvey Wheeler (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1973). Skinner's important technical works include *Verbal Behavior* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957); *Contingencies of Reinforcement* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969); and *Cumulative Record* (Third edition; New York: Meredith, 1972). (Since Chomsky's review of Skinner's *Verbal Behavior* is so famous [Noam Chomsky, review, *Language,* 35 (March 1959), 26–58], a good defense of *Verbal Behavior* might be noted: Kenneth MacCorquodale, "On Chomsky's Review of Skinner's *Verbal Behavior,*" *Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior,* 13 [January 1970], 83–99.) A complete (through 1969) bibliography of Skinner's publications can be found in *Festschrift for B. F. Skinner,* ed. P. B. Dews (New York: Meredith, 1970), pp. 23–27. For summaries of behaviorism in general, see especially William L. Mikulas, *Behavior Modification: An Overview* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972) and Albert Bandura, *Principles of Behavior Modification* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969).

[2] About eighty per cent were critical, according to

The critics' reasons for doubt were many.[3] One reason was the empirical phenomena and theoretical conclusions that behaviorism appears unable to explain. In addition, many critics argued that behaviorism presents an invalid or partial view of psychological reality. For instance, they criticized Skinner's strict parallel between physics and psychology, which leads him to be sure that, as soon as psychology stops talking about intangible states and feelings (like "mind"), it will make the same advances physics made when it abandoned intangibles (like Aristotle's "jubilant" falling body [BFD, p. 8]); surely, the critics asserted, there is a possible difference in subject matter between physics (with its particles) and psychology (with its humans). Related to this criticism was another, that Skinner allows his methodology to determine his ontology: since his methodology ignores or assigns no causal role to internal processes, for instance, he assumes that they do not exist or at least are unimportant. Another criticism centered on Skinner's reductionism in terms of values: for Skinner, there are not (nor ought there be) any trans-social norms against, for instance, murder; all values are determined relativistically, by what is positively reinforcing to the individual in his particular environment. Other critics rejected Skinner's peculiar definition of science, wherein science is not the disinterested search for truth but rather is reduced to the pursuit of behavioristic hypotheses and evidence buttressing behaviorism. The criticism of these reductions led some critics further, to accuse Skinner of triviality and of question-begging. A final type of criticism was directed against the content or the goals of a Skinnerian society; they are goals that many critics simply would not like, in part, some said, because they seem to be small-town, nineteenth-century American values.

The critics' reasons for doubting behaviorism are all rejected by Skinner (AB, p. 4), who asserts that "most of my critics have been shown a surprising misunderstanding of the science on which [my books are] based and of the nature of my treatment of the subject."[4] Skinner's unfavorable reviewers have, in general, criticized the assump-

---

Skinner (*Center Magazine*, Mar./Apr. 1972, p. 63). The generally favorable reviews stress the validity of Skinner's evidence, the cogency of his reasoning, or the desirability of his goals. Four review symposia contain favorable reviews: "Review Symposium," *American Journal of Sociology*, 78 (Nov. 1972), 696–708; "Skinner: Pro and Con," *Contemporary Sociology*, 1 (Jan. 1972), 19–29; "B. F. Skinner's *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*," *Soundings*, 55 (Fall 1972), 335–368; and "Self-Determination: Fact or Artifact?" *Philosophical Studies* [Ireland], 21, 31–83. Other sympathetic or enthusiastic discussions can be found in Willard F. Day, review, *Contemporary Psychology*, 17 (Sept. 1972), 465–467, and in some chapters of *Beyond the Punitive Society*, ed. Wheeler, esp. John R. Platt, "The Skinnerian Revolution" and Dennis C. Pirages, "Behavioral Technology and Institutional Transformation."

[3] Critical reviews of Skinner's work abound. The most cogent recent ones, which develop many of the points mentioned in this paragraph as well as others of importance, are: John R. Champlin, "Behavior (-ism & -alism) & Theory (Political)," *Polity*, 5 (Winter 1972), 243–249; George Kateb, "Toward a Wordless World," *The Atlantic*, October 1971, pp. 122–125; Joseph Margolis, "Freedom as Determinism," *Society [Transaction]*, 9 (Sept./Oct. 1972), 80–90; David Spitz, "The Higher Reaches of the Lower Orders," *Dissent* (Spring 1973), pp. 243–269; and Meredith Watts, "B. F. Skinner and the Technological Control of Social Behavior," *American Political Science Review*, 69 (March 1975), 214–227. Two highly critical reviews in psychology journals are Andrew M. Colman, review, *British Journal of Psychology*, 64, (Feb. 1973), 150–151; and Raymond J. McCall, "Beyond Reason and Evidence: the Metapsychology of Professor B. F. Skinner," *Journal of Clinical Psychology*, 28 (Apr. 1972), 125–139. The review symposia cited in note 2 contain critical articles which raise numerous issues. *Beyond the Punitive Society*, ed. Wheeler, also contains many critical reviews, of widely varying cogency; see especially the chapters by Nathan Rotenstreich, "Skinner and 'Freedom and Dignity'," and by Max Black, "Some Aversive Responses to a Would-Be Reinforcer." Unfortunately, the two best-known reviews are flawed. Noam Chomsky ("The Case Against B. F. Skinnner," *New York Review of Books*, 30 December 1971, pp. 18–24) misunderstands or misrepresents Skinner at various points, as does Richard Sennett (review, *The New York Times Book Review*, 24 October 1971, pp. 1 and 12–18); their mistreatment of Skinner's sentence on p. 155 of *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* is but one minor example (see B. F. Skinner, "Letter to the Editor," *New York Times Book Review*, 21 November 1971, p. 50, and Sennett's continuing blind response). Less recent but still acute analyses of Skinner's thought include Andrew Hacker, "Dostoevsky's Disciples: Man and Sheep in Political Theory," *Journal of Politics*, 17 (Nov. 1955), 590–613, and Henry S. Kariel, "The Political Relevances of Behavioral and Existential Psychology," *American Political Science Review*, 61 (June 1967), 334–342. Continuing examination of behaviorism can be found in the journal *Behaviorism*, 1- (1972-     ).

The above treatments generally criticize Skinner from outside his analytic framework and behaviorism, and are thus rejected by Skinner and many behaviorists regardless of the validity of their criticisms. Only one article has attempted the sort of internal refutation that this review essay attempts: Phillip H. Scribner, "Escape from Freedom and Dignity," *Ethics*, 83 (Oct. 1972), 13–36, which brilliantly proves that Skinner's goal—the survival of the culture—requires for its realization not Skinner's automatically good man but rather a man who has been conditioned to be a rational decision maker (and who can therefore take into acount new phenomena, for instance) in a society of free institutions (so that he can act on his rational decisions). While this review essay is consistent with Scribner's argument, it does not rely on nor use it in any way.

[4] Skinner, "Answers for My Critics," pp. 256–257; see also AB, p. 7.

tion—of an existent or immanent science of behavior—on which his books rest. For Skinner, empirical and experimental evidence will some day be explicable on behavioristic principles; the theoretical and methodological objections will soon be shown to be wrong, because it will become obvious that the parallel between physics and psychology does exist, the methodological ignoring of internal processes is justified because such processes do not exist or at least play no causal role, and science is in fact behaviorist science. Furthermore, Skinner believes that the complaints about his reductionism in values or about the goals of his society will be shown to be irrelevant to the scientific managing of behavior. Skinner's critics have started from a standpoint outside of behavioristic science; therefore, they have misunderstood Skinnerian behaviorism and come up with these irrelevant criticisms. For Skinner and many behaviorists, who have faith in the ability of their method to overcome all problems in the explanation of behavior (BFD, pp. 160–61), such an attack on their science is unwarranted and invalid.

And they may well be right. Despite the doubts of many both inside and outside psychology, a Skinnerian behaviorism may, ultimately, be able to explain and even predict human behavior scientifically. Even if Skinnerian behaviorism proves adequate on its own terms, however (and also if it does not), it is essential to comprehend that the political and social conclusions and programs propounded by Skinner are not the only nor the logical implications and applications of his science and technology; that his political and social thought is inconsistent and inaccurate on its own terms; and that it is full of incomplete or ambiguous arguments. Unlike the empirical criticisms which he brushes aside as minor and temporary problems to be overcome in the ever-continuing advance of his version of science, unlike the theoretical and methodological criticisms which he rejects as misunderstandings because they are made from outside his scientific system, these logical and theoretical problems are internal in Skinner's thought and cannot be overcome by the progressive development of behaviorism that Skinner envisions. Even if Skinner's assumption of a science of behavior is accepted, it is not necessary to accept the inaccurate, incomplete, and unwarranted political and social conclusions he draws from his science.[5]

The arguments that follow are by no means exhaustive; but they are intended as major arguments in an internal refutation of Skinner's program. They are usually based on the formulations of *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, since it is Skinner's most recent full statement; in general, however, neither time nor criticism has changed his views. They are independent arguments, so that any weakness or error in one does not affect the validity of the others. The validity of any single argument is sufficient to undermine at least the strongest (or most extreme) version of Skinner's behaviorist society: that a peaceful, harmonious, happy society can be created, can survive for a long time, and can develop fully the potentials of all individuals (W2, pp. 251–76; BFD, pp. 136, 214–15). The validity of either of the last two arguments casts serious doubt on even a weaker (or less extreme) behaviorist vision: that human life can or will be improved by the application of behavioral engineering on the level of the nation or the culture as a whole.[6]

Because of the paucity, bemoaned by Skinner, of precise scientific terminology in the English language, the arguments that follow are labeled "sociological," "philosophical," and "political." These terms, however, must be understood by Skinnerians as prescientific translations of some of the actual practical problems—in social organization, human goals, and political requisites—that arise from the scientific study and designing of a culture. Of the three types of criticism, the "sociological" arguments may seem the least conclusive, because they seem vulnerable to the countercriticism of being "merely technical" problems that wise techniques can conquer. But they are technical problems that in practice would prove extraordinarily difficult to overcome.

### The Problems of Social Organization

Skinner accurately asserts that a planned culture, in order to have a high probability of survival, should have not uniformity nor regimentation but "planned diversification" (BFD, p. 162). But for many "sociological" reasons planned diversity is highly improbable. First, as Skinner himself realizes, planned diversity is technically much more difficult than planned uniformity; to control reinforcers in the interactions and activities of diverse persons in diverse settings is substantially, indeed exponentially, more difficult than with uniform persons in identical settings.[7]

---

[5] Conversely, of course, the refutation of Skinner's social and political ideas is not a refutation of his psychology.

[6] This statement leaves open the applicability of behavior modification in institutions like schools, prisons, etc., where, however, even Skinner sees problems (BFD, pp. 171–172; AB, p. 191).

[7] The problems here may be insurmountable. Skinner's discussion of "Social Behavior" in *Science and Human Behavior* is, according to a sympathetic reader, "very thin, indeed," even though it only deals with two-person situations: "Two-person behavior is indeed complicated, and it presents difficult problems for operant conditioning. The same behavior . . . may be negatively reinforcing to one [person] and

To the extent that time and resources are scarce, and to the extent that the responsiveness of the subjects is reinforcing to the controllers, uniformity rather than diversity will prevail. Even in Walden Two there is much uniformity; for instance, children between the ages of three and six are given training that inculcates uniform ethics by uniform techniques, like prohibiting hot soup to half a group for five minutes while the other half eats, the eaters being determined by chance (W2, pp. 104–10).[8] Second, if behaviorism is introduced not as a grand design of a total culture but incrementally, area by area, as Skinner suggests is likely (BFD, p. 156), then it will be introduced under conditions of scarcity, and cost constraints will probably force it to aim at uniformity.[9] Skinner, fond of drawing parallels between behaviorism and science, should recognize that scientific agriculture, which also "requires planned diversity" (BFD, p. 162), simply has not received it, under conditions of scarce resources; thus, for instance, a single type of corn blight can destroy much of America's (uniform strain) corn production. Third, since Skinner is a chief modern exponent of science, scientific rationality, and scientific technology, which aspire to uniformity, consistency, standardization, and simplicity (like the "simplification characteristic of science" [BFD, p. 154]), it is at least incongruous for Skinner to advocate planned diversity, which runs counter to these tendencies of science.

There is a second important "sociological" problem. For Skinner, "The problem is to free men, not from control, but from certain kinds of control, and it can be solved only if our analysis takes all consequences into account" (BFD, p. 41). To "take all consequences into account" is a mind-boggling problem, especially if the scale is, say, 200 million or three billion persons. The collecting and processing of accurate data, and the transmitting and effective implementing of the results, are tasks so immense as to be technically difficult if not impossible. As a (fictional) behaviorist has admitted:

> I didn't say that behavior is always predictable, any more than the weather is always predictable. There are often too many factors to be taken into account. We can't measure them all accurately, and we couldn't perform the mathematical operations needed to make a prediction if we had the measurements (W2, p. 258).

Indeed, Skinner himself admits that behaviorism's knowledge and control are limited: "Although a science of behavior permits a person to interpret what he sees more effectively, it will never tell him the whole story about the individual case" (AB, p. 242), and, furthermore, "Obviously we cannot predict or control human behavior in daily life with the precision obtained in the laboratory" (AB, p. 228). Frazier, Skinner's alter ego in *Walden Two*, and Skinner himself admit to the technical impossibility of what Skinner's program requires and what Skinner explicitly requires in *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*: taking all consequences into account.

### The "Philosophical" Problems of Human Goals

Skinner omits consideration of "sociological" problems: the implementation of planned diversity and the taking into account of "all consequences." He also ignores a variety of "philosophical" difficulties inherent in his arguments. Some of his errors lie in his treatment of values. Skinner is quite right to realize that a science of

---

aversive to the other. Adding a third person, or an '$n^{th}$' person, enormously complicates the situation, so that it virtually defies analysis." (Harvey Wheeler, "Introduction: A Nonpunitive World?" in *Beyond the Punitive Society*, ed. Wheeler, p. 12). Another way of phrasing the problem is to analyze the Skinnerian "environment," which Skinner never closely examines. Skinner assumes that environments are readily modifiable for the purpose of shaping behavior; but, since much of the human environment is the behavior of others, to shape the behavior of one person, Skinner must modify that person's environment, i.e., the behavior of others—and so on, in infinite regress, because to shape the behavior of the others involves modifying their environments, i.e., the behaviors of yet others.

In a different way, groups may pose another "sociological" problem for Skinner. As he notes, he is a "methodological individualist" (AB, p. 241); further, as he has Frazier say, "We know almost nothing about the special capacities of the *group*" (W2, p. 293). Yet Skinner seems not to realize that the group, with its group structure and behavior, may have characteristics and behaviors (including "special capacities") that are not merely the sum-total of the characteristics and behaviors of its individual members and that are not readily—if at all—susceptible to analysis and control by a methodological individualist, who "reduces social processes to the behavior of individuals" (AB, p. 241). In slighting the group, with its special capacities, structure, and behavior, Skinner seems to be slighting a pervasive form of social organization and ignoring an important aspect of and influence on human behavior. (This point is more fully developed by Watts, "B. F. Skinner and the Technological Control of Social Behavior.")

[8] As the example of ethical training in Walden Two makes clear, Skinner's sincerity in advocating "planned diversity" is in doubt. Diversity drastically increases behaviorism's technical problems. On the other hand, if Skinner really opposes diversity, then the survival of a Skinnerian society is rendered very problematic. In short, Skinner is on the horns of a dilemma: diversity is needed for survival but technically almost impossible; uniformity is technically desirable but makes survival improbable.

[9] Skinner generally overlooks costs and the problem of cost constraints; he writes as though he and his engineers had unlimited resources. (It should be noted that, in this instance, he could minimize the problem of costs if behaviorism could be successfully introduced through the establishment and spreading of communities, like Walden Two.)

behavior, in order to be complete in itself, must be able to deal with values in a way that reduces them to the level of factuality. So he asserts that "to make a value judgment by calling something good or bad is to classify it in terms of its reinforcing effects" (BFD, p. 105). Thus, things are good if they are positively reinforcing, bad if they are negatively reinforcing (BFD, p. 104). Further, things are good or bad "presumably because of the contingencies of survival under which the species evolved," i.e., because of their "survival value" (BFD, p. 104).

But Skinner's bold statements about values conceal many problems. The world, as conceptualized by Skinner, is almost totally subjective, i.e., defined according to the responses of the individuals.[10] For Skinner, values must be subjective, because reinforcers share no common characteristic except as they are perceived (or responded to) by specific individuals. Whether caviar is to be classified with steak or castor oil in terms of reinforcement cannot be known independently of the individual concerned. (Indeed, how steak and castor oil are to be classified cannot be known independently of the individual concerned.) And, just as values are defined according to the response of the particular individual, so too, for Skinner, color, texture, and taste depend in part upon individual responses (BFD, p. 103). But Skinner then draws a parallel between values and color, and produces an interesting problem. He asserts that "some part of what we call red . . . must . . . be in the eyes . . . of the beholder" (BFD, p. 103). But most scientists would disagree; for their scientific purposes, "red" is defined objectively and impersonally, in terms of length of light-waves. And it is this objective, impersonal definition which has made it possible for scientists to develop intersubjectively testable hypotheses about color, about noise, about many phenomena which different individuals perceive differently. For Skinner to insist on the subjective aspect in defining "red," values, or anything else is for him to move away from the type of definition required by successful modern science and technology, which his behaviorism attempts to emulate (BFD, pp. 3, 215, and *passim*). If, on the other hand, Skinner agrees that scientifically red is defined in terms of light-wave length, then he is left without an equivalent, objective, "scientific" definition for "value." Skinner does say that "what is ultimately good or bad, are things, not feelings" (BFD, p. 107); but he does not explain how good and bad things are to be defined and measured in a way equivalent to the way color is defined and measured. In short, Skinner treats "values" in a way significantly different from modern natural science's definitions of phenomena. So it is logically illegitimate for him to assume, as he does, that values can be described and manipulated like other scientific categories.

Despite the dissimilarity to the definitions of modern science, Skinner defines values subjectively. He then goes on to assert that things have come to be valued good or bad because of their "survival value." He next notes, in passing and without further comment, that "the effect of a reinforcer which cannot be attributed to its survival value in the course of evolution (the effect of heroin, for example) is presumably anomalous" (BFD, p. 110). But surely Skinner's conclusion is inadequate. For the effects of heroin are not "presumably" anomalous; they *are* anomalous. Indeed, they are more; they are examples that disprove Skinner's presumption that things are reinforcing (valued good) because of their survival value. Heroin reinforces but kills; so do the rewards showered on the "hero" in one of Skinner's anecdotes, who "takes on more and more dangerous assignments until he is killed" (BFD, p. 111). (While his actions may or may not have survival value to his culture, they certainly do not have survival value to him.) An effective variable-ratio schedule of reinforcement—like those used in Las Vegas—hooks the individual and turns him into a gambler, who then ends with a "negative utility," having been positively reinforced into penury or worse (BFD, p. 35; AB, pp. 60–61, 71, 198). Similarly, all things that individuals do at present and that Skinner dislikes and that offer reasons for him, in his despair about this society, to wish drastically to alter its form: all these things are reinforcing but are—Skinner implies—not related to survival (BFD, pp. 156–58). (If these valued things were productive of survival, there would be no need to change this culture.) The same holds on the level of cultures: that which peoples call good (because it reinforces them) does not necessarily lead to survival. For cultures, the good is the reinforcing, of course (BFD, p. 128); but, as Skinner admits, the good does not always lead to survival: "Extinct species and extinct cultures testify to the possibility of miscarriage" (BFD, p. 175). In short, his attempt to fuse values and survival fails.

That he cannot connect values to survival should have been apparent to Skinner as soon as he defined values subjectively, in terms of reinforcement, for then they cannot be consistently or necessarily related to anything other than those subjective responses (of individual or culture); they cannot, for instance, be linked to survival.

---

[10] "Subjective" and "perceptions," among other terms, are strictly speaking not terms in the behaviorist's vocabulary. Those who are not behaviorists can easily understand the terms' meanings; and behaviorists can easily "translate" them into technical language (AB, pp. 19–20).

For the heroin user, heroin is positively reinforcing and thus (by Skinner's definition of value) good, even if heroin use leads to death, and even if a culture-wide use of heroin leads to the culture's destruction.[11] Skinner dislikes heroin and other things that many find reinforcing; in order to make those positive reinforcers a "bad" and not a "good," Skinner's theory must have some criterion of value other than the subject's perceptions. But to define values in terms of reinforcements makes values subjective, and then no other criterion that is consistent with values can be found.

The problem of the lack of relation between values and survival is connected to Skinner's second "philosophical" problem. For Skinner, individuals and cultures frequently do not know the objective world, but only their perceived world, the world as they respond to it—for instance, the grey that looks red because of a prior stimulus (BFD, p. 103). On occasion the objective world differs from their perceptions. In the case of colors, the problem is usually minor. But the cases of heroin, of Skinner's anecdotal hero reinforced to his death for slaying dragons, of the gambler who thinks he shall win but who is really entrapped by a sophisticated variable-ratio schedule, and of many extinct cultures are all cases in which the subject's perceptions and responses result in his extinction because the perceptions and the objective world do not coincide. Skinner has no way to avoid this problem, except the disarming parenthetical statement:

> (That a behavioral process should thus go wrong and lead to death is no more a violation of the principle of natural selection than the phototropic behavior of the moth, which has survival value when it leads the moth into sunlight but proves lethal when it leads into flame [BFD, p. 111].)

If Skinner's new society is to avoid the moth's problem, his planners must have insight into and act according to objective conditions, and not just subjective perceptions (which may mistake that which reinforces and that which actually will lead to survival). If Skinner's planners are like all other human beings, however, they will value and pursue that which reinforces, whether the reinforcer is the sunlight or a flame.[12]

Thus, it is highly problematic for Skinner to assert that "a culture which for any reason induces its members to work for its survival . . . is more likely to survive" (BFD, p. 136). Many cultures have become extinct or badly damaged because their members worked for their survival but were reinforced for actions that did not lead to survival. For instance, many generals and rulers have gone to war in order to assure the survival of their culture, only to be defeated and to have their culture destroyed. Similarly, all contemporary defenders of "freedom and dignity" are working for the survival of their culture; but, from Skinner's perspective, they are making it less likely that their culture will survive. Furthermore, actions frequently have unintended consequences, some of which may be disastrous (if the world goes up in nuclear holocaust, the decisions leading up to the production of atomic weapons would have been a good example). But Skinner tends to overlook these problems or use the analogy of the moth when he really should be talking about some—or perhaps all—of earthly life. Skinnerian planners simply do not know objective conditions; they decide on the basis of what reinforces them (whether it be a candle or a sun); and thus their "expertise" in working for (what they perceive as) cultural survival carries little assurance.

Skinner does, it should be noted, have a response to the problem of a Skinnerian society going wrong; but it does not stand close evaluation. He labels such criticism as "Cassandran prophecies of disaster" for which "proof is seldom offered"; he asserts, correctly, that "the unplanned also goes wrong" (BFD, p. 161). At least as much as his critics, Skinner fits his own label: he, too, plays the alarmist ("it is science or nothing" [BFD, p. 160]) while offering little evidence, much less proof.[13] At best for Skinner, the argument is one of empty assertion versus empty counterassertion. More likely, Skinner misses the point about the unplanned or—to be precise—the decentralized. Planned, centralized, efficient control has the great advantage that the good decisions of a controller are promulgated promptly and thoroughly. Unfortunately, erroneous decisions are too. In a centralized, Skinnerian system, error—like good—is quickly and greatly magnified. In a decentralized or inefficient system, there may well be more errors, and more discontent or even suffering, than in a centralized system; but each error has very little potential to create culture-wide disaster, because the scope of each error is very limited.[14] The decentralized does go wrong; but it is much less likely to go wrong on a grand and disastrous scale than is the centrally planned.

---

[11] Skinner might try to point to "deferred aversive consequences" as grounds for not using heroin. But then he both must prove that the deferred consequences are indeed aversive and must convince the heroin users that the consequences will be, on balance, aversive. Even were this possible, the aversive consequences would be only weak current reinforcers, since the aversive consequences are in the fairly distant future (more distant than the next, positively reinforcing "fix"), i.e., the aversive consequences are "remote" (BFD, p. 134). Further, even "unremote" aversive consequences are not effective against some reinforcement schedules (BFD, pp. 34–35; AB, p. 71).

[12] The implications of Skinner's methodology are far-reaching. He really proposes an end to knowledge or, rather, that there is no knowledge—for scientists pursue not science, knowledge, and facts, but instead that which reinforces them, just as Skinner's engineers pursue not the objective interest of the community but instead that which reinforces them. Among other things, there is something strange about a "scientific" methodology that ends up denying the existence of scientific knowledge. At most, the validity of such a methodology might be thereby thrown open to doubt.

[13] It is hard to know exactly what would constitute "proof" here. Skinner admits that he does not yet have enough evidence (BFD, p. 160; AB, p. 189). Both this essay and Scribner's "Escape from Freedom and Dignity" try to demonstrate logically that Skinner's system will not work as he projects.

Skinner's third major "philosophical" problem lies in his assertion that "survival is the only value according to which a culture is eventually to be judged" (BFD, p. 136). This is a strange statement, for many reasons. It has definitional problems. What is a culture? Skinner gives analogies, but no examples, nor any criteria by which to determine examples. Is there—and was there a century ago—a Bavarian culture, or is it part of German culture, or even part of European culture? Similarly, what is survival? Did ancient Athenian culture survive the traumatic loss of the Peloponnesian War? If so, did it survive the Romans? the Byzantine Empire? the colonels? In order to compare "cultures" in terms of the criterion of "survival," clear definitions are necessary. But Skinner gives almost no hints of definitions; his few hints are contradictory (SHB, pp. 420 and 432), confused (SHB, pp. 431–32), or too general (AB, p. 203); and thus his talk of cultural survival is carried on in a contentless vacuum.

Even if these definitional problems could be resolved and each term given the same unambiguous meaning in all contexts in which it is used, Skinner's assertion, that survival is the only criterion by which cultures are judged, is one with which many persons would disagree, as Skinner realizes (SHB, p. 431). Similarly, it is an assertion not accepted universally by cultures, many of which have sought glory or wealth—even at some risk of survival—rather than try to maximize survival potential. Indeed, Skinner himself does not agree with his assertion at various points. Current cultures are surviving, yet he wants to modify them drastically. Poorly adaptive cultures may survive a long time (BFD, p. 130); does that bare persistence make them better than a highly adaptive behaviorist society destroyed by some quirk of fate or by a controller's technical error?[15] If, on the other hand, the adaptive but short-lived society is judged better, on what grounds can the judgment be made, other than the abstract or "*in vacuo*" test Skinner rejects (SHB, p. 432)? Finally, Skinner hints darkly that, if behaviorism is not adopted, "some other culture may . . . make a greater contribution to the future" (BFD, p. 183); but what "great contribution" can be made culturally, except long life, if survival is the only criterion?

As a criterion that is not universally accepted and that is contradicted by Skinner himself, survival has no valid scientific derivation. At one point, Skinner bases it on a physical analogy: "Do not ask me why I want mankind to survive. I can tell you why only in the sense in which a physiologist can tell you why I want to breathe."[16] Clearly, however, individual or cultural survival is not an unconditioned reflex or action, like breathing; nor is there any reason to assume that survival—rather than another action—should be the criterion of cultures. At another point, Skinner derives survival as a value from his analogy between human cultures and natural species; individuals and cultures who do things lacking in survival value will tend, like dinosaurs, not to survive (SHB, pp. 430–34), through a sort of cultural natural selection or "natural morality" (BFD, p. 173; AB, p. 205). But it is unclear why Skinner thinks he must follow nature in choosing the value by which cultures are to be judged; his choice is especially unclear since he does not use the "natural" criteria of self-defense and survival as the criteria for individuals. Furthermore, it is unclear why, having chosen to use a natural standard, Skinner thinks that survival is the self-evident one; instead of survival, he could have chosen any one of myriad other natural criteria—for instance, like some "Social Darwinists," he could have chosen a violent social process, duplicating the natural norm of a nature "red in tooth and claw." He simply has no scientific basis for choosing survival as the criterion of cultures.[17] In sum, then, although Skinner asserts that survival is the criterion, his assertion is one with which many persons and cultures disagree, one which he himself contradicts, and one which has no scientific basis. Since there is no scientific or other valid basis for Skinner's assertion that survival is the criterion by which cultures are judged,[18] his assertion dissolves, and, with it, his attempt to provide a scientific norm or goal for cultures.

---

[14] Nuclear weapons and ecological problems may seem to be partial exceptions, where the decentralized has little or no advantage over the centralized. To a large extent, however, the current nuclear and ecological problems have been brought about by centralized planning and by concentration (i.e., centralizing tendencies) in industry.

[15] As Skinner himself sees, some cultures which he does not like have survived a long time: "If you control through superstition and ignorance, as has been the case in India, the control may be profound (a maharaja and his descendants may prevail for centuries)" (Evans, *B. F. Skinner,* p. 49). If survival is the criterion, surely some Indian cultures must be rated highly, as must be the hunter-gatherer culture of primitive man. Skinner does add that "in the long run you have to consider the survival of the group" (*loc. cit.*); but surely "centuries" (in India) and millennia (for hunter-gatherers) are an adequately "long run."

[16] Carl R. Rogers and B. F. Skinner, "Some Issues Concerning the Control of Human Behavior: A Symposium," *Science,* 124 (30 Nov. 1956), 1065. Obviously, survival was not an unconditioned action for Socrates or Thomas More.

Survival as the criterion of cultures also poses the serious problem that occurs whenever an organism (or a culture) seeks a single goal. If survival is the only way by which to judge a culture, then there is no need to see "what man can make of man" (BFD, p. 215), to bring forth all the great achievements man can produce; for they are superfluous. Survival alone counts; and it is likely that survival as the single goal can be easily, cheaply, and "effectively" attained by minimizing cultural flourishing and concentrating on narrowing the needs and accomplishments of individuals so that they are reinforced by few things, positively or negatively, but that those few do reinforce positively. The populace will thus be content, indeed perhaps somnambulant, and the society stable, like the spaceship in the movie "2001" (before the computer went berserk, a mere technical problem to be ironed out in the next experiment), like the ancient Egyptian or Indus River Valley civilizations, or like the pre-Iron Age cultures of hunters and gatherers. Skinner recognizes the possibility; writing of safeguards against despotism, he notes that "an agency which employs the stupefying practices of propaganda suffers from the ignorance and the restricted repertoires of those whom it controls" (SHB, p. 443). But Skinner gives no real reason why the controllers must suffer, especially since they can create other sources of reinforcements for themselves. And it is certainly possible—at least as possible as any other alternative—that an ignorant and narrow working class can in fact provide an excellent—and stable—base on which to build a culture full of reinforcements for the rulers; with stability the prime aim, such a working class would be valuable. In sum, the "survival of a culture" lacks a clear meaning, has no valid derivation, and is a dangerous single good.

Skinner's work, then, contains some serious and unconquered "philosophical" problems: the subjectivity of values and thus the lack of relation between reinforcement and, for instance, survival; the subjectivity of knowledge and thus the serious problem of unintended consequences; and the flawed and vague derivation and criteria of cultural survival. Behaviorism by itself cannot comprehend philosophical values and human goals.

### Political Problems

Skinner's work also has some serious "political" problems. The first type of political problem appears in many different specific forms throughout Skinner's work: Skinner does not follow arguments and statements through in enough detail, and as a result he overlooks or omits many important questions and problems which need to be resolved.

The most important, telling, and dangerous omission is the ignored question: Who is going to implement Skinnerian ideals, and how?[19] There are certainly no likely candidates, especially given the prevalence and perniciousness of the myths of freedom and dignity. Moreover, in *Walden Two*, Skinner has Frazier suggest that no one in existing political systems will implement his ideas: "You can't make progress toward the Good Life by political action. Not under any current form of government. . . . It's not the place for men of good will" (W2, p. 193). Indeed, all organizations are difficult to change; for example, "it is nearly impossible to change an educational establishment" (BFD, p. 155). Since the political system is so hopeless, there seems little chance of Skinnerian technology's being introduced by men of good will. Thus, what Skinner is doing in practice is tossing out an ethically neutral technology (BFD, p. 150) equally to "men of good will" and of bad, but with the knowledge that men of good will hardly exist in current governments and thus with the implicit understanding that, if behaviorism is used at all, it will probably be by men of bad will for their own (evil) ends, not by "men of good will" and not for the noble ends (BFD, p. 214) Skinner foresees. Ethically neutral in the abstract, behaviorism will be in practice pernicious, if Skinner's assessments of current governments are correct.

---

[17] As he himself admits. In answer to the question, "Why should I be concerned about the survival of my culture?" Skinner writes, "The only honest answer to that kind of question seems to be this: 'There is no good reason why you should be concerned, but if your culture has not convinced you that there is, so much the worse for your culture'" (BFD, p. 137). Skinner, thus, is in the strange position of using science to create and propound myth. See also note 12, above.

[18] Skinner could actually come up with a less weak defense of survival as a value; following Hobbes, he could argue that survival is an instrumental value, necessary because it is a means to all other values. But then Skinner would have to start from and emphasize individual, not cultural, survival. And survival is not as logically sound an instrumental goal as, for instance, Hobbes's peace, as Skinner implicitly realizes (BFD, p. 210); it might also commit Skinner to favoring a hunter-gatherer culture (see note 15, above). Even such a stronger argument, however, would not avail completely. How would Skinner explain those who would "rather be dead than Red," who would rather smoke cigarettes and risk cancer than give them up, or who gamble or shoot heroin to their own destruction? In short, individuals and cultures do differ in what reinforces them, including whether or not survival is reinforcing. In any case, for a Skinnerian society to have a single goal (instrumental or final) poses the problem raised by the next paragraph in the text.

[19] In *About Behaviorism,* Skinner says that "we must look to the culture," not to individuals (AB, p. 206). But looking to the culture is inadequate, on Skinner's own terms, because, in the absence of wise behavioral design, "the results are by no means well-designed social environments" (AB, p. 191). In order to get a "well-designed social environment," "explicit design" is necessary (AB, p. 205), and it requires human action and intervention: "In the behavioristic view, man can now control his own destiny because he knows what must be done and how to do it" (AB, p. 251). In short, despite Skinner's appeal to culture (AB, p. 206), the question remains: "Who will implement Skinnerian ideals?"

Skinner's "political" discussions are incomplete on other points. Skinner says little about the concrete design of a culture: what it would look like in detail. Even the descriptions in *Walden Two*, where the novelistic format allows and encourages detail, lack explanations of how or why the depicted events occur, and of what happens when exceptions arise. For instance, when Frazier narrates that self-control is taught to children by various means, like denying them soup for short periods of time, he does not explain why or how denying soup reinforces self-control instead of, for instance, apathy or alienation, how the controllers can know which behaviors they are reinforcing, or how the controllers can re-educate in case of error or mistake. Skinner the novelist never lets Frazier's critics demand detail; they are satisfied when Frazier blithely answers that "we follow each child carefully" (W2, p. 110), an answer lacking in concreteness, detail, and content.

In *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* and his other theoretical treatises, the lack of detail is more extreme even than in *Walden Two*. Skinner does give references for some technical matters, like educational environments (BFD, p. 217). But he barely describes social and economic institutions and interactions; at best, in one paragraph in which half the sentences contain the hedge "presumably," Skinner suggests certain general aspects of life (like economics and medical care) that are presumably important, without stating concretely what the society should look like in these areas (BFD, pp. 152–53). Any sentence in the paragraph indicates Skinner's vagueness and generality; for instance: "A culture must be reasonably stable, but it must also change, and it will be strongest if it can avoid excessive respect for tradition and fear of novelty on the one hand and excessively rapid change on the other" (BFD, p. 153). Skinner's use of "reasonably," "presumably," and "excessively" evacuates from the sentence most of whatever meaning it might have had; and such broad generalization tells almost nothing about the structure of society—except that it should be neither excessively reactionary nor excessively revolutionary, a platitude which can obtain the agreement of everyone on the ideological spectrum from Burke to Lenin. And, while Skinner excuses his lack of concrete suggestions by pleading ignorance of the details of political and social problems (AB, p. 250) or by appealing to the "simplification in utopian writing" (BFD, p. 154), he surely forgets the details about, for instance, politics in Rousseau's *Social Contract*, education in Plato's *Republic*, or biology in Huxley's *Brave New World*, details significantly lacking from his own writing.

Skinner's lack of concreteness leads him to broad and vacuous generalization; it also allows him to avoid many problems wrestled with by other utopians who have gone into detail. Skinner sees, for instance, no conflict possible between private interest and public interest (W2; BFD, p. 110; AB, p. 204). But certainly the heroic knight who goes to his death for the public interest represents a direct conflict between private survival interest and public interest. Another case of conflict is exemplified by the individual who plans for the public interest or his culture's survival; he "may suffer some loss in personal reinforcers" (BFD, p. 151) for his concern. Only if Skinner cares nothing about the individual can he ignore the problem of the conflicts between private and public interest, by always sacrificing the individual; if individual survival is important or tends to be reinforcing, then Skinner must treat, as he does not, the conflicts between public and private interest.

Further, when Skinner does suggest how his culture might be given a content, he is disconcerting: "Designing a culture is like designing an experiment" (BFD, p. 153). But not all experiments produce the predicted result; as Skinner would say, that is what is meant by the term experiment. To fail in the laboratory, however, is one thing, for the experimenter has only damaged a few pigeons; to fail on a culture-wide scale—say 200 million persons—is quite another; to fail grandly enough may be to destroy everyone

The first major "political" question, then, revolves around the lack of detail in Skinner's "design for a culture" and its implementation, and the questions and dilemmas he thereby omits. His second major "political" problem is one for which Skinner's answers are completely insufficient to attain the goal. He does recognize the problem: "The great problem is to arrange effective countercontrol and hence to bring some important consequences to bear on the behavior of the controller" (BFD, p. 171). But if the masses could exercise effective countercontrol, the effects would probably be pernicious to the Skinnerian scheme. As Skinner has Frazier say:

> The people are in no position to evaluate experts. . . . The amateur doesn't appreciate the need for experimentation [by experts]. He wants his expert to *know*. And he's utterly incapable of sustaining the period of doubt during which an experiment works itself out. The experts must either disguise their experiments and pretend to know the outcome in advance or stop experimenting altogether and struggle to maintain the *status quo* (W2, p. 267).

Although specifically in reference to democratic elections, Frazier's statements apply equally to all forms of effective countercontrol: it inhibits or perverts the expert. An additional problem is that for Skinner the experts aim at cultural survival; but countercontrol operates only when the people are not positively reinforced (i.e., are not happy). Thus, effective countercontrol is useless when the experts' policies mistakenly do not pursue long-term cultural survival but do nonetheless make the people happy; and effective countercontrol is contrary to survival when the experts are promulgating wise policies necessary for survival but temporarily contrary to popular happiness, like an austerity program necessitated by natural disaster. Countercontrol, if effective, would on occasion undermine the Skinnerian experts or be contrary to cultural survival.

But Skinner's design and the requisites for behaviorist experimentation mean that in practice Skinnerian countercontrol is ludicrously inadequate and ineffective. For Skinner, "The scientist in the laboratory . . . exerts a conspicuous control on the pigeon, but we must not overlook the control exerted by the pigeon. The behavior of the pigeon has determined the design of the apparatus and the procedures in which it is used" (BFD, p. 169). But surely the "control" of the pigeon over the experimenter is not a paradigm of "effective countercontrol"; all despots and totalitarian rulers, after all, have had to deal with the countercontrol exerted by the behavior of those whom they so ruthlessly suppressed. Furthermore, Skinner admits that there is a lack of balance between control and countercontrol "when control is taken over by organized agencies" (BFD, p. 171); but it must be obvious to Skinner that a government of planners, Skinnerian or not, is an organized agency. Nor can Skinner rely on cultural contingencies as a last resort, to produce effective countercontrol (AB, p. 206),[20] for the planners are exactly those who manipulate cultural contingencies according to their own designs. In short, countercontrol is ineffective, and Skinner's answers to the vexing and perennial problem of "who shall guard the guardians?" are inadequate and insufficient.[21] And they must be so in order for there to be a behavioristically-designed culture. For Skinner's controllers, experimenting on the populace, cannot have the populace be any more recalcitrant or be any more able to exercise effective countercontrol than pigeons.[22]

Skinner's final "political" problem is simply that his psychology does not give an unambiguous political answer. It is usually inferred from Skinner's work that the controlling—the "explicit design" (AB, p. 205) of a culture—must be done by one or a few, who are presumably Skinnerian technicians (W2, p. 54; BFD, pp. 180, 182). But this centralized and dictatorial approach is not the only possible planning approach, given Skinnerian behaviorism. Since piecemeal engineering is at least technically easier to do and easier to effect than a grand design, planning on the level of small communities, rather than cultures or nation-states, might be at least as plausible as planning on the level of cultures; to some extent, the commune Twin Oaks is an example. Indeed, it might be equally desirable to institute planning not on the cultural or group level but on the individual level: just as, in the central planning model of Skinner, the planners shape the environment in which they then live (according, of course, to what reinforces them and to countercontrols), so too each individual could shape his environment in which he then lives (according, of course, to what reinforces him and to countercontrols).

---

[20] In response to some of the criticism of *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, Skinner admitted that "I do not think that I quite understood the limitations of control and countercontrol." *Center Magazine* (Mar./Apr. 1972, p. 65). Perhaps as a result, his formulation of control and countercontrol in his recent work stresses heavily the "social environment" (i.e., the culture) as the controlling factor (AB, esp. p. 206). But Skinner's reliance on the culture is inadequate again (see note 19, above). If the culture controls completely, then individuals have no causal role, and Skinner's appeals to his readers (BFD, p. 215; AB, p. 251) are meaningless and superfluous. If, on the other hand, individuals do have some causal role and can change their culture, as Skinner suggests when he says that "man can now control his own destiny" (AB, p. 251), then Skinner must look beyond the changeable culture to other things if he is to find any effective countercontrol.

[21] If "countercontrol" is seen in a different interpretation to avoid these problems, i.e., if countercontrol is merely the requirement that the masses be kept happy by the controllers, then Skinner has failed to solve the problem of the "happy slave," which he taxes the "literature of freedom" for failing to solve (BFD, p. 40).

[22] Skinner's unanalyzed use of the word "environment" raises problems (see note 7, above); similarly, his unanalyzed use of "control" can be seen as raising the problems here. If "control" means manipulation and total control, then the controllers totally shape the controllees, who can and do have no countercontrol (except, of course, for trivial limits, like their physique and genetic make-up), because any countercontrol would limit the controllers' ability to manipulate and control totally. On the other hand, if "control" means merely influence, then the controllers can exercise some countercontrol, but then also the controllers can only partially shape the controllees. In brief, if control means manipulation, there is total shaping and no countercontrol; if control means influence, there is only limited shaping and effective countercontrol. If Skinner's controllers are to be able to bring about all the benefits he promises, however, they must have control in the sense of manipulation, and then there is no countercontrol.

This last alternative sounds like self-control and self-shaping. And there are some examples of Skinnerians who have tried this approach. Skinner is one; he once said, "If I were to try to isolate the events in my own behavior which have led to original behavior, I would look for them in certain techniques of self-management."[23] On another occasion, Skinner asserted that "I do [influence my environment] all the time, as my environment influences me. *I* am the person I'm most concerned with controlling."[24] Another example is a member of Twin Oaks who established an elaborate system of self-rewards.[25] If Skinner and a commune member can engage in self-management and self-control, there is no valid reason why everyone else cannot do likewise. Indeed, Skinner suggests that self-management is possible for anyone (BFD, p. 207).[26]

The alternative of self-control is similar to the granting of political (not psychological) freedom: the central government establishes some countercontrols, like laws against murder, and requires some behavior, like education through a certain level; within such limits, the individual is allowed to exercise self-management. As John Stuart Mill implicitly recognized in the opening sentences of *On Liberty*, psychological determinism is not incompatible with the political and social freedom Mill advocates; indeed, running through the liberal tradition from Locke and Hobbes is the combination of psychological determinism and political freedom.[27]

Thus behaviorism is compatible with many models of society and politics: an individual planning model, like Mill's *On Liberty*; a group planning model, as found in communes or towns; and a central planning model. Within Skinner's behaviorism there is no evidence indicating which model is the best. Such evidence, in fact, would be almost impossible to obtain; for it would require experimenting with a large number of specific alternatives of each model, in order to see which survived the longest. To move beyond the narrow criterion of survival, as Skinner himself does, is to open the argument still further; for the best model now is one not only that can survive fairly well but that can most effectively lead to or produce those things which men ought to find reinforcing. Skinner's work, indeed behaviorism generally, is of no help here. Despite the clear implications, throughout Skinner's writings, that central planning by a few controllers is the logical consequence of the science of behaviorism, behaviorism does not, in fact, carry within itself the imperative for any one particular form of government. Compatible with many models of society and politics, behaviorism does not and cannot unambiguously imply that any one type of government or control is best in terms of survival or of any more complex criteria.

## Conclusions

In sum, then, when Skinner's behaviorism is accepted as a given, his social and political program can be seen to be, on its own terms, seriously inconsistent with itself, incomplete, unable to resolve the question of countercontrol, and unproductive of a clear political imperative. Skinner's project fails because he cannot successfully avoid or solve a set of "sociological," "philosophical," and "political" problems. Nor is his failure surprising, since he fully rejects most pre-Skinnerian theory. But many of the problems that so exercise pre-Skinnerian theorists are not merely mentalistic or merely theoretical problems, problems to be scorned as prebehavioral "philosophy," for instance; rather, they are problems that arise from human living. In ignoring them, Skinner has inconsistently and inadequately treated many central problems of human life.

---

[23] Evans, *B. F. Skinner,* p. 86, and also Skinner's remarks on pp. 45–46, 49, and 104; see also AB, pp. 176–180.

[24] *Psychology Today,* Nov. 1972, p. 67.

[25] Robert Houriet, *Getting Back Together* (New York: Avon, 1972), pp. 320–321. For a theoretical defense of decentralization and self-management within a Skinnerian world, see Carl G. Hedman, "An Anarchist Reply to Skinner on 'Weak' Methods of Control," *Inquiry,* 17 (Spring 1974), 105-112.

[26] Possible Skinnerian objections to self-management as a program are invalid. One objection might be that not everyone has the technical expertise necessary (W2, p. 266); but the dissemination of such technical knowledge is probably easier, cheaper, and less risky than the alternative of establishing the few Skinnerian planners with full control. (For the risks of Skinnerian behaviorist planners, see W2, pp. 256–257; BFD, pp. 34–35; AB, p. 198; and Evans, *B. F. Skinner,* pp. 53–55, and esp. p. 54, where Skinner, talking of the misuse of behavioral techniques [sometimes in primitive forms], says, "I think a science of behavior is just as dangerous as the atom bomb. It has the potential of being horribly misused.") Another objection might concentrate on the results, and argue that if the society is "effective," then self-management may well work; but if the society is "ineffective," then self-control will produce little benefit (SHB, p. 439). The same generalizations, however, apply to the planners in the centralized planning model, since they too are subject to environmental influences.

[27] John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (New York: Library of Liberal Arts, 1956), Chap. 1, p. 3; Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan,* ed. Richard S. Peters (New York: Collier Books, 1962), Chap. 21, pp. 159–160; John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (New York: Dover, 1959), Book II, Chaps. 21 and 27.

Skinner's social and political theory fails to produce the answers it promises; Skinner does not have an "effective design for a culture," nor does he have answers to many specific questions. Thus, all his conclusions ought to be examined. For instance, social and political theorists—including those who agree with Skinner's psychology—need not define "freedom" as the undetermined, nor "value" as that which reinforces. For both "freedom" and "value" may well have some meaning that lies beyond behaviorism's scope: "freedom" involving, perhaps, the deliberation and choice among options at least one of which is beneficial, appealing, or reasonable—regardless of the extent of psychological determinism of the agent; "value" involving, perhaps, some categorical statements—in addition to Skinner's purely prudential or instrumental "values." Similar questions should be raised about all of Skinner's content: his concept of science; his willingness to follow William of Occam in using "simplicity" as a criterion for theory and experimentation; his many "presumptions" about social life, like the possibility of utopia and the desirability of harmony; his treatments of humans as objects and not as subjects or actors; in short, all the behaviorist assumptions that underlie behaviorist theory, concept formation, and experimental research. The internal inadequacies and inconsistencies in his social and political thought keep open a world of questions and problems that Skinner tried to close. Beyond behaviorism, whatever are and may be its technical successes or failures, lie the fundamental problems of freedom, dignity, values, and the content and direction of human life.

# B. F. Skinner and the Technological Control of Social Behavior*

MEREDITH W. WATTS
*University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee*

## Introduction and Overview

The discipline of political science seems not to have sustained a continuing interest in the developments in behavioral analysis associated with the work of B. F. Skinner. Political scientists and other social scientists have evinced a certain wary animosity, a grudging admiration, and even a creeping fear of the practical successes of behavior theory. It appears, however, that the theoretical concerns of political science have yet to grasp the extent to which its own empirical and normative foundations require insight into the emerging possibilities for the modification and control of human behavior. Analysis of such theoretical issues should proceed at both the levels of general theory (including metapsychological orientations and epistemology) and middle or narrow-range theory in which specific tenets of behavior theory are relevant to the specification of empirical hypotheses

On the metatheoretical level, many have been content to attack Skinner's epistemology—or at least a reconstructed epistemology adduced from various Skinnerian presentations—on the grounds of what might be referred to here as the "classical humanist" critique. Although this is a gross label for a heterogeneous philosophical tradition, its components generally share in asserting of the autonomy, free will, and purposive nature of human social behavior. Characteristically, such critiques take two general forms: The first is an assertion of the unique, complex capabilities that differentiate human beings from other forms of life, combined with the assertion that systematic ("scientific") control technology violates some vital aspect of that unique human nature. Although various philosophical and empirical evidence may be used to buttress this argument, it is usually supported by a normative contention about the autonomy and freedom of man. This form of critique is nourished by the rich linguistic and symbolic devices of literature and philosophy, and might be described nonpejoratively as a normative, humanist, counter-control "ideology." Not solely restricted to literary and philosophic humanists, this critique has its representatives in psychology, biology, and other behavior and social sciences.

The second form of the humanist attack on behaviorism generally does not begin with an a priori rejection of the possibility of a behavior control science (on the grounds, say, of man's uniqueness or possession of an untouchable core of capriciousness or freedom). Rather it recognizes the actuality of behavior technology and takes seriously the possibility of behavioral manipulation and scientific control. This critique asserts a counter-ideology at the level of theory, generally in the form of an attack on the human acceptability of control and the articulation of concerns designed to arouse people against the encroachments of behavior science. The critique clearly indicates that Skinnerian behaviorism must be actively countered on an intellectual and, presumably, political level.

In an insightful critique of behaviorism, Henry Kariel contrasts behavioral and existential psychology as alternate bases for political theory.[1] Kariel accepts the possibility that a systematically adopted control-oriented theory of politics might become a self-fulfilling prophecy that creates the preconditions for the emergence of its own dominance and practical power in the manipulation of human affairs. Important to Kariel's argument is that the behaviorist "validates" his methodological conventions by acting on the belief of determinacy, thereby expanding the actual amount of control that is systematically (scientifically) exerted. It is from this insight that I intend to proceed in this discussion of Skinnerian behaviorism.

The argument in this paper will differ from Kariel's in that it will attempt to draw together a clear overview of Skinnerian premises and analyze Skinner's methodological presuppositions. The emphasis will be on the empirical import of Skinner's methodology and on the extension of that approach to social behavior. Since Skinner's elevation of behaviorism to a potential tool for the engineering of entire cultures is rooted in a history of both experimental practice and quasi-utopian speculations about social order, consideration of both aspects of his work will be neces-

---

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1973 Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association meetings, Chicago, Illinois. In addition to fellow panelists who provided much valuable criticism, the author would particularly like to thank Paul Kress and Max Neiman for their invaluable substantive and editorial comments. Most of all, Elizabeth Watts has provided a constant source of ideas, constructive criticism, and support throughout the research of which this paper is a part.

[1] Henry A. Kariel, "The Political Relevance of Behavioral and Existential Psychology," *American Political Science Review*, 61 (June, 1967), 334–342.

sary. The aim throughout will be to assess the appropriateness of his theoretical speculation and empirical research to the development of what might loosely be termed humanistically concerned empirical theory.

I shall treat in some detail the methodological postulates and their implicit epistemology, the normative assumptions that seem either to be implied or are appended in an ancillary fashion to Skinner's social extrapolations, and some of the logical and inferential problems involved in moving from the individualistic experimental paradigm to the realm of speculative social-cultural engineering. The crucial question will be whether behaviorism provides a sufficient framework and method for the construction of empirical political theory.

I will argue primarily that Skinnerian behaviorism commits a fundamental error in elevating a methodological presupposition (reduction of appropriate subject matter to observable behaviors of the organism) to the de facto status of an ontological assertion (denial of the existence of constructs or hypothetical entities that are not strictly manifested in observables). This error is magnified by two major tendencies in contemporary research and in modern society.

The first tendency that intensifies the consequences of this reductionism is the very human need of researchers to investigate that for which their methodology is relevant and which will therefore yield acceptable empirical results to their professional peers. Elaboration within the limited concerns of a behavior theory approach creates sufficient employment within the paradigm, so that metatheoretical questions are pressed successfully only on those who can be lured from the laboratory. While the metatheoretical debate continues at its own level, many researchers are progressively extending and refining the practice of behavior modification and control. As a result, *practical* advances in the laboratory tend to obviate much of the *theoretical* debate.

The second tendency that magnifies the impact of Skinner's methodological reductionism lies in the nature of political practice. If it is granted that an important goal of those exercising political and administrative power is to increase the realm of *administration* (routinization, rationalization, predictability, order) then potential agencies for implementing behavior technology already exist. The possible employment of manipulative technologies for the modification of behavior is a serious problem, despite the scientific optimism of Skinner. As his pure "science" of behavior is converted to a "technology" of behavior control, the magnification of the methodological and epistemological error takes on awesome proportions that add new force to the Weberian "iron cage" of rational-legal organization of social power. One need not be either a Weberian or a culture critic to recognize that the melding of the technological imperative and the administrative imperative within the agencies of organized social and political control offers both a threat and a challenge to social theory and to the concept of the open society.

## Skinner's Methodology

For inveterate pigeon-holers, the following phrases might be used to characterize Skinner's scientific methodology: radical empiricist, atheoretical, experimentalist and hypermaterialist (or environmentalist, if you will). When venturing to extend his program to other realms, he is a "scientian" (a term coined by journalists to describe those scientists who extrapolate egregiously from their limited intellectual spheres), a technocrat, and an explicit humanist with a clear interest in increasing the quality of human life in a palpable sense. His humanism seems to be closely linked with an implicit ideology that assumes the benevolence of the scientific procedure as a rational, humane decision-making process. It is in the service of that implicit ideology that his extensions of behaviorism to social engineering create serious problems.

It is well known, of course, that Skinner adopts in modified form what is known as the S-R (stimulus-response) paradigm, and that he does not find room in this formulation for intervening properties. Skinner sees no need to posit mediating variables or hypothetical constructs that may reside within the individual organism. Some social scientists inaccurately conjure images of Pavlovian conditioning (in the sense of conditioned reflexes). Yet, it is clear that reflexology and various forms of "muscle twitchism"[2] are not fundamental to Skinner's approach. Rather, his primary theoretical contribution is the notion of "operant conditioning," a process whereby the organism's probability of emitting a particular behavior (or class of behaviors) is associated with the consequences of the behavior. If a given response successfully operates on the environment to provide the organism with "reinforcement," it is an operant. Operant conditioning, therefore, is the process whereby a given stimulus is related to the emission of a behavior (response) through its conditioning as an operant.

Clearly, this is substantially different from the Pavlovian discovery of conditioned responses of the salivary glands or other muscles and organs. Not concerned with reducing his data to physiological phenomena, Skinner remains at the level of behavior emitted by the organism—when the manipulation of the environmental stimulus is done by the experimenter, one can speak of eliciting a response from the organism or bringing it under control of the stimulus.

---

[2] Richard I. Evans, *B. F. Skinner: The Man and His Ideas* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1968), p. 17.

Although this review is sketchy and primer-like, it is sufficient to dissociate the Skinnerian method from others based on reflexology, chemical alteration of behavioral or mental states, surgical ablation, electronic stimulation of the brain, or any of a number of technological means for altering the activity of the organism. Compared with such techniques, Skinner's respect for the health and integrity of the organism is rather more praiseworthy (at least from the point of view of the organism, although not necessarily from the scientist's). Skinner's approach is also to be distinguished from other behavior theories; for example, the social learning theories of Julian Rotter[3] or Albert Bandura[4] both of whom emphasize a strong cognitive element in the learning of attitudes and the guidance of behavior.

Thus, Skinner is a radical empiricist. He admits no data that are not directly behavioral. He eschews reduction below the level of behavior, whether in the form of neurological or physiological reductionism or in the postulation of intrapsychic, mentalistic, or cognitive phenomena. What remains is behavior (in the form of responses) and the stimuli of which behavior is a function.

Particularly in his early formulations,[5] Skinner found no place for cognition. Merle Turner, a philosopher of science who recently attempted to reconstruct behaviorism on the foundation of positivism, states:

> Skinner . . . conceptually suppresses the cognitive element in the event complex and treats stimuli as cue-occasions for response. Cognitive implications of the stimuli are accommodated by his insistence that only events tied to a response (i.e., effective stimuli) can be classed as stimuli.[6]

As a result of this position, Turner argues, "intervening variables as treated . . . by Skinner . . . are logical constructions."[7] But what are logical constructions? And how does their theoretical function differ from hypothetical constructs and intervening variables?

In the first place, logical constructions are to be distinguished from hypothetical constructs to avoid the inference that a logical construction "misleads" the psychologist into thinking there is anything existential to be studied other than behavior in the functional stimulus-response formulation. For example, Skinner rejects the notion of drive (from Freud, but also utilized by less "radical" behaviorists), as "primitive animism." Rather, when Skinner defines drive in terms of a deprivation schedule or in terms of behavioral variability, he is treating motivation as a logical construction.[8] Thus, a logical construction for Skinner is simply a way of summarizing variability of the behavioral responses of the organism. or of describing the past history of deprivation (or satiation, etc.). Rather than explaining a rat's eating food pellets in terms of "hunger" (a drive, or hypothetical construct with mentalistic connotations), the functional explanation simply points to the history of the organism and shows how certain stimuli (in this case, deprivation) increase the probability of a certain type of response (eating). That is sufficient explanation. It is this methodological rejection of mediating variables that is the locus of much of the humanist hostility to Skinner's scientific formulation. Skinner's treatment of cognition—what many would claim to be the primary component of distinctively human consciousness—shows the outcome of this reductionism:

> Induction (or generalization) is not an activity of the organism; it is simply a term which describes the fact that the control acquired by a stimulus is shared by other stimuli with common properties.[9]

Or, again, with respect to the process of "abstraction,"

> Behavior may be brought under the control of a single property or a special combination of properties of a stimulus while being freed from the control of all other properties. The characteristic result is known as abstraction. . . . Abstraction . . . is not a form of action on the part of the organism. It is simply a narrowing of the control exercised by the properties of stimuli.[10]

It is obvious why humanist social scientists, cognitive psychologists, and a number of others find little room in Skinner's formulation for what they believe is distinctively human—autonomous, purposive, goal-directed, cognizing behavior. The very language Skinner employs leaves little room for compromise or amelioration of the rigid methodological posture (e.g., as when speaking of abstraction as being a "narrowing of the control properties of the stimuli"—not the active abstracting behavior of the organism, mind you, but the control properties of the stimuli!). Some behavior theorists have found room in their S-R formulations for the S-O-R modification which inserts the "organism" between the stimulus and response and postulates hypothetical constructs or intervening variables that act as mediators. As Osgood[11] and, later, Kalleberg[12] note, this process allows room for conceptualizing mediating states or entities within the organism that influence behavioral outcomes, thereby reinstating part of what is lost in Skinner's reductionism. Skinner's consistent use of logical constructions, however, explicitly denies such intervening, mediating conceptual entities. The epistemological implications of this form of "radical empiricism" need further elaboration.

---

[3] See Julian B. Rotter's *Social Learning and Clinical Psychology* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954), and his "Beliefs, Social Attitudes and Behavior: A Social Learning Analysis," in *Cognition, Personality and Clinical Psychology,* ed. R. Jessor and S. Feshbach (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1967), pp. 112–140 for an introduction to Rotter's theory.

[4] Albert Bandura, *Principles of Behavior Modification* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969). See also Albert Bandura and R. H. Walters, *Social Learning and Personality Development* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963).

[5] See, for example, *The Behavior of Organisms: An Experimental Analysis* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1938).

[6] Merle B. Turner, *Philosophy and the Science of Behavior* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967, p. 119.

[7] *Ibid.,* p. 207.

[8] *Ibid.,* p. 303.

[9] B. F. Skinner, *Science and Human Behavior* (New York: Macmillan, 1953), p. 134.

[10] *Ibid.,* pp. 134–135.

We must ask, in short, does Skinner's reductionism approach reflect *only* a methodological position and is it therefore used as a convenient strategy for narrowing investigatory purview and delimiting research strategy? Or, does Skinner really mean to deny ontological status to hypothetical constructs like "drive," "emotion," and other mentalistic constructs employed by social psychologists and political scientists alike? A partial answer comes from Skinner's discussion of emotion in which he states rather simply that

> we define an emotion—insofar as we wish to do so—as a particular state of strength or weakness in one or more responses induced by any one of a class of operations.[13]

For example, the sum of an individual's reactions to criticism of his own work reflects the "total emotion" involved in the episode under analysis. Skinner consistently reduces any alternative concepts to those of his functional behavioral analysis, implying that nothing else of interest is involved in the situation. Superficially, this appears to be more than a methodological position; it appears to be an ontological assertion, a contention about the nature of reality.

The ontological pretensions of this position are stated succinctly by Turner who argues that, for Skinner, "drives are not internal stimuli or physiological states or other substantive states not definable in terms of simple operations."[14] But, can such constructs be nothing other than the operations which indicate them?

> For the psychologist, the issues of constructual reduction obtrude when he considers the empirical status of his mediating variables . . . intervening variables are very like logical constructions, reductive and without existential status . . . , whereas, hypothetical constructs are not strictly reducible, carry surplus meaning with them, and may in fact pretend to potential existential status. The issue . . . devolves on whether intervening variables can do the job theory construction requires.[15]

Turner suggests further that such variables are tidy and reassuring to radical behaviorists, but may in fact be deficient for theory and for depicting reality. Coming from a theorist so sympathetic to behaviorism and positivism, this suggestion of a deficiency highlights the fact that Skinner's position is problematic even among behavior theorists. A brief return to Skinner's treatment of emotion will indicate further that his operational reductionism causes difficulties within his own framework as well. In *Science and Human Behavior*, Skinner says that

> as long as we conceive of the problem of emotion as one of inner states, we are not likely to advance a practical technology. It does not help in the solution of a practical problem to be told that some feature of a man's behavior is due to frustration or anxiety; we also need to be told how the frustration or anxiety has been induced and how it may be altered. In the end, we find ourselves dealing with two events—the emotional behavior and the manipulable conditions—of which that behavior is a function—which comprise the proper subject matter of the study of emotion.[16]

And later, he asserts that in order to remedy such behavior, "we must attack the external circumstances which are responsible for it."[17] Although he stops short of ascribing real or ontological status to emotions, it is clear that they stand for something more than just operations—at least in his discussion of them and their ascribed effects. In order to observe and manipulate such emotions scientifically, however, the behaviorist paradigm of Skinner requires that surplus meaning be excised, that existential pretensions be discarded, and that the external conditions of which the behaviors are a function be manipulated in order to alter the "emotional behavior." He seems willing to leave others to discuss whether simply dealing with the behavior solves the problems, because for him the behavior *is* the problem. He has defined the problem in a way that he, in principle, can solve. Any other definition places its resolution beyond his methodology. Therefore, only radical reductionism can bring within his grasp the human individual and (as will be argued later) the social world.

---

[11] Charles E. Osgood, "Behavior Theory and the Social Sciences," *Behavioral Science*, 1 (July, 1956), 167–185. Reprinted in *Approaches to the Study of Politics*, ed. Roland Young (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1958), pp. 217–244.

[12] Arthur L. Kalleberg, "Concept Formation in Normative and Empirical Studies: Toward Reconciliation in Political Theory," *American Political Science Review*, 63 (March, 1969), 26–39.

[13] Skinner, *Science and Human Behavior*, p. 166.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 317.

[15] Turner, p. 303.

[16] Skinner, *Science and Human Behavior*, p. 167.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 168.

In a subtle sense, then, Skinner slips between methodological reductionism (a research strategy and investigatory paradigm) and ontological reductionism (an assertion about the nature of reality). He intends and defends the former while committing the latter by default.[18] When he adheres to logical constructions and operational definitions and argues that they have no deeper existential status, he seems to mean that they simply summarize a set of observed behaviors and conditions. On the ontological level, his assertion should be taken to mean that those logical constructions and definitions have no *necessary* existential status within his system; that is, for his experimental purposes there is no reason to postulate such entities since they are neither directly observable or directly manipulable. It should be kept in mind that he does not explicitly *deny* the ontological existence of such possible hypothetical entities or internal characteristics of the organism, but that his methodological postulate is that they have no place *in the program he delimits*. One must also remember, however that, the program originally developed by Skinner had a research orientation that focused on the laboratory manipulation of the behavior of various species of small animals. Skinner's later attempts to extend his principles of operant conditioning to social engineering do not reinstate those concepts or "variables" that are dispensable in his laboratory but seem crucial in *social* theory. This process can be briefly summarized as the reification of a methodological postulate to the status of a central premise of a social theory.

Skinner's extension of his behavioral program to social and political affairs involves, then, an egregious mixing of the two types of reductionism, methodological and ontological, and insufficient attention to terms not included in his experimental program. This makes his extrapolation to social behavior untenable. The critique here suggests that surplus meaning is denied on the ontological level in Skinner's social extrapolations, even though it is denied only at the methodological level in his experimental investigations.[19] The result is a distortion of the subject matter and an overemphasis on that which can be studied with Skinner's methods over that which cannot.[20]

If a concept (such as "mind," "emotion," "drive," "cognition") is "irrelevant" in Skinner's program, it is not because he *explicitly* commits the reductive step at the level of ontology. Rather, he excises these concepts at the level of methodology, allowing them to dessicate naturally, because they play no role in "the kind of analysis I am trying to develop."[21] In the end the ontological shift takes place by default, but it nevertheless occurs.

---

[18] This process, endemic in behaviorism, has been described by Wartofsky as an outcome of the original revolt in psychology against the self-imposed limits of introspectionism and subjective analysis:

> The attempt to go beyond this introspective-subjective limit and to introduce objective observation into psychological inquiry, in the way of establishing public or intersubjective data, turns from introspection to perceptually available outward behavior as the subject matter of psychology. The sharpest expression of this turn from "mind" to "behavior" is the assertion of an ontological reduction, on the basis of the methodological shift. If consciousness is to be studied in terms of the "overt behavior of the intact organisms," then the postulation of an invisible and unobservable "mind" or of some internal "mental" events is no longer necessary. At best, *mind* comes to serve only as the name given to that complex of "segments" or "elements" of behavior which we regard as the ultimate entities in terms of which consciousness is to be described; and even *consciousness* is reducible, in these terms to such manifest behavior. Marx Wartofsky, *Conceptual Foundations of Scientific Thought* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 372–373.

[19] Skinner's reductionism has been widely criticized on methodological and philosophical grounds. Much of the debate has focused on whether mentalistic constructs can be expunged from a theory that seeks to account adequately for empirical reality. Some diverse sources of such criticism are Carl G. Hempel, *Philosophy of Natural Science* (Englewood-Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 106–110; Michael Scriven, *A Study of Radical Behaviorism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956); Brand Blanshard and B. F. Skinner, "The Problem of Consciousness—A Debate," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 27 (March, 1967), 317–337; and Arthur Koestler, *The Ghost in the Machine* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1967), pp. 3–18. For some other sources of the antibehaviorist critique, the reader might consult the following: Arthur Koestler and J. R. Smythies, eds., *Beyond Reductionism* (Boston: Beacon, 1969); Ludwig von Bertalanffy, *Robots, Men and Minds* (New York: Braziller, 1967); A. R. Louch, *Explanation and Human Action* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966); and Floyd W. Matson, *The Broken Image* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966). Skinner's debate with Blanshard (cited above) indicates his belief that such problems are great enough to warrant serious discussion, as do portions of the following of his writings: "Behaviorism at Fifty," in *Behaviorism and Phenomenology*, ed T. W. Wann (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 79–97, and *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* (New York: Knopf, 1971).

[20] Such reductionism involves the tendency for the methodological presupposition to become a subtle methodological imperative. For a less temperate statement of this tendency in behaviorism, see Koestler. *The Ghost in the Machine,* p. 17.

[21] Evans, p. 23.

The restrictive implications of this process indulged in by Skinner and, allegedly, by other behaviorists have been criticized from a number of different viewpoints. Abraham Maslow, for example, criticizes behaviorism in general for being a partial (though not necessarily incorrect) position that is *only one* of several valid approaches. Since behaviorism can only provide a partial representation of reality, the willingness of its proponents to reify its methodology into a world-view has ironic and reprehensible consequences. In a wry comment on behaviorism's methodological imperative he says:

> . . . I remember seeing an elaborate and complicated automatic washing machine for automobiles that did a beautiful job of washing them. But it could do only that, and everything else that got into its clutches was treated as if it were an automobile to be washed. I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail.[22]

The danger, from the point of view of humanist social science, literature, and philosophy, is that the subject matter will be violated by behaviorism. Some argue that even the rat, the cat, the monkey, and other subjects of behavioral science are wrenched from nature and that behaviorism studies only those aspects of the organism subject to experimental manipulation. Further, some assert that only artificial behaviors emerge in the artificial experimental environment.[23] Others, like von Bertalanffy[24] are offended by the extension of methods used on "lower" animals to man, on the grounds that this "rattomorphic fallacy" ascribes to man only those characteristics that can be manipulated in the rat (and leaves out those characteristics that, even in the rat, cannot be manipulated). It is at the level of this latter critique that our own discussion can best proceed; namely, whether behaviorism as described by Skinner reduces man to those characteristics that have been controlled in lower organisms and, if so, whether extrapolations to the sociopolitical level are not doomed from the beginning as social theory. The succeeding portion of this discussion will approach this question first through a consideration of Skinner's own belief about the extensibility of his methods to individual human behavior, then through his extrapolations to group processes. In a logical, although not necessarily chronological, sense this will involve our attending first to verbal, then to group symbolic processes, and finally to the engineering of cultural behavior.

### Verbal and Symbolic Processes

Skinner has repeatedly affirmed his methodological position that in principle the processes governing the behavior of men and lower animals are the same. Even though human behavior can be so complex that isolating and controlling the relevant environmental stimuli may be difficult in practice, the basic research paradigm is the same: society is potentially the research laboratory writ large. The validity of this methodological stance is of the greatest importance to Skinner's extrapolations, and he seems not to doubt its correctness:

> To extend behaviorism as a philosophy of science to the study of people in groups, of people speaking and listening, teaching learning—this is not "psychologizing" in the traditional sense. It is simply the application of a tested formulation to important parts of the field of human behavior.[25]

While some might blanch at this extension of an experimental program based on nonverbalizing animals to the analysis of verbal behavior, Skinner sees no contradiction: verbal behavior is behavior just the same, and it will yield to his program of experimentation. He states that "no assumption is made of any uniquely verbal characteristic, and the principles and method employed are adapted to the study of human behavior as a whole."[26]

Drawing upon the foregoing analysis of methodological and ontological reductionism, one can suggest that Skinner has taken what might be an allowable (but debatable) position for guiding research and allowed it to stand for a definition of the nature of the subject matter. Although a unique formulation for *human* behavior might demand a much richer program of research and conceptualization, he pares off that which does not fit his approach. Since it is not "relevant" to his program, it may not exist at all. Contrary positions seem unnecessary to him, if not utterly benighted. As Maslow has argued with respect to such modes of analysis,

> the artificial habit of abstraction, or working with reductive elements, has worked so well and become so ingrained a habit that the abstractors and reducers are apt to be amazed at anyone who denies the empirical or phenomenal validity of these habits. By smooth stages they convince themselves that this is the way in which the world is actually constructed, and they find it easy to forget that even though it is useful it is still artificial, conventionalized, hypothetical—in a word, that it is a man-made system that is imposed upon an interconnected world in flux. . . . It is dangerous to see

---

[22] Abraham Maslow, *The Psychology of Science* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 15–16.

[23] On these points, see von Bertalanffy, p. 13, and Louch, pp. 35–36.

[24] von Bertalanffy, pp. 15–16.

[25] Skinner, "Behaviorism at Fifty," p. 96.

[26] B. F. Skinner, *Verbal Behavior* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957), p. 11.

> in the world what we have put into it rather than what is actually there. . . .[27]

To the extent that Skinner commits that error, he handicaps the theoretical extensions of his approach by prematurely closing the potential universe of scientific possibilities. If this is indeed the error that it appears to be, Skinner has provided himself with a handicap that is *internal* to his system and not simply one leveled against him by those who operate outside the framework of behaviorism. The fact that Skinner's own program has no need for a richer view of human functioning is not sufficient grounds for closing an empirical theory of society against nonbehaviorist concepts. It is not possible to delineate precisely what might prove to be necessary in such a theoretical system, but the very likelihood that Skinner's behaviorism might not be sufficient is in itself a damaging argument because his methodological postulates deliberately excise cognitive and mentalistic processes *in advance*.

To complicate matters further, Skinner nowhere analyzes the meta-position of his program with respect to the whole realm of human study. He does not specify a range of possible topics for study or indicate which might be well met with the behavior control paradigm and which might not. Rather, he assumes that *any* problem of importance can be so dispatched, given sufficient scientific resources. He views reality through his methodological imperative and treats the social world as if it were ready for the molding.

The corollary of this assumption is the belief that no important aspect of human behavior is eliminated by such a methodological fiat. Further, that engineering principles are cumulative and will lead to specification of the complex order of verbal and other human behavior as the science itself progresses. Implicit is Skinner's faith that further research (which has admittedly not yet been done) will discover that human and social processes are similar to those of his laboratory animals and can be described in mechanistic and additive external processes (rather than with hierarchical, holistic, or internal processes). By default, Skinner has legislated what the further analysis of behavior should find, without adhering to his own experimental caveat to follow the data wherever they lead, rather than imposing on them one's own sense of order. This rather unscientific adherence by Skinner to only one particular mode of knowing seems highly prejudicial. Within science itself there are multiple modes of knowing, and multiple sources of theoretical guidance. To choose arbitrarily and prematurely one of many competing scientific orientations seems, at best, unwise.

To emphasize the restricted nature of the peculiar scientific framework that Skinner accepts far in advance of any confirmatory data, let us briefly consider a criticism by another behavior theorist (noticing that telling criticism can come from sources far closer to Skinner than ideological humanists). Albert Bandura, whose name is associated with a reinforcement-oriented social learning theory, has argued that:

> it has been customary in psychological theorizing to construct entire explanatory schemes around a single form of behavior control, to the relative neglect of other obviously influential variables and processes. Thus, for example, some psychologists have tended to concentrate upon stimulus control effected principally through classical-conditioning operations; Skinnerians have primarily focused upon external reinforcement control of behavior; and researchers favoring cognitive interpretations have been more preoccupied with mediational processes. These *resolute allegiances to partial processes* are typically accompanied by some disdain for variables patronized by out-group theorists. (Emphasis added.)

Having thus characterized Skinner as a proponent of *only one* of several learning or behavior-oriented approaches, he goes on to argue that

> A comprehensive theory of human behavior must encompass all three sources of behavioral regulation, i.e., *stimulus control*, *internal symbolic control*, and *outcome control*. (Emphasis added.)[28]

While many might disagree with the way in which Bandura formulates the generic categories of analysis, it is clear that Bandura sees a need for symbolic behavior, internal cognitive processing, selection of responses by the individual, and perhaps a variety of other processes that Skinner disregards. The Skinner program is particularly deficient in the area of cognitive processing and symbolic mediation, even though cognition and symbolization seem important for the analysis of human social behavior. It is this a priori allegiance to a "partial process" (the operant conditioning model) that causes Skinner problems in extrapolation to the social level.

One need not deny the relevance of Skinnerian contributions to the understanding of behavior, one need not deny his scientific or methodological achievements, to find his restrictive elevation of that methodology unacceptable. It is precisely that restrictive tendency that one of his more intemperate critics called the "infantilism of specialists who see society merely as an extension of their specialty."[29] Such a condemnation may be too harsh, but it indicates with some drama the difficulties encountered in the reification of a particular, partial, scientific methodology.[30]

---

[27] Maslow, p. 4.

[28] Bandura, *Principles of Behavior Modification*, p. 45.

[29] Northrop Frye, "Varieties of Literary Utopias," *Daedalus* (Spring, 1965), p. 330.

[30] Anyone who detects in Skinner's treatment of

### Group Processes

If there is a deficiency in Skinner's program for handling verbal behavior where the individual organism is still the unit of analysis (and group or community processing are conceived as part of the "controlling environment"), it is even more problematic how Skinner could incorporate group characteristics when these become the central focus of concern. An adequate treatment of group behavior would seem to be the next step upward in his extrapolation from the controlled laboratory to cultural engineering. This section will argue that group processes are unspecified, but nevertheless are expected by Skinner to be subsumed under the behaviorist methodology to which he is already committed, thus leading Skinner to commit yet another misstep in the reification of that methodological premise into a de facto ontology of social reality. Consider the following:

> Social behavior may be defined as the behavior of two or more people with respect to one another or in concert with respect to a common environment . . .
>
> We are interested here in the methods of the natural sciences as we see them at work in physics, chemistry, and biology, and as we applied them in the field of behavior. How far will they carry us in the study of groups?[31]

So far, there is a show of openness about whether there is a possibility of "accounting for the behavior of people in groups without using any new term or presupposing any new process or principle,"[32] but subsequent analysis (extrapolation) suggests that nothing stands in the way of such reduction—particularly since it is possible to define a "social law" as "generated by the behavior of individuals" and to find the origin of social behavior in the fact that "one organism is important to another *as part of its environment*."[33] Ensuing discussion reduces group processes to the same terminology used in the analysis of individual behavior which, in turn, is an extension of operational definitions used in laboratory experiments with animals. For one committed to precise operational definition of the terms *stimulus* and *response*, Skinner is remarkably loose in applying those terms without any empirical referents; there is little convincing proof that analogies and extrapolations on the social plane are functionally equivalent to laboratory specifications. As Deutsch and Krauss conclude (with respect to Skinner's *Verbal Behavior* exercise):

> It is . . . an extrapolation without any explicit rules for extrapolation—without any way of knowing whether the terms one has employed in his description of his laboratory experiments are being appropriately applied in the description of human behavior in a complex social situation. . . . There is, of course, nothing wrong with the use of analogies; it is often a fruitful way to orient oneself to a new area of investigation. Analogical statements are not, however, statements of obtained relationships, but *only speculations about what might be true if the analogies were valid.*[34] [Emphasis added.]

Neither Deutsch and Krauss nor I would argue that speculative extrapolation is intrinsically invalid; rather, that in Skinner's system it lacks sufficient terminological or empirical foundation to pass as adequate social theorizing. For example, Eugene Meehan has correctly noted that little research in the behaviorist tradition has dealt with human beings *in situ*, where the true complexity of the subject matter would emerge.[35] While that observation is consistent with the argument of this paper, it should not be forgotten that much research has been conducted under the aegis of "behavior therapy" or in the tradition of laboratory experimentation.[36] The rather more academic tradition of experimentation has produced a diverse body of findings, many of which are not Skinnerian in origin or impact and cannot, therefore, be taken as direct evidence of the adequacy of Skinner's faith in the approach. Although a full review of that literature is beyond the scope of this analysis, it can be noted that the

---

such cognitive or emotional states a trace of remission of his behaviorist program, should be chastened by Skinner's assertion, at the end of his book *Verbal Behavior*, that "so far as a science of behavior is concerned, Man Thinking is simply Man Behaving" or, to eliminate misunderstanding about why he devoted an entire book to verbal behavior, he says, "There is nothing exclusively or essentially verbal in the material analyzed in this book. It is all part of a field—of the behavior of the most complex creature in contact with a world of endless variety. For practical purposes a special field has been set apart in terms of characteristics imparted to it by special controlling variables." Skinner, *Verbal Behavior*, p. 452. [Note that the justification is *practical*, not theoretical or conceptual.]

[31] Skinner, *Science and Human Behavior*, p. 297.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 298.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 298.

[34] Morton Deutsch and Robert M. Krauss, *Theories in Social Psychology* (New York: Basic Books, 1965), p. 103.

[35] Eugene J. Meehan, *Contemporary Political Thought: A Critical Study* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1967), p. 199.

[36] See. H. R. Beech, *Changing Man's Behavior* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969), chapters 13 and 14; Halmuth H. Schaefer and Patrick L. Martin, *Behavioral Therapy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969); Walter Mischel, *Personality and Assessment* (New York: Wiley, 1968), pp. 161–168; Roger Ulrich, Thomas Stachnik, and John Mabry, *Control of Human Behavior* (Glenview, Ill.: Scott Foresman, 1970); Elliot McGinnies and C. B. Ferster, *The Reinforcement of Human Behavior* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971); Robert B. Zajonc, *Social Psychology: An Experimental Approach* (Belmont, Calif.. Wadsworth, 1966).

evidence is mixed and inconclusive with respect to Skinnerian projections.

On the side of behavior therapy, Skinnerian techniques are only a few of those actually employed. "Brainwashing," drug therapy, the pairing of emetics with responses to be extinguished (as in the "Ludovico" technique in *A Clockwork Orange*),[37] or numerous treatments employed by therapists to alter sexual habits are foreign to his program and should not be unfairly appended to Skinner simply for sake of argumentation. Where successes relevant to his theory are reported, they refer primarily to institutionalized settings such as prisons, mental hospitals, schools for the retarded, and similar situations where the experimenter has the advantage of a predefined manipulative situation. A "token economy" reinforcement program in, say, a reformatory can show success through provision of incentive to learning, compliance, and the like, but it cannot be interpreted as validation of operant conditioning in social settings where manipulative control of the subjects is available *prior* to the experiment. In most cases, the availability of that prior control is a precondition for experimentation. This is a critical issue in the matter of cultural extrapolation, and the final issue to be considered.

### Social and Cultural Control

It has already been seen that Skinner's approach to social processes is an extension of his manipulative experimental program. His perspective is dedicated to "methodological individualism," in the sense that it does not ascribe attributes to groups that are not based on and reducible to individual behavior. Institutional settings for operant research ordinarily rely on experimenter-subject control, or on group-subject control, where the group processes are in turn largely influenced by the experimenter (or therapist). Validation of this sort raises serious questions about the efficacy of behavior modification techniques as a basis for social theory suggesting that the possibility of behavior modification in social settings presupposes administrative and technical control by the experimenter. The question of "who controls the controllers," commonly raised in humanist critiques of Skinner, now re-emerges in this analysis of his adequacy as a source of an empirical theory of social control. The argument to be made here is that control is possible and, perhaps, even likely. Such control does not have within it the potential for benign scientific guidance or for self-correcting humaneness, both of which Skinner transfers from the laboratory to justify his proposal for "cultural" engineering. Before elaborating this thesis, it seems useful to discuss briefly the humane intent that appears to motivate Skinner's approach to the engineering of society

There seems to be little reason to doubt Skinner's integrity or humane purpose when he argues, in the voice of Burris (in *Walden Two*), that his sense of social responsibility seems to have no influence on the world and that he wants more effective means for improving human conditions.[38] Skinner also is frustrated with man's attempts to improve the world. As he says,

> Man's power appears to have increased out of all proportion to his wisdom. He has never been in a better position to build a healthy, happy, and productive world; yet things have perhaps never seemed so black.[39]

But even if this humane impulse is recognized, Skinner's antipolitical bias should give political theorists some pause. As one enthusiastic character in *Walden Two* says,

> We want to find out what people really want, what they need in order to be happy, and how they can get it without stealing it from somebody else. You can't do that in politics. . . . The politicians guess at all the answers and spend their time persuading people they're right—but they must know they're only guessing, that they haven't *proved* anything.[40]

The formulation of the problem, whether in his early utopian novel, or in his later book, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, seems much the same. The world's problems cannot be solved by simple application of scientific technology, by instilling social consciousness in scientists, or by the continued application of "folk wisdom and practical rules of thumb." Rather, "we need to make vast changes in human behavior."[41] And the tools (i.e., technology of behavior modification) are already available to be applied in lieu of "political solutions":

> Political action was of no use in building a better world, and men of good will had better turn to other measures as soon as possible. Any group of people could secure economic self-sufficiency with the help of modern technology, and the psychological problems of group living could be solved with available principles of "behavioral engineering."[42]

The significant change from the early formulation is in the possible agency for manipulating the necessary changes in human behavior. The antipolitical bias in the utopian novel took the form of a rejection of national politics and the establishment of an experimental community—a community devoid of "politics" in the generic sense and committed to rational administrative engineering of culture. The later work, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, seems no less explicitly antipolitical, but appears to be directed at a public who Skinner hopes might support or facilitate advances in behavioral engineering. Although Skinner seems no more enamored of the nation-state than in the earlier work, the hortatory goal seems to be a wider acceptance of behavioral technology.[43]

---

[37] Anthony Burgess, *A Clockwork Orange* (London: Heinemann, 1962).

[38] B. F. Skinner, *Walden Two* (New York: Macmillan, 1962), p. 8. Originally published by Macmillan in 1948. All citations are from the 1962 paperback edition.

[39] Skinner, *Science and Human Behavior*, p. 4.

[40] Skinner, *Walden Two*, p. 8.

[41] Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, pp. 4–5.

[42] Skinner, *Walden Two*, p. 14.

Skinner's antipolitical bias is even more throughgoing than would be indicated by his animosity toward national politics. In discussing group behavior, he persistently reduces the analytic situation to the individual entity, with the group serving as part of the controlling environment. He understands the action of reciprocal control to be the manner in which the individual responds to alter the (social) environment; that is, when the individual influences the group (brings it under control of himself as stimulus?). But Skinner does not seem to recognize the essentially political nature of group decision making, interaction, sharing of meanings and norms, and mutual seeking for commonly acceptable goals. This range of activity is ignored because its study would involve considerable methodological problems

Where a more humble approach would lead the author to specify the major problems posed by the subject matter for his approach, Skinner simply consigns group studies to the future. His interest is not in the political/interactive process; it is in the task orientation and efficient operation of goal-oriented groups. He says, through Frazier, the primary engineer and interpreter of the utopian community of *Walden Two*:

> We know almost nothing about the special capacities of the *group*. We all recognize that there are problems which can't be solved by an individual . . .
>
> The problem of efficient group structure alone is enough to absorb anyone's interest. An organization of a committee of scientists or a panel of script writers is far from what it could be. But we lack control in the world at large to investigate more efficient structures.[44]

As a good utopian Skinner should recognize that he has sown the seeds of his utopia's own destruction. By not allowing for some sort of meaningful action and by assuming that each individual confronts the environment (even the social environment) alone, he ignores counter-ideologies and potentially hostile or disruptive forces that might demand to influence goal setting or challenge the organization of the community. Skinner in constructing *Walden Two*, has recognized that, in the words of Berger and Luckmann,

> Maximal success in socialization is likely to occur in societies with very simple division of labor and minimal distribution of knowledge.[45]

It is difficult to excuse him, however, for ignoring this critical dimension in *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, his explicit call to the world to engage in cultural engineering in accordance with his methodological program.

For the society of *Walden Two*, and even more so for an entire culture managed by his principles, one cannot reason away the insight of Berger and Luckmann as "irrelevant":

> Incipient counter-definitions of reality and identity are present as soon as any such individuals congregate in socially durable groups. This triggers a process of change that will introduce a more complex distribution of knowledge. A counter-reality may now begin to be objectivated in the marginal group of the unsuccessfully socialized.[46]

It is hard to imagine that the emergence of a counterdefinition of the social world might be easily eliminated with Skinner's program. Even the specter of total administration which is often attributed to him would not reliably guard against such fissures in the socializing ("behavior modifying") practices of the culture. Skinner's failure to deal seriously with this question renders suspect his understanding of human interactive processes. If he understands them he should deal with them; if they are "irrelevant" to his methodological imperative, he should not reify that imperative to a cultural design. In either case his is not to be accepted as a valid model of empirical theory until such vital processes can be adequately handled.

It is suggested here that serious methodological, empirical, and inferential problems currently block the way to implementing (or even seriously planning) a program of cultural engineering. The possibility exists, however, for integrating of behavior theory into other social theories[47] (and it is to be expected that Skinnerian contributions to psychology will eventually be incorporated in more than heuristic ways into solid empirical theory). Assuming that such a task is yet to be accomplished, it is more relevant for this discussion to return to the possible impact of the application of Skinner's proposals for cultural engineering given his assumptions, methodology, and extrapolations as outlined above.

---

[43] One critic, Bennett Berger, takes this shift of emphasis to be a commitment to the nation-state and institutionalized power, particularly since there seems to be no other agency with the potential for implementing such a momentous cultural effort. Berger argues that Skinner "wishes to persuade" men in high places to initiate effective programs of behavioral control. See that author's "Review of *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*," *American Journal of Sociology*, 78 (November, 1972), p. 706. Since Skinner remains elusive about precisely who should do what to whom in order to carry out his plan, Berger's criticism remains problematic, however.

[44] Skinner, *Walden Two*, p. 293.

[45] Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (Garden City, N.Y.. Doubleday, 1966), p. 196.

[46] Berger and Luckmann, p. 166.

### Cultural Engineering and Technological Control

Skinner has said that his technology can create a world qualitatively different from the one now existing. Although the designer of *Walden Two* admitted to his interlocutor that he was not a product of that community and therefore had unresolved tendencies that kept him from being thoroughly integrated into its normative culture, Skinner has faith that such problems can be rationalized in the future. The precise nature of the social change cannot now be apparent, but he predicts that generations socialized into that kind of world—repugnant as it might be to many now—will be conditioned to live, work, and be happy within it. Most recently Skinner has reiterated that hope in *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*:

> The problem is to design a world which will be liked not by people as they now are but by those who live in it. . . . A world that would be liked by contemporary people would perpetuate the status quo. It would be liked because people have been taught to like it . . . A better world will be liked by those who live in it because it has been designed with an eye to what is, or can be, most reinforcing.[48]

In brief, the society to be constructed is not to be previsioned according to mutually agreed-upon goals, but it is to emerge from the progressive experimentation with the culture and scientific uncovering of what people find to be most reinforcing. The role of goals is minimal, if not entirely absent. The implication is that science, left to its own logic, will uncover the proper mode of human cultural functioning and will lead to its optimum design. This logic is Skinner's main defense against offensive practices by a potentially aversive elite, even though he has admitted that

> . . . a science of behavior is just as dangerous as the atom bomb. It has the potential of being horribly misused. We must devote ourselves to a better *governmental* design which will have some control over all destructive instruments. (Emphasis added.)[49]

It appears after all that the self-correcting characteristics of science may not be sufficient to maintain the integrity of the human controllees. The problem is not that scientific design is faulty, but that it might be abused or misapplied by venal controllers. Thus, there is a dilemma in Skinner's attitude toward controlling practices that surfaces in the course of his extrapolation to cultural control: the procedures of science are alleged to be self-limiting, but he acknowledges the technology may be misapplied. The problems he relates are real enough, but his system does not have within it a vital element that could clarify (if not resolve) the problem; namely, a structural theory that takes into account organized patterns of interaction and domination in society. For all his interest in transcending "politics," the very attempt to engage in social prescription seems to require a more "political" theory. A brief look at some of his writings on government and law will illustrate the problems inherent in his approach.

In *Science and Human Behavior*, Skinner took some pains to reinterpret the concept of "law" into behavioral terms, stating that "a law is . . . a *statement of a contingency of reinforcement maintained by a governmental agency*."[50] As such, a law specifies behavior and consequences to follow that behavior (usually punishments for transgression). The governmental agency is the controller and establishes the contingencies. Skinner might argue that the manner in which laws are originally generated and enforced is more consistent with experimental design (and science) if there is adequate feedback from the controllees, particularly if the process is "democratic."[51] But he is not clear about how the concept democratic applies in such a case unless one believes that people govern themselves through such agencies and that authorities have no distinct goal of their own that might influence controlling practices. Since that assumption seems untenable, it seems necessary to give consideration to governmental structure and particularly to representational practices; otherwise, there is no way to analyze the establishment and enforcement of the contingencies.

---

[47] One means whereby Skinnerian principles might be integrated into empirical social theory is suggested in the affinity between Skinner's notion of behavior selection and broader theories of functionalism. Some authors have noted this potential linkage (Arthur L. Stinchcombe, *Constructing Social Theories* [New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968], pp. 85–87; Gerald Marwell "Review of *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*," *Contemporary Sociology*, 1 [January, 1972], 18–29), but that possibility seems largely unexplored at the moment.

It is possible that cultural selection of behavior (through a process of operant conditioning) might allow a melding of the behavior modification approach with current theoretical concerns. If the central argument of this paper is correct, the imperialistic claims of the Skinnerian program are to be denied but the insights retained wherever they can be demonstrated to have empirical import at the social level.

Some heuristic uses of Skinnerian and other learning approaches have recently appeared in the literature (see Clifford Anderson and Betty Nesvold, "A Skinnerian Analysis of Conflict Behavior," *American Behavioral Scientist*, 15 [July/August, 1972] 883–909; Richard M. Merelman, "Learning and Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review*, 60 [September, 1966], 548–561; Thomas J. Cook and Frank P. Scioli, Jr., "A Critique of the Learning Conception in Political Socialization Research," *Social Science Quarterly*, 52 [March, 1972], 949–962), but more empirical and theoretical specification will be needed before the approach is fully exploited.

[48] Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, p. 164.

[49] Evans, p. 54.

[50] Skinner, *Science and Human Behavior*, p. 339.

The Skinnerian program does not have within it the concepts for dealing with such structural and processual considerations. Establishing the contingencies that affect the shaping and sharing of values within the political community should be seen as the outcome of the political process, but Skinner cannot deal with that process using his approach as currently stated. In his laboratory, and in the institutionalized applications of his methods, the controllees generally do not interact in group processes of mutual value-setting, nor do they communicate the outcome of that process to the controller. The paradigm was not developed to deal with that variety of social interaction. If it could be elaborated in that direction without vitiating the Skinnerian program, the transition to human cultural control might appear much more plausibly supported on the theoretical level.

Aware of some of the dangers of the government as controller, Skinner suggests some corrective tendencies, noting that "*in the long run* the power of a government which has the consent of the governed derives from a congruence of function between governmental and ethical control" (emphasis added).[52] The reciprocity of control between experimenter and subject and, analogously, between governmental agency and citizen, is a crucial element is achieving that congruence. Skinner recognizes, though, that the balance is ordinarily on the side of the controller and that the asymmetry will tend to favor the controller increasingly as time progresses. In fact,

> . . . the power of the agency increases with each interchange . . . the growth of power accelerates as control becomes more and more effective. When the strong man coerces others to engage in control in his interest, his total power is increased. When a government uses force to acquire wealth, it can then also exercise economic control.[53]

There may be a limit in the "simple exhaustion of the resources of the governed,"[54] but surely there must be some countercontrol short of the population's being bled dry. There is, says Skinner: in *laws* that specify and limit behavior for both controller and controllee, and in *constitutions* which establish limits on the exercise of power. "With these specifications the system is prevented from deteriorating through an asymmetrical interchange."[55] We might question whether that deterioration really could be avoided as the techniques for control became increasingly effective; however the danger of deterioration is particularly great if we accept Skinner's persistent belief that the governmental system should emulate the laboratory situation endemic in the behavior control approach. The control problem remains, and Skinner cannot resolve it within his own system: his own laboratory procedures may be self-limiting, but the ambitions of governmental agencies (the social analogue of the experimenter) are not. Structural controls like laws and constitutions may be partial possible solutions, but we may well require different laws and structural arrangements than we now have. It seems likely that innovative laws and practices would have to be designed to contain the urge toward asymmetry, and social theorists wishing to apply Skinner's insights would do well to consider the structural arrangements that would be needed.

Even if the problem of governmentally patterned power were to be overcome, there would still remain an additional problem not easily solved in Skinner's reductionist approach, which lacks the concepts to deal with the *social* patterning of dominance and power. Individuals do not appear in the culture as atomized, isolated experimental subjects, but already have personal histories anchoring them in class, status, occupational, familial, and political systems. Since behavioral control might simply be co-opted by existing "controllers" for their own purposes, it should not be forgotten that, in the social world the controllers may be inclined to condition that behavior that is reinforcing to themselves rather than the controllees. Skinner himself hints at this possibility when he describes the conditioning of "obedience" as a guard against unforeseen future problems:

> By establishing obedient behavior, the controlling agency prepares for future occasions which it cannot otherwise foresee and for which an explicit repertoire cannot, therefore, be prepared in advance. When novel occasions arise to which the individual possesses no response, he simply does as he is told.[56]

Whatever obvious benefits such coordinated behavior under governmental command might reap for the agency, the conditioning of obedience might be used for nonbenign purposes. It would be too much to expect that agency controllers would let themselves lose their positions, reputations, fortunes, and political futures over blunders and venality if they had a reservoir of conditioned obedience upon which to draw. Control in the governmental context is potentially dangerous as countercontrol fails, asymmetry accelerates, and the controllers choose what is reinforcing to *them* rather than to their public.

---

[51] Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity,* p. 172.

[52] Skinner, *Science and Human Behavior,* p. 336.

[53] *Ibid.,* p. 347.

[54] *Ibid.*

[55] *Ibid.*

[56] *Ibid.,* p. 338.

All of this raises one final problem; namely, whether it might be possible to perpetuate a pattern of control that had aversive consequences for the controllees. According to laboratory experiments and casual observation, aversive contingencies tend to produce avoidance or attack behavior —in this case, examples might be defection, exile, subversion, revolution, political opposition. A major difficulty in the political situation is that the controllers might arrange positive reinforcement for behavior that had long-run aversive consequences. The problem can, however, be *stated* (though, I believe not resolved) in Skinner's own terms. We find acknowledgement of the difficulty in the following account of the long-term and short-term consequences of controlling practices:

> A problem arises for the defender of freedom when the behavior generated by positive reinforcement has deferred aversive consequences. This is particularly likely to be the case when the process is used in intentional control, where the gain to the controller usually means a loss to the controllee. What are called conditioned positive reinforcers can often be used with deferred aversive results.[57]

The controllers in this statement are assumed to be traditional, "prescientific" agencies lacking in a technology of behavior modification. They may use positive reinforcement in the sense of immediate gratification for their subjects, but the long-term consequences may be aversive. The exploitation of natural resources for short-run affluence may produce long-run deterioration of the resource base; bread and circuses may provide immediate pleasure, hiding the self-aggrandizement of governmental authorities; short-run benevolent paternalism might promote long-run dependency and increasing asymmetry of control. The examples might be multiplied, but the basic point is that social decisions about immediate versus long-term consequences have to be made and the controllers have the primary responsibility to make such decisions.

The problem is basic to the whole system because if people are not brought under control of the long-term consequences of their behavior, then short-term positive reinforcements may interfere with the survival of the culture. To achieve such control, governmental practices ideally must set short-term contingencies that are consistent with long-run consequences. Thus, "the task of the cultural designer is to accelerate the development of practices which bring the remote consequences of behavior into play."[58] Might not an inadequately countercontrolled agency opt for short-term reinforcements for *themselves* (or even some public-oriented, but wrong program) while in fact preparing the way for long term aversive consequences? The control can work both ways— it can be used to avoid remote aversive consequences or to promote them.

As Skinner rightly notes, "some balancing of control and countercontrol may be a first step in the design of an effective culture,"[59] but it seems clear that his experimental model is not designed to handle such a problem. I do not believe his approach is "naive" (as Erich Fromm claims),[60] but that he has overworked his tools and failed to indicate where additional ones might be needed. If that was not his task, then it must be done by others. The problems of methodological reductionism, the implied ontological shift, the lack of a structural theory, and even an apparent inattention to contradictions within his own extrapolations reduce the plausibility of Skinner's claims for behavior control and cultural engineering. Once his claims have been placed in this light, it becomes clear that the science/technology of behavior control needs to be embedded in some broader theoretical framework that supplies the social and political theory lacking thus far. This will require further analysis to determine the proper areas of applicability of Skinner's approach as well as the place of other techniques for the control of human behavior. At that level, increasing attention to psychological models would become integral to political formulations, and reanalysis of the psychological assumptions about the nature of the human being become increasingly important for the development of political theory. Additionally, new political arrangements (legal, constitutional, processual) may be necessary to adequately insure humane use of behavior-control technology. In this sense, the older term "policy science" takes on renewed importance since, in a very real way, feedback, evaluation, planning, and control procedures may in the future be increasingly structured on principles of behavior modification. Thus, while many of Skinner's claims may have empirical support from the laboratory and selected institutionalized settings, many speculations lack the research and conceptual analysis to qualify yet as valid extrapolations. Still other claims are immersed in paradox, inadequately integrated in Skinner's own presentation, and plagued with anti-humane potentialities for the abuse of the power to control. The challenges put to social scientists by Skinner's social speculations therefore seem to be (1) theoretical integration of that which is valid into empirical theories of political order, (2) further analysis of that which *may* be valid, and (3) consideration of structural and processual arrangements that will insure the appropriate use of that which is effective.

---

[57] *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, p. 33. For a more elaborate working out of the problem in the terms of Skinner's concepts, see G. B. Ferster, "Arbitrary and Natural Reinforcement," *Psychological Record*, 17 (1967), 341–357. Reprinted in McGinnies and Ferster, *The Reinforcement of Social Behavior*, pp. 433–436.

[58] Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, p. 143.

[59] B. F. Skinner, "Answers for My Critics," in Harvey Wheeler, ed., *Beyond the Punitive Society* (San Francisco: Freeman, 1973), p. 265.

[60] See Erich Fromm, *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), p. 40. Chapter 2 of that book (pp. 33–68) contains a critique of Skinner and others Fromm considers to be behaviorists or environmentalists.

# Comment on Watts's "B. F. Skinner and the Technological Control of Social Behavior"

B. F. Skinner
*Harvard University*

I have dealt with many of these issues in my recent book *About Behaviorism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974) and will confine myself here to two of the issues Professor Watts raises.

The first is the use of laboratory data in the interpretation of daily life. When moving in one direction this is called extrapolation, in the other, reductionism. Consider modern astronomy. It observes events occurring in outer space, under conditions beyond any hope of experimental control, and mostly unreproducible on the earth. The astronomer has available, however, facts about gravity, radiation, pressure, temperature, and so on, obtained under the controlled conditions of the laboratory. He assumes that both terrestrial and celestial events are of the same kind and interprets his observations of outer space in the light of the laboratory results. In other words, he uses what is learned under favorable conditions to talk about facts of which he knows very little. There is room for disagreement, of course, but no serious person complains that the facts in outer space are being *reduced* to facts of a different kind. They do not so complain because they have no other information about the facts in space.

Unfortunately, the situation in the behavioral sciences is believed to be different. In my analysis of verbal behavior, for example, I begin with a formulation derived from an experimental analysis of behavior. I use this formulation to interpret a wealth of facts in which similar relations between behavior and the environment are pointed out. I attribute much of the special character of verbal behavior to the special characteristics of the environment arranged by a verbal community, but this is not *reduction*; verbal behavior begins and ends as such. What I am accused of "reducing" are concepts such as meanings, propositions, and the communication of ideas and feelings. But I do not convert them into other forms or destroy them; I simply do not use them. To many people I seem to have omitted something important because they believe they have other kinds of information about meanings, ideas, and so on, particularly as derived from introspection. But, as I point out in *About Behaviorism*, I believe the entire armamentarium of cognitive psychology may be regarded as one vast analogy, in which human thought, in the sense of human behavior, has been fancifully analyzed by internalizing various behavioral processes—the internalization being supported by the unwarranted use of feelings and introspective observations. The issue here is not mentalism but whether I have given an adequate account of the facts of verbal *behavior*.

Similarly, I do not believe that my *interpretation* of processes in government, religion, education, economics, and psychotherapy (as presented, for example, in *Science and Human Behavior*) is reductionistic. I do not make an "unwarranted use of analogy" or show "ontological pretensions" or remove a "richer view of human functioning" or "legislate what is to be found in the world at large" or "arbitrarily choose only one scientific mode" or "show allegiance to a partial process." I do none of these things to any greater extent than the astronomer in the example above.

Whether my interpretation is "egregious" depends upon two things: the extent of the laboratory science and the extent of my use of it. Professor Watts has made a sustained effort (rare among my critics) to present my position correctly; nevertheless, he could not, of course, even in summary, suggest the full scope of the experimental analysis of behavior. There are hundreds of laboratories throughout the world in which organisms are studied in extremely complex and carefully controlled environments. A fairly wide range of species has been covered, including the human species, and it is always an individual organism rather than some average that is being considered. The results show a satisfactory precision and reproducibility. I do not expect everyone to be familiar with this work, but anyone who calls an extrapolation egregious should be so. Professor Watts himself is quite reasonable on this point, though he cites others who are not.

As for the use I make of the principles derived from a laboratory analysis, I am as often accused of going too far as of not going far enough. *Walden Two* is, of course, science fiction. I was not saying, "This is the way it should be." I was simply describing one possible culture designed on behavioral principles. The book does not seem to me to have been too bad a guess. It was written nearly thirty years ago and seems to me more relevant than ever. A way of life in which people consume as little as possible, pollute their environment as little as possible, and somehow enjoy a life of friendship, art, music, science, and leisure is something to be taken seriously. *Walden Two* was written before any practical applications had been made of the experimental analysis outlined in my first book, but much of it has come true in a piecemeal way, particularly in behavior modification. Practices in psychotherapy, education, incentive systems, and so on have developed gradually, under conditions in which it should have been instantly clear that an application had outstripped the initial analysis, simply because the application was not working. In general, the technology of behavior has never been much in advance of the experimental science. But at times Professor Watts seems to be arguing that I have not gone far enough and have left important areas untouched. To this I readily plead guilty, but I am satisfied with the speed with which new areas are being successfully explored.

Is it not incumbent on those who charge me with the neglect of cognitive and mental processes to point to what might have been done with their help? What new practices in government or economics, for example, can be attributed to advances in cognitive psychology—not simply to common sense for which a place can be found in cognitive psychology?

The other issue raised by Professor Watts is my supposedly illiberal social position and my failure to specify who will control the world and to what end. Here I miss any reference to my use of evolutionary principles. The extraordinary process of *selection*, in which new forms are created by the success of essentially random mutations, can be seen in (1) the evolution of species, (2) operant conditioning, and (3) the evolution of cultural practices. It is a continuing process, which does not presuppose any advance plan, creative design, or purpose. Nevertheless, in all three fields it is possible to intervene and to take the future to some extent into account. (This does not mean the emergence of autonomous man, for the conditions under which intervention occurs are themselves a product of natural selection.)

I am not antidemocratic, I am ultra-democratic. Most political practices, including democracy, arise from the opposition of controlling and countercontrolling forces. I do not believe that this is the only, or necessarily the best, source of cultural practices. What we call democracy, particularly as observed in contemporary America, is certainly not the last word in government. The evolutionary process continues. I do not believe it is pointing in the direction of totalitarianism; the evidence is all too clear that *that* is a lethal mutation.

Unfortunately, it is impossible to foresee the governmental structures which will emerge in the distant future, but we can and do take the near future into account. If Professor Watts will tell me who now controls human behavior (even if he tells me that to some extent the individual controls himself), I will make my best guess about the future, for I will predict that the same *kinds* of people will remain in control—teachers and students, governments and citizens, therapists and patients, owners and workers, and so on. But they will control each other and themselves more effectively. As I point out in *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, the problem is not to eliminate control but to improve it, and my humane hope is that mankind will continue to discover ways of controlling itself more and more effectively, in the sense not only of guaranteeing a future, but of finding a future in which people will *feel* freer than ever before and achieve greater things.

# Behaviorism and Skinner's Social Commentary: Letting Science Catch Up to Ideology? Rejoinder to "Comment" by B. F. Skinner

MEREDITH W. WATTS

One of the traditional tasks of a "rejoinder" is that of defensively discussing one's own criticisms of someone else, normally in the hope that someone out there is keeping score. Fortunately, Professor Skinner's candor and ecumenical spirit make that sort of approach unnecessary. With a little indulgence by the reader, it may be possible to use the "Comment" as a meaningful starting point for reviewing briefly the main points of my critique of Professor Skinner's earlier works, and to discuss some relevant aspects of his most recent book, *About Behaviorism.*[1] Since that book was not available when my original essay was written, and since its author has specifically alluded to it in his remarks, it seems reasonable that some attention be given it here. Since, however, it is not always possible to see the substance of the original criticism emerging from the "Comment," it might be useful to review some of the central arguments of the original paper.

The major points can be summarized as the following:

(1) To evaluate Skinner's social extrapolations and speculative analysis of cultural engineering requires that political scientists come to grips with his program as a possible source of an empirical theory of social control;

(2) In carrying out such an analysis, it must be concluded that many of Skinner's proposals leave a number of gaps that must be filled in by behaviorists and by social scientists who wish to use Skinner's insights; notably

(a) There is a tendency to convert a methodological presupposition into a de facto ontology that by omission tends to prematurely close any emergent theory from non-behaviorist sources that might prove necessary in the future:

(b) Skinner's explicit faith in the self-correcting nature of *science* does not seem applicable to the use of a technology of behavior control;

(c) Control of behavior enters a matrix of sociopolitical power in which the material means of domination and the power to make binding decisions on others are features of the social world that seem to require some sort of structural theory and, therefore, concepts not contained in his thoroughgoing methodological individualism.

It was also argued that adherence to the "classical humanist" critique of behaviorism (rather than careful examination of its achievements and practical applications) is not a sufficient position for those interested in empirical social theory. In a pragmatic sense, behaviorism is real because its procedures have effects, and we cannot deny that efficacy on the purely philosophical level. We can, however, analyze whether it succeeds as empirical theory and point out some of its difficulties. The interrelated issues that I would like to examine in this discussion are (1) Skinner's treatment of complexity and methodological individualism, (2) the social pattern of dominance into which behavior control technology would enter, and (3) cultural design and the use of the metaphor of "evolution" in his approach to "behavior Darwinism."

## The Problem of Complexity and Structure

Complexity in social relations is a frequently cited impediment to the success of behaviorism's extension to the "natural" (nonlaboratory) behavior of human beings. Skinner's contrary article of faith is that science is an incremental, cumulative process in which building blocks of knowledge are sorted together in a relentless progression. That position, although usually more subtly stated, is common to positivism as a philosophy of science and to behaviorism as Skinner has interpreted it. Combined with a commitment to methodological individualism, the emergent social theory is one that analytically constructs society and its processes from the behavior of individual actors. That is a venerable position, and one that is defended by a number of nonecumenical philosophers as the *only* way to achieve social knowledge. I disagree, and believe that Professor Skinner might also if he would re-analyze some of the consequences of his own stance.

It is frequently argued that experimentation under controlled conditions simplifies the ordinary complexity of the social world and differs quantitatively, but not qualitatively, from naturally occurring phenomena. All of us who have to some extent attempted to "control" the complexity of an analysis either by experimental manipulation or by statistical methods designed to achieve a similar effect (for example, various types of partial correlations or cross-tabulations with one or more variables held constant) have found some solace in this article of faith. Realistically speaking, however, it is a simplifying assumption that "brackets" or suspends judgment on the larger epistemological matter while allowing research to continue within the parameters of uncertainty. It is wisest to keep in mind that a methodological presupposition has been introduced, and to resist the temptation to reify that presupposition into an epistemological and ontological assertion. It is one thing to temporarily suspend judgment on the philosophical matter; it is quite another to suspend thought about it. Professor Skinner has denied that he has made such an error, primarily on the grounds that the progressive extension of behavioral technology to broader portions of the social world is showing that complexity indeed will yield to such a program. He argues that the accumulating evidence from laboratories over the world is indeed that complexity will yield to a program based on such assumptions; it is accordingly still plausible to maintain that the more complex social environment can be expressed in terms of *more* variables (not different kinds of variables).

---

[1] B. F. Skinner, *About Behaviorism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974).

Logically what those successes provide is not confirmation of the ontological implications of the behaviorist/positivist assumption, but rather reassurance that the assumption is still tenable as a proximal research strategy. Whether there is a limiting condition that will ultimately invalidate the assumption is not indicated; its existence is rendered no less likely or unlikely by the advances of behavioral science. What is accomplished is a progressive definition of the subject matter that can be so treated, not that which cannot. But by empirically staking out one's rightful share of a seemingly lawful portion of organismic behavior, one does not thereby lay exclusive claim to the remainder of the empirical realm of behavior.

As I argued at the close of the original paper, behavior control appears to have promise for at least a certain range of problems. In therapeutic and institutional settings it has shown great advances, and in such "natural" settings as child-parent relations, infant toilet training, labor wage scales, and administrative management it has been employed wholly or in concert with other psychological strategies to advance the solution of problems. What better evidence of an advancing technology and encouragement for our efforts in attaining eventual mastery over complexity? It does not follow, however, that being impressed with such advances (as, I believe, one must be) leads to the conclusions that complexity will be unveiled with the specification of more "variables." Certainly not in the proximal future in which we must operate. Why not?

In the first place, Skinner's various excursions into social speculation have been analogical and speculative. Just as astronomy or other fields must make certain assumptions about natural order and use those terms that meaningfully organize reality, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with employing those terms to further hypothesize about what is not yet ordered or known. Skinner argues in that vein, and I agree. But one's concepts and ordering principles may be insufficient for the task. It is difficult to accept his argument that the unreached inner spaces of cognitive psychology or the more proximal but elusive spaces of social interaction are as unapproachable as the distant phenomena studied by astronomy. The force of that suggestion rests on the assumption that there is no alternative mode of explanation in either discipline that would add to our understanding. Such an implication overlooks the fact that there are alternative explanations of many astronomical phenomena, just as there are in the study of human behavior. Behaviorism is not analogous to all of astronomy (just as it is not analogous to all of physics) but comes closer to being only one of the theoretical explanations that are tentatively held pending confirmation with appropriate empirical observations. Skinner has proposed the adoption of only *one* possible approach to the explanation of human behavior and seems to have confused matters somewhat by implying either that the subject matters are somehow analogous, or that astronomy is monotheoretical. By questioning his approach, we do not deny the validity of attempts to explain human behavior (or the behavior of heavenly bodies, for that matter); rather, we are suggesting that there may be phenomena for which his monotheoretical approach may not be sufficient.

One way of analyzing the sufficiency of his formulation is to see whether methodological individualism leaves anything important out of an account of social policy. For instance we might consider one of Skinner's own examples—that of the Agricultural Adjustment Act[2] which offered positive reinforcement (payments) for keeping land out of production. Here, the individual confronts a structure which in its *aggregate* nature offers an incentive for compliance with a behavior it desires. Skinner does not discuss the behavior of lobbying groups of farmers attempting to influence the nature and distribution of reinforcements—positive and negative (i.e., the "allocation of values," who gets what when and how, etc.). Nor does he have need to analyze the structures of power that are to be influenced, their patterned relations, or the contingencies under which they operate. Neither does he indicate what environments leaders and competing groups may discriminate as being sources of appropriate reinforcements. To put all this in another way: Power, influence, and political activity are all patterned socially and constitute aggregate and processual constructs that cannot be completely dissolved and restated in a hard-nosed methodoligical individualism. At least for the proximal future, it will be necessary to employ "structural" concepts, statistical averages, probability statements, and *extensive* analytic procedures. Contrast such strategies with Skinner's preferred model which eschews structuralism,[3] rejects statistical statements and insists on the *intensive* analysis of one organism at a time. The result of this orientation is a devaluation of "structuralism" by which is meant (roughly) such approaches as behavioralism in political science[4] which describe the structure of behavior (or patterned regularities, or statistical averages) but do not probe deeper into *causal* or "functional" relationships. But what of structure —at least conceived as the patterning of relationships? Some clarity can be gained by trying to express the problem in terms similar to those of Skinner.

---

[2] The reference to the Agricultural Adjustment Act appears in a symposium involving Skinner and psychologist Carl R. Rogers. See Carl R. Rogers and B. F. Skinner, "Some Issues Concerning the Control of Human Behavior," *Science*, 124 (November 30, 1956), 1057–1066.

Structure, in behaviorist terms (more or less) can be taken to refer to the patterned contingencies of reinforcement available in the social/political environment. When society or culture is viewed in "macro" terms, that structure might refer to the broad patterning of rewards and deprivations of the society, the distribution of values, the allocation and the material and symbolic bases of domination and hierarchy. Although the individual confronts a "reified" or objectified corpus of law, institutions, and social structure, the interactions and products are behaviors that can be "reduced" to the level of the individual at the service of a methodological individualism. Such phenomenologists as Berger and Luckmann[5] use a "state of nature" such as this to assert that originally social structure begins with the reciprocal interactions of the dyad—two interacting individuals. They, like Skinner, base a theoretical or speculative structure in individualistic conceptions. They recognize, however, that most individuals confront the social structure as a reified set of institutions, patterns, and set of environmental contingencies; that is, they confront a substantial *structure.* The possibility that structure may be apprehended sufficiently by means of aggregating "variables" in an additive fashion seems remote. Skinner's aversion to structuralism and his unwillingness to pose problems of socially patterned relations indicate that if complexity is really a matter of structure it cannot be adequately interpreted within his behaviorist system. As will be argued in the following section, this conclusion has important practical consequences for the implementation of a behavior control technology.

### The Social Patterning of Domination

It is clear that effective behavior to maintain or create a system of contingencies (i.e., the material basis of domination) exists in patterned form in any social system. Domination is not random, but exists in structured ways that are of deep and traditional concern to political scientists. It is into such a pattern that the technology of behavior control would enter.

The problem referred to in the original essay as "de facto ontological reductionism" is primarily the result of Skinner's retranslation of traditional terms into behaviorist language, methodological individualism, adherence to the experimental paradigm, and an unwillingness to handle complex interactions. None of these individual points is a problem in his own program, and each has merits within its rightful realm—the real difficulty is that they work together to turn attention from the pre-existing and dynamic environment of contingencies into which Skinner's program of behavior modification and control would enter.

The leaders in such a world exist in a verbal, material, social community in which the major emphasis is on control, manipulation, relationality, efficiency; in such a community, the possibility of countercontrol may simply be absent because the material and organizational assets of the countercontrollers are insufficient. This is clearly a problem of the pre-existing patterning of contingencies and the complex interactive pattern already built up in the sociopolitical system. Professor Skinner himself notes that experimental analysis in hundreds of laboratories and in some complex environments have produced encouraging results in the modification of behavior. But he notes also that the unit and level of analysis is still the individual organism, rather than some "average." Nowhere do I specifically disagree with the appropriateness of such research; nor is there serious contention as to whether such findings should be applied in a heuristic and hypothetical fashion to the broader world of natural social environments. But I do insist that (1) environmental contingencies exist in patterns within societies and cannot adequately be expressed in wholly individualistic terms as Skinner insists; (2) that any application of behavior technology will enter into the ongoing cultural matrix of domination with the dominant being those who already can most effectively maintain contingencies that control the behavior of others. Is it then unreasonable to note that the explanatory terminology is ill-suited in its present form for the analysis of patterns (structure) of dominations and authority, and that the applications of a technology may well find themselves imbedded in the traditional pattern of domination, assuming a role as the technological tool of those whose material control over authority is already buttressed by control of reinforcers and material/symbolic legitimation? If Professor Skinner has not chosen to deal specifically with these problems, must not political scientists do so? The problem in adapting whatever Skinnerian insights are appropriate to political analysis is not a fundamental philosophical disagreement but one that comes by default from Skinner's extrapolations simply because his laboratory concepts are insufficient for some of the structural concerns so pressing for empirical theory in political science.

---

[3] B. F. Skinner, *About Behaviorism,* pp. 11–13.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (New York: Doubleday, 1966).

At this point Skinner can easily reply that he has, of course, already thought of these problems, and I believe he has. For example, he reminds us that whatever humanistic and self-congratulatory praise we may heap on the contemporary political system, we must still create the conditions (environmental contingencies) for good leadership and must not expect it to come from the spontaneous goodness of our elected officials: "The consequences responsible for benevolent, devoted, compassionate, or public-spirited behavior are forms of countercontrol, and when they are lacking, these much-admired features of behavior are lacking."[6]

It is a penetrating indictment of the system if we press to the conclusion that misconduct is not just attributable to a few desperadoes or bad characters—but to the *system itself.* If the system can be conceived of as an environment of contingencies of reinforcement, we can conclude that the problem of leadership failure is not primarily the fault of individual bad character but of the system that encouraged and rewarded such behavior. The ability to place primary responsibility with the environmental contingencies is a penetrating Skinnerian contribution.

When Skinner says, "What is needed is a restoration of social environments in which people behave in ways called moral,"[7] it is worth recognizing that he is not "illiberal" as he asserts (and I agree, although his protest appeared to be in response to my critique), and that there are some truly radical implications in his emphasis on environmental contingencies. The problem is rather that he does not possess the conceptual tools to deal with the societal processes whereby such matters could be expressed, analyzed, and experimentally manipulated. Is it asking too much that he should? Probably. But it seems to be no less than he has attempted to offer us already. Specifically, he has proposed that whole cultures might be engineered according to principles of behavior modification. This raises the interrelated problems of cultural design and engineering.

### Evolution and Design

Skinner, in a most pragmatic manner, reminds us that it is not enough to condemn some behavior as being "wrong" but that contingencies must be set up so that the behavior is ineffective, leads to aversive consequences, or is blocked by competing "good" behavior. This situation is generically similar to what Skinner describes in therapy: "The culture of the therapist should lead him to act in ways which are good for the person he is helping, and the problem of those who are concerned for therapy is to generate such a culture, not to find humane therapists."[8]

Perhaps there is little disagreement on the point that it is important to "generate" a culture in which humane therapists and benevolent political leadership are produced, but the process whereby such an enviable state might be achieved deserves some comment. In this connection, two interrelated matters will be discussed: (1) the compatibility of planned cultural design with the evolutionary analogy, and (2) the use of arbitrary (vs. "natural") reinforcers by controllers. A few remarks concerning the latter will precede discussion of the crucial problem of design vs. evolution.

Natural reinforcements, according to C. B. Ferster (a former collaborator of Skinner's) occur reliably in the organism's environment; the organism will orient behavior toward them without intervention or control from another person or agency. This is stimulus control in the benign, analytical sense. Arbitrary reinforcement, on the contrary, is introduced into milieux by a controller who has the power of manipulation of the controlled or its environment in a manner that will make a particular behavior more likely to appear. Often such reinforcement is tied to aversive consequences which can be escaped only through a particularly narrowly defined response. Often, it is "designed to preempt the rest of the individual's behavior. Thus the child facing a threatening parent cannot turn to other behaviors as he could in the face of an aversive stimulus which had a fixed physical relation to his behavior. The requirement that he emit a *particular* behavior will preempt all other behaviors."[9]

---

[6] B. F. Skinner, *About Behaviorism,* p. 191.

[7] *Ibid.,* p. 196.

[8] *Ibid.,* p. 186.

[9] C. B. Ferster, "Arbitrary versus Natural Reinforcement," in *The Reinforcement of Social Be-*

To complicate matters ethically, the immediate reinforcers are generally for the benefit of the controller, although, Ferster suggests, "we sometimes apply aversive stimuli for the individual's own good."[10] From Skinner's point of view, this notion of arbitrary reinforcement is potentially quite troublesome because (1) it is introduced by some person or agency for the express purpose of controlling the behavior of the organism and often for its own purposes (not the individual's), (2) the amount of a priori control already available in the situation will largely determine the efficacy of the arbitrary reinforcement and the greater the control available, the greater control can be obtained in an increasing spiral, (3) arbitrary control does not favor the natural evolution of adaptive responses by the individual, but guides operant selection through narrowing of the response possibilities, (4) the responses obtained (from the controller's point of view) or emitted (from the individual's points of view) do not necessarily have to be a portion of the individual's natural repertoire nor is it mandatory that arbitrary reinforcement will serve the interests of the individual.

Thus, the observation that reinforcement always takes into account the nature of the organism and does not damage its integrity or vital interests does not appear to be strictly true when behavior reinforcing to the controller is to be obtained. The slave may "control" the slave-master in an analytical sense, but realistically the slave specifies only a minor portion of the environmental contingencies of the slave-master, while the slave-master may control virtually every aspect of the slave's environment that is relevant to the production of labor reinforcing to the slave-master. Likewise, the experimental organism has its response opportunities and relevant repertoire restricted by the experimenter. There is a vast difference between the two situations, although Skinner has in the past given them a prima facie identity in an abstract sense. What seems clear is that the canons of scientific investigation may control the behavior of the scientist because the scientific community may enforce them and confer reinforcements only if acceptable procedures are followed. Obtaining a specific response from an experimental animal is less important than establishing a functional relationship between environmental contingencies and whatever responses are available and appropriate. For the slave-master, establishing a scientific, functional relationship is not the question—he wants to obtain a particular behavior that is reinforcing to him immediately, not to accumulate scientific knowledge for some diffuse verbal community. Therefore, the behavior of the controller is not under the reciprocal control of the controllee, but under control of whatever reinforcements can be obtained through the labor of the slave. That is a far cry from the integrity of the laboratory and it seems to explain in language not unlike that of Skinner why the analogy between cultural design and laboratory experimentation does not hold up. It can, of course, be argued that the problem is to *design* a culture in which arbitrary reinforcement is no longer efficacious to the slave-master (or any other controller), but that is only to leap out of one dilemma into one of more circular form. Following that line of argument, let us look more closely at the problem of design and the related matter of cultural evolution.

According to the most recent statement, the design of culture is necessary to "mediate the future" and to plan for long-term consequences of current behavior. Conscious design and experimentation with cultural practices is proposed, particularly since nature never designs experiments the right way.[11] The components of culture that provide the framework for experimentation are:

(1) a set of contingencies maintained by a group,
(2) physical status,
(3) continuing existence,
(4) a constantly changing pattern,
(5) control varying degrees of overt behavior of members ("power").

As Skinner says:

> The important thing about a culture so defined is that it evolves. A practice arises as a mutation, it affects the chances that the group will solve its problems, and if the group survives, the practice survives with it. It has been selected by its contribution to the effectiveness of those who practice it. Here is another feature of that subtle process called selection, and it has the same familiar features. Mutations may be random. A culture need not have been designed, and its evolution does not show a purpose.[12]

But what is this? The analogy to Darwinian selection (according to which behavior is retained because it is reinforced and, hence, adaptive to the environment) acknowledges the importance of random mutation and (nonpurposive) selection through the contribution of practices to survival. But how does this compare with his firm conviction that explicit (purposive?) design is neces-

---

*havior,* ed. Elliot McGinnies and C. B. Ferster (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), p. 434. This article was reprinted from *Psychological Record,* 17 (July, 1967), 341–357.

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] See Richard I. Evans, *B. F. Skinner: The Man and His Ideas* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1968), pp. 49–50. Skinner expresses this sentiment in the context of an interview with Evans.

[12] B. F. Skinner, *About Behaviorism,* p. 203.

sary? Note his statement shortly before the one cited above:

> . . . in the long run any effective countercontrol leading to the "liberation" of the individual can be achieved only by explicit design, and this must be based upon a scientific analysis of human behavior.[13]

It is not nit-picking to call attention to the fact that there are two entirely different analogical processes being employed, one for asserting the similarity of cultural design and laboratory experimentation, and the other for defending the futuristic optimism that mutation of current institutions and relationships can generate better environments even without planning. But the mix doesn't work—planning and cultural design mean purposive human decisions about the environmental contingencies to be maintained and the blend of natural and arbitrary reinforcers to be allowed. Almost explicitly, the processes of obtaining compliance, predictive rationality, and cultural planning require arbitrary reinforcement in some areas. On the other hand, mutation and selection are invoked by Skinner as a nonteleological explanation of processes of cultural adaptation, but he declines to mention explicit design or deliberate control attempts exerted by various groups or authorities within those cultures. Since much statutory and governmental activity in industrialized cultures is the result of conscious efforts to control environment and behavior, "evolution" in Skinner's usage is merely a more cosmic, external view of what internally is quite like his proposal for cultural design. When viewed from a common level, design and evolution are much the same—they are different only in the temporal role they play in the logic of the experimental paradigm that subsumes the two. They are not two separate processes at work.

How might this logical difficulty be amended? Perhaps by resorting to an overarching logic in which purposive design and random mutation are compatible. I am intrigued by the esthetics of such a system, but I suspect that it would closely resemble the experimental model with some addition to pluralism, noncentrality of planning, incrementalism, and other such attempts to escape from the classic tension between control/design and "freedom" in government.

Even if such an attempt were made, however, I suspect that Skinner, like political science itself, would not be able to blend in compatible fashion the competing desiderata of (1) cultural engineering and explicit (prior) creative design with its emphasis on purposive control, with (2) pluralistic experimentation (random mutation from his level) with its emphasis on nondesigned mutations and lack of place for prior purpose. There remains a problem of competing metaphors, each employed for a different logical and argumentative purpose by the author. The blend of competing logics is interestingly compressed in the following extended quotation with which Skinner ends a chapter on "The Question of Control":

> Will a culture evolve in which no individual will be able to accumulate vast power and use it for his own aggrandizement in ways which are harmful to others? Will a culture evolve in which individuals are not so much concerned with their actualization and fulfillment that they do not give serious attention to the future of the culture? These questions, and many others like them, are the questions to be asked rather than *who* will control and to what *end.* No one steps outside that causal stream. No one really intervenes. Mankind has slowly but erratically created environments in which people behave more effectively and no doubt enjoy the feelings which accompany successful behavior. It is continuing process.[14]

Have we resolved that the question of who controls the controllers is therefore irrelevant? Only if we accept the idea that evolution does not reflect anyone's purpose or design for the control of others' environment and hence, behavior. Further, we would have to ignore the pre-existing matrix of domination and control that makes some "mutations" more likely to succeed than others (regardless of their survival value to the culture) because of the ability of those most immediately reinforced to specify the environmental contingencies for others, and because the a priori control to some makes possible the use of arbitrary reinforcement in ways quite different from Skinner's scientific program.

Individuals enter society at birth, with the happenstance of their procreation and familial bonds being influential in altering the probabilities of their being controllers or controlled. Individuals vary with respect to their relationship to the means of manipulative control, whether it be structured around the means of production, monopoly over the tools of violence and destruction (as in the military), organizational strength and position, or other socially patterned resources which allow the possessor to specify the behavior of many significant others and set the environmental contingencies in a distinctly nonrandom pattern. The possession of a priori control makes possible the use of behavior technology to perpetuate the ongoing social structure of rewards, thus patterning much of the social world.

Skinner's program of operant conditioning, as an emergent technology of considerable potential, becomes a resource in that matrix of dominance. The uses to which the technology will be put is a matter of considerable importance, one for which

---

[13] *Ibid.,* p. 201.

[14] *Ibid.,* p. 206.

Skinner's processes of design and evolution contain less benevolent potential than first appears.

### Incrementalism or Reconstruction (or, "What about public policy and does it make a difference?")

If the general outline of my comments in this and the original essay is accepted, then it should be concluded that Skinner's social speculations are as yet insufficiently grounded to allow the full-scale development of an empirical theory of social control. That such extensions have been made analogically and hypothetically is a tribute to Skinner's insights as a humane and liberal scholar—but not to his methodology or basic experimental paradigm. Therefore, we are confronted with an insufficiently founded—but partially correct—set of social extrapolations that may or may not provide the basis for a program of cultural engineering. Some might assume that Skinner's *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* and his various writings on the engineering of culture make it clear beyond question that he intends and proposes adoption by the culture of behavioral engineering to ensure its survival. Certainly much breath has been exhausted on this assumption. But what of his much more modest projections that behavior control will soon (some day at least) be extended from controlled institutional environments (where a priori control is a prerequisite for the control of behavior) to more "natural" environments (i.e., those in which more complex variables are at work and less arbitrary control is available to the "controller")? It appears that projections exist on at least two different levels.

There is the ostensible attempt to imbue readers with an interest in and receptivity to behavior technology on a cultural level, yet the pragmatic proposals are more modest—extensions to more complex situations, evolution of practices in an experimental fashion, incremental adoption of controlling practices on a pragmatic basis. Apparently there are two Skinners here—the one who modestly and "scientifically" proposes a gradual validation of his program at ever-higher levels of complexity, and the publicist who states in the most unblandished form what his program would imply if implemented at this stage of development. To which are we to attend? To both, of course, but for different purposes. The publicist turns our attention to the cultural implications; the scientist shows what must first be done. I must grant that, in this generous rendering of his position(s), he remains what he claims in his "Comment" in this *Review*—a liberal and a democrat (terms agreeable to me, but foreign to many of his critics who see only the publicist and brand him a "scientian," or protofascist, or the like). That may be disappointing in the sense that it acknowledges the differences between the human being with an implicit ideology of his own, and the scientist whose tools do not quite reach to the lengths that his ideology and humane interests impel him.

The most defensible position from Skinner's approach thus seems to be one of liberal incrementalism—a position compatible, in fact preferred, by such a notable positivist as Karl Popper and one that might well be favorably received by pragmatists like James, or even advocates of the logic of "fallibilism" that Thomas L. Thorson adapts from James and Dewey.[15] Since that notion of piecemeal engineering is perfectly compatible with the scientist Skinner, I would like to suggest that his primary position, given an environment of moderate liberal democracy and minimal statism, would be composed primarily of (1) piecemeal engineering after the fashion of liberal incrementalism, and (2) gradual extension of his program to new realms of behavior (verbal, group, symbolic process) for scientific validation up the chain of abstraction to the social level.

If this interpretation is valid, then many of the "humanist" criticisms of Skinner are wide of the mark—occasioned in part by Skinner's own indelicacy in goring sacred oxen, and in part by philosophical combat only distantly tutored by empirical analysis. If, however, the "other" Skinner—the publicist and metatheorist—really meant what he seems at times to say, then we must reiterate with even more force that the basic criticisms of the original critique of his method are as yet unanswered and that vast new researches must be undertaken to fill in the inferential gaps. If time, as Skinner suggests, proves him to be right, it will not be because evidence ascending to the levels of *social* complexity was available at the time of this discussion.

All that is lacking to bring us into agreement is for Skinner to say that his speculations about verbal behavior, group processes, and cultural engineering are *hypotheses*[16] to be tested in further programmatic research. Then we can agree that such research should have high priority and that the handling of *complexity* might well make behaviorism more *structural*, *statistical*, and *probabilistic* than the laboratory paradigm has heretofore allowed. Then the matter of cultural engineering and of the material bases of social-political dominance and hierarchy will become moot. They will no longer be consigned to the conceptual coalbin euphemistically called "complexity," but they will enter theory freely and legitimately as major environmental contingencies that condition social and political behavior. In the event that such matters could be reconciled, Professor Skinner and I would then agree:

---

[15] See Thomas L. Thorson, *The Logic of Democracy* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962).

[16] See Kenneth MacCorquodale, "On Chomsky's Review of Skinner's *Verbal Behavior*," *Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior*, 13 (January. 1970), 83–99. That author presents a lucid defense of Skinner's analysis in that book but strongly stresses its *hypothetical* nature.

(1) that the movement from the laboratory to institutionalized control to cultural engineering is insufficiently founded;

(2) that validation (and very probably modification of his program) in the intervening areas of verbal behavior and group processes should be given high research priority;

(3) that such research should be urged immediately, in place of the arguments for cultural engineering which are thus premature except as science fiction (much of *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* would therefore be no less science fiction than *Walden Two*);

(4) that, pending research and application yielding valid evidence of operant conditioning's contributions, we assume that it is of considerable merit for the generation of empirical social theory and seek to examine further its (as yet indistinctly limned) role; and

(5) that those academic disciplines (like political science) with a primary interest in verbal behavior, "attitudes," group process, behavioral tendencies—oriented toward sociopolitical authority objects, and patterns of culturally organized controlling practices—should actively seek to integrate his insights and empirical evidence into their own theoretical, normative, and empirical investigations.

If such agreement were possible, we might then accept Skinner as a liberal incrementalist (with respect to social policy), a concerned humanist (with respect to the normative orientations of society's controlling contingencies), and a dedicated scientist who earnestly urges that his insights be tested by others for their applicability to social theory. In that case, Professor Skinner and I are in accord. If however, he avers that *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* is more than a hypothetical, analogical, speculative (and partial) working out of his research program, then I would urge in greater force the critical comments of my original essay.

# BOOK REVIEWS

**Marxist Esthetics.** By Henri Arvon. Translated by Helen Lane. With an Introduction by Frederic Jameson. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1973. Pp. XXIV, 125. $9.50, cloth; $3.45, paper.)

Marxist writers have devoted and still are devoting a great deal of space to problems of aesthetics. This should not come as a surprise to anyone. After all, Marxism has always sought to examine all human activities, however remote they may seem to be from economics and politics. Moreover, art does have political implications. Style changes may be related to changes in class structure. The functions of art may differ from one mode of production to another. Further, being interested in revolutionary politics, Marxists must ask whether contemporary art might be able to render services to the exploited classes and to the revolutionary party; and once such a party has come into power, they must wonder whether art might be of use to the proletarian dictatorship. And what kind of art should that be? Finally, a complete Marxist theory of art would have to develop some vision of art in the future communist society.

This slender volume was written by a French Marxist and has been translated into rather inelegant English. It concerns itself primarily with the tactical questions concerning the kind of art that might serve the cause of the proletariat best. It seeks to define an aesthetic committed to political relevance. Arvon reviews the advice given to writers and playwrights sympathetic to socialism by Marx and Engels. To be sure, there is not all that much the two founding fathers of Marxism ever wrote about art; and the few things they did say remain cryptic and contradictory. Hence there is no Marxist theory of art, and Arvon concedes this. There is a good deal more to be culled from Russian radicals, Marxian and non-Marxian, and two small chapters summarize the views of such art critics as Plekhanov, Bogdanov, Lenin, Belinski, Chernyshevski, and Dobroliubov, as well as some of the debates over art generated within the communist movement after 1917. The book further contains a sketch of the avant-gardist experiments in the Soviet Union of the 1920s and the subsequent bureaucratization of art under Stalin and Zhdanov. It further presents a brief chapter on the contributions made by Piscator and Brecht and an interesting review of the running debate between Brecht and Lukács. The book is slight in substance and doctrinaire in the positions it takes. According to Frederic Jameson, who wrote the Introduction, it presents "the Soviet view of Marxist aesthetics" (p. ix).

To be sure, Arvon is critical of the Soviet view. He is aware that party controls over art in the USSR have stifled creativity and produced shoddy works. He denounces dogmatism in art and pleads for an "open" Marxist aesthetic. But one looks in vain for an elaboration of this plea. All the reader gets is grand phrases seemingly culled from the works of George Lukács. It seems to me also that Arvon tends to share the stuffily conventional artistic judgments made by such writers as Lukács, Lenin, Engels, and Marx.

One looks in vain also for references to some of the most interesting problems of Marxist aesthetics. Arvon seems to reject the sociology of art as simplistic; he has little or nothing to say about the function of art in capitalist society or its relationship to philosophy and science; he hardly deals with the puzzle that troubled Marx concerning the continued appeal which the art of past societies has for us, and totally skips the fascinating problems of the ambivalent relationship between revolutionaries and artists. His book therefore fails to acquaint the reader with the rich and lush literature of Marxist aesthetics which has generated so many exciting and stimulating ideas. For an initial introduction to Marxist aesthetics, it seems to me, the beginning reader must look to other books.

ALFRED G. MEYER

*The University of Michigan*

**The Politics of Expertise.** By Guy Benveniste. (Berkeley, Calif.: The Glendessary Press, 1972. Pp. 232. $7.50, cloth; $3.75, paper.)

Given the growing tendency for engineers, lawyers, public health specialists, and city planners to take a few courses in microeconomics and statistics, and then to call themselves public policy or system analysts, it is useful to have a book that explains to the would-be policy experts that the role they seek is invariably a highly political one involving value judgments and bureaucratic maneuvers as much as the manipulation of equations. Professor Benveniste has written such a book and has done it well. Unfortunately, he mars his effort by including in the slim volume some not very well-thought-out comments on the comparative development of planning systems and some even less well-thought-out comments on the possible uses of the social sciences by Congress.

Much of the book is a primer on politics. Professor Benveniste adopts the style of Machiavelli, but advises the advisors rather than the Prince. For example, the advisor should be aware that the Prince needs political support as much as he needs advice. The advisor should be wary of the Prince's lieutenants, for they will resent rivals for the Prince's council. And the advisor should be concerned where his office is located, for its location is often symbolic of an advisor's power position. All of this is sound, and much of it is entertaining. There are perhaps too few case examples cited, but those that are, and especially those drawn from the author's previous work on Mexico, are persuasive.

Problems arise, though, when attention shifts from the role of the expert advisor in government to a comparative examination of planning systems. Categories such as laissez-faire, imperative, and intentional are used to classify the planning systems of nations without a thorough analysis of whether or not they can be distinguished from one another in practice. The chapter on the institutions of planning in the United States too readily depreciates the efficacy of the existing central planning mechanisms while too easily asserting the efficacy of agency or corporate planning mechanisms. The discussion of the French planning system is too brief to help evaluate the related system of planning favored in the text for the United States. The frequent reliance on unsupported statements about the collapse of governmental institutions or the growing dominance of corporations limits both the opportunity for dispassionate analysis and the value of the exercise.

In a "Utopian Epilogue" Professor Benveniste claims to be in advance of reality by advocating the congressional use of partisan social science experts to protect the legislative branch against the information monopolies held by the executive branch experts. But Congress does not suffer from a shortage of policy alternatives in its examination of executive branch proposals. Long ago Congress learned that pitting the experts of one agency against those of another could provide it with sufficient information on the policy conflicts that are always lurking within the executive. The reasons why Congress fails to plan effectively are the same reasons why the executive branch fails to plan effectively. The world is uncertain; the alternatives are complex; and we are divided on our goals. Increased usage of social scientists or system analysts by Congress will not alter this reality.

HARVEY M. SAPOLSKY
*Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

**Democracy.** By Carl Cohen. (New York: The Free Press, 1973. Pp. xv, 302. $2.95, paper.)

Carl Cohen's *Democracy* is an attempt to retrieve the word "democracy" from the confusion and stretching to which it has been subject; "There is a philosophy of government properly called democracy" and Professor Cohen offers a "coherent and reasonably complete" account of it (p. xiii). In view of the methodological agonies many contemporary political theorists experience in their efforts to figure out a way to work, it is both surprising and refreshing to discover an author simply rolling up his sleeves and going to it. (Of course there is a price to be paid in terms of difficulties not discussed and works not attended to.) As a first book in democratic theory, *Democracy* has much to recommend it, although instructors may sometimes wish that Cohen had saved them the labor of relating Cohen's work to "the literature." This may endear the work to beginning students, but one sometimes wonders whether Cohen is aware of the thickets he is strolling through.

The argument is developed around six questions: What is the *nature* of democracy? What are the *presuppositions* of democracy? What are the *instruments* of democracy? What are the *conditions* required for the success of democracy? What arguments can be given in *defense* of democracy? What are the *prospects* of democracy? The treatment is quite thorough; Cohen even offers three paragraphs on the physical machinery of participation—"ballot boxes, filing cabinets, legislative chambers and offices" (p. 108).

"Democracy is that system of community government in which, by and large, the members of a community participate, or may participate, directly or indirectly, in the making of decisions which affect them all" (p. 7). Cohen has refined this definition by distinguishing "the *administrative* sense of government," which involves controlling or compelling, and "the *directive* sense of government," which involves setting goals and policies, and suggests that it is the latter in which all may participate (p. 5). (It does not occur to him to address doubts in the conventional wisdom of political scientists that this distinction is extremely hard to make in practice.) He then distinguishes three dimensions of participation, its breadth, depth, and range. Breadth is the apparently simple matter of the proportion of community members who participate; but Cohen neatly shows that breadth is relative to a given community, and thus raises the problem of the unrecognized community: when enormous military and economic "powers lie, as they do at present, in the hands of a few governments, representing only a fraction of those seriously affected by their decisions, the global community goes unrecognized and is very far from democracy" (p. 16). Depth is less simple; it is a matter of how full and effective participation is. Cohen finds an increase in depth to be the kind of democratization most imperative for contemporary political communities, and he is persistently concerned to defend deep democracy as a viable ideal for large polities; as will be seen shortly, this involves him in controversy on a number of fronts.

The last dimension of participation is its range, the kinds of questions that are decided by the people. Cohen offers an intriguing distinction between the sovereign range and the effective range of a given democracy. The sovereign range is "determined by those matters over which the affected public have, truly, ultimate authority" (p. 23). It is not necessarily restricted by having certain issues dealt with by representative machinery or by private decision-making bodies. The effective range, by contrast, includes both issues that the public actually decides and "how effectively the members of the community may influence or alter decisions, normally made through systems of indirect control, if it is their pleasure to do so." Cohen admits "that most large democracies—and all modern national democracies—have severely restricted effective range" (p. 24). But this need not upset the democrat if the sovereign range is not restricted. Unfortunately, what the sovereign range actually is "will be in every case a serious empirical question. . . . often . . . a most difficult question. It may have no definitive answers. . . . [and is] always a central question for every democracy" (p. 25). One wishes for a more successful analysis of this interesting notion; at least I wondered whether explicit consideration of Rousseau might not have had more than antiquarian interest.

Some "participatory democrats" (Cohen does not think there is any other kind) may find the upshot of Cohen's argument upsetting, despite his advocacy of deep and wide democracy, because it might seem to permit thin, pallid, and narrow forms of participation to pass for the real thing. "Madisonian democracy" is also seen "not to present a special theory of democracy or a kind of democracy" (p. 217). Rather as the "rule of fluctuating majorities," pluralism (*The Federalist #10*) is identified as "a key factor in the health of any large democracy" (p. 72). Political scientists who have found either Peter Bachrach or Robert Dahl plausible will find food for thought in Cohen. "It would be naive and unrealistic to suppose that participation in government must take the form of a town meeting or something much like it" (p. 28). Hence both efforts to find ways to create such intense forms of participation *and* efforts to redefine democracy in a more "realistic" way by dropping participation in favor of parties, elections, competition for support, and so forth, fail in Cohen's view to deal with the essential core of democracy.

In sum, then, Carl Cohen's *Democracy* deserves a wide audience. It is unfailingly clear and often interesting. Its faults are largely due to insufficient grappling with the ideas of others; but that would have required a different and much longer work, and readers may profit by trying to remedy such faults themselves.

JOHN R. CHAMPLIN

*The Ohio State University*

**The Pathology of Politics: Violence, Betrayal, Corruption, Secrecy and Propaganda.** By Carl J. Friedrich. (New York: Harper and Row, 1972. Pp. 287. $10.00.)

In this loosely structured book Professor Carl Friedrich plays the role of the worldly scholar who introduces the reader to phenomena such as corruption, violence, betrayal, treason, secrecy and propaganda.

He views these morally objectionable forms of behavior as potentially, though not inherently, pathological; they can be not only system maintaining, but system developing, because they are important for growth and decay. He sees it as the political scientist's task to "determine within what limits a violation of ethical norms may contribute to the good of the political community" (p. 15). Friedrich ranges broadly over time and continents to illustrate his analyses, but he also promises at the beginning that these will be critical and purposeful analyses which will focus attention "upon the problem of the limit at which they become dysfunctional" (p. 13).

Friedrich is not skittish about stating that violence, for example, can often be functional. He cites American vigilantism as an example, since on the frontier, "plural violence operated as a substitute for the centralized violence of the modern state" (p. 63). Ideally the state should have a monopoly of organized force. But even where the organized state is largely embryonic, Friedrich argues that "if the cherished ideas of the community must be violated in the interests of upholding the community, it will and should be done" (p. 65). Those who argue that functionalists display a built-in bias for preserving the status quo could often cite Friedrich as a prime example.

Friedrich does not usually attempt to distinguish degrees and varieties of functionality. On the whole his examples tend to be rather starkly polarized. Thus he concludes that the Stamp Riots were "functional in relation to the emerging American system," whereas he has "little difficulty in concluding" that the New York Draft riots of 1863 were "completely dysfunctional" (p. 68). Often his functionality ratings seem solely dependent on the long-term success of the endeavor on whose behalf the "immoral" techniques were used.

Revolution is seen to be two-faced in its functionality: "it is dysfunctional to the dying order and functional to the new order" (p. 55-56). Some phenomena have greater inherent pathological potential than others. Thus treason must be presumed to be dysfunctional until functional aspects can be proved. The traitors of the German "July 20th group" died functionally because subsequently the new regime could use observance of the anniversary to recall to the youth the evils of its predecessor. The "ideologically motivated treason of a man like Alger Hiss," on the other hand, Friedrich finds illustrative of the limits of functionality, "for if in the end everyone betrays everyone, the faith which men need for maintaining a political community is destroyed" (p. 117).

Not all will accept Friedrich's repeated suggestion that his potentially pathological phenomena usually tend to reinforce each other; that more violence begets more treason, more corruption begets an increase in violence, etc. Other functionalist authors such as Huntington have pressed substitutional arguments, and concluded that at times corruption should be tolerated as a lesser evil than large-scale violence. In certain situations, corruption and violence might be reinforcing in one direction, but not the other. For instance, large-scale organized violence is likely to induce potential victims to resort to bribery of soldateska, SS troopers, etc.; but those subject to "speed money" or "five-per-cent-off-the top-" extortions would usually not be likely to hire gunmen in order to avoid this exaction.

Friedrich insists that there is a core meaning of corruption, namely "private gain at public expense" (p. 127). Yet elsewhere he notes that all the phenomena he discusses have at times been lumped together by political philosophers under the heading of corruption. The Watergate scenarios seem to have triggered such an accordion-like expansion of the way the term is used.

Friedrich usefully reminds us that when philosophers like Plato, Montesquieu, and Rousseau talked of corruption, they tended to refer to a general disease of the body politic or to a kind of global degeneration. He makes some effort to try to distinguish this broad moral concept of corruption from more specific forms of political corruption. Corruption in the broad, as distinguished from the narrow, sense cannot be functional, since it includes all kinds of practices which by definition are believed dysfunctional. Here he indeed touches the limits of his functionalist framework of analysis.

For its breadth of scope as well as for its forthright style, Friedrich's book is to be recommended. Perhaps partly because it assembles residuals from ambitious previous efforts, it is not Friedrich at his very best; but it displays a breadth of scholarly knowledge, a richness of references in both the text and the footnotes, and a determined and often successful ability to relate problems in utterly diverse social and historical settings.

ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMER
*Washington University*

**American Political Thought: The Philosophic Dimension of American Statesmanship.** Edited by Morton J. Frisch and Richard G. Stevens. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971. Pp. x, 262. $10.00.)

This volume contains eleven essays by ten college professors about certain men who achieved prominence in American public life and spoke or wrote seriously on matters of enduring political consequence. Eight of the ten authors are members of the University of Chicago faculty or have the Ph.D. from that institution, another received a Chicago M.A., and it is possible that the tenth, Harvey Mansfield, Jr., has a Chicago connection not disclosed in his A.P.S.A. biographical sketch. If the choice of authors was intended to expose a Chicago school of thought, the community of interest or method which distinguished them from other serious students of political thought does not come through to me.

One essay deals with *The Federalist*. Nine are, each, directed to a single individual: Thomas Jefferson, John Marshall, John C. Calhoun, Abraham Lincoln, Frederick Douglass, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Felix Frankfurter. The eleventh essay, a 19-page Introduction, is by the editors, each of whom contributes one of the other essays. Contrary to the promise of the title the contributors have not provided a series of articles which more than casually explore the philosophic dimension of American statesmanship—unless one applies tests of philosophic discussion considerably more lenient than mine.

Several sentences in the preface aroused a second expectation which was not to be realized, viz., that a hypothesis would be tested or a thesis developed. The preface asserts: "What might be called the master idea of this book is that the highest political thought in America is that of its statesmen . . . " (p. viii). American statesmen who had political responsibility at three critical periods, "in facing up to the problems those crises presented, have come nearer a philosophical treatment of the problems of liberal democracy than have any other Americans" (p. vii). " . . . *almost* nobody [else] in America has views of politics as worthy of study" (p. viii). One ought not expect so small a book to establish the meagerness or shallowness of the literature stemming from Americans who assumed no political responsibilities, but surely the preface invites one to anticipate that each statesman featured in an essay will be shown to have engaged in some form of sustained discourse. By sustained discourse I mean something imposing greater intellectual demands than will be encountered in speeches and messages that do little more than identify and publicize the deeply held values which justify a statesman's actions, stir a population with repeated appeals to forego personal interest in favor of the public good, and charm it with a few cogent reasons for doing what the statesman is advising the people to do.

Six of the essays, in varying degrees, satisfy me on this count. The authors have as guiding purpose to discover essential values or commitments which underlay the policies espoused by some of America's greatest statesmen, and to show to what extent those values and commitments were developed and justified in thoughtful oral or written statements.

Martin Diamond's highly regarded essay on *The Federalist* is reprinted from the *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 53, March 1959. I found it admirable then and think it admirable now for resort to imagination, rigor of analysis, and wise choice among possible conclusions. Harvey Mansfield, Jr., chose not to survey Jefferson's wide-ranging contributions but instead to show in what respects and with what consistency Jefferson's political actions were based on and adhered to his philosophic conclusions, especially as his beliefs were expressed in the Declaration of Independence and his *Notes on Virginia*, and as his actions were manifested in his leadership of the Republican party. Ralph Lerner attempts to find out what Calhoun was trying to say to his countrymen (mainly in the *Disquisition*), to account for his conclusions as to how just government can be secured, and to relate Calhoun's views to the problems of governing in his day and ours. Harry V. Jaffa has a thesis: that Abraham Lincoln believed: (1) that the conditions of just government announced in the Declaration of Independence must be the foundation stone of every humane political order, and (2) that the preservation of the American Union and its Constitution was essential for the continued recognition of this great truth throughout the world. Jaffa's essay, written twenty years ago, searches out the evidences of this belief in Lincoln's speeches and actions from the debates with Douglas to the last of his days. Herbert J. Storing proves that Frederick Douglass, free black champion of the American slave, drew upon a thorough understanding of American political and social arenas and a sensitive appreciation of moral dilemmas to challenge and shame the dominant whites for their wanton assaults on their own ideals as well as their violation of the black man's humanity. Harry M. Clor shows that Woodrow Wilson's salient policies as president were in keeping with and guided by his teachings as political scientist, and that these teachings, chastened by experience, were marked by a comprehensiveness and an analytic rigor which entitles us to speak of "a Wilsonian system of political thought—a distinctive Wilsonian view of the common good and the American purpose" (p. 191).

Three of the contributors failed to convince me that the statesmen they wrote about were guided by a mature or reasoned system of thought sufficiently comprehensive and profound to be called philosophic—Robert K. Faulkner, Morton J. Frisch, and Richard G. Stevens writing respectively about John Marshall, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Felix Frankfurter. The central thesis of Walter Berns's essay is that Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., was neither statesman nor great political thinker. Berns writes an angry protest against Holmes's persistent refusal to inquire whether the language of the Constitution forbade legislative enactments which were challenged in court on the ground that they denied basic human rights. "It was not that he trusted the legislature, or the people electing it; on the contrary, he had no respect whatever for them. He was simply of the opinion that what others regarded as constitutional questions were in fact merely political questions to be decided with finality in the political process" (p. 180). I fear that Mr. Berns's eagerness to convict the Justice of nonthinking may have deterred him from asking whether Holmes had a well-developed theory of popular sovereignty and legislative preeminence in the governmental structure.

The title and the preface of this book hold out promises of extraordinary attractiveness for students of political thought. Readers who think as I do that execution falls far short of promise may yet be richly rewarded by a careful reading, both because some of the essays do explore the mutual reinforcements of responsibility, thought, and action in politics and because other essays provide illuminating analysis of the public expressions of statesmen who are not shown to have brought a philosophic dimension to their thought.

CHARLES S. HYNEMAN

*Woodrow Wilson International*
*Center for Scholars*

**Culture and the Radical Conscience.** By Eugene Goodheart. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973. Pp. 179. $7.95.)

How can one fail to be sympathetic toward an author whose "criticism, like nemesis, is directed toward the hubris of reason and imagination, not toward reason and imagination themselves" (p. 149)? The occasion of this attack upon hubris is the problematic status of contemporary humanist culture, with special emphasis upon the connection between art and politics. In the terms of his own argument, Professor Goodheart is a liberal who tries to be just to the conservative as well as to the radical positions. He sees that "the belief in and love of distinction, of the heights, is essential to the cultural idea" (p. 88). Furthermore, "the Cartesian spirit of beginning at the beginning and looking only to the future is fine, if one has rich, clear, and distinct ideas to fill the void. And if one does have these ideas, the chances are that one owes a debt to the cultural past" (p. 160). Professor Goodheart is thus able to resist the nihilistic excesses of radical "counterculture" spokesmen, who condemn reason and tradition on behalf of instinct and imagination. In perhaps the best chapter of his book ("Utopia and the Irony of History"), he shows both the dependence of intelligent radicals like Marx and conservatives like Burke upon the historical process (cf. p. 104), and also how the utopian idea, "when it gets incorporated into the historical process, . . . begins to exercise a constraint or tyranny of its own" (p. 111). Among the many other sober lessons to be learned from this book, one might also single out Professor Goodheart's critique of the immoral and politically irresponsible consequences of freeing the imagination from the restraints of reason: "Immoralist art and thought, as Nietzsche so well understood, is experimental, not to be imitated by everyone and not to be given an immediate political realization" (p. 147).

On the other hand, Professor Goodheart recognizes the connection between art and politics (pp. 80ff., 145), the debilitating effects of the "democratic" surrender to methodology and the "cult of objectivity" in the study of art (pp. 53–60, 67, 73), and "the pragmatic question whether the passion for justice can be sustained for long without resentment" (p. 128). While condemning the excesses of anarchy, Professor Goodheart is sensitive to the evils of fascism, the unpleasant aspects of cultural elitism, and the degree to which academic sterility invites a spirited attack from what one may with some oversimplification call the left. At this point, however, it seems to me that the weaknesses of Professor Goodheart's book become visible. In his desire to provide a balanced picture, he too frequently erases or blunts a point that needed to be made, with a ritualistic gesture toward his opponents that lacks force and clarity. One detects in Professor Goodheart a conflict in which his intelligence and sense of excellence are blurred by sympathies, not toward liberal balance, but toward the contentions of the radical left. Perhaps he unwittingly illustrates the contention of conservatives and radicals alike that liberal balance is impossible. I at least find that Professor Goodheart is unable or unwilling to draw the full consequences from his recognition of the aristocratic or elitist character of spiritual activity (cf. pp. 67 and 88). Professor Goodheart seems to be suffering here from bad conscience which makes him a radical *malgré lui*. This is most evident in the lack of precision with which he uses terms like "aristocratic," "reactionary," "conservative," and the like. He does not seem to be able to retain the correct perception of creative excellence, as though from fear of being condemned by his counterculture colleagues as a "fascist" (cf. his criticism of Tocqueville, Schiller, Marinetti, and Yeats: pp. 103, 129, 143, 148). No distinction is made between "conservative" and "reactionary," or more fundamentally, between a cultural aristocracy and its degenerate political forms.

Still more fundamentally, the hedging with respect to "aristocracy" reveals a serious ambiguity in "culture," Professor Goodheart's central conception. He is himself aware of this ambiguity, as is shown by his discussion of anthropological and psychoanalytic uses of the term (pp. 24–28). But he does not seem to have thought through with sufficient fortitude (not to mention hubris) the significance of the difference between culture and (to use his term) "dialectical illiteracy." One cannot explain the difference between a cultured and an uncultured man by attempting to replace "elitism" with "a fruitful tension" between democracy and culture (pp. 93–97). To say this is not to deny a necessary relativism in the definition of culture. The term means different things in different societies or epochs; but it becomes altogether meaningless if the distinction just noted cannot be drawn in a given society or epoch. Whether or not we draw this distinction, difficult and even disastrous political consequences ensue. Much as I sympathize with Professor Goodheart's intentions, and however many fine passages his book contains, I miss both a sharp formulation of the difficulties, and a salutary hint as to the way in which they may be resolved. Nevertheless, the book contains valuable things, and deserves to be read.

STANLEY ROSEN

*Pennsylvania State University*

**Factions No More: Attitudes to Party in Government & Opposition in Eighteenth-Century England.** By J. A. W. Gunn. (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1972. Pp. 275. $14.00.)

This book offers something worthwhile to political scientists of several sorts: students of comparative party development, of British political history, and of theories of ideology, conflict, and interest. Gunn provides brief excerpts from seventy-four works, for the most part polemical tracts, having to do with the way in which attitudes toward political parties developed in eighteenth-century England.

Gunn wrote his book, he tells us in his preface, to take issue with the view still widely held that "no one before Burke had much of interest to say about political parties." What there was of interest, as he sees it, was not a well-developed philosophical literature, but instead a succession of ways of looking at parties and talking about them, theories being fitted out haphazardly to deal with facts. England was the first country to develop parties in the modern sense, of course; and there was no set of categories ready-made for eighteenth-century Englishmen to explain just what was happening. Parties were first regarded with suspicion, then accepted grudgingly as expedient for certain purposes, and by the end of the century brushed up and set forth by Burke as eminently respectable entities. Along the way to respectability, parties were justified, condemned, and analyzed incessantly.

Why do men form parties, and what cements their association? In Gunn's excerpts, a variety of answers can be found. Halifax gives an elegant statement of the view that men come together under the guise of concern for the common interest to get a larger share of the spoils; one of his "Maxims of State" is as follows:

> That *Parties* in a *State* generally, like *Freebooters*, hang out *False Colours*; the pretence is the *Publick Good*; the real *Business* is, to catch *Prizes*; like the *Tartars*, where-ever they succeed, instead of Improving their *Victory*, they presently fall upon the *Baggage* (p. 43).

Lord Shaftesbury, in a thoughtful passage from the *Characteristicks*, rejects the common view that parties are rooted in selfishness by showing that consistently selfish men will be least likely to commit themselves in any cause. He speaks of "cantonizing" as a natural tendency in a large state. The distance between the people and the government grows so large that men's natural proclivity for sociable activity is given little scope in politics. Thus he hypothesizes that

> the associating Spirits, for want of Exercise, form new Movements, and seek a narrower Sphere of Activity, when they want Action in a greater. . . . Nothing is so delightful as to incorporate (p. 78).

Hume, for his part, points out that

> nothing is more usual than to see parties which have begun upon a real difference continue even after that difference is lost. When men are once enlisted on opposite sides, they contract an affection to the persons with whom they are united, and an animosity against their antagonists; and these passions they often transmit to their posterity ("Of Parties in General," quoted p. 136).

One hardy canard of the times was that parties (which are good) and factions (which are not) can be distinguished in that the first are based on "principle," and the second on the much less admirable motivation, "interest." This view comes up frequently in Gunn's tracts, but it is disappointing to find that almost no one tries to say what "interest" means. Since Gunn's own earlier work (especially his *Politics and Public Interest in the Seventeenth Century* [London 1968]) has been a pioneering venture in studying the history of the term, one feels safe in assuming that if there had been any sustained discussions of "interest," he would have picked them up. In the midst of all this complacent and quite superficial condemnation of "interest," one comes with relief upon Hume's trenchant suggestion that a faction based on interest is far more reasonable than one based upon principle, which is "perhaps, the most extraordinary and unaccountable phenomenon that has yet appeared in human affairs" (p. 136).

A theme which receives more careful treatment by Gunn's polemicists is the uses of conflict in the state. It is intriguing to discover how domesticated the "murd'rous Machiavel" of the Elizabethans has become by now, and how often he is cited with approval in favor of the view that conflicts are healthy in a free state. The metaphor of cleansing winds whipping through the state, upsetting some things but warding off stagnation, crops up often. There are also arguments to show that vigorous competition leads to healthful balance in the state (p. 126), promotes truth through controversy, and makes possible the delights of diversity (see esp. p. 164). Adam Ferguson provides one of the few sustained discussions of the way in which cooperative pursuit of private interest, when congruences of interest are perceived, serves the public interest in the long run. This idea, which was common to ethical argument on both sides of the Channel in the eighteenth century, appears to have had few repercussions in the literature of English political polemic which Gunn explored.

One of the most valuable aspects of Gunn's study is the way in which he shows how the notion of "opposition" developed through the century. He shows (p. 256) that in the early years opposition (as opposed to faction) was generally assumed to be a good thing, since it was associated in the public mind with standing up to tyrants. When opposition became more common, and shifted into disagreement over less fundamental matters, it was thought necessary to point out that those who opposed a government could be quite as much motivated by hope for gain as those who supported it. Next it was important to establish that opposition to policies or personnel of a particular government did not entail opposition to the entire regime or to the state (p. 138); and finally the principle of a Loyal Opposition, assigned the regular task of criticizing the policies of the administration, begins to emerge.

For all my appreciation of Gunn's work, I have two criticisms. The first is that he has been too reticent with his own ideas. His introduction, while sound and exceptionally well written, is too brief, and fails to raise several of the questions I have sketched out here. He might have done well to be more intrusive in organizing the several sections and guiding the reader through them.

My second criticism concerns Gunn's assertion in the preface that for his purposes the literature of political controversy is more valuable than formal treatises in political philosophy. What he says is true if taken tautologically—the output of polemicists is superior to philosophical treatises as "an index of prevailing attitudes." But Gunn means to argue also that polemical tracts are better for his purposes because there is something peculiar about notions of party and opposition which has meant that they have not attracted philosophical attention. I cannot in this review take issue with his contention, though it raises points worthy of further discussion. Even on the evidence he provides, however, his claim must be rejected. The most rewarding passages in this book are taken from formal treatises by relatively familiar philosophers—Shaftesbury, Ferguson, Burke, and (*pace* Gunn, p. 258) Hume. There is always the possibility that this perception derives from my self-interest as an historian of political thought; it is reassuring nonetheless. We sometimes have difficulty defending a few works as part of a canon worthy of special study by our contemporaries, selected by some mysterious process from all the political writings of the past. Reading a collection such as this provokes at least momentary confidence in the way the mysterious principles have worked.

NANNERL O. KEOHANE

*Stanford University*

**Knowledge and Human Interests.** By Jürgen Habermas. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. Pp. 356. $3.95, paper.)

Jürgen Habermas's comprehensive critique of social science methodology represents the intellectual culmination of the work of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research. Utilizing selectively the insights of Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud, the Frankfurt School has viewed capitalist society in its latest phase as being maintained by the propagation of an ideology through education, popular culture, the media, and social science which has effectively retarded the development of any critical or reflexive consciousness of the human situation. The socialization process by which this ideology is instilled is so effective that most people really accept the claims of the ideology that a harmony of interests is being realized. Social scientists have become prisoners of this ideology utilizing their research techniques in an uncritical fashion. Habermas holds that by failing to comprehend that the attitudes they examine are formed under the institutional constraints of capitalist society, social scientists are guilty of selective perception of reality. For Habermas and the Frankfurt School, a "critical" social science must appeal to a conception of human self-realization which present sociopolitical conditions and contemporary social science block. Social science, in this view, must above all be a critique of society's self-image and it should speak in behalf of the potentialities and "interests" of human beings that are frustrated under present arrangements and "interests" of the status quo.

Jürgen Habermas attempts in this work to explicate a critical theory that could become a guiding instrument for social understanding; he recognizes that such a theory must be both theoretically and politically useful. Habermas claims that Husserl and the phenomenologists viewed the crisis of positivism and objectivity in its disassociation from practical interests. Husserl's remedy was to institute a purely contemplative posture which would not only release the sciences from the grip of illusion that the world is a ready-made structure of "facts" to be apprehended in purely descriptive terms, but it must also by its own therapeutic powers, lead to a new kind of practice. Habermas claims that there are two basic limitations in the phenomenological critique of positivism. First, it fails to demonstrate the symbiotic relationship of society's dominant interest(s) and "truth." Second, it fails to deal with the problem of intersubjectivity. Even though phenomenological description would dispel the illusion of objectivity, positivism in no way prevents science from influencing practice. What is needed is not to restore the practical significance of the sciences by making them finally break with interest. Rather it is the function of the social sciences in particular to reveal the true relationship of knowledge and interest which positivism conceals and phenomenology misunderstands.

Positivism in the social sciences has viewed its independence as a form of theoretical life based upon methodological rule of technical rationality. The result, according to Habermas, is a rationalization of the interests and values which guide technological domination as a particular life style. In present capitalist society, the "value-free"conception of rationality provides a critical concept of human development which supports the socially stratified world of "traditional" values. In providing social scientists with the basis of a "critical theory" of sociopolitical arrangements and a "critical" methodology, Habermas enjoins us to be aware that social science knowledge needs to be grounded in an authentic reflexivity through which it recognizes its ties to individual values and community interests. His five theses provide the basis for a reflexive social science which is responsible to the person as actor:

(1) The achievements of the transcendental subject have their basis in the natural history of mankind.

(2) Knowledge equally serves as an instrument and transcends mere self-preservation.

(3) Knowledge-constitutive interests take form in the mediums of work, language, and power.

(4) In the power of self-reflection, knowledge and interest are one.

(5) The unity of knowledge and interest proves itself in a dialectic that takes the historical traces of suppressed dialogue and reconstructs what has been suppressed.

All knowledge about man presupposes some metaphysical position between human facticity, knowledge, and interest. In the capacity of everyday language to express the distinction between appearance and reality, there resides a potential for emancipation. The process of dialogue and the self-reflexive potential for expression of competitive outlooks can be used to interpret repression. For Haberman, Freud's "talking cure" is a special type of hermeneutic inquiry appropriate to the social sciences. The psychoanalyst's aid in the reconstruction of the individual's life history brings to consciousness the person's own self-formation process and results in the patient's recollection and restoration of repressed parts of a life history. The experience of alienation and repression generates an *interest* in the critique of ideological "false consciousness" of capitalist society which must be exposed if self-reflection is to be carried out to the point of the dissolution of dogmatic attitudes and the ideological structures (with its knowledge–interest concepts) of contemporary industrial society. Capitalist power and privilege (interest) is sustained to the degree that communication about the truth-claims of capitalist society is blocked and the degree to which the socializing agents are based on technical rules. For Habermas, the struggle for liberation must involve the self-liberation of persons from the personality structures that result from a technical and positivist civilization.

Habermas's work is far too complex to outline and interpret within the confines of a brief review. His critique of major schools of epistemology in the social sciences is an incisive analysis of the limitations and contributions of Hegel, Marx, and Freud to the development of a "critical theory" of knowledge that deals directly with the "interest" of the masses in developing nonrepressive and nondistorting dialogue and liberates relationships via social scientific knowledge. Although many logical empiricists may be repelled by Habermas's concepts and programmatic recommendations, his discussion of the "interest" and "value" components of social science knowledge provides political scientists of every methodological and ideological persuasion with a significant criticism of positivism and technological rationality. Habermas's work is a seminal contribution to the present "postbehavioral" debate within the discipline over the fact–value dichotomy and the ethical responsibilities of political scientists.

KENNETH L. DEUTSCH

*SUNY at Geneseo*

**Selected Essays in Dynamics of the Capitalist Economy**. By Michal Kalecki. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971. Pp. viii, 198. $7.95.)

This volume of essays, selected by the author shortly before he died, demonstrates Kalecki's original, and increasingly influential, contribution to the understanding of the workings of capitalist economies.

The first essay in the book, published in Poland three years before the appearance of Keynes's General Theory, not only contains, as the author puts it in his introduction, the essentials of Keynes's ideas. It also represents a far more decisive break with the framework of conventional theory. For Kalecki approached the problem of employment from where Marx left off in Volume II of *Capital*. Starting with Marx's proposition that the capitalist class "realize" profit by their purchases of capital and luxury goods from one another, Kalecki shows how these purchases determine the level of output as well. So, for Kalecki, capitalists' investment decisions determine employment through a process of profit realization which reflects the reality of capitalism much more clearly than does Keynes's analysis in terms of savings. Kalecki also bases the crucial accumulation decisions more firmly on objective factors, such as the going rate of profit, than did Keynes, who emphasized subjective psychological factors. So Kalecki arrives at a theory of the trade cycle linked, through profits, to earlier accumulation decisions. In the second and third essays this approach is extended to take account of the effect of foreign trade and government expenditure on profit realization, and therefore on economic activity. The third essay includes a masterly demolition of the view that money wage cuts would cure an economic depression.

Later essays refine much of the earlier analysis, particularly of investment decisions which Kalecki calls "The central *pièce de resistance* of economics" (p. 165). Included from his earlier *Theory of Economic Dynamics* is his theory of the distribution of income between wages and profits as determined by the "degree of monopoly." In his last essay, "Class Struggle and the Distribution of the National Income," he takes up the question of whether trade unions can increase the share of wages in national income. He concludes that in general higher money wages will merely push up prices proportionately, since the degree of monopoly—the competitive position of individual firms—will be unaffected. He does leave some slight room for trade-union power to restrain profits. An individual industry will not necessarily pass all wage increases on because it will "not like such a process making its products more expensive and thus less competitive with products of other industries" (p. 161). Following Kalecki's line of argument, a stronger case for money wages squeezing profits can be made. In many industries firms face direct competition from firms in other countries. This may prevent differential wage increases forced on one (national) group of firms from being fully passed on.

Finally Kalecki's amazingly prophetic essay from 1943, "Political Aspects of Full Employment," discusses opposition by business to government intervention directed toward full employment. Kalecki underestimated the extent to which private investment would respond to, and thus help to maintain, a high level of economic activity, though he was correct to argue that political opposition to public expenditure could be overcome under mass pressure. But, as he said, continuous full employment would mean that

> "the sack" would cease to play its role as a disciplinary measure. The social position of the boss would be undermined, and the self-assurance and class consciousness of the working-class would grow. Strikes for wage increases and improvements in conditions of work would create political tension. It is true that profits would be higher under a regime of full employment than they are on average under laissez-faire; and even the rise in wage rates resulting from the stronger bargaining power of the workers is less likely to reduce profits than to increase prices, and thus affects adversely only the rentier interests. But "discipline in the factories" and the "political stability" are more appreciated by business leaders than profits. Their class instinct tells them that lasting full employment is unsound from their point of view and that unemployment is an integral part of the normal capitalist system (pp. 140–141).

In fact, shrunken profit margins are accompanying the other effects of sustained full employment which Kalecki foresaw. The capitalist world is on the brink of the most severe "political business cycle" of the postwar period. This is the best possible reason for returning to Kalecki's clear and penetrating essays.

ANDREW GLYN

*Corpus Christi College, Oxford*

**History, Man, and Reason: A Study in Nineteenth Century Thought.** By Maurice Mandelbaum. (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971. Pp. xi, 553. $15.00.)

In the space allowed I cannot easily summarize this massive book (whose ample but sometimes periphrastic footnotes alone cover 148 pages) or record the sum of my attitudes toward it. Nor am I qualified to agree or debate with the author on a number of issues. My general reaction, however, is that while having confronted a mine of erudition arranged with some regard for systematic contour, I remain very much at odds with certain interpretations, and suspicious of the end product. Let us concede at the outset that the author intended only to develop certain themes illustrated by English, French, and Germans and not to provide a panoramic overview of the period. He does maintain, however, that as a result of his intellectual history it can be seen that "certain common beliefs and attitudes regarding history, man, and reason, came to pervade a great deal of nineteenth-century thought" (p. ix). Moreover, his purpose has been "to show how each of a group of otherwise divergent or opposed thinkers held similar or almost identical beliefs and attitudes concerning the issues with which I have sought to deal" (p. x).

I have four preliminary observations on Professor Mandelbaum's work. First, despite acknowledged omissions, it comes through more as a study "of" than a study "in" nineteenth-century thought: thus it is open to criticism as an interpretation of the intellectual period as a whole. Second, its linkage of "otherwise divergent thinkers" in "almost identical" contexts of thought often neglects the manifold of their intellectual purpose or their temporal or territorial situation, and tends to create a pastiche of theory independent of the theorists themselves—a kind of scissors-and-paste *Zeitgeist*. Third, the treatment of the authors tends to compress them into coded data of certain categories, either through selective citation of one or two works or through a not always representative choice of passages that overclarify the *leitmotifs*. Fourth, since Mandelbaum's book consists of a progression of sometimes brief, sometimes rather serried, summaries and analyses of specimens of nineteenth-century thought liberally interspersed with his own impromptu or protracted philosophical criticisms of the theories studied, we are treated both to a history of ideas and to a philosophical thesis on the nature and development of social knowledge. It is never clear which task is uppermost, which are the important things and which are illustrations; and my conclusion is that we get a less than satisfactory version of either. I realize that my criticism, at this level, fails in specificity and that reading twice through a book does not especially match the efforts of an author who, by his own account, has been at work on the topic since 1953.

Above all, however, I sense the absence of any juncture between the topics canvassed in the work on the one hand and social reality on the other. We mostly see texts in contact or in contrast with other texts, and theories juxtaposed to theories, sometimes with sweeping disregard for time and place (e.g., Fichte and T. H. Green), as if the mutation of knowledge were as simple a proposition as minds transmitting to minds or books to books; and I have a gut feeling that this is not the truth of the matter. It was poignant (on p. 370) to come upon the remark that "one must take cognizance of the experience of the first World War, especially in Germany, and of the widespread social and political upheavals which began in the 1930s and have continued unabated ever since." For there had been little or no cognizance of anything like Romanticism, nationalism, class struggle, or the changing role of the intellectual in the earlier pages of the book. There had been chiefly an ontology and exposition of the author's seminal intellectual categories, with a variety of texts clustered around them. Given its scope and ambition, *History, Man, and Reason* is one of the most flagrantly "history-neutral" and antisociological books on the nineteenth century that I have ever read; that was its special fascination. It is a book about profoundly human questions written in the detached manner of a history of science, where even J. S. Mill's wrestling with the nature of the body politic, Marx's treatment of the questions of exploitation and labor, and Kierkegaard's anguished combat with his pseudo-Christian milieu are transformed into statements about reason and method, experiment and scientific controversy.

Yet Mandelbaum's is a very rich and prepossessing work. One learns much from it; one reassesses much. The author is a man of undoubted intellectual power and scope. Who could not be excited at the prospect of a trained mind wandering at length, and with a purpose, through the writings of Matthew Arnold, Alexander Bain, Clifford, Coleridge, Comte, Darwin, Du Bois-Reymond, Durkheim, Engels, Feuerbach, Fichte, John Fiske, T. H. Green, Hegel, Helmholtz, T. H. Huxley, Jacobi, Kant, Kierkegaard, Lyell, Mach, Maine de Biran, Marx, J. S. Mill, Morgan, Nietzsche, Saint-Simon, Schopenhauer, Spencer, Tylor, and Wilhelm Wundt? And who could fail to be intrigued when they are linked with the past —Spinoza, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Helvétius, Rousseau, Herder—or with the future—Freud, Bergson, Lévy-Bruhl, John Dewey, Karl Popper, Pavlov, Mead, Skinner? It is a gifted director who can move so many characters on and off stage with requisite skill. And yet it all adds up to a very particular nineteenth century. As I was reading, I imagined the experiment of conducting a "study" based on those who had been left out—e.g. Bentham, Macaulay, Strauss, Humboldt, Grimm, Constant, Chateaubriand, Sir Walter Scott, Goethe, Savigny, de Maistre, Madame de Staël, Owen, Fourier, Mazzini, Proudhon, Lassalle, Le Play, Carlyle, Tocqueville, Treitschke, Lorenz von Stein, Cousin, Burkhardt, Ranke, Maine, Acton, George Eliot, William Morris, Newman, Bagehot, Michelet, Renan, Renouvier, Sorel, Kipling, Ibsen, Mosca. . . . Cast in such a light, Mandelbaum's nineteenth century remains slightly opaque to my own.

Mandelbaum's study is essentially about epistemology, theories of history and human development, and social science methodology. There are several other tangents; but these topics furnish a center of gravity from which most of the other explorations proceed and by which the choice of texts and subjects is organized. "Nineteenth century" is a kind of fiction; for we stretch backward at need to Spinoza and Locke or forward to recent developments in psychology and social anthropology. There are selective references to religious thought (an early potpourri and a later section on Kierkegaard under the familiar "rebellion against reason" rubric). Little or nothing is ventured about aesthetics, politics, legal philosophy, linguistic theory, technology, economics, or indeed moral philosophy in its ordinary sense. The work is organized around concepts like "metaphysical idealism," "positivism," "materialism," "historicism," "development," "geneticism," "nativism," "organicism," and something vaguely idealistic called "the progressive view of man" (i.e., as self-developing). The author takes care to define each of these categories, and to relate them logically and historically, but some of his terms are quaint (e.g. "nativism"—which means a sort of Cartesian belief in the common properties of the human being in all times and places) and others create confusions (like "geneticism"). In the areas with which I am most familiar, I thought that Fichte, Hegel, Mill, Green, Marx, and Nietzsche were all somewhat doggerelized or misrepresented. On the other hand, I appreciated the serious treatment of Spencer and Huxley, and I learned much from many of the passages of connective tissue. Too often, though, the thinker was forced to fit the thought, not too difficult if a dead man has left thousands of pages (published or otherwise) for selective appropriation.

Mandelbaum's thesis is in part (if I have it correctly): Few theorists of the nineteenth century are methodologically above reproach, though some of their insights are most valuable. Development is an axiomatic trait of the human condition, and evolutionary theory (faithfully construed) is an intelligent guide. Psychological explanations of collective human events are probably paramount, but psychological reductionism is anathema. Reason is an operative human faculty (there is much sympathy for Kant). Revolts against reason, where something vaguely definable called "will" is given supremacy, are explicable but indefensible. To a large degree the twentieth century was an intellectual continuation of the nineteenth, with generally bad results. The abandonment of nineteenth-century presuppositions will in time lead to other relinquishments, but with results that one can scarcely foresee. I can neither contest nor support this view in the few words remaining. In some ways I believe it to be separable from parts of the textual analysis.

The style of the book merits brief comment. It is not usually unclear or clumsy, but it is extensive, redundant, and leisurely to the point of annoyance. There is not room to cite or rewrite passages here. But, in my judgment, good editing or less indulgent authoring could have reduced the text considerably with improvements of literary grace and scant sacrifice of concrete information. In this respect the book could be compared unfavorably with Löwith's *From Hegel to Nietzsche* or Lucien Goldmann's shorter monograph, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*.

The reader of this journal might wish to know what the professional political scientist can learn from Mandelbaum's work. It is not really a book about politics at all. In this sense it will have little to offer the serious researcher in nineteenth-century political culture. On the other hand, some of our contemporary theorists—especially those who engraft the methodologies and epistemological disputes of other disciplines to their own—may find some shoots for their vine. For the scholar to whom politics is basically inseparable from the entire movement of culture, the book should be read, but neither its categories nor its interpretations nor its conclusions should be accepted uncritically.

GEORGE ARMSTRONG KELLY
*Brandeis University*

**Permanent Income, Wealth, and Consumption.** By Thomas Mayer. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973. Pp. xv, 415. $15.00.)

This is a very impressive book. In it, Professor Mayer presents an extremely detailed cataloguing and critique of the tests of the permanent income theories of the consumption function that have accumulated since these theories appeared on the scene in the 1950s. Most of the time, the author focuses on the permanent income hypothesis of Friedman and the life cycle hypothesis of Modigliani and Brumberg, but the relative income hypothesis of Duesenberry and the absolute income hypothesis also receive a good deal of attention. Written by an economist about economics, the book is obviously of greatest interest to economists; so clear is most of the exposition, however, that a little statistics and an undergraduate course in macroeconomics are all that are really needed for the reader to appreciate the material.

The book consists of two distinct parts preceded by an introduction that sets out the purpose of the exercise and discusses the theories to be analyzed. The first part consists of an exceedingly detailed and scholarly appraisal of the extant tests of the wealth theories and the relative income hypothesis. These are the chapters in my opinion that really set the book apart. Mayer carefully criticizes each of the 16 tests that Friedman himself made of the permanent income hypothesis, each of the tests of Modigliani and Brumberg of the life cycle hypothesis, and each of Duesenberry's tests of the realtive income hypothesis. In addition, he also appraises the subsequent tests of others—Bodkin, Liviatin, Friend and Kravis, Holbrook, Landsberger, and Modigliani and Ando, to mention just a few.

In the second part of the book, Mayer undertakes a series of new tests of the wealth theories using both time-series and cross-section data. In general, I am much less impressed with this part, especially as regards the tests using aggregate time-series data in Chapter 9. In these tests, Mayer attempted to assess a variety of permanent income, standard income, and wealth models both against a naive model and vis-à-vis one another using a common body of data for the U.S. In order to achieve a consistent data set for all of the models involved, however, he was forced to restrict the test to the years 1954–1968, and, as Mayer himself notes, this is a very short time period to register anything very definitive. On the whole, I think Mayer would have been better advised to omit these tests. They really don't prove anything, and it is evident that research resource constraints led to some inadvisable cutting of corners (estimating a functional form different from that originally specified, substituting of constant for current dollars, of one deflator for another, etc.). Mayer's new tests involving cross-sectional data in Chapters 10–14 are of much more relevance and interest. I found especially interesting the analysis of the long-term budget studies in Chapters 13 and 14, drawing on observations on the same household for more than five years.

In assessing what he calls the full permanent income hypothesis, Mayer focuses throughout the study on (1) the *proportionality postulate*, which asserts that the elasticity of consumption with respect to permanent income is unity, and (2) the assumption that the marginal propensity to consume out of transitory income is zero. Of the long list of tests considered by Mayer, the evidence against the proportionality postulate is quite overwhelming. Indeed, as he puts it: "What is even more persuasive, of all the many tests which have been undertaken by friends of the hypothesis, *not a single one supports it*" (pp. 347–8, his italics). Mayer then goes on to conclude that the proportionality postulate is "definitely invalidated."

Mayer's conclusion with regard to the marginal propensity to consume out of transitory income is more circumspect. As he puts it,

> . . . someone who insists on really rigorous confirmation or disconfirmation must accept the agnostic verdict that for now this hypothesis is neither confirmed nor disconfirmed. But if one is willing to work with the conventional definition of consumption, and to accept the assumption that the yield on transitory income is less than, say 40 percent—hardly a wild assumption—then there is evidence . . . that the transitory income elasticity of consumption *is* greater than zero (p. 348, author's italics).

Mayer concludes from his massive poring over of evidence that the "standard income" theory, which he expounds as a mixture of the permanent income and relative income theories, is most consistent with the evidence. However, one need not accept this conclusion to reap much from the fruits of Mayer's effort. For nowhere else can one find such a detailed cataloguing and analysis of existing tests of the permanent income and life cycle hypotheses, and, for this reason alone, the book belongs in the personal library of everyone concerned with the analysis of consumer behavior.

LESTER D. TAYLOR
*University of Arizona*

**Turgot on Progress, Sociology, and Economics.** Translated and edited by Ronald L. Meek. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Pp. 186. $12.50.)

Turgot has always been prominent in the political history of late eighteenth-century France, but scholars who have read him thoroughly are in general agreement that he ought to figure at least as prominently in the intellectual history of the period. With his enormous erudition, his breadth of interests, his powers of analysis and synthesis, his secular philosophy, and not least, his active involvement in public life, he fairly epitomizes the Enlightenment in thought and action. Ronald Meek, Tyler Professor of Economics at the University of Leicester, has thus rendered signal service to Turgot's reputation and to nonspecialists by translating and editing for a wide audience three of Turgot's most original and penetrating essays, on progress ("A Philosophical Review of the Successive Advances of the Human Mind," 1750), sociology ("On Universal History," 1751), and economics ("Reflections on the Formation and Distribution of Wealth," 1766). Together with Meek's excellent Introduction, the essays should stimulate further interest in Turgot's enduring intellectual contributions.

The essay on progress, for example, ought to be read in preference to Condorcet's more celebrated (or notorious) *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain.* Condorcet's impassioned testament has too often been taken as representative of Enlightenment thought when in fact the doctrine of inevitable progress was a minority view. Turgot was of that minority and he offered the first full-fledged argument in support of the idea of progress. But as he elaborated it the doctrine emerged, in comparison with Condorcet's essay, as a more nuanced and accurate interpretation of the process of social development. Turgot's theory took cognizance of periods of stagnation and regression and tempered its fundamental optimism with a salutary dose of realism. Turgot was anything but an abstract literary politician. As Meek points out, his analyses of social progress and general historical developments are based on his firm grasp of economic conditions and trends. Turgot emphasizes such factors as the emergence in the agricultural stage of development of a "social surplus" which leads in turn to "towns, trade, the useful arts and accomplishments, the division of occupations, the differences in education, and the increased inequality of conditions of life" (p. 43). He stresses the connections between commerce and the development of astronomy, navigation, and geography (pp. 47, 50), and the role of towns, which "among all civilized peoples constitute by their very nature the centres of trade and the backbone of society" (p. 55). In the essay "On Universal History," Turgot elaborated his "three stages" theory of social organization—hunters, shepherds, husbandmen—which brilliantly original conceptualization was, as Meek rightly notes, "of great importance in the subsequent development of social science in the eighteenth century. Not only did it enable a plausible explanation of *differences* between societies to be given; but it also facilitated the formulation of a general theory of the *development* of society from lower to higher levels" (p. 10). Incidentally, Turgot's opinion that "the same senses, the same organs, and the spectacle of the same universe, have everywhere given men the same ideas, just as the same needs and inclinations have everywhere taught them the same arts" (p. 42), squares with the antidiffusionist revisionary thesis currently being debated among anthropologists. In his views on history and sociology, Turgot was original, enormously informed, and always undogmatic.

The same may be said of his economic theories as expressed in the "Reflections." Meek's admirably balanced and perceptive analysis of that essay clarifies Turgot's ambiguous relationship with the Physiocrats and nicely outlines Turgot's conception of his society and its direction of change: "One of the most interesting things about [the "Reflections"] is the way in which the staggeringly 'modern' theory of capital in which it culminates, and the basic 'Physiocratic' theory of production of which it makes use, are both set within the context of a broad historical and sociological analysis, deriving from Turgot's earlier works . . ." (p. 19). Refining Joseph Schumpeter's opinion that Turgot was a nonphysiocrat with physiocrat sympathies, Meek concludes that in effect, Turgot was an original thinker who eludes classification in any school of economic thought. Meek also disposes of the simplistic view of Turgot as the personification of "the French bourgeoisie in the full flower of its hope." Leaving aside the question of how a tenth-generation noble could personify the bourgeoisie, Meek demonstrates that Turgot's economic theory presupposed a society more static than dynamic in its development and that Turgot's "capitalists" throughout are, unlike Adam Smith's investors, "industrious," and their profits are not clearly differentiated from any wages or interest they might receive. Proprietors of the land remain of primary importance in Turgot's theory and thus, as Meek writes, "The flower of the French bourgeoisie's hope was still rooted—even if only loosely—in feudal soil" (p. 33). I should only add that given the nature of French society (based on a mass of free, propertied peasants) and of the French economy (overwhelmingly agricultural) it is perhaps an error for Meek to charge Turgot with being "unable completely to transcend the limitations of the 'agricultural' framework within which the analysis in the first part of the 'Reflections' was set" (p. 33). A painstaking empiricist, Turgot could transcend this agricultural framework only by surrendering his grasp of concrete reality. That is, he could no more be an Adam Smith than Méline (who one hundred years later "could hear the wheat growing") could be a Gladstone. That being said, let me iterate my view that Meek's edition of Turgot's essays will be welcomed by students of eighteenth-century thought and generate further inquiries concerning the great man's work.

GERALD J. CAVANAUGH
*George Mason University*

**Conflict Among Humans: Some Basic Psychological and Social-Psychological Considerations.** By Robert D. Nye. (New York: Springer Publishing Co., Inc., 1973. Pp. 185. $7.50, cloth; $4.50, paper.)

In this small book, Professor Nye sets out to accomplish two goals. The goal he sets for himself in what may be labeled as the first of two parts, is to categorize and succinctly examine the standard psychological and social-psychological bases of conflict, which he operationally defines as "mutual hostility between or among individuals or groups" (p. xii). To accomplish this initial task, he confines himself to the analysis of the individual, interpersonal, and group interaction levels. On the individual level, he examines the various ways in which social reality may be selected from, restricted, or downright distorted and thereby lead to conflict behavior. Specifically, he examines the more dangerous dimensions of defensiveness (including displaced aggression, projection, and rationalization), along with authoritarianism, dogmatism, punishment, and prejudice (which receives special attention). On the interpersonal level, conformity and obedience are also posited as potential sources of social conflict.

Shifting to the interactional, or situational, level of analysis, Nye deals with the interaction patterns of competition, domination, and provocation. Part One thus ends with a collapsing of the levels and an examination of the "dynamic interplay" between individual characteristics and patterns of interaction.

Part Two, which is devoted to the means by which conflict might be reduced, follows logically and smoothly, treating the ailments of Part One in almost perfect succession. But as one studies the remedies and the accompanying prognoses, one is soon confronted with Nye's encroaching utopianism. Interestingly enough, Nye does in fact warn his readers against expecting too much, yet, as he moves through Part Two, he repeatedly suggests remedies that are idealistic and—in a few instances—naive. For example, while prejudice may often lead to social conflict and should therefore be eliminated, the art of persuasion represents a relatively weak threat to such an unfortunately secure historical bastion. Moreover, any appeal for the construction of a whole "culture of civility" as a means by which large amounts of social conflict might be avoided is naive to the extent that sustained and altruistic collective action is historically rare.

I believe the central weakness of the book, then, is that it fails to deal adequately with perhaps the most salient dimension of social conflict—i.e., aggression. True, Chapter 6 in Part One is entirely devoted to the problem of aggression, but Nye assumes that aggressive behavior is caused by:

> . . . (1) physiological disorders, such as a malfunctioning limbic system or neocortex, (2) experiences which result in the learning of defensiveness, prejudice, blind conformity and obedience, aggressiveness, and other conflict-promoting individual characteristics and (3) stressful, frustrating, or painful circumstances, such as being deprived of basic needs, being hindered in the achievement of goals, or being competed with, dominated, or provoked by others (p. 184).

In other words, Nye rejects the hypothesis that aggressive behavior is in any way innate, or instinctual, in the human species. Naturally, then, his remedies fail to adjust to this potential source of conflict.

All of this, of course, is not to say that Nye completely fails to deal with the so-called "instinctivists." Actually, he does discuss Freud, Ardrey, and Lorenz in some detail before rejecting them. The interesting aspect of these rejections, however, is their selective nature. While Nye is quick to reject the instinctual theories of Freud, Ardrey, and Lorenz, he apparently accepts the work of some other "energy" theorists, notably Maslow and Dollard, who are respectively concerned with the behavioral impact of instinctual needs and drives. Interestingly enough, Lorenz also identifies a number of fundamental needs or instincts which condition behavior. But unlike Maslow, Lorenz reserves a special place for the instinct to aggress. Thus, it is not so much the identification and categorization of instincts which upsets the author, as it is the inclusion of aggression as a rung on the instinctual ladder. In any case, Nye seems to place the cognitive-informational theorists (as opposed to the "instinctivists") in the predominant position in the diagnosis and treatment of conflict.

Overall, then, *Conflict Among Humans* skillfully examines the psychological and social-psychological sources of conflict, except, of course, for underestimating perhaps the impact of innate aggression. While there is by no means an abundance of evidence to support the instinctivists' position, there is an equally critical shortage of contradictory evidence. Indeed, it may be time to return to the more speculative bastions of Hobbes—and then Rousseau. In any case, Nye's only real error lies in his attempting to resolve an issue which for centuries has remained decidedly unresolved.

STEPHEN J. ANDRIOLE
*University of Maryland, College Park*

**Coercion.** Edited by J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman. Nomos XIV, Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy. (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, Inc., 1972. Pp. 328. $8.95.)

The essays in this volume of *Nomos* are so diverse in subject matter and approach that it is impossible to sum them all up neatly. The papers do not form a solid contribution to a single problem in the way that essays in earlier volumes, such as *Justice*, *Political and Legal Obligation*, or *Liberty* did. Perhaps coercion is a less rewarding subject for philosophers, lawyers and social theorists. Coercion is central enough in political and social life; but it lacks the philosophical substance of some of the concepts earlier volumes have dealt with.

The essays fall into broadly separable groups. One group of papers is philosophical, dealing with analysis of the meaning of the concept and its relations with other concepts of more or less the same family. Another group deals with general issues of political and social theory—the nature, role, and justification of coercion in social affairs. Two discuss coercion in international relations. A couple attempt game-theoretical exercises with questions about coercion: J. Howard Sobel seeks to show that "even hyper-rational act-utilitarians . . . could need coercion" (p. 148); W. H. Riker, starting from the text that "Covenants, without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all," seeks to show that there are conditions in which trust, as an alternative to coercion, will give security to agreements amongst men.

The reader is offered a wide variety of definitions of coercion. In the philosophical group, Bernard Gert contributes an acute, closely analytical paper. He argues for a more restrictive definition of the concept than most of the other contributors would accept. As I understand his paper on "Coercion and Freedom," he argues that only voluntary actions can occur either freely or under coercion; a man cannot be coerced unless he has the "ability to will" ("a man has the ability to will if and only if there are reasonable incentives that would lead him to do that kind of action and reasonable incentives that would lead him not to do it," [p. 31])—which seems to be the same thing as ability to make a choice. The notions of "reasonable" and "unreasonable" incentives are fundamental in Gert's analysis. In Gert's view, coercion occurs only when a man who has the ability to will acts as the result of being brought under the pressure of "unreasonable incentives."

According to Gert, coercion "in the wider sense" (i.e., inducing someone to act by threatening evil consequences) does not necessarily limit freedom; it does so only when the threatened evil amounts to an "unreasonable incentive." "Enticement"—i.e., inducing action by offering "goods" rather than by threatening "evils"—is not coercion, does not limit freedom. Psychological compulsions or obsessions are not coercive; the compulsive handwasher cannot choose to wash or not to wash his hands: lacking the ability to will, his freedom is not restricted. He is neither free nor unfree. Gert also sharply insists on the distinction between "being free to" and "having the power to," between "disabling" a man and depriving him of freedom. These sharp distinctions, and the narrowly defined concept of coercion that accompanies them, are uncongenial to most other contributors who wish to emphasize the pervasiveness of coercive relationships in society. This is a sharp and provocative paper.

The notion of an "unreasonable incentive" is interesting. Men might differ about what is an *unreasonable* incentive, or think that what is "unreasonable" in one set of circumstances is not in another. So Gert argues that "whether the threat of evil provides an unreasonable incentive, and so counts as coercive, depends upon the responsibility standards that are accepted. Stricter standards will generally be adopted for more serious crimes. . . . Thus it may happen that the very same threat is regarded as coercive for one act and not for another" (p. 42). What is and is not coercive will sometimes be judged by an external judge applying his own standards of "unreasonableness" and responsibility.

Virginia Held ("Coercion and Coercive Offers") argues against some of Gert's positions, including his view that "enticements" are not instances of coercion. But the issue is not clearcut, since Gert himself concedes that a man may act as he wouldn't otherwise act because a proffered good enables him to escape a desperate situation he can't otherwise escape. It would be hard doctrine to maintain that exploitation of a man's almost intolerable hardships by offering him "enticements" is not on all fours with other species of coercion.

Amongst the political and social theory papers, perhaps the two most interesting are W. L. McBride's on "Non-Coercive Society—Some Doubts Leninist and Contemporary," and Alan Wertheimer's on "Political Coercion and Political Obligation." Wertheimer examines with force and lucidity a wide range of issues: the nature of political obligation, the shortcomings of consent theories of obligation, relations between coercion and freedom and between coercion and obligation, difficulties in applying notions of consent and voluntary membership to the state as an association.

Of the pair dealing with international relations, McIntosh devotes much of his space to developing a definition of coercion using the terminology of games theory. His is the least discriminating of all the definitions proposed in the book: When A has the power to determine the value of a variable within the interaction field in which B is involved, and when B's choice of a strategy is influenced by the value of that variable, A coerces or has coercive influence in relation to B. This seems to erase the distinction between what is usually called coercion and many other forms of influence, persuasion, bargaining, manipulation. This is a concept of coercion too blunt to be useful in political and expecially moral analysis.

John Chapman's essay on "Coercion in Politics and Strategy" is long, difficult, and obscure. Chapman refers from time to time to international coercion, blackmail, and so on, but his subject is really the nature and role of strategy. His theme is the revolution he alleges has recently occurred in ideas about the nature of strategy. He contrasts "classical" notions of strategy concerned with the preservation of the security of sovereign states by predominantly military means with new conceptions according to which strategy is a matter of control and manipulation of the political systems and ideologies of other states. This is a crude, savagely abbreviated, version of what Chapman argues; his argument is supported by wide-ranging reviews of recent writing about strategic theory, and by discussion of international political development since 1945.

The paper is obscure and tantalizing partly because, in spite of all the detailed documentation, Chapman does not demonstrate the sharp discontinuity between two conceptions of strategy he alleges to exist. Also, there are some very unclear pronouncements about the relations between political and strategic thinking. Until quite recently, we are told, strategic thinking was disconnected from the tradition of classical political thinking; in our time, strategic theory and political theory are again being assimilated, strategic theory is now being brought within the ambit of the concepts of political philsosphy. I remain very uncertain as to what exactly Chapman has in mind and would have been helped by a clearer and sharper explanation of what Chapman takes the nature and role of political theory to be in the first place, and why he believes contemporary strategic theories exhibit more of the character of political theory than "classical" strategic theories have done. Much of what Chapman says about politics and political theory in passing does not evoke the shock of recognition.

The book is marred by a quite exceptional number of misprints; the editors of *Nomos* must attend to their proofreading.

P. H. Partridge
*Australian National University*

**Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History.** By J. G. A. Pocock. (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1971. Pp. 291. $10.00, cloth; $3.25, paper.)

Although this book contains valuable substantive information about important thinkers, its major impact should stem from Pocock's methodological proposals for the interpretation of political thought. Pocock criticizes the schools of theory interpretation that rely, consciously or unconsciously, on contemporary values and assumptions to explicate the meanings intended by past thinkers and argues instead that accurate interpretation must analyze a thinker's words in terms of the context of meanings existing when they were originally used. In *Politics, Language and Time* Pocock presents a framework for such an interpretive approach and then provides examples of its application. His efforts are a noteworthy contribution to the study of political thought, a scholarly pursuit whose lack of coherence has become increasingly disadvantageous to its devotees as well as to the public generally.

The book consists of articles previously published by Pocock sandwiched between first and last chapters written by him specifically for this volume. To his credit Pocock has done an excellent job of integrating the articles into a rationally defensible whole. The opening theme is maintained throughout, with very little duplication. The first chapter deals extensively with methodological questions; later chapters analyze primarily, with one exception on Chinese thought, ideas of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England.

In Pocock's opinion, analysis of the social use of language is the key to understanding a theorist's ideas. Social discourse constitutes one kind of authority system; the words of such discourse carry tangible political ramifications in the society in which they are used. A particular thinker writes within the discourse of his time, and the meaning of his words is ascertainable only in terms of that context. The student of theory must, therefore, move beyond a theorist's words to examine the levels of discourse that those words were intended to fit. In this respect Pocock believes that a society's perspective of time is an important variable for analysis. The variation in societal assumptions about individuals' relationships to the past and future has marked effect on political thought. Pocock shows convincingly that an understanding of thinkers such as Hobbes and Burke is greatly facilitated by knowledge of the time perspectives conveyed in the political language of their times. He argues that Hobbes's view of sacred history was part of the "conceptual equipment possessed by Christian Europe" (p. 162) and that his view negated any secular or religious claims to authority based on the power of salvation because salvation could occur only after the second coming of Christ. Divine history, very real to Hobbes, places the individual in a cosmos considerably different from one operating on a time perspective based only on experience. Similarly, examination of Burke's thought indicates that his reliance on the authority of tradition based on common law assumptions of slow and imperceptible change was, contrary to the suppositions of Sabine and Meinecke, not a reaction to Hume but was continuous with a paradigm of political discourse extending back into the seventeenth century.

Words in and of themselves cannot carry the full meaning of their context, nor can their authors consciously intend much of the meaning with which a culture endows them. Pocock notes that in the 1950s, linguists caused consternation among students of political thought by raising fundamental questions about the nature of meaning that had been largely ignored. Today, however, Pocock believes that many of these issues can be resolved by employing Thomas Kuhn's concept of the paradigm to give broader range to the interpretive analysis of political thought. It is possible, he suggests, to view the political discourse of an era as occurring within paradigms of cultural assumptions that provide meaning contexts for words. Furthermore, examination of general language usage in an era will disclose much about the normative paradigms then existing.

The paradigms of political discourse have neither the precision nor the authority of scientific paradigms, for it is likely that in any complex society several politically relevant paradigms will be operative simultaneously. Thus, a writer's words may engender different meanings among his audience, although Pocock clearly believes that within a given society or cultural era the spectrum of meaning intended or imputed has definite limits. He also recognizes, however, the possibility that the variety of values in a society may enable a thinker to reformulate existing beliefs into a theoretical construct that further expands the paradigmatic boundaries of the era. Just as with scientific paradigms, the paradigms of political discourse change substantially over time. As cultural era telescopes into cultural era, original meaning and the words used to convey it grow farther and farther apart.

Pocock argues that the narrowness and methodological confusion of much theory interpretation lead to substitution of the interpreter's current subjective interests and assumptions for the meaning of the theorist. As far as he can tell, that interpretation which has been contextually, or paradigmatically, accurate has been largely coincidental. He is particularly critical of typologies of thought that force past thinkers into contemporarily invented classifications, and he gives several examples of how unwillingness to deviate from the encasement of imposed categories has caused distortion or even blatant disregard of a theorist's ideas. Hobbes's discussion of religion in the second half of *Leviathan* was important to him and had significant effect on his political thought generally, despite the fact that as Pocock puts it, " . . . It has . . . come to be a near-orthodoxy that he did not believe what he wrote in the unread half of *Leviathan*, and that consequently these books have no meaning . . ." (p. 161).

In a related respect, Harrington's ideas were rather quickly twisted from their context and misinterpreted by succeeding English ideologues who were responding to changes being wrought by the rise of the modern state and a capitalistic economy. As early as 1675 the first Earl of Shaftesbury was using Harrington's words on the military as a source for criticizing the idea of a standing army, even though, as Pocock states, Harrington himself "had little real conception of the standing army as the later seventeenth century was coming to understand the term . . ." (p. 119). By 1698 Harrington's ideas on the distribution of property in a commonwealth had been taken from the historical context in which he had specifically placed them and inserted into a framework of historical interpretation more conducive for attacks on the court.

Again, in a more limited example of misinterpretation, Pocock argues that R. I. Aaron's failure to investigate beyond textual analysis of Locke's words led him to assert that Locke's lack of concern for historical explanations of politics was typical of his rationalist age when in fact it was atypical. In Pocock's opinion, restating a theorist's ideas in contemporary terms is a legitimate "humanist" activity, but such efforts should be based on the historical kind of study that analyzes words in terms of the time in which they were used.

Pocock is relatively conservative in his approach to interpretive analysis, preferring to view social and economic factors as nonessential explanatory supplements to the understanding of ideas carried by language. He argues that to draw meaning inferences from retrospective analysis of the economic and social conditions during a theorist's lifetime as McPherson does is at best problematic. While it may be analytically safer to rely primarily on tangible forms of language usage for the explanation of ideas, it is nonetheless true that Pocock is most effective when he has a firm grasp of the economic, social, and political environment of the theorist with whom he is dealing. In this respect the arid and abstract quality of his analysis of Chinese thought reflects his relative limitations in the area of Chinese history. This point is not intended to refute Pocock's criticism of MacPherson, but it does suggest that Pocock's proclaimed reliance on prevalent language usage may be putting his case on a narrower basis than he himself is willing to utilize.

If Pocock's ideas are given the serious attention they deserve, they can contribute significantly toward increasing the status and sophistication of the study of political thought. Although it will entail considerable effort and perseverance, a contextual approach to the words of a theorist clearly seems to outweigh an approach which relies primarily on the shifting sands of current feeling. It is hoped, also, that pursuit of theory interpretation along contextual, or paradigmatic, lines will incorporate the knowledge about interpretation of meaning that sociologists, psychologists, linguists, anthropologists, and interpreters of literature have accumulated. For, although Pocock's contribution is substantial, it is only a first step toward making the study of political thought more rigorous.

ROBERT HEINEMAN

*Alfred University*

**The Critique of Domination.** By Trent Schroyer. (New York: George Braziller, 1973. Pp. 258. $8.95.)

*The Critique of Domination* is an impressive and ambitious attempt to relocate within the present the central insights and procedures of "critical theory." "Domination," as Trent Schroyer uses the term, comprises all "socially unnecessary constraints upon human freedom," which entails that "in today's scientized civilization the character of domination is broader than economic exploitation and alienation." This in turn means that "to regain any access to contemporary forces of change is to comprehend science and technology as forces of production and to recognize that critique must be reformulated within this context."

Although his adherence to their precepts is anything but uncritical, Schroyer acknowledges his indebtedness to the Frankfurt School, and in particular to its contemporary spokesman, Jurgen Habermas. Many of the central convictions found in *The Critique of Domination* indicate the influence of Habermas. Schroyer opposes mechanical Marxism, which has become a variant of "instrumentalist" ideology in its own right; he denies the fact-value distinction as being inimical to the *praxis* needed to transform the status quo; he insists that consciousness and critique, properly so-called, are emancipatory and not "value-free"; and he repudiates any "autonomous" social science that would claim to operate apart from its historical and philosophical moorings. Indeed, one of the central predicaments that *The Critique of Domination* attempts to meet testifies to the effect of Habermas: "Contemporary Marxism," it says, "is in a serious crisis which, due to its objectivistic understanding of culture, it cannot transcend."

Schroyer succeeds, for the most part, in preserving his critical distance from Marx and the Frankfurt School's "cultural Marxism" alike; indeed, he puts the achievements of Habermas into better perspective than is found in the evaluations of the latter's more intemperate admirers (such as the late George Lichtheim) or impressionistic critics (such as John O'Neill). Agreeing with Habermas that "Marx's critical theory . . . underestimated the sociocultural and overstressed the economic and political," Schroyer goes on to insist that a mere reassertion of the sociocultural does not automatically redress the imbalance. Habermas's attempt to reunite "classical" and "cultural" Marxism, which "opens up a new era for the critical philosophy of the social sciences," nevertheless in Schroyer's view issues in a formalistic, contemplative critique unrelated to the prospects of emancipation—unlike the Marxian original which, for all its drawbacks, was resolutely practical.

Like Habermas, Schroyer also confronts technocracy as the dominant ideology of contemporary capitalism. Nevertheless, Schroyer insists, Marx's view of capitalism is supported, not superseded, by that of Habermas. If capitalism has subverted the possibility of significant communication, as Habermas thinks, this point remains subsidiary to Marx's original insight that capitalism is destructive of human forms of work and community. While Habermas believes that Marx's "instrumentalism" prevented him from recognizing that ideology is a form of distorted communication, Schroyer indicates shrewdly that Marx's theory of ideology has more than one face to present. "The thoughts of the ruling class . . . in the 'instrumental' sense of a superstructure which ensures domination" is one side, but ideology also "implies the dissolution of false consciousness as an emancipatory process mediated by communication and reflection." Marx's works, Schroyer insists, were "from the beginning a historical critique of constraints on consciousness" even though Marxian thought degenerated into a mechanistic monocausalism, which fatally neglects the subjective component that Schroyer regards as essential to critical, dialectical theory.

It should be apparent that *The Critique of Domination* is firmly placed within a theoretical context (or tradition) that is not for the uninitiated. Schroyer's study is wide-ranging and somewhat disjointed. Its centerpiece is its middle section, "A Reflexive Philosophy of Critical Theory," which is the most demanding as well as the most exciting part of the book. The first section, "The Category of Alienation and the Idea of Critique," which attempts to demonstrate the continuity of critical theory as a moment even of premodern Western thought, has its drawbacks. Schroyer's point here—that there is no *prima facie* reason why critical theory, broadly conceived, should be restricted within the Kantian-Hegelian-Marxian tradition—is well taken; but his argumentation is much too compressed, and his array of evidence much too sketchy, to carry sufficient conviction. It merely smacks of prolepsis.

Otherwise, Schroyer's book is most successful and persuasive when it fulfills its author's aim of moving at the level of a comparative analysis of social theories. Its third and final section, "Toward a Reunification of Critical Theory," ambitiously attempts to combine the insights of critical theory with those of modern radical economics (particularly the "disaccumulation theory" of Martin Sklar) in a critical reevaluation not only of the modern U. S. economy but also of Marxian economic theory. The former discussion, again, is suggestive but too compressed even for what Schroyer tells us is no more than "a preliminary conceptualization." The discussion of Marxian economics, on the other hand, like so much else in *The Critique of Domination*, is tough-minded and original; it treats *Capital* both as a critique of concepts and as a "crisis theory" and squarely faces the uncomfortable fact that Marx's account in his major work of the generation of surplus-value and capital accumulation explicitly entails a tendential forecast of the falling rate of profit—a forecast which Schroyer emphasizes *can* be matched to the world we live in. Schroyer's discussion of Marx's conceptions of "forecast" and of the falling rate of profit should reopen discussion about Marxian economics. Unhappily, however, the very concluding chapter in which this excellent analysis appears peters out into a disappointing conclusion; in its indulgent bestowal of emancipatory potential upon too extensive a catalogue of institutions and responses in modern American society, this conclusion does not clinch the argument. On the contrary, it takes us no further than Marcuse's venerable but much maligned (by Schroyer as well as others) "Great Refusal."

PAUL THOMAS

*University of California, Davis*

**Democracy and Disobedience.** By Peter Singer. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. Pp. 150. $6.50.)

The question of civil disobedience in liberal democracies has been much discussed in recent times, and this book is a valuable contribution to the debate. It is lucid, concise and well argued. In the first and longest part of it, Mr. Singer describes a simple model of democracy to explain what forms decision making must take to be properly democratic; in the second he discusses the forms and purposes of civil disobedience; and in the third he points to some of the important respects in which Western democracies fail to be properly democratic. He adds, as an appendix, an account of the troubles in Northern Ireland and their causes.

The best part of the book, or rather the part least open to objection, is the second, which deals with civil disobedience. Mr. Singer distinguishes disobedience whose object is to draw attention to injustice from disobedience which aims at inducing a reversal of policy, and both of these from conscientious objection. Conscientious objection, he says, "is a position well suited to those who believe that it is worse to commit a wrong oneself than to fail to do one's utmost to prevent a wrong being done by another" (p. 98). He seems to be less in sympathy with this attitude (which, as he describes it, is self-centered) than with other forms of civil disobedience which aim more generally at preventing injustice and wrongdoing. Mere conscientious objection is the form of disobedience least dangerous to authority and therefore the most likely to be tolerated by it.

In the first part of the book Mr. Singer rests the case for democracy, not on people's right to take part in making decisions that bind them, but on its being the most peaceful method of making such decisions. If it is held that the wisest or the best men should make decisions that bind the others, there will be disputes about who the wisest and the best are; it is therefore safer to allow everyone to take part in making them. But this strange argument, that the demand for democracy is justified only when it is unsafe to disregard it, is scarcely convincing. Mr. Singer would not deny that the people who make this demand do so in the name of justice and not of expediency. Yet he dismisses their case for it perfunctorily, and puts forward another which, though it is well enough argued, fails to take account of why democracy is important to believers in it.

The main fault of the book is that it raises more issues than can be dealt with adequately in so short a space. There was no need for Mr. Singer, if his purpose was to discuss civil disobedience in liberal democracies, to raise the issue of whether democracy is justified more on grounds of expediency than of justice, but, having raised it, he should have gone into it more thoroughly. So, too, there was no need for him either to deny or to assert that to take part in a process of decision making in which others take part in good faith, though it creates a *prima facie* obligation to accept the results of the process, is to *consent* to those results, but having denied it, he should have argued his case more fully. He calls this *prima facie* obligation "quasi-consensual" and says that there is "a conceptual connection between voting and consenting" (p. 50) and yet, without making clear his reasons for doing so, he denies that the obligation arises from consent.

The third part of the book is a good summary of the reasons for holding that Western democracies fall far short of being fully democratic. It relies heavily on the findings of American political scientists, and is all the better for that, for the most perceptive and enlightening accounts of Western democracy have in fact been produced in America. But Mr. Singer, though he clearly implies that the imperfections of liberal democracy both produce civil disobedience and justify it, does not explain how they do so. "The picture which emerges is one of elections which present the citizen with a choice of two, or perhaps three or four, alternative policies and candidates, the selection of alternatives . . . being made by oligarchical organizations. It is hard to see how this can satisfy the requirement of fair compromise" (p. 119). Maybe so. But in itself this selection of alternatives does not—or at least Mr. Singer does not appear to argue that it does—justify civil disobedience. It would have been interesting to hear more about how it helps to produce situations which do justify civil disobedience.

Yet the book, in spite of these defects, is full of good arguments put with force and clarity. It is a fresh and honest book which stimulates careful and clear thinking about important matters.

JOHN PLAMENATZ

*All Souls College, Oxford*

**Control: The Basis of Social Order.** By Paul Sites. (New York: Dunellen Publishing Co., 1973. Pp. 225. $13.50 cloth; $6.95 paper.)

Professor Sites has provided a rich portrait of nomothetic materials from sociology and social psychology which will be of interest to political scientists dealing with political socialization and behavior and micropolitics. But the advertised task of this work is far more complex than compilation or description. Sites intends to demonstrate that "control" is "the most fundamental component in individual and social life," and, even more ambitiously, seeks to develop:

> a synthesis of existing theories around the concept of control. This attempted synthesis is based on the fact that the concept of power, the basis of control, is central to all existing social theory. . . . The point is that, at base, the concept of power is indispensable to all existing theoretical formulations. This being the case, it is around the concept of control (power in action) that the synthesis is attempted (p. 1).

Rejecting functionalist theory as a vehicle for synthesis, he employs the concept of "control" to attempt a meshing of a wide variety of concepts, models, and theories, including: socialization theory, concepts of human needs, dissonance theory, exchange theory, role theory, and numerous others. While the proffered synthesis is conceptually intriguing, it fails to do more than titillate the epistemic prurience of social scientists desirous of novel and more integrated theoretical frameworks for the analysis of political and social life. The effort lacks a cognizance of the complexities of theory-building, and, indeed, of problems concerning the requisites of viable theory and fruitful conceptualization; problems so much discussed in the philosophy of social science literature. Sites tries to legislate a "control theory" by demonstrating that "control" is a leitmotif cutting across divergent theoretical foci and contexts of behavior, but he fails to make a credible epistemological case. For example, we are told that

> dissonance theory can also be understood within control theory, which again adds evidence of the fruitfulness of the control theory approach for the understanding of individual and social life. (p. 107)

But the synthesis of dissonance theory and control theory is dispensed with in one and one-third pages, with rather superficial references to the similarity of perspective between the two.

Basic concepts such as "control," "power," and "order" lack sufficient precision and rigor to demonstrate convincingly that control is more fruitful or crucial for understanding phenomena than many other umbrella terms whose vagueness and imprecision allow them vast latitude in describing many facets of human behavior and social organization, but severely curtail their ability to foster empirically valid theorization. The concept of control and the elaboration of control theory is frustratingly vague.

> Control theory sees the activities involved in the process of interaction as the source of constraint. As each individual attempts to control, he constrains others and is constrained by others. It should be remembered that Ego is constrained by others, not only by their control attempts but also by the necessity of using certain tactics in his attempt to control others (p. 127).

The hypotheses and tenets of control theory are, by and large, neither novel nor precise enough to generate conclusive empirical test:

> That individuals form groups and societies or are formed into groups and societies, and that intergroup and intersocietal relations can be best understood from the point of view of control and counter-control (p. 137).

Most disturbing for political scientists concerned with building interdisciplinary links, "control" and "power" are viewed in interactive terms having no political context and little political relevance. Sites's analyses of intergroup competition, culture and socialization, the relationship of macro and micro behavior, and cybernetics not only fail to enlighten political scientists interested in the political relevance of these topics, but neglect the considerable contributions of political scientists (for example, Deutsch, Easton, Bay, Truman) to the theory and research of these areas. Moreover, the "strategies" and "tactics" of control offered in chapter six encompass a large chunk of political life ("terror," "symbolism," "cooptation," "war") but are divorced from any expressly political contexts and consequences.

In the search for interdisciplinary links, political scientists cannot legitimately demand that all social scientists pay homage to the primacy of politics before their work has relevance to the profession. But it seems unproductive for attempts at broad theory-building to submerge politics totally in social-psychological interaction and to write political science out of the analysis, while at the same time subsuming much—if not most—of the political process.

PHILIP H. MELANSON
*Southeastern Massachusetts University*

**Lord Salisbury on Politics: A Selection from his Articles in the Quarterly Review, 1860–1883.** By Paul Smith. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972. Pp. 385. $21.00.)

It is difficult not to harbor a prejudice against a book that costs $21.00 and has less than 400 pages, only about one hundred of which contain material not readily available in good university libraries. Yet in the case of Paul Smith's edition of a selection of the political journalism of the third Marquis of Salisbury, any such bias is overcome by the merits of the book.

The editor's lengthy introduction complements and differs somewhat in its conclusions from Michael Pinto-Duschinsky's *The Political Thought of Lord Salisbury, 1854–68* (London: Constable, 1967). While the latter was primarily concerned with establishing Salisbury as an important conservative political theorist, the former, a lecturer in History at King's College, London, has different interests, which are more those of an empirical political scientist than of a normative political theorist. In Smith's view, a study of Salisbury's articles is important not because of their theoretical profundity but "for the insight they give into the mind of a major British statesman, for their embodiment of some typical—and some untypical—features of conservative thinking in general and of British nineteenth-century Conservatism in particular, and for their often incisive analysis of the politics of the day" (p. 103).

Unlike Pinto-Duschinsky, Smith is not very impressed by the quality of Salisbury's theorizing. "Salisbury's general views on society and politics were far from amounting to a comprehensive and rigorously worked-out conservative philosophy. They can scarcely be regarded as a major intellectual contribution to the conservative tradition" (p. 57). Smith does, however, follow Pinto-Duschinsky in seeing Salisbury as representing a very different strand of conservative thought from the irrational, romantic, and religious one celebrated by Russell Kirk and certain other latter day conservative writers. Although intensely religious, Salisbury never used religion to justify conservative policies, which instead were justified in terms of empiricism and the principle of utility. Like most conservatives, he was contemptuous of abstract theorizing, although some of the most important "facts" upon which he based his arguments turn out to be abstract and unempirical themselves. His extravagant fear of democracy seems at least in part the result of mistaking rather superficial generalizations about human groups for reality.

Fully as much as Marx, Salisbury perceived mid-Victorian politics as founded upon class struggle. For the future Conservative Prime Minister, democracy meant the victory of the working class in which the majority who are poor and ignorant rule over and exploit the few who are propertied and educated. Since he assumed that every social class would seek its own interests to the detriment of the interests of other classes, Salisbury believed democracy was inevitably a tyranny of the majority. To prevent the advent of democracy and later to limit its excesses, he was prepared to take nearly any steps short of executive dictatorship, a form of government which he probably would have found it congenial to preside over but which offended his constitutionalist notions of the need for checks and balances in government. Party advantage was definitely less important to Salisbury than containing democracy, and he despised politicians such as the Whigs in the Liberal Party and Disraeli and Lord Derby in his own party who appeared to believe the contrary.

In order to inhibit the growth of democracy, Salisbury persistently strove to encourage an alliance between the middle and the upper classes. In an 1873 essay, Salisbury explained that up until 1848 the main political struggle in France and England had been between the newly wealthy middle class and the privileged landed aristocracy. During this struggle, the bourgeoisie had allied itself with the working class, which it had used to threaten and chastise its landed enemies. By 1848, however, workingmen had concluded that "they had interests of their own diametrically opposed to those of their employers" and had begun to pursue the "wild and bloody dream" of socialism (p. 305). Thus by mid-century, the working class had become the new enemy of the middle class while the "upper class" had become its ally in fending off democracy. The political party manifestation of this reversal of class alliances was to be the absorption into the Conservative Party of the "moderate Liberals" without the support of whom the remaining Radicals within the Liberal Party would not have the strength to succeed in their pernicious attacks on Church and property. Appropriately, Salisbury was to lead his party after Disraeli's death when Gladstone's Home Rule policy propelled so many "moderate Liberals"—and some Radicals such as Joseph Chamberlain as well—into alliance with the Conservatives.

WILLIAM B. GWYN

*Tulane University*

**The Illusions of Progress.** By Georges Sorel. Translated by John and Charlotte Stanley. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973. Pp. 273. $3.25, paper.)

It is an act of intellectual bravery above and beyond the call of academic duty to undertake a review of the work of Georges Sorel. For Sorel anticipated that people would misunderstand and hence, misrepresent his work. It is not even unduly difficult to imagine the man resurrected, denouncing his reviewers for having missed the point. It is, thus, not without some discomfort, aware of the pitfalls of interpreting Sorel, that I attempt to analyze *The Illusions of Progress*, which has just been translated into English by John and Charlotte Stanley.

The translation is excellent and manifests the diligence, precision, and devotion of the translators. For this reason, it is appropriate, if not somewhat perverse, to question the value of a project which obviously demanded and received much time and effort. To respond in the most fundamental terms, the book is important for those interested in Georges Sorel, and so justifying the translation is literally a self-validating exercise. But the translators claim a value beyond the merely personal for the book. The book is supposed to contribute to the understanding of the idea of progress, that idea which was so influential in Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is this ostensible contribution which the review probes, evaluating the book in terms of the adequacy of its analysis of the notions drawn together by Sorel and labeled the idea or doctrine of progress.

The first point to settle, then, is the meaning of progress. For Sorel, progress is not an objective category describing the relative state of society or of its parts; rather, progress is an abbreviated term embodying a set of ideas about the world, the direction of its change, the characteristics of that change, and the consequences for social, political, and economic organization. Progress, as Sorel discovers, has defined the chronology of change as well as the social, political and economic concepts used to understand it. Sociology, political science, economics, philosophy—French thinking as a whole has been dominated by the assumption that to understand change properly is to understand that the world is constantly improving.

Sorel is interested, too, in the sources of the idea of progress. In this respect, he finds the power of monarchy to be crucial. Monarchical power and the administration it engendered centralized the nation-state, enabling the upper classes to increase their wealth and to improve their general living conditions. In order to justify the increased wealth and their enjoyment of it, these groups claimed their improvement to be part of the natural course of world development, implying that in time, such improvement would touch the lives of all human beings.

The illusions of progress are obvious from this perspective. For it is illusory to associate the improvement of a particular class of people with the general improvement of all society. The illusions are distillations of the interests of the poor from the collected interests of the rich, and to believe in them is useful only to a small segment of society, and damaging to all the rest. According to Sorel, then, the doctrine of progress is no more than the ideology of a particular class, and this can be easily demonstrated by the philosophy in which it is rooted, a philosophy which nourishes the attitudes of the rich, in constant search for ways to demonstrate that what is, is right.

Sorel presents his analysis by weaving his argument in and out of discussion of areas in which the idea of progress has reared its conceptual head, subverting truth and objectivity in philosophy, in literary criticism, to say nothing of the more obviously vulnerable realms of politics and economics. The idea of progress shapes the process of thought so that no human activity, including thinking, is free from the class interests which constitute the point of origin for the idea of progress. Sorel even suggests the possibility that Galileo derived his law of the acceleration of weights from the political and economic arrangements of the strong monarch, formulating policies which aggrandized the power and wealth of the upper classes.

*The Illusions of Progress* thus contains allusions to insights developed more fully but much later by social scientists: that political paradigms might influence the scientific, that democracy does not distribute but rather concentrates power. Brilliant allusions—not completely developed, but brilliant enough to justify the translation of the book into English.

*The Illusions of Progress* is not a simple book, nor is it a well-laid-out theory of politics; it is a book for those patient enough to excavate the argument from beneath discussions of controversies which dominated French salons, controversies which involve people much less well known in our own time. Perhaps an expanded introduction mapping the literary controversies and locating their main participants would have made the book more easily comprehensible; but the exercise of intellectual archeology is worthwhile, at the very least for the number of provocative ideas uncovered.

DONNA ROBINSON DIVINE

*Smith College*

**The Dilemma of Contemporary Political Theory: Toward a Postbehavioral Science of Politics.** By Thomas A. Spragens, Jr. (New York: Dunellen Publishing Co., 1973. Pp. 181. $10.00.)

Despite its subtitle, Professor Spragens's book has little to do with science. Neither the authors nor the questions to be expected in a discussion of science or its philosophy are well represented in the text. Of the "philosophers of science" cited on p. 11, for example, only Stephen Toulmin and N. R. Hanson are properly classified; Thomas Kuhn is an historian, Michael Polanyi a chemist, and Abraham Kaplan a conventional philosopher. The argument is based on two major sources: the tendentious and idiosyncratic epistemology of Michael Polanyi and Thomas Kuhn's initial formulation of the manner in which conceptual transformations occur in physical science.

Like Sheldon Wolin, Thomas Thorson, and others, Spragens uses Kuhn to attack and discredit the working assumptions that most scientists and philosophers of science would consider necessary to modern science—primary reliance on observation and rigorous inference, piecemeal theory development, nominalism, maximization of objectivity and freedom from bias, and pragmatic concern for performance. Criticisms of Kuhn's thesis are for the most part ignored, though Stephen Toulmin, whose *Foresight and Understanding* is cited with favor, has subjected it to devastating attack, and Kuhn himself abandoned much of it.

In place of logical empiricism, Spragens recommends a theory of knowledge based on idealism, realism, subjectivism, a strong bias to teleological reasoning, and a commitment to holistic, overarching conceptual structures. Very briefly, he argues that: (1) the conceptual apparatus of contemporary political theory is badly confused; (2) the confusion is a consequence of "objectivism," a philosophic outlook originating in the 17th century and combining—dogmatically—nominalism, an absolute separation of empirical and normative affairs, and a search for "totally" objective knowledge; (3) the confusion can be remedied ". . . only by a postbehavioral political science that takes its bearings from contemporary achievements in the philosophy of science," (pp. 1, 4–5, 22); and that requires (4) a new way of construing the relation between values and facts and therefore a new epistemological base.

I do not find the argument supporting this position convincing. Even granting that "objectivism" is not a straw man, that it originated in the 17th century, and that knowledge of its origins is prerequisite to improvement (none of which I am prepared to concede), it does not follow that destroying an extreme philosophic position invalidates a more moderate view—while extreme empiricism is out of the question that does not imply that the inquirer must abandon efforts to maximize the empirical element in knowledge claims.

The major inadequacies in the argument are, in my judgment, conceptual and epistemological. It is annoying to find citation treated as evidence (p. 119, n. 5, or p. 139) or etymological affinity as observable relation (p. 128) and the failure to maintain the distinction between forced conclusions or logical entailment and the absence of contradiction sometimes leads Spragens to assert that conclusions are either necessary or impossible when they are nothing of the sort (see pp. 10, 60, 124, for example). These are relatively minor shortcomings.

The vagueness and ambiguity of the conceptual apparatus is more serious. The central concepts in the argument (theory, norm, empirical, logic, etc.) are undefined and used so imprecisely that meaning is too often impossible to determine. Only part of the difficulty can be attributed to the rococo style of writing. The effect appears very clearly in the treatment of the central issue of the work—empirical/normative relations. The "absolute" separation of values and facts is much discussed but the nature of the separation is nowhere made clear, hence the validity of the argument is impossible to test. If observation provides evidence for statements about what is the case, then general statements (unrestricted in time and place) and normative statements (relating to preferences) cannot be supported by observation directly or by inference from statements which observation *can* support. In empiricism, the fact/value disjunction is logical, precisely equivalent to the induction problem. Denying the logical separation forces the inquirer either to abandon observation as a source of evidence or to claim that observation can support normative statements. Spragens's discussion reflects this confusion. In Chapter 6, the treatment of the role of organizing norms such as malnutrition in description often leaves the impression that norms are *produced by* description. But if a norm is *only* an organizing concept (p. 119) then it cannot perform the normative functions that preference requires; if norms are prescriptive (p. 131) they certainly cannot be generated by description. The assurance that ". . . recognition that norms operate in the context of description and are not merely prescriptive expressions of preference should make more apparent the basically descriptive, one might even say empirical, character of normative theory," (p. 131) is a mere play on words.

My quarrel with the epistemology sketched in Chapter 7 and attributed to Michael Polanyi is equally serious. Polanyi (or Spragens) focuses on the condition of the knowing person rather than the content of the knowledge claim. Knowing is ". . . a felicitous indwelling of the knower in the world," (p. 146), involving an act of commitment, a ". . . passionate contribution of the person knowing what is known," and acceptance of ". . . personal responsibility for what he is willing to accredit as true." (p. 157). Despite the disclaimer, this is subjectivism reinforced by moral obligation, and that is not enough. To be acceptable, an epistemology must account for what man has done and suggest how he might do more. In its better moments, philosophy of science has focused on precisely these points. And Spragens ignores them. That is, he does not claim that he can better account for science or enable science to do better. Instead, his reasons for accepting the epistemology refer to its value for reconciling empirical and normative theory or for enabling social science to cope with sociology of knowledge, ignoring costs. In the context of scientific knowledge, that strikes me as mere scholasticism.

And that brings me to the central problem in this type of review. I agree with Spragens that the epistemological question is prime; I have stated my reasons for refusing his epistemology as clearly as space permits; yet the issue remains unresolved. The source of disagreement lies beyond what either of us has written; it cannot be resolved in a review and there are no other institutional arrangements available for its resolution. That, I believe, is the context in which the book, and this review, should be read.

EUGENE J. MEEHAN
*University of Missouri, St. Louis*

**The Politics of Motion: The World of Thomas Hobbes.** By Thomas A. Spragens, Jr. (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1973. Pp. 224. $7.75.)

Chapter I of this volume, "Hobbes, the Philosopher," is an excellent review of what has happened during the last century to the philosophy of Hobbes as it fell into the clutches of philosophers. In this volume, too, the political theory has fallen into the context of a logical theory of "transformed paradigms" formulated by Thomas Kuhn in his *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd. Ed., 1970). Professor Spragens confesses: "The basic thesis and most of its elaboration had already been completed before I first encountered *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* . . . and the book could undoubtedly have been written without it." (p. 216). To review Spragens's review of Kuhn's theory of paradigms would take us far beyond the space assigned here, and far beyond political science. Suffice it, therefore, to concentrate our attention on the essentials of Spragens's conception of Hobbes as a revolutionary political scientist. This is best expressed in Chapter 5 ("A New Science and Political Deliverance") and Chapter 6 ("Passion and the Politics of Containment").

The author has the good political sense to begin with the final section of *Leviathan*, "The Kingdom of Darkness," which is usually overlooked as mere anti-Catholic propaganda. Spragens sees the relevance of this impassioned attack on the Scholastic doctrines that were supposed to be Aristotelian, such as the separation of essence and existence, life and soul, for the scientific revolutions of Hobbes's time. Spragens might also have emphasized Hobbes's repudiation of the concept of a "spiritual body." Spragens shows in considerable detail how Hobbes's attack on the Scholastic version of Aristotle's philosophy, especially the separation of "life" and "soul" in man, was based on the new theories of bodies in motion. Both the passions and the thoughts of men had to be interpreted as motivations, as inner bodies in real motion. But this positive conception of emotions as physical motions subject to the laws of momentum and inertia raised the problem of how they could be "contained" or governed by anything except other bodies in motion. This made the traditional theory of equilibrium in man and in society antiquated. No spiritual power of church or state or soul could stop motions which continued endlessly unless "contained" by other bodies in motion. It was therefore revolutionary, as Spragens shows, when Hobbes claimed that the containment could be explained as the result of the joint power of reason and fear, both of which are inner motions of bodies, neither passive nor spiritual.

Spragens then makes an interesting digression, based on Kuhn's theory of "transformed paradigms," to show that this revolutionary theory of containment could be interpreted as a transformation of the ancient system of moral and political philosophy as formulated by Aristotle's biological conception of "movement" before the Scholastics had ruined it.

Spragens then returns to the politics of Hobbes. His theory that the joint power of fear and reason was a sufficient motivation to explain the moving power of contracts and obligations gave him a scientific foundation for the theory of social contract and commonwealth as governing powers.

This gave Hobbes a new interpretation of "natural law." And Spragens wonders why he did not develop the new concept adequately for his new political theory. In the central passage of the chapter on "the generation of the commonwealth" Hobbes merely formulates the "principles of peace and security" as empirically established "maxims of prudence" as well as the substance of "natural equity." Hobbes does this so briefly and unpretentiously that it reads more like a Puritan sermon than a scientific theory of natural law. It seems to be neither natural nor law. This is disconcerting for a philosopher and also for Spragens, who would like to see it developed as a new paradigm based on a scientific revolution. It is true that Hobbes regarded this "discovery" of "natural justice" as his chief contribution to science and his chief claim to fame. He might, therefore, be gratified if he could see how Spragens with the help of Kuhn have "developed" it as a revolutionary paradigm for the politics of motion. He might, on the other hand object to this treatment of motivation in the human body as only another instance of Galileo's laws of motion of lifeless bodies. For though he was fascinated by geometry and physics as they were being developed by his contemporaries, he spent his own efforts on the science of "internal motions."

HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER

*Claremont, California*

**The Dialectics of Legal Repression: Black Rebels before the American Criminal Courts.** By Isaac D. Balbus. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1973. Pp. 269. $11.25.)

The black ghetto revolts of the 1960s placed enormous strains on the capacity of the American criminal justice system to handle, according to the rules of due process, the thousands of persons arrested. The major police tactic was to end the disorders by swift use of arrest to remove rioters from the streets. This resulted in great numbers of defendants, both rioters and bystanders, being dumped into the laps of prosecutors and judges for a determination of guilt. The response of the criminal justice systems in Los Angeles, Chicago, and Detroit to this challenge is the empirical basis for this most impressive study. Comparisons are made to show the possible interrelationships among levels of violence, cohesiveness of local political structures, and severity of court sanctions. The author goes further, however, than merely presenting documentation in order to contrast the impact of case overload on the local criminal justice systems. Using the conceptual framework of Marxian critical theory he notes that the *form* of repression is a more important variable for analysis than is the *severity* of the sanctions emanating from that form. The book is a unique combination of evidence amassed through the methodologies of modern political science with a theoretical orientation that seeks to reveal the underlying historical dynamics and structural context of the criminal justice system of the American liberal state.

Balbus posits that the outbreaks in the affected cities set up for the elites a conflict between their immediate need to end the disturbances and their long-run need to maximize legitimacy, thus blunting the revolutionary potential of the situation. Because legitimacy in the liberal state is founded on the concept of formal rationality, or equality before the law, a tension is created between these long- and short-run interests. Since the rule of law and the rights of due process dictate that those accused of criminal violations be accorded bail, counsel, and a fair trial, constraints are imposed, by the need to maintain legitimacy, on the ability of political elites to dispose efficiently of collective violence: elites are required to keep order but they must do so according to the rule of law and without overtaxing the organizational resources of the criminal justice system. By weaving together elements from Marx, Weber, Hobbes, and Michels, the author suggests that when confronted with collective violence, American court authorities are simultaneously faced with a threefold threat: "a threat to their interest *qua* political authorities in *order*, a threat to their class interests in *formal rationality*, and a threat to their bureaucratic interests in *organizational maintenance*" (p. 25). Each of these interests is compelling, yet efforts to avert a threat to one would at the same time endanger the other two. The court authorities must create a balance among these interests so that compromises are made in each to maximize harmony among the three.

The Watts riot of August, 1965, resulted in 4,000 arrests during a four-day period; in Detroit more than 6,000 were arrested during three days of tumult in July, 1967; while the actions of 2,000 resulted in their arrest in Chicago following the death of Martin Luther King in April, 1968. Given the social and political differences among these cities, and the several levels of violence, it might be expected that the ways the accused were processed and the sentences given the guilty would vary considerably.

Yet Balbus finds an amazing similarity in the response of criminal justice and political elites in all three cities. From the beginning of the rioting, and until the streets were secure, the response of legal actors was to subordinate the interests of due process and organizational maintenance to the interest of order. This meant that prosecutors, judges, and even the defense community were in agreement that order should first be achieved. Because of this emphasis, the usual arrest, charging, and bail setting procedures were temporarily set aside. Those caught by the police were held in the already overcrowded prisons to await disposition. They were not given access to an attorney nor an opportunity to contact relatives or to raise bail. Throughout this early phase all judicial actors were motivated primarily to "keep them off the streets." Yet even with these departures from formal rationality, the rule of law was not completely abandoned in the interest of achieving order. In short, while the riots were in progress a semblance of formal rationality obtained, and the normal procedures, although distorted, were followed as much as possible.

Of particular interest was the role played by defense attorneys. In each city various nonestablishment groups tried to elicit for the accused the support of the defense community. While the riots continued even lawyers associated with the National Lawyers Guild and the ACLU gave negligible help and displayed their shock at the violence. When the fires were put out and relief of the pressures on detention facilities became a concern of officials, the defense community assisted in gaining bail reductions to effect the release of defendants.

When order was secured, formal rationality and organizational maintenance reemerged as primary considerations. The result was an attempt to clear the dockets by having defendants plead guilty in exchange for a minimal sentence or sentence to time already served. During the period after the riots there was an increase in the rate of dismissals, and reduction of charges became routine.

Struck by the similarity of the response by political elites to major violence, Balbus also examined court response to "minor" revolts in the same three cities. He observed differences in the nature and severity of sanctions that tended to confirm the relationship among levels of violence, intercity political variations, and court sanctions. The author believes that the impact of local political structures on policy outcomes may depend on conditions that must be specified. Minor challenges to authority will be met differently from major challenges.

This book is a welcome addition to the literature of criminal justice and American politics. Its scope and theoretical framework are stimulating and will undoubtedly serve as a base for other research. Yet one is disturbed by the ease with which such terms as "legal repression" and "collective violence" are used without either definition or verification. Perhaps such usage may be excused by the enthusiasm of the author for his newly discovered Marxist orientation, but in judging an empirical study one would hope for a greater correspondence between some of the organizing concepts and the data. With this exception, which may be the problem a non-Marxist has with the rhetoric, Balbus has produced a most interesting work.

George F. Cole

*The University of Connecticut*

**The Payroll Tax for Social Security.** By John A. Brittain. (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1972. Pp. 285. $3.50, paper.)

Taxes collected for old-age, survivors, disability, and health insurance, which amounted to $44 billion in 1971, made up almost one-fourth of our federal revenue. All federal taxes on earnings labeled "contributions for social insurance" totaled $56 billion, which was more than the receipts from the corporate income tax and more than one-half the yield from the federal tax on individual incomes. The maximum tax per employee reached $1,320, or $2,640 per family with two earners. For the low-income family, moreover, there were no exemptions for dependents and no concessions based on ability-to-pay; on the contrary, the higher the earnings the lower the tax rate on those earnings.

In the light of the current volume of payroll tax revenues and their obvious regressivity, economist John A. Brittain raises some fundamental questions of tax policy. What importance do we attach to equity in the selection of taxes? Specifically, why do we tax the earnings of the poor but exempt them from personal income taxes? Is it true that the employee pays both his tax and that of his employer? What rate of return does an employee receive on his tax payments? What role do payroll taxes play in the stabilization and growth of the economy? In his discussion of these and other issues, the author exposes some of the mystique surrounding this country's system of social security for the elderly and the disabled, as well as that of unemployment insurance.

The question of equity is foremost in Mr. Brittain's analysis. He reasons that a tax of 11.7 per cent on the wages of a $4,000 per year family head with a wife and two children contradicts both federal antipoverty policy and the philosophy underlying our progressive income tax scheme. Even assuming that the benefits later received from OASDHI exceed the amount paid in taxes, plus a yield that is higher than that averaged on savings accounts in the past half-century—which he says is likely to be the case—the low-income family's pressing need for funds nevertheless argues against the forced saving. The fact that some of these families will earn real rates of more than 7 per cent over their lifetime is more than offset by the much higher rates they currently pay to borrow money. Moreover, the upper limit on taxable earnings means that the $12,000 wage earner pays twice the tax rate that the $24,000 worker pays. "The issue is not whether provision should be made for the future of the poor; the real issue is whether this should be accomplished by a tax on the poor themselves or by other means."

Exempting the poor from their payroll taxes in 1969 would have reduced revenues by about $3.2 billion; an increase in income tax revenues of 4 per cent would have been required to replace this portion of the payroll tax loss. Substitution of income for payroll taxes altogether would require a 45 per cent increase in income tax yields. The greater degree of equity achieved by an ability-to-pay income tax scheme notwithstanding, the payroll tax has the advantage of being less visible (the $5,000-a-year family of six doesn't realize that it is paying $570 in payroll taxes), meanwhile appearing to be a form of financial preparation for old age rather than a tax liability.

In answer to other questions regarding the impact of the payroll taxes, Mr. Brittain concludes that: (1) by constraining consumption, the tax achieves a higher savings ratio than would exist under the income tax alone and thus is less of a drag on growth; (2) no reallocation away from labor toward capital (which would aggravate unemployment) occurs; (3) the payroll tax is a weak automatic stabilizer, and may even become a destabilizer; (4) combined taxes and benefits are progressive when considered in a lifetime perspective, since benefits favor the poor. Although his major indictment of the payroll tax—that "a very large, growing and regressive tax has come to place a substantial burden on millions of working poor"—the author's analysis of payroll tax incidence, lifetime rates of return, the impact of payroll tax on economic stability, allocation of resources, and growth should not be overlooked. These, too, are important considerations in tax reform. Arguments can be made for a tax that improves the savings rate. There is the further question of whether social security benefits would have grown as they have if tax revenues had not been collected specifically for that purpose. Finally, the belief that one pays into the system and receives a benefit as a matter of right rather than need sets these benefits apart from old age assistance in the minds of the recipients. It may well be that paying for benefits out of general tax revenues would have instilled a different attitude.

But this last argument is surely less persuasive than it once was. Moreover, a regressive payroll tax and a progressive income tax are clearly contradictory in intent. The closer we come to a system of money transfers to the poor, on the basis of a belief that a minimum level of living should be provided to all, the less sense the payroll tax makes.

The questions raised by Mr. Brittain are not new, but they assume added importance as the size of the payroll tax increases and the need for even larger aggregate benefits grows. The latter need is an outgrowth of the growing numbers of retirees and the higher income requirements of this group, given present rates of nflation and the decline in labor force activity and earnings on the part of elderly men. Methods of financing retirement benefits will continue to be scrutinized closely by social scientists. Mr. Brittain offers substance for this dialogue.

Juanita M. Kreps

*Duke University*

**1972 Congressional Campaign Finances.** 10 Volumes. (Washington, D. C.: Common Cause, 1973. Unpaged. $60.00.)

This 10-volume compendium is organized geographically, and consists of printouts from widely scattered official sources listing the principal facts about the financing of the campaigns of all major party candidates for the House and Senate in 1972. Names and addresses of large donors, individual and group, are given, and provide the chief source of amusement for the casual reader. There is much overlap, for example, between large donors to the campaigns of such dissimilar candidates as Senators Tower and Brooke, who have in common little other than their membership on the Banking and Currency committee. Or consider the plight of Philip Hansen, hapless challenger to Senator Walter Mondale's seat, whose major contributors were virtually all from the state of Minnesota, while Mondale could—and did—call on ready liberal money from all over the country. Political scientists will be particularly gratified also to see the name of a colleague, Martin Peretz, of Cambridge, Massachusetts, cropping up as a heavy spender in a number of Congressional races far beyond the banks of the Charles, for example, in behalf of the incumbent of California's 7th Congressional district.

Libraries and private citizens should not acquire this set of documents for their value in provoking merriment alone, although that may be enough to justify the purchase in some cases. As a source of solid information about interest group activity, these documents are novel and illuminating. Common Cause should be warmly congratulated for making them available.

Nelson W. Polsby

*University of California, Berkeley*

**The Politics of Command: Factions and Ideas in Confederate Strategy.** By Thomas L. Connelly and Archer Jones. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973. Pp. xv, 235. $10.00.)

The authors, both well published in the general area of Confederate strategy, have produced an interesting and significant book. They have not written a full treatment of all aspects of Confederate strategy. Instead, they explore two hitherto neglected elements which influenced the decision-making process in Richmond: European military thought, as reflected primarily by Napoleon and Jomini; and the existence of a network of friendships and associations among Confederate military and civilian figures, by which ideas were circulated and pet projects forwarded. Thus we have the kind of military-intellectual history that is uncommon in writings on the Civil War.

Jefferson Davis is viewed as the center of an ongoing strategic debate, in which a "western concentration bloc" generally adhering to the ideas of Beauregard labored for the president's ear against the influences of Lee and the Virginians. This bloc urged the national application of Napoleonic concepts of strategic concentration, especially in the Tennessee theater. They had more success than previously believed, for what finally happened was a belated (and unavailing) triumph for Beauregard's ideas. However, the authors also find Davis to be remiss in allowing the system of territorial department commands to dictate strategy too often rather than employing it solely as an administrative tool. Lee, as Davis's military advisor, comes in for more of the same criticism Professor Connelly has leveled at him before: preoccupation with Virginia to the strategic detriment of the Confederacy as a whole. If there is a hero to the piece it must be Beauregard, who is seen as having the insight and ability to apply the proper Napoleonic remedies for the South's particular needs.

It is perhaps natural, given their interest in European military heritage, that the authors should be drawn into a comparison of Confederate performance with that of European armies. They conclude that the only mid-nineteenth century experience against which the Confederacy would measure unfavorably was that of Prussia. This is a bit like ratings in college football—comparing teams that do not play each other or play comparable schedules. It would be more apt to compare South and North, especially since both came from the same American military, political, and administrative heritage, and since at least half of the factors identified as contributing to the deterioration of Davis's leadership (p. 198) also afflicted—but did not cripple—Lincoln. The result would confirm Clausewitz's dictum that a great civilian war leader does not necessarily need military knowledge but does need a keen mind and strength of character. Although the authors see in Davis certain things to praise, some of his known weaknesses of intellect and character are confirmed.

The book is designed to raise more questions than it answers, and to point the way for additional research; the may haves, might haves, probablies, and perhapses are out in force. Extensive research has been done in manuscript collections and official documents, though some readers may wish there were fewer eight- to ten-page sections without footnotes. If the book has any weakness, it is in the writing, which is redundant at times and generally heavy, a problem perhaps attributable either to joint authorship, an overlapping topical organization, or the difficulties of writing about theory as opposed to narrating campaigns.

This book will appeal not only to Civil War students but also to those interested in the policy-making, administrative, and intellectual sides of military history in general. It will also appeal to those who appreciate handsome, well-made books. The publishers deserve credit for resisting the temptation to cut corners with quality and escalate prices in this world of increasingly shoddy literary merchandise.

JAMES E. SEFTON

*California State University, Northridge*

**The United States Supreme Court and the Uses of Social Science Data.** By Abraham L. Davis. (New York: MSS Information Corporation, 1973. Pp. 150. $3.75.)

We know little about the effect of social science data on the decisions and opinions of the Supreme Court. In what kinds of cases are such data most likely to be present? How often are they actually present? What kind of data are offered and of what quality? Under what conditions are such data likely to affect significantly the decision or opinion of the Court?

Students of the Court seeking answers to such questions unfortunately will not find them in this book, for its scope is far narrower than its ambitious title suggests. Rather than systematically investigating the frequency and effect of social science data in Supreme Court cases, the author confines himself primarily to describing the use and probable impact of such data in a handful of well-known cases. Nearly half of this brief book focuses upon the school desegregation cases. An unsystematic treatment of other cases in which the Court has encountered social science data or could benefit from it is confined to one brief chapter. This chapter cites instances in which economists have provided data in antitrust cases, pollsters have surveyed local sentiment towards defendants in criminal cases and measured public confusion over similarly named products in trademark and unfair competition cases, and psychologists have assessed psychological pressures on children exposed to possible coercion in school-sponsored religious activities. Some cases described here, however, did not reach the Supreme Court.

Professor Davis's conclusions are not likely to surprise many students of Supreme Court behavior. His three major hypotheses (p. 10) are: (1) in cases where social science data are found, other factors also shape outcomes; (2) mention of social science findings in opinions does not mean they have determined the outcome; (3) the impact of such data depends on the subject matter. Few will dispute his contention that judges will cite social science data favorably when they support the judges' values and conclusions and will overlook them when they do not. His belief that the research cited in the famous footnote 11 of the *Brown* decision did not significantly shape that decision is commonly accepted. But his contention that the Court employs "a number of non-sociological factors in the decision-making process *because* of the uncertainty of social science conclusions and the fear that some of these findings may be pseudo-scientific in character" (p. 10, emphasis mine) implies a theory of Supreme Court decision making that is likely to be vigorously disputed.

The description of the Brandeis brief and the analysis of the role of social science data in the desegregation cases contain some interesting information. The book will be useful to undergraduates for its brief, easily understood introduction to the topic. Because it makes practically no theoretical contributions and leaves many of the interesting factual questions about the Court's use of social science data unanswered, however, it is not likely to be very useful to scholars.

JAMES EISENSTEIN
*The Pennsylvania State University*

**The Political Culture of the United States.** By Donald J. Devine. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972. Pp. 383. $7.95.)

Few books serve more admirably the dual task of introductory survey and monograph than Donald Devine's *The Political Culture of the United States.* The burden of serving two different audiences sometimes takes its toll, however, seeming at times to be too complex for the student and too mundane for the scholar. Nevertheless, both student and scholar can appreciate the thoroughness of the author's analysis and the importance of his study for an understanding of the predominate value and belief structures within the United States.

The primary objective of Devine's study is to define the value components comprising the American political culture through a secondary analysis of national sample surveys. Devine categorizes the fundamental political values contained within the political culture into four value dimensions or "subsystems": An identity system, a symbol system, a rule system, and a belief system. The political culture is then viewed by Devine as operating within the context of the system "analogy" developed by David Easton, where it acts to shape and regulate the demands made upon, and support provided to, the political system.

Consciously and unconsciously, culture serves to filter, to distort, and to alter individual perceptions: Citizens seek information consistent with their values and tend to interpret information in a manner congruent with these values and beliefs. This cognitive "screening" serves to limit the number and the intensity of the demands placed upon the political system: Through their own value systems, individuals may themselves decide what demands are inappropriate, or may modify the demands they seek to impose. By limiting the volume of demands, and minimizing the amount of friction ("stress") which such demands contain, the political culture aids in the maintenance of governments (i.e., "regimes"). In addition, the political culture displays the property of "givenness"—values and beliefs are automatically and unquestionably defined and accepted—which enables the political system to cope with existing stress (e.g., war) by generating diffuse support for regime structures and the values associated with them. Diffuse support, in turn, is a reserve of citizen good will toward the basic levels of the political system, without regard to the pragmatic performance of those structures.

Devine argues that the consensual political culture operating within the United States is a function of the republican principles expressed in the writings of philosopher John Locke, reinforced and adapted to the American circumstances by the "founding fathers." According to the author, Locke provided the rationale for the founding and development of the United States during the formative period of colonial history. Maintained throughout the colonial period, the values promulgated by Locke were ultimately incorporated within the Constitution; it is this value set (i.e., "the liberal tradition") which Devine suggests has been transmitted intact from generation to generation. In sum, the American liberal tradition is viewed as generating a political culture which displays "givenness," produces regime support of a diffuse nature, and shapes demands so as "to maintain its own value composition and its regime" (p. 60).

Devine uses diverse sources for his data such as opinion surveys conducted over the past few decades by the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup Poll) and the Survey Research Center. The author's analysis of the responses to survey questions relevant to eleven Lockean principles, as extracted from the latter's writings, reveals substantial popular support for these values—support which appears to transcend major social, demographic, and economic partitions of the populace. Although such support for Lockean values is somewhat diminished during periods of crisis, the author presents data which suggest that these principles "return to the status of cultural value when the stress is removed" (p. 320). Finally, Devine draws upon additional survey data to suggest that the cultural values of the liberal tradition shape perceptions and attitudes to conform to the tenets of the Lockean value system. Thus, the liberal tradition appears to be a consensual system of values with the capacity to shape perceptions which, although experiencing decreased support during periods of stress, remains intact.

*The Political Culture of the United States* is not without its problems, and the author is quick to recognize them. Even if one were to ignore the difficulty in operationalizing the complex concepts implied by the liberal tradition, the data pose still further problems. In relying upon the secondary analysis of existing data, Devine is forced to utilize measures of Lockean values which are far from satisfactory; the specific wording of the questionnaire items contained in some of the early sample surveys utilized by Devine makes measurement of the liberal tradition even more hazardous. Moreover, the author is confronted with the difficulty of conceptualizing and operationalizing value consensus—a central concept in his analysis. Devine finally arrives at the statistical requirement that consensus is to be defined by the responses to any question such that a majority support the value, with at least twenty percentage points difference between the majority and minority positions. Although this empirical definition of consensus may seem inadequate to some, it does not greatly detract from his findings: Popular support for the values associated with the liberal tradition is generally above sixty per cent and frequently reaches beyond seventy per cent.

Despite all of these potential and unavoidable pitfalls, the heterogeneous nature of his data adds considerably to his analysis in that the impressive consistency of his findings (i.e., that there is consensual support for Lockean principles) strengthens his theoretical interpretation. The diverse nature and range of his data afford ample opportunity for rejecting his interpretation; yet the evidence marshalled fits remarkably well with Devine's analysis of the value base of the American political culture.

In conclusion, by adding appreciably to existing knowledge, *The Political Culture of the United States* is certain to influence the study of the American political culture as well as future research into the nature of mass belief systems.

GLENN R. PARKER

*Miami University*

**Law, Politics and Birth Control.** By C. Thomas Dienes. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972. Pp. vii, 374. $15.00.)

The systematic study of seriously divisive issues in the context of social change mechanisms is the stated objective of this book. The author advocates Harold Lasswell's categories of functional analysis of the decision process and several other approaches as the conceptual bases of his investigation. Yet after an introduction that is based upon Lasswell's model, a variety of writings by advocates of the legal process approach, and an Eastonian "systems-perspective," the substantive portions of the book are largely devoted to a conventional descriptive account of the development of public policies related to birth control. This largely historical description heavily emphasizes legal sources such as national and state legislative committee actions, the actions of the chambers of these legislatures, and decisions of state and federal courts with occasional treatments of British precedents. The statutory and judicial decision-making analyses are treated in chronological sequence.

Professor Dienes first provides an account of the historical association of birth control policy with the law of obscenity, treating the common law as well as statutory law origins of such policies in both their British as well as American settings. The impact of Anthony Comstock's organizing zeal upon both the federal and state statutory process is delineated in considerable detail. Second, the judicial responses to the Comstock laws enacted in the 19th century, are analyzed. The decisions, generally supportive, served to legitimize the earlier legislative actions. Dienes's third focus is the origins of the birth control movement. The nature of the organizational efforts, the diverse strategies employed, and the initial governmental responses to these efforts and strategies are described, like the previous material, in conventional historical terms. Perhaps one of the most significant dimensions of these early historical portions of Dienes's study is his account of the shifting emphasis on birth control within American Protestantism from opposition to support. The author suggests that this shift was closely related to subsequent shifts in federal and state legislative voting behavior. No evidence is provided to distinguish legislative behavior which may have reflected the absence of specific denominational influence or the overall decline of all church influence. Similarly, Dienes's generalizations about state reactions on the basis of the New York, Massachusetts and Connecticut legislative and judicial experiences is not warranted by comparative evidence. While, on the basis of historical inference the experiences of those states may provide the starting point for a thorough-going comparative inquiry, no additional evidence across states was provided.

The same basic problems were present in the chapters dealing with the modern developments in birth control policy. Clearly, Dienes's description of key developments is comprehensive, and his assessment of statutory and judicial decision making is factual and straightforward. But the occasional excursions into full-blown social analysis are deficient in terms of empirically based and theoretically explicit explanatory hypotheses. The extended analyses of changes in family lifestyles, in patterns of family size and attitudes are, indeed, suggestive, but because the author did not undertake thoroughgoing investigations of the possible linkages between fundamental demographic and attitudinal changes on the one hand and changes in legislative and judicial decision-making behavior regarding birth control on the other, much of this portion of the book is deficient.

In sum, the value of Dienes's work is as a solid historical summation of the major legislative and judicial decisions regarding birth control in the federal Congress and judiciary and in their counterparts in the states of Connecticut, Massachusetts and New York.

John R. Schmidhauser
*University of Southern California*

**The Gray and the Black: The Confederate Debate On Emancipation.** By Robert F. Durden. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972. Pp. xi, 305. $10.95.)

On 13 March 1865, the Confederate Congress passed a bill providing for the enlistment of slaves. Although it made no difference to the South's war effort, the debate and discussion which preceded the decision are very interesting, since cherished assumptions about slavery and the slave and the purpose of the Confederacy were both being stringently evaluated. Nevertheless, except for a few articles and brief references to it in more general works, no extended discussion has been produced until Robert Durden's *The Gray and the Black.*

*The Gray and the Black* is not a monographic analysis of the debate but is instead a collection of primary documents—mostly newspaper editorials, private letters, and speeches—which tell the story of how the Confederates decided to arm the slaves. Rather than using the documents to demonstrate a series of assertions the author wishes to make, he instead employs a quite different technique, rarely used by historians but very effective nonetheless; he selects and edits the documents in such a way that, with minimal editorial commentary and intervention, the participants in the episode can tell the story themselves, in their own words.

Since a developing story rather than an analysis is Durden's concern, the presentation is chronological instead of topical. The specific time-period is the six months after September 1864 when the Confederates undertook an intensive self-scrutiny, following Jefferson Davis's message referring to the sensitive issues of enlistment and emancipation. Once the anathemas had been broached publicly, debate ranged over matters that were fundamental in Southern culture, society, and politics. These are discussed extensively in Durden's sources, and they provide fascinating reading as the South's leading men reveal some of their most basic beliefs and assumptions as well as fears.

All the same, however, *The Gray and the Black* does present some problems. The first is organizational. Although the editorial method used by Robert Durden can be very effective, it is not appropriate in all situations, and this may possibly be one of them. The author's purpose is to show how the Confederates produced a policy decision; he is therefore concerned with a series of interrelated events and actions occurring over a period of time. Yet his sources are not suitable for this purpose; they are instead argumentative statements about an issue. In this respect they are valuable in revealing a state of mind and a body of attitudes. But they cannot successfully sustain a developing and active narrative. As a consequence, lines of arguments and points of view predominate, often repetitively, so that momentum and drama are lost.

The second problem is interpretive. The unifying theme of the book is Jefferson Davis's central role in the whole episode. Mr. Durden feels that, in seizing the issues of employing the slaves in the army (though he did not suggest they be used as soldiers) and of later emancipating them, Davis displayed courage and a flexibility that runs completely counter to the accepted view of him. Even if it is conceded that Davis's initiative was as radical and as forceful as Durden claims, and it is a contestable point, there is still the question of what his flexibility on this issue meant. It can be persuasively argued that, while Davis may have been prepared to grasp the nettle of emancipation, it was because he was utterly inflexible and obtuse about the need to achieve Southern independence at any cost. His opponents, on the other hand, while adamant about retaining slavery if at all possible, were aware that only a flexible war policy aimed at a negotiated peace would prevent what was a far greater danger to the planter-class, that is, the disintegration of society and authority within the Southern states. Flexibility and courageousness can be assessed only if the context and aim are considered, not just the means.

The controversy over Davis's leadership is, however, an old one. It is a pity then that Professor Durden did not use the very intriguing documents he has unearthed to elucidate some of the social and cultural issues of the Old South which currently fascinate historians, a task incidently for which his sources are most appropriate.

MICHAEL PERMAN
*University of Illinois at Chicago Circle*

**Black Politics in Philadelphia.** Edited by Miriam Ershowitz and Joseph Zikmund. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1973. Pp. 228. $10.00.)

Sponsored under the auspices of Temple University's Center for the Study of Federalism, *Black Politics in Philadelphia* presents the first broad-based analysis of the role of black participants in American urban politics. Using articles whose data base focuses exclusively on Philadelphia, Professors Ershowitz and Zikmund have produced a diverse portrait of the historical development of black participation in Philadelphia politics throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. By blending historical and contemporary articles, the editors have succeeded in exposing the different phases of black participation in electoral politics, in community controlled antipoverty programs and in organized civic and interest groups.

The finest articles in the book concern black participation in electoral politics. Using data from presidential and mayoral elections throughout the twentieth century, the articles by Oscar Glantz, William McKenna, Charles Ekstrom, and John Strange trace the movement of black voters from the Republican party of the post-Civil War nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to the Democratic party of the post-New Deal twentieth century. Certain characteristics of black electoral participation in Philadelphia emerge from these articles: (1) blacks have come to constitute the most consistently loyal element in Democratic party voting in Philadelphia, although they have not achieved positions of leadership within the party; (2) blacks have voted exclusively within the Democratic party since the New Deal and have failed to develop their own independent political organizations; (3) blacks have voted primarily on the basis of party identification rather than on the basis of race, and thus have not traditionally split their tickets to support black Republican candidates against white Democratic candidates; (4) blacks constituted *the* significant voting bloc in the emergence of the Democratic party reform movement from 1949 to 1962 although the reform movement's leadership was dominated by white, upper-middle-class business and civic organizations; and (5) blacks have consistently participated in elections at lower rates than have whites, although this difference is partially attributable to differences in socioeconomic status. Throughout the articles on black electoral politics, the intense loyalty of black voters to Democratic party candidates and the lack of independent black political organizations and candidates are used to explain the overall lack of black effectiveness in gaining a proportionate share of the rewards of Philadelphia's political system. In this regard, the book noticeably lacks any analysis of the 1971 mayoral election in which black wards voted overwhelmingly Republican as a reaction against Democratic candidate Frank L. Rizzo, and of the emergence of several successful independent black state legislative candidates in the early 1970s. The articles presented by the editors detail black electoral participation through the late 1960s, but fail to describe or explain the emerging electoral independence of the 1970s.

The majority of articles in *Black Politics in Philadelphia* focus on electoral participation. The editors, however, have also included a number of articles on other significant forms of political participation, notably in federal antipoverty programs and in community/civic organizations. Although these articles implicitly recognize the importance of studying nonelectoral forms of participation to understand blacks as actors in urban politics, they are much less satisfactory than those on electoral political participation. The articles by Harry Bailey, Jr. and Elliott White provide an in-depth analysis of the low levels of lower income, black participation in and influence on antipoverty elections and decision making in Philadelphia in the mid-1960s. The editors, however, failed to include any articles discussing other forms or examples of black participation vis-à-vis bureaucracies in Philadelphia. Movements for community control and bureaucratic accountability did arise in the city in the late 1960s and early 1970s, primarily in the public schools. Although these movements generally failed to alter the centralized and professionally dominated decision making of the public schools and of other city bureaucracies, the book's description of nonelectoral politics would be improved by their inclusion. Black politics in Philadelphia in the 1960s generally lacked indigenous black leadership, and an analysis of the movements to enhance public school responsiveness to the needs of lower-income, nonwhite children would clearly illustrate this characteristic. Despite Paul Lermack's analysis of the fragmentation of black political organizations between middle- and lower-class blacks within the civil rights movement in Philadelphia—a fragmentation which limited the impact of the NAACP and CORE in Philadelphia politics—the editors do not provide articles sufficiently analyzing the growth and impact (if any) of other black community, religious, and civic organizations in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Even though the data on black participation in bureaucratic politics and in community/civic organizations terminate with the mid-1960s, Ershowitz and Zikmund's book constitutes a valuable contribution to the study of black, urban politics in the United States in general and in Philadelphia in particular. Those articles detailing the racial and ethnic diversity and competition (especially between Irish and blacks) and the growth and stability of black partisan loyalty to Democratic candidates within Philadelphia are essential contributions to the study of American urban politics. Those articles detailing the anti-poverty programs and the black civil rights organizations point to the need to study bureaucratic and community/civic group forms of participation, a point often overlooked by political scientists. The book's most significant contribution, however, may well be to generate additional studies of minority-group participation in other urban areas and in more contemporary time periods. Once such a body of data is accumulated, urban political scientists can begin the task of formulating meaningful generalizations about the role of blacks and other minority groups as actors in and clients of urban political systems.

FRED J. FOLEY, JR.
*LaSalle College, Philadelphia*

**Unquestioning Obedience to the President: The ACLU Case Against the Legality of the War in Vietnam.** By Leon Friedman and Burt Neuborne. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1972. Pp. 284. $8.95.)

With the withdrawal of U.S. uniformed forces from Vietnam, the congressional cutoff of U.S. bombing in Cambodia after August 15, 1973, and the enactment over the president's veto of a war powers bill restricting the executive's war-making powers, the political process has finally achieved a result which the judicial process, in spite of numerous efforts to prod the courts into action, steadfastly declined to attempt. This book is the record of one of those efforts, involving the two related cases of *Orlando* v. *Laird* and *Berk* v. *Laird*.

These cases did not achieve the notoriety of certain other efforts to get the courts to declare the Vietnam War unconstitutional principally because, when the Supreme Court in 1971 denied *certiorari* for review of the lower court decisions, Justices Douglas and Brennan, dissenting, did so without opinion. In contrast, when the Court refused to hear *Mora* v. *McNamara* (1967) both Justices Douglas and Stewart asserted that the case, which Stewart said raised "large and deeply troubling questions," should be heard. In *Massachusetts* v. *Laird* (1970) Douglas wrote an even longer dissent, while Justices Harlan and Stewart dissented without opinion, and in *Sarnoff* v. *Shultz* (1972) Douglas, with Brennan's concurrence, once again argued the judicial obligation to consider the constitutionality of a "Presidential war."

The *Orlando* and *Berk* cases have some significance, however, since they drew from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit a firm rejection of the government's contention that the president's power as Commander in Chief to commit American forces to combat was as broad as his inherent power in the entire field of foreign affairs (429 F. 2d at 304–305), and a ruling that a determination of the respective powers of the president and Congress in connection with war-making was a judicial question, not a nonjusticiable "political question." But the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district courts to determine whether the president's action was nonjusticiable for another reason, namely, for lack of judicially discernible and manageable standards for resolving the claim that the Vietnam War had not been authorized by Congress.

On this issue, both district courts and the Court of Appeals concluded that manageable standards could be formulated, but instead of doing so they accepted as evidence of congressional participation and approval, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and congressional appropriations for the conduct of the war. The method of congressional concurrence, the Second Circuit held, was solely within the discretion of Congress, and the courts should not interfere with the flexibility of action needed by the political branches of the government.

This book is a valuable record of the unsuccessful litigation, but its merits as a depth study are limited because it consists mostly of extracts from the record and memoranda of counsel in the two cases. The editors were among the counsel in the two cases, but we learn little about the development of their strategy, how the various lawyers divided up the work, and how they got along together. As a case study in the judicial process, it is at the opposite extreme from *Gideon's Trumpet*.

C. HERMAN PRITCHETT
*University of California, Santa Barbara*

**Political Behavior and Public Issues in Ohio.** Edited by John J. Gargan and James G. Coke. (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1972. Pp. 388. $10.00.)

In 1969, the Center for Urban Regionalism at Kent State University began a program designed to arouse the interest of Ohio's academic community in studies related to constitutional reform—which then seemed imminent—in the state. One product of the Center's program is *Political*

*Behavior and Public Issues in Ohio*, a misleadingly titled anthology of twelve studies of various aspects of constitutional reform in Ohio, authored by faculty, graduate students, and one undergraduate in higher educational institutions in the state. The volume is a collage rendered in mixed media. The dozen studies are not unified by any common analytical framework or normative viewpoint and reflect the individual substantive interests and methodological preferences of their authors. There is no attempt to provide a comprehensive critique of the Ohio constitution or even to include studies on all major portions of it. For example, there is no study here on any aspect of the executive branch. The volume as a whole is disparate, partial, and inconclusive, yet it contains imaginative and well-executed individual studies that merit scholarly attention beyond the borders of Ohio.

This anthology presents an interesting array of professional orientations to the general topic of constitutional reform. Three are in the pragmatic, atheoretical tradition of the governmental research bureaus and institutes. Yong Hyo Cho studies the impact of certain state constitutional provisions on municipal finance in Ohio; Frederick D. Stocker suggests a way of overcoming certain strictures imposed by a tax "turnback" feature of the state constitution; James G. Coke synthesizes and criticizes several decision-rules imposed by the Ohio constitution on urban policy making. These three studies are aimed at practical solutions to problems of fiscal management and policy making in Ohio and make little pretense of addressing broader theoretical issues. They seem likely to interest political practitioners in Ohio, while most of the remaining works will be more attractive to a broader scholarly audience. The study that perhaps best integrates the concerns of practitioners and academicians is that by James S. Gionnochio and Howard D. Hamilton; these authors examine empirical data on local "tax levy elections" in Ohio, they evaluate referenda results against the criteria of effective resource allocation and direct democracy—which turn out to be competing values in this instance—and they present arguments for and against fiscal policy making by plebiscite.

For readers outside Ohio, perhaps the most interesting aspect of this volume will be the sense of disquietude expressed by several authors with tenets of constitutional reform widely accepted since the Progressive era, and their attempts to suggest alternative criteria for constitutional evaluation. Thomas A. Flinn suggests that the usual "economy-efficiency" standards for evaluating state legislatures need to be supplemented or replaced by political criteria. He develops, rather sketchily, six such criteria, measures the Ohio legislature on each, and finds a high level of legislative performance. Many will argue with some of the specific criteria proposed by Flinn yet agree with him that legislatures are properly evaluated not by models of administrative efficiency but of political performance. Kathleen L. Barber examines participation in elections for appellate judges in Ohio and certain aspects of judicial behavior to show the partisan nature of the judiciary; she writes lucidly of the tension between the judicial norm of independence and the political norm of popular accountability, and suggests a method of judicial selection meeting both criteria. Joseph B. Tucker takes issue with those who argue for an autonomous constitutional status for state universities; after reviewing the relationships between state politics and public higher education in Ohio, he concludes that autonomy is a doubtful preventive of legislative interference in university life; his case study, though specific to Ohio, raises questions of institutional reform not limited by state boundaries. The final reformist idol to be desecrated is "home rule." John H. Bowden and Howard D. Hamilton's study of charter referenda in Cleveland and Summit county reveal several kinds of political barriers to metropolitan reform in Ohio; "home rule," they conclude, has turned out to be a blind alley rather than an avenue toward local governmental reform, and they suggest returning power over local governmental structure to the "benevolent despotism" of the state legislature. The volume ends with two studies of the politics of constitutional reform in Ohio. One, by William A. Spratley, is a searching analysis of state legislative roll-calls on constitutional issues; the other, by Carl Lieberman, examines a number of factors associated with support for amendments in Ohio referenda. These two studies present nothing new methodologically but are well executed and perhaps directly replicable in many other states.

These dozen studies vary so much in style of analysis and breadth of concern that the volume, as a whole, almost becomes a nonbook. Its strength derives primarily from the general orientation to constitutional reform that pervades most of the works. The various authors reject any a priori principles of constitutionalism; there is not even a footnote citing the Council of State Government's *Model State Constitution*, and even the more recent recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations are awarded only passing references. Not only are the Progressive principles challenged (where they are recognized at all) but also there are beginning attempts to fashion new criteria for evaluation.

This volume contains much that is refreshing and constructive in a field that has been moribund for a long time.

Douglas Gatlin

*Florida Atlantic University*

**Politics and Urban Policies.** By Brett W. Hawkins. (Indianapolis, Ind.: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1971. Pp. 127. $2.95, paper.)

Political scientists in recent years have devoted themselves increasingly to the analysis of public policies. Brett Hawkins's *Politics and Urban Policies* attempts to summarize what currently is known about the determination of public policies in cities.

Hawkins proceeds towards this end by proposing that the urban policy-making process be understood in terms of the familiar model of "systems analysis": the local and extracommunity environments generate demands upon the urban political system, to which the system responds, in its fashion, with policy outputs. This model suggests to Hawkins that the task of explaining what urban governments do and why they do it requires one simply to ask whether the policies cities pursue are more strongly influenced by their environmental or by their political characteristics.

Unfortunately, the mode of analysis Hawkins employs is not really suited to answering even this drastically scaled down question. He does not proceed, as the problem which he poses requires, by selecting some policy choices of urban governments that he wishes to explain, specifying a model which incorporates each of the variables he deems relevant to explaining the policy in question, and then estimating the coefficients of such a model. Hawkins's mode of analysis differs from one which would be appropriate in a number of ways that impair its value.

In the first place, when he selects indicators for his dependent variable, Hawkins fails to distinguish between public policies (e.g., teacher salaries) and their intended consequences (e.g., teacher turnover)—that is, he fails to recognize that his dependent variable at times refers not to the behavior of municipal governments (something that, within constraints, is subject to public *choice*), but rather to the behavior of individuals (something that, at best, is subject to public *influence*).

Second, Hawkins focuses his analysis upon his independent, rather than his dependent, variables: he presents data on the environmental and political influences on urban policies in separate chapters, and within the chapter on environmental characteristics, each one—population size, density, and distribution; social class, economic base, ethnicity, race, and religion—is discussed separately. Because Hawkins presents data in this way, his dependent variable constantly is shifting. In the six paragraphs (pp. 66–70) devoted to the influence of city size upon urban policy outputs, for example, the reader is told in rapid succession that city size is correlated with: urban renewal expenditures, general municipal expenditures, school segregation, per pupil school expenditures, teachers' salaries, teacher turnover, private school enrollment, "levels of public service development," total welfare expenditures, and per capita spending for services. Because his dependent variable constantly changes it is impossible to learn from his analysis how any particular urban policy, or how any category of urban policies, gets made.

Third, the statistical techniques which Hawkins (and the scholars whose research he cites) employ also are inappropriate to the task he sets himself. The statistic upon which Hawkins most frequently relies is the bivariate correlation coefficient, which at best tells one of the existence of an association between two variables, not (as the question he is seeking to answer requires one to know) the magnitude of the influence of the one upon the other. Hawkins, moreover, is oblivious to consequences of the fact that his environmental variables are highly co-linear. He takes the existence of correlations between each of his environmental variables and various dependent variables as providing repeated confirmation of the importance of environment in shaping policy, without realizing that what he actually is doing is measuring the same relationship again and again. And since his environmental and his political variables also are co-linear, his effort to estimate the impact of the one while ignoring the other necessarily is flawed.

Rather than enabling one to understand the forces which influence the content and conduct of urban policies, then, all Hawkins's analysis tells one is that associations exist between each element of a package of redundant indicators labeled "environment" and at least one element of a package of heterogeneous indicators labeled "outputs." Whenever he discerns such an association—whether it be that city size is correlated with teacher turnover, median family income with sanitation expenditures, or population density with "public service development"—Hawkins claims confirmation for the same conclusion: "environment" influences "policy outputs." And by proceeding in a comparable manner in his chapter on "political system variables," Hawkins arrives at his subordinate conclusion: "politics" influences "policy outputs." These concepts, propositions, and conclusions, clearly, are so general that they are totally uninformative.

There is as little relation between the explanations Hawkins proposes for the findings he reports and these findings themselves, as there is between the data upon which he relies and the conclusions he draws from these data. For example, Hawkins considers the major finding of urban policy analysis to be that the population characteristics of cities correlate both with the retention of unreformed governmental institutions and with urban expenditure patterns. Hawkins explains these correlations by arguing that the more heterogeneous a city's population, the larger and the more disparate will be the volume of demands upon its government, and hence "the more potent the demand inputs for retaining politicized institutions adept at accommodating differences," and "the more numerous the demands for services" (p. 114). These explanations confuse two distinct concepts: Hawkins equates the proportion of the city's population that belongs to various social groups (e.g., percentage of foreign stock) with the rather different concept, social heterogeneity. Based as it is upon such a confusion, his explanation suggests something that is most improbable: Cities whose populations are, for example, one-third foreign stock are as likely to be governed by unreformed institutions as those whose populations are two-thirds foreign stock (for, being equally distant from a 50–50 native-foreign split, they are equally heterogeneous ethnically), and are much more likely to have unreformed institutions than cities whose populations are nine-tenths foreign stock (and hence less heterogeneous ethnically). Hawkins's explanation for variations in the formal structure of urban governments incorporates as well the highly dubious notion that the presence of political conflict in a city will lead the contending forces to support political institutions adept at managing such conflict, rather than, as appears historically to have been the case, leading them to support the retention or the adoption of those institutions which would favor their own side in such conflicts. And his argument that the more socially heterogeneous a city, the more numerous the demands made upon its government and hence the larger the city budget, depends upon a series of equally questionable premises: that all social groups in the city make demands entailing that governmental expenditures (and hence municipal taxes) be increased; that it is impossible, for some reason which Hawkins does not explain, for the same expenditure simultaneously to satisfy the demands of different population groups (Because different population groups demand that public monies be spent on different things? Because it is more expensive to provide the same service to two individuals whose demographic characteristics differ than to two whose demographic characteristics are the same?); and finally that city governments characteristically respond to incompatible demands by satisfying each of them rather than by indulging some at the expense of others, or by splitting a fixed budget among them, or by falling into a deadlock.

The deficiencies of Hawkins's book—deficiencies of index construction, model specification, statistical methodology, concept formation, and explanation—to be sure, reflect in large measure the inadequacies of the studies upon which he so uncritically relies. But the fundamental source of Hawkins's difficulties, one suspects, lies with the model of the political system which informs his analysis. The set of concepts which this model provides him, and the questions about the policy-making process which this model suggests to him, lead him to draw only the most abstract and uninformative conclusions from the existing literature in the field. (Hawkins's analysis of the forces that explain federal urban policies, for example, is in its entirety: " 'actions within the political system' is the answer suggested by the literature. Actions by official political actors [e.g., Congressmen and Senators], interest groups, and professional experts are emphasized in explaining federal action on urban problems" [p. 105].) And Hawkins's insistence that the scientific status of a study is directly proportional to the size of the sample upon which it is based (pp. 5f.) leads him to ignore most of the interesting recent work—e.g., that of Alford, Banfield, Crensen, Greenstone, Lipsky, Peterson, and Wilson—in urban policy analysis.

MARTIN SHEFTER

*Cornell University*

**A More Perfect Union: The Impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction on the Constitution.** By Harold M. Hyman. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973. Pp. xviii, 562. $15.00.)

A constitutional crisis may be defined as an occasion when the survival of the nation is threatened and it is doubtful whether the government created by the Constitution can cope with the challenge. So defined, the United States has had no more than three constitutional crises, those involving the Civil War, the Great Depression, and World War II.

Or the word "constitutional" can be used in an Aristotelian way, to refer to "an organization of offices in a state, by which . . . the nature of the end to be pursued by the association and all its members is prescribed" (*Politics*, Bk. IV, chap. 1). In this sense, the period *following* the Civil War presented challenges to constitutional order as profound as the war itself.

Harold M. Hyman's *A More Perfect Union* is a narrative history of the period from 1860 until 1868. The book is presented in two rather separate parts, which deal consecutively with the two types of constitutional crisis here defined.

In the first sixteen chapters, Hyman focuses on the effort to suppress the rebellion and restore the union. In one of the book's best passages, he evokes the atmosphere of the lame-duck Buchanan administration, of a president sensing the impending disaster, but paralyzed by the belief that the Constitution conveyed no authority to resist it.

Enter Lincoln, and almost overnight, the question becomes, not whether the government can act, but which measures are mostly likely to succeed in restoring the union. The will to take action is quickened by the president's bold decision to fight at Fort Sumter. Almost immediately, Taney's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in Merryman's case recalls the old conviction that the choice is between liberty and military dictatorship. But Lincoln's response is unhesitating: to defy Taney, to apply ferocious force against the rebellion—and to join Congress in enacting a substantial enlargement of civil liberties, including procedural safeguards in cases involving national security (chap. XI).

Taney and Buchanan thought that the onslaught of war would mean the end of constitutional government. Instead, by the war (and by the Thirteenth Amendment), the Constitution threw off its shackles. The election of 1864, conducted in the presence of war, concerned the most fateful matters, and its decision settled them. Once again, the nation's political processes were worthy of the attention of capable people.

What happened after the War, to which Hyman devotes twelve chapters, was a less glorious example of the capabilities of constitutional democracy. "In early April 1865," writes Hyman, "President, Congress, and Supreme Court were staffed with men who agreed on essentials, including decent treatment for freedmen through access to schools, courts, and ballots" (p. 281). With the death of Lincoln later that month, everything changed.

In Congress, the dominant Republicans sought to impose "Reconstruction" on the South, but their efforts—moderate and reasonable, for the most part, in Hyman's judgment—were thwarted by President Johnson. The beginning of the end for Reconstruction was the failure to impeach Johnson, whose "nonenforcements, malforming interpretations or outright obstructions" of statutes (p. 506) thus escaped punishment. By 1868, the will to use public energy to help blacks overcome the legacy of slavery was rapidly dissipating.

It took Hyman a decade to compose this book, and he has produced a judicious, thorough study. Unfortunately, its length and chronological presentation are likely to discourage most political scientists from reading it.

The lack of cross-fertilization between historians and political scientists is deplorable. Despite occasional citations of such scholars as Talcott Parsons, William Riker, and Clinton Rossiter, Hyman shows little evidence of having drawn on social scientific techniques in his work. Tools for analyzing congressional and popular voting behavior, for example, which have been used to good effect by such historians as Allan Bogue and Joel Silbey, might have been helpful in assaying the sources and depth of support for the Constitution bequeathed by Lincoln.

On the other hand, I suspect that few political scientists will be willing to wade through Hyman's vastly detailed pages. Specialists may refer to the book's good chapters on the reform of judicial organization, the use of state governments as laboratories for social experimentation, or the debate (featuring Walter Bagehot, Sidney George Fisher, Sir James F. Stephen, and others) about the "adequacy" of the Constitution in times of crisis.

But for most of us, a narrative like Hyman's is raw material, and probably too raw to be very useful.

Donald Allen Robinson

*Smith College*

**Private Assumption of Public Responsibilities: The Role of American Business in Urban Manpower Programs.** By Peter Kobrak. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973. Pp. 257. $17.50.)

This book focuses on urban manpower programs as a response to the civil disorders which occurred in Watts, Detroit, Newark, and a number of other cities between 1965–1967. It is also an intensive case study of the JOBS Program (Job Opportunities in the Business Sector) set up by President Johnson between 1967–1969 and continued for a short time by President Nixon after he took office. The author is well qualified in the manpower field, having served in a House committee, the U.S. Department of Labor, and the Governor's Office in New York. Most of the intensive research for his monograph was undertaken in Milwaukee, where he is a political scientist at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.

A private vehicle relied upon by the JOBS program was NAB (National Alliance of Businessmen), hence the title of the book. In effect, this committee of American businessmen, headed by Henry Ford II, was asked to absorb half a million of the hard-core unemployed by 1971, in a "partnership" between the government and the private sector, financed by public monies.

In the course of telling his story, Professor Kobrak throws light on the power balances within industry as well as within the government. He also has a good deal to say about political socialization within the private sector. The program as a whole seems to have made some dent on the racial and unemployment problems of some of the largest cities and hence indirectly has contributed to the allaying of tensions causing riots.

The NAB program was confined almost entirely to the largest corporations. Some had enough motivation and managerial flexibility to respond to the challenge, but others made promises which were poorly fulfilled. In both the public and private sectors, a tension was created between those who favor institutional, off-the-job training, and those who believe that on-the-job training within industry is the superior method, especially for the underprivileged who must first have jobs and incentive before they even try. Private "crash" programs of this nature are not substitutes for planned public programs, and were not intended to be, but in crisis situations they may have their uses. The author also shows that the planning of the program at the national level was much superior to its instrumentation at the urban level, because as so frequently happens, a link is missing, or there is not enough upward organization locally.

This study is one of a growing number focusing on partnership and the social conscience of businessmen. One thinks, for example, of John Corson's *Business in the Humane Society* (1971), Jules Cohn's *The Conscience of the Corporation: Business and Urban Affairs* (1971), or Neil Chamberlain's *Business and the Cities* (1970).

Because of the interdisciplinary nature of the problem, the study is of interest to a number of specialties: to the theory of pluralism and socialization, the comparative workings of the organizational-managerial process, urban affairs, the economist's concern with manpower programs, and the sociologist's interest in cooptation and Selznick's concept of leadership. The method depends largely upon the questionnaire and interview techniques but subscribes to Norton Long's "ecology of games" model as developed in *American Journal of Sociology* for November 1958. The author makes a substantial contribution to an area of political science that is likely to increase in importance rather rapidly in the near future, namely the private-public balance as a means of improving the overall effectiveness of public programs.

MARSHALL E. DIMOCK

*Bethel, Vermont*

**First Freedom: The Responses of Alabama's Blacks to Emancipation and Reconstruction.** By Peter Kolchin. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1972. Pp. 215. $10.00.)

In writing about Reconstruction in the South, most previous historians have viewed the blacks as "passive objects," says Peter Kolchin, assistant professor of history at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. "Many questions still remain largely unexplored—questions dealing with the structure and behavior of the Negro community itself rather than with the actions of whites toward it, and with black social patterns rather than with race relations" (pp. xiv–xv). These are the questions to which Kolchin addresses himself, in what was originally a doctoral dissertation done under the supervision of David Donald at the Johns Hopkins University. Though Kolchin focuses on Alabama, he conceives of his work as a case study for the South as a whole.

For sources, Kolchin has exploited more fully than previous writers on Alabama Reconstruction the unpublished letters and reports of the Freedmen's Bureau, the papers of the American Missionary Association, and the manuscript returns of the federal censuses of 1860 and 1870. He has made some use of quantitative techniques in a roll-call analysis of voting in the state constitutional convention of 1867.

He finds a persistent theme in the effort of Alabama blacks, during the several years immediately after emancipation, to assert their freedom and live their lives as independently as possible of the dominant whites. The blacks did so by "forming their own churches, seeking to improve their position vis-à-vis their planter employers, becoming active politically, acting to strengthen the family as a social unit," and "supporting the education of their children" (p. 189). There resulted, Kolchin concludes, a social revolution that was more important and more lasting than the political revolution of Radical Reconstruction.

His findings, Kolchin believes, cast doubt on the "Sambo thesis" of Stanley Elkins, who holds that the brutalizing experience of slavery made blacks childlike and submissive. "As soon as they were free, these supposedly dependent, childlike Negroes began acting like independent men and women" (p. 190). The findings, Kolchin contends, also cast doubt on the views of sociologists, such as Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who see in the slave past the origin of instability in black families of the present. "If during Reconstruction a relatively stable black family had begun to develop, whatever family instability there is among twentieth-century urban blacks must be the result of the disruptive conditions faced by those families in the ghetto, not the perpetuation of slave patterns" (p. 192).

This remains arguable, but Kolchin's opinion commands respect. Thoroughly researched, well reasoned, clearly and cleanly written, *First Freedom* deserves the appellation of a model monograph.

RICHARD N. CURRENT
*The University of North Carolina at Greensboro*

**The College and Community Development: A Socio-economic Analysis for Urban and Regional Growth.** By Julian Martin Laub. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. Pp. 328. $16.50.)

During the growth period experienced by higher education in the 1960s, local communities often competed with one another to become sites for the construction of new institutions or for the expansion of older ones. Local feelings of pride and prestige undoubtedly contributed to such competition, but concrete economic and social benefits were generally attributed to the existence of these facilities as well. Among other things, a college was said to enhance property values, to bring in new revenues, and to broaden the social base and cultural offerings of the community.

This monograph is concerned with a selected set of these questions with respect to various two- and four-year institutions in New York state. It examines the residency patterns of professional and auxiliary staffs in New York schools, the economic and social interactions of staff and students with local townspeople, the impact of college purchases on the community and region, and student enrollment and commutation practices. A large part of the analysis focuses on the situation in the small village of Alfred (the home of Alfred Agricultural and Technical College and of Alfred University) and on the city of Cortland (the location of a state four-year college). The sections utilizing survey data draw on two additional institutions (Cazenovia College and Auburn Community College), while the chapter on residency patterns is based on data from thirty-nine New York schools.

The author finds that local communities generally receive substantial economic benefits from the existence of a local college, but that community size is often an important variable in the benefits retained locally. A small community such as Alfred—with limited entrepreneurial capacity and growth potential—may experience a great deal of "spillout" of economic opportunities into adjoining areas. Such factors, it is suggested, should be taken into account in the planning of new institutions and in the expansion of existing ones.

Perhaps of greatest interest to the political scientist are the sections dealing with the input of staff and students into local social and political affairs—although the information presented on these subjects is drawn solely from a survey of staff and students, not from the residents of the communities described. It is found that professional staff members report themselves to be high-to-moderate participants in community service activities, to have moderate or close-to-moderate ties with local residents, and in at least some instances to be influential in local educational policies. The potential impact of such activities upon community affairs is suggested (although not explored) by the large number of professional staff members who indicate that they hold less conservative political views than most other residents in their respective communities. It was found that nonlocal students likewise report themselves to be more liberal than community residents; in this case, however, interaction with townspeople was found to be highly limited, even with respect to economic purchases.

As the author notes, many of his conclusions may be specific to the particular colleges or communities examined in the analysis. As he further notes, his study is primarily intended to benefit those responsible for college planning, urban and regional development policy, and public and private investment decisions.

HAROLD E. QUINLEY
*Stanford University*

**Ward Number Six.** By David Lebedoff. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972. Pp. 172. $2.65, paper.)

It is difficult in the light of all that has occurred to remember the political activities and mood of late summer 1967. To read David Lebedoff's *Ward Number Six* is to have it all come forcibly back.

*Ward Number Six* is a personal political diary by a former aide to Senator Walter Mondale. It is the story of a political trek from local ward politics to the Democratic National Convention of 1968. Lebedoff has a fascinating story to tell and he tells it well. The book is fast-paced and absorbing. It reads as if it were political science fiction. Unhappily, it is all too true.

Early in the piece Lebedoff becomes involved in the politics of the Sixth Ward in Minneapolis. This ward is situated on the West Bank of the Mississippi River, and at the time of the book's setting it was just receiving an influx of students from the University of Minnesota, located just across the river. At the ward-club meeting he attends, Lebedoff observes that a group of well-organized students, deeply committed to ending the Vietnam War, is taking over the moribund political organization in the ward. Lebedoff isn't quite sure how to portray these students; he is impressed by their organization, but uncertain about what their methods will be. Lebedoff walked into this initial meeting with his brother and the chairman of the Hennepin County Democratic-Farmer-Labor organization. He stated, "I still couldn't get over the fact that the students very obviously didn't like us. It was a rude awakening. It wasn't fair. I was not yet thirty, I deserved to be trusted."

Lebedoff is impressed by the cold efficiency of these early McCarthy supporters, and their results (both in Minneapolis and nationwide) were manifestations of their superb organization. Yet he is also dismayed. He tells of walking over to congratulate a young man who had just been elected delegate to the State Convention. He shook hands with him and commented about how well things had turned out. "Yes" the young delegate agreed, "but if those bastards had tried anything funny, well, we were ready for them." He opened his jacket and showed a gun.

The book goes a long way toward debunking the myth that youthful campaign organizations began with George McGovern perched upon his white horse. Lebedoff relates the rise of one Vance Opperman, who is rated so highly that one wonders why he has never been heard of since, outside of Minnesota. His pictures of student-campaigners are often complete; his detailing of the ward canvasses and organization is thorough and quite clear. Lebedoff points out that these insurgents, once in power, became ruthless and exclusionary, trying to forge a party in their own image; a phenomenon which occurs often when the "outs" become the "ins" and then make every attempt to insure that they are never the "outs" again.

Lebedoff, rather disturbingly, portrays students and organization alike. It is a scene reminiscent of Weimar Germany, only there are no heroes, just villains. The stories are of strong-arm tactics, making one's opponents feel as uncomfortable as possible in every way possible, and wrangling and debating every petty issue imaginable; all to the detriment of the governmental and party processes. He is understandably upset over one of the McCarthy people's tactics: insisting upon winner-take-all when they are the victors, demanding proportional representation when they are the vanquished. Yet Lebedoff points out in a roundabout way that politics is a business in which principle, no matter how high the principle, is out of place. Politics is a forum where "Who has the most votes?" is the final determinant of right and wrong. Principle can undoubtedly seek out a higher battle ground. Nevertheless, *Ward Number Six* is a fine account of one man's political experience, which despite its limited focus and personal nature does add considerably to our understanding of the political process.

DONALD G. HERZBERG

*Georgetown University*

**Millionaires and Managers.** By S. Menshikov. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969. Pp. 327. $2.50.)

Professor Stanislav Menshikov—division head of the Institute of Economics and Organization of Industrial Production of the USSR Academy of Sciences—is the author of a number of recent Soviet books on United States capitalism. The basic research for this work was done while the author was an exchange scholar in the United States for four months in the autumn of 1962. The Russian edition appeared in 1965, and this English version is the result of a thorough review and updating of the original statistical data five years after the book was written.

While here, Menshikov seems to have had entrée to all the right people. As he indicates in his preface, the author met chairmen of the board, presidents and vice-presidents of dozens of corporations, and 13 out of the 23 largest commercial banks, as well as partners of some of the principal investment banks, law firms, insurance companies and investment trusts. Among his interviewees were Henry Ford II, Henry S. Morgan, David Rockefeller, and Cyrus Eaton.

Any scholar studying the concentration of power in the United States would no doubt give his eyeteeth to gain access to such illustrious members of the "power elite." Still, we should always be cautious about accepting their replies to our inquiries at face value. The fact that bankers (and most economists) *think* that the Federal Reserve can control changes in the money supply does not mean that alternating monetary policies can be effectively used as a major policy instrument—a conclusion that both the current Federal Reserve Chairman, Arthur Burns, and Milton Friedman, the leader of the monetary counter-revolution, are beginning to recognize. By the same token, the fact that the financial oligarchy thinks that they exercise ultimate control over the policies of the large corporations does not necessarily make it so.

Traditional Marxists tend to emphasize the basic contradiction of capitalism as the struggle between labor and capital. The other side of this coin is the subordination of the internal antagonisms within the capitalist class. In this respect, Menshikov is conventional and, not surprisingly, he received considerable reinforcement for the latter assumption from his interviewees. His approach is very similar to that taken earlier by Victor Perlo, and more recently by the Fitch-Oppenheimer team, although he does not always come up with precisely the same answers (see pp. 201 and 281). Like Perlo, he concludes that economic power is concentrated in associations of finance capital, whose leadership consists of *definite* combinations of millionaires and managers. Nevertheless, Menshikov does recognize the fact that the millionaire-manager combination paradoxically assumes the most diverse concrete forms. Thus, the Morgan interest group, including the families of its partners, failed to produce a man capable of leading the head bank and was therefore forced to choose the late Henry Alexander, a professional top executive, to be president of the Morgan Guaranty Trust. Another anomaly is Kaiser, which does not seem to have the attributes that turn a monopolistic association into a financial group since it has shown no coalescence of bank and industrial capital.

The general position of Menshikov and Perlo is of course at variance with that of the neo-Marxists —Paul Sweezy, the late Paul Baran, and James O'Connor. (See Paul Sweezy, "The Resurgence of Financial Control: Fact or Fancy?" *Monthly Review*, November, 1971, pp. 1–33. [Reprinted in Paul M. Sweezy and Harry Magdoff, *The Dynamics of U.S. Capitalism*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1972, pp. 113–145.]) The neo-Marxist position emphasizes the reduced financial power of "interest groups" over the operations of the large corporation as capitalism matures, and stresses the internal financing of investment assisted by the state subsidization of the investment process via investment tax credits and provisions for rapid depreciation. Menshikov recognizes investment subsidies (p. 31) and internal financing (p. 79), but sees no secular increase in the importance of this phenomenon (p. 193).

There is one conflict within monopoly capital, however, which in my view neither of the above positions seems to recognize, and that is the general opposition by the financial oligarchy to the use of Keynesian fiscal policy. This general preference for the use of monetary tools, including devaluation of currencies, is most apparent in banking circles, which also seem to be most opposed to the acceptance of the inevitability and functionalism of secular inflation. The top levels of the large corporations, on the other hand, tend to recognize the necessity for the manipulation of the economy through the budget, especially investment subsidies, and take a considerably more cavalier attitude toward inflation and so-called balance of payments difficulties. Their profits *are* higher when the economy is growing rapidly and when inflation is predominantly of the demand-pull variety. On the other hand, slow economic growth and cost-push inflation lead to low corporate profits and the need for greater corporate reliance on financial institutions as sources of financing.

In my view, the corporate center of power has developed sufficiently in recent years to prevent anything comparable to the Great Depression from occurring. Yet there is enough residual power persisting in the financial oligarchy that prevents the successful operation of Keynesian fiscal policy so that high level stagnation has now become endemic in the advanced capitalist world. Thus, the struggle over measures to realize the potential surplus of the advanced capitalist system tends to overshadow the classic capitalist contradiction, with large labor and large capital frequently lined up in opposition to the financial oligarchy. Conventional bourgeois economists tend to paper over this relatively new contradiction by talking about the proper "mix" of monetary and fiscal tools, but the only "solution" to this problem is a chronically neutral monetary policy—as Hitler's overall economic policy clearly demonstrated.

*Millionaires and Managers* represents a qualitative jump in Russian studies of the United States economy, although Menshikov does not quite fill the void created by the death of his former mentor, Eugene Varga. Despite the lack of an index (a common Soviet economy measure), the amount of useful information contained in this hard-cover book is surely a bargain in our inflation-riddled economy.

LYNN TURGEON

*Hofstra University*

**Defensible Space: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design.** By Oscar Newman. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972. Pp. 264. $8.95.)

Oscar Newman is an architect and urban planner. *Defensible Space* is a book about the relationship of the design of residential areas to the organization of public and semi-public spaces so that such spaces can be defended against potential crime. These public or semi-public spaces include grounds, play spaces, walkways, parking areas, entries, lobbies, elevators, stairways, hallways, etc. and are subject to common use by diverse individuals. Whether these spaces are "owned" by some public authority or by a private proprietor is irrelevant; they are, in fact, used as common properties by diverse communities of individuals.

Newman, thus, is concerned with (1) how the design characteristics of public or semi-public spaces affects the fabric of social organization which develops in the use of these common properties and (2) how the interaction of these variables affects the amount (measured in quantitative terms) of criminal behavior. Newman finds that where public or semi-public space is designed so that boundary conditions can be easily identified, and when a relatively small community of people are recognized as the primary users of the commons, then patterns of organizations will develop to defend the space against hostile intruders and to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by the common facilities. Where public and semi-public spaces are undifferentiated and large numbers of people use that space, then no single set of users can identify who belongs or who does not belong. The commons becomes a "no-man's land" which anyone and everyone is relatively "free" to use for lawful or unlawful purposes. The size factor that Newman is considering is the same size factor that Mancur Olson examines in *The Logic of Collective Action.*

Newman presents empirical evidence based upon matched comparisons. Socioeconomic characteristics of the residential population and forms of proprietorship are held constant; and the design characteristics of defensible space are varied. The evidence dramatically supports Newman's thesis and Olson's *Logic.*

Newman's work has far-reaching implications for political scientists. Banfield's *Unheavenly City*, for example, implies that a culture of poverty is a way of life in which people opt for short-term satisfaction and are unwilling to strive for longer-term satisfactions. Where the partitioning of public spaces is carried to small units with fewer persons using those spaces, costs of organization will be low, and the value of the public spaces will be better maintained. Where public spaces are undifferentiated, and numbers of users are greater, costs of organization will escalate and the value of those common properties quickly erodes. Thus, Banfield's short-term, long-term calculus can probably be translated into the costs of taking collective action. When those costs are high, individuals will use shorter time horizons and more limited social-space horizons in selecting strategies appropriate to their situations. When costs of organization are lower, the social-space and time horizons will begin to expand. By identifying a variable—size—and its relation to the cost of organization in maintaining the value of common properties and reducing crime, Newman's *Defensible Space* points to factors that could enable poor people to cope better with the exigencies of life in poor residential neighborhoods.

Newman's concern with the effect of size upon the use of public and semi-public spaces in residential areas has substantial implications for scholars concerned with neighborhood government and community control among neighborhoods within large central cities. Unless neighborhoods are very small we would not anticipate long-term success by voluntary organizations. Patterns of collective action established by reference to formal structures of authority can be relied upon where patterns of social organization do not arise spontaneously among larger neighborhoods. Yet the very large city governments are unlikely to take account of varying preferences, lifestyles, and environmental conditions existing among the numerous neighborhoods of the large center cities.

Newman's discussion applies to the quality of the urban environment as well as to potential criminal behavior. The failure to consider the management of public and semi-public places may precipitate what Garret Hardin has called "The Tragedy of the Commons." When the use of common properties cannot be subject to effective control in response to competing uses by the communities of users, then some users will drive out other users. An erosion in the quality of urban life will occur for those who can no longer make use of the public or semi-public spaces they need.

Oscar Newman's work, as reflected in his concern for the use of public and semi-public spaces and in his methodology, deserves careful consideration by political scientists because of its important implications for urban politics.

VINCENT OSTROM
*Indiana University, Bloomington*

**Decentralizing the City: A Study of Boston's Little City Halls.** By Eric A. Nordlinger. (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1972. Pp. 310. $12.50.)

Professor Nordlinger studies Boston's Little City Halls, which are dedicated to the increase of governmental responsiveness, the reduction of citizen alienation, and an increase in the level of city services. The study contrasts the Little City Hall approach with alternative methods of solving the problems of the central city's distance from its citizens. It concludes that the Boston program has been successful, and it commends the Boston effort to others concerned with the problem of decentralization and citizen participation.

Scholarly work on urban problems can be divided into three rough categories: (1) theoretical works which discuss cities in general terms, dealing with a broad range of political problems (e.g., Long, Williams, Banfield); (2) analytical monographs which study causal relations or patterns among a narrow range of key urban variables such as policy preferences, institutional structures, leadership and recruitment, expenditures (e.g., Wood, Sharkansky, Dahl, Eulau and Prewitt), and (3) descriptive works on specific institutions or problems, frequently in the form of case studies of one program, in one city, at one point in time (Bachrach and Baratz, Lipsky, Crain).

Nordlinger's study clearly belongs in the last category. As such, it illustrates both the advantages and limitations of the descriptive case study approach. The patient reader will become an instant expert on one topic: Boston's experiment with bureaucratic and political decentralization between 1969 and 1972. He may, however, be left with little sense of how the results of this experiment apply to the solution of problems of citizen alienation and lack of governmental responsiveness in other cities—or indeed, of the degree of decentralization of urban decision making and administration elsewhere, and how it relates to such problems. In brief, the study is an interesting one, but the twin questions of theoretical and practical relevance rear their ugly heads. Nordlinger is correct in his statement that the comprehensiveness of Boston's program—together with the serious nature of the city's problems—provide an ideal testing ground for his conclusion that "the Little City Hall's potential capabilities are as great if not greater than those of the bureaucratic, representative and governmental models in meeting the decentralizer's objectives" (p. 308). He has failed, however, to provide the theoretical linkage which might enable others to extrapolate from the experience.

Nordlinger's strongest contribution is found in Chapter III: "The Boston Bureaucracy: A Theoretical Analysis." He offers a convincing explanation of the poor performance of the bureaucracy (poor services, a high degree of citizen alienation), by examining the linkage between recruitment and promotional patterns, the "friction avoidance ethos" of superiors, and the "behavioral rules" by which civil servants work (p. 96ff). Low pay, absolute veteran's preference in hiring, and promotion policies based on the ability to memorize rules rather than on performance standards have created a bureaucracy in which "superiors strongly avoid actions that might cause strain, friction, or antagonism between themselves and their subordinates" (p. 102). This ethos leads to minimal control and supervision, low performance standards, little delegation of authority, low initiative by subordinates, and almost no internal review of departmental performance.

The author then goes on to demonstrate that managers of Little City Halls who have recognized the institutional and informal constraints of the bureaucracy have been far more successful than those who have fought or ignored such constraints. His conclusion that Little City Halls have been more successful in broadening the range of services than in their efforts at community organization is not, in fact, surprising—given his analysis of constraints.

Fine! But do his conclusions about the theoretical linkage between recruitment, promotion, norms, and performance of a bureaucracy apply to Atlanta, San Francisco, or Chicago—as well as to Boston? No attention is devoted to this question; no effort is made to compare or contrast the bureaucratic practices and outcomes in general terms, either through the literature on bureaucracy or through studies on other cities. I would have preferred a general discussion of bureaucratic norms and behavior, dealing with Boston's situation as one among others; as things stand, we have no way of knowing if it is typical or atypical of cities of comparable size.

My comments on Chapter III—the only theoretical effort in the study—should suffice to illustrate my disappointment with Nordlinger's work. His statements on evaluation, in the final chapter, are equally parochial. At no point in his discussion does he go beyond the Boston arena, nor does he draw on the rich and burgeoning literature on the evaluation of urban programs.

One minor set of complaints must also be registered concerning the *format* of the study. The author never tells us what research strategies he pursued, aside from the detailed discussion of his opinion survey. I *assume*—from the text—that he has interviewed a substantial number of officials including Little City Hall managers, commissioners, councilmen, mayoral assistants. I would also hope that he spent some time as a silent observer of the interactions between clients and administrators. His assessment of performance—and indeed of innovative efforts of Little City Halls—requires that he have first-hand information on these points. It would be helpful, however, to those who read his work to know what were the bases for the evaluatory statements.

The book was apparently produced by a photo-offset process, and in fact was published "by" the MIT Press "for" the Boston Urban Observatory. The results are logistically disappointing. Extremely narrow margins, uneven typeface, typographical errors—and the omission of either an index or a reference list of works cited—make the book very difficult to read or to use as a reference source.

In summary, this study might have made a major contribution to our understanding of city politics and administration if it had been better grounded in theory, had made a greater effort to "place" Boston in a universe of cities, and had been presented in a more viable format. Despite these flaws, however, Nordlinger has given us an interesting account—and preliminary assessment—of an innovative and comprehensive urban experiment. Scholars and administrators alike might profitably ponder the Boston experience.

Betty H. Zisk

*Boston University*

**War and Society: The United States, 1941–1945.** By Richard Polenberg. (Philadelphia, Pa.: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1972. Pp. 298. $5.95, cloth; $2.45, paper.)

Most historians would probably concur with Richard Polenberg's assertion that "World War II radically altered the character of American society and challenged its most durable values" (p. 4). Yet only a modest number of studies have attempted to deal systematically with the domestic impact of this crucial period in American history. Therefore *War and Society* is doubly welcome, both as a solid piece of historical scholarship and as a useful contribution to a somewhat neglected area. The historian who ventures into the many and complex facets of the home front encounters a monumental amount of documentation produced by wartime Washington alone; when added to the existing evidence regarding nongovernmental problems of the period, the effect is staggering. Despite these obstacles, Professor Polenberg's work suggests that the diligent scholar can cope with the seemingly insurmountable mountain of surviving material.

But even Polenberg must make some concessions to the magnitude of his undertaking; as a result, *War and Society* is more nearly a series of essays than an integrated or comprehensive history of the period. The author deals in successive chapters with such disparate topics as economic mobilization, civil liberties, wartime politics, minority groups, social impact of the war, labor unrest and business opposition to controls, and economic reconversion. These chapters contain some excellent sketches of wartime agencies like the War Production Board, the National War Labor Board, the Office of War Mobilization, and numerous others. Through these agencies the government was able to establish a coherent system of economic controls by mid-1943. This program, however, was established at the expense of any further domestic reform; a conservative resurgence during the war years meant that Roosevelt would acquire foreign policy support only in exchange for soft-pedaling New Deal-type domestic measures. The war brought about significant changes in political allegiances and alliances, and as prosperity returned because of the war economy, liberalism in general was weakened and liberal Democrats in particular declined in influence.

Most of the topics Polenberg covers have been dealt with before, but he generally succeeds in bringing new insights and information or fresh perspectives to each problem. Especially good are his chapters on labor unrest and the "national service" controversy, and on the struggle between civilians and the military to control economic mobilization and reconversion. In the latter he rightly emphasizes the importance of the reconversion period in the birth and growth of the military-industrial complex.

Polenberg makes no easy generalizations about American society during World War II—it was "both unifying and disunifying . . . in some ways it made for cohesion, in others for fragmentation" (p. 153). Refreshingly, Polenberg avoids grandiose claims for his research. He refuses to reduce the complexity of events to some easy catch-phrase or slogan. He abjures the temptation to make his facts fit some preconceived schema. His conclusions are balanced, well documented, and carefully derived. Polenberg's style, while not striking, is clear and fluid, and the development of his ideas is logically impeccable. *War and Society* has broken considerable ground for the historian who will ultimately write the definitive history of World War II at home.

FREDRICK J. DOBNEY

*Saint Louis University*

**Constitutional Rights of College Students: A Study in Case Law.** By Richard C. Ratliff. (Metuchen, N. J.: Scarecrow Press, 1972. Pp. iv, 260. $7.50.)

Although campus turbulence appears to have diminished, major questions affecting student rights remain to be answered. For those who seek a legal and historical understanding of the status of these rights, reference to Richard Ratliff's study will be of value.

This doctoral dissertation surveys and synthesizes court decisions and legal writings pertinent to procedural and substantive rights of college students with emphasis on the years 1961–1969. The early section of the study explores the nature of the student-college relationship in the United States and examines the factors which have caused this relationship to be redefined and altered. In this context the author discusses seven legal theories which have been advanced and utilized by the courts, the most dominant being *loco parentis*, to describe the legal bonds between student and college. The core of the study is a careful examination of *Dixon* v. *Alabama State Board of Education* (1961) in which the Court of Appeals in the Fifth Circuit declared that "due process requires notice and some opportunity for hearing before students at a tax-supported college are expelled for misconduct." *Dixon* is thereafter treated as the landmark case for student rights and its precedent related to other federal cases. The study concludes with an analysis of student rights in the context of the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.

It is certainly true that academic administrations in the United States have been often arbitrary and capricious in their treatment of students. Indeed, students have been the last constituency—after legislatures, alumni, and business community—to whom universities have been responsive. As the author notes, even more amazing than the documented instances of deprivation of student rights by colleges has been the historic willingness of the judicial system to accept and tolerate these infringements. Yet, as the study confirms, the courts have been anything but protective of these interests. Given the reluctance of the courts to enter the area, it is not surprising that the legal picture today is filled with equivocation, confusion, and uncertainty. The *Dixon* decision came in response to rights claimed by Negro students. It has led to the conveyance of rights to a larger group, college students in general. Since, however, the "due process doctrine" spelled out in *Dixon* has not been explicitly upheld on all counts by the Supreme Court, one can only guess as to how general and applicable the doctrine has or will become.

It is on this point that one must criticize the Ratliff study. Although it is helpful to gather up legal expositions on student rights and explore the meaning of *Dixon*, a far more useful enterprise would be to document the impact of *Dixon* or other legal interpretations on academic institutions. The author makes some modest effort in this direction, but the reader is almost at a total loss in understanding the real consequences of this new-found student due process. It is clear that *Dixon* is nowhere near as important for students as *Gault* was for juveniles. In fact, one must conclude from the little evidence offered that colleges, to say nothing of secondary and elementary schools and private institutions, are treating their clienteles very much today as they did in the pre-*Dixon* period. With little systematic attention to the consequences of the decision, the reader is skeptical that *Dixon* is leading us into a new era of equity for students.

One could also wish that the Ratliff study demonstrated more political sophistication and awareness. The question of student rights in the university community is primarily a political question, and when these rights are fully won, they will come through political means. To focus a study on the legalistic incantations of the courts is to neglect the most essential and intriguing aspects of the whole question of student power. Even in the courts, the issue is alive with political ramifications, and therefore the study would have been enhanced immeasurably by attention to the political dynamics of the student struggle.

Perhaps I am asking too much for one piece of research. *Constitutional Rights of College Students* seeks to be a study in case law. It is that. Although it is of limited value to the political scientist, it should be of greater interest to the college activist and the university administrator.

Richard J. Richardson
*University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill*

**Law and Social Change: Civil Rights Laws and Their Consequences.** By Harrell R. Rodgers, Jr. and Charles S. Bullock, III. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1972. Pp. 219. $3.95, paper.)

*Law and Social Change* is an excellent introduction to the policy consequences of civil rights laws. Rodgers and Bullock deserve strong praise for their highly original attempt to construct a comparative assessment of policy impacts in one major issue area of contemporary American politics. Because the book combines a novel approach with sophisticated, precise writing and dispassionate, thorough analysis, it deserves to be widely used in college courses on public policy making and civil rights.

The primary purpose of the authors is to examine the degree to which political outcomes approximate policy outputs in the civil rights field, and to analyze why political outcomes so often fall short of expressed goals. This theme is pursued in separate chapters on voting rights, public accommodations, school desegregation, minority employment, and open housing, as well as in concluding chapters of a more general nature on the role of law in bringing about social change, on variations in federal strategies for achieving equality, and on the consequences of incrementalism in the civil rights sphere. Thus, the reader acquires specific substantive knowledge in various important areas of civil rights, and an analytical overview of the way in which the American political system deals with these conflicts.

The traditional approach to this area has been to focus excessively on legislative, executive, and/or judicial policy making, and slight the complex and difficult problems associated with assessing the significance of the new policies. The Rodgers and Bullock book provides a counterweight to the more traditional approach by concentrating on policy impact. On the other hand, however, it is perhaps inevitable that such a segmented approach to systems analysis is bound to have a certain disjointed air. *Law and Social Change* tends to underestimate the importance of the stages of the policy process prior to formalization of new policies on the probable political outcomes of federal laws and judicial decisions. For example, the chapter on voting rights lists the major provisions of the 1957, 1960, 1964, and 1965 voting rights acts, and assesses what was and was not accomplished under each piece of legislation, but it does not provide much information on what political factors shaped the successive legislative acts. The authors devote only a few paragraphs of their chapter on discrimination in education to the important subject of de facto segregation in the North, perhaps because such a discussion would necessarily have to focus on the factors restraining the development of federal policies.

In large measure, Rodgers and Bullock agree with the conclusion the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights reached in its important 1970 publication, *The Federal Civil Rights Enforcement Effort*, that the goals set out in civil rights legislation are not being pursued by the federal government with sufficient vigor. The authors explain why greater progress has been made in voting rights and public accommodations than in other policy areas, and they argue that school desegregation, employment, and housing policies have, in contrast, been less successful. Their indictment of policies in these three areas stresses the federal government's lack of commitment, its timidity, the shortcomings of executive leadership, and the administrative handicaps imposed on executive departments by Congress.

In my opinion, more could be said about the other side of the coin: the skillful and, in many instances, organized resistance to substantial changes in the status quo, as well as the strong electoral appeal of candidates who have won office at the national, state, and local levels as spokesmen for citizens alarmed by the changes that have already occurred. For many years it has been an article of faith of liberals that progressive policies were nonexistent or ineffective because of institutional aberrations such as the seniority system or the filibuster; perhaps now is the time to focus on the possibility that the ambivalence in federal civil rights policies and enforcement efforts may to a great extent be a fairly accurate reflection of contemporary public values.

While the initial chapters of *Law and Social Change* are factual and detailed, the final chapters will probably provoke more discussion among readers of the book. The authors address two important questions: (1) Why has the federal government followed a straightforward policy of nondiscrimination in certain policy areas and a policy of affirmative action in others, and (2) Does law in fact change attitudes and behavior? Students exposed to the subject of civil rights policy through this brief book will, in all probability, come away from the experience stimulated to pursue in further depth the important questions of value and politics that permeate contemporary black-white relationships. Scholars, it is hoped will use *Law and Social Change* as a reference point for future efforts to study policy impacts in defined issue areas on a comparative basis.

ALAN H. SCHECHTER

*Wellesley College*

**Leadership of the American Zionist Organization, 1897–1930.** By Yonathan Shapiro. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971. Pp. 295. $9.50.)

Modern political science was born at approximately the same time as the modern nation-state. Historians of our discipline have at least suggested that there is a direct connection between the two phenomena. One result has been that political science has focused on politics as more or less the exclusive possession of nation-states, including at its widest scope their territorial subdivisions as well. Where political scientists have studied the politics of other forms of political association, they have always been treated as dependent rather than independent variables set firmly within the context of one nation-state or another.

Only recently has our generation of political scientists begun to consider other forms of polity as potentially independent variables, as matrices for political action no less complete than the nation-state. In part, we have done so because of our discovery of the "Third World." The peoples of Asia and Africa, although now being organized into nation-states on the Western model, still maintain political patterns antedating that development that cannot be missed by any reasonably intelligent observer of their political life. The nation-state is now being used by their own leadership in an effort to blot out those forms of polity, but the task has not proved to be easy.

It seems that the "Third World" example has encouraged the reemergence of political aspirations in the West on the part of those groups located within well-established nation-states which, while possessing many of the characteristics of group identity that seek political expression, do not have recourse to nation-state status to express their political aspirations. Many American Indians and not a few blacks are seeking to articulate group political consciousness, not simply as interest groups within a larger body politic but in ways which demand the same kind of recognition that states normally obtain. Their efforts are paralleled throughout Europe by risings of peoples who have no expectation of gaining statehood for themselves, but seek some kind of comprehensive political identity within the new European polity that, at times, seems to be emerging.

One group that lends itself especially to study from this perspective is the Jewish people. It has always been an anomaly among polities in the sense that it is neither a tribe nor a territorial state but embraces elements of both. Its trans-territorial scope has not prevented its members from seeking territorial statehood, not only recently in the conventional modern way but three thousand years ago when the Jews founded one of the first nation-states in recorded history. The neat interplay between territorial statehood and diaspora communities is worthy of far more systematic study by political scientists than it has received. Moreover, the Jews have pursued their own needs for polity in such a way as to make them less than exclusive, allowing and even encouraging multiple political attachments in this sense. One of the features of the modern nation-state is its demand for exclusive loyalty in every way that counts, something that is almost never demanded in the post-modern era that we have now entered. Here, too, the Jewish situation reflects a pattern that was and a pattern that may very well occur again.

Yonathan Shapiro has done us a service by contributing to the study of this phenomenon of polity beyond statehood. In the case of the leadership of the American Zionist Movement, 1897–1930, Dr. Shapiro looks at one phase of the recent Jewish effort to reestablish a territorial state. His immediate subject, however, is a diaspora Jewish community located within a polity to which it is firmly committed politically and in every other way with an intensity at least equal to its commitment to the Zionist goal. Indeed, that seeming contradiction which Jews live with and harmonize so well provides the focus for Shapiro's study. He does not examine American Jewry in the context of American interest-group politics as another pressure group seeking support from the American political system to achieve its specific goals, but as a community with its own internal politics and political struggles which are tied intimately to the whole question of its place within both the American context and that of world Jewry.

Shapiro's study is a chronicle of the history of the American Zionist movement from the time of the first world Zionist Congress until the passage of leadership from the first generation and an examination of the acculturation of an immigrant group within American society. He focuses particularly on the problem of leadership, showing the shift from the indirect leadership of a kind of Jewish "aristocracy" (the term may be too strong) to an elite that appealed directly to a mass base.

The Jewish community in America at the turn of the century was led by a more or less interlocking group of families representing its Central European "upper crust." While few were Zionistically inclined, Shapiro shows that the leadership of the fledgling Zionist movement which emerged in the 1890s was drawn from members of the same circles. They held on to the leadership until World War I and then succumbed to the challenge of leaders who emerged from the Eastern European migrations and who were able to rally the "Jewish street" behind the Zionist cause. The transition paralleled that found in many other polities as the twentieth century ushered in the age of the common man. In his history of the struggle between the two sets of leaders, and his contrast between them, Shapiro adds to our knowledge of leadership within modern polities committed to democratization.

One may raise questions regarding Shapiro's interpretation of American Jewish attitudes toward Zionism and his assessment of such external factors as anti-semitism on the development of Jewish support for the Zionist movement. Nevertheless, his book is a contribution toward the understanding of a dimension of politics that generally escapes our attention.

Daniel J. Elazar

*Temple University*

**A Question of Judgment: The Fortas Case and the Struggle for the Supreme Court.** By Robert Shogan. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs Merrill Company, 1972. Pp. 314. $10.00.)

One hardly hears Abe Fortas's name mentioned in Washington any more. He has become curiously *passé* in a city concerned only with the latest news, scandals, and resignations. To discuss last year's news might seem almost as silly in this atmosphere as wearing string ties or hoop skirts.

Robert Shogan has written about an old scandal. His balanced description of Justice Fortas's rise and decline is based on extensive interviewing, much of which he did while he was *Newsweek*'s Supreme Court reporter. (Shogan now works for the *Los Angeles Times.*) A great deal of the material on Fortas's close relationship with Lyndon Johnson is not available elsewhere, while the analysis of the connection between Fortas and financier Lewis Wolfson is a good piece of investigative reporting.

Despite this, *A Question of Judgment* is not a satisfying book. Shogan tends to report facts without providing any context or analysis. In that respect, the book displays a problem that is a common one in American political journalism. After all, why should anyone want to read about Abe Fortas when so many juicy things are happening right now?

Of course we all know, or sense, that Fortas's decline was important. But *why* was it important? Was it, as Shogan's subtitle suggests, primarily because Fortas's resignation gave Richard Nixon another vacancy to use in his attempt to change the Court? What if Fortas had resigned under pressure from Ramsey Clark instead of John Mitchell? As Shogan points out, the timing of the public revelations was largely dependent not on the administration in power but on the work of an independent investigative reporter, William Lambert. If Lambert's *Life Magazine* piece had come out two years earlier, Johnson then would have been president. Would that have made the Fortas case any less interesting? Not at all. The political impact would have been altered. But the essentials of the case, the behavior of a Supreme Court justice under financial and political temptation, would have been the same.

Shogan seems to be aware that the key to the Fortas case did not lie in the accident of Nixon's election. But all his attempts at providing positive explanations fail. He reads the fall of Abe Fortas almost as a morality play about American liberalism. Fortas is treated as the prototypical member of the establishment whose failures parallel, and even represent, the failures of New Deal liberalism. According to Shogan,

> Criticism of the establishment [in the late 1960s] was aimed at the conglomerate of public and private forces whose influence on national life had taken on awesome dimensions in the wake of the upheavals of the 1930's. The leaders of the American establishment were not a monolithic group. But most shared similar backgrounds and ideas which blurred individual distinctions. In a broad sense, they were liberals. . . .
>
> Fortas had been a servant of the New Deal, a Washington lawyer, a presidential counselor. Now he sat on the highest court in the land. As much as any man, he seemed to symbolize the system that held the reins of power. . . . Now they [all those with power] as well as Fortas, would have to answer for their judgments (pp. 26–27).

This quotation represents Shogan's only serious attempt at generalizing from the Fortas example. In a way, this unwillingness to generalize represents both a strength and a weakness. It represents a weakness because of the patent absurdity of his one major generalization: if liberalism deserves the sole blame for Fortas's every peccadillo, then it must also deserve the praise for the good traits of others. Of course it is possible that the overall blame New Deal liberalism ought to bear outweighs the praise it deserves, but whether this is so cannot be decided from *A Question of Judgment*. Shogan presents literally no evidence to help a reader decide whether Fortas was typical of postwar political leaders or not.

The major strength of Shogan's book is that the weakness of his thesis seems not to have affected his narrative. The best chapters in *A Question of Judgment*, the accounts of the Fortas-Johnson and Fortas-Wolfson relationships, are fascinating. In contrast, the worst chapter, the one about Fortas's role on the Supreme Court, is filled with conventional generalizations.

After reading the good chapters, the reader senses that there is still another book waiting to be written about these events, one explaining why we thought them important. The relationship between Fortas and Johnson, for example, raises serious questions about what the relationship between presidents and Supreme Court justices has been in the past, and should be in the future. Shogan does not raise these questions, however. He deserves praise for his description of one case, but for overall perspective the reader should look elsewhere; perhaps to Edward S. Corwin's classic *President: Office and Powers* or Robert Scigliano's *Supreme Court and the Presidency*.

Similarly, Fortas's relationship with Wolfson raises a number of general questions about off-the-bench income and friendships. Why did people become so concerned when the Wolfson connection became known? Shogan does not say, but the title of his book suggests an answer.

The difference between paying a Supreme Court justice and paying a private person for extracurricular services has something to do with the kind of judgment we expect justices to exercise. When people begin to think courts operate on the basis of whim, prejudice, or favoritism, they lose along with their respect for the courts their respect for law. And without this respect, the courts cannot withstand the other branches of government.

At the end of his book, Shogan quotes a passage written by Alexis de Tocqueville that makes this point. Supreme Court justices, Tocqueville wrote, "are the all powerful guardians of a people which respects law, but they would be impotent against popular neglect or popular contempt" (p. 275).

Shogan's book is a worthwhile narrative. But we need a second book to explain why it is worthwhile, perhaps one that would begin with Tocqueville, instead of one that quotes *Democracy in America* as an afterthought.

Michael J. Malbin

*National Journal Reports,*
*Washington, D.C.*

**To Save a Nation: American Countersubversives, The New Deal and the Coming of World War II.** By Geoffrey Smith. (New York: Basic Books, 1973. Pp. 244. $10.00.)

In the 1930s, as the depression lingered and European fascism went from success to success, the menace of fascism's American imitators seemed terribly real. Sinclair Lewis, in a rather hysterical novel, warned that *It Can Happen Here*, and he was echoed by many less prestigious figures and now-forgotten leagues to defend democracy. William Dudley Pelley, Fritz Kuhn, and Father Coughlin, the subjects of Smith's study, were presences and portents. Today, however, they (and others of the same ilk) are dimming memories, revived only by historians, neglected even by those who fear that contemporary America will slide into a wholly home-grown fascism. Smith's subjects seem, in retrospect, almost *opera buffa*, at best footnotes to a decade.

Professor Smith makes a good case for taking them more seriously than that. Though Coughlin, Kuhn, and Pelley used politics as a "symbolic sounding board" for values, frustrations and aspirations only "distantly related" to specific issues, they revealed, in doing so, characteristics of the larger population to which they appealed. The extremist, Smith contends, is simply the underlying constituency made articulate and uninhibited and hence accessible to the historian. Moreover, the "countersubversives" are not only clues to the psychology of significant publics; they indicate values and goals not comprehended by the established political institutions and processes of their time. And in both ways, Smith asserts, they reflected long-term problems of the American polity which found expression during the Cold War and which continue to beset us today.

Smith's argument relies heavily on Bell, Lipset, and Hofstadter in contending that the "countersubversives" were engaged in "status politics" reflecting their own ambivalence toward a modern America which they felt grievances against but with which they identified. They sought to blame those grievances on alien ideologies and influences, denouncing America's "higher circles" (the real enemy?) as witting or unwitting allies of the forces of alien doctrine and moral decay. The "countersubversive" appealed to two major constituencies, Smith argues: "erstwhile aliens" who felt themselves still excluded from America, and "agrarians" who felt themselves losing status within it.

This line of reasoning will, at best, bore social scientists. Smith also argues, however, in a somewhat more original (and defensible) vein. Hating communism and "International Jewry," the countersubversive was led, willy-nilly, into expressions of sympathy for fascists. Especially after the Hitler-Stalin Pact, however, the would-be superpatriots could be identified *with* alien forces, as parts of a "fascist conspiracy" (or, after 1939, with the fascist-communist-banker conspiracy Nathanael West fantasized and satirized in *A Cool Million*). Not only did this destroy their effectiveness; it allowed interventionists to taint their isolationist opponents with the brush of "fascist sympathy" and, hence, to inhibit the development of effective alternatives to expansive interventionism in the years during and after the Second World War. Indirectly, then, the "countersubversives" contributed to the atmosphere of the Cold War. And once freed by Allied victories from the putative association with foreign dictators and doctrines, the psychological needs of the countersubversive's constituency could again express themselves in American politics, as they did with Joe McCarthy and, presumably, with the right-wing today.

There is something to be said for this second line of argument, though not as much as Smith seems to believe. His rather second-hand analysis of the social bases of "countersubversive" ideology is more seriously flawed. For example, one can hardly imagine Lipset or Bell asserting that "the only link between Coughlin and the European dictators lay in the staunch support offered the cleric by less educated, agrarian groups" (p. 48). Smith, after all, cites with approval Lipset's idea of a "left-fascism" akin to Peronism as also characteristic of Coughlin, so he is presumably aware that Lipset identified European fascism as primarily a middle-class, "center" phenomenon. Accepting Smith's evidence, one could make a better case for Coughlin as a Maoist. But there is no evidence cited that Coughlin had such staunch agrarian support. And the Hofstadteresque effort to link Coughlin with Populism is simply silly. Smith notes that older ethnic anti-Semitism had yielded in the 'thirties to "ideological" anti-Semitism because of a projection onto the Jew of felt national defects that could not be confronted. But the Populists *did* confront them; they had enemies enough at home.

Worse, Smith notes in passing that upper-class hatred of Roosevelt was mirrored among the "countersubversives," but he never pursues this strong hint of an *elite* component in domestic fascism. Does his selection of Kuhn and Pelley in preference to Lawrence Dennis—intellectual, elite-trained, a man of salons and drawing-rooms—reflect a desire to see "countersubversion" as rooted in "marginal men," gross like Kuhn, psychologically disturbed like Pelley? Anti-Bolshevism and anti-Semitism appealed to ambivalent men like those Smith describes because these were values accepted by the higher circles—or by elements in them. Of course, the "countersubversives" also hated the elites. (With some reason: Coughlin was right in arguing that "conservatives" with their resistance to reform, their zeal for commercial innovation and their materialism were "the worst of radicals".) But Hitler also hated the Junker generals and the Ruhr industrialists whose tacit and active support was so vital to Nazism. The moral of Smith's study, like other studies of fascism, might be that elites would do well to be forewarned.

WILSON CARY MCWILLIAMS
*Livingston College, Rutgers University*

**Children and War.** By Howard Tolley, Jr. (New York and London: Teachers' College Press, 1973. Pp. xii, 196. $9.50, cloth; $4.95, paper.)

First the bad news: this book was a doctoral dissertation, and it has those familiar tonalities—a rather heavy prose style; a tendency to examine all conceivable sides of an issue; and a general absence of bite. But the good news is good indeed. Tolley has done us the service of surveying what a large sample of children (2,677, grades three to eight) felt and believed about the Vietnam War while it was happening. So far as I know, these are the only extensive data we will have on children's reactions to a war which was unique in its divisiveness and in its singular impact on the nation's politics. Thus the findings are themselves unique, much of the time fascinating, and some of the time unexpected. Such being the case, let me move immediately to them, stressing those which seem to me significant, or surprising, or both.

*On war in general.* The Vietnam conflict does not appear to have produced a heightened level of anti-war sentiment among children; attitudes have not changed much when compared with findings of a poll taken during the 1930s. Children develop feelings against war around ten or eleven years of age, but then begin to lose them in adolescence. Sex differences are insignificant (here as elsewhere), but racial differences strong: blacks are far more likely to condemn war. Children of military and civilian families disapprove of war equally. Jews, nonbelievers, and (especially) Quakers oppose war more than Protestants and Catholics do.

*On the Vietnam War in particular.* A most important finding: Children's views of the war seemed to be indistinguishable from those held by the general public; Tolley's data, taken in 1971, show very nearly the same distribution of pro and con feeling as do Gallup results published at that time. Most children thought the war had been a mistake, as most adults did; and most children doubted both the President's policy *and* veracity about the war, again just as most adults did. Age, race, and social status were related to attitudes about Vietnam, with blacks, older children, and those from upper-income families more often voicing opposition.

*Influences.* Quite possibly the most important finding of all: There is a strong relationship between parental opinion on the war (as the child reported it) and the child's own views; and the relationship is sustained as the child achieves adolescence. Television does not seem to have been highly influential in forming children's opinions on the war, but was an important source of factual information. Teachers' opinions of the war were influential only in the absence of strong parental attitudes.

Tolley's findings support a mounting impression that children do not occupy a distinctive world of belief; rather they hold opinions which reflect fairly accurately the views of the immediate milieu (which means, most of the time, the family). Neither the media nor the schools have much impact when the issues are salient, and when the parents have strong convictions about them. Those conclusions are modest enough, if not indeed banal; yet they will, one hopes, help clear the air of the many fancies which have accumulated on the topic of youthful political belief. Note well, for example, that there is no evidence in the age-range surveyed of a generation gap (to the contrary), nor of adolescent idealism, nor of adolescent rebellion.

Tolley's study was more or less a one-man show, and it reminds us of how much one man can do given enough enterprise. Yet it also reminds us that we must begin to work on a grander scale if we hope to answer some of the really difficult questions about political socialization. If we want a more precise understanding of influence, we will need independent (rather than respondent-reported) measures of the opinions of parents, peers, teachers, and so on. If we want to grasp the vicissitudes of opinion over time, we will need longitudinal studies. If we want to get beneath overt opinion to underlying frameworks of belief, we will need in-depth and projective interviewing. Some such work is now being done, as in the important studies by Jennings and Niemi, but not much, and the sheer economics of the matter cannot make us too sanguine about the immediate future.

JOSEPH ADELSON
*University of Michigan*

**The American Indian and the United States: A Documentary History.** Four Volumes. Edited by Wilcomb E. Washburn. (New York: Random House, 1973. Pp. xiv, 3119. $110.00.)

This is an *excellent* and unprecedented compilation of critical materials pertaining to the study of American Indian affairs. It includes a wealth of source material in the form of original documents of the following types: Reports of the Commissioners of Indian Affairs; transcripts of congressional debates on crucial policy questions; the texts of major treaties between the tribes and the United States government; basic Acts, Laws, and Proclamations on Indian policy; and most of the central Court Proceedings on the status of the Indian communities. These selections cover both the time and space dimensions of the Indian experience most effectively. Such a collection should prove enormously useful to all scholars whose work touches on Indian policy in any way.

FRANCES SVENSSON

*The University of Michigan*

**The Shameful Blight: The Survival of Racial Discrimination in Voting in the South.** A Report of the Washington Research Project. (Washington, D. C.: The Washington Research Project, 1972. Pp. 214. $2.50, paper.)

This study by the Washington Research Group, covering eight months, several southern states, and a variety of techniques, found the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to be inadequate as public policy. The reasons for these inadequacies are: (1) lack of enforcement, (2) lack of effective actions on the part of the Justice Department to remedy extremely low black voter registration, (3) failure to eliminate reregistration efforts, (4) the near abandonment of the Federal Examiner's program, (5) black office-holding remaining still token or nonexistent in some areas, (6) failure of the Justice Department to assist black office-holders, (7) continued existence of obstacles to blacks' holding public office, (8) districting practices that dilute blacks' voting strength, (9) efforts by the Nixon administration to remove Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, (10) impact of economically depressed and dependent status of blacks on their political activity, and (11) numerous illegal techniques to stymie black registration on the part of the states.

All of these findings are clearly expressed and supported with a variety of cases and actual data from the various southern states.

In addition to highlighting these findings, the Report also discusses the newer techniques now in use to replace the old white primaries, racial gerrymandering, the county unit system, the poll tax, and the grandfather clause. For example, a new device to limit full black political potential is the full state requirement, which holds that the voter must vote for as many candidates as there are positions to be filled. "Thus if a five member city council is to be elected, the voter must vote for five candidates for city council for his choice to be recorded, even if there is only one candidate for whom he wishes to vote" (p. 127). Some of the other devices covered are: numbered seats or posts, staggered terms, residence requirements, annexation, and consolidation. The picture painted of the effects of these devices is not a pleasant one.

Yet, the Report concludes on an optimistic note, by offering six recommendations to maximize black political power in the South. Four of these recommendations call for a more effective effort by the Justice Department, while two recommendations urge that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act be vigorously and literally enforced.

The methodology used in the study is not always clearly set forth and structured. Incidents, interviews, and observations are all thrown together, in not the best of order. Therefore, an array of facts, data, and cases in some sections of the Report may confuse or even overwhelm the reader. But despite the lack of a clear methodology and structure for the presentation of the data, the report presents some hard facts and they tell some harsh truths. The book is a great addition to the growing literature in regards to the impact of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. And it is a veritable gold-mine of data. I highly recommend it to scholars concerned with the impact of public policy, black politics, and race relations in a democracy.

HANES WALTON, JR.

*Savannah State College*

**Bittersweet Encounter: The Afro-American and The American Jew.** By Robert G. Weisbrod and Arthur Stein. (Westport, Conn.: Negro Universities Press, 1970. Pp. 242. $11.50, cloth; $2.95, paper.)

This book, by a political scientist and an historian, is essentially a review of events in black and Jewish history in the United States, from the period of slavery until the present time. The book attempts to focus on the nature and extent of Jewish racism and black anti-Semitism and in this connection considerable attention is devoted to such clashes as the New York school decentralization conflict. Other issues covered include: black nationalism and the Arab-Israeli conflict, Jewish participation in nineteenth- and twentieth-century civil rights movements, and mutual Jewish-black perceptions and tensions during the decades under examination.

The fundamental problem presented by this detailed narration lies in its failure to consider the relationship between blacks and Jews in the context of other ethnic rivalries in this country. Thus, the history of ethnic conflict in America is never even referred to by the authors. It is no secret that, for example, Irish and Italian-Americans have opposed one another in church politics, Puerto Ricans and blacks have opposed one another for antipoverty program patronage; and most ethnic groups have opposed one another over ethnic succession to political power in urban communities. In some northern cities (Newark, Philadelphia), Italians are viewed as the major antagonists of blacks. In Boston, the Irish are prime opponents. And even in New York City, the focus of this book's concern, it is clear that the largely non-Jewish building trade unions and police are among the targets of black hostility.

Ethnic conflict is not limited to blacks and Jews and never has been. What may differentiate the current "black-Jewish" conflict (to the extent that it exists) from earlier versions lies in its increasingly public nature. Conflict which used to be resolved by bargaining and behind-the-scenes negotiations has gained increased visibility because of coverage by the media and the decline of party-oriented coalition politics. Thus, covert resolution of problems has now been transformed into public confrontation, difficult to reconcile through compromise because of the large numbers of people involved.

Curiously, in their discussion of ethnic conflict, the authors fail to mention two important indices of black-Jewish relations; those indicated by opinion surveys and by election data. Opinion survey results have traditionally found greater political liberalism among Jews than other white ethnics, including sympathy for black protest, support for interracial contact, and support for federal aid to improve conditions. Such progressive sentiment has been coupled in some recent studies with fear among lower-class Jews of black anti-Semitism and violence. Blacks tend to stereotype Jews as money-oriented and to resent Jews' ascendance to position of authority vis-à-vis blacks. Still, most survey researchers view what may appear to be anti-Jewish feelings as essentially anti-white. Blacks are, in fact, generally less anti-Semitic than other groups are: they are far less prone to traditional anti-Semitic stereotypes regarding Jews as "too powerful." In general, blacks tend to perceive few differences between Jews and other whites, but where differences are perceived, blacks tend to prefer Jews. A recent study by Louis Harris and Bert Swanson of black-Jewish ethnic conflict in New York City found a degree of consensus among the two groups—both groups fear that bigots seek to separate them, and perceive the media as a polarizing influence. Both groups see the survival of New York City as dependent upon their mutual accommodation.

Analysis of election data demonstrates that blacks are attracted to the political liberalism of Jewish candidates—having voted for Shapiro in Illinois, Mandel in Maryland, Shapp in Pennsylvania and Massell in Atlanta—in numbers at least equal to their previous support of Democratic candidates. Jews in turn have often supported black candidates in far greater proportions than other ethnic groups, e.g., Hatcher in Gary, Bradley in Los Angeles, and Stokes in Cleveland. Hence, the well-publicized conflicts among these two groups which are emphasized by the authors cannot be interpreted unequivocally as reflecting pervasive underlying hostility.

A major failure in Stein and Weisbrod's account is their failure to differentiate between different subgroups among both blacks and Jews. The polarization attributed to ethnicity may validly be regarded as class oriented—with the young, affluent, and college educated (Jews and other whites) joining blacks on issues and in elections, in opposition to their lower-class co-ethnics.

In sum, this book does not meaningfully analyze the relations of two key ethnic groups in America. In describing the events it covers, it breaks little new ground. This is the fourth book to be published in recent years on black-Jewish conflict in America. Perhaps the topic should be given a respite, unless authors are prepared to analyze the subject in a comparative context, with less attention paid to visible confrontation and more concentration on the changing nature of urban politics.

JOYCE GELB

*City College of the*
*City University of New York*

**Local Interest Politics: A One-Way Street.** By Betty H. Zisk. (Indianapolis, Ind.: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1973. Pp. 184. $10.00.)

Students of city politics have paid too little attention to the role of interest groups on the local level, and Professor Zisk's book is a welcome attempt to add to our knowledge about this subject. One of several books which have developed out of the City Council Research Project at Stanford University, Zisk's study examines 82 city councils in the San Francisco Bay Area. Her analysis is based chiefly on interview and questionnaire responses by more than 400 councilmen in these cities; she also makes use of data on these cities' social, political, and policy characteristics.

The study focuses on the predispositions of councilmen as a major determinant of interest group influence, and these predispositions are seen as one feature of a general role system in the city council. A typology of roles toward groups is established, in which councilmen are classified as Pluralists, Tolerants, and Antagonists. This typology is based chiefly on attitudes toward local interest groups, with Pluralists the most favorable and Antagonists the least favorable. It also takes into account councilmen's perceptions of the number of influential groups and their "sophistication" about groups. Slightly more than two-thirds of the councilmen are classified as Tolerants, one-quarter as Pluralists, and the remaining 7 per cent as Antagonists. Zisk skillfully employs this typology as a central variable whose relationships with other attitudes and behavior can be studied.

Several types of such relationships are examined. First, antecedents for roles toward groups are sought in personal backgrounds and city characteristics. Zisk finds that the young, the well-educated, and those in low-status occupations are relatively likely to become Pluralists. Tolerants are most heavily concentrated in very small and nonindustrial towns, while the largest proportion of Pluralists is found in large and industrial cities. This and other findings of the study indicate that groups are most active politically and most readily accepted by councilmen in the largest cities; elsewhere, their activity and acceptance are rather limited.

Zisk then examines consequences of roles toward groups for bargaining behavior within the council and for other role orientations. This analysis indicates that group-related roles are part of more general conceptions of the political process. Pluralists tend to take a "political" view of local politics, one which perceives politics as a group struggle or bargaining process. In contrast, other councilmen tend to take a "managerial" view which stresses consensual elements in policy making. Significantly, pluralists constitute a distinct minority of councilmen. This finding corroborates evidence from earlier studies that most local officials outside central cities see politics in nonconflictual, routine terms.

Finally, Zisk attempts to determine the effects of group politics on city policies. She sets up a model of the urban policy process, in which environmental factors (city socioeconomic characteristics), the political translation process (group activity), and the political conversion process (councilmen's relationships with groups) are posited as potential determinants of city spending policies. Relationships among these variables are examined statistically.

The results of this analysis indicate that environmental variables are the most significant in determining spending policies.. Evidence is also found, however, for the effect of the translation and conversion processes on one type of spending, expenditures for "amenities." From this finding, Zisk concludes that the relevance of political activity for policy outputs has been demonstrated. This conclusion may not be fully justified. Too few variables were included in the analysis to allow firm judgments about the relative importance of broad categories of variables. More fundamentally, the analysis was predicated on an assumption that city councils are the bodies which make spending decisions; in actuality, Robert Wood and others have indicated that councils may play only a peripheral role in city policy making.

The scope of Zisk's study and the firmness of its conclusions are limited by its data base. No information was obtained on the actual behavior of councilmen, except from their own reports. Similarly, group influence on councilmen could be gauged only from councilmen's responses to questions framed in general terms. The picture of council and group activity which emerges is necessarily a narrow one, and its lack of richness is frustrating for the reader who seeks an understanding of the local political process.

Within these limitations, the book offers much. Zisk makes skillful use of the available data, and her mode of presentation is exceptionally clear and careful. The study provides a considerable body of useful information and insights on local interest politics, and it is well worth consideration by students of local politics and of interest groups. One hopes that it will also stimulate continued research to fill in the gaps which remain in our understanding of its subject.

LAWRENCE BAUM

*The Ohio State University*

**Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology.** Edited by Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan. (New York: The Free Press, 1970. Pp.xii, 400. $11.95.)

**Essays in Political Sociology.** By A. F. Davies. (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1972. Pp.x, 207. $Aust. 3.95.)

Is political sociology emerging as a distinct autonomous discipline with its own professional identity, organization, and internally recognized intellectual leaders? Or is it rather a developing set of concepts and techniques, with which all students of politics should be familiar so as to be able selectively to employ them? These two volumes, whose titles proclaim a common concern with political sociology, suggest different answers to these questions.

*Mass Politics* contains a dozen papers selected from those delivered during the decade of the 1960s to four conferences organized by the Committee on Political Sociology, a body sponsored by the International Sociological Association. The papers, which are of uniformly high analytical standard, have been grouped by the editors under three heads: Cleavage Systems and Mass Politics; Geography, Class, and Voting Behavior; the Party and the Polity. For present purposes, however, they can more usefully (if roughly) be grouped according to the primary geographical focus of empirical (often psephological) research discussed, for there is a recognized leader associated with each major focus: Scandinavia (Rokkan); 19th-century Britain (Cornford); the world (Lipset). Two of the best essays—Linz on Spain and Sartori on the typology of party systems—do not fit easily into this classification, which may be why they are among the best.

In a foreword, Lipset claims that, despite these differing foci, the papers in *Mass Politics* give testimony to "the emergence of a common theoretical and methodological perspective among a group with diverse cultural and intellectual backgrounds" (p. ix). While this statement no doubt reflects the feelings of many of the participants in the Committee's conferences, it is difficult to find much support for it in the volume. The only indication of a common perspective is that most authors make an early obeisance in the direction of Lipset before getting on with their business. Surprisingly, the 19th-century giants of political sociology figure far from prominently in the volume's 35 pages of reference notes. Of the pantheon of Nisbet's *The Sociological Tradition*, only three are mentioned—Weber, Marx and Durkheim. Among those who do not figure at all are Hegel, Comte, de Tocqueville, Le Play and Simmel. Can an aspiring discipline so easily neglect its historical roots?

Less surprisingly, the leaders of modern political science are given scant attention, even though most of them have given ample testimony of their sociological interests. A decade ago, Somit and Tanenhaus located nineteen scholars in the postwar Hall of Fame of American political science (and how little the membership would have changed since then!). Only six (Almond, Dahl, Deutsch, Friedrich, Lasswell and Simon) appear in the notes to *Mass Politics*, and of these only Almond seems to have excited more than a passing interest among the contributors to the book.

Still, only the most narrowly professional political scientist would fail to profit from exposure to the original perspectives employed by several of the contributors to *Mass Politics*. For example, students of mass political behavior will find nothing in recent relevant political science literature to match the dialectical subtlety and daring of Allardt's paper, "Types of Protest and Alienation." Again, the three papers on British psephological history (and especially that by Conford, "Aggregate Election Data and British Party Alignments, 1885–1910") demonstrate that the psephologist may fruitfully draw upon a number of disciplines. Indeed, it may well be that if political sociology ever does emerge as a distinct autonomous discipline it will be indistinguishable from psephology.

One would expect the American Hall of Fame to figure more prominently in the 23 pages of references at the end of *Essays in Political Sociology*, for Davies is Professor of Political Science in the University of Melbourne. Curiously, it does not, for he cites a mere five (Burns, Dahl, Key, Lasswell and Truman), and of these only Lasswell appears as a dominant influence.

It is, however, the early, psychoanalytically oriented Lasswell who most interests Davies. Throughout the volume, psychoanalytic writings and themes figure most prominently, as they do in most of Davies's work in the past fifteen years. Indeed, his book could more aptly have been titled *Essays in Political Psychology*, if only because it contains two superb psychoanalytic pieces on Rousseau and the contemporary Parisian political critic, André Gorz. Further, even when Davies is operating at the sociological level, as in the essays on intellectuals, and fanatics, in politics, he seems invariably most interested in the psychological roots of social phenomena. Thus, many readers may well consider that Davies has been rather idiosyncratic in the choice of title, even if allowance is made for the unfortunate fact that it is difficult in Australia for originality not to appear idiosyncratic, and Davies is certainly one of the most original social scientists so far produced by this country. Both the title and, more important, the contents of *Essays in Political Sociology* are understandable only in the context of development of Davies's highly individual research interests, which center on the problems in the way of developing a systematizing framework for political biography. Nearly two decades will ultimately separate his two major works, *Private Politics* (a comparative study of five middle-level Australian political activists, written in the late 1950s and published in 1966) and *Political Psychology*, of which a first major installment, *Politics as Work*, has already appeared. (*Melbourne Politics Monograph* [mimeo., May 1973, pp. 228, $Aust. 3.00], available from the Department of Political Science, University of Melbourne.) The *Essays* then have a transitional quality. As Davies puts it, they "may fairly be called 'Footnotes to *Private Politics*,' since each grapples in some way with a gap, inadequacy or ambiguity in formulations first appearing in that book" (p. ix). Similarly, several of the essays seem destined to appear prominently as footnotes in Davies's future definitive treatment of these topics, especially his notable contributions to the systematics of biography, "The Tasks of Biography" and "The Concept of Administrative Style." After forty years, someone is finally recapturing the excitement and promise of work begun, but long since neglected, by Dollard (*Criteria for the Life History*) and Lasswell (*Psychopathology and Politics*).

Despite their transitional quality, several of the other essays have considerable value as contributions both to sociology in general and to our understanding of Australian society and politics (viz., "Politics in a Knowledgeable Society," "Suburban Political Styles" and "Migrants and Politics").

Even here, however, Davies's sociological work is firmly harnessed to the purposes of the biographer, for the common theme underlying all these essays is that of identity in modern society.

For Davies, the discipline of political sociology is thus a vital but subordinate dimension of his scholarly work. In contrast, several of the contributors to *Mass Politics* may aspire to a higher, more autonomous status for the discipline, while in practice engaging in modest, but highly competent researches into historical and contemporary psephology. The crucial, as yet unresolved question may well be: Can an autonomous discipline be erected on the base provided by Lipset's *Political Man?*

J. M. POWER

*Canberra College of Advanced Education*

**Crisis, Choice, and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development.** Edited by Gabriel A. Almond, Scott C. Flanagan, and Robert J. Mundt. (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1973. Pp. 717. $12.95.)

Gabriel Almond, senior editor and co-author, is a past master of such collaborative undertakings. His earlier works in this genre—*Politics of the Developing Areas*, with James S. Coleman in 1960; and *The Civic Culture*, with Sidney Verba in 1963—made a deep impress on the emergent field of comparative politics. As first chairman of the SSRC Committee on Comparative Politics, Almond showed his innovative and leadership skills. We are entitled, therefore, to expect path-breaking and exciting ideas in this large new volume.

In 1960 we were treated to macro-interpretations of politics in major regions of the non-Communist, non-Western world. In 1963, through survey data, our focus was narrowed to five participant political cultures: Britain, Germany, Mexico (all included in the new volume) plus the United States and Italy. Now the methodology is again changed as we consider in depth seven political episodes. These include the British Reform Act of 1832 by G. Bingham Powell; the 1931 crisis of the British party system by Dennis A. Kavanagh; the establishment of the Third French Republic by Robert J. Mundt; the formation of the Weimar Republic by Volker Rittberger; the politics of the Cárdenas administration in Mexico by Wayne A. Cornelius; the Meiji Restoration in Japan by James W. White; and India's crisis of the mid-60s by Thomas E. Headrick.

The theoretical meat on these historical bones is provided through two introductory chapters, one by Almond and one by Scott C. Flanagan, and a concluding chapter jointly authored by Almond and Mundt. A great methodological improvement over the Almond and Coleman volume claims attention: each case study actually illustrates and tests a theoretical framework.

That framework, of course, is the important contribution of this volume. It rests, in chapter one, on a candid account of comparative politics as a contemporary intellectual movement. It seeks a synthesis by classifying four major approaches within a four-cell matrix, bounded by two dimensions of stability-development and determinacy-choice. System-functional theory is classified as having a stability and determinacy orientation; social mobilization theory as determinacy and development; rational-choice-coalition theory as choice and stability; and leadership theory as choice and development.

The authors admit their inability to make good use of leadership theory. Personally, I believe they short-changed systems and *structural*-functional theory, which need not be either deterministic or static, although admittedly many authors handle it that way. Certainly a major weakness in the volume is its failure to examine governmental structure as a serious independent variable, nor do we find a clear conception of "development."

Almond claims that the book will supersede "monocausal explanations," remedy the neglect of "international events" in shaping polities, redress the "deterministic imbalance" in developmental explanation. Praiseworthy objectives these: partially successful, and partially directed at straw men. What comes through as the most exciting and innovative aspect of the book is its treatment of coalition and rational-choice theory. The basic framework presented by Flanagan, after reviewing and rejecting the central stream of coalition theory, rests on two key variables: the resources available to contenders, and their preferences, as measured by issue distances from other contenders. Combining these measures, an index of polarization and systemic crisis is generated. The performance potential of any coalition is calculated in relation to the resources of its members and their internal dissonance, based on issue distances. All possible coalitions at each stage of a crisis are considered, their ruling potential calculated, and preferred sets compared with the coalition which actually won. Hence choice versus determinacy becomes apparent. Except, of course, that some important variables are omitted. Consider that all but the Mexican case occur in countries with parliamentary structures of government, where the costs of replacing governments are minimal. But in presidential, communist, and military regimes, replacement costs are much higher. This helps to account for the apparently deviant Mexican case. In general, the greater the replacement costs of a regime, the greater the resources automatically available to any incumbent leadership and the more powerful must successful counter-coalitions be.

Another relevant variable depends on levels of development. Since all seven cases occur in relatively developed *polities* (not necessarily industrialized economies) it is possible to use them only to test a theory of coalitions in developed polities. But insofar as we are interested in explaining political *development*, we need to add less developed polities. Consider that power holders concern themselves both with "issues" and with the "occupancy" of positions which confer not only power but also wealth, prestige, and other cherished values on their incumbents. The book focuses on issues, not only public policies but also "constitutional" questions. Main-line coalition theory, by contrast, focuses on the immediate rewards of victory.

Hypothesis: the less developed a polity, the more salient the intrinsic values of role *occupancy*; the more developed a polity, the more salient the *issue* orientations of incumbents. If so, the ratio of issues to occupancy in a polity must be weighed. The Almond-Flanagan model applies best to polities with a high issue/occupancy ratio, i.e., to more developed political systems.

The Cárdenas and Tokugawa cases illustrate a propensity for coalitions to fractionalize. The higher the replacement costs of a polity, and the lower the issue/occupancy ratio, the greater the weight to be assigned to mere incumbency, and the more powerful must a counter-coalition be to replace those in authority. If this be true, then surely the theory of coalition formation ought to be supplemented by a theory of coalition fractionalization, plus weights for replacement costs and the issue/occupancy ratio. Moreover, the less developed the polity, the more relevant these supplementary factors.

The subtitle of the book would be more accurate if instead of "Historical Studies of Political Development" it were "Case Studies of Coalition Formation during Crises in Developed Polities." As such it is a profoundly important book.

FRED W. RIGGS

*University of Hawaii*

**The Elections in Israel—1969.** Edited by Alan Arian. (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Academic Press, 1972. Pp. 311. $12.00.)

Among the many impressive features of Israel is that nation's ability to inspire a "reverse brain drain." Scholars born or trained abroad have been drawn to settle in an endangered and only moderately developed land. Since this attraction is particularly evident among political scientists, the concepts and methods of American and European electoral studies are evident in this collection of fifteen articles on Israel's seventh national election since the winning of independence.

As a totality, these articles tell us more about Israeli electoral politics than has ever been available. For a short time, until more general works by some of the contributors are completed, it will be a basic work for those interested in this unique country. There are five sections: on issues; election results at the national and local levels; parties, including the candidates, party organization and campaign finance; public opinion, including the relationship of policy views and social characteristics to voting, and the influence of television; and the nature of the campaign and the vote among Arabs and ethnic Jewish groups. Since the latter area has received very little attention, the inclusion of four articles on this subject is welcome. In the other areas, previous knowledge has been limited as well, and the volume adds substantially to our information.

But, a reader may wonder, is this a case of information overload? Parochial studies of the United States may be justified by America's world position, but why should a nonspecialist be interested in Israel at all, or this book in particular? I see two opportunities for truly comparative analysis in studies of the Jewish state. One opportunity would be to compare Israeli politics with that of other nations on the basis of some common features, such as a multiparty system, one-party dominance, parliamentary government, or the influence of class and ethnic factors on voting. Alternatively, we could attempt to contrast Israel with other nations on the basis of its relatively unique features, such as the maintenance of democracy amid grave threats to its existence (which are particularly salient as I write), or the remarkable stability of the mass vote and of the governing coalition among major factions.

A second opportunity would be to consider Israel as a case study of a developing country, and to put its politics in the context of relevant theories. It has a dominant Labor party, which was established in power even before independence, political direction of major economic and social institutions, a differentiated bureaucracy, and mass consensus on societal goals. Perhaps these features make Israel the true prototype of Huntington's model of political development.

About half of the articles fail even to notice these or comparable opportunities. These authors restrict themselves to an account of some features of the 1969 elections, speaking only to an Israeli audience. As a few examples may show, these parochial articles also tend to be marred by shallow or flawed methodology. Thus, instead of an analysis of Israel's interesting attempt to finance elections through public funds, we are provided only with a legislative history. In another chapter, investigating the impact of television, first used in Israel in this election, the appropriate technique of survey analysis is employed. The important question however—the electoral effect of television—is not researched, although my own recalculation of the author's data (p. 228), shows that television viewers voted differently from nonviewers. The essay on Oriental Jews relies on ecological tabulation of a handful of precincts to conclude that the Labor party is weak among this group. Yet, even these data support the conclusion only in the relatively small city of Jerusalem, and the relationship would be eliminated by a change in only two precincts (p. 273). In analysis of split-ticket voting (differences between national and local results), an index is devised which fluctuates within no standardized range, because the authors have failed to take the square-root of a sum of squared differences (p. 84).

Five chapters deserve commendation, because they go beyond the specific features of the 1969 election and are suggestive of factors operative outside of Israel. Aronoff's contribution on relations between the party center and periphery is the most theoretically informed of the contributions. He skillfully demonstrates the concentration of power within the Labor party, but then forecasts the decentralization of power with population growth and the development of new institutional power bases. Recent events support these predictions. Brichta catalogues the characteristics of the members elected to the Knesset. He finds recruitment determined principally by oligarchical party processes, and argues convincingly against Seligman's earlier view that Israeli politics was developing toward a pattern of pluralist group representation. Deshen revisits Kiryat Gat, site of his 1965 study, for a new look at the influence of ethnicity on the vote. The shift in this development town to age and class cleavages in the campaign is intelligently discussed as illustrative of the subordination of ascribed factors in a developing country. Torgovnik ably relates party platforms to two variables: the audience toward which the message is directed, and the closeness of the party to power. He finds platform specificity varies inversely with the size of its audience and with the probability of a party entering the government coalition. These propositions, if quantified, could usefully be tested in a number of polities.

Arian's major independent contribution is analysis of a voter survey, in which he explains the results using Duverger's theory of a dominant-party system. The analysis is partially flawed by deficiencies in the sample, which underrepresents residents of poor urban districts and smaller religious communities. The major finding is still important: Labor support comes "disproportionately from the secure, moderate, middle strata of Israelis. . . . They are socialists who have become plump—few get fat in Israel" (p. 192). The connection drawn between this electoral base and ideological softening in Israel is of potentially general interest.

Aside from his own contributions, Professor Arian must be chided for the lack of integration of this volume. The authors generally seem unaware of their colleagues' work, and only Aronoff refers to another chapter. There are no organizing themes to the work, nor attention to common problems. While the essays are therefore occasionally repetitious, there are also clear discrepancies of fact. Thus, the historical record of Knesset elections is given twice (on p. 66 and p. 203), while the Arab proportion of Israel is reported as both 12 per cent and 14 per cent (p. 240 and p. 253). As a total work, therefore, the book remains an uneven and uncoordinated collection. While these articles clearly contribute to our understanding of the electoral process of this fascinating land, we must patiently await more definitive and theoretically provocative works.

GERALD M. POMPER

*Rutgers University*

**Between Class and Elite: The Evolution of the British Labour Movement.** By Zygmunt Bauman. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1972. Pp. 334. £.4.80.)

**The Post-War History of the British Working Class.** By Allen Hutt. (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1972. Pp. 316. $12.50.)

It is a sad commentary on the state of publishing at a time of soaring costs that the only merit of the republication of the books under review is their ample demonstration of how far labor history in Britain and elsewhere has come since they were written. Allen Hutt's *Post-War History* is a Popular Front tract, written in 1937 by a leading labor journalist to prove that "the whole course of the British workers' post-war history has shown the folly of . . . a policy of accommodation to a social order which nowadays is always on the brink of slump, of war, of grinding democracy under Fascism's iron heel." What is the alternative? The "only hope," Hutt affirmed, was to adopt "a straightforward, consistent and unequivocal working-class policy, setting forth what the workers want and leading them boldly and unitedly forward to win it" (p. 315). Thus the

Communist Party line in 1937, phrased in terms vague enough to obscure the vagaries of party pronouncements about social democracy during the previous fifteen years. The narrative chapters which precede this statement are uninspired journalism, though fired by indignation, and they would not serve even in the modest role of an undergraduate introduction. The student would be better served to consult the surveys of Mowat and Taylor, or the studies of Miliband, Mason, and Stansky and Abraham.

Zygmunt Bauman's book *Between Class and Elite* is the English translation of a study which first appeared in Warsaw in 1960. It grew out of the author's work in Robert McKenzie's seminar at the London School of Economics in the late 1950s and the contemporaneous flowering of Polish sociology during what Professor Bauman describes as "the happy years of unconstrained intellectual creativeness" which followed the 1956 uprising (p. xiii). The author claims that his book offers a "new analytical perspective" which is Marxist "in its activist, uninstitutionalized version" (pp. ix, xii). Its guiding assumption is that "no goal, final form or measuring standard is set for the labour movement," but that it is "an active, adaptive and self-regulating system, 'assimilating' its 'outer' environment by trying to impress on it the desired structural changes and 'accommodating' its own structure to the changing requirements of the successful assimilation" (pp. xi–xii).

On this premise the author constructs a four-stage model of the growth of the British working class, the labor movement, and its political elite. He distinguishes between the "embryonic" period (1750–1850), the movement's "coming of age" (1850–1890), the evolution of a "mass labor movement" (1890–1924), and the "consolidation of the labor movement" (1924–1955). In each period, the motive force of the development of the labor movement was the mobilization of emerging strata of the working class. By the mid-1950s, the author argues, the process of structural change had ground to a halt. By then the labor movement had mobilized all the strata of the working class, which thereby "exhausted" its "internal dynamism." Hence "its flexibility gave way to conservatism and consolidation" (p. 230).

Despite this short-sighted view about the necessity for stagnation within the labor movement, the book does contain passages of incisive analysis and acute observation. But it cannot be said that it provides either a convincing theoretical treatment or an adequate sociological account of the consequences of the emergence and growth of class society in Britain. The main reason is the conspicuous absence of a single reference to the formidable body of writing on all aspects of British working-class life which has appeared since 1958. It is simply not possible to write persuasively about class formation and class conflict in England, as a sociologist, an historian, or any other interested student, without confronting Edward Thompson's masterpiece *The Making of the English Working Class*, Eric Hobsbawm's numerous writings, and the work of many others who have created a new and growing school of historical research.

It is ironic that in the same year that Baumann's book was written, these scholars decided to found a research group to encourage work in the field of working-class history. Most of the founders were in one way or another students of G.D.H. Cole, who had nurtured labor history at Oxford sufficiently to make it a self-respecting academic discipline. After consideration was given to naming the group after Cole himself, the more descriptive title adopted was the Society for the Study of Labor History. The work of this group can be surveyed most conveniently in the *Festschrift* to Cole entitled *Essays in Labour History*, published in 1960 shortly after Cole's death. In the fifteen years which have followed, the work of members of the Society has transformed one side of English historiography. Surely Bauman, now Professor of Sociology at Leeds University, knew that to write of the British working class without confronting the writing of Thompson, Hobsbawm, John Saville, Royden Harrison, Asa Briggs, and Sidney Pollard among others is to court disaster.

What these men have done is to go far beyond the institutional history of labor which Cole did so much to foster. They have broadened the scope of research in order to place working men in a setting in which both their struggles and their complex cultural, political, and work experiences can be understood and evaluated. They have also made a powerful claim for the strength of a school of historical writing which shares not identical political commitments but rather the belief that such commitments are necessary for the writing of labor history. Most of these scholars passed through the Communist party in the 1930s and 1940s, and most left after 1956. Most retain the belief, eloquently restated by Thompson in his open letter to Leszek Kolakowski in the 1973 *Socialist Register* (London: Merlin Press, 1974, p. 55) that "the atomized and predatory logic of capitalism (which persists even within statist forms) can only be displaced by the alternative intentions and aspirations of a social consciousness which can (as empirically-given historical fact) be shown to find partial and fragmented embodiment in the actual working-class movement. British history, over 150 years, has shown this alternative possibility to be waxing and waning and waxing again—not as *exactly the same* possibility, but as the same in terms of an alternative, socialist logic." Younger researchers have continued this socialist scholarship. Their inspiration is drawn perhaps more from early rather than later communist experience. James Hinton's brilliant study of *The First Shop Stewards' Movement* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1973), during the First World War is a case in point. By concentrating on the ways in which the war changed the work situation of metal workers, he is able to illuminate preprecisely those sources and limitations of revolutionary activity which Bauman's schematic treatment neglects. Here is the stuff of which a "theory of the labor movement" will be made, and it is to scholars like Hinton that we must look to provide the overview of class conflict in Britain since the Industrial Revolution—an overview that is still to be written.

J. M. WINTER

*University of Warwick, England*

**The Revolution and the Civil War in Spain.** By Pierre Broué and Emile Témime. Translated by Tony White. (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1972. Pp. 591. $12.50.)

The translation of this splendid book, originally published in 1961 (*La Révolution et la guerre d'Espagne* [Paris: Les Editions de Minuit]), has been long overdue. In my opinion, it is one of the two or three best general studies of a subject that has inspired literally thousands of volumes. Although it has previously received the praise and serious attention of specialists in this country, its appearance in English will presumably bring it the wider audience it deserves.

The book was certainly not written exclusively for specialists. The authors are professional historians, but not Hispanists, nor do they see the Spanish civil war as a purely Spanish affair. On the contrary, they argue that the conflict must be seen as part of two wider European developments. On the one hand, the war triggered a revolution by the "fourth estate"—the workers and landless peasants—which rapidly outdistanced the more timid goals of the liberals and reformist Socialists in the Popular Front, a process that has characterized revolution everywhere since 1794. On the other hand, revolution meant European involvement. "Such civil strife ultimately involves all powers and all peoples, because it is merely a particular aspect, in a precise geographical context, of the crisis that is rocking humanity in the century of world wars" (p. 13). Once European intervention was assured, the Spanish civil war became irrevocably part of the crisis in European politics of the 1930s, a harsh and ominous prelude to World War II.

Yet once having declared their intention to interpret both the Spanish revolution and the civil war as aspects of larger historical phenomena, the authors analyze the political situation in Spain in its own terms and avoid tenuous analogies with other revolutions and other civil wars. In fact, their untangling of the complexities of party politics in both Republican and Nationalist Spain indicated that Professors Broué and Témime had indeed become Hispanists by the time they were ready to begin writing. Only in the introductory chapters, which contain a number of inaccuracies and overgeneralizations, do they betray their lack of training in earlier periods of Spanish history.

The book is divided into two sections, a reflection of the authors' division of labor. Part One, written by Broué, covers the prerevolutionary situation that developed after the February 1936 elections, the revolutionary explosion that coincided with the military pronunciamiento of July 17, and the gradual dismantling of the revolution by the liberals, the moderate Socialists, and the Communists, who argued that winning the war must take precedence. Particularly admirable is Broué's analysis of the political spectrum in Republican Spain and his description of the political maneuvering that strengthened the central government and the Communist party at the expense of the revolutionaries. In Part Two, Témime deals with the political evolution within Nationalist Spain and with the international context of the war, arguing convincingly that it was German and Italian intervention, together with the inhibition of the Western democracies, especially Great Britain, that converted an inevitable Nationalist defeat into an equally inevitable victory.

Most readers will find the Broué section the most absorbing because his conclusions are the most controversial. This book was the first major scholarly defense of the revolutionaries of July 1936. In 1961, most English and American historians probably saw the civil war from the viewpoint of the liberal Republicans and moderate Socialists who had been the soul of the Second Republic. In their eyes, the collectivizations, the rule by revolutionary committee, and the revolutionary terrorism of the first months of the war undermined the Madrid government's efforts to organize for war. Broué not only provided a sympathetic and detailed view of life in revolutionary Spain, particularly in Catalonia, he argued that the destruction of the revolution meant the loss of the war as well. The workers fought to preserve the revolution, but the Republican state, increasingly under the iron control of the Communists, weakened the workers' will to resist by removing their principal reason for fighting. Staking its prestige and *raison d'être* on victory, the state signed its own death warrant when the victories failed to materialize.

This argument, along with the revolution itself, was generally ignored by liberal scholarship in the early 1960s, but both resurfaced in 1967 in an essay by Noam Chomsky (in *American Power and the New Mandarins: Historical and Political Essays*) in which he attacked the "objectivity" of liberal scholars, in particular, Gabriel Jackson, whose *The Spanish Republic and the Civil War, 1931–1939*, had appeared in 1965. A rejoinder to Chomsky's rather unbalanced and impassioned defense of the revolution appeared in 1970, with the publication of Stanley Payne's *The Spanish Revolution*. Payne condemned revolutionary infantilism and maximalism and argued that the democratic Republic advocated by the Communists and the center-left offered the only hope of winning the war and building a new, broader, political center. The entire debate during the late 'sixties drew on the highly emotional political situation that had grown out of the Vietnam war.

The debate, of course, continues, which makes the appearance of this English translation doubly welcome. Perhaps no agreement will ever be reached in a debate that draws as much sustenance from historical speculation and political value judgments as from historical investigation. Broué himself seems to see the war as a tragic situation that killed a truly democratic revolution, rather than as the event that made the revolution possible in the first instance. One need not sympathize with the Communists, however, to agree with them that the war had to be won before the revolution could proceed. Anarchist militancy not only frightened the middle classes, whose support was essential, it also fragmented the power of the state and disrupted the economy at a moment when efficiency and unity were imperative. Since Franco won the war, there is room for arguing that revolutionary enthusiasm might have defeated him. It seems more likely, however, that Témime is correct in attributing the outcome of the war to foreign intervention. Fear of a "Red" Spain was one of the reasons Britain withheld its support. The anarchist militants argued further that the Republic without the revolution was no better than Franco. An old Spanish proverb assures us that "they're always the same dogs, with different collars." The thousands of Spaniards who resisted the Nationalists until the end and subsequently suffered exile, imprisonment, and political repression, knew better.

Undoubtedly the debate will continue, with contributions from both theorists of twentieth-century revolution and historians of contemporary Spain. The careful scholarship and thoughtful analysis of Broué and Témime will be indispensable for all who wish to take part.

Carolyn P. Boyd

*University of Texas at Austin*

**Urban Government for Valencia, Venezuela.** By Mark W. Cannon, R. Scott Fosler, and Robert Witherspoon. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973. Pp. xvii, 152. $13.50.)

Few social processes are as complex and visible in the Third World as urbanization. Many studies of urbanization deal with patterns of migration, employment, and the social and political attitudes and activities of urban dwellers. Relatively few address the other side of the coin: the response of local government to changing urban problems. Given the very high rate of urbanization in Venezuela, and the position of Valencia as one of Venezuela's few industrial cities, the topic of this book is of clear importance and immediate relevance. For these reasons, one turns to the analysis with great hopes; but unfortunately, the results are mixed and the book as a whole disappointing.

The authors provide some general background on the evolution of municipal government, with special reference to the emergence of planning agencies, roles, and functions. They stress the interaction (often at cross purposes) of national and local agencies, as well as the ties among different national agencies operating in the local area. The role of field offices of various national ministries is examined in some detail, in case studies of transportation, education, water supply, and sewage.

Both the virtues and defects of traditional works in public administration are visible here. As to virtues, useful data are provided on the complex ties between national, state, and local levels of government, particularly in the area of taxation and the distribution of revenue. There is also a useful discussion of the meaning of planning. The authors argue that local and national planners see planning primarily in terms of physical design criteria. Thus, social planning often ignores social factors. For example, more attention is paid to school construction than to the nature of the population to be served, the scope of services, or the content of curricula.

Defects are more notable. First, the descriptions of municipal government agencies and functions, as well as the general accounts provided of political processes, are exceedingly formalistic, simplistic, and often inaccurate in points of detail. Moreover, there is little or no attempt made to relate the data to some general theoretical propositions, or to fit the details of this case study into a systematically ordered body of knowledge. This is all the more disappointing in a book which is one of a series of thirteen studies of urban administration and politics around the world, sponsored by the International Urban Studies Project of the Institute of Public Administration of New York. Despite many references to the "comparative" study of urban government, no comparative analysis is made, no comparative questions are posed.

The absence of explicit theoretical criteria leads to a series of dissatisfying *ad hoc* explanations. To pick just one example, the authors argue that *Fundacomun*, a national agency for municipal development, succeeded in Venezuela after 1958 in part because " . . . with the democratic awakening throughout the country, the time was ripe for a municipal movement" (pp. 26–27). But this is no explanation at all.

The lack of concern for theoretical issues and for comparison is visible in the absence of references to the extensive comparative literature on problems of urban growth and change, from migration and housing to employment and political activism. The reader lacks a sense of the larger world as it impinges on, and interacts with, the planning process. One also lacks a sense of the impact of planning on the people affected by it, particularly in the discussion of housing. The study of urban government in Valencia is left in a vacuum, and for these reasons, the analysis does not do justice to the importance of the topic.

Daniel H. Levine

*The University of Michigan*

**The Dynamics of Indian Political Factions: A Study of District Councils in the State of Maharashtra.** By Mary C. Carras. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972. Pp. 297. $19.50.)

This book can be commended to authors of textbooks and lecturers in political science who want an extreme example of a graduate student overgeneralizing from data. Dr. Carras studied four of 25 District Councils (Zilla Parishads) in Maharashtra—in the districts of Ratnagiri, Poona, Aurangabad, and Akola), interviewing 160 Congress councillors during a 21-month period in 1964–66. These interviews represented 10 per cent of the councillors in Maharashtra at the time, 20 per cent of them belonging to the Congress Party. In these interviews, Professor Carras attempted to determine the bases for factional conflicts between Congress loyalists (i.e., those who supported the official slate Congress party candidates for office) and Congress rebels (those who supported Congress candidates opposed to the official party slates). Dr. Carras concludes that the factional behavior of her interviewees "corresponds, on the whole, with rational (or calculable) economic interests; that it is not determined by 'irrational' (that is, emotional) and often unpredictable personal loyalties which may be based almost exclusively on feelings of awe, respect, or devotion to a leader because of his charismatic qualities, or on feelings of loyalty evoked by caste or community ties or by family links" (p. 184). More specifically, Dr. Carras found that the only consistent correlation in her study, out of a good many that were tested, was the association of rebel Congress councillors with the cooperative movement in Maharashtra and the converse association of loyalist congressmen with private economic interests.

This is interesting enough, and not really inconsistent with other studies of Indian political behavior (my only objection in the above paragraph would be to the author's equation of ties to caste, community, or family with "irrational" behavior). We know that economic factors can override ties of caste and family in Indian political life and have frequently done so. We know that economic considerations are frequently at the root of factional conflicts that are openly expressed in terms of caste or family ties. We are all familiar with the various "right" and "left" factions in the Congress party, and with the salience of Congress ideological debates within Congress at various points in time. But Professor Carras seems to have a chip on her shoulder, or, perhaps more accurately, she seems obsessed with the penchant of many graduate students to set up "straw men" in the beginning of their dissertations in order that they have a convenient foil for their ideas. In this case, the foil is no less than the cream of the political science discipline concerned with South Asia—Weiner, Brass, Kothari, Morris-Jones, etc.—who, according to Dr. Carras, have "offered no explanation [of Indian politics] at all, but a description at best" (p. 7), primarily because they have attempted to explain the dynamics of India's political alignments in terms of personal loyalties to caste, community, and other ascriptive groups, as well as economic motivations.

In order to use past studies of Indian politics as a foil, Dr. Carras misinterprets and exaggerates their findings. For example, she argues that previous studies of Indian politics either explicitly or implicitly assume "that there is a sort of mystical (i.e., irrational) bond between social unit and political action, between leader and follower" (p. 7, her parentheses), but she offers no specific evidence that any political scientist studying South Asia in the past has made this assumption. She also suggests that explanations of Indian political factionalism that focus on ascriptive ties are "particularly appealing to Westerners" (p. 8), but again without a hint of evidence for this assertion. Nevertheless, she goes on to propose what she calls "an alternative, and somewhat more inclusive, explanation concerning the factional behavior of political actors," an explanation that emphasizes the importance of ideology and the cooperative movement in Maharashtra in analyzing the behavior of her 160 councillors.

Because this study is well documented, and because it does blend a useful methodology with successful fieldwork, it is an interesting addition to the literature on local politics in one Indian state. Its presentation, however, is seriously marred by the claims made for it—for example, on the book jacket, "that recent regional and national events could have been predicted by focussing on [the division elucidated in the study]." It need hardly be pointed out that in many Indian states there is no cooperative movement worth the name, that in many others District Councils simply do not function, that Maharashtra is the only Indian state where direct popular elections to District Councils are contested on an explicit party basis, and that a host of studies at least as well documented as this one indicate that caste, family ties, and other ascriptive loyalties do occasionally override or co-exist with economic factors in determining Indian factional alignments. If there is one thing we do know about Indian factional politics, it is that the subject is much too complex to be explained away by mere economic determinism.

This also seems to be the conclusion of Dr. Richard D. Lambert, the dissertation advisor for this study, who states in a foreword to the book that "the conclusion is a bit too clearcut for my own bias in favor of the impenetrable complexity of human behavior" (p. v). One wishes that Dr. Lambert had been able to press this point further with Professor Carras when her study was in progress. One also wonders why Cambridge University Press resorted to such sensationalist claims for the study on the jacket of the book. Is it becoming *that* difficult to sell scholarly monographs on South Asia?

MARCUS F. FRANDA
*American Universities Fieldstaff*
*Colgate University*

**The Political Development in Nepal, 1950–70: Conflict Between Tradition and Modernity.** By R. S. Chauhan. (New York: Barnes and Nobel, 1972. Pp. 336. $13.50.)

R. S. Chauhan's book on *The Political Development in Nepal* represents the most recent analysis of contemporary Nepalese politics in book form by an outsider. As his subtitle suggests, the author has tried to dramatize Nepal's recent history by presenting it as a struggle between the forces of tradition and modernization. It is not unnatural for analysts to present their picture of the complex flow of events in a setting which brings out what they see as the most important factors in bold relief. But it may be debated whether the complex politics of an emergent nation lend themselves to the format of a medieval morality play. There is no shining knight of modernization, whom we can single out amongst the many elements of a developing polity and place on a charger against the dragon of backwardness. Nor do the forces of tradition arrange themselves in neat and distinct ranks. The fact is that tradition and modernity blend and braid themselves not only in the many institutions and elements of our nations, but even in the very personalities of the leaders. Thus the terms the author has set himself inevitably vitiate his analysis.

As Chauhan clearly states in his concluding paragraph (p. 317), he identifies the forces in favor of the parliamentary system as the progressive elements and those behind the panchayat system as traditional ones. This is simplification on the grand scale. For instance in his analysis of the various institutions of Panchayat Democracy in Nepal which he terms the rise of neo-traditionalism (Chap. 8) he shows the domination of higher castes in both the civil service (p. 233) and the District and Village Panchayats (pp. 244–247). He neglects the fact, however, that a similar analysis in 1959–60 (the period of parliamentary government) would have shown an equal dominance by higher castes in the parliament and an even greater dominance in the civil service. Chauhan's failure to analyze the 1959 elections in depth (he devotes only two and one-half pages to the elections, pp. 100–102) has led him to ignore the fact that the overwhelming success of the Nepali Congress, which he sees as the main modernizing force in Nepal, was due to the Congress's astuteness in allying itself with the most powerful landlords or communal leaders in the various constituencies.

On the other hand he claims (p. 162) that "the King feared the consequences of the various reforms initiated by the (Parliamentary) government particularly in the sphere of land tenure and civil administration . . . " yet the Birta Abolition Act introduced in 1959 was fully implemented in 1961 after the takeover of government by the King (see "Land Tenure and Taxation in Nepal, Vol. II, [Berkeley; Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1964, pp. 197–198]). He was to go even further in the Land Reform Act of 1964. Equally administrative reform on not dissimilar lines was to be the continuing feature of the sixties. Chauhan's characterization of the institution of monarchy as a purely traditional force does not, as it should, deal with the argument that most of the major developments in the fields of transport, electricity, irrigation, and education, which are undoubtedly altering the very face of traditional Nepal, have occurred since 1960. The point is that no single force holds an exclusive option on modernization. The real conflict is waged over the strategy for modernization, the pace of change, and alternative views of the goals of change.

Thus Chauhan seems undecided on whether he is engaged in political polemics or the calm analysis of research, and as a consequence he falls between the two stools. As his petulant phrasing at one point indicates (p. 157, "It was therefore neither the fault of the parliamentary institutions or that of the infrastructure, that democracy in Nepal proved a failure") he is more concerned to apportion blame and judge the guilty, than to devote studious care to the accurate and measured delineation of facts and trends. The first part of the book adds nothing to the far more sophisticated and balanced analysis of Bhuvan Lal Joshi and Leo Rose in *Democratic Innovations in Nepal* (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1966). In the last section of his book, however, those parts that deal with the second half of the sixties do represent research on an area about which there is very little information. The author's attempt to present in terms of black and white a tale in reality composed of different shades of grey compels one to suggest the use of more delicate brushes and more discriminating glasses, when, as one hopes, he once again turns his attention to Nepalese problems.

PASHUPATI SHUMSHERE J. B. RANA
*Kathmandu, Nepal*

**Protest and Resistance in Angola and Brazil: Comparative Studies.** Edited by Ronald H. Chilcote. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972. Pp. xvi, 317. $12.00.)

Chilcote, a political scientist who has written both on Portugal and Brazil, was the organizer and coordinator of a 1968 colloquium which evolved into the present book. The intent of the colloquium, as described in the *Latin American Research Review* (IV, [Spring 1969] 125–136), was to examine links between Brazil and the Portuguese African territories (Angola, Guinea, the Cape Verdes, and Mozambique) using a multidisciplinary approach. For this purpose, twenty-four experts from several countries and with various disciplinary commitments were invited to give formal papers before seminars of faculty and graduate students. Each contributor was asked to identify the principal issues or problems as related to his case study, to examine the theoretical aspects of crisis and resistance, and to evaluate the impact of the crisis or resistance situation upon the society under study. As explained by Chilcote, the group's objectives were "to overlap the traditional area boundaries that separate specialists of Latin America and Africa, to focus on common themes from the perspective of varying social science disciplines, and to reassess and evaluate a variety of cases of protest and resistance. The specialized essays were to be analytical and exploratory, raising questions for possible future research" (p. vii).

By the time the colloquium papers were published, the twenty-four papers were reduced by half. The criteria for choosing this particular set are not given. The editor added an abstract to each essay as an attempt "to synthesize content and ideas, as well as to tie the collection into an integrated and balanced whole" (p. viii). Again, the promise falls far short of fulfillment. A tenuous nexus indeed links, for example, Birmingham's essay on the way Africans adapted themselves and their institutions to the overseas pattern of Portuguese trade (especially in the 16th century) and Forman's study of the conditions that give rise to mass political participation in contemporary rural Brazil.

This lack of common time spans and focuses makes for a strained or impossible comparison. This difficulty is compounded by an imbalance in scholarship that cannot be simply explained away by the authors' varying cultural backgrounds and disciplinary commitments. Some essays, such as Wheeler's on the origins of African nationalism in Angola (with particular reference to *Assimilado* protest writing between 1859 and 1929) and della Cava's on Brazilian backland politics (with focus on Padre Cícero's partisan politics) are solid contributions, while others appear to suffer from an original absence of conceptual and interpretive insight that is aggravated, in certain instances, by fuzzy translations.

Not having seen the entire collection of colloquium papers, I can only speculate about whether the publication of all of them here would have plugged some of the obvious gaps found in the present book. One wonders why a paper written by the late Eduardo Mondlane, the well-known Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) leader, on the failure of Portuguese colonization in Mozambique was omitted, and why indeed all the Portuguese territories except Angola were dropped. One can also question the scholarly justification for selecting the Brazilian northeast as the area for *all* case studies dealing with that country's social movements of protest and resistance. Granted the peculiarities of the northeast as a breeding ground for the politics of violence and charisma, it can be argued that the East and the South are as deserving of attention. Indeed, some of the episodes of protest and resistance in these areas (the 1789 Inconfidencia Mineira and particularly the Farrapos Republic of 1835–1845 are obvious examples) had far greater impact and historical significance than did the northeastern cases studied here. Chilcote's attempt (chapter 12) to present a bibliographical essay and synthesis that encompasses these other movements is not, by itself, sufficient to cover the absence of specific essays dealing in depth with more "representative" movements.

The limited representativeness or even importance of some of the movements studied is best exemplified by an essay on a millenarian movement that included "twenty-six people, almost all belonging to just one family, . . . composed the body of loyal followers of the New Israel . . . " (p. 166). Why is this essay included when none deals except tangentially with the Catholic Church as a locus for resistance and protest? Regardless of one's ideological or religious predilections, and even granting that much of Brazilian Catholic protest is probably more ritualistic than effective, this protest has had far wider historical, societal, and political implications than those of a minuscule band led by an obviously deranged latter-day Messiah. In the same vein, I also question the omission of essays that would present the official (i.e., governmental) perspective on and interpretation of the nature and goals of protest and resistance organized outside the boundaries allowed by those in power.

With all this said, it may come as a surprise that I still recommend this book as a worthwhile contribution that should be examined by Africanists and Brazilianists as well as by those who, like Chilcote, are manfully attempting to synthesize, compare, and classify protest and resistance movements across geographic areas. Since so much less has been written on Angola than on Brazil, this book should be of particular interest to Africanists. It should be read in conjunction with the massive *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa: Documents* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), especially because in this other work Chilcote includes chapters that contain *both* the official (pre-1974 Revolution) Portuguese position and that of the Portuguese opposition. Finally, one must emphasize that the colloquium's original objectives were admirable. The present book contains some essays that wrestle with a number of those objectives and, while other essays fail to consider them at all, that failure in itself should be a stimulus to further research and to other scholars to try again—harder.

Iêda Siqueira Wiarda
*University of Massachusetts at Amherst*

**Deviance in Soviet Society: Crime, Delinquency, and Alcoholism.** By Walter D. Connor. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972. Pp. 327. $12.50.)

One of the subjects which has interested students of Soviet affairs over the years is the extent to which ideology interferes with rational decision making in the U.S.S.R. There seems to be a consensus among scholars that, generally, pragmatic considerations have been more influential than ideological ones. There are, to be sure, sectors such as agriculture in which rationality takes a back seat to ideology in the decision-making process, but this is the exception. Walter Connor now provides us with an absorbing case study of another area—crime prevention and control—where rational approaches to problem solving are often placed under ideological constraints.

Connor, a sociologist at the Center for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Michigan, spent a half-year at the Criminal Law Department at Moscow State University as part of the U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. scholar exchange. The result of his research is a major contribution to our understanding of one of the least written about aspects of Soviet society. Much has been written about *political* dissidence in the Soviet Union, but the author excludes this topic from his book. He focuses on crime, delinquency, and alcoholism, types of deviance which are—on the surface, at least—apolitical. The modes of response to these forms of deviance, however, say much about the Soviet polity.

The author has three major concerns in this book: First, he explores in depth the deviance itself, i.e., crime, delinquency, and alcoholism. Second, he describes Soviet explanations for it. Third, he portrays the methods the Soviet authorities use in trying to prevent deviance and the approaches to rehabilitating and/or correcting the deviants themselves.

Soviet ideological rhetoric over the years has repeated the theme that crime and alcoholism in the West are due to poverty, unemployment, and exploitation. The ideologists proclaim, of course, that the latter three have been abolished in Soviet society. Further, according to the author, the Soviet version of Marxism-Leninism contends that man is more-or-less perfectible and that he is basically a social being. Thus, man's tendencies toward deviance can be socially induced and can be socially controlled. Here the Soviet ideologists are faced with an awkward problem: Crime and alcoholism in the West are socially induced. They are, in short, reflections of "sick" capitalist society. No one contends, however, that these kinds of deviance have disappeared in the U.S.S.R. What is the explanation? Are crime and alcoholism reflections of Soviet society? Hardly. Connor, in his exhaustive reading of the Soviet literature on the subject, finds that there *is* an explanation.

Since Soviet society is not "sick," deviance is explained as a tenacious survival of the capitalist past, or as one Soviet writer put it, "the operation of the objective law of the lag of consciousness behind social life." An accompanying and interdependent explanation is that although there is nothing inherent in Soviet society that would produce deviance, there are certain institutional malfunctions. That is, the families, schools, factories, youth organizations, etc. have not fulfilled their roles in the political socialization process. Admittedly, an ideological contortion act is involved here, but the author treats it all with proper solemnity.

Ideology is not only used to explain deviance but it also serves as a constraint in enlarging the scope of inquiry into finding rational methods of preventing and treating deviance. As, according to theory, Soviet society itself is blameless, it is not a legitimate target of inquiry—although specific institutions in the society are. Further, Soviet theory is not hospitable to research directed at the psychological variables relating to deviance.

There is much else of value in this book. We learn, for example, that Soviet authorities are very concerned about increasing alcoholism and its relation to crime; officials attribute 70 per cent of all crimes to drunkenness. The author is struck by the great effort to involve the public in helping to control deviant behavior—apparently with mixed success. Connor also finds that violent crime is apparently much less pervasive in the Soviet Union than America, and he feels that at least one reason for this phenomenon is the unavailability of firearms to the general public.

This book would have benefited by drawing on more comparative data on crime and alcoholism in the West. Further, it is surprising that Connor did not use as one of his sources descriptions of prison conditions from "samizdat" sources. These minor shortcomings notwithstanding, this is a valuable book which widens our understanding of an important aspect of Soviet society.

Peter Grothe

*San Jose State University*

**East Across the Pacific: Historical and Sociological Studies of Japanese Immigration and Assimilation.** By Hilary Conroy and T. Scott Miyakawa. (Santa Barbara, California: American Bibliographical Center—Clio Press, 1972. Pp. 322. $15.00, cloth; $5.75, paper.)

This compilation of individual articles by editors Hilary Conroy and T. Scott Miyakawa, despite its multiplicity of approaches and different levels of treatment in the individual chapters, does add up well. In fact, it pulls together in one volume an excellent overview of the Japanese-American acculturation experience in the United States and Canada. There are a number of other volumes preceding the present compilation that deal with special problems experienced by Japanese-Americans. Many of these center around the relocation experience of World War II, a major trauma marring the generally successful history of the Japanese assimilation into the American body politic. The virtue of this volume is that it puts this experience in a more totally conceived historical context.

One can observe that the Japanese are not as yet "assimilated." They remain a distinct group sharing the problems of pluralism with other ethnic minorities in the United States. Their physical visibility continues to set them apart in a racially sensitive American society. The prejudices they face from majority whites, however, have been reduced to subtle indications rather than to the hostility previously experienced. Owing to the availability of culturally adaptive modes of concerted group action, the Japanese have survived well by all criteria of social adaptation. The present series of articles give us concrete illustrations as well as possible generalizations about why the Japanese have adapted so well.

Part I contains three chapters of historical interest. Although not deliberately designed to do so, these chapters afford impressions of the economic motives that prompted some Americans to encourage initially the major Japanese migration to Hawaii. The chapters by Masaji Marumoto, and that of Yukiko Irwin and Hilary Conroy each in turn documents the efforts of individual Americans as facilitators; but they also document the careful alertness of the Japanese government officials about setting limits to how their people might be exploited. A sense of dignity was a key issue in determining why and in what way the emigration from Japan was allowed to occur. The third chapter in Part One gives us an interesting historical glimpse into how Japanese entrepreneurship had from an early date made inroads into Micronesia.

The first chapter in Part Two by Roger Daniels summarizes the vicissitudes of the Japanese migration onto mainland United States. The "yellow peril" campaign by the Hearst papers succeeded in preventing full citizenship for Asians. It led the United States finally in 1924 to break the so-called "gentlemen's agreement," and to injuring the dignity of a Japanese government that had used careful constraint in dealing with Western powers. The resulting bitterness was to continue to flow in a submerged stream of ill will that made more possible the Pacific war 17 years later.

The lesser-known history of Canadian prejudice and a typical Japanese response is presented in Howard Sugimoto's most interesting chapter reporting on the Vancouver Riot of 1907 in which the Japanese ably organized and protected themselves and their property by a successful counter-assertion. His account is a well-described example of how local politics can be involved in the manipulation of bigotry.

A rather personal account by Esther Rhodes is used to tell the story of wartime relocation of the Japanese-Americans from the standpoint of a helpful Quaker involved in the evacuation. This chapter is not the best source of information on the relocation. The social science dynamics of the episode have been better presented by Carey McWilliams. Nevertheless, in the context of the present overall picture, Rhodes does well with the help of Sugimoto in providing an annotated bibliography of the major works describing this collective act of insane bigotry.

Parts III and IV are of mixed quality and pertinence, but they do give a flavor of the cultural psychology of Japanese migrants, or Issei. Scott Miyakawa sketches brief biographies of Japanese who became trusted merchants in the import-export business in New York City. Sharlie Ushioda sketches out what may seem to us the somewhat inconsistent liberalism of Inazo Nitobe, the politician and social theorist. Frank Miyamoto offers us a glance into a Japanese minority community in Seattle, and George Kagiwada reports a comparison of the relative assimilation of American Nisei and their Sansei children. He discounts, in effect, any significant turning back to an enclaved ethnic identity in the third generation Sansei.

Finally, two chapters, one specific and one general, discuss the relationship of modal personality features and acculturation. Minako Kurokawa reports a significantly lower accident rate in Japanese-American children in comparison with the majority population of California. She gives some psychocultural explanations to interpret these results. In a summary chapter, Stanford Lyman depicts the cultural psychology that enabled the Japanese who traveled East across the Pacific to settle and participate successfully in the general American endeavor to create on this continent a truly pluralistic society.

I recommend this volume for its bibliographic completeness as well as its overall readability. A worthwhile effort.

George DeVos
*University of California, Berkeley*

**British Economic Policy and the Empire, 1919–1939.** By Ian M. Drummond. (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1972. Pp. 241. $13.50.)

This is a book worth reading. Professor Drummond's lucid and well-researched introduction provides an excellent analysis of the interwar economic relations between Britain and her white Dominions and the best available account of the course and results of the Ottawa Agreements of 1931. From the British point of view, according to Professor Drummond, the Empire became a far more important supplier and market in this period than it had been in the pre-World War I era even though both foreign and Empire trade were less essential to the economy as a whole and though in absolute terms foreign trade—particularly imports—remained the more important. Similarly, the Empire increased its imports from Britain and on the export side, if gold is excluded, sold more to Britain than to foreign countries during and after the slump of 1929–33. As the United Kingdom remained the world's largest importer of food and raw materials, its market for certain primary products (butter, lamb, wool, tea, etc.) became a matter of life and death for these particular Empire producers. It is not surprising that these became the subjects of imperial concern and negotiation.

This powerful economic interconnection had already become a political issue in Edwardian England. In a fascinating chapter, Professor Drummond contrasts the views of the "imperial visionaries" (Beaverbrook, Milner, Amery) and the free traders during the debates of the twenties. Neither doctrinal nor political lines were sharply drawn (even the author shrinks from distinguishing between the imperial preference people and the outright protectionists), and the debate repeatedly crossed party lines. The "visionaries" tended to prevail, but their schemes and expenditure were too modest to solve unemployment at home or to satisfy Dominion demands. There were subsidized immigration and land settlement schemes, but there were also increasing doubts about the wisdom of settling and developing land in a period of agricultural recession when the prices for agricultural products had collapsed. The Dominions and the "visionaries" would have preferred a change in tariff policy; the British electorate in 1934 refused to sanction food taxes, and this veto made a significant preferential scheme impossible.

Professor Drummond does not explain the economic conditions which brought about the Ottawa Conference of 1931, though he does describe the preparations for the meeting and provides a masterly analysis of the main subjects of debate and compromise. He draws up a careful and realistic balance sheet and shows how the subsequent negotiations over meat and butter finally produced a system of deficiency payments which was probably the least wasteful way of protecting British farmers without imposing a general duty on food products. He argues that the movement toward multilateral trade began as early as 1933, though he warns against assuming that a fall in tariff barriers is a sufficient condition for a return to prosperity. The point is that Roosevelt and Hull shared this assumption and that the Ottawa agreements further embittered Anglo-American economic relations. Even the agreement of 1938, which the British entered into for political reasons and in the face of powerful Canadian opposition, failed to satisfy American economic demands and led to the most unfortunate diplomatic consequences. Professor Drummond's discussion of the post-1931 period is illuminating but incomplete when tracing the wider economic and political implications of the Ottawa decisions.

The author concentrates on the white Dominions and defends his neglect of the remaining Empire on the grounds that it reflects the preoccupations of interwar politicians and the state of current research. A good deal is known about the British and white Dominion economies; many other parts of the Empire, including India, have still to be seriously and dispassionately studied. Professor Drummond includes a model essay on the subject of the Indian cotton tariff, the Anglo-Indian conflict over cotton duties, and the impact of Japanese competition on the scene. As at Ottawa, the British gradually sacrificed most of their preferential advantages to win somewhat dubious and illusory benefits.

The documents tell a consequent and lively story though they are drawn from less diverse sources than might have been expected. Is it heresy to suggest that some might have been omitted or further condensed (i.e., the text of the Ottawa agreement) to have made more space for Professor Drummond's fascinating coverage?

Zara Steiner

*New Hall, Cambridge*

**The Chinese Cultural Revolution.** By Jean Esmein. Translated from the French by W. J. F. Jenner. (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1973. Pp. xiv, 346. $2.95.)

In a nutshell, Jean Esmein's work will be judged most useful by scholars specializing in Chinese communism in the 1960s. General readers desiring a competent overview account of the Cultural Revolution period would still be advised to choose Stanley Karnow's fine book, *Mao and China: From Revolution to Revolution* (New York: Viking Press, 1972). Journalist/diplomat Esmein, to be sure, has profited from more of an inside view than journalist/China watcher Karnow, and at first glance this would seem to tilt the balance in his favor. But Karnow is the superior organizer and interpreter, so that even the greater length of his analysis (592 pages) cannot be counted against him.

Esmein, who was stationed in Peking as a press attaché from December 1965 to June 1968, had a priceless chance to observe the Cultural Revolution directly; he also traveled widely in China before 1968. Karnow, who had never set foot inside China before preparing his study, gathered his material instead in Hong Kong and at Harvard. Neither of these two writers dwells at length on the sticky methodological problems they respectively confronted. Esmein, despite a questionable characterization of the Chinese as "inveterate exaggerators" (presumably as a cultural or personality trait, p. xii), does make a sensitive point about the propensity of Red Guard tabloids produced during 1966 and 1967 to employ extremely fanciful language and imagery capable of leading a purely documentary researcher far astray at important junctures. Karnow, although he too gives a nod to this well-deserved reputation for hyperbole, nevertheless finds it necessary to rely upon the observations of others with personal experience inside China to supplement his otherwise only elemental skepticism in dealing with these very same documents, which constitute his principal source. Neither writer shows evidence of having consulted the extensive archives of transcriptions of Chinese provincial radio broadcasts, which on some points are quite rich in detail. And Esmein has not employed at all the source which Karnow relies upon most extensively, the three excellent translations series of the Press Unit of the United States Consulate General at Hong Kong.

The less unique part of Esmein's source material includes a commendable number of articles by Japanese observers (mostly in Japanese), as well as odd issues of *China News Analysis* (an idiosyncratic, loosely right-wing, occasionally insightful biweekly written by a former missionary to China now exiled in Hong Kong) and of *Current Scene* (a monthly publication of the United States Information Service, Hong Kong, whose mission it is to call into question "the Chinese model"). The more unique part, and that holding the greatest potential appeal for researchers, is Esmein's multitude of citations from established Chinese newspapers, Red Guard tabloids, and wall posters which he was able to read during his stay in China, but which are still generally unavailable to outside researchers. His footnotes, unfortunately, again and again fail to reveal vital details about these tantalizing inside sources; and sometimes he even restricts himself to such inexcusable brevities as "Chou En-lai's directive on the *Honan Daily* incident" (p. 231) or "extracts from the speech of Chang Ch'un-ch'iao at an oath-taking rally on February 24th on the 'Cultural Revolution,' Shanghai" (p. 189). Other cited insider sources (some of them apparently exclusively so) include *Yu-tien Fenglei* [sic], (Post and Telecommunications Wind and Thunder), which Esmein identifies only as a "revolutionary journal" (p. xiii); *T'iyü Chanhsien* [sic] (Physical Training Battle Front), which he identifies only as "Red Guard paper" (p. 123); *Pengpu Red Guard* [sic], no further identification (p. 131); *Wenhui Pao*, an important Shanghai daily (p. 183); and numerous items on the order of "according to leaflets of February 11, 1967, issued by the Red Guards of the School of Applied Engineering" (p. 150). The very sketchiness of these cloudy citations regrettably renders them of dubious value to serious researchers, but as a silver lining at least there are presented some new opportunities for corroboration of other data.

From the general reader's perspective, again unfortunately, Esmein's inside sources and occasional opportunities for on-the-spot observation have failed to supply him with original insights into the all-important personal motivations which remain hidden behind the moralistic, Manichean, belligerent, and absolutistic public rhetoric of Cultural Revolution conflict. Moreover, the level of his political analysis judged by scientific criteria is very low. For example, his concluding statement, "it is no longer possible to dispute that the Cultural Revolution really was a revolution" (p. 331) is followed only a paragraph later with a contradictory statement, "the movement thus called into being was so strong that it almost became another revolution" (p. 331). And neither point is really argued. For both reasons I can recommend the book only for limited use by interested specialists.

GORDON BENNETT

*University of Texas, Austin*

**Bolivia: Land, Location and Politics since 1825.** By J. Valerie Fifer. Cambridge Latin American Studies No. 13. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972. Pp. 301. $23.50.)

This is an essay in political geography of a rather traditional sort. Seen in this light, it is an excellent piece of work that should prove an important reference source to those interested in the development of Bolivia. The book is based on extensive and meticulous research and is therefore a most impressive scholarly effort. In addition, Professor Fifer writes with style and verve, transforming what could have been a solid tome into a pleasurable reading experience.

From the point of view of the political scientist, however, the book does have several limitations. In the first instance, it seeks to explain the thrust of Bolivian development primarily in terms of geographic location and attendant boundary problems. Some linkages are made between these questions and the economic needs of Bolivia and its neighbors. These factors are, in turn, used to explain the dynamics of the relations between Bolivia and its neighbors and the steady deterioration of Bolivia in terms of size (it lost about half of its territory to its neighbors), economic viability, and political influence in Latin America. There is, however, very little discussion of internal political dynamics and how these affected the nation's development. Moreover, by focusing mainly on location, the author does not deal adequately with the myriad effects of Bolivian integration into the international economic system as an exporter of minerals and a consumer of manufactured goods. For this reason, the book is of much greater utility for analyzing developments in the nineteenth century than in the twentieth.

Finally, from the point of view of political science, the book lacks a theoretical focus and explanatory thrust that would tie its concerns into the bulk of the writing in our discipline dealing with issues of political development and nation building. Nonetheless, this is not a book to be ignored. It is a well constructed and a well written study that provides a welter of raw material on border dynamics, the pitfalls of buffer states, and the problems of landlocked states that could provide grist for many a political scientist's theoretical mill.

JAMES M. MALLOY

*University of Pittsburgh*

**The Cross and the Bo-Tree: Catholics and Buddhists in Vietnam.** By Piero Gheddo. Translated by Charles Underhill Quinn. (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1970. Pp. 368. $7.95.)

**Viet Cong Repression and its Implications for the Future.** By Stephen T. Hosmer. (Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath, 1970. Pp. 176. $8.50.)

Both volumes under review address prospects for peace. Both conclude they are bleak because of Communist terrorism. Both are dated. Gheddo published his study in 1968 (in Italian) while Hosmer's is based on documentation available by 1969. Gheddo is reacting to the Italian Catholic antiwar movement's unqualified support for the Communists and writes in the spirit of Vatican II: accept reality, promote conciliation. Hosmer, a RAND staffer, wrote his study for a RAND research program on "various military-political aspects of war termination in Vietnam"; it was widely cited in the official and informed debate over possibilities for a political settlement. The book is a detailed report of Viet Cong directives on repression—"the broad range of measures" used "to eliminate, neutralize, punish, and reform" (p. 1)—during 1967–1969.

Those reading *Repression* should keep Mao in mind: "A revolution is not a dinner party. . . . A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows another." Hosmer describes the purposes and targets of repression, the terror squads and their repertoire. Although the extracts portray a leadership considerably more bloodthirsty than those they command, the analysis builds to a facile acceptance of the answer to "Why not more?" "The fact is, quite simply, that *the Viet Cong want to assassinate or abduct many more people than they are able to . . .* " (p. 75; emphasis in original). But this conclusion is more difficult to accept if read either in light of Douglas Pike's findings on violence and its relationship to the political struggle in his classic, *Viet Cong*, or in the context of documentation available covering 1964–1973.

Where *Viet Cong* leaves off, future analyses ought to begin. Hosmer's book would be an important resource but illustrates the difficulty of projecting Communist behavior by analyzing only one aspect of their tactics over a relatively short period. A scant twenty pages, moreover, discuss future implications, and the view is shortsighted compared to the analysis in Pike's *War, Peace, and the Viet Cong*. Both should be read, however, to assess the bloodbath hypothesis debate (summarized in the companion pieces by John S. Carroll and Richard Barnet in *The New York Times Magazine*, 15 October 1972).

The average reader cannot judge the credibility of Hosmer's sources and must trust the RAND review process. The cause of credibility is certainly not bolstered, however, by the publisher's inclusion on the book jacket of a Communist "document" that has not a single accent mark. This would be equivalent to writing English by omitting all vowels. There is also a certain determinism about the book difficult to accept now, since the predicted bloodbath has not occurred with the cease-fire or in areas where the Communists have established their Provisional Revolutionary Government. In his speculations about "the melancholy contingency that a Communist regime were to assume power" (p. 116), Hosmer does indicate that violence could initially be low and could conceivably remain so depending on the opposition. Like Napoleon, perhaps, the Communists in Vietnam may come to learn, as Talleyrand observed, that "the only thing you cannot do with bayonets is to sit comfortably enthroned on them." The presumption of *Viet Cong Repression*, however, is that they will not.

Not surprisingly, given what followed Father Gheddo's visit and the Catholic experience with Communists in general, the Communists' use of terrorism emerges as one of the central obstacles to reconciliation discussed in *The Cross*. The other is the nature of the Vietnamese Catholic Church and its deeply rooted triumphalism: " . . . the ostentation of force, power, riches and organization. The Church has to appear to the outsider as an organized, rich and powerful bloc; humility is cultivated as a personal but not a group virtue" (p. 219). Concern with terrorism runs through nearly every chapter because it explains, in part, how such triumphalism has been reinforced over decades of political struggle.

The theme of the analysis is clear: "The historical period we have studied (1945–1954) is . . . decisive in our understanding the position of the Church and Catholics in the following years, i.e., the mistakes made and the good opportunities that they will see slip away, especially the spirit of the ghetto and a closedness to the world, the defensive attitude, the fanatical anti-communism that will prevent the Christian community availing itself of other aspects of the Vietnamese reality" (p. 50). Thus, the early persecutions, the precarious protection of the state, the impact of colonialism, the participation in and early disillusionment with the Viet Minh, the exodus to the South, and life during and after Diem are all portrayed as a series of shocks each deepening the Catholics' stake in Vietnamese politics while isolating the religion and alienating the faithful from peasant society. The overall effect, Gheddo concludes, is "the failure of the Vietnamese Church to evolve" (p. 218) in the spirit of Vatican II.

Above all, Gheddo is concerned with peace. "What is the Vietnamese Church doing for peace?" (p. 296), he asks. But his suggestions do not deal with a fundamental issue: how could a church alienated from Vietnamese society mobilize its social forces for peace? Catholic political organizations have sought such a role ever since late 1968. Mobilizing for peace tended to mean, however, monopolizing it as an issue. And with the resurgence of Diemism in 1969, the lavish demonstrations on the anniversary of his death, and the emergence of key figures from Diem-era organizations in the cabinet and the civil service, the conciliar spirit Gheddo hoped to encourage was again thwarted by the triumphalism his book so well describes.

In the scant literature on social forces in Vietnam, this is nonetheless a welcome addition despite the fact that it is based on only a two-month visit. It draws together a variety of scarce sources and religious publications not easily found here or in Saigon, and the extracts included are sharp, detailed, and notably lacking in chauvinism. The *Cross and the Bo-Tree* deserves a place alongside the literature by foreigners on social forces in Vietnam that includes Gérard Chaliand, *The Peasants of North Vietnam* (Middlesex, Eng.: Penguin Books Ltd., 1969); Pierre Gourou, *The Peasants of the Tonkin Delta* (New Haven, Conn.: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1955); Gerald Hickey, *Village in Vietnam* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964); L. Cadiere, *Croy-*

*ances et pratiques religieuses des Vietnamiens*; and, Gabriel Gobron, *History and Philosophy of Caodaism* (Saigon: Tu-Hai, n.d.). Published studies by Vietnamese are even rarer and include Ngo vinh Long, *Before the Revolution: the Vietnamese Peasants under the French* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1973); the National Pagoda's *Công Cuộc Tranh-đấu cua Phật-Giáo Việt-Nam* [*The Struggle of Vietnamese Buddhism*] (Saigon 1965) covering the events of 1963; and Thich Nhat Hanh, *Vietnam: Lotus in a Sea of Fire* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967). Comparable work by Vietnamese Catholics has not yet come to light.

ALLAN E. GOODMAN
*Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace*
*Stanford University*

**The State of the Nation: Parliament.** By Granada Television. (London: Granada Television, 1973. Pp. 272. UK 85p.)

Publication by a British television company of the transcript of its five-hour film on Parliament provides an unusual subject for a book review. Comments on the film itself follow from my opportunity to view the program. Originally produced as an exploration of the effectiveness of Parliament for late-evening viewing by British television audiences, the program has sections suited to classroom use. More generally, however, the transcript and film deserve attention because of Granada's effort to contribute to our knowledge of parliamentary behavior. In the 23 pages preceding the transcript, Brian Lapping, the program director, and Norma Percy, the research director, describe the substantial intellectual preparation accompanying this effort. The film belongs to a larger Granada inquiry from which two other books are scheduled. One, going to press late in 1974, is Anthony King's *British Members of Parliament: A Self-Portrait*, based on tape-recorded discussions of eight two-hour dinner sessions with MPs. The other project, planned for later publication, is to be an analysis, by Ivor Crewe, of a carefully conceived survey of British public attitudes toward Parliament.

Much could be said for reviewing these two related books along with the film, but, given the film's own professional relevance, it is reasonable to concentrate on the one available volume. In addition to the film transcript and the already noted introductory essay, this publication also includes some critical reactions to the film and a preliminary report of the survey of public attitudes toward Parliament. The report, with tables, is much less highly developed than Crewe's projected analysis, but it does contain general findings with respect to the concerns of the film. In particular, the public's interest in having MPs pursue constituent grievances, and the relatively favorable attitudes toward individual MPs who do pursue such grievances, will appear at odds with the perceptions which MPs, in the film, reveal about their own preferred activities.

As a whole, the transcript and the film should convince the most skeptical of us that the audio-visual medium can be used at an intellectually adult level in our field as in others. I have been among the skeptics, partly because of an impression that I learn more effectively and satisfyingly from the written word than from the electronic media, but I recognize the likelihood of different learning habits. Thus, while I picked up information and ideas from the published transcript that I missed on the film, many others would probably have a fuller appreciation of the filmed program. At any rate, one does not have to be a movie buff to recognize the high academic quality of the production. The total five-hour program has three segments, each of which originally constituted a late television show. Parts 1 and 2 are 90 minutes each, and Part 3 runs for 120 minutes. Potential viewers may obtain only one or two parts, or even sections of one or more parts, rather than the entire film. Different professional purposes may thus be served, and these are apparent from the transcript as well as from the film.

Part 1 occupies more reviewing space here because of its innovative research implications for specialists in British politics and in comparative legislative behavior. But it may so subtly portray the British governmental process as to be too cryptic for many American political science classes. It is a bold effort to film the ordinarily unseen and unreported aspects of law making. The effort matches the very best attempts of American political scientists, through interviews and participant-observation, to develop purely written accounts of the inner workings of the legislative process. Called "A Law in the Making," Part 1 follows the 1973 progress of the Fair Trading Bill, or more specifically two crucial clauses of the bill determining the consumer-protection powers being given to a new public official. The bill was a Conservative government bill, eventually enacted much as proposed by the relevant ministry, but subject to pressure for strengthening from consumer organizations and to counterpressure from business groups satisfied with the official draft.

Filming the expression of these pressures, and especially the government's responses, was an odd and difficult challenge. Neither the debate on the bill in the House of Commons nor the consideration of particular clauses of the bill in a standing committee could be televised. These proceedings, while public in the sense of being open to observers, recorded in government documents, and reported in the press, nevertheless remain closed to the electronic media. In consequence, only the ordinarily private political discussions were legally available for filming. These included meetings of MPs in their party groups (that is, the separate meetings of Conservative and Labour members of the particular standing committee), interest-group strategy sessions, office conversations of civil servants dealing with the bill, and, most surprisingly, the discussions in which civil servants offered advice to government ministers. Obtaining access to these sources, especially to the privileged civil servant-ministerial discussions (where access required cabinet approval) was a major triumph for the television producer. An academic investigator or even a newspaperman must envy the producer's success.

Any of us will wonder whether political participants talk as freely and frankly on camera as they do in unfilmed and otherwise unrecorded circumstances. Doubts, however, may be allayed by the "unacted" characteristics that weaken Part 1 as a dramatic production. Even with interpretive interjections from a narrator, the discussions are often hard to follow, as unstaged private discussions are bound to be for outsiders, and occasionally two voices are raised at the same time. On the other hand, the participants fulfill their roles very neatly. The civil servants, the consumer advocates, and the business leaders look and talk so much in the manner expected of their British prototypes that these participants might well have come from a studio's central casting bureau instead of from real life. Notably one or two of the civil servants are astoundingly close to what C. P. Snow has led us to believe about the attitudes and powers of British administrators. A properly resigned air of intellectual superiority is apparent.

Although Parts 2 and 3 seem less novel in technique and in subject-matter than Part 1, they deserve more notice than I can provide here. Both, especially Part 3 might profitably be shown to undergraduate courses in comparative politics. Unlike Part 1, these are staged performances in which participating MPs but not civil servants have been paid for their work. Part 2 takes the form of a hearing by a mock parliamentary select committee, consisting of five sitting MPs who hear and discuss the testimony of nine witnesses on the question whether Parliament has lost control over law making and public money. The witnesses are other MPs, parliamentary clerks, a law professor, and civil servants—including the distinguished head of the home civil service. Part 3 presents a debate, in the best Commons style, on whether MPs are too ignorant to do their job, whether strengthening investigatory select committees is Parliament's most urgent need, and whether such committees are the only means to restore Parliament's proper role in law making. The twelve debating MPs are unusually able speakers, often of considerable intellectual distinction and of substantial political status. It is fascinating to watch Enoch Powell, from the Conservative right, join Michael Foot, from the Labour left, in a defense of the parliamentary status quo against the modernizing reformers who would strengthen the specialized informational base for parliamentary action. The discussion contains many references to American congressional practices, thus enhancing the program's interest and, at the same time, introducing important comparative questions of a scholarly nature. Here, as elsewhere, the program is well worth reading in its transcribed form whether or not it can be viewed as a film.

LEON D. EPSTEIN
*University of Wisconsin, Madison*

**Latin America: The Dynamics of Social Change.** Edited by Stefan A. Halper and John R. Serling. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972. Pp. 219. $8.95.)

This volume attempts to assess social change in Latin America through a series of eight essays and an introductory section. Its purpose is to examine the relationship between modernization and the revolutionary process in that region. While such objectives are laudable, it is my view that the editors have not been successful.

The basic theme has permeated Latin American developmental studies since the 1950s, i.e., the either/or theme of violent structural change vs. gradual reform. Yet the editors provide the reader with no analytical or theoretical framework to view the collection of essays as an integrated whole. Consequently one must evaluate each essay separately.

The exploratory essay by Gino Germani analyzes the stages of modernization in Latin America, and offers quite reasonable definitions and analyses of modernization in terms of secularization. Germani also establishes a valuable, but so far ill-defined link between change and the ability of societies to adapt or integrate that change into socially nondisruptive channels. Basically, Germani posits a developmental model based on stages of economic growth which he states is to enable the reader to view the economic transition of Latin America in general terms. He also notes *structural* obstacles to economic modernization in order to clarify the turning points in the developmental process.

Following a similar approach, the Jaguaribe essay analyzes the stages of Brazil's economic growth (pp. 44–45) in an attempt to assess Brazil's future under the current military regime. The author concludes that the short-term viability of the military regime depends on its ability to co-opt the middle class through economic expansion. Yet widespread unemployment, coupled with repressive political control may prove the regime's undoing.

Horowitz provides certain insights into the developmental process by analyzing what he terms "The Norm of Illegitimacy." Basically, Horowitz contends that societies operate either in Marxian or Weberian terms. A legitimate society is defined as one that operates over time along norms sanctioned by law and made viable through mass participation (p. 68). He does not believe that the military is capable of modernizing societies since like elites they are not concerned with socially disruptive forms of social change as policy instruments. Yet no analysis of the possibly negative examples of this argument is presented—namely the Peruvian and Brazilian examples.

Gerassi presents a polemic in order to prove that United States foreign policy has always been imperialistic and supportive of national elites who are obstacles to social change. After castigating unnamed "liberal historians" Gerassi argues for violent revolution to break the hold that the U.S. and national elites have on Latin America. The argument is not objectively presented; nor is it supported by evidence.

A more cogent argument for revolution is provided by André Gunder Frank. Utilizing a Marxist analytical framework, Frank expounds on the theme of exploitation of Latin America by the capitalist "center" which holds the continent in the bondage of underdevelopment. The most valuable segment of his analysis is that of internal capital flow and investment patterns and their relationship to the "cosmopolitan center." While never defining the socialism he seeks, his essay once again proves the essential strengths of Marxism as a tool for economic and social critique.

Ivan Illich provides a brilliant and compassionate analysis of violence and its alternatives. His concern is for people as individuals, for their worth, and for the creativity that could be unleashed as a result of social change. He does not speak of "masses" or "classes." Rather, he weighs social change on a scale of human freedom—a dimension that most social scientists seem to have forgotten.

Anthony F. C. Wallace looks at revolution from the human nature and psychological process standpoint. He is particularly concerned with what he terms "identity revolutions," i.e., those which are undertaken by the participants in order to acquire a new or better identity (p. 173). While Cuba is the only Latin American example cited, one can see many of the characteristics identified by Wallace in other revolutions or attempted revolutions on the continent. Focusing largely on nativistic and millennarian movements, he seeks to identify the dynamics of this quest for identity. However, his assessment of how these movements shift from religious to political ones is not adequately addressed; nor is the crucial variable of leadership analyzed.

Perhaps the most important essay in this collection is that of Richard R. Fagen. Basically, his is a highly successful effort to analyze Cuban thinking regarding social change. This is dominated by the concept of Cuba's producing the "Socialist Man" as the revolutionary end-product. This transformation of men will occur during the mobilization stage of the revolution. It is this stage, according to Fagen, that still characterizes the Cuban Revolution. During this stage, as Castro clearly recognizes, abundance replaces want. How this abundance is managed, and how men are transformed into possessing a conscious awareness of themselves and their collective responsibilities appears to be one of the crucial dilemmas facing the regime.

Fagen questions whether these utopian goals can endure beyond the mobilization stage. He accurately concludes that Cuban political culture is still very dependent on the revolutionary mobilization environment, and that deeply ingrained values and patterns of behavior still exist. Should the regime succeed in creating abundance, and should the revolution move to a bureaucratic stage, the experiment in social transformation may collapse.

In summary, then, this collection of essays, while lacking in organizational structure and analytical rigor, provides some useful insights. The weaknesses of the book are not attributable to the contributors. Rather, the crucial underpinnings of organization and interpretation have not been provided by the editors.

JOHN M. BAINES

*Washington, D.C.*

**The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro.** By Maurice Halperin. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972. Pp. x, 380. $12.95.)

**Cuba, Castro, and Revolution.** Edited and with an introduction by Jaime Suchlicki. (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1972. Pp. xii, 250. $7.95.)

The vast outpouring of books on Cuba since that fateful New Year's Day of 1959 falls generally into three categories, not mutually exclusive, sometimes overlapping, and often with blurred demarcation lines. First came the spate of books by journalists trying to tell an avid American public what had happened in probably the most dramatic political upheaval ever to occur in Latin America (including the Mexican Revolution beginning in 1910). To describe these as journalistic is not entirely pejorative: some were written vividly by knowledgeable Latin Americanists and as carefully as publishers' pressing deadlines permitted; others appeared to have been ground out by hacks whose acquaintance with Cuba seemed to have been limited to an overnight stay in Havana largely spent in sampling the potables at Sloppy Joe's.

The chronologically next group was the polemical writing, either pro- or anti-Castro, in which Fidel appeared as demigod or demon, depending on the stance of the writer, and in which almost inevitably fact often gave way to fancy, and distortion and misinterpretation became commonplace. Writers of this school were found in Cuba, among the Cuban exiles in the United States, and in foreign countries. This "now-it-can-be told" genre served the purpose of revealing the passion of the authors and of bringing out personal revelations that might otherwise have been difficult to uncover, but of course bias showed through in almost every paragraph.

The third, and essentially contemporary, category of books is based on those written from a more scholarly, objective, research-based point of view and consequently will doubtless have more lasting value. Fortunately, the two books under review fall for the most part in this group.

Jaime Suchlicki, editor of *Cuba, Castro, and Revolution*, has brought together seven essays by nine scholars on various aspects of the Cuban Revolution, which he quite correctly describes as a "complex phenomenon." Suchlicki, who is associate director of the Institute of Inter-American Studies at the University of Miami, himself contributes a trenchant introduction to the volume, carefully and objectively setting the stage for the essays that follow.

The most significant recent trends, Suchlicki tells us, have been an increase in Soviet influence in Cuba, a relaxing of Cuba's fervor for exporting revolution to Latin America, indications of the collapse of the multilateral embargo against Cuba, a blind-alley economic picture for Cuba, growing regimentation and militarization, greater emphasis on the development of the "new socialist man," and institutionalization of the revolutionary role. All these are spelled out at insightful length in the remaining pages of the introduction.

Particularly timely (this review is being written at the time of the foreign ministers' meeting in Mexico City) is the comment on the Latin American trend toward normalizing political and diplomatic relations with Cuba. This dovetails, of course, with the Cuban deemphasis on export of revolution and support of guerrilla movements in the countries of the hemisphere, which in turn means a lessening of the threat to established regimes in other Latin American states. This complex of tendencies would appear to point toward an ultimate and wary regularization of United States relations with Cuba—which is perhaps as it should be—thus constituting simultaneously an obvious triumph for Cuba and a subtle underscoring of the ties that bind the Latin American states together on the one side against the United States on the other. One might paraphrase Kipling, ending with a question mark: North is North and South is South and never the twain shall meet?

For the most part the essays in the volume bear out the high standard set by Suchliki's introduction. W. Raymond Duncan, political scientist at SUNY (Brockport), writes on nationalism in Cuban politics. He traces the developing impact of nationalism in its multiform definitions on the Cuban political scene, both positively and negatively, from the time of Martí on. Cuba's isolated and strategic location was a factor in this development. Spanish immigration, eradication of the indigenous population, and intermarriage with Negroes, Duncan says, provided Cuba with a bequest of Spanish negative personality characteristics. Later came the vast infiltration of United States diplomatic and economic influence. But the advent of Castro and his colleagues, the author states, introduced, not completely successfully, "a new national social ethic."

Lowry Nelson, the eminent rural sociologist, now a senior research associate at the University of Miami, contributes an incisive, objective, hard-hitting, and well-documented essay on changes in the Cuban social structure. In the conclusions to his before-and-after analysis Nelson admits that "without extensive sociological analyses within the country" (and he has been denied readmission to Cuba) interpretations "must be regarded as extremely tentative." Among his tentative conclusions he stresses the concentration of power and authority.

Economists Sergio Roca of Adelphi University and Roberto Hernández of Miami-Dade Junior College, write a well-reasoned essay, amply supported with tabular material, on structural economic problems. They conclude (p. 88) that "after twelve years of revolutionary policies the basic structural characteristics of the Cuban economy remain unchanged," but add that "the only significant change has taken place in urban-rural differences in living standards; the city-country gap has been narrowed." The dependence on sugar continues to be excessive.

In an essay, "Creativity and Revolution: Cultural Dimensions of the New Cuba," Gemma R. Del Duca, S.C., associate in campus ministry at the University of Virginia, discusses the tone, thrust, and expression of the new writing in revolutionary Cuba; she illustrates her essay with numerous quotations from revolutionary poetry. Foy D. Kohler, a former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union and now a professor at Miami, contributes a competent, though conventional and undocumented, discussion of Soviet relations with Cuba, with much peripheral mention of the United States and a briefer discussion of the USSR vis-à-vis Chile's Allende.

Leon Goure and Julian Weinkle, both at the University of Miami, continue the analysis of Soviet-Cuban relations, with special reference to "the growing integration." The ups and downs of political and economic relations between the two countries (with a progressive trend toward the "ups") are ably traced with ample statistical illustration. Soviet influence on Cuban policies will increase, the authors predict.

The concluding essay, "Castro's Challenge to Latin American Communism," is written by M. Michael Kline, a U.S. foreign service officer. He ably traces the fluctuations in Castro's policies and attitudes toward communism and guerrilla activity in various Latin American countries, using Venezuela and Bolivia as detailed case studies. Castro's consummate skill in using and then abusing Soviet policies and positions is well treated.

All in all, the Suchlicki-edited symposium is a highly useful and usable collection of essays.

Quite a different sort of book is Maurice Halperin's *Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro,* which carries the subtitle "An Essay in Contemporary History." This volume—also valuable—deals primarily with the first half-decade of Castro's rule in Cuba, 1959–64; a second volume, covering the rest of that decade, is promised.

Halperin spent almost six years in Cuba, 1962–68, following more than three years in the USSR. He consequently speaks from long firsthand observation of the Cuban scene; even greater authenticity is given his recounting of Cuban developments by his widespread use of Cuban sources to document his chapters. ~~The main emphasis in his~~ discussion is on aspects of Cuban foreign policy, and of course those eventful years involved the Bay of Pigs, the Kennedy-Khrushchev confrontations, the missiles crisis, the CIA involvement, and other dramatic developments.

The author writes with more objectivity than one would have expected in the light of some of his earlier writing, perhaps because of a sense of growing estrangement from Che Guevara (who had invited him to Cuba) and Castro. After Che's unexpected disappearance (a prelude to the dramatic Bolivian finale of his career), Halperin wrote that "Fidel began to move in Che's direction, and in time I found myself intellectually and morally stranded." Soon after that he left Cuba and is now at the Simon Fraser University in British Columbia.

His closing chapter, "The Fifth Anniversary," deals with Castro's prideful exploitation of the accomplishments of the first half-decade of the Revolution. Perhaps the second volume will treat more of the Decline.

RUSSELL H. FITZGIBBON
*University of California, Santa Barbara*

**Soviet Political Indoctrination: Developments in Mass Media and Propaganda Since Stalin.** By Gayle Durham Hollander. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. Pp. xvii, 244. $15.00.)

Almost a quarter of a century has passed since the publication of Alex Inkeles's fundamental study, *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia.* A number of useful book length studies on various aspects of political communication in the USSR have been published since the appearance of Inkeles's masterpiece. None of them, however, including Mark Hopkins's *Mass Media in the Soviet Union* and Professor Hollander's more systematic but less readable book, are comparable in theoretical depth, expository scope, or analytical power to Inkeles's landmark study. Fortunately, we also have valuable short studies by Erik Hoffmann, Ellen Mickiewicz, Rosemarie Rogers and other young scholars on emerging trends in Soviet study and control of public opinion. Still, it appears that in terms of the increasing complexity of the task confronting them, Western analysts of Soviet political communication have been hard put to achieve the level of control over the data attained in the Stalin era.

One may well doubt that a work on Soviet political socialization or propaganda of impact or quality comparable to that of Inkeles will soon be written, not only because its author happens to be one of the ablest contemporary sociologists, but also for other reasons. Inkeles had the advantage of being a pioneer, while his successors must ~~cover ground so~~ familiar as to seem, to some degree, commonplace. To be sure, later writers have had at their disposal increasingly abundant data and of course opportunities for limited on-the-spot observation in the USSR, unavailable to their predecessors. Even more important, Stalin's system of control by mass terror has been replaced by a considerably looser, more rational pattern of rule, characterized by significantly increased opportunities for the articulation of diverse points of view, at least on instrumental, technical matters, in official media, and by enhanced, even if still very limited, regime responsiveness to elite public opinion. Changes that have occurred under Malenkov, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev, however, are still far from having altered Soviet communications—and censorship—patterns sufficiently to permit foreign scholars interested in Soviet political communication processes to bring to bear the techniques that enable their colleagues working in less tightly controlled systems to achieve in-depth understanding of public opinion and the process by which it is shaped.

Contemporary Soviet communications are characterized by a contradictory pattern of similarities to and differences from that which prevailed in Stalin's reign. The analyst's difficulties in making sense of the total post-Stalin era are compounded by the substantial changes that have occurred since Khrushchev. Khrushchev's leadership was, in respect to censorship and other controls over the expression of critical thinking, considerably more "liberal" than the post-Khrushchev period. And yet, it was under Brezhnev that applied sociology began to flourish. Social science was used to "optimize" Soviet communications practices and increase their effectiveness. Confronted by this complex pattern, scholars are torn between prudent warnings against exaggerating post-Stalin change, and efforts to do justice to the changes that have obviously occurred. The interpretive consensus that prevailed when the "totalitarian model" was more or less universally accepted has vanished.

In her introduction and first chapter, Hollander surveys Soviet concepts and techniques of socialization. She finds them still highly authoritarian, dogmatic and centralized, but also increasingly differentiated and adaptive. While this chapter draws on recent American socialization literature, its general outlook is heavily influenced by the earlier work of Nathan Leites, Alex Inkeles, and Raymond Bauer. Some of the emphases of the first chapter, such as a tendency to depict Soviet socialization efforts as extremely successful, are sharply contradicted by data and interpretation presented in later chapters, but little effort is made to reconcile the contradictions. Hollander provides one useful clue to the increasingly complex problems facing the shapers of Soviet public opinion when she calls attention to the relation between the status quo orientation of the elite and the ostensibly "revolutionary" thrust of the official creed of Leninism. Unfortunately, this and other hypotheses are offered but are not elaborated or systematically tested. One gets little sense of the dynamism involved in the complex, changing relationship between a political elite determined to preserve its monopoly control of public opinion, and in some ways better able than was the Stalin regime to do this, since, with rising standards of living and more sophisticated, less coercive techniques, it can rely more on rewards and less on threats—and a public whose demands for more and better information may be rising faster than the capability of the authorities to satisfy them.

Such explicit efforts at explanation or interpretation as are contained in this book have been mostly left behind once we are carried into the seven descriptive chapters, which deal in detail with newspapers and magazines; books; radio and television; film; agitation and propaganda; and "the Soviet audience," followed by some brief concluding remarks. A large number of very useful and interesting tables, figures, and diagrams, as well as a bibliography of works in Russian and in English, are provided.

There is no doubt that a great deal of hard and on the whole effective effort went into the writing of this book. This has paid off in a number of ways, especially in making available to students of Soviet domestic propaganda many valuable data. I found particularly interesting Hollander's descriptions and summaries of studies made by Soviet sociologists, under Communist Party supervision, of newspaper readership habits and preferences and of television program preferences, in, respectively, Chapters 2 and 4. (See pages 59–73, and 117–124.) Some of the data buried in these sections of the book are rather startling. For example, a ten-year study by an Estonian newspaper indicated that readers wanted to see published more stories on "accidents and other occurrences," a theme much more in demand than popular topics, such as "family life and love," "wages and material incentives," and "embezzlement of state property and mismanagement." However, all of these were themes that readers queried felt had received too little attention. In other parts of the study also data are presented that point up the innovative, independent role of Estonian intellectuals. No attempt is made, however, to explain these variations, for example, by associating them with cultural or other attributes of the relevant populations. Nor is any explicit attention focused on ethnicity in general as a factor creating problems for and shaping the strategy of Soviet communications policy. In recent years Roman Szporluk and other scholars have published important findings pertinent to this topic.

Very interesting data are presented on listening by Soviet citizens to foreign radio broadcasts. The author adduces facts to support her contention that "because Soviet stations are so boring and tendentious . . . people have turned to foreign stations for information and entertainment" (p. 113).

The substantive information contained in this work will be useful to students of comparative politics, communication and socialization. However, as a rule, its significance (in particular its relationship to other data) and its theoretical import are left to the reader to determine. Much of its content is raw data rather than conceptual discourse. However, despite its limitations, this is a useful and sometimes an absorbing book.

FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN

*Yale University*

**Mass Media in the Soviet Union.** By Mark W. Hopkins. (New York: Western Publishing Co., 1970. Pp. xvi, 384. $8.95.)

Hopkins, formerly the *Milwaukee Journal's* Soviet affairs specialist and now a U.S.I.A. official, has put together a useful survey of mass media in the USSR. His book is by no means a journalistic account; rather, it is a serious and careful analysis which relies heavily on Soviet scholarly literature. Because it was published in 1970, however, it can no longer be considered up to date. Interested readers will also want to consult Gayle Durham Hollander's more recent study, *Soviet Political Indoctrination* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972).

V. I. Lenin saw the Bolshevik press as "a collective propagandist, . . . a collective agitator . . . [and] a collective organizer." Half a century later, Nikita Khrushchev underscored the continuing relevance of Lenin's views. "Just as an army cannot wage war without weapons," the First Secretary remarked, "the Party cannot conduct its ideological work successfully without such a sharp and militant weapon as the press." In examining the Soviets' distinctive conception of their press, Hopkins isolates six major functions which the media are called upon to perform. The Soviet press, he argues, is: (1) an instrument of political socialization and politicization, (2) a mass mobilizer, (3) a "keeper of the morals," (4) a public forum and social critic, (5) an educator and reporter, and (6) a mass entertainer and merchandiser.

The early chapters of the volume provide a general overview of the development of the Soviet media under Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev. Later chapters deal with newspapers and periodicals, radio and television, and TASS and Novosti. The concluding chapter explores the relationship between "the people's press" and "the people," i.e., the extent to which the Soviet media actually achieve the objectives set for them.

The book's principal strength (one it shares with the Hollander volume and with several briefer studies by Rosemarie Rogers) lies in the presentation of Soviet surveys dealing with the reading, listening, and viewing habits of Soviet citizens. These studies point out, for example, that newspaper readers are strongly attracted to feature articles, human interest stories, and other light, nonpolitical items. Materials on economics or politics, other than those dealing with international affairs, appeal to a far more limited audience. Indeed, Soviet research has shown that "solid political and economic information and propaganda rank lowest in reader interest" (p. 322). Surveys of broadcast journalism provide equally intriguing results.

Hopkins writes well. His presentation is straightforward, clear, and unencumbered by scholarly jargon. On occasion, he shows a gift for clever writing, as in his reference to *Pravda* as "a pacesetter in lifeless journalism" (p. 121). (This, of course, is a view which few students of Soviet politics would challenge.)

Nonetheless, the volume is not without flaws; in particular, it does not always deal adequately with questions that interest political scientists. Thus, Hopkins devotes no attention whatsoever to the Soviet cinema, and some of his efforts to compare Soviet and American media are forced and misleading. To suggest, for example, that "*Pravda* is to Soviet society what *The New York Times* is to American" (p. 182) is unfair to both newspapers and to both political systems. Perhaps most important, Hopkins barely touches on the role of the press in Kremlin power struggles. He fails to mention the famous "debates" between *Pravda* and *Izvestia* in 1954 and 1965, and he does not attempt to explore the process by which speeches of leading political figures (including Politburo members) are censored by those responsible for the media.

Despite these weaknesses, *Mass Media in the Soviet Union* is a worthy addition to the literature on Soviet affairs. It contains much that is new and helpful to Soviet specialists, and it will be of interest to students of mass communications and political socialization as well.

DAVID E. POWELL

*University of Virginia*

**The Parliamentary Diary of Narcissus Luttrell, 1691–1693.** Edited by Henry Horwitz. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1973. Pp. xvi, 538. £10.00; $32.00.)

This substantial compilation by Luttrell, a bibliophile and analyst, fills some of the gaps in Grey's *Debates* for the third and fourth sessions of the Parliament of 1690–95. It is not a diary in the personal sense but—to employ Luttrell's own title—"An Abstract of the Debates, Orders and Resolutions in the House of Commons which are not printed in their votes." The text is allowed to speak for itself, and the apparatus of explanation, apart from a brief introduction and an appendix of speakers and tellers, is kept to a minimum.

The debates provide gleanings on procedure, the behavior of the Speaker, and anxiety over the decaying timbers of the House itself and other topics, but their dominant themes were taxes, trade, the trading companies, and all aspects of war. In their perusal a dominant figure was the septuagenarian, Sir Thomas Clarges, brother-in-law of Monck and that same man who had carried the invitation of return to Charles II in 1660. Evidently believing that England had been drawn into war by Dutch interests, he constantly questioned the navy estimates and the handling of military affairs. At the beginning of the fourth session, after deploring the sparse attendance, he challenged the device of coupling support for war policies with thanks for the King's speech and congratulations on his safe return. He asserted that the nation was in a very bad condition, that there could be no divorce between advice and supply, and that there should be no suggestion that they were committed to supply before they had been informed. "If a King of England will make war out of his own purse, God forbid we should meddle in it. But if a King of England will make war by our advice, I desire we may look a little into matters, and alliances to carry on the same may be made also with our advice" (p. 305). Monarchy or republic, this had been an issue since the 1620s.

The House agreed to observe 30 January as a day of humiliation for the martyrdom of Charles I. Closer events, if more palatable, were even more embarrassing and emphasized by the presence of foreigners. Alien officers in the army aroused disquiet, and the thanks voted to General Ginkel for his services in Ireland prompted some grudging remarks in debate. William himself was unavoidable—Mary was largely acknowledged as a formality—but even so, the mood inclined toward pretending that nothing had happened and that the theory of the constitution was settled. Yet many of the old doubts and fears remained, not least because the capable William exercised powers which were not all that different from those of his two predecessors. Hence the bill for frequent calling and meetings of Parliament, originating in the House of Lords, aroused divided feelings. Clarges approved, but Sir Richard Temple saw it as being "against the constitution of this government. It usurps on the very being and essence of this House, undermines the King's prerogative in a high degree, and is a precedent—the first in kind but may not be the last, whenever the Lords do not like the face of this House" (p. 392).

Professor Horwitz, picking up the mantle of Sir Keith Feiling, believes that these years were vital for the development of a "new country party"—an alliance of "commonwealth men" and prerevolutionary courtiers—who engaged the Court on such issues as army supply and place bills. These concerns "jostled uneasily" (p. x) with party issues, though the style of the time may be noted in Luttrell's usage of the labels "Whig" and "Tory": the first receives seven references and the latter none at all. Much commentary has poured fourth in recent years, but there has been a need for contemporary accounts. Luttrell's pragmatic reporting of debates is therefore particularly valuable.

W. J. JONES

*University of Alberta, Canada*

**The Republic of Armenia, Volume I: The First Year, 1918–1919.** By Richard G. Hovannisian. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972. Pp. 547. $15.00.)

This volume, the first of three projected, treats the Armenian Republic, "a barren and isolated land, abounding with rocks and mountains, orphans and refugees, heartache and misery" (p. 38). Fashioned in the Russian Caucasus, the Republic wholly excluded the historic Armenian provinces of Turkey. Its prospects for success were slim. Within the Caucasus much of its territory lay beyond the effective range of its authority, while many of the citizens within that range avoided the obligations of paying taxes. Its boundaries were insecure.

The forging of the apparatus of government enjoyed first priority. Accordingly, Hovannisian briefly describes the formation of the Khorhurd (the national legislature), the selection of Hovhannes Kachaznuni (leader of the Dashnakists) as premier, and the operations of the American Relief Administration. But clearly his greater concern is with the enervating struggles between the Republic and its neighbors.

As Hovannisian sees it, the Armenian leadership felt threatened by the specter of encirclement by hostile Muslims and suspicious Georgians. A brief, indecisive war with Georgia in December 1918 taxed the physical and material energies of both republics, forcing the two governments to come to terms. Realizing that the recrudescence of Pan-Turanism posed a threat to political stability in the Caucasus, the British materially aided the Armenians in securing their borders, so that as the Armenian Republic reached its first anniversary it seemed that it would encompass most of what had been Russian Armenia.

The big question was whether the Allies, meeting at Paris, would support Armenian efforts to create a single state embracing both Turkish and Russian Armenians. Despite cultural and historical differences, the Armenian representatives at the Paris Conference worked to promote their common interests. While the Allied Powers expressed sympathy for the Armenians and endorsed the principle of self-determination, the existence of an independent Armenia, incorporating both Turkish and Russian areas, was not essential to the national interests of any of the Allies. Indeed, the establishment of a united, independent Armenia might preclude the realization of British, French, and Italian interests in the Near East. Woodrow Wilson further confused the settlement by uttering personal expressions of hope that the United States would accept a mandate for Armenia while evading commitments to do so when in the company of the Allied foreign ministers.

As the Allies parried and the United States vaçillated, the fate of the Armenian Republic increasingly depended upon its relations with the Soviet Union and the Turkish nationalists. Hovannisian concludes that "neither Nationalist Turkey nor Soviet Russia could countenance an independent Armenia on former Ottoman and Romanov territories" (p. xi); that Lenin endorsed self-determination chiefly as a means of ridding Russia of foreign intervention in its borderlands; and that the Turkish nationalist movement, rooted in "the heart of Turkish Armenia," was determined "to entomb all Armenian pretensions" to these lands (p. 416). The paradox was that "the Armenian leadership was convinced that without Turkish Armenia the Republic could achieve neither security nor viability, while the new Turkish leadership [Kemal] was equally certain that national integrity was inconceivable without the eastern Anatolian highlands—Turkish Armenia. The arena was thus prepared for mortal combat" (p. 447).

This carefully researched work, while sketching a sympathetic picture of Armenian aspirations, nonetheless provides a carefully weighed assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the Armenian leadership as well as a clear view of the conflicting interests of those nations whose policies would determine the fate of the Armenian Republic. The broad range of its sources, including archival materials of the Republic of Armenia, is impressive. A profusion of maps and pictures aids the reader. For the period covered this work supersedes all its predecessors.

ROBERT L. DANIEL

*Ohio University*

**The Chilean Road to Socialism.** Edited by Dale L. Johnson. (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, 1973. Pp. 546. $2.95, paper.)

**The Chilean Road to Socialism.** Edited by J. Ann Zammit. (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press and Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, England, 1973. Pp 464. $13.50.)

In 1973, two books about Chile under Allende were published with an identical title. Both are basically favorable to what the Popular Unity government was attempting to do. Yet they could not be more different in content, tone, and scholarly value. One is a work of political propaganda, the other an attempt at a careful analysis of the *via chilena* which is all the more valuable because much of it is in the words of members of the Allende government at a point midway between his election and his overthrow. Regrettably the very inferior book, that edited by Johnson, is in paperback and widely available, while the more useful work, edited by J. Ann Zammit, is published by a university press at a prohibitively high price.

The Johnson volume begins with a notably disingenuous introduction in which the editor states, "I have consciously chosen not to editorialize," letting "Chileans speak for themselves" (p. xiv). What follows can only be described as a blatantly distorted view of Chilean politics from the point of view of the left wing of the Allende coalition. The conservatives get six pages (in a 546-page book) extracted from an extreme rightist magazine. The fifteen-page chapter entitled "Christian Democracy" contains only an article by the extreme left MIR attacking Eduardo Frei, the former Christian Democratic president, and (inexplicably) a reply by the Communists to a few critical remarks about them in that article. That noted expert on Chilean politics, Fidel Castro, is represented by a speech on Chilean fascism and on women in politics. The murder of Frei's Minister of Interior, Edmundo Perez Zujovic, is attributed to groups "in contact with foreign elements" and "infiltrated by the reactionary sectors," (pp. 391–392), and former president Frei himself is described as having ordered "from his desk, that dozens of miners, settlers, employees, students, women, and children be killed" (p. 364).

In the editor's zeal to attribute all possible malevolence to U.S. policy (the first 150 pages are devoted to the U.S. role), he includes items asserting that the Food for Peace program was cut off under the Allende government (it was increased) and that "all international agencies under U.S. influence have suspended all forms of aid to Chile" (p. 491). It is true that except for two educational loans by the IDB no new loans to Chile were voted by the World Bank and the Interamerican Development Bank, but pipeline aid continued in the amount of $46 million from the World Bank and $54 million from the IDB, while the International Monetary Fund lent Chile a total of $83.3 million in 1971 and 1972.

Political scientists reading the Johnson book will be interested in the way that James Petras manipulates figures to show that Allende's support increased in 1970 over 1964 when his overall percentage of the vote dropped from 39 per cent to 36 per cent. Petras does this by comparing Allende's vote with those of each of the two candidates running against him in 1970 (Alessandri and Tomic) and running these comparisons against Allende's results against a *single* rival, Eduardo Frei, in 1964.

Much more enlightening than this example of the "committed research" endorsed on page 328 of the Johnson book, is the other work by the same title published in this country by the University of Texas Press. Based on a round table organized in March 1972 by the Chilean Planning Office (ODEPLAN) and the Institute of Development Studies of the University of Sussex, it presents in the policymakers' own words their view of the Allende government at midpoint—three months before inflationary pressures blew the lid off the Chilean economy resulting in a series of economic and political crises which culminated in the September 1973 coup. U.S. policy is only discussed late in the book, and the emphasis is placed, as it should be, on economics, agricultural reform, copper production and the balance of payments, and the Allende government's experiments with worker participation. The book also includes nearly 100 pages of documents of varying usefulness and four almost totally irrelevant (because not related to the Chilean situation) papers on socialism in Hungary, Cuba, Tanzania, and Yugoslavia.

Of particular interest to those who are attempting to sort out the plusses and minuses of the Allende experience is the paper by Pedro Vuskovic, Minister of Economics until June 1972, and head of the Chilean Development Corporation thereafter. Vuskovic admits that "a central objective of economic policy is to widen political support for the Government" (p. 50), thus helping to explain an otherwise inexplicable inflationary policy (e.g., the increase in the money supply between 1970 and 1973 by over 1,500 per cent) carried out under his auspices with results that a trained economist such as he should have been able to foresee. In discussing the takeover of industry, Vuskovic does not mention the legal "loopholes" of "intervention" and "requisition" used to take over most firms and devised by another contributor, Eduardo Novoa, Allende's legal advisor. Like most of those represented in the volume, he exhibits an almost naive optimism about the future (one contributor predicts "the slow conversion to socialism of the Armed Forces, the Christian Democrats, and of the middle classes—p. 236), at the very time that it was beginning to become clear that the apparent economic success of the first year in office had only been bought at a very high price for succeeding years.

The chapter on agrarian reform is useful in explaining why the Allende government rejected the preceding government's policy of transitional cooperatives and eventual distribution of land to the peasantry. This was opposed because it would result in the establishment of a new class of peasant capitalists while ignoring the overwhelming majority of those living on the land. The chapter also includes useful information about the "Centers of Agrarian Reform" and state farms which the Allende government preferred to the Frei-initiated cooperatives. (Again a legal loophole, a clause in the 1967 agrarian reform law referring to agrarian technical assistance centers, was used to give a specious legality to the new forms.)

It is an indication of how late in the Allende administration the military became a political force that there is no reference to the role of the Chilean armed forces until the last paper on Chile in the book and even then, most of the ensuing discussion centers around relations of the government and the Christian Democrats. The book does not discuss the educational policy of the Allende government, a significant omission, since it was the disastrous attempt to establish a Unified National School, (ENU), immediately after the March 1973 Congressional elections, which accelerated political polarization, alienated the Church, and gave the upper hand to the hardliners in the armed forces and in the Christian Democratic party. Only passing mention is given to the alternative quasi-self-governing structures in industrial and low-income areas—the much-discussed "popular power"—the emergence of which as a potential armed alternative to the military seems to have accelerated the decision to stage the September coup.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is poignant to read the one contribution by someone not involved with the Allende government, a brilliant paper by Radomiro Tomic, the Christian Democratic candidate in 1970. Tomic pleads for the establishment of an "institutional majority" behind the Allende government through a "far-reaching agreement" between the Christian Democrats and the Popular Unity coalition. He describes Allende's failure to attempt to reach such an agreement as "a fatal political error" (p. 38) —as indeed it was. At least from the evidence in this book, there seemed to be no interest on the part of the Popular Unity leadership in arriving at such an agreement which was considered to be an unnecessary and dangerous compromise when with a "gradual heightening of the political consciousness of the proletariat, there seem to be no obstacles in the internal logic of the Chilean bourgeois state to prevent the workers from winning sufficient strength to gain control of the legislature as well as the Executive" (p. 247).

Now that most of the Chilean participants in the Round Table are either imprisoned, in exile, or in asylum in various Santiago embassies, this book is even more valuable. One can only hope that the University of Texas Press may see fit to have a shortened version (omitting the papers on other countries and some of the less useful documentation) published in paperback. It is an invaluable sourcebook on a fascinating period in Latin American politics.

PAUL E. SIGMUND

*Princeton University*

**Dissent and the State in Peace and War: An Essai on the Grounds of Public Morality.** By Morton A. Kaplan. (New York: The Dunellen Co., Inc., 1970. Pp. 172. $6.95.)

Much of this book was written in the late 1960s as a response to a growing measure of what the author clearly saw as mindless violence, unreasoning dissent, and uninformed and unconstructive criticism of governmental policy both within and outside American universities. Since then, of course, the situation on the campuses has become less tense, and much has happened both in America's domestic experience and in the wider world to outdate some of the particulars of Professor Kaplan's observations and prognoses. On the other hand, his plea that our moral judgments should be both informed and grounded in reason, and some of his generalizations concerning the complexities and dilemmas of statecraft, the problems of dissent in a representative democracy, the nature of the educational process, and so on are as germane today as I believe them to have been then.

Professor Kaplan is surely right to insist that before we attempt to translate our moral precepts into practice we should consider the logical implications and the possible consequences of our acts, both for ourselves and for the wider community of which we are a part. And few political scientists will quarrel with his view that criticisms of current policy or of the current political order are empty unless based on some understanding of the context within which decisions are made and of the feasible alternatives, if any, open to the decision makers. Moreover, his admonition to academics, scientists and other intellectuals "who allow their value preferences to interfere with their critical judgments and then present conclusions as scientific that were determined instead by their prejudices" (p. 28) is in my view especially timely when, as Professor Kaplan points out, many distinguished minds endorse campaigns to propagate fashionable causes with scant regard for factual information, reasoned argument, or even moral scruple. In addition there are in the work some nice moral distinctions: between popular involvement in policy making and popular control of policy making; between the right to dissent and the right to get one's way; between the best-reasoned case and the best case.

These merits notwithstanding, it is in many ways an irritating book, and it is not merely the American dissenter who is likely to be infuriated. In the first place, the analysis is remarkably insular, for although the book purports to be about dissent and the state in peace and war, it is in fact narrowly focused on the United States, as if other countries and peoples did not also have their moral dilemmas. And if not exactly an apologia for recent American foreign policy, it does seem to accept with little question much of the conventional wisdom of the State Department. We "learn," for example that the Eisenhower administration was "anxious" to grant Castro aid and that the Cuban leader "deliberately refused to ask for it" (p. 31). We "discover" that the United States has always been careful to avoid breaches of international law in its policy on overseas intervention (p. 32). We find that during the Vietnamese War the Administration protected civil liberties to an unprecedented degree, (p. 82) and are forewarned that Communist China's conditions for membership of the United Nations would be so onerous as to be unacceptable to the organization (p. 142). With American "values" so much to the fore in this work, one is hardly surprised when towards the end of his analysis the author gives his qualified approval to the idea of an America which incorporates Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Israel and a number of other countries on the way to establishing a world-wide "democratic" empire. Surely, insularity and insensitivity to the values of others can hardly go much further than this.

If the orientation of the work is somewhat off-putting, its appeal is hardly enhanced by its diffuse structure (which is presumably why it is an essai rather than an essay) or by the author's somewhat turgid and convoluted style and idiosyncratic use of English. To quote a characteristic example: "Since the hobbling of government policy rarely permits the substitution of a different and better (depending on the point of view) policy, it usually works harm even with respect to the aims of those who attack the policy decisions. The legitimation of the failure to abide by the normal methods of changing policy by changing governments at elections would destroy the consensus on the basis of which effective external policy is possible. It seems difficult to justify this, except from an exceptionally arrogant point of view, unless one is willing to make the judgment either that the government in general is evil or that a particular policy is so evil that all these other risks become acceptable. Although either conclusion might be true and although there are historical examples where each has been true, it would seem that this conclusion would not lightly be arrived at by responsible people. This would seem to be particularly true in democracies where governments must periodically submit themselves to the people" (p. 89).

Moreover, if he raises important questions that deserve serious consideration, he all too frequently begs important questions, and assumes what has to be proved. In one page, for example, he talks about "free men," "a free society," "a proper educational process," and "the self-serving hypocrisies and pomposities of the common academic intellectual position," without any definition of terms. In another page in a plethora of question-begging and obscurantist phrases he declares: "those who impose their idiocies on the world are merely comedians, and badly educated ones at that. Education is the key, for only the properly educated can understand, appreciate, and work towards freedom. We are what we learn to be" (Preface, xv). Serious arguments, I feel, are not served by vague and subjective phraseology of this kind. But then clarity is not Professor Kaplan's strong point.

In a work of a purportedly philosophical nature a writer, however interesting, timely and original his ideas, has to be especially careful to avoid being misunderstood. Unfortunately in this work the author has not been as lucid as the subjects under analysis warrant, and if I have failed in this review to put Professor Kaplan's treatise in proper perspective, the fault, I feel, is hardly mine alone.

GEOFFREY STERN
*London School of Economics*

**In the Name of Tomorrow: Life Underground in Poland.** By Nina Karsov and Szymon Szechter. (New York: Schocken Books, 1971. Pp. 285. $7.50.)

In 1970 the authors were involved in a real-life drama. Nina Karsov, personal secretary of Szymon Szechter, a Polish historian and old-time Communist, had been imprisoned in Poland. To facilitate her release and emigration, Szechter divorced his wife and married Miss Karsov. The original Mrs. Szechter migrated to England, soon to be joined by the newlyweds. There, the Szechter-Karsov union was dissolved and Szechter and his exwife remarried. The London press made much of the affair at the time—unfortunately, however, the political aspects of the story were lost in the waves of sensationalism.

Karsov and Szechter were arrested in the mid-sixties for taking "illegal" notes at the trials of Polish Communist dissidents (the famous Kuron-Modzelewski affair). Their book is a highly readable, although oddly structured, account of their travails, of life and politics in People's Poland—especially during the period of growing conservatism and officially sanctioned anti-Semitism. The first part of the book consists of a somewhat dramatized narrative of their experiences; the last part, entitled "Nina Karsov's Diary" (but written by Szechter alone), contains the more interesting insights and generalizations.

The book was written prior to the workers' riots of December 1970 and the replacement of Gomulka by Gierek. One may assume, however, that not much has changed in the basic features of the political system (which Szechter refers to as "The Method") although it now operates with perhaps greater efficiency. The authors point out that the liberalization policies which followed on the heels of the "Polish October" of 1956, turned increasingly sour in the early sixties. The "liberal" forces, centered primarily among the intelligentsia and academic youth, we are told, were easily manipulated by the authorities, and capable of "cackling" but not of organized and effective oppositionary action.

Although the authors describe the sociocultural atmosphere in "dog-eat-dog" terms (a Polish variant of the often analyzed Soviet "*kto kavo*"), they retain a perhaps doctrinaire faith in the capacity of the working class to resist increasing bureaucratization, leadership conservatism, and systemic depersonalization—hence the title of the book. The events of 1970 and afterward may indeed justify such faith. Yet, the ruling elite whose social and personal composition becomes frozen as time moves on, is also faced with threats from the least suspected quarters—their own offspring, socialized and nurtured on the normative goals of the revolution which they still take seriously. This elite youth is increasingly disenchanted with the revolution's accomplishments and bitter about the system's failures and increased bureaucratization, and it is they who "cackle" the most. The leadership's mainstay is the conservative middle class, eager for jobs and security, populated by sycophants and careerists, whose loyalty—in the long run—is, however, highly questionable.

The ideology is used as a source of operational myths which, along with some of the traditional Polish myths, are used to keep the masses in line. One of the myths is that an imminent Jewish-"Zionist" conspiracy is threatening Polish national interests and cultural purity. Traditional as this myth is, many Polish liberals and opponents of the system fall easy victim to it and are prone to give the government the benefit of the doubt at least on that score. It was suggested to Nina Karsov while in prison that if she admitted she was an innocent tool in the hands of the Jew

Szechter, she would be freed. When she refused to do so, the authorities unearthed the fact that she was also Jewish (she was thrown as a child from a speeding train transporting Jews to an extermination camp during the Nazi occupation and subsequently adopted by a Polish Christian family). Why else would she not cooperate patriotically with Polish authorities? Although there are hardly any Jews left in Poland nowadays, the myth of a massive Jewish presence is perpetuated and given semiofficial credence by the fact that many Polish Jews have assumed Christian-sounding surnames. Ironically many Jews, Communist activists in particular, did so indeed at the suggestion of the authorities themselves immediately after the Communists came to power when they were in need of the services of Jewish loyalists and experts—since Christian Poles were initially somewhat reluctant to join the movement. Similarly, many unpopular governmental policies have been and are being justified in terms of the myth of the ever-present "Soviet threat" (i.e., fear of Soviet intervention if something displeasing to Moscow is done or something pleasing not done). An old-time Communist activist himself, Szechter is particularly sensitive to the misuse of Marxist theories and symbols. In this system, he points out, "pure" Marxism is "illegal Marxism" as is the singing of the "Internationale" on nonsanctioned occasions. However, diverse claims to ideological purity become additional tools in the confrontation between the authorities and the intra-Party opposition.

A more dispassionate (or detached) reader cannot overcome the feeling, however, that Karsov's and Szechter's literary style and gift for drama obscure the comparative implications of many of their observations. Many features of the Polish academic scene which they describe, for example, are not unfamiliar to students of campus politics in the United States. It would also appear that liberals East or West suffer from many of the same maladies. Similarly, the tendency of those in power to rationalize their violations of legality and their administrative arbitrariness in terms of "national security" is not unique to the Polish ruling elite nor to Communist leadership—viz., the behavior of our own administration, especially in relationship to Watergate and related scandals, or that of the French government on the recent disclosures of widespread wiretaps there. In like manner, in order to give depth to their picture of widespread social degradation existent today in Poland, the authors tend to glamorize, by contrast, the alleged steadfastness displayed by the masses at the time of the Nazi occupation.

The book, although readable, may be somewhat confusing because of its frequent references to persons no longer politically active or otherwise not widely known outside of the country. The occasional "clarifying" footnotes (added by someone other than the authors) are not very enlightening and, indeed, are sometimes outright misleading on that score. Despite a rather acute sensitivity to the nature of "The Method," there is also in the book perhaps an excessive stress on the roles of particular personalities (e.g., Gomulka, Moczar, Cyrankiewicz). Regardless of such shortcomings, the book holds an enormous fascination for those familiar with Poland and will be of interest to those intrigued by East European politics.

JOSEPH R. FISZMAN

*University of Oregon*

**International Manual on Collective Bargaining for Public Employees.** Edited by Seymour P. Kaye and Arthur I. Marsh. Foreword by Theodore W. Kheel. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973. Pp. 389. $25.00.)

This volume surveys the legal status and recent evolution of collective bargaining by public employees in the United States and five western European countries. One of Praeger's "Special Studies in International Politics and Government," it is identified as a symposium and is not a "manual" in the sense of an operational handbook.

One in six American workers is a government employee, and about four-fifths of these nearly 13 million people are in state and local government. In the last twenty years, the state and local sectors have accounted for most of the doubled growth in public employment, and similar expansion is projected for the seventies.

The central concern of this book is the way in which various countries respond to the emergence of public sector employee activism and, in particular, to the critical issues of strikes as challenges to public authority. The European systems described are all parliamentary democracies having a private enterprise economic base with more public ownership than the United States.

Dispositions toward public sector bargaining differ widely along a spectrum from Sweden with qualified strike privileges to legal prohibitions in most of the United States. Germany, Belgium and the United Kingdom share a de facto prohibition. Italy is unique in having the 1948 constitutional organizational rights unimplemented by statute, thus leaving the 1931 penal code technically in force.

Despite variations in cultural tradition, law and practice, the several essays support editor Kaye's conclusion in the summary chapter that prevailing patterns transcend national borders. Public workers in all professions increasingly behave like other workers when they are dissatisfied and use similar techniques of protest and coercion. The adaptiveness of contemporary government is shown by the tendency of authorities to react as though stoppages were legal and to refrain from reprisals.

The emphasis is on rights and systems rather than on negotiating techniques and contractual details. Readers with little background in bargaining should be mindful of the distance between national agreements and the resolution of problems faced by employees and their supervisors at the work site. Specialists in comparative labor relations are likely to find little that is new. Others will find the tightly packed chapters a useful introduction.

The risk inherent in undertaking such a volume is that rapid and volatile developments may render both data and conclusions obsolete. The material for the most part deals with the situation as of 1971, based on data for the 1968–1970 period.

The chapter on the United States brings the federal situation up to direct postal bargaining. The New York City case experience may be out of proportion for comparative purposes. The qualified strike privileges in the Pennsylvania and Hawaii statutes are discussed, but most state provisions are simply presented in tabular form as of 1970.

No reason is given for the selection of countries. The Canadian situation would have been instructive for students of comparative politics. Mr. Kaye attributes a relative advantage to the centralized decision making in unitary parliamentary systems in contrast to the local autonomy in the United States and our separation between the executive and legislative branches of government.

Serious public employee strikes have occurred in such different countries as Sweden and Italy, and the book is not designed to accommodate explanatory sociopolitical analysis; nor does it relate the decisive effect of incomes policy on British administration of employment relations to the inflation control problems shared by the United States. Professor Marsh does, however, very usefully show the interaction of British national economic policy and industrial relations.

National basic agreements dominate the European countries and complicate understanding of important unit determination and exclusive representation differences. The reader is left to infer possible distinctions between the California style "meet and confer" state level obligations and the joint consultation tradition of British "Whitleyism" and other European counterparts. Codetermination in nationalized industries is not analyzed.

Political scientists may be encouraged toward further study of civil service systems impacted by bargaining. Senior public officials who have no bargaining rights are distinguished from lesser employees at national or municipal level or all employees in independent public corporations who may have full rights equivalent to those in the private sector. A definition of public servant or "state official" is crucial for resolving compatibility between full bargaining rights and civil service tenure. The Norwegian commentator (relegated to the appendix) holds that collective resort to force is not reconcilable with their present system of "irremovable" civil servants.

More integrative editing and comparative analysis would be helpful, although the editors make plain their intent to promote understanding by exploring the various situations without elaborate conceptual introductions. Mr. Kaye directs his closing remarks toward harmony of interests and unity of understanding, which suggests a possibly inappropriate concept of conflict resolution. R. H. Tawney noted in *The Acquisitive Society* (1920, p. 40) that "the disputes which matter are not caused by a misunderstanding of identity of interests, but by a better understanding of diversity of interests."

The book seems rather expensive for use other than in reference collections, and at that price a typewriter which justified right hand margins might have been used. The notes are in the back, which is awkward for the extensive explanatory material footnoted in the chapters on the U.S. and Britain. There is no index. Typographical errors are few and of no consequence except possibly for the use of "regency" review for agency review on page 20 in the U.S. chapter.

HARRY F. STARK

*Rutgers University*

**Belgium's Return to Neutrality: An Essay in the Frustrations of Small Power Diplomacy.** By David Owen Kieft. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972. Pp. 201. $13.75.)

Professor Kieft's *Belgium's Return to Neutrality* is a very interesting and well-constructed book which analyzes the respective impact of major international events (the Rhineland Crisis, the British refusal to sign a military alliance), of Belgian popular movements (Rexism and Flemish nationalism) and of political men (Van Zeeland, Van Langenhove, King Leopold III, etc.) on the redefinition of the Belgian international status in 1936–37. The most interesting aspect of the book is doubtless its very fine analysis of the interaction of external and internal sources of Belgium's return to neutrality.

However, readers not familiar with the extreme complexity of Belgium's domestic politics (principally affected by linguistic, religious or clerical and socioeconomic conflicts) will strongly regret the lack of a preliminary chapter clarifying the complexity of the major Belgian political forces, conflicts, and solidarities. The author himself seems to confuse Walloons and French-speaking Belgians: the paper *La Libre Belgique*, for example, is not a Walloon paper (p. 51); it is (or it was) essentially the paper of the conservative, Christian, French-speaking people of Wallonia, Brussels, and the Flemish provinces. The Liberal party (in the European acceptance of the word) is not a Walloon party; it is a party dominated by the conservative, anti-clerical, French-speaking peoples of Brussels. Brussels is not Wallonia.

The book's subtitle, "An Essay in the Frustrations of *Small Power* Diplomacy," suggests a more theoretical analysis of the foreign policy or behavior of the small powers, as a specific category of states. Unfortunately, the book does not meet these expectations. Liska's theoretical book *International Equilibrium* is quoted, while Rothstein's *Alliances and Small Powers*, Vital's *Inequality of States*, Sveics's *Small Nations Survival*, and Keohane's, Laux's, and other authors' articles about the behavior of small states in international politics have not been consulted. This literature would have helped the author to contribute on one point, in a final chapter, to the theory of international relations.

The bibliography is incomplete: influential newspapers such as *La Libre Belgique* and the *Standaard* are not mentioned while they are frequently quoted in the text. Finally, there are several spelling mistakes in the French words (pp. 24, 51, 88, 189, 193, 194, 195) as well as in surnames of Belgian politicians (Van Langenhove, de Kerchove) and authors (De Raeymaeker).

JEAN BARREA
*Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium*

**Immigrants from India in Israel: Planned Change in an Administered Community.** By Gilbert Kushner. (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1973. Pp. 151. $6.95, paper.)

Dr. Kushner is a man with a thesis: that planned social change in a community is unlikely to result in self-government in that community. Carrying out the change means creating a bureaucracy whose relation to the populace is that of giving orders or punishments with little concern for their wishes or demands. This experience creates expectations inconsistent with self-government.

His thesis is illustrated by the case of "Bet Avi," a *moshav olim* (new immigrant farming settlement) in Israel's Judean Hills, settled by Jews from the Indian state of Kerala, the Cochin Jews. Eight years after settlement, "Bet Avi" was still run by members of the government, Histadrut (trade-union), and Jewish Agency bureaucracies rather than by, as in the *Moshav Ovdim* (cooperative farming settlement), representatives of the farmers.

In his book, Dr. Kushner describes the life of Jews in the Cochin area before the migration to Israel. He then discusses the general Israeli environment and the role that the *Moshav Olim* was to play in adaptation of new immigrants, few of whom had farming backgrounds, to a new life as Israeli farmers. After discussing the processes of life in "Bet Avi," Dr. Kushner goes on to present comparative material from U.S. Indian reservations and from World War II internment camps for Japanese-Americans.

Yet, questions remain. Are eight years (1953–62) enough time for Cochini traders to become Israeli farmers? The book, especially considering its size and price, would benefit from consideration of the past decade. Since, unlike most Jewish communities, the "Black" Cochin Jewish community was itself "administered"—run by synagogue trustees who apparently did not migrate to Israel and surely not to "Bet Avi"—is "Bet Avi" a fair example of the *Moshav Olim's* success. The greater success of Iraqi migrants (who came with their elites) as compared to Moroccans (who did not) in adapting to Israeli conditions, suggests that the "Black" Cochin Jews were handicapped in Israel by the decision of "White" and well-to-do "Black" Jews to remain in Kerala.

For the political scientist, there is a special problem. Unlike Japanese-Americans or American Indians, Israeli immigrants are not "exotic" to their political system. Central themes of Israeli society and polity have been the need to extend the range of Jewish settlement as "Bet Avi" was established to help create a corridor of Jewish settlement between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, and the effort of the Eastern European socialist elite to politically socialize religious immigrants from the Middle East. For these migrants, together with their children, comprise the vast majority of Israel's population. Israel's democracy, and the fate of the parties within that democracy, depend on their votes.

While Chapter 3 of the book is called "The Israeli Setting," this context is not discussed. Has the Histadrut bureaucracy convinced "Bet Avi's" voters to support the labor parties? Indeed, how did the village, originally composed of Orthodox Jews, come to be assigned to secularist rather than religious sponsorship. And since Israeli schools still have political and religious links, it would be worth knowing what type of school "Bet Avi's" children attend.

As an anthropologist, Dr. Kushner need not provide political scientists with what they want. But his book's thesis would be more discussible, and more illuminating for future efforts at social change, had he considered planners' goals other than self-government and the extent to which self-government is consistent with those goals.

Stephen Oren

*New York University*

**The Huks: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt.** By Eduardo Lachica. (New York: Praeger Special Studies, Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. 342. $15.00.)

This is an interesting book both because of its subject matter and the competence of the author. This work is the first full-scale study of the Huks. The fact that the author is an intelligent journalist, utilizing research done by scholars, rather than an academic analyst appears to have been an advantage in this case. The grounds for this apparent advantage spring from the nature of the Huk movement which has changed so many times that it is difficult to fit it into a rigid analytical framework. In fact, when one reads the book one wonders whether the various Huk incarnations and permutations should be considered one continuing movement in flux, or rather a variety of movements.

These different incarnations reflect, of course, changes in the underlying social and economic background as well as in the nature of the reaction of the authorities and their armed forces to the Huk movement. In a perverse way, the failure of the Huk movement to acquire a position of power makes it a uniquely interesting subject for study. The changing nature of its activities is to a large extent a mirror of the changes in the society in which it has operated. The Huks traversed the whole gamut: reformers, nationalist freedom fighters, guerrilla revolutionaries, partial collaborators with "legitimate" political leaders, bandits, and fair-weather partners of radical urban intellectuals. These varying phases are well documented in the book.

Recent activities of some Huk groups resemble more the activities of the Mafia during the 1920s and 1930s than those of guerrilla groups like the Viet Cong. Although various Huk groups were motivated by some "ideology," it was seldom well articulated since it was more "emotional" than "intellectual," to use the author's characterization. In the few cases when the ideology was well articulated, it turned out to have little to do with the actual aims and activities of the movement. As the author rightly points out this characteristic is also found in other Philippine political organizations as well, and is not unique to the Huks.

In the specific case of the Huks, the author points out, most members come from relatively remote villages with barely the educational equipment necessary to comprehend Marxism-Leninism. Even some of the popular leaders were not adequately equipped in that regard. Cooperation with intellectuals invariably failed. The Huks often felt exploited by the city ideologues with whom they cooperated, a feeling which led to an eventual parting of the ways. As is often the case, failure was a major factor in this mutual disillusionment.

One of the most interesting aspects of the Huk movement is that it has been almost exclusively comprised of the people of the Pampanga province, a phenomenon to which Mr. Lachica devotes a substantial amount of analysis. Sometimes his treatment sounds like the "national character" analysis which used to be popular. He finds of course, some objective reasons for resentment in the province; for example, the tenancy rate has been quite high. But it was also high in some neighboring provinces where the Huks had very meager success in recruiting followers. Even in Pampanga, however, their following has been limited. The lax discipline even in periods of peak strength, such as during World War II, led to many vendettas against personal enemies, giving rise to feuds which have persisted to the present.

The regional base of the Huks and the fact that they were only one of many guerrilla movements during the war contributed greatly to their inability to assume control of the underground forces, unlike the Viet-Minh. Nonetheless, they were, and to some extent continue to be a force to be reckoned with.

All this and much more is treated in detail in the book under review. The first chapters analyze the nature of the Huks and the social conditions which encouraged their appearance. The following chapters follow the movement and its successive splinters through 1970. The concluding chapters analyze the overall issues of ideologies, modes of operations of the Huks and of the government forces, and their sociopolitical implications. Four "Annexes" provide documentation, primarily in the form of recent Communist ideological platforms.

The author is knowledgeable and writes well. The uniquely Filipino-Pampanga features of the Huk movement perhaps limit somewhat the lessons which can be drawn from the Huks in analyzing underground movements elsewhere in the world. Thus, for example, when a Maoist strategy was imposed by the urban ideologues, it ended in a disaster for the Huks. Nevertheless, the book provides very interesting reading not only to Philippines scholars but also to those interested in guerrilla movements in developing countries.

Eliezer B. Ayal

*University of Illinois, Chicago Circle*

**The Persian Land Reform, 1962–1966.** By Ann K. S. Lambton. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969. Pp. 386. £4.20.)

The distribution of land among peasants has attracted the attention of both the politicians and the scholars concerned with the developing areas. Professor Lambton's book provides the most comprehensive account of land reform in Iran to date, and complements her *Landlord and Peasants in Persia* (1953). It is based on data gleaned from Iranian legal and administrative documents, observation of a number of villages in Iran, and conversations with various officials of agencies charged with developing and implementing land reform programs. The author, Professor of Persian at the University of London, treats the first stage of land reform, which began in 1962, and the second stage, which began in 1964, separately and devotes four chapters to irrigation and cooperatives. She concludes that the first stage changed the structure of land ownership and the second ended the crop-sharing agreement in most of the villages. Consequently, "The social and political power of the landlord has been broken. The levy by them of dues and services from the peasant has been abolished. The peasants have thus been liberated from institutions now recognized as obsolete" (p. 365). Further, a major change in the attitude of the peasant has been brought about by convincing him for the first time that change is possible and by giving him a new spirit of confidence (p. 348). Cooperative societies are considered by the author as the most important institutional arrangement of the land reform program by providing "their members with practice in cooperation, fostering a spirit of self-help and independence, and encouraging a sense of responsibility" (p. 366).

This book should be of interest to Middle Eastern specialists and social scientists interested in any aspect of land reform. There are, however, two major areas in which the book could be improved. First, a good part of it consists of impressions, second-hand reports, and statements of Iranian officials with vested interests. Consequently, more reliable data, in the form of systematic interviews, greater participant observation and accurate statistics, are necessary for a more definitive treatment. Second, at times Lambton's enthusiasm for land reform seems to lead to an overemphasis upon its accomplishments and potentialities and a minimizing of its difficulties and shortcomings. This is evident in her discussion of the problems related to agricultural productivity, irrigation, and the cleavage between the peasants who have been given land and the much larger number of landless peasants who are not likely to receive any. It is, however, specially instructive to refer to her treatment of the referendum of January 26, 1963, in which according to the Iranian government practically every individual of voting age participated and 99.9 per cent of them supported the six-point program (including land reform) of the Shah's "White Revolution."

> The referendum received overwhelming support. No one had doubted that this would be the case, but how genuine the support given to the six points was, it is difficult to judge. It is not unlikely that a considerable number of urban middle classes who voted were carried away by enthusiasm and a feeling that they were taking part in a movement to create a "new" Persia (p. 109).

One need not have much knowledge of political conditions in Iran at the time to understand that this referendum was a product of the efforts of bureaucrats seeking to impress their superiors and the Shah rather than an accurate expression of the wishes of the Iranian people. In fact, the major deficiency of the book is inadequate attention to the general political context and analysis of its relation with land reform programs. This is somewhat surprising in view of the author's astuteness of observation and depth of general knowledge about Iran. In spite of these reservations, there is little doubt that Lambton has given us a pioneering and valuable contribution. It should generate more systematic data and analysis on the development and consequences of land reform in Iran and other areas.

G. H. Razi

*University of Houston*

**Lenin and the Comintern, Volume I.** By Branko Lazitch and Milorad M. Drachkovitch. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1972. Pp. 683. $17.50.)

It might seem presumptuous to criticize a book which has already received the plaudits of such renowned scholars as Adam Ulam, Bertram Wolfe, Leonard Schapiro, and Lewis Feuer. Their words of praise—apparently solicited prior to publication—are printed on the jacket's blurb and certainly contribute to its marketability as "the definitive account of the history of the Communist International in its formative years" (Feuer). In this, the first of two volumes, Lazitch and Drachkovitch have indeed amassed an impressive amount of important facts, statistics and quotations—far more than are to be found in earlier works on the subject by James Hulse and Stanley Page. But they have not, in my opinion, always interpreted their material judiciously or analyzed it accurately.

Dealing with the relationship between the Bolsheviks and the Executive Committee of the

Comintern, on the one hand, and the parties or persons who either affiliated or flirted with communism on the other, the authors cover the period from 1914 to 1921 quite thoroughly. Their chapters describing the "appeals of communism," the activities of Moscow's special emissaries in European parties, and the dilemmas facing such parties as those of Germany and Turkey, whose members were killed or persecuted by governments being courted by the Kremlin, are especially perceptive and informative. Equally interesting are the numerous lengthy excerpts from speeches and writings of Left Communists who condemned the Comintern for dictating dogma based on Russian experience and interests. The scholarly community is indeed indebted to the authors for their efforts at retrieving and translating source materials hitherto unavailable or ignored.

When it comes to translating data into meaning, however, their efforts are sometimes dubious, or at least debatable. "The guns of August," they assert, "shattered the unity of the international Socialist movement," thus overlooking the revisionist controversy and other issues which divided the Second International before World War I. By ignoring these divisions and neglecting to remind the reader that, at the Stuttgart Conference in 1907, the International had committed its members to resisting war through direct action, such as the general strike, they try to portray Lenin as "unique" in avowing "defeatism"—which they define as "taking advantage of the conditions of war to promote Socialist revolution." (They neglect to add that the conditions of war for left-wing socialists included jail, exile and even death, as in the case of Jaurès.)

The authors seem unable to make a critical evaluation of the policies and tactics pursued by the majority socialists, whom they continually hold up as model Marxists, in contrast to the Machiavellian Lenin. But one could argue just as persuasively that Lenin and his followers, at least on the issue of war, remained true to the Second International's Marxist mandate, which the Social Democrats betrayed by voting war credits in their respective parliaments. The failure of moderate socialists to take a firm stand against the war helps explain the ultimate success of Bolshevism in Russia, and the growth of the Spartakusbund in Germany as well.

The authors' treatment of the Spartacist Revolt is brief and it raises more questions than it answers. They assert that Radek's cautious counsel against a premature uprising was given as a result of observations "on the scene," and stood "in marked contrast to the Lenin vision cherished in distant Moscow" (p. 100). But they offer no convincing evidence that Radek was ignoring instructions from Lenin, who they assume was urging an immediate insurrection. (They also imply more than once that Lenin secretly rejoiced over the deaths of the German Communist leaders, Liebknecht and Luxemburg, because they might have been a challenge to his authority.)

They also assert that Radek was not "free to write" his words of warning after he returned to Russia in early 1920, since his pessimistic perspective about revolutionary prospects allegedly varied so greatly from Lenin's expectations. They are thus unable to explain why Radek was appointed as Secretary of the ECCI upon his arrival and why he was authorized to publish so many articles in *Pravda* and *Izvestiia*, wherein he expounded his more sober views, even at the height of the Polish War of that year. If these views were actually at odds with those of Lenin, why was he given so much authority and opportunity to express them? (His articles on the Polish War were even published in book form in 1920.)

Another inconsistency in the authors' interpretation concerns the Comintern's policy toward abortive uprisings attempted by member parties or alleged agents. In the case of a Finnish uprising, Moscow insisted that the leader, Otto Kuusinen, undertake a public "self-critique" or "*mea culpa*," designed to analyze and explain the reasons for failure—"an institution unknown to the Second International" (p. 92). But later they point out, while discussing a 1919 *putsch* in Vienna led by a self-proclaimed Comintern agent, Dr. Ernö Bettelheim, that the Kremlin disavowed the good doctor and his actions, denying that he had been duly authorized to attempt the adventure. "The iron rule," the authors generalize, "was that, whenever a scheme flopped, Moscow was never remotely to be linked to it" (p. 124). They offer no evidence for any such "iron rule," which would, if it existed, have contradicted the Comintern "institution" of self-criticism.

In addition to these minor points of interpretation, it is possible to take issue with the authors' main contention, namely, that Lenin, until March, 1921, when NEP led to a change of course, was consistently operating on the assumption that revolution was imminent in the West. If they had taken the time to compare Lenin's opening addresses to the First and Second Comintern Congresses (or even bothered to read the works by Hulse and Page more carefully), they might have discerned the definite shift which had taken place. Such questions as arming the workers and forming councils in preparation for conquering state power, broached in 1919, were not on the agenda in 1920. Although they discuss Lenin's April, 1920 pamphlet, "Left-Wing Communism—An Infantile Disorder," which set the tone for the Second Congress, they fail to notice how greatly it differed from "State and Revolution," which inspired the speeches made in 1919. In fact, they somehow manage to ignore that all-important booklet altogether.

The main defect of this volume, which one hopes will be remedied in the next, is that it gives the impression that Lenin's predominant concern during these years was with the Comintern, and that he paid almost no attention to such questions as Russia's civil war, economic problems, or diplomatic developments. There is lacking an awareness of what effects the experience, and difficulties, of holding state power had on the Bolsheviks. Surely the view from the Kremlin walls was not the same as the view from the Swiss Alps. Like any other human, Lenin too was changed by events and his environment.

THOMAS FIDDICK

*University of Evansville*

**Conflict and Political Change in Venezuela.** By Daniel H. Levine. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1973. Pp. 285. $13.00.)

This study is in many ways a joy for a reviewer—neat, clean, and precise. Professor Levine states the problem, his approach and his sources of data; and his presentation is orderly and well reasoned. More important, of course, is the solid intellectual quality of his study. The opening chapter succinctly introduces the reader to the author's fundamental concern with problems of conflict and conflict resolution. The emphasis is upon the management rather than dysfunctionality of conflict, especially as it pertains to the development of Venezuelan political legitimacy. Moreover, attention is directed toward "identifying the conditions of different patterns of conflict and conciliation" (p. 11). Levine also duly notes his indebtedness to theories of pluralism, as well as to the example and counsel of Robert Dahl.

Two case studies lie at the core of the investigation, providing the bases for generalizations as stated in the concluding passages. The first examines conflicts over educational reform as illustrative of evolving Catholic-secular relations. The second considers the political role of students, with particular reference to the national *milieu.* Basic data were derived largely from personal interviews, of which Levine conducted 105 with a total of 89 respondents. The timing of his Venezuelan field research happily coincided with the release of Communist leaders, many of whom had been active in student politics only a few years before. The availability of such individuals—who were largely in exile or prison prior to 1968—has further enriched the data base.

Of the two cases in question, the former perhaps offers greater insight into the broad issues of conflict and its management. The span of twenty years not only permits greater longitudinal analysis, but enhances the historical dimension as well. Moreover, the policy and approach of the ruling Acción Democrática government in the mid-1940s contrasts sharply with that of its leadership in the 1960s. During the first period the party had been arrogant, sectarian, and impatient with opposition; one of its rewards was military intervention and a full decade in exile. When it returned to power in 1959, however, the strategy was one of gradualism, moderation, and conciliation of other political and socioeconomic elements. It was this very measured pace which many viewed as *entreguista* (selling out to economic interests), allegedly representing an opportunistic capitulation to both foreign imperialism and domestic oligarchy.

The Catholic-secular dimension is relevant for students of such issues both inside Latin America and out; the implications extend beyond the specific case of Venezuela. Professor Levine sketches the picture vividly, especially the appropriately subtitled fifth chapter—"Toward the Isolation of Conflict." This in turn is preceded by a superb statement of the educational principles at issue, categorized and synthesized under the rubrics of the *estado docente* and *libertad de enseñanza.* Overall, this portion of the study provides firm footing for the author's contentions regarding the resolution of legitimacy conflicts. For Venezuela, he sees this in terms of an ongoing commitment to the isolation of conflict and reduction of its scope, all as part of broader social and political reconciliation. Similar conclusions are subsequently drawn from the study of university students in conflict, although the latter is somewhat less persuasive than is the first illustration.

The author is unflinching in his willingness to recognize and to challenge interpretations which he finds erroneous. Thus he criticizes the 1968 essay of William Hamilton as having mistakenly judged student activities in isolation from national party affiliation. Of greater interest is his critique of the noted MIT-CENDES three-volume study of José Agustín Silva Michelena and Frank Bonilla. The concern of the latter with consensus and conflict, combined with an analytic and intellectual outlook quite different from that of Levine, provides the author with justification for his extended remarks (pp. 243–54). While his dissection is a responsible and searching one, I am not convinced that it merits such lengthy attention in this volume. Moreover, the reviewer knows from personal contact that Silva Michelena would have firm ripostes to many of Levine's criticisms. In the absence of a direct response from the CENDES authors, readers can find a more sympathetic if rather uncritical use of the data in

David Blank's *Politics in Venezuela* (1973), especially Chapters III and VII (respectively "Political Culture" and "Political Socialization").

Levine's conclusions regarding the Venezuelan system are consistent with the findings of his two cases. He is properly cautious in not overgeneralizing from his data, although they by no means "prove" but rather support his broad interpretations. He observes that Venezuelan national elites opted for institutional continuity, and that an inevitable price was entailed. Whatever one's normative or ideological predispositions toward this decision, it is a reality of recent and contemporary Venezuelan politics. The resounding electoral victory of Acción Democrática in December of 1973 and its subsequent return to power after a five-year hiatus provides further testimony to the deepening solidification of a pluralistic system deriving legitimacy from political mobilization and seeking consensual resolution of institutional and policy differences. At the least, the present condition of political development in Venezuela, whatever its undoubted flaws and weaknesses, provides one of the few hemispheric examples of a system resting on participatory involvement and almost hyperactive political parties.

I hope that the bases for more searching inquiry and comprehension will be produced by the current survey-based project of Enrique A. Baloyra and myself at the University of North Carolina. Whether or not that proves a vain expectation, the Levine volume will stand as an intellectually sound and intuitively thoughtful contribution to the literature. It deserves a wider audience than merely the lonely little band of Venezuelan "country" experts.

John D. Martz
*University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill*

**Hitler's Free City: A History of the Nazi Party in Danzig, 1925–30.** By Herbert S. Levine. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973. Pp. xii, 223. $7.50.)

The Free City of Danzig, a permanent ward of the League of Nations, occupied a singular place in European history in the interwar years and also in the annals of National Socialism. In this work, Professor Levine, currently a senior research fellow at Columbia University's Institute on East Central Europe, discusses the city in relation to various aspects of European and German history, such as Anglo-German and Polish-German relations, the working of the League of Nations, and the treatment of the Jews, but only in a peripheral way; his primary concern is the history of the Nazi movement in the unique Danzig setting.

Levine reveals that though the NSDAP was founded in Danzig in 1925, the party's impact upon the city's political life was insignificant until November 1930, when it won 16.1 per cent of the votes for the new *Volkstag* (Popular Assembly). Three years later, in May 1933, the Nazis won a great electoral victory when they received 50.03 per cent of the vote in what was still a free election, and they thus became the rulers of the free city. At this juncture, considering the fact that the nominal coalition government of the NSDAP and DNVP in the Reich already had given way to one-party rule, one might have anticipated that the Nazis in Danzig, with an absolute majority in the *Volkstag*, would have attempted to drive the other political parties out of the government, but the situation in Danzig was far different from that in the Reich. The League of Nations was the guarantor of the city's constitution, the arbitrator between Danzig and Poland, and the military guardian of Danzig; while Poland was in control of Danzig's foreign affairs and had other rights in the city. Thus, both the League and the Polish government, acting either separately or together, might have been able to intervene militarily to uphold the terms of the city's constitution if the Nazis made a swift, overt bid to establish a dictatorship. These special circumstances, Levine points out, in large part explain why the new Nazi government in Danzig was not able to drive the political opposition underground and achieve *Gleichschaltung* (Nazi "coordination," or Nazification) of the city until 1937, i.e., several years after similar results had been achieved in the Reich. During the years from 1937 to 1939, the Nazis worked diligently to fulfill one of the most notorious aspects of *Gleichschaltung*, the solution of the "Jewish question," and to remilitarize Danzig. Though again hindered as a result of the city's international status, their efforts were successful. By 1939 the Jewish situation in the free city was not very different from that of the Jews in the Reich, and on the opening day of the war the fully prepared city's defense forces overwhelmed the local Polish contingents and secured the city for the rapidly advancing German forces. Danzig, having suffered virtually no damage, immediately was incorporated into Germany.

This study, which was begun as a Yale doctoral dissertation, is perspicuously written and well organized; and it is based upon an exhaustive examination of the available sources in German, Polish, French, and English. It supersedes Hans Leonhardt's *Nazi Conquest of Danzig* (Chicago, 1942), which is the only other book specifically treating the NSDAP in Danzig, and thus it constitutes an important contribution to the literature on National Socialism.

Kenneth R. Nelson
*Eisenhower College*

**The Swedish Electorate, 1887–1968.** By Leif Lewin, Bo Jansson, and Dag Sörbom. (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1972. Pp. 293. No price indicated.)

Leif Lewin, Bo Jansson, and Dag Sörbom of the University of Uppsala present a multifaceted study of Swedish electoral behavior and aggregate data analysis techniques. They discuss the preparation of social and political data for longitudinal analysis; the formulation of a model for the analysis of aggregate data that purportedly minimizes the ecological fallacy; and the application of the model to obtain ecological regression analysis results that demonstrate the votes cast for Swedish parties by occupational classes in the 28 elections of the period 1887–1968. The regression coefficients are used to produce a descriptive theory of social mobilization of the Swedish political parties, to classify parliamentary elections, to establish the social distance between parties using multidimensional scaling, and to analyze the flow of voters (categorized by occupation) between the parties from election to election.

The book begins with a discussion of data preparation and the construction of coherent time series for all of the variables used. Substantial problems arise when viewing 28 elections over an 80-year period: occupations are officially reclassified; parties appear and disappear; electoral districts are modified; no records are kept of partisan affiliation of candidates in the 19th century. The suggestions for constructing a sound data base for longitudinal analysis are of methodological interest.

Section II is undoubtedly the most significant and controversial part of the book. The authors begin by reducing 110 occupations into four occupational classes—farmers; employers and white collar workers; other workers; and farm laborers—that are politically homogeneous, i.e., having all occupations in the class voting alike. The classification for all elections is fixed by the election of 1960. The classification is intended to reduce part of the regional variation and to correct for an acute problem of overfitting (25 counties or observation units). By means of factor analysis, "other" social data (e.g., income, size of rye harvest), which cause regional variation and are the basic source of the ecological fallacy, are reduced to three components explaining 70–75 per cent of the variance. The components vary from election to election.

The classificatory scheme is imaginative but not without problems. The original value for each of the 110 occupations has to be estimated before the occupations can be collapsed into four homogeneous groupings. Three cryptic sentences explain how the estimates are obtained: "In our example we assumed that the percentages of the votes cast by the different occupations in favour of the respective parties were known. In reality this is not the case, but we can calculate for each grouping of occupations a criterion of comparison that is equivalent to the λ value as defined above" (pp. 60–61). And one paragraph later, "at some point in the classification program we thus find the estimate of the voting behavior of the individual occupations" (p. 61). Since the substantive arguments that follow in Section III hinge on the accuracy of these estimates, the authors owe us a more complete explanation. Inductive classificatory schemes such as this often lead to circular arguments. If the groups are initially set up as homogeneous, they obviously become relevant in the subsequent analysis. The authors tell us that from two to 17 of the occupations shift classes over 28 elections but fail to mention if these are the larger classes. Hence it is difficult to assess the significance of the change in their independent variable. Too much of the theoretical work in the book suffers from similar lapses.

The model to circumvent the ecological fallacy employs these questionable data as follows:

> the number of votes received by the parties are traced back to classes and components. All the votes should finally be traced back to classes, while at the county level the components redistribute the classes' votes for the parties. The number of the individuals contained in the classes is equal to the number of individuals in the parties (entire population over the age of 15) (p. 102).

To remove negative and excessively large coefficients the authors employ two constraints on the regression analysis: (1) all coefficients for the classes must be positive; and (2) the sum of the coefficients must equal 100—which causes the authors to read their table entries as actual percentages. After an analysis for errors arising from methods of data collection over time, omission of variables, and multicollinearity, further correction of the data is made by means of what the authors call constrained spline smoothing. Essentially values for missing data are interpolated from data for all elections rather than the more common method of approximating missing data from known data of the election immediately prior to and after the election in question. Lewin's nontechnical descriptions of statistical procedures developed by Jansson and Sörbom lack clarity.

The quality of the substantive analysis in Section III is dependent upon the accuracy of the much-manipulated data derived through the steps of Section II. But accurate or not, the types of questions asked (e.g., about the social mobilization of the Swedish parties, the flow of the vote) and concepts employed are imaginative and merit study. *The Swedish Electorate, 1887–1968* will no doubt create a furor among methodologists and Swedish historians. The problems the volume addresses are major ones and the solutions presented are inventive, although hardly conclusive.

Robert B. Kvavik

*University of Minnesota*

**The Net Cost of Japanese Foreign Aid.** By Martha F. Loutfi. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973. Pp. 188. $13.50.)

**Japan: Financial Markets and the World Economy.** By Wilbur F. Monroe. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973. Pp. 250. $12.50.)

These two volumes were both prepared and published just before the Yom Kippur War and the exacerbation of the world and the Japanese energy crisis. They have consequently and unfortunately lost a considerable portion of their timeliness. It is likewise difficult to avoid "20-20 hindsight" in commenting upon them, even for a reviewer whose own recent offerings are equally outdated for the same reasons.

Actually these two books have little in common beyond their dating, their publisher, and their concern with the Japanese economy of 1970–72. (Mr. Monroe's Chapter 13, on Japan's economic assistance to foreign countries, overlaps Ms. Loutfi's study to some degree.) The Loutfi monograph features the ink-horn and computer-output aura of the doctoral dissertation. Mr. Monroe, fresh from a stint as assistant financial attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, offers what look like collected memoranda prepared for superiors in Tokyo or Washington and "laundered" of anything "classified" or undiplomatic.

Ms. Loutfi's main point is that Japanese aid has taken the primary form of future loan commitments rather than of contemporary transfers. Its present value at the time of the aid agreements therefore needs to be discounted for futurity, and at higher rates than the artificially low disequilibrium rates prevailing in Japan itself. Ms. Loutfi plumps for discount rates of 8 and 15 per cent, making the net cost of Japanese aid somewhere between half and two-thirds of its face or published value. (Ms. Loutfi neither predicts future inflation nor adjusts for past inflation.) This cost is still substantially higher than that allegedly claimed by anti-Japanese commentators who allege that Japan is really contributing almost nothing to the LDCs. But as I understand the anti-Japanese position, Ms. Loutfi's formidable array of statistical data and manipulation misses their main concern, namely, that Japanese aid runs counter to the critics' fetish of "balanced growth," being concentrated on industries providing raw materials for Japanese industry and markets for Japanese finished products.

Although an apparent member of the "now generation," Mr. Monroe (Ph.D. Iowa, 1969) comes across as a striped-pants financial bureaucrat largely concerned with the institutional minutiae of here and now, and limited analytically to making short-term extrapolations of only slightly longer-term trends. A main question running through nearly half of his 14 chapters is the likelihood of Tokyo's rivaling New York as a world financial market. This prospect Mr. Monroe sees as almost inevitable in view of Japan's burgeoning international reserves (now *decreasing* at least temporarily!). The main obstacle is the tentative and incomplete status of Japan's liberalization of international capital movements and direct investment. Mr. Monroe points out correctly the Japanese reluctance to dismantle control mechanisms once established, and ascribes this reluctance to Japan's desire to maintain the capability of reinstating "obsolete" controls at a moment's notice. (The long cold winter of 1973–74 bears out Mr. Monroe on this point.) Mr. Monroe does not mention the recent resort of Japanese agencies to "side letters," enforceable in the courts, in which foreign firms promise to abide by extralegal "administrative guidance" as a condition for securing ostensibly "automatic" approval to do this or that—in clear violation of the spirit if not the letter of liberalization.

In Chapter 3, on the contribution of Japanese exports to postwar economic growth, we find Mr. Monroe's most ambitious venture into economic analysis. Using quarterly data for 1961–70, he has constructed a four-equation econometric model which shows Japanese output dependent on fixed investment, inventories, and (lagged) consumption, to the near exclusion of total world imports and a relative price index (which are the determinants of Japanese exports). This is impressive—with an $R^2$ of .999—and quite possibly correct for that decade. One wonders, however, whether similar results would hold for periods when Japan was more concerned with balances of trade and payments, for lag structures other than the one Mr. Monroe used, or for difference equations explaining output *change*—i.e., growth—a more interesting variable for economists than output as such.

Martin Bronfenbrenner

*Duke University*

**Rio Grande Do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism, 1882–1930.** By Joseph L. Love. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1971. Pp. 311. $10.00.)

The political significance of regionalism during Brazil's Old Republic (1889–1930) is a topic much debated but little analyzed among those who study the course of Brazilian modernization in the twentieth century. Professor Joseph Love's book on Rio Grande do Sul, the southernmost state in the federation, deals with the regional issue from 1882, the twilight of the Empire, through the installation of Getúlio Vargas as provisional president of Brazil in 1930. While the volume does not make a major contribution to our theoretical understanding of the relevance or significance of the regional factor in politics during that period or thereafter, it does provide a well-documented and carefully written analysis of one of the most interesting states in Brazil. The study captures a good deal of the flavor of the post-1889 consolidation of political power at the state level by local elites and the gradual extension of their influence into national affairs, culminating in the 1930 "Revolution" and the coming to power of the gaúcho notables who would dominate Brazilian politics for years thereafter.

The first section of the book includes a brief historical summary of the structure of gaúcho society. Professor Love then details the rise to power of Júlio de Castilhos, the first modern *caudillo* of the state, and the formation of the *Partido Republicano Riograndense* (PRR) which came to rival the power of the Republican Parties of Minas Gerais and São Paulo, the two most influential states. After a bloody civil war (1893–1895) between opposing elite factions, Rio Grande do Sul was left with a two-party system more ideological in nature than other political groupings in the Old Republic; a centralized political elite, hierarchically organized, and in control of the state; and strong ties to the national army growing out of the civil war and other historical events. The linkage to the armed forces would give the PRR an important ally in national politics time and again in later decades.

The history of Brazil after 1910, the theme of the volume's second section, is in great part the vying for power among these three powerful state machines, with the army effectively serving as Rio Grande's ally in crucial moments. The competition for power in the Old Republic of Brazil focused almost exclusively on state and regional power blocs with the three dominant states manipulating the other, smaller units. National political power, such as it was, focused on patronage and legislation supportive of state economic and political goals.

After the premature death of Castilhos, Antônio Augusto Borges de Medeiros assumed control of the PRR. Using federal senator José Gomes Pinheiro Machado as the PRR spokesman in Congress, Borges proceeded to skillfully enlarge his state's political prominence after 1910 through varying combinations of pressure, negotiation, perseverance, and bluff. The arena for the PRR's emergence as a national power contender was the presidential succession every four years. Professor Love employs a chronological format in reviewing all the chief executive elections from 1910 to 1930 and concentrates in depth on the elections of 1910, 1919, and 1930. Rio Grande do Sul determined the outcome in these three years; the complex bargaining surrounding these elections, which Love documents very well, dispels the belief that the simple failure of Minas Gerais and São Paulo to agree on the same candidate was the major reason for Rio Grande's key role. The primitive regional/state political infrastructure of pre-1930 Brazil emerges clearly in these elitist clashes over the presidency.

The volume ends with the overthrow of the Old Republic in 1930 by Getúlio Vargas, a Borges protege par excellence, and the seizure of national power by the Generation of 1907, young gaúcho politicians and military officers, grown to political maturity in the PRR and seasoned by decades of experience and conflict at the local and national levels of government. A short, concluding chapter deals with the "forty years since" Vargas and his cronies toppled the Old Republic.

Throughout this useful and informative book Professor Love raises relevant questions about the early stages of modernization in an important Third World nation-state. Given the patrimonial or corporatist model followed since 1964 by Brazil's military government, one might consider the backward linkages to Vargas and his corporatist state from 1937 to 1945 as well as earlier conceptions of government and authority held by the Generation of 1907. What precisely was the national political legacy of the 1882–1930 period? What was its significance for the political development of Brazil? Are there earlier styles of elite leadership or patterns of institutional behavior that are relevant for understanding the political dynamics of contemporary Brazil? Some of these themes are alluded to in the closing chapter but necessitate fuller development. These questions do not detract from a solid book that provides much information about a relevant historical theme.

RIORDAN ROETT
*School of Advanced International Studies,*
*The Johns Hopkins University*

**The Myth of Population Control: Family, Caste and Class in an Indian Village.** By Mahmood Mamdani. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972. Pp. 173. $7.95, cloth; $2.65, paper.)

If the late Pitirim Sorokin were alive and had a mind to revise and update his critique of "fads and foibles" in modern sociology he might well include the widespread tendency to attribute poverty and underdevelopment in most of the world to "overpopulation" and to find the solution in programs of "population control." The neo-Malthusian population "bomb" is exploding all over the underdeveloped world, we are told by the demographic pundits, lavishly financed in various research-and-action programs by private foundations and governments. The solution, supposedly, is to find ways of getting the world's ever-proliferating poor peasants to feel what should be their greatest need—to practice family planning. The common assumption is that they are poor *because* they have large families. Or, could the causality run the other way? Mr. Mamdani, who at the time of writing was a Harvard doctoral candidate, argues cogently in this slender but solidly documented book in favor of the latter proposition. For those seeking an antidote based on evidence, not mere polemics, to latter-day neo-Malthusianism, his book is *must* reading.

The Khanna Study, which the author analyzes in detail, was a birth control study and action program, carried out over a period of six years among 8,000 people in seven "test" villages in a high density district of Punjab state, India, at a cost of about one million dollars. The work was done by the Harvard School of Public Health with Rockefeller Foundation and Indian Government financing. The aims were "to determine the effectiveness of a recognized method of contraception in limiting numbers of people when applied to whole populations of rural [village] communities in a highly populated area"; "to determine the effect of a program of family planning when offered to all members of a village community"; and "to determine the effect of population control on health and social status" (p. 26).

The project was a failure. The birth rate declined from 40 per thousand in 1957 to 35 per thousand in 1968, in *both test and control populations*, and this is attributed, by the admission of the researchers, to a rise in the marriage age and to a considerable number of couples *previously practicing* birth control changing to easier, more effective techniques.

Mamdani's chapter titles suggest the various dimensions of his analysis of the failure: Experience as Learning—the Perceptions of the Khanna Study; Technology and Social Structure; The "Population Problem" and the Agricultural Classes; The "Population Problem" and the Traditional Service Sector; The Family; How the Villagers See Birth Control. His exploration of the social structural and sociohistorical aspects of Indian rural society show clearly that the familiar assumptions of the birth controllers—availability of appropriate techniques, education with attention to local communication networks and patterns, opinion leaders, use of native and cross-culturally trained nonnative staff—are largely beside the point if the real interests of the villagers are not served by having smaller families under the given constraints of the land tenure system, availability of capital, and technology. The peasants are interested in adopting new technology, whether in agriculture or control of human reproduction, when they recognize a pay-off in doing so. Indeed, as the author states, the approach of the population controllers is an elitist one in viewing the villagers as simply ignorant peasants, who will become aware of what is good for them only when effective knowledge about controlling their numbers is poured into their heads by the experts. Such elitism is complemented by the political bias which is implicit in viewing family planning as a substitute for fundamental structural and institutional change: ". . . family planning may be easier to implement than major advances in education, or the economy, which require large structural and institutional change in the society as a whole" (p. 17, quoting Dudley Kirk). Such outlooks are also related to the astonishing theoretical naiveté which separates the motivation of human beings concerning their reproductive behavior from the actual conditions of their socioeconomic existence.

These brief remarks cannot begin to do justice to the rich material which Mamdani has assembled or to his incisive analysis, but I hope they will incite a variety of social scientists to read this important book.

CHARLES S. BRANT
*Sir George Williams University*

**Society in India. Vol. 1: Continuity and Change. Vol. 2: Change and Continuity.** By David G. Mandelbaum. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970. Pp. xi, 364; xi, 706. $10.00 each, cloth; $3.25 each, paper.)

India is almost an impossible country for a social scientist to write about in general terms. Though the societies of South Asia share certain crucial features of social structure, the cultural, linguistic, and religious diversity within each one of them is considerable; in the case of India it is overwhelming. Seeking some order in this welter of differences has been an objective that has attracted historians, sociologists, and others for many years now. "Unity in Diversity" has been their theme; the materials they handle are common to all of them; the perspectives that they bring to bear upon these materials, however, differ.

Professor Mandelbaum's *magnum opus* seeks to discover the pattern of social interaction in

India through an examination of materials collected mainly by anthropologists, but also by others, during the last 25 years or so. The tools he employs to organize them into a coherent whole are drawn from the empirical reality itself and from sociological theory of the functional-structural type. He focuses on the major social groupings recognized by Indians themselves. Thus, we find him writing about the family, the lineage, *jati* or the caste-group, and the village community. These themes make up the first volume of the study. The emphasis is on the structure of these groupings and their interaction. From the microcosmic domestic family the reader is led in the second volume to Indian civilization at the all-encompassing macrocosmic level.

Before we proceed further with the second volume, something must be said about the theoretical perspective of the whole work. Its constituent ideas are: "system" or "interchange-counterchange," "structure" or ordered arrangements of relations, and "role" or goal-oriented, normatively defined behavior. Welded together: "When some participants do not carry out the kind of *interchange* that others in the system anticipate, the others respond in regular ways of *counterchange* to restore some systemic regularity in their relations" (p. 5). Continuity and change are, from such a theoretical perspective, like two sides of the same coin. The individual role occupant is "a manipulator of his culture and society as well as a creature and carrier of it" (p. 427).

It is obvious that there is no scope here for the analysis of revolutionary change, for structural breakdowns of the social process. And that precisely is Mandelbaum's message. Till very recently—and, for that matter, even now—India's social history has been remarkably stable. The flux of political history has been matched by the capacity of the social structure to absorb change. This thesis is the subject of the second volume.

Change is identified as a familiar and recurrent process within Indian society; it has never been absent, but it has always been subordinate to structure. The most typical illustration is provided by mobility within the steel frame of the caste system: it has traditionally taken the form of "positional" rather than "structural" change. Particular caste groups have affirmed the values underlying the system and have sought to rise within it through adherence to life styles and values of superior groups. The efforts to bring about structural change, to destroy the traditional system, are not typical of India's social history. At any rate, they have not been successful in the past.

Even in the context of the massive political and economic changes that are now under way, the traditional pattern of change has not yet been significantly altered. "People throughout India commonly keep to traditional social patterns while adapting them to modern circumstances. Abstract ideals are most readily revised; fundamental motifs of cognition and motivation seem little altered and are evident in the newer arenas of competition" (p. 655). Mandelbaum, however, hints that some of the contemporary changes may ripen into systemic shifts, well beyond the boundaries of organizational change.

The materials that make up the second volume include, besides what has already been mentioned above, discussions of religious and tribal movements and of the politicization of traditional institutions. In this connection, the attention of students of political science may be drawn particularly to chapter 27. Here Mandelbaum discusses caste associations and federations, and the positive role that they have been playing in the democratic politics of the country. Paradoxical though it may seem, caste as a ritual hierarchy has been getting weaker in India, while caste (or "castism") as a factor in politics has been becoming stronger. This is an excellent example of the adaptive nature of traditional institutions.

Mandelbaum set himself a certain task and has succeeded in it remarkably. He has drawn data from about 700 works—the bibliography is one of the assets of the book for the student—and pieced together the evidence to tell us in detail what we today know about certain aspects of society in India. He has steered clear of theoretical controversies after having clearly stated his own position. It would be unfair to fault him for not critically evaluating the different works he has drawn upon, for, to repeat, that was not the task he set himself. Nor did he set out to provide a theoretical model for the study of society in India.

In other words, *Society in India* is a particular kind of book, and as such it is eminently successful and most useful. It will serve as an excellent introduction to India for the serious social scientist. The advanced research worker will find in it a guide to problems and to literature. No student of Indian society can afford to omit this work from his reference collection.

It is to be hoped that Professor Mandelbaum will follow this work with a similar excursion into urban India which he has largely left untouched. If he does so, one hopes that he will deal with certain aspects of Indian society, such as politics and economics, which he has not included in the work under review. If we ask for more, it is because Mandelbaum's efforts heretofore have proved very fruitful. He has placed all workers in the field of Indianist studies in his permanent debt. The publishers have acted thoughtfully in making the book available in a cheaper paperback edition also.

T. N. MADAN

*Institute of Economic Growth,*
*University of Delhi*

**Political Youth, Traditional Schools: National and International Perspectives.** Edited by Byron G. Massialas. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1972. Pp. 273. $7.95.)

Professor Massialas believes that citizenship education in America and elsewhere promotes Pollyannish views of the political world; that it does this by confusing political ideals with reality; that it stifles critical thinking by inculcating a "Spiro Agnew philosophy" of law and order and a flagwaving type of patriotism; and that it one-sidedly emphasizes white middle class values at the expense of all others. He deplores the training of social science teachers because it does nothing to prepare them for their proper job—the job of inspiring young citizens to become "inquiring activists." In all this, he may be right.

Professor Massialas thinks in addition that the educational establishment is not only behind the times but also outdistanced by protesting students who claim that the content of the curriculum is obsolete, irrelevant, and at variance with social and political reality. While this provides a title for this symposium, the claim is doubtful.

The role of the in-house critic and reformer is rarely a comfortable one. As head of a department of Social Studies Education, Professor Massialas must cling to the hope that curriculum changes and improved teacher-training programs will make a difference. Yet he knows from the Coleman study and the several reanalyses of the Coleman data that the *independent* effect of school variables is quite small. He is painfully aware of the Survey Research Center study under the direction of Kent Jennings which found that formal civics and "problems" courses have virtually no impact upon white and only a small impact on black students. To be sure, this does not foreclose the possibility that new curricula and teaching methods as well as teacher-training programs designed to stimulate innovation might be of some consequence. But the case is neither open nor shut.

As a member of the academic community, Professor Massialas feels constrained to bolster his position by appropriate research findings. Hence, he presents, sandwiched between his introductory and concluding essays, fifteen research studies dealing mostly with political socialization in general, and the effects of schooling in particular. None of these studies was either undertaken or written for the purpose at hand. Consequently, the editor's interpretations of the results tend to be strained, tangential, and even totally unsupported by the research reports. For instance, a study by Allen D. Glenn showing differences in political trust among students of rural, suburban and inner-city schools is interpreted to mean that "rural or inner-city children much more than suburban children learn the hard way that the government does not really care for them and should not be trusted" (p. 249).

Most of the fanciful interpretations are based on highly unrepresentative data—small samples selected for the sake of convenience or according to some idiosyncratic notions of the authors (e.g., Ellen Shantz, p. 67; Simon Wittes, p. 105). Professor Massialas's comments ignore these limitations. Moreover, the many methodological errors in this volume are bound to undermine faith in the findings. For instance, David Statt's tables show the frequencies of positive responses only—no negative responses, totals or percentages (pp. 43-45)—and the chi-square values in his Table 2 could not possibly have been calculated from the reported frequencies. Lee H. Ehman's small sample of 103 students (a larger one could have been obtained easily) suffers an unexplained loss of eleven subjects from one table to the next (pp. 97 and 99). Raymond J. Lewis, Jr., presents a "multiple regression analysis" in which six "dependent" variables appear to have been used to predict an "independent" one (p. 155). Some authors formulate hypotheses that cannot be tested or ask questions that cannot be answered. Ellen Shantz proposes "Hypothesis 1: Students are becoming more oriented toward personal political participation than earlier studies show" (p. 65), only to concede five pages later that "data from this study do not permit comparison with earlier research, so the hypothesis cannot really be tested." Similarly vague and unanswerable is Charles E. Billings's question: "How congruent are the concepts of black, high-school activism to the concepts of black nationalism" (*sic*, p. 78)?

Findings that appear to deserve some confidence tend to be consistent with those of previous studies. Glenn's comparison of three Detroit area elementary schools shows that trust in government drops steadily between the third and sixth grades; and the decline is greatest for inner-city children, least in the suburban school. The sense of efficacy, on the other hand, increases first at a rapid and subsequently at a slower rate. These results are worth mentioning, because they duplicate the Easton and Dennis findings in spite of considerable differences between the instruments used.

A secondary analysis of Jennings's data by

George B. Levenson shows that teachers tend to associate citizenship with orderliness and obedience. The same study yields the somewhat unexpected finding that among black students, those in the vocational curriculum anticipate more political participation than do college-bound students.

A study by Lee H. Ehman, conducted in a single high school in an industrial city, indicates that the sense of political efficacy does not reach a plateau in high school, as quasi-longitudinal studies may have suggested. While overall percentages remain the same in the last three years of school, Ehman's longitudinal data show a great deal of individual change in both directions, with only one-quarter of the sample undergoing no change at all. The magnitude of the individual shifts, however, tends to be rather small, so that the operation of response error cannot be ruled out. For the same reason, one cannot accept without reservation Ehman's finding that students taking more than the required number of civics courses gain greatly in their sense of efficacy.

Russell F. Farnen and Dan B. German present quasi-longitudinal age-trend data from five nations—the United States, Sweden, West Germany, England, and Italy. The findings describing time-changes in sense of efficacy are as surprising as they are unexplained. Why should the directions of change and the slopes differ so greatly, suggesting radically different patterns of political learning in the five countries? And why would we find similarly large differences in trends on two scales measuring belief in the legitimacy of democratic institutions and tolerance of political conflict and dissent? Granting that the five samples are unrepresentative, it remains unclear why the oldest groups of British and Italian youngsters in this study should end up lower on all three measures than their American, German, and Swedish contemporaries.

Most of the other articles representing the "international perspectives" of the title are marginally related to the major objectives of the volume. Theodor Hanf compares the political attitudes of Lebanese and Congolese university students; Halim I. Barakat compares the political identifications (with father, mother, both, or neither) of Jordanian, Bahraini, and Kuwaiti students at the American University of Beirut; and William Cave describes the Young Pioneer organization in Uzbekistan, USSR.

One is left with a miscellaneous collection of differentially reliable data. The weakness of thought in this volume is exceeded only by the weakness of language. Thus, George B. Levenson (p. 132): "... the full flavor of the school-generated messages to the student is not easily disentangled" (p. 132).

FRANK A. PINNER

*Michigan State University*

**Government in Spain: The Executive at Work.** By Kenneth N. Medhurst. (New York: Pergamon Press, 1973. Pp. 256. $9.00.)

This is a sensible, compact introduction to the government and politics of Franco Spain. It is the kind of old-fashioned nation study that has almost disappeared from the literature of comparative politics, long on detailed institutional description, short on interpretation. Such books are still very useful to those who want an overview of a political system unencumbered by overriding theoretical preoccupations. This is particularly valuable in the case of Spain, a nation whose distinctive political apparatus is not really very well understood by most students of comparative politics.

The book will probably be of greatest interest to those in the fields of comparative public administration and bureaucracy. Medhurst focuses on the organization of the executive in Spain, the evolution of a professional civil service and an administrative *grand corps*. There is a detailed chapter on local government. The Cortes and the legal system are interpreted primarily in connection with the problem of administrative control.

However, the teacher of comparative politics who wants to include Spain in the semester's itinerary may find that Medhurst's study provides a nice neutral medium which would be compatible with a variety of interpretive approaches. The student gets the raw materials from a book like this, and can himself determine how the Spanish experience is best assimilated to an overall framework of comparative analysis. Medhurst has a strong sense for historic continuities, and the book would go well with a developmental approach. The discussion of coalition management in the Franco period is excellent, and would fit with an elite or interest group interpretation. The details that would go into the construction of a model of authoritarianism are there. Public policy is thoroughly discussed. If the object is inductive generalization from cases, there is sometimes considerable pedagogic merit in a book which so completely eschews theory.

While Medhurst, a lecturer in government at the University of Manchester, apparently has done substantial field work in Spain, the book is largely based on public documents and secondary sources. This is not in itself a bad thing. The public record in Spain is surprisingly rich as a resource for political analysis, and Spanish scholars do sophisticated work in such fields as political sociology, political economy, and public administration. One of the more useful tasks for the foreign scholar is often to digest a domestic tradition of political analysis and make it available to the study of comparative politics generally. However, the price for such an approach is a certain degree of formalism. Medhurst communicates little of the feel of Spanish politics. There are few anecdotes, personal vignettes, or illustrative case studies. One gains little appreciation of the distinctive perspectives, interests, and outlooks of the actors in Spanish politics.

Such interpretations as Medhurst does offer are not novel or surprising. Generally he accepts the conclusions of the handful of scholars who have done research on this political system. He says the expected things about the role of Opus Dei, follows Juan Linz in seeing the regime as a kind of limited pluralism, accepts the view that Franco was a shrewd coalition manager. I find some of my own idiosyncratic ideas about Spanish public policy reiterated. All of this makes me a little uneasy. Books like this tend to lead to the creation of a conventional wisdom. Frederic William Maitland once observed that "a statement does not become the truer because it has been constantly repeated. A chain of testimony is never stronger than its first link."

I also would have wished that Medhurst had done more to relate the political theory of the regime to its institutions. Iberian corporatism is one of the great systems of thought about the nature of political order, and politics in Franco Spain has much to do with this logic of political analysis. Yet Medhurst hardly discusses this cultural base of political distinctiveness at all. The theme that gives internal coherence to this political system is almost completely neglected.

Nonetheless, this is the first overall survey of the political institutions of Franco Spain in English, and as such it is extremely worthwhile. The book is balanced and judicious, not in the least polemical. For the specialist in comparative administration, it will be rewarding and useful. This book was a needed addition to the literature on Spanish politics, and its limitations merely suggest what remains to be done.

Charles W. Anderson
*University of Wisconsin*

**Socialism in India.** Edited by B. R. Nanda. (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1972. Pp. 299. Rs 35.00.)

This book, a collection of ten essays, is the result of a seminar held in November 1968 by the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library. Like many collections of its genre, it is of very uneven quality. The initial essays are quite useful in assessing what impact the Russian Revolution had upon leftist movements in India. The best analysis of the whole phenomenon is provided by Professor B. R. Nanda in his opening survey "Socialism in India 1919–1939: A Retrospect." V. S. Budhraj and Zafar Imam's essays are adequate but less satisfying in light of the recent and excellent study of John P. Haithcox, *Communism and Nationalism in India* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), which provides more depth to the historical clash between M. N. Roy and V. Lenin regarding what the relationship of communism to Indian nationalism should be.

Another major topic addressed by two of the essayists is the ambivalent role played by Jawaharlal Nehru in the Indian Socialist movement. Both Bimal Prasad's essay on "Socialism and Foreign Policy Thinking, 1919–1939" and P. C. Joshi's "Nehru and Socialism in India, 1919–1939" are insightful, but serve merely to whet the appetite on this intriguing question.

B. B. Chaudhuri's "Agrarian Movements in Bengal and Bihar" is provocative in advancing a "pure" Marxian analysis of the *kisan sabha* movement in Bihar. However, the gradual collapse of that movement as its leader, Swami Sahajanand, moved toward the antinational policies of the Indian Communists early in World War II makes Chaudhuri's analysis questionable. Bipan Chandra's essay on "The Ideological Development of the Revolutionary Terrorists in Northern India in the 1920s" plows some new ground by synthesizing and interpreting recent autobiographical material. Chandra's analysis is useful in explaining why this group was so ineffectual. As for the two actual concluding essays concerning the impact of Indian socialism on Marathi and Telegu literature, one can only question the rationale for their inclusion in this type of study. Finally, one might have hoped that Professor Nanda would have written a concluding summary essay, to help integrate the preceding essays.

Despite the utility of some of these essays, one can only be disappointed with the totality, which is far from a definitive work on Indian socialism. Walter Hauser, John Haithcox, and Thomas Rusch have all contributed significant and solid portions of this important reality, but unhappily, the present collection does not carry us much further than the basic conclusions of those three great scholarly pioneers in this area. At the same time, except for the questionably relevant essays regarding Marathi and Telegu literature, the Nanda work is the first attempt to present in one collection several aspects of the historical background of Indian socialism. The work is also to be highly commended for its excellent bibliography and useful index.

The great, still unanswered questions concerning Indian socialism remain. Has it been a meaningful movement, which, using the Nehru family as a catalytic agent, has had a genuine impact upon the Indian political system? Or has Indian socialism merely been a movement, composed of articulate pressure groups, which has operated solely on the westernized surface of Indian political life? We still do not have definitive answers to these questions, nor do we have a study of Indian socialism comparable to Stanley Kochanek's study of the Congress Party of India, Craig Baxter's study of the Jan Sangh Party of India, or Myron Weiner's study of the whole Indian political system.

Lewis P. Fickett, Jr.
*Mary Washington College*

**European Democracy Between the Wars.** By Karl J. Newman. Translated by Kenneth Morgan. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971. Pp. 475. $12.00.)

In German this book is called *Zerstörung und Selbstzerstörung der Demokratie: Europa 1918–1938* (Köln-Berlin: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1965). The able translation of the text is more faithful to the original than is the title of the American edition, but it is marred by faulty transcriptions and typographical errors. The erudite author participated in democratic student movements in the Sudetenland before fleeing to Oxford in 1939, and he is now a professor of political science at Cologne. He uses documentary and archival material but bases his work chiefly on German and, to a lesser extent, on English-language secondary accounts.

As a whole, the product would repay more attention than it is likely to receive from American political scientists. Its historical details may bore them. Its historicist pronouncements are incompatible with the prevailing positivism which eschews facile generalizations. Although the author refers to respected literature in sociology, social psychology, and political science, his use of it is selective (confined chiefly to Simmel, Mannheim, Lasswell and Friedrich) and he turns to it for corroboration rather than guidance. The presentation is both diffuse and repetitive.

Paradoxically, the features which may repel political scientists could make Newman's study usefully challenging to them. Its historical details bring out the richness of texture of cultural forces which condition political behavior, whereas the current scientistic approach tends to oversimplify them. The focus on "Central Europe," which includes Poland as well as Weimar Germany and the Danubian countries, directs attention to an area which, with the exception of Germany proper, is more nearly *terra incognita* for empirical political science than is remotist Asia or darkest Africa. This is the more deplorable because the political, economic, and sociopsychological fragmentation imposed there by the fortunes of World War I—or, more precisely, by the misfortunes of the ensuing peacemaking—produced situations with great potentialities for research on the nature and consequences of cultural, social, economic, and political interactions.

A virtue of Newman's study is that it puts differing aspects on the interactions it examines successively into perspective. After a preliminary justification of the focus on Central Europe, it points out the dissonances produced when the ideology of liberal democracy encountered, particularly in the Austro-Hungarian succession states, traditional religious, ethnic, and social "ties" (*Bindungen*)—sturdy remnants of medievalism and enlightened despotism, scarcely modified by the belated advent of industrialization. Attention is then directed to the frustrations occasioned by the hasty co-optation of such devices of Western European constitutionalism as proportional representation, judicial review, and direct democracy. Thereafter, the "Consequences of Nationalism's Triumph in the Paris Peace Conference" are reviewed in a way which supplements earlier accounts through the use of recent German literature not widely available in America.

Not less intriguing, though less convincing, is the somewhat digressive attempt to trace the ideological lineage of totalitarianism and to contrast it with that of constitutional democracy. Surely the ramifications of "The Concept of Democracy in the Caricature of the Authoritarian Tradition" are too extensive to be clarified in a single chapter even if confined to the recent past; but Newman dips into political philosophy, constitutional history, and social psychology from classical Greece to the present with results which can only be said to be suggestive.

Retreating from the esoteric to the mundane, Newman next undertakes to show that the defeat of liberalism by nationalism at Paris—epitomized in the struggle between Clemenceau and Wilson—"led finally, in 1939, to the Second World War." The intervening factors examined include the blunders of the moderate parties in Weimar Germany and pre-Dollfuss Austria and the propaganda maneuvers and techniques of the Hitler-Goebbels combination. Most impressive is the neatly drawn contrast between the ineptitude of the moderates and the skill of the Nazis in the use of the airplane, the loudspeaker, and the radio in political campaigning.

The ensuing chapter explains, somewhat repetitiously, how an "all-pervading tyranny" was established in "a pluralistic society" within "a highly industrialized country in which illiteracy was as good as non-existent" (p. 124). Basic to the argument is the distinction between the neo-medieval associations found in the region (military and nationalist secret societies, student fraternities with medieval trappings, vestiges of guilds in the cities, and feudal structures on the big estates), on the one hand, and political parties and interest groups, as instrumentalities of modern constitutional democracy, on the other. Newman finds that by manipulating symbols with a mystic appeal and exploiting conflicts in established hierarchies of value, Hitler was able to destroy the Weimar parties and interest groups, already weakened through proportional representation which spurred the multiplication of political parties until they became almost identical with interest groups. In the end, a "pseudo-unity" was achieved "by an appeal to nationalism, the creation of substitute symbols and the formation of new artificial loyalties" (p. 357). This ingenious demonstration of "the techniques of exerting social influence by which national socialism was able to impose totalitarian dictatorship" (p. 357) would be more effective were it presented without the elaborate invocation of sociopsychological literature and explanatory apparatus. The same is true of the final chapter's "sociological analysis" (p. 360) of "The Diffusion and Impact of Fascism" internationally, but some details are added to the already well-known story of the vulnerability of the democracies to fifth columns, Quislings, appeasers, pacificists, and neutralists, who collaborated, often inadvertently but none the less culpably, to make the Second World War inevitable.

Professor Newman is to be commended for assembling an impressive array of information about events and developments of significance to political science as well as to history. It is therefore regrettable that his style and diction may repel potentially interested readers. There is an elaborate table of contents, a helpful index, and an extensive, although by no means exhaustive, bibliography of pertinent German and English literature.

C. B. Robson

*University of North Carolina*

**The Soviet Volunteers: Modernization and Bureaucracy in a Public Mass Organization.** By William E. Odom. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973. Pp. xv, 360. $14.50.)

Lieutenant Colonel William Odom is assistant military attache in the American Embassy in Moscow, and his subject in this exhaustive case study is the first decade of a mass "volunteer" paramilitary organization, founded in 1927 to provide elementary preinduction training and to disseminate basic principles of chemical and air defense. The formation of Osoaviakhim (the acronym combines "defense, aviation, and chemistry") represented initially an attempt to operationalize a central tenet of Marxist-Leninist doctrine: replacement of standing professional armies by armed citizens, spontaneously motivated by social concerns. This was the achievement of the Paris Commune, as Marx saw it, and it was to become one of the key battlegrounds between Trotsky and Stalin. Odom also places this mass paramilitary organization in the context of a rapid program of modernization in which developing states resort to labor-intensive campaigns to extract at least a marginal contribution of goods and services which might not otherwise be forthcoming. Whether Russian "backwardness" in 1927 can be compared without considerable qualification to the traditional Asian and African societies analyzed in the development literature cited, is perhaps problematical, as is the assumption that the sequence of economic and political development has remained essentially unchanged since the onset of industrialization. Nonetheless, Odom does make a strong case for the impact of a decade of Soviet modernization on the functions and structure of Osoaviakhim: "The technical imperatives of more sophisticated training endeavors led to the organization of fewer and larger unitary structures under tighter central control, structures that could execute a complex cluster of interrelated tasks" (p. 226). Thus the dream of the Paris Commune gave way under Stalin to specialization, centralization, and removal of revolutionary cadres in the purge of the thirties.

As Odom clearly shows, there was little doubt that from the beginning, the Party had wrested control of Osoaviakhim from the military, but he has also marshalled much fragmentary evidence to show that Party stewardship was often haphazard and intermittent; recruitment of membership was often coercive; the professional military input ranged from perfunctory to hostile; the Komsomol, trade unions, educational and agricultural establishments found the activities of Osoaviakhim dysfunctional for work and school. Furthermore, much of the Osoaviakhim organization and membership existed on paper only. Osoaviakhim is not untypical of many Soviet mass organizations; they are part of a network of agencies involved in the coercive mobilization of an already overcommitted population. They engage in overlapping or conflicting activities and are most often met with the apathetic response of a weary citizenry. Odom's achievement in this carefully researched study is the analysis, using the insights of organization theory, of the successes and failures of the organization in terms of its own goals. He has been able to determine the rationale for the organization and to weigh the costs and benefits of the program, even within the context of overcommitment. Given the extreme difficulty of data gathering, the isolation and analysis of the factors given below provide a scholarly contribution.

As might be expected, information concerning the operation of Osoaviakhim is notably scant in the area of elite mobility. The leadership of Osoaviakhim and its interaction with the top Party elite remain shadowy. Odom has been able to find considerable evidence of budgetary practices and agenda formation, however, the most interesting of which comes from the captured Smolensk party archive, still one of the most impressive sources for the study of prewar Party history. Another major source for Odom's study is the press of the period under review; here he finds numerous examples of informal organizational behavior as revealed by criticisms of infractions of formal strictures. Odom's task is complicated by the fact that organizational success cannot, in this case, be measured by an end product. As he points out, even if it were within the chronological scope of his study, the efficacy of Osoaviakhim's contribution to the mobilization of World War II cannot be assessed: its task was the training of manpower in elementary military skills; it had no jurisdiction over the actual wartime mobilization effort. In addition. Osoaviakhim's activities were diverse and often unrelated, although as Stalin's stamp was increasingly felt, the goals were narrowed and the organization specialized to the adapting of "civilian skills and resources for both actual and potential military use" (p. 216). In the decade under study, Odom finds that Osoaviakhim did contribute to the extractive capacity of the new Soviet state: it created some reserve military formations, taught basic specialist skills, marksmanship, established a preliminary stage of preinductee training, trained pilots, and raised contributions for some aircraft. He finds further that the organization attained a degree of success in popularizing and disseminating information about the new, and for the more traditional sectors of the population, alarming, development of air transport. Perhaps most important, Osoaviakhim performed its functions without lowering the levels of manpower available to the industrialization effort decreed by the first Five-Year Plan; most of its activities were conducted at the place of work during the workers' leisure time.

Odom is understandably most tentative in his assessment of the rationality of Osoaviakhim's bureaucratic structure. Stalin's purge, with its tremendous dislocations, is obviously part of a much broader context, and its functionality can only be treated very partially within the confines of the single organization. The change of focus which Osoaviakhim underwent throughout the thirties is, similarly, part of a society-wide reordering of priorities under Stalin. Certainly, as Odom maintains, political choice is never unlimited, and knowledge of the organizational structure and development of a single organization can provide important building blocks for a more generalizable theory of bureaucracy in Soviet-type states.

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ

*Michigan State University*

**Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940–1944.** By Robert O. Paxton. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1972. Pp. 399, xix. $10.00.)

When the French translation of Professor Paxton's book was published, a storm of indignation broke loose. In the columns of *Le Monde* and elsewhere, former Vichy officials and apologists, but also Gaullists and respected scholars acknowledged at the very least their uneasiness; others denounced the work as being, under the guise of scholarship, nothing but a "pamphlet" designed to arouse American opinion against "traditional France"; errors were revealed which, under inspection, turned out to be quite minor but were found useful to discredit the author's findings.

What provoked the violent reactions to the book were not the errors but the profound truths and the coherence of the author's interpretations of a French regime which in the words of one of our French colleagues remains *mal connu et mal aimé*. Paxton has succeeded in doing what he set himself to do, namely to restore the Vichy years to their rightful place in indigenous French history. In this book (as well as in his previous *Parades and Politics at Vichy* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966]) he has substantiated with all the necessary qualifications his stark but convincing thesis: "Collaboration was not a German demand to which some Frenchmen acceded, through sympathy or guile. Collaboration was a French proposal which Hitler ultimately rejected" (p. 51).

The motives for making this proposal were almost as manifold as the traditions and personalities that made up the shaky political structure known as the Vichy regime. Their most common denominator was, from the bitter beginning to the near farcical end, the fear of social chaos engendering communism and a perhaps slightly less sincere self-castigation about the "errors" of the past, whether such errors were defined as decadence, as godlessness, as utter inefficiency or merely as that "political effervescence" which de Gaulle was to denounce later. It is not true, as some of the book's French critics have said, that the author has not distinguished sufficiently between the roles which the principal actors, such as Laval, Darlan, and Pétain himself, have assumed. He does make the distinctions, but he is still bound to explain why most of these leaders engaged in almost ceaseless efforts to interest the German authorities in their proposals for cooperation.

A critical reinterpretation of previously known sources, such as memoirs and the records of the postwar trials (but slighting quite properly the more than dubious Hoover Institution-sponsored *France During the German Occupation*) is supplemented by ample use of so far largely neglected and frequently revealing German documents. In some instances it appears that the author has taken the reports by Nazi officials too easily at face value. By now, and especially since Speer's revelations, it is well known that there were on the Nazis' side the same internecine fights as among Vichy officials. Hence subjective interpretations if not outright falsehoods color the available evidence. The explanation of some quite decisive events awaits the release of the official Vichy papers by the French government. That it is neither forthcoming nor promised is revealing enough a manifestation of the continuing traumatic effect of the four years. (The hurt is also evident throughout most of the testimony that former Vichy officials contributed to a symposium organized by the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques and edited as *Le Gouvernment de Vichy 1940–1942*, [Paris: Armand Colin, 1972].)

For the political scientist the most valuable contribution of the book consists in its analysis of the institutional and ideological characteristics of the armistice regime. It is indeed true that Pétain's National Revolution "tells us about France, not Germany. It was the expression of indigenous French urges for change, reform and revenge, nurtured in the 1930's and made urgent and possible by defeat" (p. 143). Unless one wishes to give to the term fascism a confusingly broad definition (such as "hard measures by a frightened middle class"), the Vichy regime was not fascist. But since it was, as Paxton demonstrates, more than anything else the creation of a particular and important elite, namely that of experts and professionals, any judging of Vichy means judging the French elite. Here one must seek the explanation for the allergic reaction to accounts of the regime, especially when they originate with non-French scholars.

Paxton is quite correct when he makes clear that in a long view there were fewer breaks and more continuities between Vichy and the subsequent republics than is generally assumed. He arrives at this conclusion by examining the roster of the *grands corps* in the administration. If one investigates other sectors of the economic and social elite, the outlines of such a picture emerge even more clearly. Such continuity, however, will hardly surprise any serious students of the country's changing regimes and of its most eminent chroniclers, such as de Tocqueville.

When more documents are made available by the French government, some of the gaps in knowledge, of which Paxton is well aware, may be filled. But I doubt that except for details they will alter his findings. What is most needed after the valuable studies we now have of the Vichy elite (and of some of the elites active in the resistance movement) is a social history of the period: how did the French people live, how did their thinking and their attitudes, active or passive, develop in various regions from the beginning of the war in 1939 through liberation. So far only some journalistic and some, more or less plausible, fictional accounts exist. Others should be attempted if one wants additional evidence about French political culture and its processes of socialization.

HENRY W. EHRMANN

*Département de Science Politique*
*de la Sorbonne*

**The Secret Vysocany Congress: Proceedings and Documents of the Extraordinary Fourteenth Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 22 August 1968.** Edited and with an introduction by Jiri Pelikan. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972. Pp. 303. $11.95.)

The book is a collection of translated documents relating to the secret Fourteenth Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party which took place in a Prague suburb two days after the Soviet invasion. It includes a transcript of the tape recordings of the proceedings, documents prepared beforehand for the Congress as well as statements of other bodies in relationship to the Congress. The invasion, which in a way was to prevent the Congress and which indeed eventually cancelled the Congress achievements, at the time speeded up the opening date which originally was slated for September. 1,290 elected delegates were called by radio, more than two-thirds of the total converged on Prague. Despite the constant danger of discovery by the forces of occupation, the Congress completed its one day's deliberation and elected the new Central Committee which included the reformist leaders, at that time imprisoned by the Soviets on Russian soil. The significance of the Congress is symbolic, theoretical, and historical. Indeed, the whole period of the Prague Spring can be compared to the Paris Commune of 1871: extremely interesting, often referred to in the literature, but with little practical impact. Naturally, the editor of these papers, Mr. Pelikan, a Communist since 1939, and from 1963 to September 1968 the Director General of Czech Television, feels otherwise. To him the Prague Spring, the invasion, and the Congress itself were momentous events. His personal involvement in these happenings predisposes him to be less than selective in his choice of the documents. The plain fact is that a good bit of the book is just extremely dull. In parts, only my sense of duty kept me awake. The tape recording of the proceedings merely prove that a meeting of reformist Communists is nearly as boring as the gatherings of their conservative brethren. The same pompous speeches, the same dominance by the leadership, and the same unanimity of votes. Granted that the invasion itself produced a shock and an extreme unanimity of reaction, such a response does not make lively reading. Words, words, words—thousands of words—all in the face of the occupation, empty words against tanks. Why include both the preliminary and final versions of the Draft Party Statutes? To prove that the final version was less liberal than the preliminary because the chairmanship of the drafting committee was in the hands of the well-known conservative—Alois Indra. The editor himself admits that even the final version permitted inner party democracy unheard of any place else in the Communist block. The editor could have selected a few highlights of the differences of the two documents, which would have sunk Mr. Indra, and saved the reader. This is not to say that the whole book is without interest. The memoranda compiled for the Fourteenth Congress and the Analysis of the Party's Record and of the Development of Society since the Thirteenth Congress contain many fascinating features. Of specific importance to the study of comparative Communist political systems is the affirmation of the division within the Communist parties into those factions which stress equalitarianism and those which condemn it and which view socialist development in terms of efficiency of production.

The liberalization movement in Czechoslovakia was as much a victory of democratic principles as the defeat of the equalitarian faction within the Party. The documents prepared for the Congress condemn without reservation and in no uncertain terms the "equalitarian, sectarian and dogmatic views derived from Stalinist ideas of socialism" (p. 248). The winning faction of the reformers emphasized efficiency of production against equalitarianism, which forsakes "The socialist principle to each according to his labour . . . " (p. 197). It opposed the equalitarian distribution of inadequate resources, which "operates to the detriment of the well-qualified, the efficient, the assiduous and hardworking" (p. 197). Furthermore it claimed that the "Equalitarian and bureaucratic relations destroy people's interest in working or in gaining higher qualifications; they threaten labour discipline and morale" (p. 198). They operate "against the interest of creative intellectuals and skilled workers" (p. 197–198).

The Czechoslovak development brought into the open and proved beyond doubt the existence of the two factions in the ruling communist parties of the industrialized communist states. The factions resulting from the dichotomy of the Marxist theory itself, which on the one hand could be interpreted as the call to equality within the socialist society, and on the other hand, stresses the extremely high level of production as the prerequisite to communism. The question is what is to come first—the high volume of production or equitable distribution? The Czechoslovak reformers called for the efficiency of production as the prime goal because: "We have eliminated capitalist ownership and transferred the means of production to the hands of the state. By doing this we destroyed the stimuli to economic development operating under capitalism without finding sufficiently effective substitutes for them" (p. 209). The reformers advocated policies increasing income rewards for the intelligentsia and those performing skilled and complicated work. The new system of incentives combined with the decentralization of the economic management and with the wide political participation was to create an economic abundance allowing "consumption to reach levels appropriate to modern civilization, with ample and uninterrupted satisfaction of present human needs . . . [which] would permit the creation of new and higher demands, the refinement of people's interests and an end to those self-justifying pressures that make the consumer society" (p. 212). All those statements validate the analytical framework first developed by Peter Christian Ludz, in his study of the S.E.D. (East German Communist Party).

In conclusion, Pelikan failed in his role as editor, by including everything related to the Congress. He would have done much better had he selected those parts which emphasized the broader implications than just the Congress itself. In his introduction and the closing statement he attests to the short historical memory of the communist mind. The invasion of Czechoslovakia was not the first invasion of a socialist country by another socialist country. The Soviets invaded socialist Georgia (Menshevik) in 1921 and socialist Hungary in 1956. But perhaps those countries were not truly socialist? Which only proves the point that "socialism is what *we* say it is."

JAROSLAW PIEKALKIEWICZ

*University of Kansas*

**Public Opinion Polling in Czechoslovakia, 1968–69; Results and Analysis of Surveys Conducted During the Dubcek Era.** By Jaroslaw A. Piekalkiewicz. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. Pp. 357. $18.50.)

This study contains the results of some twenty public opinion polls conducted by Czech and Slovak professional poll-takers from March 1968 to March 1969, a period spanning the Prague Spring, the Soviet Invasion, the self-immolation of Jan Palach, and the completion of "normalization." The fact that these polls were the first of their kind ever to be conducted in the CSSR makes them noteworthy. Bridging as they do one of the most critical periods of post-World II Czechoslvak history, they become even more significant. Their publication is highly welcome.

Unfortunately, the accompanying "analysis" of the polls leaves much to be desired. Professor Piekalkiewicz's evident aim was to demonstrate or elucidate by his commentary that most Czechs and Slovaks truly favored reform in 1968. To a certain extent, the polls themselves appear to have been designed to sample public opinion precisely on this point. With the knowledge of hindsight, it does not take a very sophisticated public opinion sampler to deduce from the polls' results that the general Czechoslovak population did favor reform. Such a finding, however, does not begin to uncover the wealth of information beneath the raw data. Yet the author does not attempt to go much further and indeed gives the reader little direct help in his attempts to bring order out of the statistical chaos in several highly critical areas.

In the first place, one searches in vain for a general discussion of the polls as a whole. The raw data are broken up and arranged in chapter form by subject matter; attitudes toward revolution or counterrevolution, opinions on electoral form, confidence in public officials. A question-and-response from one survey follows a question from another, making access to an analysis of any one complete poll impossible unless the reader performs the task of reconstructing the survey himself. If he wants to find a breakdown of the polls by time and place, he must turn to the appendix and go through the twenty survey descriptions. Knowledge of the timing and location of each survey is essential to any serious attempt to develop hypotheses about the nature, growth, or direction of support for the reform movement, questions which the author does not pose in any systematic fashion. It would have been helpful, for example, to have been told that eleven surveys claim to have been based on a representative sampling of the whole C.S.S.R., eight were administered in Prague and parts of Bohemia and Moravia, and only one was done in Slovakia. This is not to say that the surveys were deliberately biased, but rather that the manner and scope of their conduct inevitably influenced the results. Not surprisingly, these tend to overstress attitudes in the Czech Lands and to minimize differences in outlook between Czechs and Slovaks. In addition, the highly significant polls regarding the objectives of political reforms were made in the Czech Lands, and there are virtually no data on how the Slovaks felt on such crucial issues as the composition of the National Front or the form of elections.

Again, it would have been useful to know that ten of the surveys were conducted before the invasion, two overlapped it, and the remaining eight were conducted during normalization. In other words, in half of the polls we are confronted with the problem of the reintroduction of censorship and fear on the part of the respondents as to the consequences of their answers. We cannot assume equal freedom to answer in all the twenty polls. In his analysis of the data, the author gives seemingly no consideration to the differences time and place might make.

A second problem presented by the author's analysis is what appears to be his lack of awareness of Czech and Slovak history or of the postwar Czechoslovak political, social, and economic climate. While the chapter notes contain references to Poland and the Polish experience, there is not one reference to a work on Czechoslovakia which might have provided the author with the background needed to give substance and structure to his eyewitness observations. There is a certain insensitivity in his treatment of Slovakia which tends to be formulated in terms of the Czech experience. Slovakia, in 1968, we read, showed less political awareness and less sophistication and had less media deployment than Bohemia. These are the old cliches. My own investigation of the relationship of Slovakia to the reform movement suggested that (a) the Slovaks were its catalysts but that (b) paradoxically they were politically more conservative, which is entirely different from being less politically aware. Because Slovak industrialization had occurred under communism, the Slovaks were more interested in a larger autonomous portion of the economic investment pie than in political freedoms. Inspection of the rather meager evidence offered by the polls would seem to bear out this contention. Slovaks appear to have been more optimistic about the economy (Tables 10:22–10:25), more supportive of the Communist Party leadership (Table 3:10), more concerned about the nationality issue, and less convinced of the validity of civil rights (Table 2:5). It could be argued that this conservative attitude was a major impediment to reform, particularly as regards the federal question.

Similarly, the author tends to discount the consistently more conservative responses of KSC functionaries and secretaries. The surveys bear out the hypothesis (and more analysis is needed on this point) that in Bohemia there was a real break between the attitudes of the KSC rank-and-file and those of the Party apparat, the former being more liberal and ready for change, the latter much more ambivalent. If this break can be substantiated, it goes a long way to explaining the process of democratization that took place within the Czechoslovak Party in 1968.

Finally, the book evidences little statistical sophistication. Sometimes, the author cites the part for the whole, as in his inferences regarding attitudes toward possible electoral systems. He does not give enough attention to the proportion of nonrespondents in each survey, particularly in the postinvasion polls. In Survey 2, conducted in September 1968, approximately 22 per cent refused to answer, expressed misgivings, or feared the survey results. This would seem to be a sufficiently high proportion to cause the analyst to question the finding that 96 per cent of the actual respondents expressed confidence in the government. Last but not least, no effort was made to cross-correlate data, to control for variables, or to utilize common statistical methods which might bring order and structure out of the raw data. Systematic analysis is sadly lacking.

A welcome contrast to the Piekalkiewicz's study is Barton, Denitch, and Kadushin's *Opinion Making Elites in Yugoslavia* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), which uses statistics to good advantage to demonstrate that opinion making in that country is a complex process, nowhere near as monolithic as one might like to assume. The findings are based on careful data analysis and thus provide a framework which can be utilized in studying opinion making in other communist systems as well. It is hoped that someone with an interest in evaluating the formation and role of public opinion in Czechoslovakia during 1968–1969 will make the sorely needed analysis of the opinion polls available in Piekalkiewicz's book that will give us similarly valid insights into the structure of influence in the CSSR during that critical period.

BARBARA JANCAR

*Union College*

**The Public Sector in the Mixed Economy.** By Merlyn Rees. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1973. Pp. 240. $8.75.)

Merlyn Rees is the Member of Parliament for Leeds South, Hugh Gaitskell's old constituency, and he clearly belongs to the same social-democratic tradition of Labour party politics. In the 1974 Wilson Government he became Minister for Northern Ireland affairs; in the previous Wilson Government he held junior office at the Ministry of Defence and at the Home Office.

In this book, however, he turns to British economic affairs. His object is to correct the imbalance of most previous surveys, which dismiss the public sector very briefly, by describing the current situation in all its complexity. After an exposition of the range of activities in the mixed economy, the book is structured into accounts of the work of central government, of local authorities, of public corporations and of state shareholdings.

The concepts of public and private "sectors" have been presented to politics by economists, who needed them for various purposes such as national income accounting. They have become part of common parlance, and at this level there is little to complain about. Nevertheless there is sometimes difficulty in following what political significance they are supposed to have, and Rees himself seems perplexed at some points.

The sphere of central government is defined politically rather than administratively—as comprising all bodies for which a Minister is responsible to Parliament. But here we find not only the great Departments themselves, but also "associated organisations"—the Charity Commission, the Land Registry, the Water Resources Board and so on. Moreover, since Ministers are responsible for grants a great range of grant-aided bodies come into this chapter, from the British Travel Association and the Industrial Advisers to the Blind to the health service administration and the universities. The second category is that of local authorities. This excludes the local administrations of bodies centrally financed; but besides the main local authority structure of counties, districts and boroughs it includes the Port of London Authority and other port organizations, and a range of fishery, drainage and other bodies, and the Metropolitan Police. Public corporations constitute the third category. They are in the public sector by reason of their ownership and the way they were created, not the way they are financed—in effect, for the opposite reason to the grant-aided bodies. Rees's fourth category is that of state shareholdings, an interesting and significant inclusion. In the other three sections he has relied mainly on the definitions of official statisticians, but here he abandons them, for the statisticians leave firms with even substantial government shareholdings in the private sector. He argues that ". . . in all logic the ownership of shares by the central government . . . surely makes the firms concerned . . . a part of the public sector" (p. 202).

It seems, therefore, that any form of dependence on the government puts people into the public sector, whatever the administrative differences. Perhaps then those in receipt of social welfare payments should be included, or subsidized farmers. But the variety casts doubt on the usefulness of the concept itself. For political or administrative understanding more than the simple dichotomy of public and private is needed. Rees's categories indeed might make a beginning in spite of some curiosities. In terms of current Labour party politics, the emphasis on state-shareholding is to be expected; it has become an orthodoxy that further public ownership is to be of this nature. When to loosely-controlled public institutions are added well-regulated and infiltrated private enterprises, however, the unreality grows. In the private sector of the statisticians, personal expenditure is to be found along with that of great conglomerate businesses: that side of the fence also has its political absurdities.

The book has value, then, in that it effectively sketches the complexity of the public sector in Britain. It does not tell us much about any part of it, but the fragmentation, the diversity, the contrasts are there; and these surely exhibit the main political truth to be appreciated. For the purpose of introducing students to the British economy more history and more extended discussion are needed. Within a wider framework, this book contributes information and a theme, but not more.

LEONARD TIVEY
*University of Birmingham, England*

**Bibliographic Control of Microforms.** By Felix Reichmann and Josephine M. Tharpe with the cooperation of Henriette Avram, Suzanne Dodson, Henry Gochman and Laura Jennings. Sponsored by the Association of Research Libraries under contract with the Office of Education. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1972. Pp. 256. $12.50.)

Brief introductory chapters deal with methods, procedures, and problems of inadequate bibliographic control, and the United States government as a microform publisher. The authors inform us that the median American Research Library had 28 microforms in 1970 for every 100 printed books and that their number will soon equal printed volumes. The U.S. government has become one of the largest producers and distributors of microforms. Unfortunately, the lack of an adequate system of bibliographic control of microforms diminishes the scholar's access to these riches of source materials.

This book provides indispensable information on the vast and constantly increasing amount of microform material existing in many countries and in a great variety of research areas. The carefully annotated "Microform Bibliography" of some 200 pages ranges from the United States and Soviet Russia to small developing countries, and from American State Papers in the National Archives in Washington to Cambodian material in French available in Tokyo and Czarist Russian newspapers in the Helsinki University Library accessible through microform interlibrary loan from Oklahoma State University in Stillman.

JOHN BROWN MASON
*California State University, Fullerton*

**Legal Control of Government: Administrative Law in Britain and the United States.** By Bernard Schwartz and H. W. R. Wade. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972. Pp. xxxii, 349. $10.25.)

Britain and the United States seem to differ over the proper role of the judge. In Britain judges are reluctant to invade the spheres of interest of Parliament and the administration, but in the United States, despite much lip service toward the doctrine of the separation of powers, judges assume the functions of legislators and administrators. This judicial activism has emerged because power is so diffused in the American political system that the system is unable to produce effective legislation on controversial social and political problems. To remedy this failure the courts have stepped in as an auxiliary legislature. In Britain power is concentrated in a government which through its party majority can control the sovereign parliament and pass its legislation. The courts, therefore, have no need to be the spearhead of social change.

In Britain too there is more confidence in the civil service. A nonpolitical, highly educated elite, devoted to a lifetime's career in government service, is trusted with considerable discretion to find the most suitable solution for a particular problem. In the United States the civil service is more penetrated by political influences, less impartial, less expert, and less devoted to a concept of the public interest. To remedy a lack of confidence in the administrative system the courts probe deeply into administrative action and seek to ensure that administrators operate in accord with rules ascertainable in advance and with a fixed and standardized policy.

In Britain major sectors of the economy have been nationalized under public corporations or closely regulated by ministers and officials who are allowed wide discretion. In the United States private ownership is so revered that the public interest has had to be injected into the economy through regulatory commissions which follow judicial procedures and are closely controlled by the courts. In Britain social security has also been extracted from judicial control, with decisions on welfare payments left to civil servants, and appeals against their decisions heard by tribunals of laymen, deliberately to avoid domination by the legal mind, cumbersome judicial procedures, delay, expense and excessive record-keeping. In the United States, however, the courts have transferred their methods of controlling regulatory commissions to the distribution of welfare benefits, thus judicializing an activity where Britain values flexibility to meet individual needs.

To protect the citizen against maladministration Britain has turned to the Ombudsman, a Parliamentary servant, who strengthens ministerial and parliamentary control of the bureaucracy. But in the United States the courts set aside and even rewrite administrative decisions. America looks gripped by doctrinaire legalism and lawyers in the quest for fees.

The situation, however, in Britain has changed since the 1940s and 1950s when the courts seemed to have abdicated to the executive. Their recent offensive to curb the discretion of the executive is well told in this volume by Britain's leading administrative lawyer. His collaboration with Professor Schwartz, who contributes sections on the American position, grew out of an Anglo-American legal exchange concerned with judicial review of administrative action. Judges, practitioners and academic lawyers visited each other's country to observe and discuss the ways the same problems were handled.

Both countries experienced the growth of government intervention in economic and social life and a consequent increase in the discretion of officials. The main problem is to ensure they act justly to the citizen. Each chapter of the book takes a single theme and considers each country side-by-side. Beginning with constitutions and institutions, it moves on to economic and social regulation, complaints against government, official secrecy, rules and regulations, and suing the state. It examines the principles, machinery and scope of judicial review, fair procedures and the limits of discretion. It is very clear on the American Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, and on the British Tribunals and Inquiries Act of 1958, which established the Council on Tribunals and began to bring some order to the tangle of tribunals and inquiries that had grown up piecemeal. Although administrative lawyers will find the book invaluable, political scientists will be irritated at the rather formalistic approach, the failure to think in terms of systems of decision making, and the absorption at times in niggling legal technicalities.

Political scientists who are concerned with the interactions between the administrative and judicial systems of decision making will find most interesting those sections on the recent assertiveness of the British judges who, the authors conclude, are now doing just the same as their American counterparts but not in so aggressive a manner. Unobtrusively and focussing on technical points they have erected major curbs on executive discretion and have delicately but firmly contradicted Acts of Parliament.

The executive can no longer suppress evidence if it feels disclosure is not in the public interest, since the minister's affidavit is not now conclusive; the courts will decide. And most important, Acts of Parliament which contain clauses apparently excluding judicial review with such phrases as "the minister may make such orders as he thinks fit," or he may make "such conditions as he thinks necessary or desirable," or his decision "shall be final," or even his decision "shall not be questioned in any court of law," have recently been shown to be far from judge-proof. The courts have said that they will not be ousted, claiming that Parliament would never intend discretion to be unfettered. They have argued that implicit in a statute is the assumption that the decision maker would act reasonably, on the basis of substantial evidence, not taking irrelevant considerations into account, and following the rules of natural justice which command that no one shall be judge in his own case or be condemned unheard. The courts have interpreted statutes as if they contained these implied limitations on discretion, and have struck down executive decisions as *ultra vires*, even though the wish of Parliament was to exclude judicial intervention.

American political scientists would find a valuable research project in studying the interactions between judges and civil servants over the last twenty years in Britain. A foreigner would be more likely than a British investigator to penetrate the barrier of official secrecy and to overcome the conventions that there is something slightly improper about studying the decisions of particular judges.

G. W. Jones

*London School of Economics and Political Science*

**The Strenuous Decade: China's Nation-Building Efforts, 1927–1937.** Edited by Paul K. T. Sih. (Jamaica, New York: St. John's University Press, 1970. Pp. xxi, 385. $10.00.)

**China's Nation-Building Effort, 1927–1937: The Financial and Economic Record.** By Arthur N. Young. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1971. Pp. xx, 553. $19.50.)

**China and the Helping Hand, 1937–1945.** By Arthur N. Young. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963. Pp. xx, 502. $10.00.)

**China's Wartime Finance and Inflation, 1937–1945.** By Arthur N. Young. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965. Pp. xviii, 421. $12.00.)

*The Strenuous Decade* is the ninth study in the "Asia in the Modern World Series" which was inaugurated by St. John's University Press in 1962 under the general editorship of Professor Paul K. T. Sih. The series has thus far not enjoyed a distinguished reputation among China specialists. Nor has the ambition expressed in the Foreword the first monograph in the series been realized. In it the president of St. John's University promised that "distinguished scholars and specialists [would] carefully describe and recreate the major events which have revolutionized Asia since 1900. . . ." The series would, first of all, be better named "Republican China in the Modern World" inasmuch as all of the studies have focused upon China, which millions of Indonesians, Koreans, Japanese, Cambodians, etc. would insist is not coequal with "Asia." A more fundamental weakness for a series pretending to study the "major events which have revolutionized Asia since 1900" is the almost total avoidance of any serious examination of the role that communism has played and is playing in revolutionary Asia. Instead, the series has concentrated almost exclusively on a narrow range of political and diplomatic events involving the Kuomintang.

Among the nine essays in *The Strenuous Decade*, each followed by the remarks of one or two commentators, are papers on international relations by Joseph W. Ballantine, political reconstruction by Dison Hsuehfeng Poe, fiscal transformation by Arthur N. Young, modernization of banking and currency by Chang Kia-ngau, the agricultural economy by John Lossing Buck, attempts to transform Chinese agriculture by Shen Tsung-han, industrial development and economic policy by Yuan-li Wu, railroad construction by Ling Hung-shan, and education by Theodore Hsi-en Chen.

Joseph W. Ballantine's experience in Asia goes back to 1909, when he began a long and distinguished State Department career as Secretary at the American Embassy in Tokyo. He writes here chiefly of China's troubled relations with Japan in the three decades after his entrance into the Foreign Service and cites at extended length a report he filed in October 1935 which demonstrates that his long familiarity with Japan had not produced a great admiration for the Japanese as a "race." The Japanese occupation of Manchuria might be extended to North China, he conceded in that report, but it was unlikely that it could last for long. "It is difficult to conceive of 30,000,000 Chinese remaining permanently under the subjection of another race no more virile and possessing no greater inherent capacity either mental or moral." Moreover, Ballantine insisted, even assuming that the Japanese should be "successful in implanting their organization in Manchuria," the Chinese would eventually "take a lesson from the Japanese book" in order to repel the Japanese. The Chinese desire to rid themselves of Japanese domination, Ballantine added, "may furnish them with the determination to learn well [from the Japanese] and put it into practice." Ballantine's 1935 report illustrates the problems of prognostication by State Department analysts —even the best of them. The Chinese were surely determined to rid themselves of Japanese domination but the techniques they used, as it turned out, were in no sense learned "from the Japanese book" (p. 24). In part, at least, they were learned from the Maoist book but that is precisely the sort of concession that the authors in the St. John's series never acknowledge.

Like most collections of essays, *The Strenuous Decade* is uneven. Ballantine's contribution, while not without flaws, is interesting and thought provoking. The two comments attached to it are not. The tone of Chin-tung Liang's comment, for example, is set by his reminder that the period of 1927–37 "has been considered the 'Golden Decade' of modern Chinese history" (p. 26). The source of this happy encomium? None other, says Professor Liang, than "General Albert C. Wedemeyer in his sworn testimony before the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. Senate, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, September 19, 1951." Few students of modern Chinese history will find the endorsement of General Wedemeyer, sworn or not, conclusive evidence of the lustre of the Nanking Decade.

Far more convincing evidence is provided by Yuan-li Wu, who neither states nor assumes that the decade in question was golden but analyzes the economic problems faced by the Nationalists and dispassionately seeks to show how they attempted to solve them through such techniques as "the official encouragement of private enterprise through cost subsidy, promotion of marketing, and the granting of cash and other awards" (p. 247). He goes on to analyze the role of the New Life Movement, created by Chiang Kai-shek in 1935, as a force for economic development.

Theodore H. E. Chen's discussion of educational reform is a similarly constructive study that avoids flag waving and concentrates on the enormous tasks that faced the Nationalists in combatting mass illiteracy, reforming the language, checking the denationalizing influence of Christianity in the schools, and a host of other staggering problems.

Two other studies which deserve special mention are the ones on banking and railroad construction by Chang Kai-ngau and Ling Hunghsun respectively. Though narrow in scope, these essays provide a wealth of data for the specialist.

Finally, *The Strenuous Decade* includes a contribution by Arthur N. Young, the author of the other three books here being reviewed. The essay in *The Strenuous Decade* is in fact a brief condensation of ideas which are more fully set forth in his *China's Nation-Building Effort, 1927–1937.* In writing this important work, Young has consulted a massive volume of published and unpublished sources, including a great many that even China specialists would have difficulty locating—unless they happen to have been financial advisers to the government of China for eighteen years, from 1929 to 1947. That was the unique experience of Arthur Young, and he draws on it to give this book the stamp of intellectual probity.

Young emphasizes that one of the great obstacles faced by the Nationalists in their nation-building attempts was the drive to achieve national unification and gives Chiang Kai-shek high praise for reversing the earlier trend toward separatism. But the Nationalists paid a high price for unification they achieved by 1937 because the military actions that brought it about were costly and diverted resources from economic and social development. Young states succinctly the dilemma faced by the Nationalists:

> Without military action against the revolts would the country have fallen apart again as in the twenties? Or would alternative use of resources have been feasible in a way that would have checked political and social unrest? (p. 425)

Young concedes the difficulty in answering such a salient question, but he clearly indicates that he favored at the time the second horn of that dilemma. The rivals of the Nationalists, both the warlords and the Communists, he argues, were much inferior in strength to the Nationalists and not really in a position to challenge the Nationalists' nation-building abilities. Young therefore felt in the 1930s that the Nationalists would have been wiser to concentrate less on suppression of its rivals and more on the making of a model area in the region of Shanghai "with the expectation that the influence of accomplishments there would radiate into the rest of the country . . ." (p. 425). While historical "ifs" are notoriously inconclusive, some are nonetheless engaging.

The scholarly coverage that Young gives the 1927–1937 decade is duplicated for the years 1937–1945 in the companion volumes *China and the Helping Hand, 1937–1945* and *China's Wartime Finance and Inflation, 1937–1945*. We find in them both the same painstaking documentation, the same balance between technical details and generalities, and the same judicious appraisal of controversial issues evident in his *China's Nation-Building Effort*. There is necessarily some duplication between *China and the Helping Hand* and *China's Wartime Finance and Inflation* that cannot be sorted out here for want of space. The former is written much more for the general reader than the latter, but both are definitive scholarly works.

JOHN H. BOYLE

*California State University, Chico*

**The Congress Party in Rajasthan: Political Integration and Institution Building in an Indian State.** By Richard Sisson. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972. Pp. 364. $12.50.)

The growing number of well-documented empirical studies of the Indian political system have contributed not only to our attempts to understand one of the 20th century's most complex societies but also to the sharpening of theories of modernization, political development, and change. Despite its apparent narrow focus as a case study of the Congress party in the state of Rajasthan, the book under review represents a significant contribution to the literature of comparative politics, political modernization, and party building. At the same time, it adds to the increasingly rich literature already available on the Congress party and state politics in India. The book, therefore, deserves the attention of both the area specialist and those interested in problems of nation building and political parties.

Although Professor Sisson draws upon a great deal of theoretical literature and is eclectic in his approach, his study is primarily an extension of the work of Eisenstadt and Huntington and is concerned with examining the process of institutional development under conditions of fundamental social transformation. Political change, therefore, is analyzed primarily as a process of institutionalization, "the existence and persistence of valued rules, procedures, and patterns of behavior which enable the successful accommodation of new configurations of political claimants and demands in an organization" (p. 4). The concept of institutionalization is applied to the emergence and development of the Rajasthan Congress and the problems associated with party recruitment and organizational maintenance. Yet because of its persistent concern with concepts and theoretical issues, it tells us a great deal about the problem of the founding, maintenance, and growth of political parties which go beyond the Indian context.

The variety of the materials used in the study adds to the richness and significance of the monograph. The major sources of data are: interviews with members of the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly and selected political leaders; state, district and constituency records and files of the Pradesh Congress Committee office; the Rajasthan State archives; selected party documents; census data; and a variety of government reports and documents. The result of this painstaking effort is a rich harvest of detailed, longitudinal data which is skillfully employed to document the main themes of the study—changing patterns of integration, institutional adaptability, and changing patterns of mobilization, recruitment, and participation.

The core of the book deals with three interrelated aspects of the process of institutionalization of the Congress party in Rajasthan. The first is the social and political antecedents governing the emergence of the Congress party in Rajasthan after independence. The Congress in Rajasthan developed from a combination of urban-based Praja Parishads dominated by high caste Brahmans and Mahajans and rural-based Kisan Sabhas which were largely an extension of Jat caste organizations. These movements had been politically active in some of the more than twenty princely states and chiefdoms which came to comprise the state of Rajasthan.

The second major theme of the book is the structure and process of organizational adaptability, involving a detailed analysis of political recruitment and mobility in Rajasthan society and local political institutions. Sisson demonstrates how the Congress has served as an integrative mechanism by mobilizing different caste groups and accommodating the competing claims of regional and other primordial interests while at the same time maintaining organizational cohesion. The result has been a gradual process of change in the composition of the Congress which has witnessed the gradual decline of influence of urban interests and the increasing strength of rural interests. Though this process has varied considerably from region to region, the overall effect has been to make the Rajasthan Congress a much more broadly based organization than the one which emerged after independence.

The third theme of the book is the process of conflict management and organizational integration in the Rajasthan Congress which emphasizes the functional contribution of factionalism to the circulation of elites and to the recruitment of new groups into the political process. Sisson stresses the openness and lack of rigidity of the Congress and demonstrates that "Congress success in elections has varied directly with change in the social basis of party representation. Congress candidates have been the least successful in those areas where social representation has been most restricted" (p. 175). Conversely, however, while electoral success has tended to be high in those areas where social representation has been plural, the level of success has been uneven because social pluralization exists in tension with organizational cohesion.

Almost all of the literature dealing with the Congress party at the state, local, and national levels tends to place major emphasis on the contributions of competition and segmentation within the Congress system to the integration of political groups and the creation of both vertical and horizontal linkages within the Congress party organization. Very little attention, however, is paid to the impact of this particular pattern of organizational behavior on public policy and governmental performance. Sisson recognizes the problem but only incidentally. As the quest for accommodation begins to involve a much larger number of factional units, Sisson admits, severe problems arise "with respect to developing and implementing common policy and programs. Support is purchased and maintained at the cost of planned change" (p. 252). Sisson returns to this theme in the last few pages of the book where he again warns that the pattern of organizational behavior he has described may reach some threshold where such accommodation may become counterproductive. The time has come for political scientists to focus greater attention on the implications of the politics of integration described by Sisson on public policy and governmental performance.

Sisson's study is a significant contribution to comparative research, yet one suspects that its title has tended to limit its audience to the small fraternity of India specialists. The analysis presented by Sisson is clearly relevant beyond the Indian context or for that matter the state of Rajasthan.

Stanley A. Kochanek
*The Pennsylvania State University*

**Area Handbook For Israel.** By Harvey H. Smith and others. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970. Pp. 457. $3.50.)

This volume on Israel prepared by a group from the Foreign Area Studies of the American University undoubtedly deserves to be brought to the attention of the profession even though it is not a conventional academic work with a central theme or focus on a specific sociological problem. It is a handbook suitable for the nonspecialist who is looking for a comprehensive compendium of information on the country in a single volume. It contains sections on social, political, economic, and national security aspects of Israel. As can be expected from a work written by nine co-authors, certain parts are better and more perceptive than others, but taken as a whole this is an impressive introductory volume.

The first section deals with the social character of the society, beginning with a discussion of the physical environment. There is an extremely well-condensed summary of the historical setting which begins with ancient Jewish origins, continues through the history of the Zionist movement and the establishment of the State of Israel, and ends with the period of the war of June 1967. Vital statistics of the population, ethnic groups, and languages are given in summary form. The authors provide a commendable review of social structure, stratification, and mobility without making superficial generalizations about such complicated issues as ethnic relations. A chapter on the family compares and contrasts urban and rural family conditions, as well as trends in marriage and divorce. Separate chapters on living conditions, education, artistic and intellectual expression, religion, and social values round out this section.

The five chapters of the political section more or less accurately reflect the imbalance in research and publication on Israeli politics that characterizes the period in which the book was written. The section begins with a competent description of the formal structure of the governmental system. The following chapter fails to live up to the promise of its title, "Political Dynamics." Most political scientists are not likely to find dynamic the discussion of the characteristics of the political parties and the Knesset (legislature) based solely on historical review of party platforms and issues. The authors are not entirely to blame for the absence of such major topics as party organization, constituent support and interest groups, decision making, leadership recruitment, cabinet crises, and power struggles. These topics have been largely ignored by Israeli political scientists until recently. For example, Medding's classic study of *Mapai* (Cambridge University Press) was not published until 1972.

The chapter on foreign relations is basically sound, but it fails to emphasize the subservience of foreign policy to security policy and the consequent dwarfing of the Foreign Office by the Ministry of Defense. The best chapter of the section is the one on political values and attitudes, for which the authors could rely on a fairly rich body of published research by Antonovsky, Arian, Cantril, and others. This area of modern political research was by far the most developed in Israel until recently. The political section is concluded with selected biographies of key personalities.

Subsequent to the completion of the Handbook much political research on Israel has been published in the areas of local politics, characteristics of the members of the Knesset and the process of their recruitment, detailed analysis of various aspects of the ruling party in both historical and contemporary periods, the roles of ethnicity and religion in politics, coalition formation and crises, voting behavior and election results, and many other fields of study. I mention this, not to criticize the Handbook, but to emphasize a major shift in the focus of research in Israeli political science which has mostly reached print since work on the Handbook was completed. Consequently there is a particularly important need to up-date the bibliography of the section on politics. This is also true of the previous section on the social character of the society—an area on which important anthropological (e.g., the Manchester University Press series) and sociological studies have been published recently.

The section on the character and structure of the economy contains chapters on agriculture, industry, labor, domestic trade, foreign economic relations, and the financial and monetary system. Of particular relevance to the political scientist interested in Israeli politics is the Histadrut (General Federation of Labor) which is one of the most unique and fascinating of Israel's innovations. It is not possible in such a brief account to relate completely its great historical role in the building of Israeli society, nor is it possible to explain fully how it made such a great imprint on the political system. That is the subject for much future research.

The final section, dealing with national security, is devoted to the armed forces, public order, and internal security. Zahal, the Israel Defense Forces, has played a central role in the building of Israeli society, in the absorption of immigrants, and it has served as a source for the recruitment of executives for the higher echelons of the economy and of the polity. For example, four members of the present Cabinet including the Prime Minister are former generals.

The authors of this Handbook are to be commended for compiling an impressive range of information on Israel in a most readable volume. They have provided an excellent introduction which provides solid background knowledge of the country.

MYRON J. ARONOFF

*Tel Aviv University*
*Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study*

**Doctors in Politics: The Political Life of the Japan Medical Association.** By William E. Steslicke. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973. Pp. 302. $17.50.)

Modern nations face the problem of providing adequate medical care at reasonable prices to the public. Japan has adopted a national health insurance plan that pays private doctors with fee rates fixed by the government. William Steslicke's book is not concerned with the broad problem of health care, but is narrowly focused on the activities of the Japan Medical Association (JMA), particularly as they relate to the efforts of the association to improve the position of its members. Specifically the association sought to have restrictions relating to medical treatment removed, get paperwork simplified, abolish regional differences in rate structures, and obtain an increase in medical fees. Since none of these goals could be achieved without the consent of the Ministry of Welfare, the JMA necessarily had to get involved in politics. In essence, *Doctors in Politics* tells the story of the involvement and may be considered a case study of a pressure group seeking to improve its status.

Much of the material concerns a nationwide campaign launched by the JMA in 1960 and 1961 to try to force the government to agree to the JMA proposals. The author has amassed an enormous amount of information and presents a detailed picture of the lobbying efforts. There are lengthy quotations from the speeches made by the association's president, Takemi Taro, an aggressive leader, and from various JMA publications. The tactics adopted by the organization are pretty similar to those utilized by interest groups in other parliamentary democracies. They involved trying to get friendly legislators elected to the parliament, negotiating with leaders of the ruling Liberal Democratic party, bargaining with Ministry of Welfare officials, winning public support through public relations efforts, and as a trump card, threatening to order doctors to go on strike. It also appears from Steslicke's account that personal contacts were extensively used. As one might expect, the end result was a compromise: Fees were raised somewhat, but the doctors did not succeed in getting all of their demands met.

The study of pressure groups also affords us some insight—although not very much—into the political process generally. Naturally JMA leaders concentrated their lobbying efforts on decision makers—cabinet members, bureaucrats, and party leaders. The author notes that big corporations and labor unions opposed higher medical fees, and although he does not explain the details presumably they applied countervailing pressures. The final outcome, therefore, probably represented a balancing of conflicting pressures. Finally as the author suggests, "In the case of Japan as in that of the United States, it is clear that the ordinary citizen—the consumer of medical services—participates only indirectly in the policy-making process, and without the benefit of unequivocal representation by one of the major organized interest groups" (p. 246).

*Doctors in Politics* is a useful addition to the rather sparse literature on the role of pressure groups in Japanese politics. Its high price, however, may keep it from being widely read. One wonders why a book without an index which is produced not by letter press but by offset from typewritten copy should cost so much.

NOBUTAKA IKE

*Stanford University*

**Education and Modernization in the Middle East.** By Joseph S. Szyliowicz. (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973. Pp. 447, $19.50.)

J. Szyliowicz, a political scientist whose many publications have almost uniquely revolved around the problems of the Middle East and specifically Turkey, has attempted in his recent book to look upon education both as an object of change and as an agent of change. The book actually deals in detail with three countries: Turkey, Iran, and Egypt, while introducing from time to time some comparative data on the other Arab states. The author points out that he deliberately omitted the Israeli case because of that country's unique heritage and characteristics.

The most interesting aspect of the book is the author's attempt to explore the strong links between the ideology of the political system and the goals of education itself. In other words, Szyliowicz tries to show with great clarity that while education may not directly produce the much sought modernization of a given society, it determines in every case the volume, mobility and impact of its elite and thus determines the orientation of societal development.

This insight seems to be even more important once we realize that the relationship between levels of education and literacy and subsequent economic development are much more complex than any two variable relationship statements would indicate. Indeed modernization can not solely be achieved by the training of manpower with particular skills or even with modern orientation and attitudes. Szyliowicz insists rightly upon the fact that variations in the social, cultural, and political patterns of any society will determine the degree to which modern men are produced and utilized appropriately. From this perspective the character of the political system and especially of its elites becomes a critical variable.

Educational policies are directly related to broader questions of policy making within any society and the specific decisions taken on such issues as who shall gain access to the schools, what they will learn while enrolled and how they will be utilized, will inevitably reflect the distribution of power, the kinds of support that any particular regime possesses, its ideological orientation, its level of political development (p. 12).

Within this framework Szyliowicz has attempted to evaluate the functional role of traditional and modern elites in the Middle East. To assess the influence of particular special core groups and elite configurations he has used a typological approach, in which the various types of elites are combined and classified according to a second variable—the orientation toward change and innovation. This combination yields four types of political systems: the radical, the reformist, the adaptive, the competitive. In addition the author discusses education and modernization in the Middle East in three perspectives: (1) the changing role of elites and the role of education in this process, (2) the educational system as an object of change, and the last (3) the degree to which the contemporary educational systems are meeting societal needs in the Middle East.

In order to demonstrate the close links between access to education and political power, Szyliowicz has very precisely summarized the traditional educational systems of the area. A short overview shows how the strength and decline of the Ottoman empire were closely related to the palace schools. Indeed, the so called "slave meritocracy," shifting under weak rulers from a service orientation toward one of self-aggrandizement, finally ends in a return to ascriptive values, based on positions into which the person is born rather than on proof of achievement. As a result, the power structure of the state changed drastically, the independence and power of core elites increased steadily, and in time the social core group came to consist of a ruling class (p. 79). Another consequence of the corruption of the palace school system consisted in the monopoly of the "madrasas" (religious seminars on the Islamic faith), which produced for many centuries subjects solely committed to the maintenance of the status quo.

It is against this background that Szyliowicz attempts to deal with the major themes of his book, namely the introduction of modern education and the creation of national educational systems. The high number of foreign schools, founded to provide schooling for non-Muslim minority children (in the 19th century some 500 French, 675 American, and 178 British Protestant schools were operating in the Ottoman empire) furnishes a striking example for Arnold Toynbee's theory of world history. It was exactly this kind of challenge situation—the introduction of Western-type new schools—which provoked the response, the creation of national educational systems. This phenomenon can be witnessed all over the Middle East.

Indeed, one of the basic findings of this richly documented comparative volume is that the educational systems of Turkey, Iran, and Egypt share such commonalities of tradition and experience that it is even possible to delineate parallel stages of educational development in all three. In each case educational reforms were initially equated with military strength, were born out of military necessity, and date back to an era when indigenous elites confronted with powerful external challenges came to the understanding that their aspirations, whether survival or aggrandizement, depended upon revitalized military establishments (p. 449). This understanding led to the creation of additional nonmilitary schools, the hiring of foreign instructors, the sending of students abroad, etc. In the twentieth century these processes: diversification, differentiation, integration and to some degree, centralization continued and grew. Szyliowicz evaluates these processes according to the styles of politics adopted since World War II by the respective countries. Thus he defines the striving toward a modern educational system in Egypt as an attempt of a revolutionary society, while treating the same process in Turkey as a manifestation of a democratic society, and in Iran as the attempt of a reformist monarchy.

The author concludes that Turkey, Iran, and Egypt are all afflicted by the same difficulty: in spite of their search for modern educational systems, the functioning of that educational system at all levels possesses many aspects that are dysfunctional for modernization (p. 448). One fundamental point seems to emerge: The establishment of a modern educational system does not automatically create channels of mobility for persons of lower- or even middle-class backgrounds unless the advancement of such elements is deliberately promoted by the ruler of the political elite.

The explanation furnished is quite interesting. Iran's Shah, despite his commitment to reform, has avoided implementing programs that would adversely affect existing authority and value patterns within the society. In Turkey, the lack of a positive, sophisticated, and dynamic leadership has prevented the necessary changes, and educational priorities have focused on quantity rather than quality. In Egypt, Nasser's commitment to radical change did not extend to all aspects of society, and the necessity to deal with external issues such as the Suez crisis, the Yemen Civil war, the Israel conflict resulted in low priorities being accorded to education. Practical consequences, as the author warns, is that unemployable graduates being turned out by these systems may eventually mobilize their despairs in the form of revolutionary political action.

The major shortcoming of J. Szyliowicz's stimulating and rich book lies more in its methodology and data source than in the handling of the subject. Although the author has demonstrated previously his comfort with first hand sources, he relies in this last book almost entirely on source material published in Western languages, predominantly in English. While most of the material collected has been very intelligently compiled and presented, it nevertheless carries the stigma of a "secondary interpretation." Many of the comments are based upon the views of foreign advisers, who again are not able to survey all the significant publications in the field. This limitation due to a selective use of available source material, deprives the reader often of indigenous criticism and challenge.

Another shortcoming is the descriptive rather than systematic analysis of recent administrative practices in Turkey, Egypt, and Iran including common dysfunctionalities. Nevertheless, this book will no doubt become a major pillar in the reading list of any person studying in a detailed way the problem of modernizing Middle Eastern countries. The fresh insight on the relationship between educational systems and their products, the elites, as well as social stratification in general should enhance its durability.

NERMIN ABADAN-UNAT

*University of Ankara*

**The Evolution of the Nigerian State: The Southern Phase 1898–1914.** By T. N. Tamuno. (New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1972. Pp. 422. $12.50.)

Although it has become somewhat unpopular to ask such questions, there is still much to be known about the early beginnings of colonial holdings in Africa. Dr. Tamuno has decided to continue such research and to change its identity from that of colonial history to that of the founding of Nigeria as a nation. In a very detailed and full account he traces the work of the colonialists as they set about creating the various institutions of Southern Nigeria during the first decade and a half of this century.

The author shows how the Nigerian peoples adapted and acquiesced to British power. Whatever opposition there was to colonialism was always ethnically based—there was no revolt which cut across ethnic boundaries. Instead, protest often took a more modern form such as pamphleteering and press criticism. Furthermore, no common leaders emerged who could write and coordinate resistance efforts by the entire population. Difficulties of transport communication and specific locally based belief all operated to suppress such a development.

Under such circumstances, says Tamuno, the major policymakers and architects of the embryonic nation were the British colonial officials and others who became absorbed in the new and manly art of empire building. The author goes into great detail to show the impact of MacGregor and Egerton as well as the views of John Holt, who wrote a prodigious correspondence on colonial policy. These early men guided British policy from protectorate into full-fledged control over both the external and internal affairs of the region. The takeover was stimulated by its own momentum (being easier to control fully than partially), by ideology (a racist one), and by a desire for economic development that could benefit both Britain and the Nigerians.

The basic thesis is, however, quite clear. Tamuno believes that the historical data support the idea of Britain as the founding, causal agent of modern Nigeria. Local tribes and nations in the area "lacked the resources which enabled Britain, from 1898, to embark upon the creation and consolidation of a colonial state in Nigeria" (p. 350).

True, but so what? It is difficult for anyone to believe that some modern states based on local power grouping would not have emerged during the same period. And if this occurred in response to internal rather than external forces, would that have been such a bad thing? I don't really know, but I am not prepared to congratulate colonial powers for establishing contemporary African states. What they did, they did in their own interest, and they prospered from such actions, while the colonies moved at a snail's pace until the time of independence.

Professor Tamuno is, however, to be congratulated for bringing together a wealth of detail on the founding of colonial southern Nigeria. It now remains for enterprising historians to use these materials from colonial records to get the Nigerian side of the story and fill in the picture from the point of view of the people and their leaders who had to accommodate themselves to the unquenchable thirst for empire that led Europe to drink at Africa's well.

RONALD COHEN

*Northwestern University*
*Ahmado Bello University, Nigeria*

**The Making of Modern Southeast Asia, Volume I: The European Conquest.** By D. J. M. Tate. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972. Pp. 582. $19.00.)

This is the first volume in a three-volume history of Southeast Asia, ostensibly designed for university students and the general reader. In my opinion the book is too detailed, encyclopedic, and expensive for its stated audience, though it contains some useful reference material for the Southeast Asian specialist.

Volume I, *The European Conquest*, focuses on the military and political subjugation of Southeast Asia by the Western powers. Volume II (not yet out) will focus on the social and economic consequences of the Western conquest; Volume III (also not yet published) will trace the rise and development of nationalism throughout the region to the attainment of independence from the West.

*The Making of Southeast Asia: The European Conquest* is organized into two sections. Part One deals with the history of island Southeast Asia—Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. Part Two deals with the history of mainland Southeast Asia—Burma, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Laos. Within these parts each chapter deals with a different country. There are only very brief introductory and concluding remarks, and the author makes no real effort to compare one nation's or region's experience with another. Instead the author provides only a very brief comparison of British and Dutch colonial policies in island Southeast Asia, and a similarly brief comparison of British and French colonial policies on the mainland.

This book is replete with information and can be valuable as a reference work. It names almost every major and minor sultan and sultanate in all of nineteenth-century Southeast Asia. The author views history as a dynastic struggle among elites, and his conception of the Western conquest of Southeast Asia is that of the replacement, primarily by military means, of a native elite by a Western one. Thus his discussion adheres very much to the overthrow of kings, the fomenting of colonial wars, and the signing of colonial treaties. The book makes very little, if any, reference to the economic and social history of the area as it must have affected most of the people who lived there.

This approach to history can, however, be somewhat misleading, especially to the casual or uninformed reader. The book is entirely consistent in its organization and thus treats large wealthy trading states in very much the same manner as smaller relatively isolated ones, and the author devotes very little discussion to cultural or religious differences. The uninformed reader knowing little, for example, about either village Indonesia or traditional Burma, would tend to equate them in size and culture since they are presented entirely separately, are never compared, and are dealt with in about the same number of words, maps, and tables.

Nevertheless, this book must represent many years of hard work on the part of the author. The book contains sixteen tables, listing the major rulers of individual states and the major chronologies of important events. Also included are sixty-eight maps showing the activities of the colonial powers in the region and the progress of the various colonial wars there. The maps alone are useful reference resources for the Southeast Asian scholar.

On the other hand, the usefulness of the volume in the classroom is likely to be quite limited. The book does not lend itself to easy integration into developing nations or comparative politics type courses because the author has provided almost no comparative analysis. His tendency to see history as a progression of rulerships also leads him to downplay the discussion of general political forces within the countries and instead to overemphasize the importance of Europeans and European colonial policy.

It should be noted that, in the effort to avoid being labeled Europe-centered, he goes into considerable detail about native rulerships. He does not deal, however, with the roots of change, the contrasts from one area to another, and the different origins of nationalism in this early period in each of these states. Instead he contents himself with naming individual native leaders, the skirmishes in which they were involved, and how they fared with the imperialist powers. One can only hope that Volumes II and III will fill these glaring gaps.

Barbara N. McLennan
*Stanford Research Institute, Arlington, Va.*

**Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927–1937.** By Hung-mao Tien. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1972. Pp. 226. $8.95.)

In this slender monograph Dr. Hung-mao Tien, who is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, Waukesha, seeks to evaluate the development of political institutions in China during the decade which Kuomintang leaders, today, regard as their "golden age." Dr. Tien assesses the degree to which the Kuomintang, its Nanking government, and its armies succeeded in moving China "toward greater political and economic integration" (p. 1). To answer this central question Dr. Tien divides his work into two sections, one dealing with the central government and one with the provinces. In each section he considers the organization and administration of political institutions, the men who directed them, and the financing of these institutions.

Dr. Tien concludes that Chiang Kai-shek and his supporters within the Kuomintang failed to achieve effective political integration between 1927 and 1937. During the course of the 1930s, Dr. Tien argues, neither the civil administration nor the Kuomintang directed central or provincial policies successfully. "With both the party and civil administration proving ineffectual as instruments for nation-building and policy implementation," he states, "the 1930s saw a clear tendency toward the militarization of politics and administration" (p. 39).

Dr. Tien emphasizes the role of factional politics within the Kuomintang leadership as a factor in the regime's failure to achieve unification. Chiang Kai-shek and other party leaders relied upon "informal, particularistic political processes" rather than a "functioning decision-making mechanism" (p. 45). "The reliance on factional politics," the author suggests, "seems to have crippled the party-government's ability to develop the network of institutions necessary to govern a country as large and as underdeveloped in terms of communication as China" (p. 4).

In the midst of the flood of monographs on the Chinese Communists one welcomes this effort to explain politics during the Kuomintang era. Mao Tse-tung did not invent Chinese politics. In his first major contribution to the field, Dr. Tien has written a good book, though not the definitive work. A glimpse into one of the important chapters in this monograph, "Chapter 3: Factions in Kuomintang Politics," will illustrate this judgment.

In this chapter Dr. Tien makes a significant contribution by providing a systematic treatment of four important factions within the Kuomintang: the "C.C. Clique," the "Whampoa Clique," the "Blue Shirt Society" and the "Political Study Clique." A weakness of his presentation is that the author provides a misleadingly static picture of these factions. In this chapter Dr. Tien identifies the leaders and summarizes the general policy objectives of each group. One gets the impression that each faction was united in support of a clearly defined program. This was not the case. For example, although Ch'en Kuo-fu and Ch'eng T'ien-fang were members of the "C.C. Clique" (p. 49), each man offered quite different proposals for educational reform to the Third Plenum of the Fourth Kuomintang Central Executive Committee which met December 15–22, 1932 (*Chung-yang tang-wu yüeh-k'an*, No. 53 [December, 1932], pp. 895–899). Although they cooperated on some issues, Ch'en and Ch'eng put their personal views on education ahead of clique loyalty. It was not unusual for a Kuomintang member, because of personal ties and inclinations, to oppose a given policy supported by his faction. As noted earlier in this review, Dr. Tien states that Kuomintang leaders operated in an "informal" and "particularistic" manner, but he fails to take this working style into account in this chapter on Kuomintang factions.

Dr. Tien could have deepened his understanding of factional politics if he had used a body of materials which he neglected; the memoirs and collected writings of Kuomintang leaders. For example, two influential members of the "C.C. Clique" were Ch'en Kuo-fu and Ch'en Pu-lei. *The Collected Works of Ch'en Kuo-fu* [*Ch'en Kuo-fu hsien-sheng ch'üan-chi*] (Taipei: Cheng-chung shu-chu, 1952) and the *Memoirs of Ch'en Pu-lei* [*Ch'en Pu-lei hui-i lu*] (Hong Kong: T'ien-hsing ch'u-pan-she, 1962) both reveal a great deal about relationships among Kuomintang leaders to the discerning reader. These works and others of the same sort are available in American libraries.

Despite its deficiencies, *Government and Politics in Kuomintang China* is an important work. All scholars who study China in the 1920s and 1930s can profit from Hung-mao T'ien's achievement.

ALLEN B. LINDEN

*University of New Hampshire*

**The Evolution of the Egyptian National Image: From its Origins to Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid.** By Charles Wendell. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972. Pp. xvii, 329. $17.50.)

This book, written by a scholar who is essentially an orientalist, is an historical rather than a systematic or conceptual study. The principal theme of the book is that the concept of the Islamic nation (the *umma*) was ecumenical rather than "national" and that its change from an ecumenical to a modern national type has been accomplished under the impact of Western culture and pressure. This change, though beginning in the early nineteenth century, has not yet reached its full development even in the country where it first began to be modified. Egypt, presumably the first country in the Islamic world to experience change of its concept of the *umma*, is chosen as the *exemple par excellence* for a deeper understanding of the nature and the implication of this process of transformation.

Although the book is primarily devoted to a study of how the *umma* has acquired a national character, a full discussion of the ecumenical character of the state during the formative period is provided in chapter 2. The discussion of the concept of the *umma* during the period of decline to the end of the eighteenth century is outlined briefly in one chapter (chapter 3) presumably because the ecumenical character remained virtually unchanged until the opening of the nineteenth century. Two chapters (4–5) are devoted to a study of the forces that brought about the change and the writers who propounded the concept of the national state. Chapter 6 provides a full study of Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, whose writings have given full exposition of the *umma* as a secular and national concept.

This study, originally written as a doctoral dissertation, has been revised for publication, though the heavy annotation to explain familiar names and terms has been retained. It is a meticulously researched work, and its author has used all available published material, both in Arabic and in Western languages.

Apart from details, I agree with the author's general line of thought that Islam, an ecumenical and a missionary religion, was capable of incorporating diverse elements of race and culture and formed a universal nation-state, embodied in the concept of the *umma*. Because religion provided the foundation of the political community, only believers were considered equal members of that community; unbelievers, though tolerated and given a special status called *dhimmis* (protected peoples), were allowed to practice their own law and religion provided they accepted certain legal disabilities, especially the payment of the *jizya* (poll tax).

Dr. Wendell has taken a very critical attitude towards Islam's treatment of Christians and Jews because certain discriminatory rules were recognized (though not always observed) which provided grounds for inequality. It is, of course, easy to criticize premodern societies for the lack of liberty or equality notwithstanding the fact that the central issue was not the claim of equality but rather toleration and protection against persecution. Although he concedes that the Jews were treated more harshly in Christian Europe a thousand years ago than were Christians and Jews in Islamic lands, he takes issue (pp. 50–51) with my position as expressed in the following statement: "These vexatious measures and practices, hard as they must have been on many individuals, should not obscure the original objectives of the law which reflected a genuine spirit of toleration and provided safe-guards for the non-Muslim subjects who preferred their own rites" (Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*, p. 200).

A much more important point of disagreement is the author's assertion that the Islamic state failed to achieve its ideal of unity. "The Umma Muhammadiyya," he says, "was a political failure . . . the course of Islamic history from 750 to the end of the Ottoman Empire in 1919, is the history of the political fragmentation of the Dar al-Islam and the destruction of the lofty dream of the undivided Muslim State" (p. 71). Dr. Wendell seems to maintain that the Islamic state was designed never to change. Even in the formative period, however, Islam allowed diversity among its ethnocultural subunits long before it was divided into separate entities. Moreover, the fragmentation of the *umma* has been achieved by internal forces and not *ab initio* by foreign pressures; foreign pressure has triggered the process and the idea of the nation-state served to rationalize existing conditions (see my *The Islamic Law of Nations* [Baltimore, 1966], pp. 59ff).

MAJID KHADDURI

*School of Advanced International Studies*
*The Johns Hopkins University*

**Back to Africa: A History of Sierra Leone and Liberia.** By Richard West. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971. Pp. 357. $6.95.)

Common denominators shared by Sierra Leone and Liberia are geography—both occupy a continuous stretch of the West African coast, a few latitudes north of the equator; and common languages—English, Krio, and some border-overflowing tribal languages. They also share a historical oddity; both were originally settled (in a limited area, on the coast) by freed slaves, hence the names Liberia and Freetown—and the title of the book.

With these few tidbits the similarity, by and large, ends. Monrovia, in spite of attempts at modernization, appears as a recolored replica of an ante-bellum American small southern town. The impression is heightened by U.S. Army style uniforms, U.S.-type mail boxes, American paper currency, etc. Freetown—on the other hand—is British tropical Africa. (My own surprising introduction to what was an outpost of Western democracy in Africa, came when, shortly after independence, the speaker of the Legislature at the time, Tejan Banja-sie, suggested a most unusual visit in Africa: to meet the leader of H.M. Loyal Opposition, Siaka Stevens, perhaps the only black-African politician in such a position. Alas, years later, Stevens republicanized Sierra Leone, exiled Sir Banja, then Governor-General, virtually abolished the opposition, and made himself president.)

Richard West, an English journalist who writes mainly for *The Sunday Times*, also authored *The White Tribes of Africa* (1965) and *Sketches from Vietnam* (1968). Professionally he is a member of the distinguished fraternity that contributed substantially to the academic discussion of Africa, a fraternity which includes Henry M. Stanley, John Gunther, John Hatch, Colin Legum, William Attwood, and many others. West's reportage draws on a thorough presentation of descriptive historical data on the attitude toward slavery in Britain and in the U.S., the abolition and emancipation movements, the drives toward the repatriation of Africans, the realization of the dream, and finally, the failure and futility of the efforts: "Sierra Leone and Liberia have not fulfilled the hopes of their founders. The fault lay in the concept of 'Back to Africa.' The plan failed in the first and most important purpose of easing the lot of the blacks in England and America" (p. 328).

Colonization by Negroes from England and the U.S., according to West, also failed in its second purpose of "bringing civilization to Africa" (p. 329), the reason being that Sierra Leone and Liberia never expanded deep into the hinterland of West Africa. The influence of the settlers, until the twentieth century, did not really extend beyond the towns and villages of the coast.

West's forte is biographical character sketching. Although there are on hand massive scholarly works on West African history, note in particular Christopher Frye, *A History of Sierra Leone* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), and its companion, edited by Frye, *Sierra Leone Inheritance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), none manages to create a feeling of contemporary acuity as West does. Given the sensitivity of African governments to criticism, especially by outsiders, academicians more often than not abide by the maxim "If you don't have something nice to say . . . ," etc., perhaps because of professional need to "keep the well accessible." Journalists have no such compunctions. The correspondent for an English daily was expelled from Sierra Leone, allegedly for writing that the agonized cries of young girls initiated into Bundu societies could be heard at Fourah Bay College. Attwood, editor-in-chief of *Look*, and Kennedy's Ambassador to Guinea and Kenya, is surely *persona non grata* after *The Reds and the Blacks* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), and West may have endangered his return trip by writing candidly:

> In most West African cities poverty is relieved by charm. Monrovia is unique in its overwhelming nastiness. The ruling class of Americo-Liberians, or 'A.L.s' as they are unfondly called, tend to be vain, ostentatious and quarrelsome. The venality and sheer knavery of the Liberian ruling class is impossible to describe, not from any lack of good evidence but because of those shark Liberian lawyers who live by spurious libel claims. Liberia's police are the laughing-stock of the continent. They will arrest and demand bribes from any foreigner on any trumped-up charge (p. 324).

Perhaps, however, all is forgiven because of the pious closing sentences of the book which, even if applicable to some other parts of Africa, must be apocryphal vis-à-vis Liberia and Sierra Leone:

> The evangelicals and the colonizationists hoped that the Back to Africa movement would recompense for the cruelty of the slave trade to America. It did not and could not. There can be no recompense, as long as western civilization survives, for the white man's crime against Africa (p. 330).

Although not a major academic contribution to Africana, West's book presents an interesting comparison between dissimilar neighbors. He succeeds in deriving little-known data from a multitude of sources, and, not least, *Back to Africa* provides compelling reading.

EDGAR S. EFRAT
*University of Victoria, Victoria, B.C.*

**The Ormée of Bordeaux: A Revolution during the Fronde.** By Sal Alexander Westrich. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972. Pp. xii, 160. $10.00.)

From May, 1652 to July, 1653, a revolutionary assembly—the Ormée—governed Bordeaux and its dependencies. The assembly was revolutionary in more senses than one: it created a government which had no prior claim to authority save the principle that the people should rule when the authorities are corrupt or incompetent, it dispensed justice of a pronounced class character, it eventually displaced the Parlement, the Jurade, and other major instruments of government sanctioned by the Crown, and it formed or proposed alliances not only with the princes who were then in rebellion, but also with Spain and England. The Ormée was the last sustained revolutionary movement in France before 1789. Although it temporarily rearranged Bordeaux' entire structure of power, and ended with a number of executions and banishments, it doesn't seem to have fundamentally changed the direction of the city's development. The events matter historiographically, however, because so much controversy about the nature of old-regime France pivots on interpretations of the Fronde. Carefully squeezing recalcitrant sources, Sal Westrich makes a considerable contribution to the debate. He makes a good case that the Ormée was a "movement of artisans, shopkeepers, petty officials, and small merchants seeking protection from patrician justice, the uncertainties of mercantile capitalism, and the increasingly heavy burden of the royal fisc" (p. 59). That conclusion weighs against historians who portray the Fronde as essentially an elite movement and who deny the significance of class conflict in France before the eighteenth century. Westrich occasionally compromises his case by adopting Kossmann's description of the Ormists as petty bourgeois and "proletarian," when his own evidence indicates that the governing coalition excluded journeymen, apprentices, servants and other members of the laboring poor in favor of the masters. He is unable to reconstruct the origins of the movement, except to argue plausibly that the Ormée grew from popular assemblies protesting the exactions of the Parlement; the Parlement had led the city's participation in the 1650 rebellion against the crown, the second Fronde, and had emerged from the conflict divided, but in virtually autonomous control of the city's affairs. Nor does he give us any convincing reasons why such a substantial rebellion should have occurred at Bordeaux rather than elsewhere. But he skillfully portrays the struggle for power and the crumbling of the revolutionary coalition as its external sources of support melted away. As a case study in revolutionary processes, as an analysis of urban politics, and as a contribution to the history of the French seventeenth century, Sal Westrich's *Ormée* is a valuable book to have around.

CHARLES TILLY

*The University of Michigan*

**Politics and Society in de Gaulle's Republic.** By Philip M. Williams and Martin Harrison. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1972. Pp. xi, 393. $8.95.)

British political scientists Philip Williams and Martin Harrison know France as do few insiders. In this evaluation of the first dozen years of the Fifth Republic, they put on a brilliant display of their encyclopedic knowledge of French politics. Nothing escapes their net: from serious social science literature to the most obscure rumors, plots, and scandals, they are in full control of their material. Foreign and French readers alike will find here a masterful survey of the Fifth Republic, along with detailed treatment of political parties, pressure groups, and political institutions. Adopting a racy literary style that strikes so many foreigners as appropriate in dealing with French politics, the authors are especially successful in sustaining reader interest, though at the price of a little exaggeration from time to time (for example, when they observe that the Communists were the "firemen of the regime" during the May Revolt, or that Couve de Murville never pretended to have a mind of his own as foreign minister). But for comprehensive coverage, factual detail, and familiarity with the ins and outs of French politics and politicians, this book is impressive.

Williams and Harrison not only tell a piping good story, they also present a critical interpretation of the French political system—with less success. The constant theme is modernization. They state at the outset that, " . . . ultimately any regime must be assessed not only on its achievements on the international stage or on the increase in the material wellbeing of its citizens, but also on the extent to which it promotes or hinders the emergence of the modern political order which France has lacked for so long" (p. 23). They depict France under the Third Republic as languishing in "economic backwardness, social stalemate and political instability" (p. 3). Continuing an argument that owes much to the work of Stanley Hoffmann, Michel Crozier, and Lawrence Wylie, they describe politicians in this fragmented, highly individualistic society as being interested only in their little games of coalition formation, which never changed the static equilibrium. Defeat and occupation shattered the "old stalemate society," but the continuing "political paralysis" under the Fourth Republic made it impossible to deal with pressing international and colonial problems, they assert. Then General de Gaulle reappeared on the scene in 1958. Did he succeed in bringing about a modern political order? In spite of de Gaulle's great achievements in ending the Algerian war and creating a strong executive, the authors conclude that he did not create the conditions for long-term political stability. "The long overdue task of political modernization is incomplete, and in some respects it has scarcely begun" (p. 379).

What the authors mean by political modernization turns out to have little to do with the usual indices of modernization. At one point it is "the development of fresh attitudes and structures sustaining an adequate sense of political community and effective democratic authority relationships" (p. 22), and later "the development of a party system capable of sustaining firm representative government" (p. 368). Their model of a modern political order looks remarkably like the British political system; and the authors are quite right to conclude that this type of political modernization is still distant in France. But in view of the British record since World War II, the failure of the French to emulate their neighbors across the channel is perhaps not a cause for immediate concern to modernizers.

Unfortunately, Williams and Harrison do not present a coherent theory of modernization in terms of which it might be possible to assess any of the regimes that France has known. Their use of the term modernization as a literary device rather than an analytic concept leads them to overdraw the picture of backwardness, stagnation, and stalemate under the Third Republic, and of political paralysis under both the Third and Fourth Republics. In fact, France has modernized over the past two centuries under a variety of regimes, most of which contributed to the general process of rationalization and industrialization through appropriate political policies. Decision making was as serious a business in the classic parliamentary system as anywhere else, even though untidy and done in lurches. The system was geared to the confrontation of one major issue at a time, with center parties playing the key role, swinging now to the left and now to the right for popular and parliamentary support. Williams and Harrison admit that sweeping changes transformed French life in the twenty years following World War II, which presumably includes the maligned Fourth Republic. We might add that sweeping changes took place in France under the Third Republic as well, and the classic parliamentary system, far from "lagging behind," contributed to this secular process of modernization—through a range of decisions creating the infrastructure of a modern economy and society and also providing a climate of freedom and ferment in which innovative attitudes could emerge. Evolution toward government by the center, or a revival of the classic parliamentary system even within the structure of the present constitution thus will not necessarily mean a return to a preindustrial society or a paralyzed government. France has had a modern political order certainly since 1875 (and in some sense ever since the breakup of feudalism); its political system has both contributed to and been transformed by the general national experience of modernization—and this under the Third and Fourth Republics, as well as the Fifth. Modernization does not automatically produce political stability, democratic attitudes toward authority, and pragmatic parties. On the contrary, modernization may also generate glaring discontinuities within a society, create new tensions, and strengthen authoritarian parties and trends. Creating a modern political order and establishing a consensual parliamentary democracy are separate, though related tasks, and they are confounded in this account of the Fifth Republic and its predecessors. *Politics and Society in de Gaulle's Republic* is superb *en détail*, disappointing *en gros*.

BERNARD E. BROWN
*City University of New York (Brooklyn)*

**Man, State, and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib.** Edited by I. William Zartman. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973. Pp. 531. $15.00, cloth; $6.95, paper.)

It is difficult to know by what criteria to assess this collection of forty essays on contemporary North Africa. Only two of the contributions were written expressly for the book. Consequently one cannot fault any of the other thirty-eight authors for failing to relate their remarks to the topical subthemes of the collection or to a North American readership. The editor himself does not explicitly state how selections were made, to what audience they are addressed, nor whether the book is designed to stand on its own or serve as supplemental readings to some better integrated set of materials. We are told that the "best" (p. ix) articles have been chosen, although the choice has been shaped by a desire to make available hitherto inaccessible, but presumably high-quality, pieces. Moreover, the editor notes that many of the pieces are out-of-date, but that later articles have not handled the same subject matter as well (p. ix). The latter contention is at best dubious. There is no space here to suggest one "expert's" candidates for inclusion (or exclusion) in such a collection, but Favret on tribal power, de Bernis on Algerian development, or Leca on Algerian politics are but a few of the conspicuously absent.

Even more conspicuously absent are North African scholars themselves. There is not a single interpretive chapter written by a North African. One of the six parts of the book is entitled "Leaders and Personalities." Therein we find a collection of speeches by various North African leaders such as Bourguiba, Qaddafi, and Hassan II. This is the only instance—and a fleeting one at that (fifty-six pages)—in which Maghribis speak for themselves. It is disconcerting that some fine North African scholarship was not included. Zghal, Hermassi, Laroui, Pascon, Guessous, Belal, etc., apparently are not up to snuff, and if you do not know who they are you will not find out from this book.

There are a number of technical problems that affect the overall quality of the book. Not only are most of the articles out-of-date, but those presenting economic data are a decade behind and thus present a distorted picture. This shortcoming is only partially remedied by the useful statistical appendix that brings some data up to 1970.

The editor provides us with less than ten pages of explanatory prose on an area and subject matter about which his readers probably know very little. Moreover, there are very few annotations in the text itself to explain obscure concepts or personalities. Salah ben Youssef is introduced on p. 106. Clement Henry inadvertently tells us who he is on p. 271. Others are never identified at all nor are the authors of the articles. Translations from French (there is only one translation from Arabic material) are frequently wooden and difficult to follow. The text is littered with typographical errors.

As regards the substance of the book, the editor has grouped the materials in six parts: Background; Values and Attitudes; Leaders and Personalities; Elites and Social Groups; Forces and Institutions; Change and Environment. Just as the book itself does not present an integrated overview of North Africa, the selections in each of its parts do not by any means cover the subject matter under which they are classed. For instance, Zartman declares (p. 17) that "the basic ingredient of North African attitudes is the area's Islamic background." This sweeping claim is arguable, but as an hypothesis it certainly warrants greater treatment than the ensuing seven articles give it. Leading off is a liberal colonialist, Dejeux, who tells us a good deal about himself but little about Islam: "North African workers in France have observed authentic Christian households and have appreciated the place of the wife in these homes" (p. 26). L. C. Brown makes the sole attempt to give us a general picture of North African Islam but is given only five pages in which to do so.

Each of the subsequent parts is characterized by similar strengths and weaknesses: a sprinkling of first-rate articles some of which, such as that by Fanon, are difficult to appreciate out of context; a sprinkling of mediocre articles victims of age or incompetence; and a preponderance of reasonably good, fairly comprehensible, not-too-dated essays. One of the strongest pieces in the book is Griffin's article on Algerian agriculture. It is concise, thorough, and can be read as a whole without reference to other sources. Yet even this piece is ten years out of date.

In general, the economics of independence have been slighted. There are a few micro-studies of micro-populations constituted by the nomads as they face the oil industry and/or sedentarization, but the crucial macro-problems of North African states asserting their economic sovereignty and charting their national development strategies are not given adequate attention. Only three articles in part six approach such matters and at that tangentially.

Similarly, it is unfortunate that so little attention is given to what might best be called cultural decolonization. The French educational and cultural impact upon Maghribi society, particularly that of Algeria, has been peculiarly intense. French-trained technocratic and intellectual elites have grappled with their own identity problems while devising programs to reinvigorate the precolonial "national" heritage of their countries. Arabization, educational reform, revisionist historiography, etc., have been at the heart of politics in independent North Africa, and there is an abundant literature treating this phenomenon. In this book, however, it is again L. C. Brown who is given the sole opportunity to examine the problem with relation to Tunisian education, supplemented by Gellner's article on Moroccan revisionist historiography.

At least twenty-five of the articles in the book deal directly or indirectly with politics. Taken together they do not give us a rounded picture of North African political processes but rather discrete glimpses of discrete problems: suspension of parliament in Morocco, military politics in Algeria, the likely succession struggle in Tunisia, and so forth. They should be read, at least by the non-expert, in conjunction with more integrated studies such as C. H. Moore's *Politics in North Africa* (Little, Brown, 1970).

To sum up, there is a good deal of material in this collection that is useful and of high quality. However, these materials suffer from age, problems of presentation and annotation, and the improvised categorization into which they are fit. The size and scope of the collection make it a welcome addition to the meager literature in English dealing with North Africa, but there is reason to doubt that it has done justice to the richness of the field.

JOHN WATERBURY
*American Universities Field Staff, Cairo*

**Balfour: A Political Biography.** By Sidney H. Zebel. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Pp. 312. $14.95.)

After A. J. Balfour's fifty years in politics, nearly four as prime minister, and thirty two years as a Minister of the Crown, comparatively few works have been published about him. Professor Zebel's study describes the statesman better known in this country as the author of the "Balfour Declaration," which dealt with a Jewish Home in Palestine, than as the political figure who handled so many of the vital issues of his day.

A Tory politician from the time of his initial election to Parliament in 1874, Balfour was protege—and nephew—to Lord Salisbury, Disraeli's Foreign Secretary. That relationship (which then provoked extensive comment) was the cornerstone of Balfour's rise to political prominence, but few would credit it as the single most important factor in Balfour's political success. Achieving some eminence as an author, his first book, *A Defense of Philosophic Doubt*, in 1879, established Balfour as an able young conservative intellectual.

From this early stage, Professor Zebel unfolds in cautious descriptive style the step-by-step advancement of Arthur Balfour's career. Zebel's description of Balfour's formative years, a more discreet rendition than Kenneth Young's 1963 biography, lays the foundation for what became an English "family affair" in the full sense. (Later, when Salisbury was Prime Minister, Arthur and his brother Gerald were both appointed to key posts, as were other members of the Cecil family—including Salisbury's eldest son and his son-in-law.)

It was after the 1880 elections when Balfour clearly emerged as a serious politician. When his uncle became Prime Minister, Balfour was appointed a junior minister. In November 1886, he was elevated to the Cabinet and a year later appointed to the critically important (and even then unenviable) post of Irish Chief Secretary. Balfour held that post until the end of 1891. He has subsequently been described as the smartest Irish Secretary the British ever had, and Professor Zebel analyzes his tenure in office minutely.

In the last decade of the 19th century, "Prince Arthur" functioned as Salisbury's Deputy Premier, and helped formulate Conservative domestic and foreign policies. Although unimpressive as the chief Tory legislative strategist, Balfour was considered far more effective as a behind-the-scenes politician.

On July 12, 1902, following the death of Queen Victoria and Salisbury's retirement, Balfour "naturally and inevitably" succeeded Salisbury as Prime Minister. Unfortunately, Balfour's successes as PM were overshadowed by his failure to devise a positive domestic program. He resigned on December 4, 1905. The overwhelming party defeat of January 1906, filled with reproach, marked the end both of Balfour's premiership and 20 years of Conservative domination. Balfour himself was defeated.

Professor Zebel focuses on the irony that Balfour's career after leaving the premiership was probably his most distinguished. After losing the party leadership in 1911, Balfour pursued other interests, in what Zebel characterizes as the "more constructive" facet of his career. In 1916 Balfour became Foreign Secretary. Lloyd George once commented that while he thought Balfour was a failure as a democratic leader, in large part because of his aloof mannerisms, he never stumbled or failed to make decisions on important issues. Lloyd George also thought Balfour brilliant.

One of the fresh aspects of Professor Zebel's manuscript is that it is based on a variety of unpublished as well as previously published sources, including the Balfour manuscripts and papers retained by the Balfour estate. In his sometimes dry account, a great deal of new information is exposed to the light of history. For example, Zebel describes Balfour's elder statesman activities after leaving the Foreign Office in 1919—heading the British delegation to the League of Nations, and participating in many major issues. In 1923, after receiving an earldom, Balfour requested Prime Minister Bonar Law to relieve him of his responsibilities as British representative at the League. While he gave his age and illness as reasons, Professor Zebel posits that he apparently feared a conflict with the Cabinet and as well disliked his subordinate status.

After the 1924 Tory victories, Balfour—at age 76—became Baldwin's Lord President of the Council. Balfour's role in the 1924 Imperial Conference laid the cornerstone for what some have described as his most important political contribution of all—the birth of the British Commonwealth of Nations. After the May 1929 general elections, Arthur Balfour's public career formally ended.

Arthur Balfour certainly was a gifted, charming, even fascinating politician and individual. First a tactician in politics, Balfour became a talented administrator who formulated significant policies. Zebel is meticulous in his efforts to explain how Balfour never achieved wide popularity throughout the period of his premiership. It is only in his later years that he came to be considered a truly national leader. Balfour's general indifference to social reform, in light of his conservatism and dedication to tradition, can be no surprise for the reader of this biography.

Professor Zebel's apt description of the life of this gifted individual, a "loner" in many ways, has an eerie ring to it reminiscent of several contemporary political figures. Viewed from that perspective, Balfour's career should have interest for all admirers of political biography.

JOEL M. FISHER

*Los Angeles, California*

**Crime: International Agenda.** By Benedict S. Alper and Jerry F. Boren. (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1972. Pp. xxii, 221. $7.50.)

Just over one hundred years ago, in 1872, representatives of 22 states met in London for the First International Prison Congress. This commemorative volume was originally intended for the delegates from 85 countries who came to the Fourth United Nations Crime Congress in Kyoto in 1970, but it was completed too late to reach them and now describes their work as well. It looks back to the period that led up to the French Revolution, to the developing pressures for penal reform. It reviews national activities, like those of the Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons, which Dr. Benjamin Rush actively encouraged and helped to establish in 1787, and examines international efforts, for example, the work of the London Society for the Improvement of Prison Discipline.

We are told that in 1825, the London Society sent a tract, written in Spanish, to the Argentine, suggesting that good prison management proscribed chains or fetters on prisoners "except in cases of absolute necessity, and even then, for a period not to exceed two days. Underground cells are also proscribed" (p. 12). These recommendations for benign prison management suggest that prison reformers have not worked entirely in vain, although the authors, both sociologists, and William Clifford, Chief of Crime Prevention Programs at the UN, who supplies a valuable Foreword, all acknowledge that international efforts sometimes give the impression of substituting movement for progress.

Still, if the reader looks at the 26-point agenda of the London conference of 1872, he must surely be impressed that experts now agree on answers to many questions asked then. They concur on the desirability of smaller, rather than larger, prisons; on the need to classify prisoners to determine proper punishment and methods of rehabilitation; on the desirability of special training for correctional personnel; on the usefulness of prison labor as a means of training; and on the need to give special attention to problems of juvenile offenders. Moreover, "civilized" states no longer employ "transportation" and banishment, and, where these discredited practices are approximated, as with Solzhenitsyn, they are the object of almost universal opprobrium. Surely, these are measures of real progress: perhaps our very astonishment that such "obvious" steps represent "progress" indicates just how far we have in fact advanced. It is significant, too, as Mr. Clifford reports, that the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners are very much in demand from the UN, especially in times of prison riots. These rules, "designed to assure suitable treatment" for prisoners, stem from the 1872 meetings, were endorsed by the League of Nations in 1934 and by the Economic and Social Council in 1957, and were reaffirmed in Kyoto.

Obviously, much still remains to be done to galvanize lawmakers, legislators, lawyers, judges, and penal administrators to support reform, even though demands to improve penal legislation, to reorganize the police, to find community-based solutions for treating offenders have been with us for a long time. But, as Mr. Clifford says, what we need is "solid administrative knowledge and the will to give practical effect to principles . . . enunciated before" (p. xvi). That will, of course, is sadly lacking today, when even states that have pioneered in prison reform, like the United States, have governments which ignore and even discredit expert testimony on such matters as pornography, drug addiction, and victimless crimes. In fact, Attica and reports of "Special Treatment and Rehabilitation Training" ("behavioral modification" programs) in U.S. prisons make it appear as though we are retrogressing.

It is, therefore, especially useful for the authors to remind us that, in 1789, it took just one man, the Grand Duke Leopold, to transform criminal justice throughout Tuscany by carrying into effect prescriptions set down by Cesare Beccaria (1738–1794) in his influential volume on the reform of criminal justice, *Dei delitti e delle pene*. Leopold's reforms, of course, were very much the product of the Enlightenment, and a new Enlightenment seems far away just now. But that only makes it more important for those aware of what needs doing to keep alive through the contemporary dark age progressive notions still not implemented after more than fifty years of discussion.

This book's title may be misleading: the real subject is *penal reform*, not the wider "international agenda" of extradition or crimes like piracy, slavery, forced labor, counterfeiting, or prostitution. Unfortunately, the authors' writing, though not Mr. Clifford's, is jargonistic and sometimes simplistic ("As its name indicates, ECOSOC was allotted two main areas of responsibility: for economic questions and for social questions" [p. 78]). Messrs. Alper and Boren assume some familiarity with their field, which is fair enough, considering that they were writing a handbook for experts, but they themselves are not entirely comfortable with UN documents, their editing is a bit clumsy when it comes to providing cross-references to their documentary "Exhibits," and their footnotes and bibliography are scanty. Despite these drawbacks, however, the book will guide serious students of criminology, prison reform, and international organization to other useful sources, and it does bring together information not easily accessible elsewhere.

RICHARD N. SWIFT
*New York University*

**The Other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States.** Edited by R. P. Barston. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1973. Pp. 341. $26.45.)

This eclectic collection is a welcome addition to the growing and corrective series of publications on a relatively underdeveloped field—the international politics of small and new states. It is not a definitive work but a modest and timely contribution which illustrates the rich diversity of policies and relationships among the "other" powers. It reveals the strengths and disadvantages of an orthodox approach to international relations. The essays are thorough and original; however, the volume lacks any comparative framework or findings. The editor introduces the field and not the essays; the contributors do not contrast their analyses. The impact of the book is minimized because a wide variety of suggestive comparisons are not made explicit. There is no conclusion, and an unintroduced appendix indicates that the selection of nations is from several categories of "small" states.

The contributions have no common structure although all present valuable details of the international history, external economic linkages, and formal policy-making institutions of each country. Few, however, provide critical analyses of the political economy of small states or question whether actors other than national bureaucracies "make" foreign policy. Most fail to distinguish between levels of interaction or among relations in different issue areas. The weak are not powerless in all their linkages; as Orvik comments, "A state is only small in relation to its environment" (p. 29). This volume is unreasonably and inexplicably expensive, disjointed and unsatisfactory;

however, it is essential reading for all concerned with the politics of small powers.

The contributions focus on a variety of small states—the old (Norway, Netherlands, Switzerland, Cuba), the new (Zambia, Cyprus, Singapore) and the "middle-aged" (Israel, New Zealand). They include islands and land-locked states; a wide variety of international associations; states with "charismatic" leaders, others with "faceless" bureaucracies; some have hostile neighbors; some are rich but none are among the "least developed" group; some are homogeneous, others are preoccupied with the politics of diverse languages and races.

The introduction contains a useful discussion of alternative approaches to the politics of weakness and the collective strategies of small states. The editor's substantive chapter on Cyprus describes the impact of the island's communal politics on its international activity and its attempts to reduce its underdevelopment and vulnerability by the diversification of external linkages. Continuing dependence on the presence of international organizations leads to skepticism over Barston's conclusion, that "Cyprus, on balance, has been successful in the management of its foreign policy" (p. 206).

The first three case studies—on Norway, Holland and Switzerland—illustrate the concern of some small states with the development of international law, although over time all three have also adopted a variety of complementary strategies to defend their interests. The Norwegian "aristocracy of the sea" requires a policy of interdependence with the current major power; Orvik is a conservative advocate of such alignment against neutralist critics in Norway. The reorientation of the Netherlands from a colonial to a European power has been supervised by Mr. Luns; Baehr is supportive of its nonpartisan alliance with the United States and its traditional "moralistic-legalistic attitude" (p. 66). Freymond indicates that the multiplication of small states has ended the anachronistic status of Switzerland as it is now one among many; the continuity of its neutrality is based on the interaction of its ethnic heterogeneity with its geopolitical vulnerability.

Old and affluent small states have widespread, if thin, diplomatic representation; new and small states have less developed administrative structures. The excellent chapters on the international politics of Zambia, Cuba, and Singapore analyze the impact of the politics of dependence. Bone focuses on Zambia's linkage politics, especially the influence of external values on national development: "Western aid tends to perpetuate capitalist structures" (p. 123). She also distinguishes between Zambia's global insignificance and its strategic role in southern Africa, where the dominance of President Kaunda and the politics of race are clear. The recent history of Zambia illustrates the possibility of overcoming inherited constraints: "high copper prices have facilitated sustained growth *and* the realignment of external economic relations" (p. 135). Stansfield's analysis of Cuba points to the dilemmas of revolution and the dangers of *detente* for those poor nonaligned states that have advanced it. Cuba has exchanged, not eliminated, its dependence and has failed to guarantee its revolution: "in the event of a *rapprochement* between the United States and her hesitant Soviet *patrón*, Cuba might well prove to be a negotiable strategic asset" (p. 237). Similarly, despite the transnational relations among Jewish communities, Israel's continued identity is dependent on superpower indulgence; Reuveny suggests that its freedom of maneuver "depends not on actual power but on much political skill, imagination and inventiveness" (p. 180). Likewise, under the energetic leadership of Lee Kwan Yew described by King, the new city-state of Singapore seeks to become the financial center for ASEAN without terminating ties with nonaligned and Commonwealth states. Harrison's analysis of New Zealand foreign policy reveals the insecurities of isolation and continued economic dependence on Britain; imperial alliance has been superseded by alignment with the U.S. in ANZUS and SEATO.

Despite the uneven style and diverse interests of the authors, the collection does contain an impressive selection of data. A brief bibliographic note accompanies each chapter. These, along with characteristically thorough references, make the volume helpful for further, and hopefully more analytic, comparative and suggestive research.

TIMOTHY M. SHAW

*University of Zambia and*
*Dalhousie University*

**In Defense of Earth.** By Lynton K. Caldwell. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972. Pp. x, 295. $8.50.)

This is a tract for the times, ranging from reflections on the nature of man through a compelling survey of the environmental dangers that now beset him, to description of the institutional instruments he has at hand or can make to counter them, and of how he must use them.

The theme is this: Man is an "unecological animal," at least in his technological phase, since "modern industrial organisations . . . are deficient in self-sustaining or self-renewing abilities" and "industrial man has overtaxed the biosphere's capacity to absorb an ever-mounting volume of wastes," (pp. 21, 22). So a host of unprecedented environmental problems and opportunities have been created by "(1) a world-wide explosion of human populations and urban growth, (2) mass use of automobiles and aeroplanes, (3) nuclear energy, (4) a plastic and pesticide revolution in industrial chemistry, and (5) technologies for the exploration of hostile environments in the polar regions, beneath the seas, and in space," (p. 202). The costs of failure then to adapt our technological systems and political structures to ecological forces will be "1. Impoverishment and degradation of the human environment. 2. Adaptation to progressively lower qualities of life, accompanied by declining levels of public health and, perhaps, by increasing genetic deterioration. 3. Ultimate ecological catastrophe," (p. 230); and

> the wide-spread belief that environmental problems are largely those of affluent industrialised nations is not confirmed by fact. Some of the most serious and worsening environmental problems of the present time are found in the burgeoning centers of developing countries. In the backlands of these countries there is growing evidence of abuse and depletion of natural resources (p. 192).

Professor Caldwell handles the theme with objectivity and compassion; he presents both a detailed survey amply supported by references to sources of much that has been undertaken, internationally and nationally, to meet the environmental challenge; and also a positive program offered for environmental protection. Why then did I close the book in disappointment? Because, while its whole message is that there are difficult choices and urgent priorities of action if human society is to survive in something like its present form, the author fails to indicate what choices should be made or what these priorities are. Nor is the scale of action marked out: when must action be global, when is regional action more effective, or when is local action sufficient? To illustrate: The second point in the program calls on each nation or international organization to "survey and evaluate the overall state of the environment within the area of its responsibility as a basis for the establishment of priorities and plans of action in relation to human needs, available resources, and social goals," (p. 211).

Apply this to the Nile Valley. The Aswan High Dam is attacked as a "developmental symbol," "a simplistic solution to complex sociological problems," which caused serious environmental changes: reduction of fish in the Eastern Mediterranean, formerly fed by Nile water nutrients; erosion of the Nile channel and delta; and loss of fertility in "bordering farm lands" (bordering what: the Dam, the Nile?) which began to require artificial fertilizers (p. 92). But if this issue demands setting priorities in terms of human needs, available resources, and social goals, why are the benefits of the Dam to Nile Valley agriculture or its use for generation of power not mentioned? Why should not agriculture over a large area of the Nile Valley be given priority over the sardine fisheries at Alexandria? Why is artificial fertilizer automatically regarded as undesirable?

This is not to say that the construction of high dams does not call for more sophisticated ecological planning than it has so far had, but the example shows that to implement the second point in the program, it has to be decided what environmental changes are, according to the best information in a given region, unacceptable, tolerable, neutral, or beneficial. So environmental changes would be unacceptable if they blocked social goals in the long term, whatever the contemporary human needs, *and* those goals are preferred to the satisfaction of the contemporary needs. They could be tolerable, if there were counterbalancing advantages, if, in the example, the improvement of farming by flood control and irrigation in upper Egypt is preferred to the protection of the sardine industry in Alexandria. What we ask of such a book as this is that it at least try to indicate which particular environmental changes, now in progress or threatened, are unacceptable and in terms of what social goals. Without such specification, priorities can hardly begin to be marked out.

The book in fact does little to identify social goals, or to develop its underlying assumptions about them. In the darker pages, where man is seen as a deviant animal, the goal is bare biological survival; at other points, it appears to be that "the quality of life"—whatever that elusive notion really means—is not to be diminished: (pp. 93–96). Further, some social principles are dismissed as superstitions: for example, "beliefs that the Gross National Product is an index of economic health, or that there are *inherent* social or 'political' rights are as rational as the belief that bleeding will reduce fevers," (p. 18). Then "our thesis assumes that human behavior *can* be transformed, but it does not assume that it will be transformed in a desirable way or in sufficient time," (p. 233). But does it assume that it *ought* to be transformed, and if so, why? If there are no social or political rights, at least axiomatic if not inherent, why are there responsibilities to other natural species, to the environment, or to our grandchildren?

What proponents of "a policy of the environment" and of "continuing programs for public understanding of man's relationships with both natural and cultural environments" (points one and ten in the program) have to do, if they talk the language of ecological catastrophe, is to say what the priorities for action are;—are they, for example the reduction of marine pollution, the compulsory control of population growth by taxation or by euthanasia, the reduction of carbon dioxide in the upper atmosphere, or the development or reversal of nuclear energy uses?

The sixth point in the program calls for "information systems to provide public decision makers and all affected parties with accurate, timely and meaningful data on environmental problems" (p. 211). No one can demand that data be always complete or faultless, or deny that "no responsible scientist could seriously predict the specific occasion or combination of events" that would produce ecological disaster (p. 105); but why does a responsible scientist, quoted on p. 97, declare that "the oceans are beginning to die from chemical pollution and nothing is being done about it," after a decade of massive increases in fish catches around the world and at a time when much, though certainly not yet enough, is being done both internationally and nationally to stop marine polution? This kind of statement, light-years away from the criteria of point six of the program, gets amplified by the mass media, and can create a weary cynicism in the public instead of the positive attitude needed to tackle and solve the environmental problems that confront us.

J. E. S. Fawcett

*London, England*

**China and the Question of Taiwan: Documents and Analysis.** Edited by Hungdah Chiu. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973. Pp. 418. $18.50.)

The question of Taiwan has been more political than legal ever since President Harry S. Truman interposed the U.S. Seventh Fleet between Chinese Communist and Chinese Nationalist forces in June 1950. Regardless of the numerous footnotes and lengthy documentation, behind most studies of the subject lie prescriptive aims that force scholarship to serve one of the three contending claimants to the island's ultimate disposition, the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China (ROC), or the Taiwanese Independence Movement.

This book is no exception. It presents the Chinese Nationalist viewpoint in rebuttal to an impressively argued but presently irrelevant tome by Lung-chu Chen and Harold D. Lasswell, *Formosa, China and the United Nations* (New York St. Martin's Press, 1967) which is repeatedly attacked but conspicuously omitted from the "selected bibliography." More interestingly, it seems to have been updated, somewhat unevenly and superficially, to argue against any implications in the new Sino-U.S. rapprochement that Washington's interests would be served by further accommodation to Peking with respect to Taiwan.

The volume is not without scholarly interest. A thoroughly professional and admirably lucid essay on the economic development of Taiwan by Ramon H. Myers offers both descriptive and analytical data of wider use in contemporary comparative development studies as well as in a longitudinal focus covering Japanese and Chinese development strategies over the past seventy-five years. Hungdah Chiu's survey of the respective political postures adopted by Peking, Taipei, and Washington since 1945 includes, *inter alia*, a useful compendium of Chinese Communist statements that demonstrate the flexibility of strategy and tactics subsumed under the uniform slogan "Liberate Taiwan." Ting-yee Kuo's review of the island's turbulent history restores perspective on its tenuous relationship with the mainland as a territorial prize repeatedly coveted by Dutch, French, and Japanese force.

Unfortunately the intrusion of political bias weakens, and in some cases, vitiates the impressive research which underlies the volume. It is expecting too much of a Taiwanese professor with professional and personal ties on the island to present a balanced analysis of "Political Development in the Republic of China," and Yang Wei's contribution suffers accordingly. Curiously his identification is omitted from the bibliographic summaries "about the editor and the contributors" while three other individuals listed there are given no credit elsewhere for participation in the volume. Although the historical essay is predominantly factual, its polemical attack on Japanese behavior (p. 24) climaxes with the hyperbolic assertion, "For half a century Japan inflicted immeasurable evils on China, but Taiwan suffered the most." This is completely contradicted by Myers who notes (pp. 38–40), "By the mid-1920s Taiwan was a model of economic progress, stability, and order. . . . Modest gains in everyday living standards strongly suggest that the life of the lower-class farmer, coolie laborers, and merchant became more pleasant by the mid-1930s in comparison with the early 1900s."

Other contradictions reflect poor editing and publishing. Yan Wei's assertion that "members of the Formosan Independence Movement have deliberately tried to avoid using the term "Taiwanese" (p. 93) is followed by the editor's consistent use of "Taiwanese Independence Movement," correctly identifying prominent political activitists. Myer's claim (p. 58) that C. K. Yen is premier conflicts with Wei's proper description of Chiang Ching-kuo's succeeding to this post in 1972 (p. 99). Particularly troublesome is the editor's erroneous use of present-tense verbs in his essay, which confuses the reader because in virtually all instances the past tense is required.

The editor asserts the essentiality of ROC military strength to Asian security against PRC threats and the vulnerability of Taiwan to seizure should the U.S. guarantee be withdrawn. Yet he shows no demonstrable relationship between the 600,000 servicemen on Taiwan and the defense of any other Asian state, nor does he cite any evidence in the present and foreseeable PRC force posture that reflects any credible intention to invade Taiwan in the absence of a U.S. defense. Instead Chiu speculates on the feasibility and consequences of a covert American overthrow of the Chiang regime in order to establish an independent Taiwan. His concern is as anachronistic as his tedious tracing of legal evidence to prove Taiwan is part of China, both issues being overtaken by the joint Sino-American communique of February 1972.

More than half the volume consists of documents, some in full but many excerpted. Primarily from the last two decades, they offer insights on the virtual identity of positions in Taipei and Peking with respect to Taiwan's status as a Chinese province. Beyond this, however, they are so redundant as not to deserve the space allotted them. Nor would a careful analyst wish to include as "official documents" all *People's Daily* items, whether editorials or signed articles, on an equal basis with statements by Chou En-lai.

ALLEN S. WHITING

*University of Michigan*

**China's Practice of International Law: Some Case Studies.** By Jerome Alan Cohen. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972. Pp. 417. $15.00.)

*China's Practice of International Law* is a collection of ten largely self-contained and somewhat diverse studies of Chinese diplomatic perceptions, practices, and objectives. The chapters, which reflect the differences in training and expertise of the twelve contributors, vary considerably in purpose, mode of analysis, and scope. Yet there is a coherence to the book as a whole, and the volume is a significant addition to existing literature on contemporary China.

The book is an end product of a project begun in 1967 when a panel of specialists was organized by the American Society of International Law to consider the topic "China And World Order." Several of the chapters were presented in preliminary form at a conference on "Communist China & International Law," at the New School for Social Research (cosponsored by ASIL) on Feb. 7–8, 1969. The volume is the sixth title published in the series of Harvard Studies of East Asian Law; it is the third to be written or edited by Professor Cohen, who has become perhaps the most influential scholar in the field of Chinese legal studies.

While Professor Cohen suggests that the focus of the volume is on China and International Law (how does the People's Republic use international law in dealing with a particular country or international organization; or, how does it treat a specific legal problem in its relations with all countries? [p. 3]), political scientists will be pleased to find that the legal questions are usually set within a larger political framework. In part, this is a consequence of Peking's tendency to consider the impact of international law on the international scene to be limited at best. But it also appears that the authors in some cases are more concerned with the dynamics and significance of the larger political questions than they are with the specifically legal elements involved.

It is to Professor Cohen's credit that each of the chapters contributes to our knowledge of China's diplomatic behavior. The topics covered include China's views and practices with regard to recognition, diplomatic immunity, participation in international organizations, trade in the absence of diplomatic relations, and internment and detention of Chinese nationals in foreign states.

The piece by Ginsburgs and Pinkele on the early phases of the Sino-Soviet boundary question (up to 1965) deserves special mention. The analysis is exhaustive and convincing, though their argument is occasionally obscured by an overly complex style of presentation. They conclude, most importantly, that the boundary question was not by itself a serious point of difference between the Chinese and Soviet elites; rather both have used it in "an intricate game played for extrinsic political stakes in accordance with a series of well defined rules" (p. 237).

With perhaps one notable exception, the authors are generally agreed that Chinese leaders have not violated the ordinary and recognized precepts of international law with the reckless abandon of revolutionaries or international outlaws. Where Peking has offered novel explanations of its legal obligations or otherwise given evidence of an unwillingness to abide by customary norms, the authors have found the rationalizations plausible and the behavior at least understandable. They see China's diplomats as pragmatic, intelligent, reasonable, and capable of error; in short, rather like their counterparts elsewhere. Only Philippe Ardant is highly critical—both of the Chinese and the leaders of states having diplomatic intercourse with the People's Republic: ". . . China has no intention of submitting to the 'norms of international law.' It has its own conception of diplomatic relations, which, it is true, is not opposed to a conditional reference to 'international usage' when this usage is favorable to Chinese interests and world revolution" (p. 89). Later, he concludes: "One thus gets the impression that foreign states do not want to run afoul of the Chinese, that they humor them, and that they accept from them what they never would suffer in their relations with one another" (p. 128).

Beyond this rather broad assessment of China's diplomatic practice, the authors are very cautious in offering generalizations. Though they seldom examine the matter directly, they recognize that Peking faces a serious dilemma because it has advocated the need to bring about change in the international order, while at the same time it has found it must deal with other states here and now. They also note that China's objectives, though typically reasonable, are not susceptible of easy solutions through legal means.

The volume has one significant limitation: most of its analysis predates the changes in China's diplomatic options and practice which began as the Cultural Revolution drew to a close. This gap is particularly apparent in those chapters which treat general subjects (e.g., recognition, or China's participation in international organizations). Though the book has a copyright date of 1972, Professor Weng's otherwise impressive study of Peking's participation in international organizations relies essentially on data from 1968 and before. Given the admission of Peking to the United Nations and other recent and related developments, his study is no longer current. The same can be said of Professor Hsiung's chapter on China's recognition practices, since the number of Peking's contacts with other states has so drastically increased in the past two or three years.

Scholars treating contemporary problems generally are plagued by the possibility that significant and relevant developments will break shortly after they have completed their manuscripts. The contributors to this volume have seen that possibility realized. Nevertheless, they are to be commended, for though their efforts in some cases are in need of supplementation, their analyses remain basically sound.

ARTHUR A. STAHNKE
*Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville*

**Regional Integration in Central America.** By Isaac Cohen Orantes. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1972. Pp. 122. $10.00.)

Political analysts of common-market associations must grapple with a number of difficult issues. Among these issues are: (1) the relationship between economic interdependence and political integration; (2) the role of extraregional powers in either promoting or undermining economic and political cooperation among market countries; and (3) the impact of international corporations on regional economics and politics. With the European Community in crisis, these matters are especially compelling today.

Professor Isaac Cohen Orantes' political study of regional integration in Central America thus treats a subject of more than parochial interest. Unfortunately, the promise is better than the result. Although the book contains useful observations, it lacks both focus and argument. The trivial and the significant are jumbled together, and the result for the reader is frustration.

The author claims to evaluate the "political consequences of regional economic integration" by comparing the expectations of both "theoreticians" and "practitioners" of integration with what actually happened from 1950 to 1968 in Central America. "Theoreticians," for these purposes, are those, like Ernst B. Haas, who have argued that regional economic agreements can lead to political union through gradual expansion and "politicization" of regional commitments. "Practitioners" are Central American officials who have viewed the regional market as a means to achieve national development and modernization. As one might guess in advance, the author discovers that both "theoreticians" and "practitioners" have been excessively optimistic in their expectations. The next question is whether such a framework for analysis yields good political interpretation; and it seems that it does not.

In fact, the author's story appears almost in spite of the neo-functional jargon in which it is told. At its center are the decisive issues of the origins of the Central American Common Market (CACM) and the subsequent interplay of national, regional, and United States interests.

As Professor Cohen Orantes shows, the Central American Common Market was the child of two foreign parents, the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and the United States government. ECLA exercised hegemony first. During the 1950s, the U.N. organization conducted studies and laid plans for the gradual integration of the Central American economies. In 1958 and 1959 the Central American governments signed the first regional trade and industrial agreements. Initial enthusiasm for the plans waned, however, as the costs to the member countries became apparent. At this juncture, in 1960, when the future of the market looked bleak, the United States government stepped in as a stronger, richer, and less disinterested sponsor of the common-market project. From 1960 to 1963, common-market plans were reoriented; ECLA's "statist" leanings ceded to the free trade philosophy of the United States. New institutions were created as channels of U.S. influence, and dollar aid floated the regional programs. The Central American states joined other beneficiaries of the Alliance for Progress as countries to be defended economically, as well as militarily, against communist aggression. As happened elsewhere in

Latin America, "development" became synonymous with U.S. support for the status quo.

Against this background, one might question whether the author has focused on the relevant expectations at work in the Central American Common Market with his "theoreticians-practitioners" scheme. One wonders whether either the United States or the local elites were *primarily* working for economic integration; what that meant (precisely) to them; and to what extent they saw their own interests furthered by such a goal. To explore these matters, would require one to define and to rank the relationships among (a) declared purposes; (b) regional policies and institutions established to realize these purposes; (c) interests of participants (national, regional, and foreign; public and private); and (d) the actual results of the Common Market.

No such analysis appears. Yet the author's own comments on the CACM's political "failures" suggest viable alternative hypotheses. Perhaps, for instance, the local elite classes sought or achieved from the CACM just what best served their interests. This interpretation would link a number of the study's conclusions, among which are: (a) that elite regimes were strengthened by participation in the market; and (b) that national politicians and bureaucrats used regional offices to enhance personal and national prestige at the expense of regional goals. Perhaps, as another hypothesis, U.S. economic interests (either sponsored by or unwittingly aided by the U.S. government) shaped and limited CACM integration decisively. In support of this reasoning are Professor Cohen Orantes's observations: (a) that the U.S. government successfully opposed regional planning for industrialization in favor of free-trade policies; (b) that the only industries to reorganize on a region-wide basis were subsidiaries of foreign (U.S.) corporations; and (c) that competition among Central American governments to attract foreign capital undermined cooperative programs.

In sum, Professor Cohen Orantes's theoretical scheme is inadequate to probe the most interesting suggestions of his study. These possibilities await another student's efforts.

GAIL R. SHERMAN

*The City College, CUNY*

**International Conciliation.** By Jean-Pierre Cot. (London: Europa Publications, Ltd., 1972; 1968. Pp. 349. $13.95.)

Let us assume that the era of detente has been attained. Negotiations succeed in taking the place of confrontations. In such circumstances, it would be necessary to strengthen techniques for the peaceful settlement of disputes between sovereign and powerful nation-states. In this connection, third-party assistance in negotiations is an important procedure toward the creation of a more harmonious world. This is just the reason why Jean-Pierre Cot's book *International Conciliation* is particularly timely, since it deals with one such method. Employing an institutional-historical approach, the author skillfully examines the history, definition, objectives, techniques, prospects, and achievements of a form of third-party settlement that stresses sovereignty and voluntarism in national relationships. Such terms as conciliation and mediation are more precisely defined than is often the case, even in the professional literature.

Cot is a professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Paris. The book under review, first published in France and translated into English in 1972, is a well-organized, extensively documented publication. Its contents are divided not only into parts and chapters, but also into 153 sections, each with its own heading. In this way, it is easy for the reader to locate any particular subject.

The author defines the principle behind International Conciliation as the "intervention by a third body, having no political authority of its own, but enjoying the confidence of the parties and which, after examining the dispute in all its aspects, proposes a solution which they are not bound to accept" (p. 329). The procedure is compared to the recourse to a wise man who has no force to support him. He represents reason, not political power. Only the good will of the disputants can ensure the success of the operation. The wise man brings antagonists together through his understanding of the conflict. He persuades rather than imposes.

Cot differentiates between conciliation and mediation. The latter represents intervention by a political authority. It is compared to an appeal to a prince who, in a world of sovereign states, may be equal to the disputants, but who, nevertheless, pursues his own interests. Therefore, "the neutrality of a political authority is always suspect" (p. 2). The author argues that mediation, while popular in the 19th century, had been discredited as of 1914 since "the intrusion of a third party interest in a conflict between two private interests was in accordance neither with logic nor the principle of the sovereignty of states" (p. 332). Indeed, it was the weaknesses of mediation that laid the groundwork for the emergence of conciliation as a method for the settling of international disputes in the 20th century.

After an examination of introductory material, Cot divides his discussion into two parts: Part One concerns bilateral conciliation, and Part Two deals with conciliation in international organizations. The author places much greater emphasis on bilateral conciliation than he does on procedures in international agencies. This is logical since he feels that "conciliation is, in essence, a strictly bilateral procedure" (p. 59). The technique has evolved into a stable institution with its own procedures.

These procedures are described in detail: There is usually a commission composed of members appointed in their individual capacities rather than as representatives of a particular nation. Even the national members selected by each party serve as individuals. In any case, the deciding votes are held by neutral members; each side chooses agents who act as representatives before the commission and present written and oral statements as part of a procedure that is conducted in the strictest secrecy. Attempts are made to avoid the restrictions inherent in a judicial proceeding. In fact, decisions are made on the basis of compromise, rather than through the strict application of legal norms. An informal atmosphere is created to emphasize that all concerned are equally united in an endeavor to seek the truth. The signs of authority are discarded, as agents and members sit around a common table. The report drawn up by the commission is frequently the product of ideas from all concerned. The parties have the option of accepting or rejecting the report.

Part Two of the book contains a very interesting discussion of conciliation in international organizations, which, the author believes, is in marked contrast to bilateral conciliation. Two categories are examined: (1) conciliation and the settlement of specific (economic and technical) disputes, and (2) conciliation and the general settlement of disputes. In view of space limitations, I will concentrate on the latter type. International organization, says Cot, does not provide an example of pure conciliation, acting in isolation from political pressures. For example, the United Nations has employed "mediators," but these officials report to organs which possess political authority. Conciliation is just one part of a larger process. Thus Cot argues that "since the founding of the League of Nations, the prince has assumed the guise of collective mediation by the organization. Though it has required a social significance, his intervention is still political. It often represents a coalition of private interests rather than a hypothetical common interest in a divided world" (p. 333). Despite this fact, the author does admit that there is a need for some political authority in an anarchical world. "For the wise man needs the prince, just as the prince needs the wise man" (p. 333).

I share the view that settlement procedures work best if the parties have positive incentives to prevent a dispute from deteriorating into a dangerous situation. Perhaps international organization can help create such incentives through assisting in the development of binding social and psychological ties across national boundaries. It seems to me, however, that there are certain dangers in Cot's position. There is always the possibility that arguments which rely on principles of national sovereignty could deteriorate into justifications for policies of national egoism.

*International Conciliation* is a welcome and provocative addition to the literature. The book's contents should be carefully read even by those who may disagree with some of the concepts it contains.

DAVID BROOK

*Jersey City State College*

**What Are Human Rights?** By Maurice Cranston. (New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, Second ed., 1973. Pp. 170. $6.95.)

Professor Cranston puts his emphasis on three subjects: (1) the meaning and the justification of the statement that X is a human right; (2) the rights of life, liberty, and property; and (3) the question whether economic and social "rights" should be called human rights. The book is short (85 pages of text, plus documents), which necessarily entails sketchiness. Even so, it is disappointing, especially since it is a revised and thus presumably an improved edition—the first edition having been published in 1962.

Implicitly Cranston rejects the view that human rights are what they are declared to be by the members of the United Nations and other international agencies. Instead he associates the idea of human rights with the classical conception of natural law, natural rights, and the rights of man, and he makes the identification of human rights a matter of tradition and of rational and moral inquiry. What he gives is an elementary introduction to the subject. Those who want a more thorough and cogent treatment of it will do well to go to Benn and Peters, *The Principles of Political Thought*, and to the various contributions (including Cranston's) to D. D. Raphael, ed., *Political Theory and the Rights of Man.*

The most noteworthy feature of Cranston's discussion of the rights of life, liberty, and property is the very fact that he selects them for special scrutiny. Attention to the rights of life and liberty is to be expected, and attention to the question of a right to property is at least understandable—although more in terms of Anglo-American practice than in terms of philosophic considerations. But why scarcely a mention of numerous other rights? In particular, why scarcely a mention of the right to equality and nondiscrimination? Whether the question is faced philosophically or empirically, the omission is difficult to understand. Philosophically, questions about equality and discrimination are at the heart of questions of social justice. Empirically such questions have been prominent in the international movement for human rights ever since World War II. According to the Charter, human rights are to be promoted "without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." In the UN, the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities has played an important role from the first. Some of the major international conventions concern discrimination. Few subjects get more attention in the United Nations than does racial discrimination in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, and even in Europe questions about discrimination sometimes become prominent, as indicated by the Belgian linguistic cases that went to the European Court of Human Rights. Surely it is a reversal of the proper emphasis to neglect these subjects while devoting a chapter to the right of property.

Human rights are generally put into two categories: civil and political, on the one hand, and economic and social, on the other. Cranston accepts the idea of human rights in the first of these categories, but he denounces the idea that what is in the second category should be called *rights* at all. To him, X deserves to be called a human right only if it is susceptible to fairly prompt transformation into a positive right that is realized in practice. He takes it for granted that civil and political rights meet this test, but for a great many countries he argues that economic and social "rights" do not, which to him means that they are not rights at all. Rights are one thing, and ideals and aspirations are another! Cranston argues this (or really asserts it) not as a matter of preferred strategy but as a matter of correct thought; and on this basis his view is not at all compelling. On the one hand, it seems unlikely that the implementation of economic and social rights in a number of countries is any more remote than the implementation of civil and political rights. For that matter, civil and political rights also have an aspirational element about them—e.g., the statement in the Declaration of Independence that all men are created equal. On the other hand, words really should not be allowed to be the master. When virtually all governments of the world join in declaring that human rights exist in the economic and social category as well as in the civil and political category, why not accept the view and go on from there? It is quite possible to argue (as Cranston does) that it is a mistake to say that vacations with pay are a human right without concluding that nothing in the economic and social category should be called a human right. Cranston's position is analogous to the position that, in view of Austin's definition of law, international law does not exist.

The book is useful as an elementary (and in some respects provocative) introduction to the subject.

VERNON VAN DYKE

*University of Iowa*

**American Foreign Policy Toward Communist China, 1949–1969.** By Foster Rhea Dulles. Foreword by John King Fairbank. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1972. Pp. xii, 273. $5.95, paper.)

Although a significant new page has been turned in United States relations with the People's Republic of China, the complex story of the traditional attitudes and feelings of the two peoples and the combination of historical forces that fostered McCarthyism and reinforced Washington's cold-war stance toward Peking deserve to be re-examined in the new climate of the 1970s. While more reappraisals are yet to appear on the subject, Foster Rhea Dulles's succinct account helps place two decades of U.S. China policy in proper historical perspective.

The volume vividly portrays how domestic partisan politics—the McCarthyist fanaticism—as well as the sinister clouds of Stalinism abroad, the sheer ignorance of the American public, and the complications arising from the continued but reduced existence of Chiang Kai-shek's government in Taiwan had, no less than Communist obduracy itself, combined to make the China question a far more intricate tangle in American policy than it should have been. The author maintains the lucid and readable style that was his hallmark in earlier works, guided by a professional conviction that reciprocating self-righteousness, from which crusades and counter-crusades arise, lies at the very root of human hostility and collision which he considers a historian's task to do away with.

This professional conviction stands behind his demonstration of how the Manichean spirit of Joe McCarthy, the late Senator from Wisconsin, which found quaint reincarnation in the ideological zealotry of John Foster Dulles, the future Secretary of State, and the latter-day saint Dean Rusk, moved—and locked—this country's China policy in a dead corner. The author recaptures the political climate that generated the McCarthyist jitters, by noting the simultaneous existence of a *China bloc* in Washington alongside the *China lobby*. The lobby consisted mostly of American private protagonists of Chiang Kai-shek's cause, aided by the Nationalist Chinese embassy. The *China bloc*, on the other hand, was made up mainly of conservative Republicans who were frustrated by Truman's unexpected election in 1948 and convinced that the Truman administration was soft on communism. Their fear, roused by the Communist victory in China and Stalinist coups in East Europe in the late 1940s, was brought to fever pitch during the Korean War. Joe McCarthy exploited and thrived on the fear. Although McCarthyism was in the end denounced by American public opinion, the blind fear of communism lingered on to dominate the China policy in a State Department demoralized by the McCarthyist witch-hunt. The author's candid survey, zooming in on characteristic cold-war paeans to virtue against the Communist evil, delivered by such public figures of the time such as Congressman John F. Kennedy and Senator Robert A. Taft, serves to illustrate the intensity of the prevailing mood of self-righteousness.

Combining a veteran journalist's pen with scholarly detachment, Professor Dulles maintains a good balance throughout the volume, though occasionally one wishes that he had consulted wider sources than press reports and personal memoirs of the participants. In discussing the possible reasons for Peking's change in its position at the Panmunjom talks (p. 137), for example, he could have considered domestic factors in China and the possible impact of Stalin's death on China's foreign-policy orientation, even though the book's focus is on American policy toward China.

Similarly, the book should perhaps have given greater emphasis to the triangular relationships between Washington, Peking, and Moscow. A rather spotty account of the changing Sino-Soviet relations is given, but not enough is said about the long-range significance that these changes held for the future development in the relations between this country and China. The Sino-Soviet split headed a long list of factors—besides Peking's acquisition of nuclear capability after 1964, the Nixon administration's Vietnam policy, and the changing U.S. relations with Japan and the Soviet Union—that led both Peking and Washington to a sober, realistic reappraisal of their policy toward each other. The rapidly changing events ushered in by the Spring 1971 round of "pingpong diplomacy" are rational outcomes of these mutual reappraisals. For this reason the triangular tangle deserves much greater exposition than it has received in the book.

Yet, it would not be fair to judge the book purely from the present-day vantage point, for the author, at the time of his death in September, 1970, was unable to see the quickening pace of détente between the two countries. If his rather cautious conclusion about the future of Sino-American relations was a bit too gloomy, the "continuing impasse" he anticipated—referring to the ideological and practical assumptions persisting from the cold-war era which we have not yet learned to jettison—remains to be broken. This point is highlighted in John King Fairbank's "Foreword," which does much to illuminate the book's many merits. In holding that courage and enlightenment are needed to overcome long-standing prejudices and stereotypes, Foster Rhea Dulles's book bequeathes a mellow humanist lesson, which is a tribute to his life-long devotion to the enhancement of understanding among peoples through a better-informed public.

James Chieh Hsiung

*New York University*

**The Vietnam War and International Law. Vol. 3: The Widening Context.** Edited by Richard A. Falk. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972. Pp. xi, 951. $25.00, cloth; $9.50, paper.)

This third volume of a useful collection of periodical literature and public documents presents a cross section of official and professional opinion upon legal issues posed by the Vietnam War. The earlier volumes (I [1968], pp ix, 633; II [1969], pp ix, 1270) are needed for a full view of the uncertainties in the international law of intervention and consequent controversy over the legality of United States involvement, the applicability of United Nations security procedures, the constitutional issue of the President's power to initiate war, contentions of objectors to military service, and standards applicable to the conduct of warfare and treatment of prisoners. In the present volume emphasis is upon the "widening context" of a general Indochinese war following American military responses to Communist violations of the neutrality of Laos and Cambodia. The three volumes were issued under the sponsorship of a distinguished Panel on the Role of International Law in Civil Wars created by the American Society of International law.

The present collection contains: 170 pages of reprinted articles on international and constitutional aspects of the intervention into Cambodia; nearly 300 pages of judicial opinions and articles on war crimes, emphasizing the application of principles governing the Nuremberg and Yamashita trials to Song My/My Lai and to conscientious objection and war resistance in the United States; 234 pages of articles and congressional comments on constitutional allocation of war powers; 141 pages of articles on problems of settlement and principles which should govern reshaping of the law of intervention and warfare and of international instruments of order; 56 pages of principal public documents relating to the matters discussed earlier. Most of the articles are from law school journals and the *American Journal of International Law;* the forty contribu-

tors include such familiar names as Cyril E. Black, Richard A. Falk, William T. R. Fox, Wolfgang Friedmann, Louis Henkin, Nicholas deB. Katzenback, Henry A. Kissinger, John Norton Moore, William V. O'Brien, William H. Rehnquist, Elliot L. Richardson, John R. Stevenson, Telford Taylor, Quincy Wright.

While the contributors show the high order of analytical ability characteristic of our best law reviews, many also exhibit a forensic quality which reflects strong commitments to position. A balanced view must therefore depend upon examining all sides of the complex debate, and it is the merit of this collection that it enables critical readers to do this. Although the editor is a principal protagonist of the critics of Administration policies and legal positions, he has been scrupulous in including the work of the ablest supporters of Administration positions. The result is that this volume, with its predecessors, presents the best collection of materials available to students of international and constitutional law on the vexing legal issues presented by the Vietnam War. General students of international relations will also find much to interest them.

What principally emerges is the large difference of expert opinion about the definition of essential concepts of international law. What is self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter? What form of "aggression" justifies such defense? Can a state not attacked assist the victim of attack in collective defense? Confusion is compounded by doubt about how far the United Nations Charter has displaced earlier rules of customary international law. Both the customary and the Charter rules are affected by whether the war is an international or a civil conflict, but the basis for determining whether belligerents are independent states or groups within one state is recognition by other states, which at present is decided mainly on political grounds. These doubts affect the legal position of the United States in assistance to South Vietnam. But to this are added special doubts about intervention into Cambodia, which did not request such aid in its defense, although the Lon Nol government probably welcomed it. For some years the United States had refrained from military responses in Cambodia although improper use was being made of its territory by North Vietnam and the Viet Cong. Was there sufficient change to justify an alteration of policy? In the sense of defense of Cambodia, probably not. In the sense of defense of South Vietnam, perhaps, for destruction of Cambodian bases gave more time for Vietnamization of its defense. But would that justify violation of neutral territory? Was it seriously argued that withdrawal of United States forces was jeopardized when such withdrawal was the principal desire of the Communists? The questions merely point the lack of clear legal guidelines on violations of neutral territory by one belligerent which justify intervention by the other.

Similarly, discussion of war crimes exposes uncertainties in the law. The Yamashita case imposed upon a commanding general liability for misconduct of his troops on the theory that he failed in his responsibility to control them. The Japanese forces in the Philippines were then defeated and dispersed so that his headquarters could not communicate with them; he neither authorized nor approved their acts. Granted that in organized military forces the commander is responsible for the acts of his forces, had not the Japanese ceased to be an organized force? But *a fortiori* should not U.S. commanders be held liable for My Lai? And should this liability extend up the chain of command even to the president as Commander-in-Chief? If this is the law in the books it certainly has not been the law in practice. Nuremberg rejected the defenses of superior orders and act of state, but difficulties of application are apparent. In a context of widespread retaliation against civilians aiding and harboring Viet Cong insurgents, what tacit mandate is a company officer justified in assuming? There is need to rework controlling legal formulations in the light of these problems.

It need scarcely be added that the constitutional law of the United States on war powers is unsettled. The Congress alone may declare war, but wars are now generally fought without declaration. Does it follow that the president as Commander-in-Chief has full power by initiating military operations to start wars? Practice has tolerated broad presidential initiatives, but the courts have not yet clarified the law. It remains a bone of contention between Congress and president, evident in passage of the War Powers Act, which the president declared an unconstitutional infringement of executive powers. In this uncertain state, private persons have obtained little judicial clarification of what constitutes illegal war, or of their right to decline participation in such war.

These and other questions are argued *pro* and *con* in the materials offered. If the answers are not self-evident, at least the issues are sharply posed and the arguments for one or another position vigorously marshalled. And the urgent need for prompt and authoritative reworking of this body of law becomes inescapable.

CHARLES H. MCLAUGHLIN

*University of Minnesota*

**This Endangered Planet: Prospects and Proposals for Human Survival.** By Richard A. Falk. (New York: Vintage Books, 1972. Pp. xiii, 495. $2.95, paper.)

In calling upon all peoples to respond to the substantial threats to human survival, Richard A. Falk, Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice at Princeton University, has produced a book that is disturbing, disappointing, and not easily forgotten.

The book will disturb many readers because of the author's compelling conviction that the human race has ten to 100 years to prepare a response to the increasing threats to human survival. In general terms the threat to survival and the planetary crisis involve problems of population pressure, pollution, resource depletion, and the chance of wars of mass destruction. Although these problems may have existed in the past in varying degrees, Falk asserts that it is the technological character of contemporary society that gives the impending crisis its apocalyptic possibilities.

In viewing the planetary crisis, Falk persuasively argues that national states and the existing system of world order are wholly inadequate to meet the challenges. The national states are inadequate because the crisis clearly transcends national boundaries; in addition national loyalties impair the development of a planetary perspective that is necessary to promote the survival of mankind.

In taking a long-range view, Falk articulates two scenarios for the future. The "no-change" scenario suggests that the 1970s will introduce the politics of despair and will be followed by succeeding decades of the politics of desperation, the politics of catastrophe, and culminate in the twenty-first century with the era of annihilation. A more hopeful scenario commences with the decade of awareness and proceeds through the decade of mobilization, the decade of transformation, and culminates in the era of world harmony in the twenty-first century.

Although social scientists are not yet in a position to assert complete predictability in social forecasting and although any observer can probably cite evidence to support either a pessimistic or an optimistic forecast, a sensitive reader will not wish to dismiss Falk's apocalyptic scenario.

The book is disappointing because of the author's inadequate treatment of the appropriate responses to population pressure as one of the causes for planetary crisis. Indeed one might argue that the problems of population growth must be resolved before the other manifestations of the planetary crisis can be contained. Whereas Falk is articulate and persuasive in developing alternative structures for systems of world order and comprehensive in his analysis of the inadequacies of the present state system, he appears to back away from a sensitive discussion of alternatives to reduce the population pressures.

It is clear that Falk considers population pressure to be one of the causes of the planetary crisis, but he is ambiguous on the magnitude of the problem. At one point he appears to suggest that the optimal planetary population is 1.0 billion (p. 104); he subsequently suggests that an agreed optimum population would be between .5 and 1.0 billion (p. 304). He later concludes that it is premature to select a figure "—say 2 billion" as an ideal figure for planetary population (p. 402). Notwithstanding the ambiguity about the size of the optimal planetary population, it is clear that the author considers the present planetary population of 3.6 billion to be a substantial threat to planetary survival. If the present population is excessive, how is it to be reduced? Falk equivocates. He rejects extreme measures such as mandatory sterilization of certain social classes or ethnic groups or the insertion of contraceptive chemicals in water supplies; but he acknowledges the inadequacy of voluntary approaches to family planning. Effective nonvoluntary population controls would appear to be doubtful in the light of the author's insistance that the world-order system be " . . . willing and able to uphold personal rights of conscience and autonomy and group rights of assembly and cultural assertion" (p. 306).

Apart from some general humanitarian concerns, Falk's generally sensitive weaving of moral, legal, and political threads is not applied specifically to population pressures. Indeed one can suggest that it would be constructive if Falk began to think about the unthinkable. In doing so, he need not adopt the excesses that he observes among the nuclear strategists:

> One of the distinguishing characteristics of the nuclear age has been the production in the United States of a generation of cold-blooded civilian war-thinkers, the best of whom set forth with clarity, ingenuity, and uncompromising rigor the strategic implications of nuclear weapons, and proclaim on their own behalf the virtues of "thinking about the unthinkable." One notices that these nuclear strategists seem to attack their subject matter with such relish that it seems fair to suspect the presence of a rather unusually large appetite for exploring these particular regions of unthinkability that fill their more squeamish colleagues with disgust (p. 259).

If the planetary crisis is as acute as Falk proclaims, and if one of the causes is population pressure, someone must set forth " . . . with clarity, ingenuity, and uncompromising rigor . . . " effective measures to accomplish the optimum population level. It is disappointing that Falk appears to be satisfied with outlining the difficulties of the problem. Unless he and others with similar humanitarian values engage in such thinking, strategists with " . . . a rather unusually large appetite for exploring these particular regions of unthinkability . . . " (p. 259) may dominate the discussion to the detriment of the fundamental values he seeks to promote.

Although Falk does not explicitly address his academic colleagues, his book is a call to social scientists to use their skills to respond to the fundamental problems of human survival. He invites us to disagree with his articulation of the appropriate responses to the planetary crisis, but he will not let us ignore the problems.

DON C. PIPER

*University of Maryland*

**Nongovernmental Forces and World Politics: A Study of Business, Labor, and Political Groups.** By Werner J. Feld. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. Pp. 306. $16.50.)

There are few issues of greater controversy in the study of international politics today than the impact of interdependence on the international system and about the growth and consequences of nongovernmental and transnational forces. Werner Feld has provided a useful survey of evidence concerning the major empirical issues associated with these questions and a systematic but also somewhat problematic discussion of the consequences of these forces for both the international system and international relations theory.

Professor Feld's survey of nongovernmental forces is both broad in scope and rich in detail. In addition to the usual discussion of multinational business enterprises (MNE's)—their growth, investment activities and political consequences—Feld has included a survey of the transnational activities of organized labor, traditional nongovernmental organizations, and a variety of other groupings, from political parties to foundations, churches and even national liberation movements.

While his discussion of multinational business enterprises draws heavily upon his earlier analysis in *Transnational Business Collaboration Among Common Market Countries* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), it is a good deal broader and highly lucid. Professor Feld has sensibly divided his discussion under three rubrics and has devoted a chapter to each: transnational initiatives, transnational effects and consequences, and transnational business collaboration. The extensiveness of the discussion of MNE's is undoubtedly warranted in a study of such wide scope, given the relative role business enterprises play in all transnational activities.

The chapters on the activities of organized labor and on miscellaneous political groupings are weaker than are those on MNE's, both in the data the author has provided and in the sophistication of the analysis. But in both instances, Feld is able to draw far less upon the work of others, since scholarly writings on the transnational activities of these entities remain relatively undeveloped. The analysis of NGO's is far more satisfactory in both respects, and the synthesis the author has provided is consistently good.

In summary, the empirical chapters of the book are lucidly written and should provide students with graphic illustrations of the rise of nongovernmental factors in world politics, particularly during the twentieth century, as well as with differences among the growth rates of various transnational entities. While Professor Feld might have attempted some rudimentary cross-tabulations and statistical summaries of his data, his synthesis of findings of others, together with the data he has gathered or generated himself, will enable other researchers, more concerned with data analysis, to investigate systematically a wide variety of questions.

The theoretical chapters of the study and the theoretical discussions within some of the chapters are far less satisfactory. Professor Feld has in fact raised a number of questions that go to the heart of debates concerning transnational activities. He has tried to answer questions, for example, about how extensive and effective nongovernmental structures and their capabilities are, about how much these factors ought to modify more traditional conceptualizations of the international system, and about whether they represent a new pluralism in international society that can strengthen functionalist forces and undermine the authority of nation-states. But the tentativeness of his answers to each of these questions reflects, in part, the weaknesses of Feld's own theoretical perspective as outlined in the introductory chapter. It also reflects his failure to come to grips with the now large body of theoretical literature on transnationalism.

The theoretical analysis in the book is based in part on a modified input-output model of the international system, but the reader is never told whether this system and its subsystems are concrete or analytical structures, or what differentiates political activities (or political consequences) from nonpolitical ones. Since a good deal of the discussion in the book is concerned with evaluating the consequences of nongovernmental activities on international politics, it ought to have elaborated a coherent set of criteria for distinguishing benefits and costs, especially when both are likely to be present in a variety of referent areas at all times; but here, too, Mr. Feld's discussion is weak.

More significant is Feld's avoidance of theoretical writings that have already attempted to put empirical findings like those he has presented in a more general framework. Had he looked, for example, at some of the hypotheses concerning the growth and effects of international interdependence on governmental autonomy, or at the question of whether transnationalism and nationalism work at cross-purposes or symbiotically, he might well have been able to make a more fundamental theoretical contribution. It would have been worthwhile had he simply tested the validity of some of these hypotheses, which stem from a broad-base of writings, including neo-Marxist scholarship on "dependence" and more positivist writings on asymmetrical international relationships.

Professor Feld's discussion of nongovernmental forces is, in the end, probably too proximate to have permitted an abstract theoretical presentation. As a consequence, however, he has been able to write a sensible survey of these forces, and to provide a synthesis of studies and data which should be of use to students and fellow scholars.

EDWARD L. MORSE

*Princeton University*

**European Security and the Atlantic System.** Edited by William T. R. Fox and Warner R. Schilling. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973. Pp. 276. $10.00.)

This is a difficult book to evaluate. For one thing, it is a predecessor of, and companion piece to, another book, *American Arms and a Changing Europe: Dilemmas of Deterrence and Disarmament*, and thus should be judged as part of a whole. For another; it was written in 1969 so that, as the editors say in their preface, "history has eaten its way into this collection of essays . . . ." Finally—and most importantly—these essays do not take the same approach, in that two of them look at alternative European futures, two assess policy options of their own devising, two are historical treatments, and one attempts to combine historical analysis with forecasting.

The first two (by Klaus Knorr on "Economic Factors in Future Arrangements for European Security" and by Victor Basiuk on "Future Technology and Western European Security") are perhaps the most interesting, because each attempts to determine whether current trends will either limit the possibility of achieving certain options (such as a more united Europe) or impel Europeans in that direction. To such questions Professor Knorr answers "No," on the ground that economic factors are neither compelling nor limiting. Dr. Basiuk, however, views technological developments as so crucial that policies with respect to technological innovation and application can either make or break Western Europe, with a continuation of nationally based efforts leaving it weak, noncompetitive, reduced to providing services such as tourism, and politically vulnerable to Soviet influence, whereas political unity and an integrated effort would enable Western Europe, by the mid-1990s, to "catch up with and perhaps even exceed the United States as the foremost technological power" (p. 62).

The essay by Wilfred Kohl on "France and European Security: de Gaulle and After" is, as we might expect, scholarly and penetrating, but it is neither new nor forward-looking. The same may be said of the chapter by Annette Baker Fox on "Domestic Pressures in North America to Withdraw Forces from Europe," with the saving grace that it does cover Canadian problems and policies, as well as those of the United States. And although the chapter by Catherine M. Kelleher and Donald J. Puchala on "Germany, European Security, and Arms Control" does look at future developments in Central and Eastern Europe, and at the possibilities of a *rapprochement* between East and West, the authors take so narrow a view of what is acceptable to the major actors that their 1969 predictions seem somewhat wide of present realities, as in the conclusion on p. 159 that a continuation of East-West tensions would be more appealing to the West than formal recognition of the *status quo* in Central Europe.

The chapter by Andrew J. Pierre on "Britain and European Security: Issues and Choices for the 1970s" suffers somewhat from being written before British entry into the EEC; nevertheless, his analysis of options open to that country both forecasts and justifies that choice. Professor Fox, in her continuing essay on "NATO and the American Nuclear Deterrent," does not so clearly justify choices, partly because she attempts to cover thirteen alternative policies, and hence cannot do justice to even the more likely ones, and partly because she makes assumptions and assertions (such as that on p. 244 concerning the link between strong conventional forces and the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee) which render suspect some of the alternatives she does choose. One can only wish that this capable and experienced analyst had been given more space, a lesser scope, or both.

To repeat, this book is hard to evaluate. It is probably of little use to professionals in the field of European security, and so uneven and so dated as to have comparatively little value to professionals in other fields. It does, however, incorporate a good deal of material, offer several new perspectives (as on the importance of technological factors), and generally illuminate the problems confronting the West Europeans—and the Americans—as they move, in President Nixon's phrase, from an era of confrontation to one of cooperation. On these bases, it could be helpful to beginners in the field, and useful in specialized college courses. For these purposes, I recommend it.

J. I. COFFEY

*The University of Pittsburgh*

**Nationalism and the International System.** By F. H. Hinsley. (Dobbs Ferry, N. Y.: Oceana Publications Inc., 1973. Pp. 192. $7.50.)

Professor F. H. Hinsley is one of the handful of contemporary scholars whose work bridges the gap between the theory of international politics and international history. Those who seek to contribute to the former are seldom steeped, as Professor Hinsley is, in the history of diplomacy; and those who contribute to the latter are generally afraid of asking theoretical questions.

The latest book contains a section on nationalism, a section on the international system, and a short section linking the two—"Nationalism and Internationalism in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century." The value of the book lies in its parts rather than its effect as a whole. The essays on nationalism and on the international system are penetrating analyses, each of which can be read as a self-contained study; but it is less clear that Professor Hinsley has succeeded in relating the one to the other in an integrated thesis. His earlier, major study—*Power and the Pursuit of Peace* (1963), I should argue, had the same quality of being impressive in its parts but unsatisfying as a whole.

Nationalism, Professor Hinsley takes to be "that state of mind in which the political loyalty is felt to be owed to the nation" (p. 19). Nations as ethnic or cultural groups, he contends, are primordial; but nationalism occurs only when the political loyalty comes to be mobilized by the nation rather than by some other group such as the clan, the tribe, the city-state or the empire. Professor Hinsley traces the development of political loyalty to the national stage, arguing that the emergence of the state, which is a necessary condition of the appearance of nationalism, is not a sufficient condition; that is, before the political loyalty is attached to the nation, there has to be a process of mutual interaction between the state and the cultural or ethnic nation. He goes on to give his own version of the distinction between the "state-nations" that emerged in western Europe from the 14th to the 16th centuries, and the "culture-nations" that emerged in the 18th and 19th centuries in northern Europe—emphasizing that the latter, whose prophets were Herder and Fichte, not Locke and Rousseau, were not the outcome of the democratic revolutions in France and America, but were essentially opposed to them.

In his account of the international system Professor Hinsley presents once again his view, first put forward in *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*, that the modern international system began in the 18th century. In the latter work he places his emphasis on the demise, after the defeat of Louis XIV, of the idea of a hegemonial power; here he mentions the new conception of Europe as a system of independent but interlocked states, the experience of an equilibrium of power, the rise of the idea that an equilibrium of power should be preserved, and Vattel's formulation of international law.

Here as in the earlier work Professor Hinsley fails to substantiate his position by formulating it carefully and critically and relating it to that of other authorities in the field. It is, after all, widely held by some that the modern international system should be dated from 1648, and by others that it began in 1494. What is needed here is a critical discussion of the different meanings of the concept of the international system and an examination of the arguments in favor of each theory of its origins.

The discussion which Professor Hinsley goes on to provide of the collapse of the modern international system in the two world wars and the search for peace in the first half of the twentieth century, while it contains many perceptive points, is marked also by this tendency to be dogmatic and oracular. His view, for example, that "the independent state is not becoming obsolete or impotent" (p. 145) is one which may well be correct, but it is not argued carefully in relation to the works of those who hold a contrary view. Professor Hinsley's tendency to present his often stimulating views without any apparent awareness of the complexity of the issues or the existence of other works dealing with the issue in hand has always seemed to me to be a consequence of his working in isolation in the intellectually provincial atmosphere (in this field at least) of the University of Cambridge.

Where this book is least satisfying is in relating nationalism and the international system to one another. The discussion of the latter centers essentially on the relations not of nations or nationalisms but of states. Professor Hinsley does not discuss how nationalism has affected the international system, nor does he take up the question, broached in the introduction, as to whether the First World War arose out of nationalism or the conflicting interests of great powers. The question raised on p. 63 about the relation between nationalism and internationalism, a term that is not defined, is also left hanging in the air.

HEDLEY BULL

*The Australian National University, Canberra*

**Hundred Day War: The Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua University.** By William Hinton. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972. Pp. 288. $7.95.)

William Hinton, a journalist who has been a frequent visitor to and long-term sympathizer of the People's Republic of China, has written a detailed and useful account of the Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua University, China's famous institute of science and engineering. While Hinton offers little insight into the political and ideological origins of the Cultural Revolution, the reader familiar with China's latest mass movement can discern for himself the relationship between the campus activity and that in the rest of China.

Rather Hinton sees as his objectives: (1) the exposure of the "old, revisionist education" in China and (2) by way of lengthy interviews with students, faculty, administrators, and Workers Propaganda Teams, the story of how "right" and "left" political lines developed in the mass movement, in particular how an "ultra-left" line emerged, dominated the field for a time, and then was defeated. He is more successful accomplishing his second aim as his treatment of educational reforms in China is sketchy and superficial.

Hinton tells us how in June of 1966 a Work Team sent by Liu Shao-ch'i attempted to curb the student rebellion at Tsinghua that was sparked by the big character poster written by Nieh Yuan-tzu of Peking University. Despite the efforts of the Work Team, including Liu Shao-ch'i's wife, the radical student leader Kuai Ta-fu was able to mobilize the students. At this time Kuai's opposition to the Work Team was considered "positive and progressive" and he became a hero to the left not only at Tsinghua but throughout the country. Because Liu Shao-chi'i's prestige was committed at Tsinghua, it became a focal point for the struggle.

August, according to Hinton, was the beginning of a very confused period, with the rebellious students dividing into two groups: the left 8-8s and the loyal 8-9s. He notes that many students joined neither side, that the bulk of the college population of 40,000 tended to be drawn in during the high tide of the movement, and that only a few hundred participated in the violent phase. By spring of 1967 the lines were again divided by the issue of how to treat the old cadres: Kuai Ta-fu and his hard-core Chingkangshan rebels rejected the old cadres, while the old 8-9s were prepared to rehabilitate them. Kuai's group became known as the Regiment, while the opposition was now called the 4s. As Hinton points out, this factional split at Tsinghua was by no means unique; in general in the course of the two-line struggle in China, the movement tended to split into an unprincipled rivalry for power between factional leaders.

In the summer of 1967 Tsinghua students took part in the mass demonstrations in Peking. Hinton tells us how the Wuhan incident, which saw local military leaders challenging the center, triggered a campaign to "pull out a handful from the PLA," with students pitting themselves against the Army. Factionalism on the campus became characterized by increasing violence which continued to escalate throughout the second half of 1967, breaking into open warfare in April 1968. Hinton vividly describes this warfare on the campus, its strategy and tactics, the indiscriminate killing of students, and the abortive attempts at negotiation. The fighting was only ended with the intervention of the workers on July 26, 1968. After the suppression of violence at Tsinghua the Workers Propaganda Team attempted to persuade the students to form a big alliance of workers, cadres and PLA personnel. It took a year of intensive political work to convince the factional leaders to come together. Meanwhile, the Propaganda Team stayed on at Tsinghua to supervise the transformation of education. A new Party Committee was set up in January 1970. Interestingly, as Hinton points out, many of the old cadres who had been earlier "set aside" were given leadership posts in the Party Committee. As for Kuai, he was the target of mass meetings and while an "honest rebel" in 1966, he was accused of having moved in the course of the struggle from ultra-left to counterrevolutionary.

Hinton's sections on educational reform at Tsinghua are not particularly useful. The color and vividness that characterize his chapters on the growing factionalism and warfare are missing in his treatment of more mundane subjects. While Hinton gives a detailed picture of factionalism on the campus, he makes little effort to relate developments there to those in the remainder of the country. Where some attempt is made to do so, as in the case of the Wuhan incident and the struggle with the PLA, the result is still inadequate. Nor does Hinton attempt to evaluate the role of the Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua in the overall context of the period. What did the years of contention accomplish at the University? What type of educational reform emerged at the University? In sum, the major weakness of the book is Hinton's failure to make any attempt at analysis. Nevertheless, this lack of analytical insight does not mar the value of the book taken as pure description.

ALICE LANGLEY HSIEH

*McLean, Virginia*

**The Price of International Justice.** By Philip C. Jessup. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971. Pp. 82. $5.95.)

The author of these three lectures, which were given at Columbia University in 1970, is an amazing figure in international law and diplomacy. He served for nine years as the American judge on the International Court of Justice at The Hague. He has been a professor of international law at Columbia. He has been this government's representative to both the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations. He has served as an attorney for several nations in their various international lawsuits. He has written several books and numerous articles and was responsible for the idea of "transnational law" as law that extends across national boundaries even though it might not technically fit into the rubric "international law."

The book under review reads briskly. But in this transcript of Judge Jessup's lectures very little of the author comes through. The author spends most of his time summarizing the researches of others. His choice of cases seems haphazard, reflecting some of the cases he has been familiar with professionally over the years but without the imprint of his own participation. The basic theme is that international society has to take care of little disputes so that they do not grow into big disputes. Unfortunately, he says, the world only notices the disasters; it gives little credit to the people who keep small disputes small.

Do little disputes invariably grow into big ones if left unattended? Or, what percentage of them do? Or, what type? There are some small disputes that resemble in many particulars other past small disputes that grew into big ones. If we detail the resemblances enough, we might be able to judge that the successful management of the small disputes should be praised.

Judge Jessup's lack of methodology makes it hard to figure out whether the small disputes he selected—a fight between Cambodia and Thailand over who owned a border temple (resolved in the International Court of Justice), a boundary dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras, U.S. claims against England after the Civil War regarding the outfitting in British ports of Confederate vessels, etc.—would ever have grown into full-scale wars, or, if they had, wars among which powers? Perhaps in the days when wars were fought at the drop of a hat, a border dispute between two medieval powers would also have led to war. But these days, who knows? Maybe some small territorial disputes are inherently incapable of becoming a war because both nations, in advance of any public dispute, know that the matter is not worth a war. Factor and regression analysis of hundreds of small disputes that either grew into big ones or stayed small is the minimum we might expect before we could cope with the question of the price of international peace and justice. Judge Jessup has only given us a half-dozen cases and has not asked the same questions of each one.

But perhaps his cases illuminate recurrent issues in international law, viewing international law itself as a way of keeping the international peace. Alas, real-estate disputes are probably the least generalizable class of any cases in international law. They typically turn on maps and the authenticity of maps, questions which are necessarily different depending upon the real estate in question. It is very hard to draw any conclusions from such cases.

Hence Judge Jessup's book fails to live up to the promise of its title and, one might add, the reputation of its author. Judge Jessup's talents perhaps do not lie in the systematic analysis of small cases and the search for recurrent factors. In selecting such a topic for his lectures, the author spent his time on an area of theory that was not productive for the reader. In my opinion he might have tried the opposite extreme. Instead of searching for regularities among cases, Judge Jessup might have searched his own thought processes with respect to any one or more international negotiations in which he was involved. His own experience is a very valuable resource. The more he can tell us about himself and his own goals and negotiation procedures, the more we will learn about international peace and justice from the standpoint of a major actor in that area. I hope that Judge Jessup will favor us with lectures or a book along these lines someday.

Anthony D'Amato
*Northwestern University School of Law*

**Conflict of International Obligations and State Interests.** By Jung-Gun Kim and John M. Howell. (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972. Pp. 135. 21 guilders.)

In this book Professors Kim and Howell attempt to examine the conflict between the international obligations of states and their national interests. An assumption on which the book is based is that, since the end of World War II, international organizations have claimed more and more activities, issues, and problems as their legitimate concerns, as states have correspondingly sought to circumvent these obligations. The bulk of the book is concerned with identifying these major modes of circumvention and illustrating them through case studies.

The authors state in the preface that a major purpose of their work is to provide a systematic framework for the study of the " . . . prolonged disregard of international obligations during a time in which international organizations are increasing in numbers and functions" (Preface, unnumbered page). In their effort to fulfill this goal the authors identify three categories of circumvention: avoidance, noncompliance, and defiance. After three essentially introductory chapters, the remainder of the book illustrates each of these categories.

The authors have selected their cases from widely different substantive and geographic areas including the Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees, the South African apartheid cases, the Congo crises, France's withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Connally reservation, to mention just a few. While the subject matter shifts, a coherent conceptual focus persists throughout the book.

If by "framework" the authors mean nothing more than a set of categories then they have achieved their goal. But if a framework means not only categories but some hypothesized relations among them the conclusion must be different. What Professors Kim and Howell have done essentially is to examine the behavior of states with respect to the norms of international organizations and to assert that diverse behaviors are alike in that they are instances of avoidance, noncompliance, and defiance. This identification of raw events as special cases of some more abstract concept is part of the mapping function that is central to subsequent theory construction. Unfortunately the authors develop these three categories *in vacuo* and do not attempt to relate them to additional variables, so that we are not helped in the further task of theory construction—i.e., explanations and relations between variables.

At times the authors do provide us with explanations of why a particular state circumvents its obligations and why it might adopt a particular form of noncompliance. But when this is done (e.g., Israeli rejection of Security Council decision, p. 5) it is done in an ad-hoc way with the explanations so laced with specific and proper names as to render them unsatisfactory as general explanations.

Another difficulty is that the problem of identifying noncompliance is the same as the problem of identifying deviant behavior. "Deviant" means departing from some norm that is generally given by some established structure. Defining what is deviant may be valid when the society in question represents a consensual system with a fairly unequivocal power structure. But when applied to a global system still divided on fundamentals—race, wealth, culture, power—the labeling of deviance may disguise a provincial viewpoint as a universal one. These authors are sensitive to this danger and try to avoid it even though it is to some extent inescapable in their approach. For what, after all, constitutes "... a general statement of the norms of international organizations" as the authors say in the preface? International organizations are loose coalitions of states with divergent goals and resources. If you are outside the dominant coalition, as the Soviet Union is on the Security Council, you are likely to be deviant. We should not think that international organizations speak in tones that are either neutral, universal, or univocal.

James A. Caporaso

*Northwestern University*

**Japan in World Politics.** Edited by Young C. Kim. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Asian Studies, 1972. Pp. 114. $3.00, paper.)

This book is a collection of scholarly but readable essays containing the essential facts about Japanese foreign policy and its formulation from the end of World War II to 1972. Frank Langdon succinctly describes the foreign policy-making process in Japan, which is dominated by the Prime Minister, who is normally the leader of the pro-American, business-oriented Liberal-Democratic (conservative) Party. A principal topic of debate within the ruling party has been relations with the two Chinas. One group advocates close ties with Peking to the exclusion of Taipei, the other group would prefer a more pro-American orientation and continued ties with Taipei, even after the diplomatic recognition of the Peking regime (which occurred after the book under review was published).

Shigeo Sugiyama writes on Japan's dispute with the Soviet Union over the Kurile, Habomai, and Shikotan Islands. Although the two countries signed a peace declaration and regularized diplomatic relations in 1956 (eighteen years ago), they have been unable to sign a World War II peace treaty because of the territorial controversy. Sugiyama presents the legal arguments supporting the Japanese demands and stresses that the leftist opposition parties are just as concerned about this issue as is the conservative party.

Young C. Kim discusses the constitutional, diplomatic, and military aspects of Japan's security policy. There has long been a debate as to the scope of the renunciation of armaments and war contained in Article 9 of the Constitution. While few assert that Japan has given up the *right* of self-defense in the Constitution, a preponderance of scholarly opinion holds that Japan may not maintain land, sea, and air forces for the *purpose* of defense. Thus Japan's present Defense Forces, which today rank about eleventh among the world's armed forces, are widely alleged to be unconstitutional. In 1973 (a year after the publication of this book) the Sapporo District Court formally declared the Defense Forces unconstitutional. The government is appealing this sensational ruling to the Sapporo High Court, which may reverse it. The government admits that Article 9 imposes limits on the equipment and movement of the Self-Defense Forces, but the nature and extent of these are the subject of much controversy. For example, how do you distinguish between defensive weapons, which are allegedly permissible, and offensive weapons, which are not? May the Self-Defense Forces be sent abroad to participate in United Nations peace-keeping activities? Legal and moral issues seem to take priority in the minds of many people over strategic considerations. Although somewhat outdated as the result of the Sapporo Court decision, Professor Kim's treatment is the clearest thing I have seen in English on this complex topic.

Mildred C. Vreeland writes on Communist Chinese perceptions of, and policies toward, Japan from 1965 to 1968, relying heavily on *People's Daily* and *Peking Review*. In 1966, Chinese leaders, after suffering severe setbacks in Africa and Southeast Asia, feared military invasion by the United States. Extremely distrustful of the Soviet revisionists, the Chinese Communists broke relations with the Japanese Communists, who advocated united Sino-Soviet action against American imperialism in Vietnam. The Cultural Revolution immobilized Chinese foreign policy, Vreeland concludes. Since this chapter was written, however, Communist Chinese policy towards Japan has drastically changed, with the establishment of diplomatic relations between Peking and Tokyo in 1972.

Sung Yoon Cho discusses South Korean attitudes towards Japan as reflected in the making of the 1965 Normalization Treaty between the two countries. He is correct in emphasizing that the Japanese government regarded the treaty as contributing to the political and economic stability of South Korea, as strengthening international stability in East Asia, and as stimulating economic cooperation, while, on the other hand, the South Korean government viewed the pact as strengthening the Free World front against South Korea's formidable Communist neighbors.

Since this book was published, Eisaku Sato, who had been Prime Minister since 1964, was replaced by Kakuei Tanaka, who visited Peking in 1972 and established diplomatic relations with Communist China. The oil crisis which struck Japan and the rest of the world late in 1973 (Japan was dependent on the Middle East for 80 per cent of her energy) rudely awakened the Japanese to the extreme vulnerability of their economy to external pressures. The modish theory that the U.S.-Soviet bipolar world order is being replaced by multipolar power structure in which Japan would be an equal member of a five-power system (U.S., U.S.S.R., West Europe, China, and Japan) must now be seriously questioned.

This volume might have been strengthened by a concluding chapter which would have explained the interrelations among the preceding chapters and suggested their implications for the future of Japan's foreign policy. Although fairly short, this book presents in a concise, well-balanced way the principal facts and issues relevant to the formulation and substance of Japan's foreign policy.

THEODORE MCNELLY
*University of Maryland, College Park*

**SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970s.** Edited by William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973. Pp. 447. $11.95.)

This book is a collection of essays which were originally presented at the Fifth International Arms Control Symposium held in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in October 1971. Like most such collections, the book is uneven, repetitious, and lacking in continuity. More important, the usefulness of the book suffers because the Strategic Arms Limitations agreements were signed on May 26, 1972, long after all but one of the essays were prepared. In an attempt to remedy this shortcoming the co-editors added an evaluation of the agreements in the form of a concluding chapter. Since they had the benefit of viewing later SALT developments and the collective contribution of the symposium participants, their essay is more relevant to current strategic arms control issues.

The authors of this concluding essay either do not recognize or refuse to acknowledge the significance of the permanent accord which limits antiballistic missile deployments to 200 missiles and bans the development of mobile ABM systems and the transfer of ABMs to other countries. The ABM Treaty thus removed the greatest threat to each side's strategic deterrent—the proliferation of antiballistic missiles. As a result, the United States was able to forego the full-scale deployment of the ABM system, and thus eliminated a drain on its technical and economic resources, measured in tens of billions of dollars. Also, the codification of mutual vulnerability implicit in the permanent ABM Treaty makes it possible for both sides to consider reductions in offensive forces in the follow-on negotiations since the assured absence of ABMs greatly reduces the number of delivery vehicles and warheads required for the retaliatory mission and for other military tasks.

The editors' perception of the Interim Agreement as highly advantageous to the Soviet Union is typical of the simplistic thinking that emphasizes the significance of disparities in numbers of offensive missiles ignoring the more important complexities and asymmetries in technology, other nuclear forces, geography, and even bureaucracy.

Most serious strategic analysts conclude that the Soviet advantage in the number and size of its ICBMs is more than offset by the U.S. technological lead in such diverse areas as re-entry vehicles, missile accuracy, intelligence collection systems, and antisubmarine warfare; by superiority in numbers of bombers and warheads; by the forward basing of Polaris submarines and nuclear capable tactical aircraft; and by superior technical and military management. In any event, the strategic balance between the two superpowers is a stable one, and each side has more than sufficient strategic capability. Paradoxically, many who argue that the United States should bargain from strength also unduly denigrate its strategic capability, thus adversely affecting the perceptions of both our allies, and of our opponents at the negotiating table.

Many of the remaining essays in the collection, however, have merits of their own and are useful for establishing a solid background for understanding issues in strategic arms control. Thomas Wolfe's assessments of Soviet objectives and options in SALT demonstrates his thorough and sound insights into Soviet military and political affairs. His discussion of several interest groups within the Soviet power structure is of special interest.

J. I. Coffey's treatment of U.S. interests in SALT is a well-balanced analysis of strategic relationships. Robert Bowie adds a brief but well-written treatise in his discussion of the SALT negotiating process. I found particularly valuable the series of essays on the attitudes of other nations toward SALT. The implications of possible outcomes of the negotiations for European nuclear forces is delineated in an excellent study by Geoffrey Kemp and Ian Smart.

On the other hand, a disappointment throughout the book is the presentation of the symposium discussions. They appear to be hastily edited and detract from the scholarly quality of some of the papers from which they were derived.

ALTON H. QUANBECK
*The Brookings Institution*

**Die Stimme Amerikas: Auslandspropaganda der USA unter der Regierung John F. Kennedys.** By Manfred Knapp. (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1972. Pp. 199. DM 30,—.)

This book begins with a recognition that the instruments of foreign policy employed by nations have undergone some significant changes since the Second World War. The functions of the traditional instruments of foreign policy have been expanded or diminished as a result of new necessities. Beyond this, however, nations have developed entirely new instruments of foreign policy which they employ along with the standard diplomatic, economic, and military means in an effort to achieve their present interests and objectives. Dr. Manfred Knapp has analyzed one relatively new instrument of American foreign policy, viz., the official foreign propaganda of the United States.

During the Second World War, Knapp observes, officials in the United States government determined that it was necessary to make a systematic effort to influence foreign peoples. The subsequent development of the Cold War made this appear all the more important. The first years, or developmental phase, of the United States Information Service were difficult and turbulent ones. It was not until the beginning of the Eisenhower administration, in 1953, that this service achieved a relatively independent and permanent existence with the establishment of the United States Information Agency.

Following a brief discussion of the organizational structure and activities of the USIA, Dr. Knapp directs his attention to the role played by the agency during the Kennedy administration. It is Knapp's thesis that there were significant, although not revolutionary, changes in the role of the USIA during the Kennedy years. It was at this time, Knapp argues, that the USIA was *explicitly* assigned the task of *directly* assisting in the formulation and achievement of American foreign policy goals. The decisive evidence cited by Knapp is a memorandum from President Kennedy to the Director of the USIA on January 25, 1963 stating that the mission of the agency "is to help achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives by (a) influencing public attitudes in other nations, and (b) advising the President, his representatives abroad, and the various departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated U.S. policies, programs, and official statements" (p. 56). With this memorandum, Knapp sees a significant departure from the Eisenhower administration's view of the proper role to be played by the USIA. Eisenhower is supposed to have seen the role of the agency as more of an "information" service, while the Kennedy memorandum clearly reveals, nay establishes, the "propaganda" functions of the USIA and admits the agency into the decision-making process of the United States government on matters of foreign policy. Knapp then demonstrates the manner in which the USIA performed this new role in specific parts of the world (e.g., Western and Eastern Europe, Africa, and Latin America), and in special situations (e.g., the Cuban missile crisis, the Berlin Wall, and the race to the moon).

The use of the USIA as an explicit propaganda instrument in American foreign policy points to what the author regards as "the fundamental question" in this study. That question involves the relationship between this foreign-policy instrument and the governmental and social system of the United States. The use of propaganda by a liberal democracy appears to be terribly problematic to Dr. Knapp. He argues that it is not possible to reconcile the straightforward openness and rationality of explanation which he believes to be required by democratic theory, with the activities of the USIA during the Kennedy administration.

It is with this point that the reader might take issue with Dr. Knapp. While most Americans would readily concede that the concept of propaganda has many negative connotations, the use of propaganda does not appear to be manifestly and irreconcilably inconsistent with democratic theory. It is perhaps as much misleading as it is helpful to dichotomize propaganda and information. The selective presentation of facts is not identical with distortion and deception, nor is it necessarily antithetical to the democratic commitment to and dependence upon education and enlightenment.

This revised German doctoral dissertation raises some interesting questions for the student of American foreign policy concerning an instrument of foreign policy about which many Americans feel very uneasy. It concludes with some vague remarks about an allegedly advancing consciousness of mankind and an assertion that this will be the cause of future problems for U.S. foreign propaganda. Dr. Knapp's study, while generally solid, is not likely to find a very large audience in this country. The subject is of relatively limited interest to American political scientists; the price of the book is prohibitive; and it is written in the German language.

ALAN AICHINGER

*Ohio University*

**The Soviet Union in World Affairs: A Documented Analysis, 1964–72.** By W. W. Kulski. (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1973. Pp. 526. $17.50, cloth; $5.95, paper.)

Professor Kulski has set the ambitious goal in this large book of so thoroughly informing his readers about Soviet foreign policy that they "will not be unduly surprised by future Soviet moves on the international chessboard" (p. x). The author attempts to reconstruct the "Soviet viewpoint" of international politics by means of numerous and often very lengthy quotations from Soviet journals—particularly *Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn'* (International Life) and *Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia* (World Economics and International Relations)—the Soviet press, and official statements by Moscow's political leaders. The primary intention here is "to acquaint the reader with Soviet views, not with Western interpretation of these views . . . " (p. ix). The Soviet viewpoint and actual Soviet policies are placed within a framework of international problems. "Hence the reader will find it easier," Kulski hopes, "to relate Soviet views and policies to actual international events and will better understand Soviet initiatives as well as reactions to the moves made by other governments" (p. ix). The reconstruction is comprehensive with discussions of Soviet specialists and Soviet national interests preceding the more substantive chapters on Soviet views of "the nuclear fact," peaceful coexistence including separate sections on Soviet relations with specific "imperialist" states, the Third World (in general and in specific "select areas"), the international Communist movement, the "socialist commonwealth," China, and "the challenging events of 1971–72."

Probably no book should be held accountable for failing to achieve as ambitious a goal as Kulski established for himself in this study. Nevertheless, he might have gotten closer to this aim but for certain fundamental shortcomings. Most important, Kulski seems largely to have ignored the question of the link between the commentators and academicians on the one hand and the policy makers and political leaders on the other. He pays greater attention to the former and justifies this by stating in the Preface that the specialists "have a good knowledge of international issues and *probably* [emphasis added] influence the formulation of policies in their capacity as scholarly advisers" (p. viii). This "probability" is crucial, yet it is never examined or evaluated. There has been a significant trend within the Soviet Union throughout the period under study (1964–1972), and even preceding it to some extent, toward a growing freedom of ideas and research permitted Soviet academicians. William Zimmerman, in particular, in his *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, 1956–1967*, has detailed this evolution and made clear, I think, that Soviet researchers, while hardly autonomous are not necessarily accurate representatives of official attitudes. Kulski indirectly supports this criticism when he refers to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko as twice placing "the official seal of approval on these comments by Soviet writers" (p. 371). What of all the other commentary on which Kulski is basing his study but which has not received an "official seal of approval"? The relationship between academic research and Soviet foreign policy decisions is unclear, the nature of the "flow" of influence dimly perceived. It is an area that deserves further Western research and analysis. Kulski's brief discussion of "Soviet specialists" in Chapter One and his statement that "it is in the interest of Party leaders . . . to hear honest opinions of their own experts" (p. 1) is not an explanation of this subject nor even an adequate recognition of the vital issues involved in it.

The critical question of the divisions within the Soviet leadership on foreign policy issues has also gone almost totally unexamined. However one chooses to analyze these factions and their alignments on various kinds of issues, and even indeed if the analyst seeks to argue their *lack* of significance—enough serious research in recent years has pointed to their existence so that the questions simply cannot be ignored. Particularly if one seeks not to be surprised "by future Soviet moves," he ought to try to see at least the crude outlines of the leadership divisions. The existence and role of these divisions seem particularly significant, for instance, in the cases of the decision-making process in the Kremlin regarding a response to the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and to President Nixon's then-impending visit to Moscow and his escalation in Vietnam in 1972. On items on which there seems to be less evidence at this time—such as relations with China, policy toward the Federal Republic of Germany, Third World objectives and policies (especially the Middle East)—one might also wish for some enlightened speculation by the Western scholar. Nevertheless, although he indirectly suggests internal differences on the question of foreign aid (p. 198), the author never recognizes this problem explicitly.

Finally, I was made somewhat uncomfortable by the overall lack of analysis in the volume, which typically *lists*, rather than *evaluates*, aspects of Soviet behavior. Even more often, long quotations are strung together with too little analytical framework around them. (To go back to the subtitle, there is more "documentation" than "analysis.") What interpretation there is, is often static, as if the author, in describing a particular instance of Soviet policy making, were treating it as immutable Soviet behavior. Except in the last chapter, Kulski rarely treats Moscow's policy and practice as evolving, despite the major shifts and alterations in Soviet foreign policy that have occurred since 1964.

How, then, can the book best be used? Because it is difficult to read (owing especially to the many lengthy quotations) and because it fails to examine the critical issues mentioned above, its use as a text is problematical. The questions it fails to answer limit its usefulness for the specialist as well. Perhaps the study could best serve, although the price of even the paperback might make that somewhat unlikely, as supplementary reading in a course on Soviet foreign policy, a reference source of contemporary Soviet statements on virtually all international issues. The book does manage to take an interesting reading of the state of Soviet policy as of the beginning of the 1970s, and includes valuable data on contemporary Soviet academic thinking and practical policies through mid-1972. Certain of the analytical sections, particularly the overall framework and sensible discussions of the relative weights of ideology and national interests are also useful. Nevertheless, the deficiencies are substantial; clearly, the work that will keep us from being surprised at future Soviet foreign policies remains to be written.

ROBERT C. HORN

*California State University, Northridge*

**Theory and World Politics.** By Robert J. Lieber. (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, 1972. Pp. 166. $3.95.)

Lieber's *Theory and World Politics* is an exceedingly puzzling book. Extremely well written throughout in a direct and nonjargonistic manner, Lieber's first chapter is one of the better introductory discussions of the attributes and values of theory and model building from the perspective of international politics. But the rest of the volume does not seem to take cognizance of the points laid out in Chapter 1. None of the remaining chapters presents anything that even comes close to resembling a theory of international politics. Rather, the remaining chapters—as Lieber even notes in his preface—describe several of the "new approaches" that have been used to discuss and analyze international politics. Thus Chapters 2 through 6 cover, respectively, game theory, integration theory, cybernetics and communication theory, international power and conflict, and systems theory. While each of these chapters presents a concise discussion of the topic under consideration, covering much of the relevant literature in a well integrated and reasonably logical way, it is difficult to see what relationship the chapters bear to one another or to the first chapter beyond the noun "theory" which coincidentally occurs in all but one of the chapter titles.

What I found particularly puzzling was that in most of the chapters the author seems to be aware of the fact that he is not dealing with a theory but rather with concepts, frameworks, and hypotheses. Indeed, there were times when I wondered if the same man was responsible for both the first chapter and the later ones. Thus, Lieber makes some important and sophisticated judgments about each of the areas he considers, and these ideas could have been quite usefully made the underlying theme of the volume and incorporated into the first chapter. For example, Lieber seems to be well aware that both game theory and cybernetics as currently applied in political science have not been used as models for theories. In both instances these two fields have principally contributed a useful vocabulary. Thus we can talk about a "prisoner's dilemma" situation as distinct from a "zero sum" setting, using the terms of game theory, and "feedback" and "control" to designate certain features of dynamic systems using concepts from cybernetics. Lieber also seems to be aware that while game theory and cybernetics have contributed useful concepts, the significance of the integration literature has been mainly in suggesting hypotheses which postulate the necessary and sufficient conditions for integration. Finally, in what is probably the best introductory discussion in the political science literature, Lieber presents an extremely coherent and lucid account of systems theory, demonstrating convincingly that it represents a general approach or philosophical orientation. This distinction, then, between approaches that have contributed a vocabulary as opposed to approaches that have contributed hypotheses and approaches that represent frameworks is an interesting and valuable insight. It is unfortunate that Lieber did not use these ideas to tie the volume together. Indeed, the author might have gone one step further. After making these distinctions he could then have discussed the defining ingredients of a theory and shown in what sense the application of each of these new approaches in political science falls short of producing a theory of international politics. Perhaps he could also have indicated the type of development that would be necessary to make each approach produce a theory of international politics.

Such a general chapter tying together the differences between the "new approaches" and their relationship to formal theory might alleviate another problem that plagues the volume, namely the rationale behind Lieber's choice of these particular "approaches." While the author takes pains in the preface to acknowledge that he has omitted other comparable approaches, he provides no explanation for his particular choices. Had he used the above distinctions between approaches that have contributed: (1) concepts, (2) hypotheses and (3) general orientations, he could have argued that his choice was simply an attempt to illustrate these differences. In a concluding chapter the other approaches, not covered in the volume could have been fitted into this scheme without having to discuss each at any length.

Certainly a summary chapter along the above lines would be preferable to the concluding chapter that the volume now contains. In the last chapter Lieber discusses the traditional/behavioral issue and the usual question of whether we can be scientific in our analysis of international politics. Obviously if such a discussion is to occur it should precede all other chapters: the previous six chapters are all based on the *assumption* that a scientific approach is possible and worthwhile. But it is questionable whether Chapter 7 belongs in the volume at all. The assumption of the inherent value of the scientific approach is so pervasive throughout the entire volume it seems almost redundant to devote a separate chapter to its consideration, particularly as a conclusion.

In addition to these two difficulties there is one other that should be mentioned. As noted earlier, the chapters are generally well written, coherently organized, and insightful. But there is one exception to this: the chapter on power and conflict. This chapter contains two almost unrelated segments, one on the literature attempts to define the concept of power and the other on international conflict and war. While the discussion of the power concept is, like the other chapters, well researched and reviewed, its relationship to the conflict section is totally left to the inferences of the reader. In addition, the section on conflict, perhaps because it is so broad a topic, seems to be rather superficially reviewed. The author principally relies on Waltz's three explanations for war and, while Lieber rather nicely integrates into the Waltz thesis some of the contemporary quantitative research, the total discussion leaves something to be desired. One feels that the extensive literature that exists in this area has not been done full justice, as were comparable literatures covered in the other chapters.

If we overlook these problems, however, we can say that Lieber has contributed a set of perhaps unrelated but nevertheless coherent and readable essays on some of the major contemporary approaches in international politics. The volume represents then not just a textbook, but a set of summaries of significant approaches in the field together with useful insights about their relative importance and contribution.

DINA A. ZINNES

*Indiana University*

**The International Regulation of Civil Wars.** Edited by Evan Luard. (New York: New York University Press, 1972. Pp. 240. $8.95.)

Professor Evan Luard establishes in the first chapter of *The International Regulation of Civil Wars* that since 1945 external intervention in civil wars has become increasingly common and civil wars themselves more frequent. As many as thirty full-scale civil wars are listed for the period 1945–1970, and the list is not complete. The vast majority of the civil wars "emerged fundamentally from the fragile political and economic structure of small, and often relatively new, nations" (p. 15).

Civil wars are most likely to occur in countries with a low standard of living and with a government that is not representative. Intervention by the Great Powers is far more likely to occur on both sides, or not at all. In general, the Great Powers have not provoked civil wars but have usually been drawn into them by the local factions involved. Where there has been intervention it has usually taken the form of "the training and support of revolutionary forces on outside territory" (p. 17), or of the sale of arms to the forces of either side. Only rarely has intervention included active participation in the fighting. The fact that the sale of arms has occurred in almost all of the civil wars since 1945 is of the greatest significance for international relations. Intervention is most likely when the civil war takes place in states that closely adjoin powerful neighbors and intervention by one Great Power is most likely if there has already been intervention by the other.

Civil conflict is certainly a major reason for the increasing disorder so characteristic of modern international affairs. The potential dangers inherent in this situation at a time when the nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the Great Powers are sufficiently powerful to be capable of destroying civilization as we know it, if not all human life on the planet, are obvious. As recent events in the Middle East indicated yet again, intervention by the superpowers can easily escalate to nuclear confrontation, and bring mankind to the brink of disaster, even if these powers do not actually desire this. The significant danger of general nuclear war by miscalculation or by accident or madness, probably at a maximum when the superpowers intervene in the affairs of other countries, can be eliminated only by complete nuclear disarmament. And the task of negotiating a disarmament process, leading to the abolition of weapons of mass destruction at an early stage, is probably easier to accomplish than that of bringing sufficient order into international affairs to reduce the dangers inherent in a heavily nuclear-armed world to an acceptably low level (which most reasonable men would say was zero). Significant disarmament is, however, unlikely to be brought about until the United Nations is seen to have an effective peacekeeping capability. And it is this relationship between disarmament and peacekeeping which makes *The International Regulation of Civil Wars* such a timely study. The value of the book is much enhanced by chapters written by such experienced peacekeeping practitioners as Major-Generals Henry Alexander and Indar Rikhye.

*The International Regulation of Civil Wars* surveys in detail the causes and resolution of a number of major civil wars starting with the first attempt to organize international action in a civil-war situation, namely the Spanish civil war, and then going on to some important post-Second World War civil conflicts—Greece (1944–1949), Lebanon (1958), Laos (1959 on), the Congo (1960–1965), Yemen (1962) and Cyprus (1963 on). A chapter on international law and civil conflicts (by Rosalyn Higgins) admirably brings out some of the ambiguities and uncertainties of international law in this field, and chapters on UN peacekeeping forces in civil war situations and on the control of UN peacekeeping at UN headquarters describe graphically some of the difficulties inherent in the often thankless task of peacekeeping.

A number of important lessons for the future can be learned from the successes and failures of the cases examined. For a UN peacekeeping mission to be effective, the following conditions must be met: its terms of reference must be adequately framed, and its conduct must always be seen to be completely impartial (the Yemen case); the operation must be rapidly mounted at an early stage (the Lebanon case); and the UN should maintain consistent interest in the area over a sustained period of time (the Laos case). Although the UN can never impose a settlement by force in a civil war, UN activity can provide an environment within which other forms of peacekeeping can be effective (the Greek case); it can play a substantial role in bringing law and order to a disturbed region and help to restore reasonable economic and social conditions (the Congo case); and it can provide the conditions necessary to promote discussions between the conflicting parties (the Cyprus case).

In the final chapter, Evan Luard attempts to draw conclusions from past experiences of the international regulation of conflict. He concludes that although the record of the United Nations in dealing with civil-war situations may not be impressive it has achieved really valuable results in each of the cases considered. But the greatest defect in the UN's record is its failure to consider a number of civil war situations at all—for example, those in Nigeria and Vietnam. Apart from the most fundamental roles of peacekeeping and mediation, the UN can perform two other invaluable tasks: the prevention of outside intervention to reduce the scale of the fighting and its international implications; and the provision of objective information relevant to the conflict (fact finding). Some of the principles which should be observed by international organizations (and by countries not directly involved in the conflict) to reduce the dangers arising from civil wars include: the establishment of a set of rules concerning external intervention; the establishment of more objective criteria for determining recognition of governments; and a more consistent respect for the wishes of the people concerned—for example, by offering to supervise elections.

For the sake of world security, the effectiveness of the peacekeeping function of the UN must be increased. To this end, new procedures and rules of conduct are urgently required. *The International Regulation of Civil Wars* provides excellent background material for this task.

FRANK BARNABY

*Stockholm International*
*Peace Research Institute*

**American-East Asian Relations: A Survey.** By Ernest R. May and James C. Thomson, Jr. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972. Pp. 425. $15.00.)

This historiographic study should interest and inform anyone, irrespective of academic discipline, interested in "American-East Asian Relations." It is a successful attempt, by way of seventeen essays, to examine the literature in a field which covers an historical expanse of nearly two centuries (1784 to the 1960s).

The American Historical Association Committee on East-Asian Relations commissioned the study to measure the existing literature in the field against the test of time and determine the areas in need of further study. The survey succeeded in both endeavors.

A general observation which recurs throughout the often disparate essays is that the literature has often been narrow, with a tendency toward justifying and/or rationalizing American policy in East Asia. By concentrating on only the diplomatic aspects of this relationship, a narrow, one-sided and often distorted picture has been drawn. The economic, cultural, and psychological effects of the relationship, particularly as they affected the East Asian nations, were often overlooked.

Edward D. Graham, covering the years from 1784–1839, notes the dearth of studies on this particular period, the heavy concentration on the diplomatic-historical approach, and the scant consideration given to the economic and cultural relationships existing at that time.

John K. Fairbank follows up on this theme in his survey of Sino-American relations during the 1840 to the 1860 period. Highly critical of the preponderance of studies concentrating on the diplomatic aspects, he recommends breaking out of this mold by analyzing other political factors, as well as economic and psychological forces which have also influenced Sino-American relations. Kwang-Ching Liu brings U.S.-China relations up to 1895 in another substantive and comprehensive essay. A major point he makes is that scholars have not adequately examined the role of Americans in China and the Far East during the latter half of the 19th century.

Robert Schwantes's examination of American relations with Japan (1853 to 1895) strongly recommends using both Western and Japanese source materials so that the "two records will illuminate each other" (p. 97). He then very thoroughly documents the resources available for such a comparison both in the United States and Japan.

Marilyn Young, Raymond Esthus, Charles E. Neu, Burton F. Beers and Roger Dingman trace the period from the Open Door Notes to the Washington Treaties. Ms. Young in her brief essay, "The Quest for Empire," concentrates on the theme that historians in general have failed to recognize that American imperialism in Asia, which reached its apogee during the Vietnam War, began during this period.

Akira Iriye presents one of the most comprehensive and thoroughly enlightening essays in his survey of American, Chinese, Japanese, and Russian literature of the period from 1922 to 1931. He continues the theme that historians should broaden their approach and recommends that diplomatic-history should be "diplomatic intellectual-psychological history" (p. 242).

Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr. and Louis Morton cover the decade of the thirties. Morton in his excellent study of the 1937–1941 period examines both the traditional and revisionist positions. He presents a fairly exhaustive list of the archival materials available in the United States and in Japan. He also offers a critical analysis of the materials available and the controversies and questions still unresolved in the study of the pre-Pearl Harbor period.

Very few surveys of American-East Asian relations include a study of the Philippines. But this survey is an exception. Peter Stanley has written a very broad and comprehensive study delineating many of the areas of conflict and controversy between these major and minor Pacific powers.

The Pearl Harbor to the 1960s period is examined in turn by Jim Peck, Robert Halleck, Morton H. Halperin and James C. Thomson, Jr. Jim Peck's "America and the Chinese Revolution 1942 to 1946: An Interpretation" is one of the best essays of this survey. Peck takes into account the cultural, economic, and political factors as well as psychological perceptions and ideological motivations. He raises some of the questions that few historians or political scientists have fully faced. He asks not only what was American policy toward the Chinese Revolution but why was it the way it was? Why did the policy makers in Washington refuse to listen to their men on the scene in China? How did the isms of colonialism, capitalism, imperialism and communism affect American policy? Peck poses sharply the issues involved in this particular relationship. This is a refreshing respite from the often turgid conventional wisdom on the subject. He has not necessarily resolved the problems, but he has at least sought to come to grips with the hard questions.

Robert Dalleck, in a notable essay on the "Truman Era," includes an extensive survey of the literature as well as source material already in the public domain.

Morton Halperin's essay on the Eisenhower years is the weakest in the entire survey. Although he discusses some of the more traditional works for the period, Halperin makes no mention of any unpublished dissertations and cites only three journal articles which discuss American-East Asian relations. He ignores both the Asian side of the relationship and revisionist critiques of the period.

James C. Thomson's "The Nineteen Sixties as History" is much more substantive and analytical than Halperin's essay. He is more thorough, although not exhaustive, in his discussion of literature in the field but, like Halperin, he only considers English language publications.

In conclusion, this study should contribute substantially to a better understanding of the nearly two centuries of American-East Asian relations. It is a must for any history or political science graduate student boning up for an examination on any aspect of American-East Asian relations or seeking a thesis or dissertation topic. It is also a substantial reservoir of both literature in the field and the gaps in that literature, since it contains over 1300 bibliographical sources.

Frank E. Rogers
*Winston-Salem State University*

**Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939.** Second series, Volume XI. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert. (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1970. Pp. 598. $18.00.)

The British Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided the editors of its published interwar archives full freedom of selection and arrangement. The result has been an immensely useful series characterized by careful editorial judgment, broad coverage, and the inclusion of numerous minutes to documents which often prove more revealing than the documents themselves.

Covering Far Eastern affairs from October 1932 to June 1933, when the Tangku truce ended the major phase of the Manchurian Crisis, the present volume's nearly 600 documents delineate the problems faced by Britain as she stood between the still untested collective security system and the potential hostility of Japan. Sir John Simon, the pro-Japanese foreign secretary, was counseled by his advisers when forced to choose between Tokyo and Geneva that Britain's long-run interest required adherence to League of Nations principles (document 155). But Simon, fearing to provoke Japan, resisted and delayed. Contemptuous of China and hostile to the League's most enthusiastic members, he followed a policy which effectively undermined collective security: he would support the League but never lead. "Our role is to act as a loyal member of the League, not as a bell-wether to the others, some of whom will promptly point out to Japan that *they* have not rushed in to condemn" (minute, p. 175). With the Americans outside of Geneva and no other League member powerful enough to threaten Tokyo, his stance stifled any meaningful League response, discouraged American cooperation, and ironically weakened Britain's Far Eastern position. Ultimately faced with total Japanese intransigence, he did the inevitable and concurred in League condemnation of Japan—whereupon the Japanese simply left Geneva without regret (document 465).

Those who have read Christopher Thorne's work on the Far Eastern crisis (*The Limits of Power: the West, the League of Nations, and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931–1933* [London: Hamish Hamilton, 1973]) will find no surprises in this volume. Nevertheless, it contains some invaluable items which no secondary work can do justice to, particularly the analytic memoranda of Sir John Pratt and a forty-page review of Chinese developments from 1926 to 1933 by London's envoy in Peking.

Overall, what is most notable about the documents is the virtual absence of references to League economic or military sanctions against Japan. Even the pro-League members of the foreign office believed that collective security might somehow succeed without invoking sanctions. Ironically, in the only memorandum mentioning the subject, Simon sharply rejected the idea of sanctions while advocating an arms embargo against *both* Japan and China, a policy which he must have realized would mainly punish the victim of aggression (document 342). For China, unlike Japan, imported most of her arms. The volume traces the imposition and failure of this embargo policy. It concludes with the complex negotiations following the Chinese military defeat in Jehol district which resulted in the Tangku truce and clear Japanese hegemony in the northeast provinces.

Gary B. Ostrower
*Alfred University*

**The Asian Alliance: Japan and The United States Policy.** By Franz Michael and Gaston J. Sigur. (New York: National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1972. Pp. 92. $1.00, paper.)

To summarize the recent state of Japanese-American relations within 85 pages of text is a daunting task. The authors of this slender volume, Dr. Franz Michael, who recently retired as director of the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies at George Washington University, and Dr. Gaston Sigur, who succeeded him in the same post, have attempted more than this. Realizing that it would be difficult to convey much of the sense of Japanese foreign-policy making without some general background, they devote nearly half the book to general material about Japanese politics, economic growth, and military structure.

This would be acceptable if the material were presented in an accurate and balanced way, but in several places it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the authors' own grasp of the subject-matter is uncertain. For instance, in discussing factionalism within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, they refer to the factional followings of individual party leaders as "sub-factions" of the "mainstream, nonmainstream' and antimainstream factions." If properly elucidated and qualified, this might be an interesting way of looking at the situation, but stated baldly, it not only flies in the face of normal usage but also conveys a quite misleading impression. Although in the present setup, the Tanaka and Ōhira factions co-operate for the purpose of remaining in control of the party, they surely constitute a coalition of factions rather than a single faction divided into sub-units.

Perpetuating the notion of "Japan, Incorporated," the authors argue that business leaders not only "play a decisive role in the process of selecting a Prime Minister," but also "recommend policies which the Prime Minister and his cabinet would fail to implement at their peril." Both these generalizations, however, may now be seriously doubted. Evidence has accumulated that the Liberal Democratic Party has consolidated its hold on decision making and has become largely independent of the kind of direction from big business which the authors believe to be effective. While there is certainly a broad coincidence of view between government and business leaders, the idea that business controls the government does not stand up to careful scrutiny.

If the authors' judgment about aspects of the governing structure may be questioned, the inaccuracy of some of their information on the Opposition is patent. According to them, the "Socialist Party of Japan" was established "in the early part of this century" (p. 22) and was banned by law in the 1920s and 1930s. In fact the Japan Socialist Party was founded in 1945. A minuscule party of the same name existed briefly at the turn of the century. Various socialist and labor parties operated quite legally in the 1920s and 1930s, although those thought by the authorities to be Marxist were proscribed. Far from being banned, the Social Masses Party achieved considerable parliamentary representation during the 1930s. The authors also imply that the electorate voted the Socialist Party into power in the disturbed situation of 1947, and later shifted its allegiance to the conservatives. In fact, however, the Socialists did better electorally in the late 1950s than in 1947, and it was only the fragmentation of the conservatives in the immediate postwar period that left the way open for the Socialists to take part in a short-lived coalition government.

In discussing the origins of the "peace clause" of the 1947 constitution, the authors omit all reference to the view that it originated with Prime Minister Shidehara. However unlikely this may seem, this is the version subsequently confirmed by General MacArthur, and it is curious simply to ignore it. They also exaggerate the effect of the 1959 Sunakawa case on left-wing thought concerning the "peace clause." It is not the case, as the authors state (p. 56) that with "the Sunakawa decision, determined efforts on the part of the left wing to question the legal basis for rearmament came to an end." These efforts still continue.

The book was completed after Tanaka became Prime Minister, but before the normalization of relations with China and before the Lower House general election of December 1972 in which both Communists and Socialists improved their position. Japan's China policy, the big talking point of the time, is thus given substantial coverage. China is cast as the villain of the piece, attempting to meddle in Japanese internal affairs and subvert the Japan-US alliance. Little is said, however, of the damage done to Japan-US relations by President Nixon's blunt economic announcement of 15th August 1971. The supremely important economic basis of Japan's foreign policy is given short shrift in comparison with China policy, and incredibly, a chapter on "Foreign Trade, Aid and Investment" contains less than four pages. Practically nothing is said about Japan's resources diplomacy, despite its enormous significance.

There is undoubtedly a real need for the kind of introductory survey of Japanese foreign policies that this book aspires to be. Regrettably, however, in this case the aspiration is not matched by achievement.

J. A. A. Stockwin
*Australian National University*

**The U.S.S.R. and the Arabs: The Ideological Dimension, 1917–1972.** By Jaan Pennar. (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1973. Pp. xii, 180. $9.75.)

Although the East-West struggle for influence in the Arab world is usually analyzed in terms of *realpolitik*, Jaan Pennar emphasizes that it also needs to be examined from the perspective of ideological competition. This relatively small volume, therefore, assesses the ideological compatibility between the Arab socialist paths to development (represented by Nasserism, Baathism, and the Algerian National Liberation Front) and the Soviet "noncapitalist" route to modernization.

To accomplish this end, the book is divided into six loosely connected chapters. Professor Pennar begins by defining the concept of the "noncapitalist" path to development and describing the struggle among Soviet theoreticians to gain official support for this route to scientific socialism. In the second chapter, however, he changes course in order to outline the failure of the Arab Communist parties to gain much support. The failure is mainly attributed to the fact that these parties paid little or no attention to growing liberation movements in these nations and, instead, concentrated their appeal on traditional class war doctrines. Consequently, such parties were not well received by the Arab peoples and came more and more under persecution by the nationalist regimes. The apparent implication of this chapter is that the Soviet Union had little choice but to switch support from these parties to other Arab movements if they were to gain any influence in the region.

The heart of Pennar's work is the separate chapters analyzing Nasserism, Baathism, and the Algerian National Liberation Front and their compatibility with the Soviet "noncapitalist" path. These chapters are particularly instructive in explaining the basic tenets of the Arab ideologies and for describing the changes in Soviet attitude and policy toward these movements. The sixth and final chapter summarizes the findings: the Soviet Union can support (and has supported) these Arab ideologies (although they are less than the "noncapitalist" path) because they have the potential for conversion to scientific socialism. Pennar correctly points out, however, that a number of obstacles impedes this conversion to Marxism and hinders the development of a true Soviet "noncapitalist" path in the Middle East. These obstacles are the importance of the Islamic religion, the strong sense of nationalism, the presence of military leadership, and the emerging "bureaucratic bourgeoisie." As a result, Soviet hopes for further ideological inroads among the Arabs are likely to be slow at best.

On balance, the author does a credible job of describing the noncapitalist path and cataloging the development of the Arab ideologies. Pennar obviously has a sound grasp of the subject matter. Moreover, the book is fairly well documented with heavy reliance placed on official statements of Soviet and Arab leaders. For those interested in more rigorous systematic analysis, however, this volume provides very little.

The main problem is that it is too loosely organized. The chapters do not form a unified whole; rather, they tend to be discrete units with little transition from one to the other. Only in the last chapter does the author attempt to tie them together. At this juncture, he is quite successful. But if this effort had been put forth much earlier, the unity of the book would have been better served.

Students of Soviet and Middle East politics will undoutedly find this work useful. Since efforts at analyzing the ideological similarity between the principal Arab movements and Soviet doctrines have received little attention, this book fills a void in our understanding of Arab-Soviet relations.

James M. McCormick
*The University of Toledo*

**The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics, 1919–1969.** Edited by Brian Porter. (London: Oxford University Press, 1972. Pp. 390. $17.75.)

The present volume consists mainly of the papers submitted to a conference held in December 1969 at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the foundation of its chair of International Relations, the first such post in the United Kingdom. The object was to chronicle the history of the department at Aberystwyth as a contribution to intellectual history, to look at changes in the study of the subject both in respect of content and of method, and to survey the broad trends of international life over the period in question. Many distinguished authors, mainly but not exclusively British, obviously gave much thought to their papers, and the result is a work of much greater distinction and weight than is usually the case with collections of conference papers.

The most striking thing about the volume in general is perhaps the fact that its two main sections—the essays on international relations as an academic subject and the surveys of the period—hang so poorly together. It could be that the very seniority of most of the contributors to the latter part of the book has made them refractory to the new methodologies and their vocabulary; they grew up intellectually before the fashions were launched: three are in their seventies and none by my reckoning under fifty now. But the reason may also be that all the fuss and fury that have gone into the new methodologies have produced very little that actually illuminates the real world with which international statesmen have to deal and within which we have to live.

It is true that Mr. William C. Olson, one of the two American contributors treats the development of the subject under the title: "The Growth of a Discipline" and does go into it with the thoroughness one would expect; yet even he comes up at the end with a very pertinent question: "Is there not a danger now that instead of being a window through which the world may be seen more clearly the new approaches may be something more like a looking-glass in which we see only ourselves deeply engaged in methodological and theoretical controversies which become less and less intelligible to those who determine the policies on whose wisdom survival depends?" (p. 29). Nor is Professor Hedley Bull much less sceptical in his chapter, "The Theory of International Politics, 1919–1969," as when he talks of more than one brand of behaviorism as "sunk in the provincial barbarism of preoccupation with the present" (p. 66).

It would appear that all the attempts at model-making derived from a statistical analysis of the behavior of states cannot overcome the problems set by the small number of instances available, and by the changing nature of the states themselves and of the successive international constellations of which they form part. What has given the subject new vitality is not the development of theory—though this has some role of course in the discussion of certain strategical aspects of interstate relations, as shown by Mr. Arthur Lee Burns in a chapter whose undoubted scholarship does not altogether compensate for a certain opaqueness of style; it is the working into the subject of considerations derived from other fields of inquiry. Mr. Alastair Buchan's essay on technology and world politics and Mr. Geoffrey Goodwin's on economics and international politics are both worth reading from this point of view, while Mr. Michael Howard's lucid discussion of changes in the use of force over the period deals with the prime instance in which technological change has so affected behavior, and in such unexpected and unforeseen ways, that all one's assumptions are continually subject to revision.

Of other academic disciplines, law has of course been the one most traditionally associated with the study of international relations, and Professor Charles Manning is still ready to defend both its relevance and its autonomy, and to argue against the ideas of those contemporary international lawyers who treat law and politics as though they were almost identical. His argument will be less readily accepted by some readers because his case for the United Nations' having abandoned its original charter without putting anything in its place and for the International Court's having also succumbed to current political and ideological pressures rests largely on their handling of "colonial" questions; it is thus colored by his well-known belief that in treating both South Africa and Rhodesia, the United Nations has itself acted in a way that lowers respect for the law. But unfashionable views should not be disregarded because they are unfashionable, and it would perhaps have been better if Barbara Ward, to whose eloquent pen has fallen the task of treating the "Developing World," had been readier to take into account the radical critics of aid-programs such as Professor P. T. Bauer.

What one misses in the volume is any attempt to see what if anything the biological sciences, psychology, and anthropology may have to say about the international conflicts of the last half century; there are allusions to ethology but no systematic treatment. After all, what has most distinguished this period from its predecessors appears to be the widespread practice of genocide as an instrument of national policy, and admirable as are Professors F. H. Hinsley and Hugh Seton-Watson in their handling of nationalism and ideology, one has a feeling that one wants something more; nor does Sir Herbert Butterfield's rather tentative discussion of "Morality and an International Order" altogether cope with the problem. On a less dramatic aspect of the subject, the growth of international institutions, one feels that Professor Inis R. Claude's treatment, thorough and systematic as it is, does not give sufficiently the feeling that these bodies are run by people, that these people work in a very unusual environment, and that the psychological—perhaps even physiological—effects of this environment should also be taken into account.

Professor J. B. Duroselle deals adequately if unexcitingly with the changes in diplomacy over the period, and Professor Hans Morgenthau challengingly with the rise of the superpowers. The potential Soviet-American condominium in the world towards which he looks with some degree of favor seems, to me at any rate, a non-starter—but the discipline of international relations is no more help to the futurologist than are any other of the so-called "social sciences."

MAX BELOFF
*The University College at Buckingham*

**Foreign Policy and National Integration: The Case of Indonesia.** By Jon M. Reinhardt. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1971. Pp. 230. $6.50.)

It is the assumption of Professor Reinhardt's book that "what is essentially taking place" in Indonesia is an attempt "to resymbolize a 'traditional' (natural!) view of world order" (p. iii) which was supposedly compromised during the Dutch colonial period. Moreover, Reinhardt contends that the political changes that have taken place in Indonesia, particularly during the Sukarno era, are not easily explained by the "structural-functional" concepts of modern comparative political analysis because the latter "have evolved mainly in the context of the Western sociological tradition" and thus presumably have "more relevance" for the West (p. iii). Reinhardt also considers it "quite likely" that the ideology and "patterns of government" established during the Sukarno years "will continue to provide the legitimizing rationale for future policy" (p. 1). Successive chapters of the book deal with "decolonization" and the changing dimensions of Indonesian political culture, the "Javanese conception of state and kingship" in relation to the rest of the Indonesian islands, the origins of nationalism and the dynamics of post-independence politics, the "confrontation" campaigns to acquire West Irian (New Guinea) and against Malaysia, and, finally, with the general character of the Indonesian style of "nation-building" tactics and with the place of foreign policy in them.

In its descriptive, as opposed to its analytical, passages, the book has much to recommend it, although what is said about domestic Indonesian politics in the era of struggle to acquire West New Guinea, for example or about the course of the crisis over the formation of Malaysia, brings little or no news. Since Reinhardt has worked through most of the standard literature on these questions his synopses are useful and informative. It is, however, when he attempts to interpret the West Irian and Malaysian campaigns in the context of his concern with the pivotal role of precolonial "indigenous and traditional factors" in Indonesian politics that unresolved paradoxes arise to detract greatly from the book.

Thus, in his introduction Reinhardt termed it "misleading" to explain the period of Indonesia's "militantly nationalistic foreign policy" essentially as a "diversion" from its economic difficulties or as a "deviation" from a "normal" path of development. I am not aware of any informed scholarly or journalistic analysis that has interpreted the campaign to acquire West New Guinea (surely a high point in the "militantly nationalistic" phase of Indonesian foreign policy) as a "deviation" from a supposedly "normal" course in Indonesian development (p. iii). I am aware of the argument that the campaign to win control of West New Guinea, a campaign relying on mass mobilization and extensive international "war scare" tactics, diverted attention from serious domestic economic stagnation, hunger, and political dissent. Curiously, it is in just such terms that Reinhardt also describes the effect of the West New Guinea campaign, writing: "The campaign had also helped the stability of the regime by rechanneling domestic dissatisfaction away from the seriously pressing problems of an explosive birth rate, a sprawling bureaucracy, inadequate transportation, dwindling productivity and growing food shortages" (p. 73). Despite this enumeration of domestic calamities, Reinhardt nevertheless asserts that Sukarno's popularity was at its peak at the time of the West New Guinea campaign, a contention not borne out by the bitter, if covert, political opposition to Sukarno and the plots and attempts on his life.

Reinhardt's emphasis on the importance of "indigenous and traditional factors" in the shaping of other policy ventures such as the anti-Malaysia "confrontation" tends to raise more questions than it answers. He asserts that also the campaign against Malaysia and, presumably, the flamboyant cultivation of a domestic crisis atmosphere in connection with it, "roughly" was a reflection of what "many Java based regimes in the past" had desired, namely hegemony throughout the Indonesian islands (p. 127). If this is true, it remains to be explained why today the Suharto regime and its policy of *Wawasan Nusantara* (territoriality), which also means central Indonesian government control over the islands, and, especially, of the adjacent waterways of the republic, can be articulated in the low-key, anti-ideological, anticrisis pragmatism of the Suharto government. The latter, indeed, seems to have specifically repudiated the "traditionalist" political dynamics and style of the Sukarno era.

In fact, it is hard to see how the Suharto government which, in its way, is such a marked "deviation" from its predecessor, can be fitted within the central assumption of Reinhardt's analysis that current events in Indonesia are an effort to "resymbolize" the traditional world view, presumably that of the Javanese. It also is difficult to agree that Indonesian political changes in recent decades cannot be easily analyzed because of the "Western sociological tradition" (p. iii) underlying structural functional analysis. I do not know what the "Western sociological tradition" is, but would suggest that the ideological and tactical political style of Sukarno can be studied quite well through some of the analytical categories developed by Western students of political authoritarianism in the last quarter of a century. Sukarno's mystique which, for a time, he employed so effectively in the political arena, should not now begin to mystify his Western observers as well!

JUSTUS M. VAN DER KROEF
*University of Bridgeport*

**The Wages of War, 1816–1965: A Statistical Handbook.** By J. David Singer and Melvin Small. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972. Pp. 419. $13.95.)

As the title indicates, this handbook systematically presents statistical data on wars occurring over the years 1816 to 1965. An excellent collection, it was compiled with a great deal of care and thought and significantly advances our statistical knowledge of war.

The authors first discuss in detail the variety of previous compilations of war data and the criteria they use for identifying their population of wars (such as producing a minimum of 1,000 deaths) and participants (such as whether a central system member). For the 93 interstate, imperial and colonial wars thus included, they develop three sets of statistical indicators: nation-months as a measure of magnitude; battle-connected deaths as a measure of severity; and fatalities divided by nation months, by armed forces, and by population as measures of intensity.

The authors next systematically compare their collection of 93 wars to those listed by Richardson (289 wars), Wright (133 wars), and Sorokin (97 wars). The detailed comparisons enable the reader to gauge the precise differences among the collections.

Thus having established the parameters of their collection, they focus on its statistical characteristics. They begin by rank-ordering wars by severity, magnitude, and intensity, and find that these measures are highly intercorrelated, of course. They also determine that when transformed to logarithms, wars comprise a normal distribution.

They next consider what trends, cycles, and seasonal concentrations are shown by their 93 wars. Plotting and regressing war's severity, intensity, and magnitude against time, they conclude that war is not on the increase or decrease, a surprising conclusion conflicting directly with the findings of others, such as Wright. Singer and Small, however, base their conclusions on linear regressions, which do not take into account the changing range of war's severity. For example, their Figure 8.5, which plots wars under way (in nation-months) against time, clearly shows the range of war remarkably increasing from 1816 to 1965, although the overall correlation coefficient with time is .14. Even though this conclusion is thereby qualified, it is to their credit that they present enough detail for others to compensate for their technique.

This aside, they find that there are on the average, 6.2 wars (with remarkably little deviation) leading to 1.9 million battle deaths per decade. Moreover, there is a rather weak twenty-year periodicity in the amount of war under way for any year, although overall the incidence of war well fits a Poisson curve (confirming Richardson's findings and suggesting that the occurrence of wars is randomly distributed through time). They also show that April and October are the major months when war breaks out.

Singer and Small subsequently consider the involvement of particular nations in wars. They statistically define that small fraction of the world's nations, usually the major powers, which contribute most of the wars, and show that Europe experiences the most wars of any region. Looking next at pair-wise frequencies, they find only slight evidence supporting the belief in "traditional enmities and enduring friendships." There is considerable flexibility among nations in their choice of enemies and friends from one war to the next. Finally, they show that there is no discernible relationship between defeat or victory in war and fatalities incurred. However, the initiators (who nevertheless lose almost 30 per cent of the time) fare better than the victims, suffering about half as many deaths.

The above constitute only the most prominent findings among a variety of statistical observations on war. The authors purposely focus here only on the statistical aspects of war, ignoring war's systemic and national correlates, causes, and conditions. An assessment of these relationships is the focus of their larger Correlates of War Project, of which some findings are already in the journals and others will be reported in subsequent volumes.

The *Handbook* presents a great variety of raw and derived data in many clear tables. Every student of war therefore will find this book a necessary and useful reference. Only one thing is lacking. In their concern for the statistical data, the authors neglected to present qualitative, politico-military thumbnail sketches of their 93 wars. These would have added a valuable extra 40–60 pages, or could have replaced some less important statistical analyses and data.

Aside from this, in their attention to detail, appreciation of data's many roles in scientific and scholarly research, and in enabling others to check their logic, rationales, criteria, data and analyses, Singer and Small have done a great service to all concerned about war.

R. J. RUMMEL

*University of Hawaii*

**War and Rank among Nations.** By Michael David Wallace. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1971. Pp. 142. $11.50.)

*War and Rank among Nations* is a further attempt to relate nation behavior, in this case war, to a nation's ranking within the community of nations. More specifically, the book proposes that war between nations is a function of the participants' status disequilibrium on two dimensions, capability and reputation. The basic hypothesis of the study is summed up as follows: "The greater the inconsistency between a nation's capabilities and the reputational status accorded it in the international system, the greater the likelihood that it will engage in conflict behavior" (p. 18).

The whole document has the austere aspect of a doctoral thesis, although I am not sure whether it really is. The argument beginning with the induction of the ideas from sociology to a final section which deals with some practical application of the findings is contained within 121 pages. This distillation leaves only the bare bones of an argument, and I think the manuscript suffers as a result.

Wallace lays the foundation arguments quite clearly in the earlier sections. After brief attempts at defining major concepts such as status in the international system and relating status and power, he goes to great trouble to lay before the reader a very full review of the literature on status inconsistency, most of it imported from sociological theory. He adds to this review a list of the objections to such importation. He considers the problems posed by "crosscut" or "cross-pressure" theories. These theories, which propose that inconsistencies in an individual's position may actually lead to control and moderation of social conflict, are seemingly entirely inconsistent with the major hypothesis of study reported in the book. Wallace, however, goes on to persuade the reader that any conflict between the two theories is more apparent than real. He achieves this in something less than two pages. I believe, however, that such a serious countertheory deserves a much more complete discussion.

Indeed, this whole strategy of throwing up the problems encountered and then summarily dismissing them tends to irritate the reader. Professor Wallace deals, not in a dilettantish fashion, but certainly less than completely with the problems of spurious correlation. (I was actually surprised to find a student of Professor Singer using the term since Singer often has remarked that there are no such things as spurious correlations only spurious inferences. Thus a correlation is a correlation—nothing more!)

Wallace gets out of identification difficulties by testing the hypotheses at the level of the international system as a whole. Thus the major hypothesis is reformulated to: "The greater the amount of status inconsistency in the international system as a whole, the greater the level of conflict that will be experienced within it" (p. 24).

The data exploited in the testing of these general hypotheses were developed on the Correlates of War project. The period chosen was 1825 to 1964, and the data were aggregated into five-year periods. Three kinds of data analysis were accomplished, all in mounting complexity. The first level of analysis involves simple bivariate correlations on the data. On getting encouraging support, Wallace moves onto stepwise regression. While spending an inordinately limited time in discussing such problems as multicollinearity and serial correlation of the error terms, he does obtain some encouraging results.

Wallace then proceeds into a dependence analysis (path coefficients analysis) in an attempt to identify the underlying causal structural relationship between the variables. He obtains checkered results in this part of the analysis. In doing this type of analysis, Wallace presumes a recursive model in which feedback, neither direct nor indirect, is allowed among the variables. Thus while the amount of conflict is seen to be determined by inconsistency between military capability and attributed status, the amount of conflict, with its obvious effect upon military capability, is not allowed reciprocally to influence the inconsistency between military capability and attributed status. I personally find such recursive models unrealistic.

In a final section on the practical applications of the results, Wallace wisely makes the point that since the analysis had been at the global level, it follows that suggestions can only be made at that level. His suggestions go from manipulation of attributed status and capability status through an isolationist solution to an advocation of global denationalization.

As I pointed out earlier, the study is a coherent whole, although lacking sufficient discussion of tremendously important points. Wallace's thoroughness in explicating his data analysis is admirable and unfortunately very rare in political science research, especially his careful scrutiny of the residuals from the analysis.

I was puzzled by the use of the severity and magnitude of international war as the dependent variable (p. 3). Why not use the existence of war as a binary dependent variable? In this way, it may be possible to look at the conditions of the international system which lead to the outbreak of war rather than the less useful, from a practical point of view, magnitude and severity of war.

One final point; Wallace makes no attempt to relate his work to Rummel's status field theory which was made available to the Correlates of War project as early as August 1971. This is the second piece of work from the Correlates of War project which reports on conflict behavior and status inconsistency without mentioning status field theory. Future scientific historians may well document this omission as evidence of paradigm rejection!

GORDON HILTON

*Northwestern University*

**Sino-Soviet Dialogue on the Problem of War.** By John Yin. (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971. Pp. 247. Guilders 35.75.)

Is war inevitable or avoidable between the Communists and imperialists? This is the difficult subject of this remarkable small book. The purpose of the book, as argued by the author, is to clarify the military aspect of the Sino-Soviet dispute. On this important subject, an astute student of Communist theories, Professor John Yin, starts with a comprehensive analysis of the causes of war from the point of Communist ideologies. He traces Soviet processes of revising original Marxist-Leninist concepts on various kind of wars (i.e., world war, civil war, and war of national liberation) by Khrushchev and the Chinese negative reaction to them. He continues to examine Sino-Soviet dialogue on this vital issue during the Vietnam conflict. He then concludes the study by warning that a real basis for peaceful Sino-Soviet coexistence is rapidly disappearing. A Sino-Soviet war would be regarded by each side as one between a socialist and an imperialist state (p. 188).

The author has extensively utilized the original sources both in Russian and Chinese as well as drawing on English, German, and French commentaries as collateral sources. Particularly impressive in this 247-page volume is its 47-page extensive bibliography.

It is a pity, however, that such a carefully written book should be so soon outdated as this one. The author was fully aware of this inevitable danger, as he indicates in his preface. By and large, two major events appear to have been responsible for this. The first is the mysterious disappearance and downfall of the heir-designate, former Chinese Defense Minister Lin Pao. Practically all of his utterances, from 1956 to the time of the completion of the book, are utilized throughout (see pp. 9 and 23 for quotations accusing Kennedy, Johnson, and Khrushchev; pp. 153–54 on people's war; pp. 103 and 155 on revolution, among others). Exhaustively used is Lin's then widely celebrated treatise, "Long Live the Victory of People's War." Basing his work on Lin's thesis, Professor Yin "contrives to build" his major hypothesis (p. 9). Not only was Lin's geopolitics the major Chinese repudiation of the Khrushchevian revisionism but it also advocated the so-called Soviet-American encirclement theory against the People's Republic of China. Having condemned Moscow for abandoning chief responsibility for world revolution, Lin advocated Peking's assuming of the role as the headquarters of world revolution. As widely reported, Lin is now the major target of criticism for his "counter-revolutionary revisionist line" as a "devout disciple of Confucius." Undoubtedly, Peking no longer honors Lin's thoughts.

The second event that has made the book somewhat dated, is, of course, the much improved course of Sino-American relations. No longer is the U.S. the chief target of Chinese attack. Rather it is now Moscow that is being rebuked for its practice of "social imperialism." These unpredicted turns of history are obviously not shortcomings of the book. In all likelihood, however, they were not unrelated events.

A minor shortcoming of the book may be its failure to examine closely verbal communications against actual deeds of the two disputants on specific conflicts (i.e., the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Sino-Indian War, and the Czech Crisis) to discover any possible discrepancies between words and acts. The late Edgar Snow was once reportedly advised by Chou En-lai to pay more attention to Chinese actions rather than words. One may find that Sino-Soviet dialogue, as such, even on vital problems of war, is less important as the major substance of their dispute. Ideological differences, whether on the problems of war or any other subject, may be symptoms rather than causes of the much more serious and deep-rooted historic animosity between the two continental powers. An old Chinese saying goes, "It takes more than one cold day for the river to freeze three feet deep." At any rate, the final chapter does not, contrary to the author's assertion, conclude the study. Rather it is just the beginning for more serious and vigorous investigation in the future.

ROY U. T. KIM

*Drexel University*

## Revista/Review Interamericana

## ANNOUNCES TWO LANDMARK EDITIONS

### LATIN AMERICAN WOMAN Vol. IV #2

*The Image and the Reality*

Eleven articles on the Hispanic woman in the circum-Caribbean area by thirteen U.S. & Puerto Rican Specialists.

### LITERATURE(S) OF THE CARIBBEAN Vol. IV #3

Seventeen articles on Spanish, English French and Papiamento writers or literature(s) of Puerto Rico, Cuba, Guadeloupe, Dominica, Curacao, Guyana, Trinidad, Barbados and Caribbean generally.

*Each $4.50 ppd. Special classroom rates on request*

Subscription rates: Individuals: $8/year; $12/2 years
Institutions: $12/year

---

### THE POLITICS OF HOSTILITY:

Castro's Revolution and U.S. Policy

*by Lynn Darell Bender*

A detailed and balanced analysis of the adversary relationship between the U.S. and Cuba during the years 1959-1973. The only book-length study of U.S.-Cuban relations, covering the official policies and complex maneuverings of those years. Fully annotated. Index. 168 pp.

Paper—$2.95 Cloth—$7.95

### PERSONALISM AND PARTY POLITICS

Institutionalization of the Popular Democratic Party of Puerto Rico

*by Kenneth R. Farr*

An analysis of Puerto Rico's dominant political party and its problems in surviving the transfer of power from one generation of leaders to another. The elections of 1960, 1964, 1968 and 1972 are analyzed in detail. 164 pp.

Paper—$5.00 Cloth—$12.50

### PUERTO RICO: TRASFONDO DE SU ECONOMIA

*by S. L. Descartes*

A clear and concise summary of the Puerto Rican economy from the Conquest to the present, with special emphasis on the effect of modernization on the traditions and institutions of the island. Spanish edition only. 50 pp.

Paper $1.95

### SANTIAGO IGLESIAS

—Labor Crusader

*by Clarence Senior*

Foreword by Herman Badillo

Biography of Puerto Rico's great labor leader, the dedicated Spaniard (1872-1939) who organized the labor movement on the island with the support of U.S. leaders like Gompers and Green, and was eventually elected Resident Commissioner in Washington. Illustrated with photos. 98 + xiv pp.

Paper—$2.95 Cloth—$5.00

**INTER AMERICAN UNIVERSITY PRESS**

**P.O. Box 1293 Hato Rey, Puerto Rico 00919**

# IN A TIME OF DECEPTION, DIRTY TRICKS, DOUBTFUL VALUES...

# HERE

**Promise and Performance of American Democracy**
Second Edition
By Richard A. Watson, *University of Missouri-Columbia*

How a democratic government *should* operate, and how American government does *in fact* operate, are not the same. As in the widely adopted first edition, Watson gives a balanced assessment of the American political system—one that takes into account both the process by which public policies are made, as well as the content of those policies.

Each chapter opens dramatically, with a brief development or incident designed to stimulate interest, and show the relevance of American government to contemporary social issues. The introductory chapter contains a far more extensive discussion of the general theory of democracy than can be found in any other beginning text.

Subsequent chapters analyze such aspects of the American political process as the roles of political parties, interest groups, Congress, the President. Three major policy areas—race, poverty, foreign affairs—are also evaluated in terms of how effective our society has been in achieving social equality, economic equality, and the protection of our national interests.

In short, the book balances three major purposes of an introductory text: It provides basic factual information about American government, concepts around which to organize that information, and a critical evaluation of the American political system.

Utilizing an entirely new format and page design, the new Watson has been updated to reflect Watergate and Nixon's resignation. More attention is given to criticisms of our government, including information on the increasing disillusionment of many Americans with the credibility of governmental officials. It provides new material on abortion, obscenity, and impeachment, with a new section that incorporates James Barber's analysis of the various "personality" or "character" types that have served as Chief Executive.

As proven by the many adoptions of the First Edition, *Watson works* in the classroom.

1975 Paperback

wiley

# WHAT WE NEED IS A GOOD, HONEST LOOK AT OURSELVES.

# ARE NINE.

## The Plot That Failed:

**Nixon and the Administrative Presidency**

By Richard P. Nathan, *Brookings Institute*

Prior to the 1972 election, Nixon, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman decided that in order to achieve the Administration's major domestic policy objectives, they needed to gain control over the management and machinery of domestic affairs. Watergate was their downfall.

THE PLOT THAT FAILED is Richard Nathan's perceptive account of the Nixon attempt to command the federal bureaucracy—the attempt of the "Administrative Presidency." Nathan, an HEW official in the Nixon administration for four years, provides a timely, authoritative view of a scheme narrowly avoided.

April 1975

## Serving The Few:

**Corporate Capitalism and the Bias of Government Policy**

By Edward S. Greenberg, *University of Colorado*

". . . modern government is not a set of neutral institutions responsive to the public will [but is, instead] the instrument by which corporate capitalism attempts to fashion for itself a stable environment conducive to steady expansion and healthy profitability."

SERVING THE FEW is a Marxist analysis of the unjust distribution of benefits in American capitalism. It is also a macro-level description of the American Political System. Providing a close interplay between theoretical issues and an empirical examination of American life, it raises questions about the functions of government for the larger social and economic systems, and shows how government intervention affects the distribution of costs and benefits among social classes.

Kenneth Dolbeare, on SERVING THE FEW: "It is well-written, historically grounded, substantive, analytical and provocative. . . . I would be very proud to have written this book."

October 1974 275 pages $4.95-paper

## The National Policy Game: A Simulation of Congressional Executive Relations

By John Foster, Thomas A. Henderson, and Daniel Barbee, all of *Georgia State University*

This is not a book—it's a game! It's designed to simulate the process of preparing the national budget.

To play the game, students assume the roles of congressmen, bureaucrats, OM & B members, lobbyists, and the press. Following the provided instructions, they perform the complex maneuvers required by the process, and learn while they interact! They are furnished with tear-out score/work sheets, as well as suggestions for background reading.

THE NATIONAL POLICY GAME has been classroom-tested at three major universities and found to be an exciting, discussion-perking innovation—ideal as a supplement for courses in American Government, Public Policy, Public Administration, or Budgeting. Available with an Instructor's Manual. April 1975

## The Troubled Republic: American Government, Its Principles and Problems

By Fred R. Mabbutt and Gerald J. Ghelfi, both of *Santa Ana College*

Our Founders stated, in the Declaration of Independence, what they deemed to be just political conduct. Using the Declaration as a benchmark, this book examines the philosophical justification behind such principles as majority rule, liberty, rights, equality—then measures contemporary politics in this light.

THE TROUBLED REPUBLIC features an up-to-date examination of our judicial system, emphasizing the Nixon Court and the Watergate controversy. It also contains an innovative chapter, "Civil Rights in the Twenty-first Century"—a futuristic examination based on current constitutional law and questions. 1974 360 pages $5.95-paper

## Public Opinion and Political Attitudes

Edited by Allen R. Wilcox, *University of Nevada at Reno*

War, riots, race, the military, poverty, the police—this reader brings together articles both theoretically provocative and politically pertinent. Tightly integrated within a conceptual framework, the 34 articles (including 11 originals) will stimulate your students to further discussion and investigation. 1974 667 pages $6.95-paper

## American Public Opinion: Its Origins, Content, and Impact

By Robert S. Erikson and Norman R. Luttbeg, both of *Florida State University*

Now available in a paperback edition, this book gathers the most recent findings from public opinion, voting behavior, socialization, and political linkage research. It presents this data in the form of numerous tables, to help students more readily consider the quality of public opinion and its impact on policy.

1974 343 pages $6.95-paper

## International Politics Since World War II: SECOND EDITION

**A Short History** By Charles L. Robertson, *Smith College*

Robertson's new edition provides a detailed historical summary of international affairs since World War II. It attempts to derive broad patterns from these affairs and relate them to social, technological, and other underlying changes in the environment. And it is one of the only books to treat these events on a *global* basis—not just from the standpoint of American foreign policy.

The new edition has been reorganized, expanded, and rewritten to cover the period from 1945 and deal more specifically with the events and political changes of the last decade.

March 1975

## International Law and National Behavior:

**A Behavioral Interpretation of Contemporary International Law and Politics**

By Ahmed Sheikh, *Western Illinois University*

In the first major attempt to treat the "applied" aspect of International Law, this text utilizes a new conceptualization: International Law as *process, dynamic force,* and *independent variable* in international politics. It is the first book on a textbook level to answer such questions as, How, when, why, and to what extent do nations—

- feel impelled to develop new laws and abolish old ones?
- use International Law as a tool of foreign policy?
- comply with or ignore existing laws, depending on the circumstances?

It also analyzes the motivation and attitudes of many non-Western countries with regard to International Law observance, in light of their foreign policy objectives.

1974 352 pages $7.95-paper

**For your complimentary examination copies, contact your Wiley representative or write to Mr. Richard L. Baker, Dept. 625, N.Y. office. Please include course title, enrollment, and present text.**

**JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.**
605 Third Avenue New York, N.Y. 10016
In Canada: 22 Worcester Road, Rexdale, Ontario

Prices subject to change without notice. A4832-WA

## New from Chicago

### THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER

**Sotirios A. Barber**

Barber analyzes the constitutional "rule of non-delegation," focusing specifically on its conceptual origins and its relationship to other constitutional ideas. He then proposes a set of guidelines designed to alert the courts and the public to cases of excessive or improper delegation of power.

*1975 176 pages Cloth $12.00*

### THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY

Between Anarchy and Leviathan

**James M. Buchanan**

Employing the techniques of modern economic analysis, Professor Buchanan reveals the conceptual basis of an individual's social rights by examining the evolution and development of these rights out of presocial conditions.

*1975 xi, 210 pages Cloth $12.50*

### THE ASIAN TRADE REVOLUTION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

The East India Companies and the Decline of the Caravan Trade

**Niels Steensgaard**

Steensgaard combines an analytical economic approach with detailed historical scholarship to provide an imaginative and important analysis of a central incident of modern world history—the breaking of the Portugese monopoly on Asian trade in the seventeenth century by English and Dutch mercantile interests.

*1975 442 pages Cloth $15.00 Paper $4.95*

### PURITANISM AND LIBERTY

*Second Edition*

Being the Army Debates (1647-49) from the Clarke Manuscripts with Supplementary Documents

***Selected and Edited with an Introduction by A. S. P. Woodhouse***

**With a Preface by Ivan Roots**

. . . an invaluable aid to those interested in the development of the political assumptions upon which this country was founded."—Alex Gottfried, *Western Political Quarterly*

*1975 506 pages Cloth $15.00*

**The University of Chicago Press**
Chicago 60637

**SOLDIERS IN REVOLT**
The American Military Today

*David Cortright.* Discontent and even rebellion within the Armed Forces became widespread during and after the Vietnam War; this book examines this serious deterioration in morale and shows how the military could play an effective role in modern society. Introduction by Marcus Raskin. A Doubleday Anchor Original. Hardbound, $7.95; paperbound, $2.95

**FAILURE OF A DREAM?**
Essays in the History of American Socialism

*Edited by John H. M. Laslett and Seymour Martin Lipset.* Clinton Rossiter, Daniel Bell, Seymour Martin Lipset, Norman Thomas, Michael Harrington and Staughton Lynd are among the contributors who debate the role of America's indigenous socialist movements. Paperbound, $5.95

**JAILS**
The Ultimate Ghetto of the Criminal Justice System

*Ronald Goldfarb.* Jails hold persons accused, *but not convicted* of any crime; this book shows how they victimize their poor and legally innocent inmates and how they can and must be changed. Hardcover, $8.95

**MORE POWER THAN WE KNOW**
The People's Movement Toward Democracy

*Dave Dellinger.* For more than a quarter of a century, Dave Dellinger has fought for social change. In this candid memoir, he tells of the "movement's" growth from the crusade to ban the bomb through the turbulent 1960s—and looks at where our post-Watergate society is headed. Hardbound, $10.00

**EIGHT BADS — EIGHT GOODS**
The American Contradictions

*Alfred de Grazia.* Based on a blend of Chinese and American political theories, de Grazia brings both an amusing style and fresh insight to the discussion of the problems facing America today. A Doubleday Anchor Original. Paperbound, $2.95

ANCHOR·PRESS·DOUBLEDAY·

Doubleday & Company, Inc.
Garden City, New York 11530

Two new views on a subject of
grave importance to every American . . .

## AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: THE FACTS REORGANIZED

Roderick A. Bell, St. Mary's College of California
David V. Edwards, University of Texas at Austin

Providing a relevant and controversial analysis of American government, this new instructional system includes a *core text* that traces the development of the United States from its revolutionary beginnings as a small, isolated republic to its present role as a nation-state and world power. A unique and provocative perspective on American government past and present is provided by this blend of history and political science. Also available for enrichment of the core text chapters and for in-depth excursions into selected topics are the following *associated units: Approaches to the Study of American Government,* Roderick A. Bell; *Congress and Public Policy,* Lawrence Dodd; *Power and Bureaucracy in America: A Marxist Analysis,* Albert Dragstedt; *The Political Impact of Federal Aid on State and Local Government,* Thomas Kiefer; *The American Way of War and Peace,* Richard Kraemer; *The City as a Polity,* David Perry; *The Evolution and Scope of the American Federal Bureaucracy,* Richard L. Schott; *Interest Groups in American Politics,* John Sinclair; *The Evolution of the Supreme Court,* Mary Walker; and *Democratic Theories of the Republic; 1776—The Civil War,* Elliot Zashin.

Core Text: 1974 236 pp. paperback $6.00
Associated Units: 1974/1975 48 to 64 pp. paperback $1.95 *each*

## THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY

Charles W. Dunn, Clemson University

Under the editorial direction of Professor Dunn, twelve eminent authors from academia, the United States Congress, and the news media have created a penetrating analysis of the office of the presidency since World War II. The author team has developed a very comprehensive work that will provide the reader with the criteria for predicting future presidential behavior. This book is ideally suited for the course on the American Presidency, or the Executive Branch, and as a supplement for courses in American Government and Post World War II American History.

1975 400 pp. paperback $8.95

For examination copies write Director of Marketing

GENERAL LEARNING PRESS
Box PS-25, 250 James Street
Morristown, New Jersey 07960
Available in Canada from GLC Educational Materials and Services, Ltd., Agincourt, Ontario

# PEOPLE VS. GOVERNMENT

## *The Responsiveness of American Institutions*

**Edited by Leroy N. Rieselbach**

Contributors to this volume have set out to examine the performance of key institutions in meeting the needs of the country and the desires of the citizens and their relationship to the current crisis of credibility and confidence. They find that the various institutions are responsive—to those with power and influence—and they suggest methods and reforms to enable the public to gain its share of attention and respect. These thoughtful original essays will interest concerned laymen as well as political scientists and their students:
Contributors include.

**Presidency**—Dennis Eckart and John C. Ries

**Congress**—Leroy N. Rieselbach

**the Supreme Court**—Richard Claude

**the federal bureaucracy**—Lester M. Salamon and Gary L. Wamsley

**the states and local government**—Ronald E. Weber

**the military**—Edward F. Sherman

**the police**—Elinor Ostrom

**environmental management**—Lynton K. Caldwell

**416 pages, tables, index** **$15.00**

INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS
10TH & MORTON STREETS ● BLOOMINGTON, INDIANA 47401

**from Mayfield**

## LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS

### A Developmental Approach

*Edward J. Williams* and *Freeman J. Wright*

Taking a horizontal or developmental approach, the authors consider the evolutionary sweep of Latin American political change and address themselves to the sociological and economic questions that have affected the area's politics. Rather than examining Latin America country-by-country, they view it as a developing area in a way that places the myriad and confusing complexities of each individual country into perspective.

Spring 1975 prox 512 pages cloth

47 adoptions in its first six weeks!

## WOMEN: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE

Edited by *Jo Freeman*

**Women: A Feminist Perspective** is a collection of penetrating essays (many of which are original to this volume) on women by women from a wide range of academic disciplines. Political scientists, attorneys, sociologists, and psychologists among others employ traditional disciplines and concrete data to assess the effects of sexism, to document the status of women, and to analyze the complex institutions and values that keep women in their place. Extensively indexed and cross-referenced.

1975 487 pages paperback $6.95

## PUBLIC OPINION

### Its Formation, Measurement, and Impact

Edited by *Susan Welch* and *John Comer*

This book gathers together the diverse topics involved in public opinion—psychological factors behind individual attitudes, sociological antecedents of mass opinion, impact of opinion on policy making, influence of policy making on our evolving political culture, sampling theory, measures of mass opinion, and characteristics of the responsible voter—to create a comprehensive reader. The articles, not repeats of those that usually appear in readers, are grouped into six primary sections: defining, describing, shaping, measuring, explaining, and assessing the influence of public opinion.

Spring 1975 prox 500 pages paperback

## INSIDE FOREIGN POLICY

### The Department of State Political System and Its Subsystems

*John H. Esterline* and *Robert B. Black*

**Inside Foreign Policy** is a functional-operational look at the formal structures of three representative organizations affecting American foreign policy formulations—the State Department, USIA and AID. Drawing on 40 years of experience in the U.S. Foreign Service and illustrating their thesis with real cases of international affairs administration, the authors analyze the bureaucratic relationships and politics—the conflicts and struggles for power—within the three agencies, both in Washington and in embassies abroad.

Spring 1975 prox 200 pages paperback

**Mayfield Publishing Company ● 285 Hamilton Avenue ● Palo Alto, California 94301**

# Essential Documents—Trenchant Comments—on U.S. and World Affairs

**THE DYNAMICS OF WORLD POWER • A Documentary History of U.S. Foreign Policy**
***With an Introduction by Arthur M. Schlesinger, jr., General Editor***

Each volume of this 5-volume set is edited, introduced, and narrated by a specialist in the field who places events in both their contemporary context and broad historical perspective. It includes documents and events of U.S. foreign policy relating to—Western Europe; Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; Latin America; The Far East; the United Nations; and Subsaharan Africa.

**5 Vols.** 4800 pp. $169.00

**GREAT BRITAIN FOREIGN POLICY/THE SPAN OF EMPIRE: A Documentary History, 1689-1971**
***Edited by Joel H. Wiener***

These 4 volumes make accessible the decisive documents that shaped the course of Great Britain's relations with foreign countries and her imperial activities on all 5 continents from the 17th century to the present. The 555 documents range from treaties and tracts, declarations of war and accounts of battle, Commons debates and addresses, to letters, pacts, reports, resolutions, and radio broadcasts. A capsule history of Great Britain's foreign and imperial policy is provided in the Introduction and editorial comments precede each section.

**4 Vols.** 3400 pp. $139.50

**THE BILL OF RIGHTS • A Documentary History**
***Edited by Bernard Schwartz***

This is a collection of complete texts or excerpts from 198 documents—charters, laws, constitutions, judicial decisions, letters, diaries, biographies, newspapers, official records, legislative debates—in chronological order from the Magna Carta to legislative debates preceding ramification of the first 10 amendments to the Constitution in 1972.

**2 Vols.** 1252 pp. $65.00

**STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES**
***Edited by Bernard Schwartz***

This work has long been needed—a legislative history of issues that figure strongly in American life today. All documents are reproduced in full, complete with commentaries, relevant excerpts from Congressional debates, Presidential messages, and Supreme Court Decisions. Vol. I is devoted to Civil Rights; Vol. 2 to Labor Organization; and Vol. 3 to Income Security.

**3 Vols.** (4 books) 3700 pp. $129.00

**McGraw-Hill Book Company Dept. APSR**
**1221 Avenue of the Americas, N.Y., N.Y. 10020**

# Black-White Income Differentials

**Empirical Studies and Policy Implications**

by STANLEY H. MASTERS

*A Volume in the INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON POVERTY MONOGRAPH Series*

This important work attempts to summarize some of the literature that has developed on the economics of discrimination.

TENTATIVE CONTENTS: Economic Theories of Discrimination. A Review of Empirical Studies of Discrimination against Blacks. The Effect of Migration on Black Incomes. The Effect of Housing Segregation on Black-White Income Differentials. Estimating the Relative Importance of Labor-Market Discrimination versus Differences in Productivity between Blacks and Whites. Alternative Policy Perspectives. Policy Recommendations.

*1975, 204 pp., $12.50/£6.00*

# Social Policy and Sociology

edited by N. J. DEMERATH III, KARL SCHUESSLER and OTTO LARSON

*A Volume in the QUANTITATIVE STUDIES IN SOCIAL RELATIONS Series*

Based on the proceedings of a conference held at Carmel, California and sponsored by the American Sociological Association, this volume includes the discussions which these articles elicted at the conference.

The topics considered fall under three main categories: societal dynamics at the macro-level; individual stress in the family cycle; and problems of youth, education, and the law.

*1975, 380 pp., $17.50/£8.40*

# Introduction to Structural Equation Models

by OTIS DUDLEY DUNCAN

*A Volume in the STUDIES IN POPULATION Series*

The aim of this book is to prepare the reader to understand both the current sociological literature reporting on the use of structural equation models in research and the recent discussions of the methodological questions pertaining to such models. It is a concise, systematically organized work of the kind that has long been needed not only by graduate and advanced undergraduate students, but also by a wide range of professional social scientists interested in the use of models in their research.

In fact, *Introduction to Structural Equation Models* may well be the first unified, elementary treatment of recursive and non-recursive models. It integrates path analysis with the structural equation approach. It deals with both errors in variables (measurement error, unobserved variables, multiple indicators) and errors in equations (stochastic disturbance). It is written in an almost casual, every-day style; although results are stated carefully, mathematical rigor is not stressed.

*1975, 190 pp., $12.95/£6.25*

*Prices subject to change without notice.*

**ACADEMIC PRESS**
*A Subsidiary of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers*
111 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10003
24-28 OVAL ROAD, LONDON NW1 7DX

**THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT**

**by David Saffell**

**(Ohio Northern University)**

Dramatic changes have taken place in the American political system since the First Edition of **The Politics of American National Government.** Watergate, with all its ramifications, has to be considered in any American Government course taught today. While this book covers recent significant events— Watergate, Nixon's resignation, Ford, Rockefeller, the 1974 elections — it delves much deeper into the American political process than many so-called "relevant" texts. It describes, analyzes, and explains this political process, as it relates to the National Government. In a succinct manner, this text presents basic information about government institutions, and helps the student understand how individual congressmen, supreme court justices, and the "man-on-the-street" influence the formulation of governmental policies.

*February, 1975 approx. 450 pp. paperbound, $6.95.*

An Instructor's Manual is available.

For consideration copies of this text, write to: Richard Marran, WINTHROP PUBLISHERS, INC., 17 Dunster Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

W P

# ALSO NEW FROM WINTHROP

## INTRODUCTION TO POLITICS

**by Ton DeVos (Trinity University)**

Presents an integrated, conceptual framework for analyzing politics — introduces the dominant concepts of contemporary political science, and aids in acquiring a comprehensive perspective on politics in all contexts.

*March 1975 approx. 350 pp. paperbound, $6.95*

## FRENCH POLITICS IN TRANSITION: THE YEARS AFTER DE GAULLE

**by Roy Macridis (Brandeis University)**

Analyzes current political trends in France after DeGaulle's departure — emphasizes the manner in which the Gaullist institutions appear to have been legitimatized to provide political stability and effective leadership — includes issues and results of the 1974 Presidential election.

*February 1975 paperbound, $3.95*

## URBAN POLITICS, SECOND EDITION

**by Murray S. Stedman, Jr.**
**(Temple University)**

Refines and updates the widely-used first edition — continues a cohesive political theory to support descriptive and analytical material. Includes new coverage of financing urban government, urban court systems, law enforcement, etc.

*February 1975 paperbound, $6.95*

For consideration copies of any or all of these texts, write to: Richard Marran, WINTHROP PUBLISHERS, INC., 17 Dunster Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 02138

WP

## Statement of Ownership, Management and Circulation

Required by Act of October 23, 1962:
Section 4369, Title 39, United States Code

1. **Date of Filing:** October 1, 1969

2. **Title of Publication:**
American Political Science Review

3. **Frequency of Issue:**
Quarterly in March, June,
September, December

4. **Location of Known Office of Publication:**
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

5. **Location of the Headquarters or General Business Offices of the Publishers:**
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

6. **Names and Addresses of Publisher and Editor:**

Publisher:
American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Editor:
Nelson W. Polsby,
Department of Political Science
U. of California, Berkeley, Calif. 94720

7. **Owner:**
American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

8. **Known Bondholders, Mortgagees, etc.:**
None

9. The purpose, function and nonprofit status of this organization and the exempt status for Federal income tax purposes have not changed during the preceding 12 months.

10. **Extent and Nature of Circulation:**

| | Average No. Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months | Actual No. Copies Single Issue Nearest to Filing Date |
|---|---|---|
| A. Total Number Copies Printed | 18,000 | 18,000 |
| B. Paid Circulation | | |
| 1. Sales | None | |
| 2. Mail Subscriptions | 15,000 | 15,000 |
| C. Total Paid Circulation | 15,000 | 15,000 |
| D. Free Distribution by Mail, Carrier or Other Means | 0 | 0 |
| E. Total Distribution (C + D) | 15,000 | 15,000 |
| F. Office Use, Left-Over, Unaccounted, Spoiled after Printing | 3,000 | 3,000 |
| G. Total | 18,000 | 18,000 |

# New from Columbia

## CULTURES IN CONFLICT
### The Four Faces of Indian Bureaucracy
**STANLEY J. HEGINBOTHAM**

Based on extensive interviews and sophisticated questionnaire surveys, Professor Heginbotham reveals the complex of cultural, historic, and ideological forces acting upon bureaucracies in India. This important new study reveals not only the structure of modern Indian bureaucracy but also the details of that life and style. $12.50

## PRELUDE TO REVOLUTION
### Mao, the Party, and the Peasant Question, 1962-1966
**RICHARD BAUM**

Providing new insights into a particularly confusing historical period, Richard Baum, in his new book, discusses the origins of the Great Proletarian Revolution in three interrelated areas: the conflicts between Mao Tse-Tung and his chief lieutenants, the Socialist Education Movement, and the state and rural party administrations. $10.00

## PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE SECRETARIES-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS
**ANDREW W. CORDIER and WILDER FOOTE, Editors**

**Volume 4: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1958-1960**

Hammarskjöld's unanimous reelection, his settlement of the Lebanon-Jordan affair, and his attempts to promote a lasting peace in Indochina are among the events recounted here through documentary and press materials and the editors' commentaries. $22.50

**Volume 5: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1960-1961**

This volume presents the documented story of the United Nations operation in the Congo and Soviet challenge to the Secretary-General's place in world affairs to the time of Hammarskjöld's death. $27.50

## EASTERN EUROPE
### A Geography of the COMECON Countries
**ROY E. H. MELLOR**

In this systematic survey of the Socialist countries of Eastern Europe—the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania—Professor Mellor links together the historical and contemporary scenes and illuminates the complexity and interrelationships of these countries.
cloth, $17.50; paper, $9.00

**COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS**

Address for orders: 136 South Broadway, Irvington, New York 10533

# POLITICAL SCIENCE

## AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES IN TRANSITION

### Judson L. James

"James' text is a sweeping panoramic view of change and stability within the American party system."—*Choice*/This basic text for the political parties course covers the full range of party activity, focusing on its relationship to the achievement of democratic government. A relatively short work that permits the instructor a wide range of choices in supplementary materials, it is concise and systematic in its evaluation of factual and normative issues. The text also responds to current student and general public criticism of political parties and addresses itself to fundamental questions about their role in a democratic political system. The text features chapter introductions and summaries. 273 pages; $8.95/cloth. 1974.

## URBAN POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY

### Second Edition

### Robert Lineberry and Ira Sharkansky

Featuring a strong emphasis on public policy in this edition, URBAN POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY is a comprehensive text for the first course in urban politics. All traditional topics, including power structure, nonpartisan politics, federalism, city managers, bureaucracies, and taxation and finance, are covered, with special attention given to controversial areas and current issues. The book uses a systems approach to examine in detail the elements of the decision-making process and demonstrates why the politics of trade-offs among conflicting goals dominates the out-put of the policy-making system. 348 pages; $7.50/paper. 1974.

## THE METROPOLIS: Its People, Politics, and Economic Life

### Third Edition

**John C. Bollens and Henry J. Schmandt**

The Third Edition of this text presents a balanced, multidimensional view of the metropolis with emphasis on process and behavior as well as on form and structure. This edition includes major developments that have occurred since 1969 and endeavors to assess their significance and impact on urban communities and the life styles of their residents. Such issues as inflation, Watergate, the women's movement, the energy crisis, ecology, the "gray power" movement, the "park-ins" of the truckers, and the "tenants rights" activism of luxury apartment dwellers are discussed. March 1975. Tentative: 336 pages.

**Now in paper: $6.95 (tentative).**

## THE POLITICS OF BLACK AMERICA

**Milton D. Morris**

This text is a comprehensive survey of the political experience, attitudes, and behavior of black Americans from their very earliest political activities through the 1970s. A balanced overview is achieved through the integration of a wide range of legal, historical, and social science research. April 1975. Tentative: 368 pages; $6.50/paper.

## THE INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY OF POLITICS

**Monte Palmer, Larry Stern, and Charles Gaile**

Introducing a vast array of behavioral concepts drawn from the fields of political science, sociology, psychology, anthropology, and economics, this text evaluates their uses and their limitation for political scientists as well as other social scientists. While emphasis is on those behavioral concepts most relevant to political analysis, concepts common to all behavioral sciences, including power, systems analysis, and communications, are covered. August 1974. 177 pages; $4.95/paper.

1817

**FROM HARPER & ROW**

*10 East 53d Street, New York 10022*

LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL
ORDER

As the Suez Crisis of 1956 moved from diplomacy to force to at least temporary resolution, how did international rules, norms, and agencies influence the protagonists? Analyzing this multi-sided conflict in the context of Middle East rivalries, Cold War politics, and divergent allied objectives, Robert R. Bowie shows why the institutions of international law were unable to prevent the use of force, yet played a substantial role in determining the course and outcome of the crisis. $7.50

**SUEZ 1956**

**International Crises and the Role of Law**

**ROBERT R. BOWIE**

**OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS**
200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

PRAEGER
SPECIAL STUDIES

**PUBLIC PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT**
**The Bittersweet Heritage of Civil Service Reform**
*Jay M. Shafritz*
Foreword by *Dale S. Beach*

Overviews the content and practice of public personnel administration at the federal, state, and local levels of U.S. government.
ca. 160 pp. Apr., 1975 ca. $13.50
ISBN 0-275-05840-9

**LAND USE, OPEN SPACE, AND THE GOVERNMENT PROCESS**
**The San Francisco Bay Area Experience**
Edited by *Edward Ellis Smith* and *Durward S. Riggs*

Traces land use and development in the San Francisco Bay Area and outlines the need for coordinated planning at all levels of government. The study was performed by Jones & Stokes Associates, Sacramento, California, and commissioned by the Commonwealth Club of California.
214 pp. 1974 $13.50
ISBN 0-275-05700-8

**PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND COMPUTERS**
**Guidelines for Municipal and Other Public Information Systems**
*O.E. Dial* and *Edward M. Goldberg*

Presents a method for maintaining a balance between the public's "right to know" and the citizen's "right to privacy." Suggests procedures for establishing security control measures and data access-control administrative regulations.
186 pp. Mar., 1975 $14.00
ISBN 0-275-09890-7

**OCEAN SPACE RIGHTS**
**Developing U.S. Policy**
*Lawrence Juda*
Foreword by *Oliver J. Lissitzyn*

Examines "ocean space rights" and the developing international law in this area; including domestic political forces that have shaped American policy.
318 pp. Feb., 1975 $20.00
ISBN 0-275-09240-2

**MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW**
**A Comparative Analysis**
*C. Lloyd Brown-John*

The first empirical examination of the effectiveness of economic sanctions in international law enforcement. Finds that sanctions, coupled with massive political maneuvering can work.
448 pp. Feb., 1975 $25.00
TC 0951 ISBN 0-275-28775-0

**QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES IN FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS AND FORECASTING**
*Michael K. O'Leary* and *William D. Coplin*

Demonstrates how content and statistical analysis and computer simulation can be employed to examine and forecast foreign policy events, with case studies of African coups, elections in Western Europe, the Middle East conflict, and global oil politics.
314 pp. Mar., 1975 $20.00
ISBN 0-275-05630-9

**SOVIET NAVAL POLICY**
**Objectives and Constraints**
Edited by *Michael MccGwire, Ken Booth,* and *John McDonnell*

The Soviet Union's recent emergence as a formidable sea power is the subject of this interdisciplinary analysis published for the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax.
692 pp. Feb., 1975 $32.50
ISBN 0-275-09270-x

**POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE**
**A Comparative Framework**
Edited by *Ivan Volgyes*

Analyzes agents of political socialization, the role of political communication, the goals, and the achievements of political socialization in Romania, Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia.
220 pp. Feb., 1975 $16.50
ISBN 0-275-09550-9

Please include TC and ISBN numbers when ordering.
Order directly from praeger 111 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10003

# AN IMPORTANT SELECTION OF —NEW FROM MACMILLAN

## AMERICAN POLITICS:

***Crisis and Challenge***
Louis Loeb, Luther College, and the late
Daniel M. Berman

**AMERICAN POLITICS:** *Crisis and Challenge* offers an analytical and interpretive view of national politics. Historical, descriptive, and behavioral materials are skillfully integrated to illuminate the institutions and processes of American politics and provide a basis for enlightened critical examination. Uniquely organized, the book builds from a focus on the individual, through the organizational inputs in the political system and the factors that condition such inputs, to the policymaking process.

**A Three-Part Organization Features**

I. **POLITICAL PARTICIPATION:** Voting, political behavior, public opinion, political parties, and interest groups.

II. **THE POLITICAL PROCESS—*Conditioning Factors:*** The media and political public relations, money, and the climate of expression.

III. **THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS:** The ways the major institutions of government—Congress, the Presidency and the bureaucracy, and the courts—function in the making of public policy; a theoretical background for understanding the American Constitution and how this document can be viewed in terms of the contemporary functioning of American politics; and the intricacies and interdependence inherent in the American political system.

**AMERICAN POLITICS**

- integrates the most current material—including taxes and politics, Watergate, Nixon's resignation, struggles of the Presidency and Congress for dominance in the policymaking process—as well as significant issues of the past.
- assesses the role of the individual citizen in influencing government policy.
- illustrates the roles of institutions, political behavior, parties, groups, media, and money in politics. Contemporary examples for each are provided.
- includes an invaluable essay on reading and research, which guides students in further reading and suggests sources of data.

## AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, THIRD EDITION

Erwin L. Levine, Skidmore College and
Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., Brown University

Maintaining a focus on the basic institutions of American government at the national level, **AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT** is now in its Third Edition.

**NEW MATERIAL IN THIS *THIRD EDITION* INCLUDES**

- a chapter—"President and Congress: The War Powers Act of 1973"—covering policymaking in the White House and on Capitol Hill.
- increased emphasis on policymaking.
- the impact of Watergate on American institutions.
- revised and updated material throughout, reflecting the major political events affecting the national government to 1974, including President Nixon's resignation. Among the expanded topics are revenue sharing; conflict control; how parties relate to the national policy system; impeachment; executive privilege; problems of presidential control; military; and the role of the court as a political body.

**THIS POPULAR PAPERBACK CONTINUES TO**

- analyze the fundamentals of the Constitution and the American political process.
- emphasize a constitutional/political approach.
- consider the patterns of interest which have shaped and continue to shape the Constitution and American politics.
- provide valuable charts and illustrations elaborating on issues of federalism, the Presidency, the Congress, and the civilian-military relationship.

## THE DYNAMICS OF URBAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Jay S. Goodman, Wheaton College

**THE DYNAMICS OF URBAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS** is exclusively devoted to urban politics, with an emphasis on local public policy. Using an interdisciplinary approach, the book draws on material from economics and sociology, as well as political science.

**INSIGHTFUL, TIMELY ISSUES HIGHLIGHT THE TEXT**

Among the topics examined are

- federal programs and their impact on urban areas, including revenue sharing and mass transit.

# OUTSTANDING TEXTS IN 1975—

- class cultures, offering Banfield's views along with other critical perspectives.
- distribution of benefits and costs, including various models of public policy.
- community control.
- alternative urban futures.

**MORE OUTSTANDING FEATURES**

**The Dynamics of Urban Government**

- analytically examines the utility of numerous models.
- combines conceptualization, description, analysis, and speculation.
- provides a complete treatment of metropolitan settlement, governance, and models.
- integrates national and state politics with urban politics.
- confronts a wide range of issues involved in various controversial topics.
- includes tables, graphs, charts, and photographs throughout.

## DIMENSIONS OF STATE AND URBAN POLICYMAKING

Richard H. Leach, Duke University and Timothy G. O'Rourke, Campbell College, General Editors

A collection of 20 readings on state and urban policymaking, this book focuses on how the public, elected officials, and the bureaucracy determine government policy at both the state and local levels. Prominent scholars in the social sciences present their views on selected important issues.

**SPECIAL FEATURES OF THE BOOK**

- Authorities in political science, economics, and social psychology are represented. Among the contributors are Edward C. Banfield, John Burns, Thomas R. Dye and L. Harmon Ziegler, and Thomas F. Pettigrew. The article by James Lee has never before been published.
- Comparative treatment is given to policy outcomes at both the state and local levels, with specific attention to the problems of education, race, taxation, crime and the environment.
- Insightful comments introduce each article.
- Material encompasses both institutional and problem-oriented analysis.
- The institutions responsible for policymaking are examined, including the governorships, legislature, and mayoralty.
- Attention is given to the impact of the political environment.
- Carefully selected bibliographies follow each reading.

## AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,

**FOURTH EDITION**

Martin Shapiro, University of California at San Diego and the late Rocco J. Tresolini, Lehigh University

Long considered a standard text in the field, **AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW** successfully introduces 98 significant court decisions ranging from *Marbury v. Madison* through the 1974 term, to political science majors and pre-law students. Incorporating modern behavioral research, the text begins with three introductory chapters designed to give students a basic understanding of the way cases arise, come to the Supreme Court, and are decided. Chapter introductions survey the case law, analyze the major policy issues, and discuss court problems.

**IN THE NEW FOURTH EDITION**

- Maintaining the balance between historical and contemporary cases of policy interest, the book has increased coverage of recent cases.
- There are detailed comparisons between the approaches of the Warren and Burger courts in such areas as the new equal protection, criminal procedure, freedom of speech, and religious and racial discrimination.
- Material on the federal system now reflects the key contemporary problem of central government interventions against racial discrimination.
- Introductory materials and two cases on non-constitutional, statutory interpretation are carefully organized so that the professor who wishes to reorganize this material according to his own lecture schedule, can easily do so.

**A COMPLETE REORGANIZATION OF CHAPTERS ELIMINATES EXCESSIVE CROSS-REFERENCING**

- Chapters on freedom of speech and communism have been combined.
- The chapter on privacy has been expanded to cover cases on birth control and abortion.
- Chapters on Congress's commerce and tax powers have been combined.
- There is now one chapter devoted to the interrelated problems of war, foreign affairs, and the powers of the Presidency.
- *Dred Scott* has been incorporated into the chapter on race and federalism along with *Afroyim v. Rusk.*
- One chapter is devoted to racial discrimination; another deals with the new equal protection, covering the whole development of the "suspect classification," "fundamental rights" approach.
- The criminal procedure chapter now contains a detailed treatment of the development and current state of the law.

## MACMILLAN PUBLISHING CO., INC.

**100A Brown Street**
**Riverside, New Jersey 08075**

***New texts from F. E. Peacock Publishers, Inc.***

***In February***

**VOTING BEHAVIOR AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS**

By **Robert D. Cantor,** Temple University

This book offers the student an overview of voting behavior in Presidential elections including 1972. The more prominent theories are examined in the light of electoral reality. Changes in the characteristics and electoral behavior of American voters are analyzed and the impact of these changes on our political system emphasized. The impact of partisanship is placed in perspective.

The emphasis of the text is placed upon the political climate existing at the time of the election and its impact upon the voting decision. Campaign techniques and spending are also discussed.

February 1975 140 pages *c.* $3.50 paper

**PUBLIC BUDGETING AND FINANCE: Readings in Theory and Practice, Second Edition**

Edited by **Robert T. Golembiewski,** University of Georgia,
and **Jack Rabin,** Auburn University

The editors have used the same framework but have thoroughly updated this new edition. The purpose of this text is to provide a comprehensive introduction to budgeting and finance concepts and tools for those applicable to public agencies.

Teacher's manual available.

February 1975 515 pages *c.* $11.95 cloth

***Recent***

**THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF AMERICAN STATESMEN**
**Selected Writings and Speeches**

Edited by **Morton J. Frisch,** Northern Illinois University,
and **Richard G. Stevens,** Rockford College

Introduces the student to the literature of political thought with writings and speeches of statesmen facing certain crises in American history. The editors have chosen selections that contain a maximum of principles, doctrines, and purposes rather than those confined to the circumstances to which they were addressed and, wherever feasible, have given complete texts.

1973 374 pages $5.95 paper

**DILEMMAS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT**

By **Monte Palmer,** Florida State University

Moves from consideration of social, cultural, political, and economic factors in political development as related to traditional societies to a thorough examination of the impact of social change on the politics of transitional, or developing, societies. The roles of charismatic leadership, political parties, the military, and the bureaucracy in political development and the impact of disruptive political problems on economic development are examined.

1973 213 pages $5.95 paper

***Write Edward A. Thomas for examination copies***

F. E. PEACOCK PUBLISHERS, INC. ITASCA, ILLINOIS 60143

*"...the most current, topical, and provocative introductory text on the market today"*

**Democracy Under Pressure**

**AN INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM**

*SECOND EDITION*

MILTON C. CUMMINGS, JR.,
The Johns Hopkins University
DAVID WISE,
political analyst and author of
*The Politics of Lying: Government Deception, Secrecy, and Power*


DEMOCRACY UNDER PRESSURE
SECOND EDITION
DEMOCRACY UNDER PRESSURE
An Introduction to the American Political System
MILTON C. CUMMINGS, JR. AND DAVID WISE
SECOND EDITION

654 pages

"Even better than the first edition. I especially like the extensive use of examples and pictures. It is one of the few texts that make it difficult to fall asleep while reading."
—OWEN NEWCOMER, College of the Canyons

"*Democracy Under Pressure* is an exceptional text. I am impressed by its concern for historical accuracy, meaningful rhetoric, and provocative illustrations. Most importantly *Democracy Under Pressure* communicates to young people in a way that is only rarely matched by other books in the field of American Government."
—CHRISTOPHER HOLLOWAY, Mesa State College

"Outstanding in content, style, and readability."
—P. C. MCLAURIN, JR., Mississippi State University

"The book is a fine text in American Government — informative and timely and quite complete."
—ROBERT W. LANGRAN, Villanova University

"The Second Edition of Cummings and Wise makes the most interesting reading of any new American government text I have examined."
—JIM R. ALEXANDER, Midwestern University

"The Second Edition is undoubtedly the most current, topical, and provocative introductory text on the market today. Its format makes reading and learning more of an experience than a chore, even to students with no background in American government. This is one of the few texts that students should find hard to put down."
—WILLIAM H. JERVEY, JR., Florida Technological University

"An experience that should be shared by all students of American Government."
—ARTHUR C. HILL, Metropolitan Community College

**Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.**
New York • Chicago • San Francisco • Atlanta

### THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PAX AMERICANA

U.S. Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century

C. J. Bartlett

It is the basic premise of this book that to understand the United States' objectives in world peace, one must understand her foreign policy from the nineteenth century onward. In this lucid and comprehensive account, the author examines the constant interplay between domestic and foreign policy, places the Kennedy legend in perspective, and analyzes the traumatic impact of Vietnam, which signified the retreat from "Pax Americana."

April 1975 300 pages $16.95, cloth

### THE PLURALIST STATE

David Nicholls

*The Pluralist State* is a critical account of the ideas of English political pluralists of the first two decades of the twentieth century. The author presents a critical exposition of the ideas of these men—Acton, Maitland, Figgis, Laski, Cole, Russell—in the context of a growing European nationalism and a decline of negative, laissez-faire, liberalism. He examines the pluralist theory of the state in relation to the group and to the individual, and discusses the contemporary significance.

May 1975 300 pages $18.95, cloth

# New Books in Politi

### CHANGE WITHOUT WAR

The Shifting Structure of World Power

Alastair Buchan

Written by a leading authority in the field of international relations, this compact study analyzes the dramatic changes that have occurred recently in the relative influence, relationships, and preoccupations of the major nations of the world. The author suggests what kind of international institutions are needed to control our new universal problems—the environment, energy, transnational activity, and control of trade, money and arms.

*January 1975 112 pages $8.95, cloth*

# New Books in Political Science

### REVOLUTIONARY TRANSFORMATION IN THE ARAB WORLD

Habash and His Comrades,
from Nationalism to Marxism

Walid Kazziha

A former officer in the Arab Nationalist's Movement presents a brief account of the Movement since the Palestine War of 1948. Filling a sizable gap in the literature of Arab politics, this book shows how events have led to the transition from Nationalist to Marxist principles, and describes the disintegration of the ANM into a variety of groups and factions across the Arab world.

March 1975 128 pages $8.95, cloth

### DEMOCRACY

Jack Lively

Offering a broad account and critical evaluation of the current debate on democratic theory, the author discusses the works of the major writers on democracy today. He includes a definition of democracy, a discussion of the majority principle, an examination of the current modes of theorizing, and an analysis of "democratic ends"—the general interest, the common good, liberty, and participation.

March 1975 160 pages $10.95, cloth

## New Books

# New Book

### MARXISM AND IMPERIALISM

V. G. Kiernan

This book evaluates the contributions of classical Marxist theory to some of the main problems of nineteenth-century Imperialism. The approach of this study is remarkably fresh. Most Marxist theorizing has pointed to the basic incompatibility of Marxism with Imperialism. This study focuses on the connective factors.

January 1975 288 pages $18.95, cloth

# New Books in Political Science

### THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIALIST SOCIETY

Andras Hegedus

Written by the former Prime Minister of Hungary, this detailed study offers an authentic account of communist life. The book is remarkable for its honesty—the author labels his biases openly—and its coherent fusing of details with a flowing narrative.

March 1975 224 pages $9.95, cloth

### THE BRITISH GENERAL ELECTION OF FEBRUARY 1974

David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh

This particular general election was one of the most unique in British political history. The authors show how the events of previous years laid the scene for the election and how the energy crisis precipitated it. They describe the campaign tactics of each party, analyze the peculiar nationwide alarm over the poll of February 7th, and examine the incredibly close outcome.

January 1975 350 pages $18.95, cloth

**cal Science**

### THE IDEA OF SOCIAL CHOICE

David J. Mayston

Of interest to political scientists, economists, political philosophers, and public administrators, this book is concerned with the theory and analysis of collective decision making, as carried out by committees, parliaments, legislatures, and electorates. The author pursues an original approach to long-standing problems in welfare economics and the theory of social choice and studies the problems posed by attempts to relate the social choices made by legislatures to individual preferences.

March 1975 96 pages $10.95, cloth

### WORLD LEGISLATURES

*John Paxton, editor*

*World Legislatures* has been compiled to meet the demand for a one-volume reference book on those bodies of men and women in every country who are vested with the power to make, amend, and repeal laws. The book contains comprehensive coverage with concise descriptions of the complex procedures of legislatures in new states, developing states, states that are part of larger federations, and countries that have long-established legislatures.

March 1975 192 pages $16.95, cloth

**in Political Science**

### BRITISH POLITICAL FACTS, 1900-1974

Fourth Edition

David Butler and Anne Sloman

A truly unique handbook, *British Political Facts* now contains a greater variety of information than ever before. In addition to expanding and correcting the third edition, the authors have added a new chapter of famous quotations and their origin, new tables about cabinets and shadow-cabinets, and a fuller treatment of economic advice to Ministers.

April 1975 352 pages $19.95, cloth

### POLITICAL CHANGE IN BRITAIN

Second Edition

*David Butler and Donald Stokes*

The Second Edition is a thorough revision of a landmark study of voting behavior, party loyalty, and issues and ideologies. The authors have re-interviewed many of the same voters they surveyed in the mid-1960's for their first edition. With this new data, taken in a time of Labour rather than Conservative power, the authors make a more long-term assessment of stability and change in the electorate. New in the Second Edition are discussions of the decline of social class as a basis for party loyalty, and the effects of a huge influx of immigrants on the electorate as a whole.

February 1975 500 pages $17.95, cloth

**s in Political Science**

**St. Martin's Press**
P.O. Box 5352
New York, N.Y. 10017

". . . the most unpompous, clearest, and most lucid translation I have ever encountered."
—WOLFGANG M. NEUSCHAEFER, *Penn Valley Comm. College*

*A "CLEAN, SUPERIOR"* new translation of*

**PLATO'S REPUBLIC**

by **G. M. A. GRUBE**

**at a REMARKABLE PRICE—$1.75!**

"The excellence of the translation, the usefulness of the notes, and the very modest price makes this edition the only one I shall use."
—A. WAYNE COLVER, *Calif. State Univ. at Fresno*

**270 pages 1974 $1.75, paper $12.50, cloth**

"A BEAUTIFUL TRANSLATION—SMOOTH AND VERY ACCURATE."
—BENSON MATES, *Univ. of Calif., Berkeley*

* G. K. PLOCHMANN, *Southern Illinois Univ.*

**For an exam copy, send $1.00 to cover P & H to:**
**HACKETT PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC.**
**P.O. Box 55573**
**Indianapolis, Indiana 46205**

*New this Spring...*

**Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy**

*Harry N. Howard*

In this first study of American concern over the problem of the Turkish Straits, Howard traces American diplomacy from 1830—the date of the first Ottoman-American treaty of commerce—up to the present. He also considers the interaction of interests and policies of other powers in the region with those of the United States. $14.50

**The Federal Machine**

Beginnings of Bureaucracy in Jacksonian America

*Matthew A. Crenson*

Significant major changes toward the bureaucratic form of government were taken during the administration of Andrew Jackson. Crenson traces the process in the two then-largest agencies of the U.S. government—the Post Office Department and the General Land Office. He contends that Jacksonians resorted to rules, regulations, and surveillance in order to guarantee the reliability of human integrity. $10.00

**JOHNS HOPKINS**

The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland 21218

# The freshest ideas are from Viking

**STALIN**
**The Man and His Era**
**by Adam Ulam, Harvard University**
"...a full one-volume biography...which is likely to remain the most detailed and comprehensive study of Stalin...."
—PAUL AVRICH, *New York Times Book Review*
768 pages
$4.95 paper (C568); $12.95 cloth

**COLLECTED ESSAYS**
**by George Lichtheim**
The major essays of the brilliant theorist, historian, and critic, in which he explores many of the important international social, political, and intellectual issues of the twentieth century.
512 pages
$3.95 paper (C569); $15.00 cloth

**THE STALLED SOCIETY**
**by Michel Crozier**
A leading French sociologist examines the causes of societal breakdowns in advanced, post-industrial societies. A compelling new book by the author of *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon.*
192 pages
$2.25 paper (C572); $6.95 cloth

**EXPENDABLE AMERICANS**
**by Paul Brodeur**
An intensive investigation of corporate and governmental procedures which condone the death of tens of thousands of American workers annually. A biting indictment of the "medical-industrial complex."
256 pages
$2.95 paper (C580); $8.95 cloth

**AMERICAN ROULETTE**
**The History and Dilemma of the Vice-Presidency**
**by Donald Young**
**Revised and Updated**
**Introduction by Senator Birch Bayh**
A thorough, stimulating study of the nation's second highest office and the men who have held it—from John Adams to Gerald Ford. "...a bright, well-covered, up-to-date account of the nation's vital second office." —LOUIS KOENIG, N.Y.U.
448 pages $3.95 paper (C570)

**THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON**
**Edited by Merrill D. Peterson**
**University of Virginia**
A judicious selection of Jefferson's most important writings. Included are *A Summary View of the Rights of British America, Notes on the State of Virginia,* other key state papers and addresses, and seventy-nine letters.
704 pages
$3.95 paper (P80); $7.95 cloth

**THE OTHER GOVERNMENT**
**The Unseen Power of Washington Lawyers**
**by Mark J. Green**
A penetrating examination of the most powerful private citizens in America who exercise enormous influence over our daily lives, by the co-author of *Who Runs Congress?*
GROSSMAN PUBLISHERS
356 pages $10.00 cloth May

**RESIGNATION IN PROTEST**
**Political and Ethical Choices between Loyalty to Team and Loyalty to Conscience in American Public Life**
**by Edward Weisband, SUNY at Binghamton, and Thomas M. Franck, N.Y.U.**
A timely, provocative study which examines major high-level governmental resignations from William Jennings Bryan to Elliot Richardson.
GROSSMAN PUBLISHERS
320 pages $10.00 cloth April

**THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEES**
**A Study of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees**
**The Ralph Nader Congress Project**
**Peter H. Schuck, Director**
An in-depth analysis of one of the most powerful and controversial of Congressional committees. The first volume in a monumental new study of Congress.
GROSSMAN PUBLISHERS
480 pages
$6.95 paper (C594); $16.50 cloth

For a complete catalogue of all Viking paperback books, write to:

**THE VIKING PRESS**
625 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022

## *POLITICAL SCIENCE THESAURUS*

### Table of Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Description and Use of the *Thesaurus* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Associated Listing of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Permuted Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Geographical Listing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hierarchical Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Appendix 1 *Thesaurus* Rules and Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Appendix 2 Sources of Terms Used in Data Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Appendix 3 Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

## *POLITICAL SCIENCE THESAURUS*

The American Political Science Association is announcing publication of a major reference work, the *Political Science Thesaurus,* designed and developed at the University of Pittsburgh by the University Center for International Studies, the Knowledge Availability Systems Center and the Social Sciences Information Utilization Laboratory, in conjunction with the Scientific Information Exchange Committee of the Association.

The *Political Science Thesaurus* will serve as a major reference tool for political science as well as for other social sciences. The *Thesaurus* will be particularly useful to political scientists in their research and teaching activities. Libraries and information centers will find the *Thesaurus* very valuable for organizing their collections.

The *Thesaurus* will be employed as the terminology control device for a computer-based information retrieval service to be known as the United States Political Science Information System (USPSIS). At present, USPSIS exists as a one-year pilot demonstration project. Seventy-five journals, selected by members of the American Political Science Association, are being analyzed in their entirety. Articles are being described by listing their titles, sources, authors, abstracts, special features (such as maps and charts), and cited authors, proper names, and geographic areas. Each description also includes appropriate descriptions from the *Thesaurus.* Books, on a chapter by chapter basis, are to be included as well. The USPSIS demonstration project will result in practical revisions of the *Thesaurus* and valuable data concerning costs and benefits of alternative configurations for the System.

The *Political Science Thesaurus* will be available in both hardback and paperback editions of approximately 575 pages. An order form appears on the next page for your convenience.

# POLITICAL SCIENCE THESAURUS

*A Publication of the*

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

*In Conjunction with the*

UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
University of Pittsburgh

*Compiled by*

Carl Beck, Eleanor D. Dym, and J. Thomas McKechnie
University of Pittsburgh

---

# POLITICAL SCIENCE THESAURUS

## *ORDER FORM*

The *Political Science Thesaurus* will consist of approximately 575 pages 7 3/8" x 9 1/4" in size and will be available in both hardback and paperback editions. Prices for both are listed below on the order blank. Please return it with your payment to the American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. A 10% discount will be given to members of the APSA.

| | *Individual Rate* | *Institutional Rate* |
|---|---|---|
| HARDBACK EDITION: | $20.00 | $30.00 |
| PAPERBACK EDITION: | $15.00 | $25.00 |

Please make checks payable to the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

*Name* ____________________________________________

*Address* ____________________________________________

____________________________________________

____________________________________________

*Zip Code*

Enclosed is my payment in the amount of $__________ for __________ copy(ies) of the *POLITICAL SCIENCE THESAURUS*.

**NEW FROM CALIFORNIA**

**Governing Greater Stockholm**
A Study of Policy Development and System Change
Thomas J. Anton

In this study Mr. Anton argues that planning agencies frequently have little or no effect on urban development. Instead, he emphasizes the significance of organizations in shaping urban politics.
304 pages, $12.75

**Swedish Economic Policy**
Assar Lindbeck

In this sophisticated, factual study the author has focused mainly on economic policy in Sweden since the end of World War II. Considerable emphasis is placed on experiments with new tools to stabilize business fluctuations, such as attempts to influence the patterns of public and private investment. 239 pages, $12.00

**Moscow and the New Left**
Klaus Mehnert
Translated by Helmut Fischer

Analyzing hundreds of Soviet articles and books, Mr. Mehnert discusses the Soviet view of the Western intelligentsia and the emerging industrial and consumer society which gave rise in the West to the New Left. 304 pages, $12.50

**Underdevelopment in Kenya**
The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism, 1964-71
Colin Leys

Kenya has been widely regarded as a leading example of successful development and modernization. Colin Leys questions that view and challenges many prevailing ideas about African development, such as the significance of tribalism and the role of aid.
304 pages, $10.50

**The Myth of the *Lokamanya***
Tilak and Mass Politics in Maharashtra
Richard I. Cashman

Some historians depict *Lokamanya,* Bal Gangadhar Tilak, as India's first mass politician and a creative nationalist myth-maker; others see him as an opportunist who manipulated politics for selfish purposes. Mr. Cashman suggests Tilak did not create the myth of the *Lokamanya* but, responding to social and political pressures, became a prisoner of the myths. 256 pages, $12.50

**UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS**
**BERKELEY 94720**

## 1975 PUBLICATIONS

**CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS**

*Edited by* ANTHONY DE CRESPIGNY, *University of Cape Town, and* KENNETH R. MINOGUE, *University of London.* Paperback. 320 pp. $5.95

**IDEOLOGIES AND MODERN POLITICS, Second Edition**

*By* REO M. CHRISTENSON, ALAN S. ENGEL, DAN N. JACOBS, MOSTAFA REJAI, *and* HERBERT WALTZER, *all of Miami University.* Paperback. 288 pp. $4.95

**THE PRESIDENCY IN CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT**

*Edited by* NORMAN C. THOMAS, *University of Cincinnati.* Paperback. 320 pp. $5.95

**PUBLIC OPINION IN AMERICA**

*By* ALAN D. MONROE, *Illinois State University.* Paperback. 352 pp. $6.95

**VOTER'S CHOICE: Varieties of American Electoral Behavior**

*By* GERALD M. POMPER, *Rutgers University.* Paperback. $5.95

## 1974 PUBLICATIONS

**THE AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM**

*By* J. KEITH MELVILLE, *Brigham Young University.* Paperback. 353 pp. $4.95

**THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL PROCESS: Models and Approaches**

*By* CHARLES H. SHELDON, *Washington State University.* Paperback. 244 pp. $5.95

**BLACK CITY POLITICS**

*By* ERNEST PATTERSON, *University of Colorado.* Paperback. 310 pp. $5.95

**THE PHENOMENON OF REVOLUTION**

*By* MARK N. HAGOPIAN, *American International College.* Paperback. 402 pp. $6.95

*When requesting free professional copies,*
*give name of course and annual enrollment.*

DODD, MEAD & COMPANY
79 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

# Political Science

**Social Problems and Public Policy**
**INEQUALITIY AND JUSTICE**
edited by Lee Rainwater

*"An excellent reader; theoretically important and empirically rigorous articles are provided . . . some of the very highest quality work in applied policy research done in economics, political science, etc. Timely, thorough."*—H. Scott, Northwestern University

Poverty; health; education; housing; political power; welfare; racial, ethnic and sexual equality; pollution and environmental conservation; military power; international inequalities—these are the urgent issues that political scientists are dealing with today and will continue to confront. This book was specifically designed for political science courses dealing with public problems.

464 pp. $15.00 cloth $5.75 paper*

JUST PUBLISHED!

**WOMEN, WIVES, MOTHERS**
**Values and Options**
Jessie Bernard

One of the most important series of events in modern times—the restructuring of sex roles to adapt them to modern life—is unfolding before our eyes. In this lively, lucid book Jessie Bernard chronicles these epochal events from the perspective of a long lifetime of writing about women. She examines, with concern and expertise, the dramatic changes in values being experienced by women of all ages in all classes of society, and how these changes are affecting the options available to women in American society today.

300 pp. $15.00 cloth $5.95 paper*

**GREAT ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (Second Edition)**
edited by Morton A. Kaplan

*"An excellent collection of readings . . . really 'hangs together' and treats, from a number of different points of view, a large number of pertinent issues in international politics and American foreign policy."*—Robert H. Berkov, University of Southern California

The Second Edition of this highly acclaimed sourcebook—completely reorganized, expanded and updated—provides students with a lively and compelling means of approaching current foreign policy and the principles on which it is based, through analysis of the most pressing issues of our time. It is an invaluable text for all courses in U.S. foreign policy and international relations.

576 pp. $17.50 cloth $5.95 paper*

NOW IN PAPERBACK!

**HOUSING URBAN AMERICA**
edited by Jon Pynoos, Robert Schafer and Chester W. Hartman

*"An extremely valuable reader. . . a dense and solid collection that provides material that reflects varying points of view on housing problems (and) provides analyses from a number of different disciplinary perspectives. It should serve for a wide range of courses."*—Nathan Glazer, Harvard University, *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*

The editors of this book, three of the leading authorities in the field of urban planning, have compiled a selection of over 50 articles that promotes a balanced and comprehensive review of the range of housing problems in urban America.

630 pp. $25.00 cloth $9.95 paper*

# Texts from Aldine

**AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS**
**A Critical Introduction**
Blanche D. Blank

*"A judicious critical introduction . . . The students get the 'facts' but more so the difficulties and ambiguities that surround those facts. It will make them think."*—J. Fernandez, Brooklyn College

273 pp. $12.50 cloth $2.95 paper*

**THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE**
Theodore R. Marmor

*"Professor Marmor deals competently and comprehensively with the history, politics and economics of an important area of social legislation. The work is invaluable for students of public policy."*—John P. Crecine, Director, Institute of Public Policy Studies, University of Michigan

159 pp. $5.95 cloth $2.95 paper*

**POVERTY POLICY**
**A Compendium of Cash Transfer Proposals**
edited by Theodore R. Marmor

*"Extremely valuable . . . Dr. Marmor has pulled together the major reform proposals of the 1960s and provided a very useful framework for comparative analysis."*—Robert Harris, Executive Director, President's Commission on Income Maintenance Programs

241 pp. $9.95 cloth $4.95 paper*

**BENEFIT-COST AND POLICY ANALYSIS 1973**
**An Aldine Annual on Forecasting, Decision-Making and Evaluation**
edited by Robert H. Haveman, Arnold C. Harberger, Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., William A. Niskanen, Ralph Turvey, Richard Zeckhauser and Daniel Wisecarver

A selection by the distinguished panel of editors of 22 papers from among the most important written during 1973.

543 pp. $20.00 (institutional rate)
$14.00 (individual rate) $11.75 (text edition)*

**THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENCY**
**Concepts and Controversy**
**Second Edition**
edited by Robert S. Hirschfield

*"The most concise, and I might add, the best book of readings on the presidency. Superior to the first edition as it now gives 'equal space' to some of the more critical material."* —Martin S. Sheffer, Old Dominion University

407 pp. $9.75 cloth $3.95 paper*

**MEASUREMENT IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES**
**Theories and Strategies**
edited by H.M. Blalock, Jr.

This book deals with selected problems of measurement; it represents a series of studies of topics deemed to be crucial for the advancement of social science research, but which have not received sufficient attention to date.

512 pp. $16.00 cloth $8.95 paper*

**POWER AND POLITICS IN AFRICA**
Henry L Bretton

*"A first class book . . . It fills a wider range of purposes than any book currently available on African political systems. As such it stands out as a text book."* —Martin Kilson, Professor of Government, Harvard University

408 pp. $15.95 cloth $5.95 paper*

*text edition for classroom use only

**ALDINE
PUBLISHING
COMPANY
529 S. Wabash Ave.
Chicago, Ill. 60605**

# From The Free Press

## POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE

**A Policy Approach**

Edited by Garry D. Brewer, The Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, and Ronald D. Brunner, University of Michigan

This collection of original essays presents a comprehensive *interdisciplinary* approach to the study of political development and change. It stresses five intellectual tasks of problem orientation: goal values, trends, conditions, projections, and alternatives.

300 pages $17.95

## ON WAR

**Political Violence in the International System**

Manus I. Midlarsky, University of Colorado at Boulder

An investigation of the circumstances under which the onset of political violence — internationally, regionally, and domestically — is most likely; and those circumstances which most affect the intensity and duration of the conflict.

256 pages $12.95

## THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Edited by F.S. Northedge, London School of Economics and Political Science

Do we live by the force of law or the law of force? Nine original essays offer a thorough view of war, intervention, subversion, the threat and feasibility of force between the Great Powers, force in relations between the Great Powers and the Third World, restraints on the use of force, the balance of power and force as an instrument of diplomacy.

258 pages $12.95

## NEW DIRECTIONS IN POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

Edited by David C. Schwartz and Sandra Kenyon Schwartz, both, Rutgers University

Do children get their political concepts from popular culture? What is the socialization impact of the heroes, myths, and moods that popular culture creates? This book identifies and charts some important new directions and shifts in emphasis of theory and research which will advance the study of political socialization.

320 pages $12.95

## THE STRAINED ALLIANCE

**Peking, P'yŏngyang, Moscow, and the Politics of the Korean Civil War**

Robert Simmons, University of Guelph

The Korean conflict takes on new dimensions in this study based on Army intelligence files and translations of daily radio broadcasts from China, Russia, and North Korea. Simmons examines the conflict as a civil war, not as part of the Cold War.

288 pages $10.00

THE FREE PRESS
A DIVISION OF MACMILLAN PUBLISHING CO., INC.
100D Brown Street, Riverside, New Jersey 08075

# NEW HARPER TORCHBOOKS

**Frederick L. Bender, Editor**

## THE BETRAYAL OF MARX

"One main obstacle to a clear understanding of Marxism has been the failure to distinguish the views of Marx from those of his epigones. . . . It is to clarify the development of Marxism after Marx that the present anthology has been conceived."—*from the Preface* **HR/1805 $5.95**

**Anthony Giddens**

## THE CLASS STRUCTURE OF THE ADVANCED SOCIETIES

"Giddens's contribution in this book is to summarize and rethink the writings of Max Weber and Karl Marx . . . especially as these authors (and their critics) conceive of social class, class conflict, industrial society, and the future of social classes."—*Choice* **TB/1845 $3.95**

**Werner Maser**

## HITLER

***Legend, Myth, and Reality***

"There is much in [this] book that is new, and his material tends to explain Hitler rather than explain him away. . . . After Maser's work it will no longer be possible to dismiss Hitler's early successes as the product of fluke or demonic intuition." —John Cornwall, *Times Educational Supplement* **TB/1835 $3.95**

**David McLellan**

## THE THOUGHT OF KARL MARX

***An Introduction***

"Impressive both for the erudition it contains and for the great simplicity with which this erudition is displayed. . . . It is the sort of introductory work which should do a great deal of good."—*Times Literary Supplement* **TB/1839 $2.95**

**Christopher Norwood**

## ABOUT PATERSON

***The Making and Unmaking of an American City***

"A colorful detailed, excoriating tale of Jersey jobbery, but the achievement goes far beyond provincial reporting. . . . Miss Norwood takes Paterson as a negative 'model city' and uses its sad fate to show how our urban centers. . . . have yet to be saved."—*New York Times Book Review* **CN/393 $3.25**

**Alfred Rosenberg**

## RACE AND RACE HISTORY

***And Other Essays***

**Edited and Introduced by Robert Pois.** "This book is of prime importance for anyone who wants fully to understand the *völkisch* and Nazi religion. The new mythos was supposed to release the deep powers within the human and racial soul. . . . We can now follow [Rosenberg] into the abyss of this soul, remembering its consequences."—*Times Literary Supplement* **TB/1820 $2.95**

**Max Stirner**

## THE EGO AND HIS OWN

**Selected and Introduced by John Carroll.** "A classic of anarchist thought. . . . Many of the shocking things which were later said by Nietzsche were first said by Stirner."—Maurice Cranston, *Sunday Times* [London] **TB/1819 $3.45**

*for a complete catalog write*
*Harper Torchbooks, 10 East 53d Street, New York 10022*

## American Government

**Readings and Cases**
**Fifth Edition**
**Peter Woll**
Brandeis University

Invaluable as a sourcebook for American Government courses, this successful, balanced collection of readings and cases focuses on issues that are central to an understanding of the governmental process. It provides excellent coverage of Constitutional cases, plus historical and analytical background materials. 40% of the readings in the revised Fifth Edition are new; they deal with contemporary problems and the stresses that have been placed on the political system in the 1970's.
Paper approx. 544 pages
February 1975 $6.50 tent.

## Comparative Politics Today

**A World View**
**Gabriel A. Almond, General Editor**
**Frederick C. Barghoorn**
**Henry W. Ehrmann**
**Andrew J. Perry**
**Richard Rose**
**Robert E. Scott**
**James R. Townsend**

Finally! An introductory comparative politics text within the scope of the average undergraduate that doesn't need extensive (and expensive) supplementation *to provide representative coverage.* COMPARATIVE POLITICS TODAY offers a world view: in-depth studies of six countries — England, France, Russia, China, Mexico, and Tanzania — in one compact, attractively-designed, competitively-priced volume. The book combines a theoretical overview of political systems with the individual country studies. The book is heavily illustrated — with nearly 200 line drawings, photos, maps, and tables — and surprisingly readable, considering the range and depth of the material.
Cloth 477 pages 1974 $11.95

## Political Thinking

**The Perennial Questions**
***Second Edition***
**Glenn Tinder**
University of Massachusetts, Boston

There are certain basic, perennial questions that are essential to the nature of politics and political life — questions that have been asked by political thinkers since the time of Socrates. These are the questions that make up Glenn Tinder's POLITICAL THINKING, now available in its Second Edition. Engaging students directly in the activity of political thinking, this book offers issues, not answers.
Paper 206 pages 1974 $3.95

## The Unheavenly City Revisited

**Edward C. Banfield**
University of Pennsylvania

The storm of controversy over his book, THE UNHEAVENLY CITY (published five years ago), some changes in the problems of the cities, and 1970 census data have prompted Edward C. Banfield to "revisit" the American city. The book and its essentials are basically unchanged in the new edition. But, Banfield has tried to clear up some points of confusion — ambiguities of language — that he felt were distracting readers from his major points. He has also taken into account some recent developments in urban society that seem to be significant, and has added a new preface, which examines the controversy over the book *and attempts to distinguish misunder-*standings from valid differences of opinion.
Paper 358 pages 1974 $4.95

## The Politics of the Budgetary Process

**Expanded Edition**
**Aaron Wildavsky**
University of California, Berkeley

The new expanded edition of THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS is, like the original edition, a penetrating political analysis of federal budgetmaking. After a brief discussion on the nature of budgets, Prof. Wildavsky presents a straightforward description and analysis of the roles of those people involved in the budgetary process, viewing budgetary decisions as answers to central political questions — i.e., who gets what and how. The expanded edition features two new chapters: one evaluates and analyzes program budgeting; another discusses the loss of Congressional control over federal spending and suggests a new approach called the Annual Expenditure Increment. New, updated charts on the budgetary process and a new preface are also included.
Paper 271 pages 1974 $4.95

College Division
Little,
Brown
and Company
34 Beacon St.
Boston, Mass.
02106

# Little, Brown: *the* name in Political Science:

## INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SCIENCE/THEORY

**Political Socialization**
Richard E. Dawson/
Kenneth Prewitt
Paper 226 pp. 1969 $3.95

**The Political Culture of the United States**
Donald J. Devine
Cloth 383 pp. 1972 $7.95

**Crisis in Confidence**
The Impact of Watergate
Donald W. Harward
Paper 200 pp. 1974 $3.95

**Revolutionary Change**
Chalmers Johnson
Paper 191 pp. 1966 $3.95

**Elections and Political Stability**
A. J. Milnor
Paper 205 pp. 1969 $3.95

**The Dramas of Politics**
James N. Rosenau
Paper 250 pp. 1973 $4.95

**Political Thinking**
Glenn Tinder
Paper 206 pp. 1974 $3.95

**Foundations of Political Action**
Sidney R. Waldman
Paper 256 pp. 1972 $3.95

**Politics and Vision**
Sheldon S. Wolin
Cloth 529 pp. 1960 $12.95

## AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

**The Unheavenly City Revisited**
Edward C. Banfield
Paper 358 pp. 1974 $4.95

**The American Political Arena**
Joseph R. Fiszman/
Gene S. Poschman
Paper 631 pp. 1972 $6.95

**The End of Politics in America**
Michael Leiserson
Paper 276 pp. 1973 $5.95

**American Political Patterns**
Dan Nimmo/Thomas D. Ungs
Cloth 575 pp. 1973 $10.95

**Policy and Politics in America**
Allan P. Sindler
Paper 244 pp. 1973 $4.95

**American Government**
Peter Woll
Paper c. 574 pp. Feb. 1975
$6.50t

## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS/AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

**Essence of Decision**
Graham T. Allison
Paper 338 pp. 1971 $5.50

**International Politics**
Robert J. Art/Robert Jervis
Paper 567 pp. 1973 $6.95

**The Use of Force**
Robert J. Art/Kennetth N. Waltz
Paper 547 pp. 1971 $6.95

**The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy**
Bernard C. Cohen
Paper 222 pp. 1973 $4.95

**Defense Strategies for the Seventies**
Morton H. Halperin
Paper 149 pp. 1971 $3.95

**Readings in American Foreign Policy**
Morton H. Halperin/
Arnold Kanter
Paper 434 pp. 1973 $6.95

**Peace in Parts**
J. S. Nye
Paper 210 pp. 1971 $4.95

**Trends and Tragedies in American Foreign Policy**
Michael J. Parenti
Paper 228 pp. 1971 $4.50

**Politics in the American States**
Herbert Jacob/Kenneth N. Vines
Cloth 627 pp. 1971 $11.95

**Rites of Way**
Alan Lupo/Frank Colcord
Edmund P. Fowler
Paper 294 pp. 1971 $4.95

## POLITICAL PARTIES

**Party Politics in America**
Frank J. Sorauf
Cloth 445 pp. 1972 $9.95

**Political Parties in the American System**
Frank J. Sorauf
Paper 194 pp. 1964 $3.50

## PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION BUREAUCRACIES

**Essence of Decision**
Graham T. Allison
Paper 338 pp. 1971 $5.50

**Inside Bureaucracy**
Anthony Downs
Paper 292 pp. 1967 $5.95

**Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy**
Francis E. Rourke
Paper 173 pp. 1969 $4.50

**Bureaucratic Power in National Politics**
Francis E. Rourke
Paper 419 pp. 1972 $5.95

## LEGISLATIVE POLITICS PRESIDENCY

**Congressmen in Committees**
Richard F. Fenno, Jr.
Paper 302 pp. 1973 $5.50

**The Congressional Process**
Lewis A. Froman, Jr.
Paper 221 pp. 1967 $4.95

**Crisis in Confidence**
The Impact of Watergate
Donald W. Harward
Paper 200 pp. 1974 $3.95

**Legislative Politics U.S.A.**
Theodore J. Lowi/
Randall B. Ripley
Paper 383 pp. 1973 $5.95

**The Politics of Finance**
John F. Manley
Paper 395 pp. 1970 $4.95

**The Politics of the Budgetary Process**
Aaron Wildavsky
Paper 304 pp. 1974 $4.95

**Power, Action, and Interaction**
George H. Quester
Paper 573 pp. 1971 $5.95

**Planning, Prediction, and Policymaking in Foreign Affairs**
Robert L. Rothstein
Cloth 215 pp. 1972 $6.95

**The Elusive Enemy**
Simon Serfaty
Paper 241 pp. 1972 $4.50

**Dominance and Diversity**
Steven L. Spiegel
Paper 309 pp. 1972 $5.95

## COMPARATIVE POLITICS

**Comparative Politics**
Gabriel A. Almond/
G. Bingham Powell, Jr.
Paper 348 pp. 1966 $4.95

**The Civic Culture**
Gabriel A. Almond/Sidney Verba
Paper 379 pp. 1965 $3.95

**Crisis, Choice, and Change**
Gabriel A. Almond/Scott C.
Flanagan/Robert J. Mundt
Cloth 717 pp. 1973 $12.95

**Comparative Politics Today**
Gabriel A. Almond
General Editor
Frederick C. Barghoorn/Henry
W. Ehrmann/Andrew J. Perry/
Richard Rose/Robert E. Scott/
James R. Townsend
Cloth 477 pp. 1974 $11.95

**Cases in Comparative Politics**
James B. Christoph/
Bernard E. Brown
Paper 301 pp. 1969 $5.50

**European Politics**
Mattei Dogan/Richard Rose
Paper 590 pp. 1971 $7.95

**Ethnic Conflict and Political Development**
Cynthia H. Enloe
Paper 282 pp. 1973 $4.95

**Aspects of Political Development**
Lucian W. Pye
Paper 205 pp. 1966 $3.95

**Cases in Comparative Politics: Asia**
Lucian W. Pye
Paper 306 pp. 1970 $4.95

**China: An Introduction**
Lucian W. Pye
Paper 384 pp. 1972 $4.95

## JUDICIAL PROCESS

**Justice in America**
Herbert Jacob
Paper 237 pp. 1972 $3.95

## URBAN/LOCAL POLITICS

**Race in the City**
Joel D. Aberbach/Jack L. Walker
Paper 293 pp. 1973 $5.95

**The Unheavenly City Revisited**
Edward C. Banfield
Paper 358 pp. 1974 $4.95

**Metropolitan Politics**
Michael N. Danielson
Paper 426 pp. 1971 $5.95

**The View From Below**
Susan S. Fainstein/
Norman I. Fainstein
Paper 360 pp. 1972 $5.95

**State and Urban Politics**
Richard I. Hofferbert/
Ira Sharkansky
Paper 474 pp. 1971 $6.95

College Division
Little,
Brown
and Company
34 Beacon St.
Boston, Mass.
02106
75

# When your students need extra help . . . turn to Spectrum Books

## GLOBAL COMPANIES:

### The Political Economy of World Business

*Edited by George W. Ball*

Global companies, with budgets that often dwarf the economy of nations, are fast becoming one of the most potent forces in world trade and international relations, raising serious questions about their role and impact on the world economy and world politics.

Former Undersecretary of State George Ball and such leading authorities as Eugene Rostow, Jacques Maisonrouge, and Charles Kindleberger examine the unresolved, yet critical issues that surround global companies—how they function without restriction and often recognize no allegience other than profit.

*An American Assembly Book*

*May Cloth $8.95/Paper $2.95*

## CRIME AND PRIVILEGE:

### Toward a New Criminology

*By Barry Krisberg,*
*University of California, Berkeley*

Our criminal justice system has created an uneven, unhealthy social climate weighted on the side of the privileged.

In *Crime and Privilege,* criminologist Barry Krisberg shows how traditional methods of punishment and correction actually serve to suppress entire classes of individuals—mainly minorities—who pose a threat to the status quo.

The author offers a convincing argument for radical reform based on a new criminology that is not only responsive to the expectations of the privileged, but sensitive to the needs of the oppressed as well.

*June Cloth $7.95/Paper $2.95*

## Recently Published Volumes

## CHOOSING THE PRESIDENT

*Edited by James David Barber,*
*Duke University*

In the wake of recent campaign abuses and the resignation and pardon of an American President, crucial questions have been raised concerning the office and system which elects the President. Contributors examine these questions and analyze the election process from "eligibility" to the effect of recent reforms and the future of reforms of candidacy, campaigns, and election procedures.

*An American Assembly Book*

*Ready Cloth $7.95/Paper $2.95*

## THE NEW SOVEREIGNS:

### Multinational Corporations as World Powers

*Edited by Luiz Simmons and*
*Abdul Said, American University*

Should the multinationals be allowed to continue their relentless expansion? Such contributors as Irving Horowitz and Ronald Muller weigh the pros and cons of this question to provide a well-balanced examination of the nature, role and impact of the multinational on the world scene today.

*Ready Cloth $8.95/Paper $3.50*

## SUPERPOWERS AND VICTIMS:

### The Outlook for World Community

*By Charlotte Waterlow,*
*Browne and Nichols School*

This volume examines the massive problems emerging nations face, shows how the superpowers have both helped and prevented their growth, and presents a strong argument for global planning to manage world resources for the benefit of all peoples.

*Ready Cloth $6.95/Paper $2.95*

**Spectrum Books**

Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 07632

At your bookstore. Teachers: Examination copies available from your Prentice-Hall representative.

# PUBLICATIONS FROM UNITED NATIONS

**STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1973**
Important compilation of statistics from countries throughout the world covering a wide range of economic and social subjects, including: population, agriculture, manufacturing, construction, transport, trade, balance of payments, national income, education and culture. Improved statistical coverage has enabled the *Yearbook* to widen the territorial scope of many of its tables and to provide more comprehensive and accurate world and continental aggregates.

Order No. E.74.XVII.1 Clothbound $35.00



**COMPENDIUM OF HOUSING STATISTICS 1971**
This world-wide compilation of housing and related statistics is prepared by the Statistical Office of the United Nations with the assistance of the Population Division and in co-operation with the Centre for Housing, Building and Planning. Its main purpose is to make available information derived from national housing censuses and to provide for a more complete interpretation of this information than would otherwise be possible by presenting other data that have a bearing on the housing situation. These include data on population and its growth, dwelling construction, the cost of housing, and capital formation in housing.

Order No. E/F.73.XVII.4 $14.50



**YEARBOOK OF CONSTRUCTION STATISTICS 1963-1972**
This is the first in a new series of annual compilations of statistics on world construction activity and has been prepared to make available the information derived from annual surveys in this field undertaken all over the world.

The data presented in this publication are primarily based on replies to the Construction Statistics Questionnaire of the United Nations, distributed in 1972 for the first time. The information received has been supplemented in a few instances with data obtained from published sources, as well as with the work undertaken by the Statistical Office on the compilation of construction statistics in the United Nations *Statistical Yearbook.*

Order No. E.74.XVII.9 Clothbound $18.00

**DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK 1973**
The twenty-fifth issue of the *Demographic Yearbook* contains 1973 statistics of area, population, natality, mortality, nuptiality and divorce for every country of the world, latest available data on expectation of life and a 7-year trend of international arrivals and departures. Data on the economic characteristics of the population are shown, including labour force participation rates by age and sex as well as various cross-classifications of population by industry, occupation, status, age and sex.

Order No. E/F.74.XIII.1 Clothbound $38.00

**United Nations Publications,** Room LX-2300, New York, N.Y. 10017
or
**Palais des Nations,** 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland



Soar to New Heights on a

**TO KEEP THE REPUBLIC: Governing the United States in Its Third Century. David J. Olson,** Indiana University and Visiting Professor at the University of Washington, and **Philip Meyer,** National Correspondent, Knight Newspapers
Offer your students a knowledge of where the nation has been to help them understand where it is—and where it is going. This comprehensive introductory text combines an analysis of standard topics and traditional concerns with an exploration of contemporary issues and unconventional political structures and processes. Balancing the shortcomings of the democratic experience against the demonstrated successes, the authors consider the realities of contemporary government and determine which political resources, strategies, and tactics produce which results. Creative and critical thinking is stimulated by this engaging text as readers are challenged to examine provocative issues and resolve the contradictions of a modern, complex democracy.
Instructor's manual available. 1975, 480 pages, $11.50

College and University Division, **McGraw-Hill Book Company,**

**POLICY AND POLITICS IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS**
**Ira Sharkansky**, University of Wisconsin, and **Donald S. Van Meter**, Ohio State University
To understand why and how American governments have evolved—and what things governments do—or fail to do—the authors look to the formation and delivery of public policy in the United States. This brief, selectively written introductory text provides students with a framework for examining policy and politics. Combining institutional and behavioral research, the authors use the study of government to begin the study of politics. *Policy and Politics in American Governments* integrates all levels of the political system, thereby making students acutely aware of the interrelationships between national, state, and local government. Instructor's Manual available. 1975, 360 pages, paper, $6.95

**McGraw-Hill**
**Text...**

**ELEMENTARY POLITICAL ANALYSIS, Second Edition**
**Herbert Jacob**, Northwestern University, and **Robert Weissberg**, Cornell University
Do more than acquaint your students with political structure and procedure. Teach them to *think* about politics. Through self-paced, semi-programmed units, *Elementary Political Analysis* develops skills needed to distinguish fact from value judgement and to formulate vague generalizations into analyzable propositions. Keyed for use with most basic texts in American government, this extensively field-tested supplement has consistently improved student capacity for analytical thinking.
1975, 320 pages, paper, $7.95

*Prices subject to change.*

1221 Avenue of the Americas, New York, N.Y. 10020

**Only a time machine could give you a better picture of America's past.**

Short of time travel, primary sources best portray the events and ambience of the past.

And when it's America's past you're studying, we have the most comprehensive selection of relevant primary sources available: some 18,000 American books and periodicals written from the discovery of the New World through the turn of the 20th century.

[illegible] Special Collections [illegible] to serve you

SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
of BOOKS and PERIODICALS

The American Series

**Xerox University Microfilms**
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

XEROX

XEROX® is a trademark of XEROX CORPORATION.

the
handbook of
political science

**Edited by Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby**

**VOLUME 1: POLITICAL SCIENCE: SCOPE AND THEORY**
1 *Dwight Waldo:* "Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise"
2 *J. Donald Moon:* "The Logic of Political Inquiry: A Synthesis of Opposed Perspectives"
3 *Dante Germino:* "The Contemporary Relevance of the Classics of Political Philosophy"
4 *Felix E. Oppenheim:* "The Language of Political Inquiry: Problems of Clarification"
5 *Brian Barry and Douglas W. Rae:* "Politcal Evaluation"

**VOLUME 2: MICROPOLITICAL THEORY**
1 *Fred I. Greenstein:* "Personality and Politics"
2 *David O. Sears:* "Political Socialization"
3 *Moshe M. Czudnowski:* "Political Recruitment"
4 *J. David Greenstone:* "Group Theories"
5 *Dennis J. Palumbo:* "Organization Theory and Political Science"

**VOLUME 3: MACROPOLITICAL THEORY**
1 *Samuel P. Huntington & Jorge I. Dominguez:* "Political Development"
2 *Robert A. Dahl:* "Governments and Political Oppositions"
3 *Juan J. Linz:* "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes"
4 *Michael Taylor:* "The Theory of Collective Choice"
5 *Charles Tilly:* "Revolutions and Collective Violence"
6 *Arthur L. Stinchcombe:* "Social Structure and Politics"

**VOLUME 4: NONGOVERNMENTAL POLITICS**
1 *Norman H. Nie & Sidney Verba:* "Political Participation"
2 *Philip E. Converse:* "Public Opinion and Voting Behavior"
3 *Robert H. Salisbury:* "Interest Groups"
4 *Leon D. Epstein:* "Political Parties"

**VOLUME 5: GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES**
1 *Harvey Wheeler:* "Constitutionalism"
2 *William H. Riker:* "Federalism"
3 *Anthony King:* "Executives"
4 *Nelson W. Polsby:* "Legislatures"
5 *Martin Shapiro:* "Courts"
6 *Mark Nadel & Francis Rourke:* "Bureaucracies"

**VOLUME 6: POLICIES AND POLICY-MAKING**
1 *Harold D. Lasswell:* "Research in Policy Analysis: The Intelligence & Appraisal Functions"
2 *Joseph A. Pechman:* "Making Economic Policy: The Role of the Economist"
3 *Harvey M. Sapolsky:* "Science Policy"
4 *Charles E. Gilbert:* "Welfare Policy"
5 *Duane Lockard:* "Race Policy"
6 *Robert C. Fried:* "Comparative Urban Policy and Performance"
7 *Bernard C. Cohen & Scott A. Harris:* "Foreign Policy"
8 *John G. Grumm:* "The Analysis of Policy Impact"

**VOLUME 7: STRATEGIES OF INQUIRY**
1 *Clement E. Vose:* "Sources for Political Inquiry: I Library Reference Materials and Manuscripts as Data for Political Science"
2 *Jerome M. Clubb:* "Sources for Political Inquiry: II Quantitative Data"
3 *Harry Eckstein:* "Case Study and Theory in Political Science"
4 *Hayward R. Alker, Jr.:* "Polimetrics: Its Descriptive Foundations"
5 *Richard A. Brody & Charles N. Brownstein:* "Experimentation and Simulation"
6 *Richard W. Boyd & Herbert H. Hyman:* "Survey Research"
7 *Gerald H. Kramer & Joseph Hertzberg:* "Formal Theory"
8 *Herman Kahn:* "On Studying the Future"

**VOLUME 8: INTERNATIONAL POLITICS**
1 *Kenneth N. Waltz:* "Theory of International Relations"
2 *Dina Zinnes:* "Research Frontiers in the Study of International Politics"
3 *George H. Quester:* "The World Political System"
4 *Richard Smoke:* "National Security Affairs"
5 *Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye:* International Interdependence and Integration"
6 *Leon Lipson:* "International Law"

For detailed information and prices write the publisher.

*Social Science & Humanities Division*
ADDISON-WESLEY PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC.
503 Jacob Way
Reading, Massachusetts 01867

# NEW IN 1975

THE **71st ANNUAL MEETING** OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION WILL BE HELD TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 2 THROUGH FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 5 IN

# SAN FRANCISCO

WATCH FOR DETAILS IN THE SPRING **PS** OF THESE NEW FEATURES:

- PANELS WILL BEGIN TUESDAY MORNING AT 9:30, AND END FRIDAY AFTERNOON AT 4:00
- CASSETTE TAPES OF YOUR PANELS WILL BE AVAILABLE
- YOU CAN PRE-REGISTER AND AVOID THE LONG LINES
- YOU CAN TAKE A **CHARTER FLIGHT** FROM THE EAST COAST, OR
- YOU CAN TAKE ADVANTAGE OF A PRE- OR POST-CONVENTION TOUR TO **HAWAII**

## Broadening the bases of understanding foreign policy . . .

### U. S. FOREIGN POLICY Context, Conduct, Content

**Marian D. Irish and Elke Frank**

This new textbook focuses on the *current conduct* of American foreign policy—how our foreign policy is formulated and how it is implemented, by Congress as well as by the Chief Executive. The authors begin in the first three chapters with a clear, operational definition of foreign policy and with a discussion of the *context* in which our current foreign policy has developed—the changing character of the domestic and international environments from 1945 to the present. They then analyze and explain foreign policy machines and agencies within government, the nature of policymaking, options open to the American public, and the strategic instruments of foreign policy—economic, diplomatic, psychological, and military. Throughout the text, the authors use a conceptual framework: they clearly demonstrate that the context, conduct, content of our foreign policy is an integrated whole that is best understood through a behavioral—rather than merely descriptive—approach.

**Paperbound. 576 pages (probable)**

## and comparative politics

### INDIA Government and Politics in a Developing Nation

**SECOND EDITION**

**Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr.,** University of Texas

This brief, elementary textbook introduces students to the problems of political and economic development in developing nations through an analysis of the experience of one country—India. Professor Hardgrave examines India's struggle for independence, the development of the standardized democratic institutions, and its efforts to establish itself as a power in Asia and in the world. He recounts the experiences of India's special interest groups and discusses the critical roles each of these groups plays in terms of making demands on the government and of being the objects of public policy. He then provides an overview of the general public's increasing participation in—and demands on—a political system with limited institutional capacities to respond. This new Second Edition brings the text narrative fully up to date and includes a new concluding chapter in which Professor Hardgrave analyzes India's future role in the international community of superpowers and developing nations.

**Paperbound. 280 pages**

HBJ

**HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH, INC.**
New York · Chicago · San Francisco · Atlanta

# POLITICAL SCIENCE

Reo M. Christenson
**CHALLENGE AND DECISION:**
**Political Issues of Our Time, Fourth Edition**
227 pages $4.25: paper 1973

Richard E. Dawson
**PUBLIC OPINION AND**
**CONTEMPORARY DISARRAY**
221 pages $4.50: paper 1973

James Eisenstein
**POLITICS AND THE LEGAL PROCESS**
356 pages $4.95: paper 1973

Herbert Hirsch and David C. Perry
**VIOLENCE AS POLITICS:**
**A Series of Original Essays**
262 pages $4.95: paper 1973

Raymond F. Hopkins and Richard W. Mansbach
**STRUCTURE AND PROCESS**
**IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS**
498 pages $11.95: cloth 1973

John W. Kingdon
**CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS**
313 pages $9.95: cloth $5.95: paper 1973

Felix A. Nigro and Lloyd G. Nigro
**MODERN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION,**
**Third Edition**
468 pages $11.95: cloth 1973

Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie
**PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA:**
**Political Democracy and Social Equality**
428 pages $5.95: paper 1972

## LATIN AMERICAN CULTURE:
## An Anthropological Synthesis

**Emilio Willems**

The first genuinely anthropological introduction to Latin American culture, this book examines the various institutions of Latin American society within the context of a common way of life or culture. The text covers the emergence of the traditional culture, emphasizing the functional interdependence of such elements as the landed estate, family and kinship structure, and religion, and synthesizes the evolution of modern Latin America, stressing change, growing complexity, and newly developing forms of integration. January 1975. Tentative: 384 pages; $12.95/cloth.

*From Harper's MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT SERIES*

## MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT:
## POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION

**Lynton K. Caldwell**

The impact of the environmental crisis on public policy is examined with insight and clarity that help students grasp sophisticated and novel concepts. The development of policies designed to safeguard a quality environment and the reasons why traditional institutions are unable to manage man-nature interactions are outlined. January 1975. 172 pages; $9.95/cloth; $3.95/paper.

## MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT:
## CITIZEN ACTION

**Odom Fanning**

This lively, comprehensive text on how concerned and responsible individuals can and do act to shape a quality environment explores actual case histories and step-by-step methods for environmental action. The background and development of voluntary citizen environmental movements and the forces now shaping the environment's future are reviewed. January 1975. Tentative: 288 pages; $9.95/cloth; $4.95/paper.

1817

**FROM HARPER & ROW**

*10 East 53d Street, New York 10022*

## The United States: A STUDY OF A DEVELOPING COUNTRY

**IRA SHARKANSKY,** *University of Wisconsin, Madison*

Sharkansky demonstrates that the sharp contrast between the rich and poor sectors of the U.S., a parallel of the situation that exists in countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, has important implications for the competing policy goals of economic growth and conservation. He argues for economic growth as a way to maximize opportunities for the less-developed sectors of the U.S.

(**Courses:** *American Politics, Public Policy*) $3.95, paper

## The Politics of Women's Liberation

**JO FREEMAN,** *State University of New York, Purchase*

"Jo Freeman is one of the most effective and perceptive participants in the movement for women's liberation. This book is required reading for those who would understand its politics."—Jerome H. Skolnick, *University of California, Berkeley*

(**Courses:** *Public Policy, Women's Studies*) $8.95, cloth; $4.95, paper

## Education in National Politics

**NORMAN C. THOMAS,** *University of Cincinnati*

"Conveniently and expertly summarizes the complicated scene of education and politics. And it goes well beyond what is already familiar to provide a richly detailed analysis of the policy concern."—Robert A. Salisbury, *Washington University, St. Louis*

(**Course:** *Public Policy*) $4.95, paper

## The Politics of Pollution in a Comparative Perspective

**CYNTHIA ENLOE,** *Clark University*

A study of the factors which shape the ways that power and opinion interact to produce government policies regarding environmental disruption, as well as the policies which disregard these hazards.

(**Courses:** *Comparative Politics, Comparative Public Policy*) $4.95, paper

## Notes on the Old System: TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN POLITICS

**MARCUS RASKIN,** *Institute for Policy Studies*

"Scratches an itch that no other commentary on Watergate has managed to do. . . . Read it: if you've forgotten where we were before Watergate came and drowned us, this will refresh your memory."—*The New York Times*

(**Courses:** *American Politics, Presidency*) $6.95, cloth; $2.95, paper

**DAVID McKAY COMPANY, INC.** • 750 Third Avenue, New York 10017

# FOREIGN AFFAIRS

## JAPAN IN CRISIS

### Essays on Taishō Democracy

**Edited by BERNARD S. SILBERMAN and H. D. HAROOTUNIAN**

The widespread social, political, economic, and cultural changes that occurred during the years of Japan's modernization movement in the early twentieth century are discussed in thirteen essays by Japanese and American scholars concerned with the Taishō period. $17.50

## LIBERALS IN THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

### The Constitutional Democratic Party, 1917-1921

**WILLIAM G. ROSENBERG**

How the Constitutional Democrats, or Kadets, responded to the events of the Russian Revolution and failed at the time of the party's greatest crisis is the subject of this political history of Russia's most prominent liberal party from 1917 to 1921. *Studies of the Russian Institute, Columbia University* Cloth, $25.00
Limited Paperback Edition, $9.75

## POLITICAL UNDERCURRENTS IN SOVIET ECONOMIC DEBATES

### From Bukharin to the Modern Reformers

**MOSHE LEWIN**

Although current economic debate in the Soviet Union deals overtly with such issues as economic planning and the pattern of economic growth, at its core are basic questions concerning the role of the state and its relation to society. Moshe Lewin emphasizes the essentially political nature of the present controversy by demonstrating its affinities with Soviet political and economic thought since Stalin. $16.50

## THE UNITED STATES AND THE CARIBBEAN REPUBLICS, 1921-1933

**DANA GARDNER MUNRO**

The shift in United States policy from that of active intervention to one of noninterference in the internal political affairs of the Caribbean states is the subject of Munro's study. The author concentrates on several important issues —the failure to compel political reforms in Cuba from 1921 to 1923, the withdrawal of the occupations from the Dominican Republic and Haiti, the intervention in Nicaragua, the response to the Machado and Trujillo dictatorships, and the refusal to recognize revolutionary governments in Central America. $17.50

## THE TUNISIA OF AHMAD BEY, 1837-1855

**L. CARL BROWN**

Under the energetic but confused prodding of the activist ruler Ahmad Bey, Tunisia made its first effort to institute European-inspired political and military reforms. Within the broad historical context of change imposed by the West on the rest of the world, Professor Brown presents this work on the reign of Ahmad Bey as both a case study in modernization as well as a historical survey of Tunisia in the mid-nineteenth century. $20.00

**Write for our new History catalogue.**

**PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS**
Princeton, New Jersey 08540

OXFORD

## The American Party Systems

Stages of Political Development

Second Edition

Edited by **WILLIAM NISBET CHAMBERS,** Washington University, and **WALTER DEAN BURNHAM,** Massachusetts Institute of Technology. □ Widely acclaimed as a standard work on American political parties, this volume brings together essays by five political scientists and five historians concerning the origins, characteristics, and functions of the American political party system. For this edition, Professor Burnham has contributed a new essay on the politics of the 1970s in which he describes a critical political realignment taking place outside the traditional party system.

Spring 1975 380 pp. 8 charts cloth $10.95 paper $3.95

## Power, Influence, and Authority

**DAVID V. J. BELL,** York University. □ Drawing on recent theories of communication and decision-making, Professor Bell approaches the concept of power by way of political linguistics in this volume. He maintains that power, influence, and authority must be distinguished and that they are expressed through different types of communication. By clarifying these three concepts, he seeks to provide a means for evaluating, explaining, and predicting political acts, not only in the national and international arena but within the family and marketplace as well.

Spring 1975 112 pp. cloth $6.95 paper $1.95

## Politics, Position, and Power

The Dynamics of Federal Organization

Second Edition

**HAROLD SEIDMAN,** University of Connecticut. □ Acclaimed as "one of the most important books in public administration in the last several decades" *(American Political Science Review),* this inside view of federal organization has now been revised and expanded to include new statistical and reference material as well as considerable analysis of President Nixon's experiences with reorganization, particularly his attempted "New American Revolution."

Spring 1975 368 pp. paper $3.95

## The Judicial Mind Revisited

Psychometric Analysis of Supreme Court Ideology

**GLENDON SCHUBERT,** University of Hawaii. □ Using sophisticated computer techniques, Professor Schubert provides a comprehensive study of the voting behavior of the Supreme Court Justices from the end of World War II through the chief justiceship of Earl Warren. "If there is a genius at large in the judicial process/behavior subfield, he is surely writing under the name of Glendon Schubert. This book is a scholarly tour de force and a significant contribution."

—Sheldon Goldman, University of Massachusetts, Amherst

1974 192 pp. illus. cloth $9.00 paper $4.95

## Democracy and Disobedience

**PETER SINGER,** Latrobe University, Australia. □ "The purpose of the book is to consider the question: does democracy entail obligations to obey the laws which non-democratic systems do not?...The argument is careful, complex, and subtle, even though it is quite brief. It is an especially important book....This book is most suitable...for any topically oriented course in political philosophy—at any level."

—Alan Wertheimer, University of Vermont in *Perspective*

1973 (paper, 1974) 150 pp. cloth $6.50 paper $2.25

## The Judicial Process

An Introductory Analysis of the Courts of the United States, England, and France

Third Edition

**HENRY J. ABRAHAM,** University of Virginia. ☐ Now completely updated, revised, and enlarged, the Third Edition of this standard work continues to offer a clear and thorough comparative introduction to the theory and practice of the judicial process in the United States, England, and France. Most of the book is devoted to a study of the United States judiciary with particular emphasis on the Supreme Court and judicial review.

Spring 1975 544 pp. cloth $12.95 paper $5.95

## In Search of American Foreign Policy

The Humane Use of Power

**LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD,** Massachusetts Institute of Technology. ☐ "Delightful reading, urbane, literate, sensible, thought-provoking...." —John D. Montgomery, Harvard University. "A first-rate and much-needed philosophical essay on the uses of power and the foundations of American foreign policy."—G. J. Buckley, Northern Arizona University. "A thoughtful and creative statement of the liberal position."

—Whittle Johnston, University of Virginia

1974 192 pp. cloth $6.95 paper $1.95

## Suez 1956

International Crises and the Role of Law

**ROBERT R. BOWIE,** Harvard University. ☐ Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956 set off a series of political reactions that led to the invasion of the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula by Israeli troops in October, the bombing of towns along the Suez by the French and British, and the landing of French and British troops in the Suez area. Although international law did not prevent the use of force, Professor Bowie argues that it was a major factor affecting the actions and policy-making of the Egyptians, Israelis, British, French, Americans, Russians, and other Canal users.

1974 (cloth 1975) 176 pp. cloth $7.50 paper $2.50

## Cyprus 1958-1967

International Crises and the Role of Law

**THOMAS EHRLICH,** Stanford University Law School. ☐ "Anyone interested in the contemporary relevance and application of international law —a too frequently neglected dimension of modern international relations— ought to read and contemplate this short book....The book is a most useful contribution to an intelligent understanding of modern international relations and a welcome antidote to the innumerable studies today which tend to dismiss international law as an outmoded and Utopian concept."

—Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., Louisiana State University in *Perspective*

1974 176 pp. paper $1.95

## The Cuban Missile Crisis

International Crises and the Role of Law

**ABRAM CHAYES,** Harvard University. ☐ In this volume, Professor Chayes, former adviser to the U.S. State Department during the Cuban Missile Crisis, assesses how international law entered into the policy making process during the Crisis. "An excellent analysis of the interaction of law and politics, interesting for the scholar as well as the student, by one who was both involved participant and detached observer."

—Robert McGeehan, City College of New York

1974 176 pp. cloth $5.95 paper $1.95

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10016

*Coming—Spring '75...*

*6th Edition of a leading text in the field—*

**Presthus: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**

**Robert Presthus**, York University

**Extensively revised, with emphasis upon policy making,** the new edition of this standard text provides fully up to date coverage for the introductory course in public administration.

Throughout, the author's own research is used to demonstrate the vital role of officials in the policy-making process. Materials discussed include citizen participation, community control, the rise and fall of planning-programming-budgeting systems, and labor-management relations in public service. Also featured are new developments in systems analysis, computer technology, and the policy sciences—all viewed as instruments of official policy-making.

Building on the highly successful approach originally developed by **John M. Pfiffner** and refined in collaboration with Dr. Presthus, the book presents a balanced synthesis of the political-economic environment of public administration and its major functional areas.

*Organized in 21 chapters, 5 major parts...*

- **I. The Study and Context of Public Administration**
- **II. Community Participation and Organizational Theory**
- **III. Personnel: Policies and Programs**
- **IV. Financial Policy and the Budget Process**
- **V. Seeking Administrative Responsibility**

6th Ed., 1975. 450 pages

**For further information or a copy of the new Ronald Catalog, write to:**

THE RONALD PRESS COMPANY
79 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

# CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY

## *presents*



### 1

### WASHINGTON INFORMATION DIRECTORY 1975

Two years in the making, a thoroughly indexed directory of who and where to call or write for information on almost any subject. A roadmap through the bureaucracy of Washington, D.C., its federal agencies, professional associations, embassies and its regional offices around the U.S. Compiled for librarians, schools, city/state/federal officials and those who look to Washington for information.

April 1975. Approx. 800 pages. 6 x 9½". Clothbound. Tentative price $18. Annual series.



### 2

### THE COMPLETE WATERGATE

CHRONOLOGY OF A CRISIS

The one permanent work historians will turn to when evaluating and re-evaluating the implications of the Watergate scandal. Includes the highly acclaimed and widely recommended Volumes One and Two (paper), plus 350 pages on Nixon's resignation, Ford's ascension, the pardon and the trials of the coverup conspirators. Documentary appendix, fully indexed.

March 1975. Approx. 1,000 pages. 8½ x 11". Clothbound. Tentative price $35.00.

**Please order directly from:**

**Congressional Quarterly Inc.**
**1414 22nd St. N.W.**
**Washington, D.C. 20037**



### 3

### GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS 1789-1974

A new reference work for libraries and scholars. In print for the first time, the most complete voting records available of elections for Presidency, Congress, Senate and Governorships. Also a history of political parties, convention ballots and platforms. Demographic data, electoral college and redistricting. The most comprehensive compilation of data on U.S. elections ever published.

May 1975. Approx. 1,200 pages. 8½ x 11". Clothbound. Tentative price $45.00.



### 4

### HISTORIC DOCUMENTS OF 1974

This third volume of an annual series carries on the tradition of selecting documents published during the past year which are of historical importance. This series gives students, scholars, librarians, journalists and citizens convenient access to documents of basic importance in the broad range of public affairs. The 1974 edition includes: Impeachment articles, key Watergate tapes, Nixon resignation, President Ford's major statements, Middle East peace agreements, economic summit, Rockefeller nomination.

March 1975. Approx. 1,100 pages. 7 x 10½". Clothbound. Tentative price $30.00
Historic Documents of 1972, 1973 also available: $30.00 each.

# 1975 DRYDEN PRESS 1975

## The Governing of Men, Fourth Edition
**Austin Ranney**

This imminently teachable introduction to political science is rapidly becoming a classic in the field. The fourth edition has been reorganized to make the text an even more viable teaching tool. This edition has been thoroughly updated through late 1974 and includes recent political developments such as the impeachment crisis, the women's rights movement, the alienation from governmental institutions, etc. An instructor's manual accompanies the text. Published Spring 1975

## Governing: A Brief Introduction to Political Science, Second Edition
Austin Ranney

A shortened paperback version of *The Governing of Men.*

## Nations and Men, Third Edition
Ivo D. Duchacek

A concise, introductory text in international politics that seeks to provide today's students with the essential tools for analyzing how nations, people, and the system of nation states interact. Focuses on why nations and people act as they do and how they can be expected to act—in all probability—in the last decades of the twentieth century. Includes an increased number of short insert-featurettes which quote original documents and statements (for example: Nixon-Chou Peking communique, the Arab-Israeli disengagement agreement, the Brezhnev Doctrine, etc.) and which give the student the exact wording—and flavor—of legal and ideological rhetorics. Published Spring 1975

## Essentials of American Democracy, Seventh Edition
Carr, Bernstein, Murphy, Danielson

In comparison to previous editions, the Seventh Edition has more thematic unity. It has been thoroughly rethought, completely brought up to date and substantially rewritten. The authors have tried to integrate into each chapter not only recent political events but also, and more importantly, new analyses by social scientists. Published Winter 1974

## Supplementary and Reference Materials

### Political Science Dictionary
Jack Plano, Roy Olton,
Milton Greenberg, Robert Riggs
Published 1973

### International Relations Dictionary
Jack Plano and Roy Olton
Published 1973

### American Political Dictionary, Third Edition
Jack Plano and Milton Greenberg
Published 1972

### Dictionary of Political Analysis
Jack Plano and Robert Riggs
Published 1972

**The Dryden Press**
**A division of Holt, Rinehart and Winston**
**901 N. Elm Street, Hinsdale, Illinois 60521**

## 3 New 1975 Texts From HOLBROOK PRESS, INC.

### SHANK & CONANT
### Urban Perspectives: Politics & Policies

**Alan Shank,** State University of New York at Geneseo, and **Ralph W. Conant,** University of Houston and Southwest Center for Urban Research. 1975, Paperbound, Est. 420 pp.

### BERMAN
### State and Local Politics

**David R. Berman,** Arizona State University. 1975, Est. 336 pp.

### UVEGES
### The Dimensions of Public Administration, 2nd Ed.

**Joseph A. Uveges, Jr.,** Western Kentucky University. 1975, Paperbound, Est. 500 pp.

**HOLBROOK PRESS, INC.,** (A subsidiary of Allyn and Bacon, Inc.)
Dept. A93, 470 Atlantic Ave., Boston, MA 02210

# New and Recent

## BEYOND THE WATER'S EDGE

### America's Foreign Policies

Howard Bliss *and* M. Glen Johnson, *Vassar College*

This brief overview traces America's foreign policy from development of the post World War II consensus to the breakdown of that consensus in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The authors deal with such matters as the nature of foreign policy; the major historic themes of U.S. foreign policy; the major characteristics of the post-war international system; the President and his primacy in policy making; the foreign affairs bureaucracy; Congress and foreign policy; and the impact of non-governmental institutions (the media, public opinion, interest groups) on foreign policy.

272 pages/paperbound/January 1975/$4.75

## POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY IN AMERICA

### An Introduction

David A. Caputo, *Purdue University*

A concise introduction to American government that stresses contemporary aspects of American institutions and public policy while providing students with factual and theoretical information required to stimulate critical thought about the complexities and characteristics of the American political system. Appropriate attention is given throughout to important contemporary issues such as race, sex discrimination, international conflict and human rights. Coverage includes national political institutions — congress, the courts, the presidency, the federal bureaucracy; state and urban politics; group politics and political parties; public policy; the future of American politics.

302 pages/paperbound/1974/$3.95

## THE PINNACLE

### The Contemporary American Presidency

John F. Murphy, *U.S. Coast Guard Academy*

In this fresh analysis of the modern American presidency, the author asserts that President Truman recognized basic transformations in the nation wrought by World War II, and that he moved to create in the presidency an instrument of permanent authority capable of pursuing a national agenda. Truman thus placed the President at the pinnacle of authority and responsibility, and he and his successors must be evaluated in that light. Professor Murphy then examines the thrust of each administration, its success in achieving the national agenda, prospects and possible problems for the presidency.

215 pages/paperbound/1974/$2.95

## PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

### The Execution of Public Policy

Don T. Allensworth

Concise, yet comprehensive, this book—an introduction to public administration—covers all major aspects, including the full range of recent developments and current trends. Those familiar with other texts in the field will find greater emphasis here on the administration of public policy, contemporary bureaucratic behavior and the politics of administration. Organization charts, tables, graphs, diagrams, maps, drawings and chapter-end summaries are included.

213 pages/paperbound/1973/$3.95

**Lippincott**

J.B. Lippincott Company • Division of Higher Education
East Washington Square • Philadelphia, Pa. 19105

# introducing the MagaBack

## What is a **MagaBack?**

- an exciting new concept in education that combines the outstanding features of *magazines* and *paperbacks.*
- a supplementary teaching tool that combines the *magazine's* vast resource files and photos, its timeliness and dramatic visual impact with the *paperback's* scholarly authorship, lasting educational value, and proven pedagogical tools.

## What's in a **MagaBack?**

- a magazine-like "cover story" used as a focal point to zero in on a contemporary issue — human sexuality, drug abuse, changing family structure
- the scholarship of a leading teacher in the field
- the clear, lively style of a professional writer
- the most recent information available from TIME's vast news and research library
- photos and illustrations
- an annotated bibliography and a glossary of terms
- an instructor's insert with suggestions for classroom use

## How will I recognize a **MagaBack?**

- each MagaBack is 64 pages long, heavily illustrated, and the size of TIME magazine.

## How will I use the **MagaBacks?**

- as a fundamental approach to teaching concepts through specific social issues
- as an introduction to, or a supplement for,
  - American Government
  - Introduction to Political Science
  - American Institutions
  - The Presidency

## What are the Spring 1975 **MagaBacks?**

- *the James Q. Wilson American Government Series*
  Erwin Hargrove and Roy Hoopes
  — **The Presidency: A Question of Power**

## Who publishes **MagaBacks?**

**EDUCATIONAL ASSOCIATES** a new division of Little, Brown and Company
232 Commercial Street • Boston, Mass. 02109

**MAGABACKS:** A Little, Brown - TIME publication

# Call 800-854-3379* and let our computer do your next bibliography.

## Then you can do the real work.



Remember the last time you prepared a preliminary bibliography? Frankly we think you would have preferred to spend that time reading, thinking, and writing.

The next time you're doing research in history, sociology or political science try a better way—call NEXUS. Tell us either the topic or the author you need. Within 48 hours we'll send you a tailor-made bibliography of journal articles from our computer's data bank. Each citation will include the journal (535 of them!), the year (all the way back to 1834), the volume number, the page, author, and the article title. Selected from over 350,000 articles.

Imagine: 48 hours after you call, a complete bibliography is on the way, air mail COD. At only 10 cents a citation plus a $5 computer use fee (and, of course, applicable sales tax).

NEXUS. Save our toll-free number for your bibliographic needs.

*California residents call collect: 714-558-0715.

*Write for further details and order forms:*

**NEXUS**™

**A Baker & Taylor Information Service**
P.O. Box 1517, Attn: Dept. 615
Costa Mesa, California 92626

© W. R. Grace & Co. 1975

# Arabia Without Sultans

by FRED HALLIDAY. This comprehensive study of the Arabian peninsula and its relationship to the West provides essential understanding of the history of oil exploitation and of the curious mixture of colonialism, imperialism, capitalism and Marxism that exists in the region. Because of its decisive importance for the Gulf, a special chapter on Iran has been included. *A Vintage original.* $6.95

# Coping

**On the Practice of Government**

by DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN. Twenty-two essays on welfare, political reform, race relations, urban affairs, education, traffic safety, the President and the press, and more—written during the years Moynihan served Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. $4.95

## LOST CHANCE IN CHINA

**The World War II Despatches of John S. Service** edited by JOSEPH W. ESHERICK. "A historical source of prime and unique importance."—*Barbara Tuchman* $3.95

VINTAGE BOOKS
a division of Random House

Does the text you now use have...

An entire chapter devoted to CAMPAIGN FINANCE

An in-depth section on the uses of TECHNOLOGY in politics

The latest information available in book form, including 1974 ELECTION RESULTS

A substantative discussion of ALTERNATIVES to the two-party system

Two chapters devoted to STATE PARTY and LOCAL PARTY organization

A whole chapter on ETHNIC and CLASS voting

If you want to look at a book that does, write to Joan Greene on your letterhead for a copy of the

NEW

TRADITION & CHANGE IN AMERICAN PARTY POLITICS

Joyce Gelb & Marian Lief Palley

**CONTENTS**

1. Parties in Perspective
2. Politics and Participation in Contemporary Society
3. The New Political Technology: The Use and Effects of Polling and Public Relations
4. The Use and Effects of the Mass Media
5. Voting in America
6. The Changing Nature of Political Alignments
7. The Local Party: Styles of Political Activism
8. The State Party Connection
9. The Party as Organization
10. Campaign Finance
11. Parties and the Nominating Process
12. Parties and the Executive Branch
13. The Party as Policy Maker: Congress
14. Conclusion

tyc

THOMAS Y. CROWELL COMPANY ○ 666 Fifth Avenue ○ New York, New York 10019

# For New Perspectives on the American Political System—

## THE POLITICS OF POWER

### A Critical Introduction to American Government

**Ira Katznelson,** University of Chicago
**Mark Kesselman,** Columbia University

*The Politics of Power* introduces students to American government through an examination of the interplay between strategic power bases in American society and the practices of the political system. It discusses all the nation's political institutions and procedures—how they evolved, how they changed over the years, and what influences their functions today. The authors' perspective, however, is highly critical, reflecting their belief that corporate interests unduly influence the democratic process in America. Throughout the book, they carefully document the influence of the corporate sector on Congress, political parties, elections, the presidency, the executive branch, and the entire socioeconomic structure of America and argue that the persistent inequalities in American society result from the great disparity in power resources the elite and the electorate-at-large possess to define and defend their interests. They support their position with in-depth investigations of such vital areas as the development of multinational corporations and its effect on both the international and domestic scenes, the critical role played by government regulatory agencies in promoting rather than restricting the operations of giant corporations, the workings of the state welfare sector, the importance of mass media as an element of social control, the effect of education on the public's political orientation, and viable alternatives to capitalism.

**Paperbound. 528 pages**

## CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGERS:

### A Conservative View of America's Government

**M. Stanton Evans,** Senior Editor, *The Indianapolis News*

A spirited response to liberal critiques of American government, this book argues that liberalism in politics and public policy has either failed to achieve its own objectives or achieved completely counterproductive results. The author contends that the current brand of American liberalism endangers constitutional democracy because its major goal is the voiding of constitutional limits on the power of the federal government. He examines the erosion of constitutional tenets by liberal programs and shows how every major target of liberal legislation suffers—the economy, education, tax reform, wage scales, urban problems, health care, public transportation, and law enforcement. He outlines the resounding failures of liberalism in the broader institutional areas of national security and foreign policies, the presidency, Congress, and the courts, and concludes by offering conservative antidotes to liberal legislation along with an original argument for the restoration of nonregulated free enterprise.

**Paperbound. 304 pages (probable)**

**HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH, INC.**
New York · Chicago · San Francisco · Atlanta

FROM D.C. HEATH

## Just Published . . .

DIALECTICAL ECONOMICS:
AN INTRODUCTION TO MARXIST POLITICAL ECONOMY
Lyn Marcus, *National Caucus of Labor Committees*
March 1975 Cloth 544 pages

## Recent Publications . . .

THE TERMS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE
William E. Connolly, *University of Massachusetts—Amherst*
1974 Paper 216 pages

PERSPECTIVES ON THE PRESIDENCY:
A COLLECTION
Stanley Bach and George T. Sulzner, *both of the University of Massachusetts—Amherst*
1974 Paper 411 pages

## Also Available . . .

THE COLD WARRIORS:
A POLICY-MAKING ELITE
John C. Donovan, *Bowdoin College*
1974 Paper 294 pages

THE SOCIAL REALITY OF ETHNIC AMERICA
Rudolph Gomez, *The University of Texas—El Paso*
Clement Cottingham, Jr., *University of Pennsylvania*
Russell Endo, *The University of Colorado*
Kathleen Jackson, *The University of Washington—Seattle*
1974 Paper 412 pages

AMERICAN POLITICS:
POLICIES, POWER, AND CHANGE
SECOND EDITION
Kenneth M. Dolbeare, *University of Massachusetts—Amherst*
Murray J. Edelman, *University of Wisconsin*
1974 Paper 569 pages

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL THEORY
William E. Connolly and Glen Gordon, *both of the University of Massachusetts—Amherst*
1974 Paper 267 pages

For more details, call us toll free:
800-225-1388.
In Massachusetts call collect:
617-862-6650.

HEATH

ON THE CITY'S RIM:
POLITICS AND POLICY IN SUBURBIA
Frederick M. Wirt, *University of California—Berkeley*
Benjamin Walter, *Vanderbilt University*
Francine F. Rabinovitz, *University of California—Los Angeles*
Deborah R. Hensler, *University of California, Los Angeles*
1972 Paper 252 pages

REPORTERS AND OFFICIALS:
THE ORGANIZATION AND POLITICS OF NEWSMAKING
Leon V. Sigal, *Wesleyan University*
1973 Paper 221 pages

MODERN COMPETING IDEOLOGIES
L. Earl Shaw, *University of Minnesota*
1973 Paper 428 pages

A PREFACE TO POLITICS
David F. Schuman, *University of Washington*
1972 Paper 195 pages

From our Problems in American Civilization Series . . .

Harry S. Truman and the Fair Deal
Alonzo L. Hamby, *Ohio University*
1974 Paper 224 pages

RACE AND ETHNICITY IN MODERN AMERICA
Richard J. Meister, *University of Michigan—Flint*
1974 Paper 198 pages

THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR
SECOND EDITION
Thomas G. Paterson, *University of Connecticut*
1974 Paper 274 pages

D.C. Heath and Company, 125 Spring Street, Lexington, Massachusetts
02173
D.C. Heath Canada, Suite 1408, 100 Adelaide Street, W., Toronto,
Ontario M5H 1S9

FROM D.C. HEATH

HEATH

Recent Books
from
Harper & Row

**The second volume of**

**THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO**

***By Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn;*** translated by Thomas P. Whitney. Coming in May, this new narrative continues the author's best-selling epic and takes the zeks from their last transit prison to the hard-labor camps. $12.50 cloth; $1.95 paper

**THE PALACE GUARD**

***By Dan Rather and Gary Paul Gates.*** The most revealing look yet at how power was given, used, or taken over in the "inner circle" of the Nixon White House, written by two of the administration's most controversial and vocal media antagonists. "Marvelous insight . . . a galloping pace that exhilarates the reader." —*Robert Sherrill, San Francisco Examiner.* $8.95

**THE ULTRA SECRET**

***By F. W. Winterbotham.*** An insider's account of the top-secret Allied intelligence operation that broke and used the Germans' highest-level code throughout World War II. "As bizarre as anything in spy fiction . . . the book adds a new dimension to history."—N.Y. *Times* $8.95

## THE WORLD AND CHINA 1922-1972

***By John Gittings.*** An expert on modern China views the men and ideas that have shaped current Chinese foreign policy. From the Revolution into the 1970s he shows how China's analyses and strategies originated and developed. Maps, bibliography. $11.00

## THE NATION'S CITIES

### Change and Challenge

***By Patrick Healy III.*** Fifty years of unparalleled urban growth—and what the future may hold for city governments—covered in a full and timely report. "Hard to ignore . . . one hopes he will be heard in Washington."—*Kirkus Reviews.* Illustrated. $8.95

## ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY

***John A. Garraty, Editor; Jerome L. Sternstein, Associate Editor.*** Over 1,000 entries in this up-to-date, innovative, single-volume reference cover significant figures of American history, politics, and culture from Columbus to the present. The unique two-part entries consist of meticulously researched factual data and signed, interpretive essays by leading authorities. "First-rate."—*Publishers Weekly.* $22.50

## AGAINST THE LAW

### The Nixon Court and Criminal Justice

***By Leonard W. Levy.*** Nixon has resigned the Presidency, but his influence will last through many more, says the noted constitutional expert and Pulitzer Prize-winning historian. His forceful indictment is "one of the towering commentaries on constitutional law in the Seventies."—*Max Lerner.* $12.95

## HITLER'S LETTERS AND NOTES

***By Werner Maser.*** From private sources and archives, this first collection of the Nazi leader's letters and personal memoranda clearly shows how biographers have misinterpreted his thought and his goals. More than 40 illustrations, including facsimile reproductions. $12.50

## THE SUCCESSFUL MANAGER IN GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS

***By William R. Van Dersal.*** The author of *The Successful Supervisor,* who has trained thousands of managerial personnel, now sets forth the most productive ways of developing sound managerial skills and techniques in business and government offices. $6.95

At bookstores

*Harper & Row*
1817
*10 E. 53rd St., New York 10022*

Crofts Classics

## IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

**An excellent, quite inexpensive series. The modest prices and professional quality justify wide use as supplementary readings. 16 titles, all except one priced *under* one dollar!**

**The Communist Manifesto**
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
Edited by Samuel H. Beer
128 p. $.85

**On Liberty**
John Stuart Mill
Edited by Alburey Castell
128 p. $.85

**The Constitution of the United States and Related Documents**
Edited by Martin Shapiro
128 p. $.85

**The Nigger Question**
Thomas Carlyle
**The Negro Question**
John Stuart Mill
Edited by Eugene R. August
96 p. $.85 $3.95 (cloth)

**Selections from the Essays of Thomas Henry Huxley**
Edited by Alburey Castell
128 p. $.85

**Areopagitica** and **Of Education**
John Milton
Edited by George H. Sabine
128 p. $.85

**Political Writings of Viscount Bolingbroke**
Edited by Isaac Kramnick
112 p. $.85

**Political Writings of Percy Bysshe Shelley**
Edited by Roland A. Duerksen
256 p. $1.25

**The Prince**
Niccolò Machiavelli
Translated and edited by
Thomas G. Bergin
96 p. $.85

**Utopia**
Thomas More
Translated and edited by
H. V. S. Ogden
96 p. $.85

**Selections from The Federalist**
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay
Edited by Henry Steele Commager
160 p. $.85

**Selections from The Wealth of Nations**
Adam Smith
Edited by George J. Stigler
128 p. $.85

**Selected Writings of Henry David Thoreau**
Edited by Lewis Leary
160 p. $.95

**Five Essays on Man and Nature**
Ralph Waldo Emerson
Edited by Robert E. Spiller,
Professor Emeritus
128 p. $.95

**The Political Theory of T. H. Green: Selected Writings**
Edited by John R. Rodman
192 p. $.85

**Papal Thought on the State**
Edited by Gerald F. Yates
160 p. $.85

Write for complimentary examination copies for adoption consideration, or to order

**AHM PUBLISHING CORPORATION**
**1500 Skokie Blvd. • Northbrook, Illinois 60062**

# AMERICAN POLITICS
## quarterly

**Editor**

HARLAN HAHN
University of Southern California

**Associate Editor**
LARRY BERG
University of Southern California

**Book Review Editor**
CHARLES R. ADRIAN
University of California, Riverside

**Editorial Board**
ROBERT R. ALFORD
University of Wisconsin
MILTON C. CUMMINGS, Jr.
Johns Hopkins University
J. DAVID GREENSTONE
University of Chicago
HERBERT JACOB
Northwestern University
M. KENT JENNINGS
University of Michigan
RANDALL B. RIPLEY
Ohio State University
DEIL S. WRIGHT
University of North Carolina
BETTY ZISK
Boston University

**Editorial Advisory Board**
HEINZ EULAU
Stanford University
RICHARD F. FENNO
University of Rochester
FRED I. GREENSTEIN
Princeton University
MATTHEW HOLDEN, Jr.
University of Wisconsin
HAROLD D. LASSWELL
The Policy Sciences Center, New York
LEWIS LIPSITZ
University of North Carolina
THEODORE J. LOWI
Cornell University
DONALD R. MATTHEWS
The Brookings Institution
AUSTIN RANNEY
University of Wisconsin
IRA SHARKANSKY
University of Wisconsin
FRANK SORAUF
University of Minnesota
RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER
University of California, Berkeley

The purpose of AMERICAN POLITICS QUARTERLY is to promote the advancement of basic research in all areas of American government—including urban, state, and national politics. The journal will publish significant studies concerning political parties, public opinion, political theory, legislative behavior, the legal process, administrative organizations, intergovernmental relations, and related fields. Since there are no scholarly periodicals devoted exclusively to the study of American politics, the journal is designed to fill this gap, as well as to facilitate research on this subject. Comments and manuscripts from all social science disciplines are welcomed. By communicating information derived from original studies and from rigorous scientific inquiry, it is also hoped that AMERICAN POLITICS QUARTERLY will contribute to an improved understanding of the pressing social problems that confront the United States.

The Editors and Publisher of AMERICAN POLITICS QUARTERLY wish to acknowledge with gratitude the assistance and encouragement of the University of Southern California and its Graduate School in providing ancillary services and support for the journal.

**Frequency:** quarterly in January, April, July and October
**Yearly subscription rates:** U.S. & Canada $20.00 (institutions), $12.00 (individual professionals), $10.00 (students). Elsewhere $21.00/£ 8 (institutions), $13.00 / £ 5.40 (individual professionals and students).

SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC.
275 South Beverly Drive
Beverly Hills, California 90212

SAGE PUBLICATIONS LTD
St George's House / 44 Hatton Garden
London EC1N 8ER

# PUBLICATIONS of
# The AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

### The American Political Science Review

Quarterly journal of scholarly articles and book reviews in political science.
Included in APSA membership.
Back issues: $10.50 per copy; $25.00 per volume

### PS

Quarterly journal of Association news and articles of professional concern.
Included in APSA membership.
Back issues: $2.00 per copy; $5.00 per volume

### DEA NEWS for Teachers of Political Science

Newspaper on education and the curriculum.
Included in APSA membership for 1974

### Annual Meeting Program

Final program for APSA Annual Meeting
Included in Annual Meeting Registration
Extra copies: $.50

### APSA Annual Meeting Papers*

Hard copies, $3.00 each

### APSA Annual Meeting Proceedings*

Microfilm reels of all papers, 1901-1912; 1956-present.
$22.00 per reel

### Cumulative Index to the American Political Science Review*

1906-1968, $6.50

### Cumulative Index to the Proceedings of the Annual Meetings*

Key word index to all papers included in proceedings of Annual Meetings for 1904-1912; 1956-1970: $18.50

*ORDER FORM for Publications:
Please send me the following publication:

______________________________

______________________________

______________________________

I am enclosing a check for $ ____________

______________________________
Name
______________________________

______________________________

Send order form to:

Customer Service Department
University Microfilms
313 North First Street
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

### Political Science Thesaurus

A major reference tool in political science; this volume represents the terminology control device for a computer-based information retrieval service.
Individuals: Hardback: $20.00;
Paper $15.00
Institutions: Hardback: $30.00;
Paper $25.00

### APSA Biographical Directory

Biographical information on over 7,000 Association members, plus names and addresses for approximately 12,500 members.
Members: Hardback: $7.50; Paper: $5.00
Non-Mem: Hardback: $12.50;
Paper: $10.00

### APSA Directory of Members: Annual Supplement to the APSA Biographical Directory

Names and current addresses of all APSA members.
$3.00 each

### Roster of Women in Political Science (3rd ed)

Biographical information on women political scientists.
$2.50 each

### Annual APSA Directory of Department Chairpersons

Names and addresses of Chairpersons of departments offering political science at four-year institutions.
$20.00 each

### Annual APSA Roster of Graduate Study Directors

Names and addresses of graduate study directors at the Ph.D. producing institutions.
$1.00 each

### Annual APSA Roster of Placement Directors

Names and addresses of placement directors at Ph.D. producing institutions.
$1.00 each

# From APSA: JOURNALS, PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, EDUCATION and PUBLIC AFFAIRS

**Personnel Service Guidelines For Employers and Applicants**

Pamphlet containing information and guidelines for members of the APSA Personnel Service and for employers listing their vacancies in the Personnel Service Newsletter.

No Charge

**Personnel Service Newsletter**

Monthly listing of positions for political scientists.

APSA Members: $8.00 subscription

**Careers and the Study of Political Science: A Guide for Undergraduates**

A monograph discussing the relationship between political science knowledge and skills and careers in law, government, business, journalism, teaching, etc.

$.50 each; bulk rates available

**Guide to Graduate Study in Political Science**

Compilation of Ph.D. and Masters programs in political science

$3.00 each

**Sources of Financial Support for Political Scientists: Research Education, Professional Development Bulletin 1: Support for Professional Development: Fellowhips and Traineeships**

Information on post-doctoral fellowships, internship programs, special training support and foreign travel grants available to faculty and advanced graduate students.

$1.00 each

**Global Dimensions in U.S. Education**

(A joint publication of the APSA Committee on Pre-Collegiate Education, the Education Commission of the International Studies Association, and the Center for War/Peace Studies of the N.Y. Friends Group, Inc.).

Four publications:
- The Elementary School
- The Secondary School
- The University
- The Community

$1.50 each
$5.00 per set

**Comparing Political Experiences**

Complete description of an alternative course for high school government instruction.

$2.75 each

**Legislative Service Project Manuals**

Individual manuals available for: California, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island.

$2.50 each; $3.00 for California

**Political Science and State and Local Government**

A volume on the current and future state of research and educational programs in the field of State and Local Government.

$3.75 each

APSA MEMBERSHIP MAILING LISTS AND LABELS

For information and price list, contact Ms. Chris Hill, APSA

APSA POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS MAILING LABELS

For information and price list, contact Ms. Rona B. Hitlin, APSA

Please send me the following publications, indicate title, and enclose check for total amount.

________________________________________

________________________________________

________________________________________

Please send me information and a price list for mailing labels:

☐ APSA Membership List ☐ APSA Department Chairpersons

Name ________________________________

Address ______________________________

City ________________ State __________ Zip ________

Send Order Form to:

American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

The University of MINNESOTA Press

**THE MYTHICAL WORLD OF NAZI WAR PROPAGANDA, 1939-1944**
**Jay W. Baird**
Based in part on captured German archives and on interviews with leading figures in Goebbels's propaganda corps, this revealing account presents the theory that the content and handling of Nazi ideology and propaganda were based on a mystical, irrational body of doctrine. 13 illus. $15.00

**MAINSPRINGS OF INDIAN AND PAKISTANI FOREIGN POLICIES**
**S.M. Burke**
A South Asian specialist parallels Indian and Pakistani foreign policies, the first time these vast subjects have been coordinated in one volume. Burke clarifies the ways in which the past still shapes the present by devoting equal attention to the periods before and after independence. $13.50

**INTERNATIONAL POLITICS:** *Foundations of the System*
**Werner Levi**
A political scientist analyzes international politics, integrating broad sociological and psychological concepts with political and economic information. On the basis of his interdisciplinary approach, Levi postulates the nature of international society in the future. $11.00

**HITLER AND HIS GENERALS:** *The Hidden Crisis, January-June 1938*
**Harold C. Deutsch**
"An historian's fascinating reconstruction of Hitler's capture of unchallenged power over the Army by virtue of his purge of two powerful potential opponents [Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg and Colonel General Baron Werner von Fritsch] . . . Based on new evidence."—*Foreign Affairs*. 17 illus. $15.00

The University of MINNESOTA Press
Minneapolis 55455

# *CHANGING YOUR ADDRESS?*

**If you are planning a move, please fill in the form below and return it to the American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Address changes should be received at the Association by the 5th of the month to be included in the monthly update of the Association mailing list.**

Name ______________________

| | |
|---|---|
| OLD ADDRESS ______________ | NEW ADDRESS ______________ |
| __________________________ | __________________________ |
| __________________________ | __________________________ |
| __________ (Zip) __________ | __________ (Zip) __________ |

---

# Registry of Retired Professors

The Association has established a Registry of Retired Professors. The Registry serves as an information exchange for those retired professors who are willing to teach one or more courses on a one-semester or one-year basis, and those institutions desiring to make such appointments. Any retired professor wishing to be listed in the Registry should contact the Association to receive an application form. Departmental chairmen wishing to inquire about the availability of retired professors in a certain specialty or geographic area should write specifying their requirements.

Director, Registry of Retired Professors
American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

**NEW PATTERNS IN AMERICAN POLITICS**
Edited by Thomas Reilly, Trinity College and
Michael Sigall, Wagner College

Designed for introductory courses in American government and politics, NEW PATTERNS IN AMERICAN POLITICS contains six substantial excerpts from recent writings that examine one or more aspects of the continuing evolution of our political system.

**Paperback Text Edition: April, 1975 216 pp. ca. $3.95**
Cloth Edition for Libraries: April, 1975 216 pp. ca. $10.00

**WATERGATE AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS**
Edited by Ronald E. Pynn,
University of North Dakota

The readings here look beyond the specifics of the Watergate scandal to its implications for American politics, both its impact on the existing system and the changes it may provoke.

**Paperback Text Edition: April, 1975 288 pp. $3.95**
Cloth Edition for Libraries: April, 1975 288 pp. ca. $10.00

**CONGRESS IN CHANGE**
Evolution and Reform Edited by Norman J. Ornstein,
The Catholic University of America

The incisive selections in this reader consider all aspects of Congress in terms of its potential for improvement: its structure and internal operations, the leadership roles of party leaders, the norms of behavior for members, and Congress' relations with the executive branch.

**Paperback Text Edition: 1975 320 pp. ca. $4.95**
Cloth Edition for Libraries: 1975 320 pp. ca. $11.50

**THE PRESIDENCY REAPPRAISED**
Edited by Rexford G. Tugwell
and Thomas E. Cronin,
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions

In this timely new collection, several leading presidential scholars address themselves to the central issues now surrounding the presidency and set forth proposals for reforming and revitalizing the office.

**Paperback Text Edition: 1974 324 pp. $3.95**
Cloth Edition for Libraries: 1974 324 pp. $8.95

**INSIDE THE SYSTEM**
A Washington Monthly Book
Second Edition
Edited by Charles Peters and John Rothchild

The writers of ***The Washington Monthly,*** in displaying their unusual talent for getting under the skin of American politics, reveal how the principles of American government are often lost when politicians and bureaucrats attempt to put them into practice.

**Paperback Text Edition: 1973 368 pp. $3.95**
Cloth Edition for Libraries: 1973 368 pp. $8.95

**Praeger**
**College Department**
111 Fourth Avenue
New York, New York 10003

**GAMES NATIONS PLAY**
Analyzing International Politics
Second Edition
John Spanier, University of Florida

In this second edition of a widely used text, John Spanier provides the conceptual tools undergraduate students need to analyze international politics for themselves. He explains in clear, straightforward prose, useful methods of analyzing foreign policy on three different levels—that of the international state system, the nation, and the decision-maker.

**Paperback Text Edition: April, 1975 528 pp. ca. $8.95**
Cloth Edition for Libraries: April, 1975 ca. 528 pp. ca. $15.00

**ANALYZING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**
A Multi-Method Introduction
Edited by William D. Coplin, Syracuse University and Charles W. Kegley, University of South Carolina

This new reader provides students of international politics with both a substantive and a methodological overview of the field.

**Paperback Text Edition: April, 1975 ca. 352 pp. ca. $6.95**
Cloth Edition for Libraries: April, 1975 ca. 352 pp. ca. $12.00

**INDIA**
A World in Transition
Fourth Edition
Beatrice Pitney Lamb

This widely acclaimed introduction to modern India has been updated to mid-1974, making it the most current and insightful study of the politics, society, and economy of this complex giant.

**Paperback Text Edition: 1975 448 pp. $5.95**
Cloth Edition for Libraries: 1975 448 pp. $11.50

**SOUTHEAST ASIA**
A Political Introduction
Richard Butwell, State University of New York, Fredonia

A short but solid introduction to Southeast Asian government and politics. Countries included are: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines.

**Paperback Text Edition: 1975 252 pp. $4.95**
Cloth Edition for Libraries: 1975 252 pp. $10.00

**THE UNITED STATES AGAINST THE THIRD WORLD**
Antinationalism and Intervention
Melvin Gurtov, University of California, Riverside

This book traces the methods and motives of American foreign policy toward the Third World since 1945. Examining fifteen cases of intervention, Gurtov marshals convincing evidence to indict the United States for a short-sighted, essentially imperial foreign policy that thwarts two major and related forces—nationalism and radical change for modernization.

**Paperback Text Edition: 1974 272 pp. $3.95**
Cloth Edition for Libraries: 1974 272 pp. $9.50

**PUBLIC POLICY-MAKING**
James E. Anderson, University of Houston

Provides a clear, complete framework for understanding the workings of the American policy-making process.

**Paperback Text Edition: 1975 192 pp. $3.95**
Cloth Edition for Libraries: 1975 192 pp. $8.50

**POLITICAL CULTURE**
Walter A. Rosenbaum, University of Florida

This concise yet comprehensive study defines the development of the concept of political culture, considers it in terms of both mass and individual orientations, and discusses the methods by whch political scientists determine the elements of any political culture.

**Paperback Text Edition:**
**April, 1975 ca. 176 pp. ca. $3.95**
Cloth Edition for Libraries:
April, 1975 ca. 176 pp. ca. $8.50

Clothbound editions of the books described in this ad are available for purchase by your college library.

**Praeger**
**College Department**
111 Fourth Avenue
New York, New York 10003

# LOW COST GROUP INSURANCE AVAILABLE TO APSA MEMBERS

## APSA INSURANCE PLANS

**Group Life Insurance**

- $15,000 protection with gradual reductions after age 50.
- Optional Dependent Life Coverage.

**Accidental Death and Specific Loss**

- Worldwide Coverage.
- Permanent Total Disability Benefits.

**Hospital Cash Plan**

- $20 or $40 each and every day hospitalized.
- Payable for up to 365 days for each period of hospital confinement.
- Benefits begin with the first day of hospitalization.
- Daily benefits are doubled if you are hospitalized for cancer.

For further information write to:

**Director, Insurance Programs**
**The American Political Science Association**
**1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.**
**Washington, D. C. 20036**

# Some of our best books are about Power and Money

These Wiley-Interscience books probe the role of power, money, and other vital factors in our political and social processes. And their interdisciplinary approaches contribute to an integrated overview of your field.

**1. THE UNEQUAL ELITES**

By Robert P. Althauser, Indiana University, and the late Sydney S. Spivack, Princeton University in collaboration with Beverly M. Amsel, Mt. Sinai School of Medicine

Is higher education the royal road to racial equality? In answer, this book offers the first "matched pair" study exploring the differential impact of college on later income levels of black and white graduates.

1975 Approx. 224 pages $12.50

**2. HUMAN ACTIVITY PATTERNS IN THE CITY:**
*Things People Do in Time and in Space*

By F. Stuart Chapin, Jr.,
University of North Carolina

Analyzing how city residents spend their time can help urban planners determine how to spend public money. Chapin links social and spatial structure and approaches the study of human activity in the urban community with a strong concern for policy-making applications.

1974 272 pages $12.50

**3. SOCIAL INDICATORS AND SOCIAL THEORY:**
*Elements of an Operational System*

By Karl A. Fox, Iowa State University

A unique synthesis of social theory with empirical models and data. Multidisciplinary in scope, this work provides solid intellectual bridges between economic analysis and other key social science fields.

1974 328 pages $14.95

**4. MATHEMATICAL METHODS IN THE SOCIAL AND MANAGERIAL SCIENCES**

By Patrick Hayes, Carnegie-Mellon University

An unusually accessible book applying quantitative techniques to problems in the social and managerial sciences. This is a valuable aid for developing facility in interpreting mathematical results. Special emphasis on geometric programming.

1975 Approx. 512 pages $19.95

**5. POLITICS AND SOCIAL EQUALITY:**
*A Comparative Analysis*

By Robert W. Jackman,
Michigan State University

Why are some countries more egalitarian than others? Jackman addresses the question with a comparative analysis of the impact of politics on social equality.

1975 225 pages $14.95

**6. WOMEN IN POLITICS**

Edited by Jane S. Jaquette, Occidental College

A selection of articles that comprises a long-overdue analysis of female participation in politics and consequent implications for the way the political system functions. America is compared with other cultures, examining whether ideology can change traditional treatment of women.

1974 367 pages $14.95

**7. MAYORS IN ACTION:**
*5 Approaches to Urban Governance*

By John P. Kotter and Paul R. Lawrence,
Harvard University

An interdisciplinary study identifying five distinctly different approaches to the job of mayor. Explores the impact mayors and their administrations have on the cities they govern.

Sept. 1974 287 pages $14.50

**8. LEADERSHIP AND POWER IN THE BOS-WASH MEGALOPOLIS:**
*Environment, Ecology, and Urban Organization*

Delbert C. Miller, Indiana University,
Bloomington, Ind.

An examination of power, leadership, and socio-political coalitions and how they promote or inhibit social objectives—especially the solving of environmental problems—in the region between Boston and Washington.

1975 Approx. 424 pages $19.95

**9. MAX WEBER:** *A Biography*

By Marianne Weber
Translated from the German and edited by
Harry Zohn, Brandeis University

The first English language translation of a classic biography of one of the giants and founders of contemporary sociology. This is an indispensable reference for all students of Max Weber's thought, written by his wife.

In press Approx. 1056 pages $18.50 (tent.)

**WILEY-INTERSCIENCE**
Post Office Box 4569, Dept. 520
Grand Central Station, New York, N.Y. 10017

Gentlemen: Please send me the book(s) I have checked below to read and use free for 10 days. At the end of that time, if I am satisfied with my order, I will send you the amount indicated for each book received plus postage and packing. Otherwise, I will return the book(s) and owe nothing.

Books now available are:
1. ☐ 1-02524-0
2. ☐ 1-14563-7
3. ☐ 1-27060-1
4. ☐ 1-36490-8
5. ☐ 1-43128-1
6. ☐ 1-44022-1
7. ☐ 1-50540-4
8. ☐ 1-60519-0

☐ Please send a list of local bookstores carrying your titles.

Name________________________

Company________________________

Your Position________________________

Address________________________

City____________State________Zip________

Prices subject to change without notice. A4895-WI

Post Office Box 4569, Dept. 521

**JEFFERSON'S LOUISIANA**

*Politics and the Clash of Legal Traditions*

**George Dargo**

The acquisition of Louisiana in 1803 brought the new American nation into contact with the largely French population of the lower Mississippi basin. Thomas Jefferson, reflecting contemporary American opinion, did not believe that the United States could incorporate Lower Louisiana into the Union as an independent state until the very character of the people and the institutional foundation of their culture had been thoroughly Americanized. The pivotal issue that came to symbolize this conflict was the struggle between Louisiana civil law and Anglo-American common law.

Which system of law would prevail in a distant and strategically vulnerable territory of the United States? Mr. Dargo shows how this important question was partially resolved by events outside the strict confines of legal controversy. The book attempts to reconnect legal history and general history, for its major contention is that the Louisiana Digest of 1808 was as much a political effort to forestall wholesale cultural transformation as it was a decision responsive to legal problems. $15.00

**HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS** *79 GARDEN ST., CAMBRIDGE, MA. 02138*

## GRANTS FOR ASIAN POLITICAL SCIENTISTS

The American Political Science Association again has received from The Asia Foundation a small grant for encouraging closer relations between Asian and American political scientists. The funds will be used in three ways:

1) To enable Asian political scientists to become members of The American Political Science Association for a one-year period. Membership includes subscription to *The American Political Science Review* and *PS*. To be eligible, applicants must (currently) reside in one of the Asian countries listed below.

2) To enable libraries, university departments, and research institutes in Asia, who have heretofore been unable to do so, to subscribe to *The American Political Science Review* and *PS*.

3) To supplement travel expenses (maximum $100) of Asian political scientists who are temporarily in the United States and who wish to attend meetings of The American Political Science Association. The next meeting will be held September 2 through September 5, 1975, at the San Francisco Hilton Hotel, California.

Applicants must be at least at the graduate student level and may come from any of the following Asian countries: Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Ryukyus, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Applicants who have not previously received grants will be given first consideration. Application Deadline: July 25.

Application forms may be obtained from The American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

---

## THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

### PERSONNEL SERVICE

The American Political Science Association's Personnel Service operates as a clearinghouse, bringing together political scientists seeking positions and prospective employers. Registration in the service is open to members of the Association and to Political Science Departments. Membership in the Service, which includes a subscription to the monthly Newsletter (except September), is $8.00 per year. Membership in the Credential Referral Service of the Personnel Service is an additional $8.00. The dues into Personnel Service cover one academic year—from October to August.

### NEWSLETTER

A Newsletter, listing openings for political scientists including teaching, administrative and research openings, is mailed monthly to all Personnel Service members. Positions are listed by institution with a brief description of each opening.

### CREDENTIAL REFERRAL SERVICE

A file will be maintained at the Association office for all members of the Credential Referral Service. This file will include a resume, a dissertation abstract and/or a list of publications and up to three letters of reference for each member. Referrals are made upon the request of a member or of an institution.

### EMPLOYERS USING THE SERVICE

The Association's Council has adopted a policy that it is a professional obligation of all political science departments to list publicly all vacancies in the APSA Personnel Service Newsletter for which they are recruiting at the Instructor, Assistant and Associate Professor levels. In addition, the listing of openings at the Full Professor level is strongly encouraged. There is no cost to the institution listing its vacancies with the Service. Forms for listing openings in the Newsletter are available from the Personnel Service.

For further information concerning the Personnel Service, write to:

Director, Personnel Service
The American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Coming spring 1975
in a NEW third edition!


IRA SHARKANSKY

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

POLICY-MAKING IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Third Edition

**PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: Policy-Making in Government Agencies,**
THIRD EDITION
**Ira Sharkansky**
University of Wisconsin

Professor Sharkansky's standard text on public administration has been extensively revised to include treatment of important new developments in government and research as it discusses new administrative and policy issues in contemporary politics. Still the only text in its field to use the systems framework of political science to study public administration, the third edition has expanded its comparisons between different national systems and has added a new section comparing administration systems in less developed states in the U.S./c. 400 Pages Cloth

Rand McNally College Publishing Company

Box 7600/Chicago, Illinois 60680

# New Publications in Government and Politics

## AMERICAN GOVERNMENT THROUGH SCIENCE FICTION

Edited by
**Joseph D. Olander,** Florida International University
**Martin H. Greenberg,** Florida International University
**Patricia Warrick,** University of Wisconsin

This innovative introductory text uses the imaginative medium of science fiction to describe, explain, and evaluate today's American government and politics. Using 18 stories to translate political abstractions into practical situations to which students can relate, the editors raise fundamental political questions and vividly illustrate concepts through a uniquely stimulating yet analytically serious method.

*360 Pages Paperback*

## PATTERNS OF RECRUITMENT: A State Chooses Its Lawmakers

**Lester G. Seligman,** University of Illinois
**Michael R. King,** Pennsylvania State University
**Chong Lim Kim,** University of Iowa
**Roland E. Smith,** Texas Tech University

The authors of this new text have selected the specific case of the selection of Oregon State legislators to present an original model of political recruitment. It is the first study of recruitment to analyze the social, psychological, and economic effects on both the winners and the losers of an election and to identify the risks as well as the opportunities of running for office.

*260 Pages Paperback and Cloth*

## PUBLIC OPINION IN AMERICA: 1936-1970

**Rita James Simon,** University of Illinois

By incorporating national survey data, this new text presents a profile of American public opinion from the worst economic depression in the country's history through the civil disorders of the 1960's. It analyzes American's feelings on a variety of important and controversial issues in domestic and foreign affairs and limits itself only to the period for which national surveys are available.

*231 Pages Paperback*

Rand McNally College Publishing Company
Box 7600/Chicago Illinois 60680

# PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC POLICY-MAKING

Edited by

WILLIAM B. GWYN & GEORGE C. EDWARDS, III

A collection of essays illustrating the variety of approaches and methods currently employed in public policy research. A number of significant aspects of public policy-making are examined.

## CONTENTS

Ira Sharkansky, *Economic Development in the Policy-Making Process: Why We Should View the United States As a Developing Country*

Richard I. Hofferbert, *Social Change, Intergovernmental Relations, and Education Finance in the Swiss and American Federations*

Douglas D. Rose, *Citizen Preference and Public Policy in the American States: A Causal Analysis of Nondemocracy*

William B. Gwyn, *'Justice' and the Ombudsman: A Case Study of Policy Formulation Within a Non-Coercive Public Interest Group*

Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Michael Parkinson, *Equalizing Educational Opportunity in Britain and the United States: The Politics of Implementation*

George C. Edwards, III and Ira Sharkansky, *Executive and Legislative Budgeting: Decision Routines for Agency Totals and Individual Programs in Two States*

Robert D. Putnam, *Bureaucrats and Politicians: Contending Elites in the Policy Process*

Thomas R. Dye, *Obstacles to Scientific Policy Analysis: Three Case Studies in Policy Impact Research*

Charles W. Anderson, *System and Strategy in Comparative Policy Analysis: A Plea for Contextual and Experimental Knowledge*

Approx. 280 pages Cloth, $9.00; paper, $5.00

TULANE STUDIES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE No. 15
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
TULANE UNIVERSITY
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA 70118

TIAA
CREF

# The Best Deal on Life Insurance, by Far, is TIAA

Independent consumer studies continue to confirm that TIAA life insurance costs substantially less than policies sold through life insurance companies that serve the general public.

These days, when it's more important than ever to squeeze the most from every dollar, it makes more sense than ever for college employees and other eligible persons to look to TIAA for the new life insurance they need. By the way, TIAA policies include the unique "Cost of Living" provision to help prevent inflation from nibbling away the purchasing power of the death protection.

While TIAA offers plans to meet different situations, and a free advisory service to help select the right plan, most educators with TIAA policies prefer Term insurance because with Term they can easily afford to carry the high level of family protection they need. For example: **$100,000 of decreasing Term insurance costs only $184 at age 30.**

**Here are illustrative cost figures for different ages:**
**$100,000 20-Year Home Protection Policy**

| Age at Issue | 25 | **30** | 35 | 40 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Premium (Payable only 16 years) | $268 | **$318** | $413 | $580 |
| Cash Dividend End of First Year* | 123 | **134** | 154 | 192 |
| First Year Net Premium | $145 | **$184** | $259 | $388 |

*Based upon the current dividend scale, not guaranteed.

This Home Protection policy is level premium Term insurance that gives its highest amount of protection initially, reducing by schedule over a 20 year period to recognize decreasing insurance needs. Home Protection policies are available for several other insurance periods in amounts of $5,000 or more and are issued at ages under 56.

ELIGIBILITY to apply for TIAA policies is limited to employees of colleges, universities, and certain other nonprofit educational institutions that qualify for TIAA. If you are eligible, complete and send the coupon so we can mail the Life Insurance Guide and a personal illustration of TIAA policies issued at your age. TIAA is nonprofit and employs no agents.

**Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association**
***College Retirement Equities Fund***
730 Third Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10017

**Please mail the Life Insurance Guide and a personal illustration.**

Name Your Date of Birth

Address Street

City State Zip

Dependents' Ages

Nonprofit Employer
(college, university or other educational or scientific institution)

AG

## from Brookings

### • • • • NEW FOR 1975 • • • •

**MONITORING REVENUE SHARING**
Richard P. Nathan, Allen D. Manvel, Susannah E. Calkins and Associates
1975 394 pages $4.95 pa. $11.50 cl.

**DISPERSING POPULATION: WHAT AMERICA CAN LEARN FROM EUROPE**
James L. Sundquist
1975 c. 256 pages $3.50 pa. $8.95 cl.

**POLLUTION, PRICES, AND PUBLIC POLICY**
Allen V. Kneese and Charles L. Schultze
1975 125 pages $2.95 pa. $6.95 cl.

**SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BUSINESS PREDICAMENT**
James W. McKie, Editor
1975 361 pages $4.95 pa. $12.50 cl.

**EAST ASIA AND U.S. SECURITY**
Ralph N. Clough
1975 248 pages $3.50 pa. $8.95 cl.

### • • • • • ADDITIONAL • • • • • BOOKS OF INTEREST

**THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN: THE LEADERSHIP SELECTION PROCESS AFTER WATERGATE**
An essay by Stephen Hess
1974 121 pages $2.50

**THIRD PARTIES IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS**
Daniel A. Mazmanian
1974 163 pages $2.95 pa. $5.95 cl.

**BETWEEN STATE AND NATION: REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES**
Martha Derthick with the assistance of Gary Bombardier
1974 242 pages $2.95 pa. $7.95 cl.

**DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM: ALIGNMENT AND REALIGNMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES**
James L. Sundquist
1973 388 pages $4.50 pa. $9.95 cl.

### • • And in FOREIGN POLICY • •

**NEW FORCES IN WORLD POLITICS**
Seyom Brown
1974 224 pages $2.95 pa. $7.95 cl.

**BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY**
Morton H. Halperin with the assistance of Priscilla Clapp and Arnold Kanter
1974 340 pages $3.95 pa. $8.95 cl.

**UNCERTAIN PASSAGE: CHINA'S TRANSITION TO THE POST-MAO ERA**
A. Doak Barnett
1974 387 pages $3.95 pa. $9.95 cl.

**U.S. FORCE STRUCTURE IN NATO: AN ALTERNATIVE**
Richard D. Lawrence and Jeffrey Record
1974 136 pages $2.50

**U.S. TACTICAL AIR POWER: MISSIONS, FORCES, AND COSTS**
William D. White
1974 121 pages $2.50

**U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES**
Jeffrey Record with the assistance of Thomas I. Anderson
1974 70 pages $2.50

*The Brookings Institution*
1775 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036